ALBINUS' METAPHYSICS AN ATTEMPT AT REHABILITATION

BY

J. H. LOENEN

I. THE INNER CONSISTENCY AND THE ORIGINAL CHARACTER OF

ALBINUS' INTERPRETATION OF PLATO

R. E. Witt's book, published in 1937 and still the most recen

general work on this subject, claims to be the first "exhaustive

examination of the Didaskalikos itself" 1). It is, however, mainly- concerned with an investigation into the sources of Albinus'

work and with a comparison of his doctrine with those of earlier

Platonists and that of Plotinus, but it does not include a syste- matical examination of the inner coherence of Albinus' inter-

pretation of Plato. Now it is very remarkable that Witt repeatedly

reproaches Albinus that his Platonism is full of contradictions and

logical inconsistencies (p. i 20 ; 128; 133-4; 135). In its most general formulation this criticism charges Albinus with the fundamental

mistake of combining an Aristotelian theology with a literal inter-

pretation of the Timaests (p. 135). This opinion may even be said

to be the current vieiv 2). Such a fundamental criticism in fact

implies that Albinus is unworthy of the name of a philosopher. Yet one asks oneself first of all how on earth Albinus could possibly be reckoned in later antiquity among the coryphaei of Platonism 3). Would the intellectual capacities of Albinus himself and moreover

of those of the principal thinkers of the subsequent centuries who

judged favourably about him, rank so far below those of modern

historians of philosophy? A very flattering thought to be sure!

At any rate Albinus himself did consider his interpretation of Plato

to be consistent, a fact which even Witt acknowledges 4). Yet I

1) R. E. Witt, Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, Cambridge 1937.

2) Cf. F. Sassen, Geschiedenis v. d. Wiisbegeerte der Grieken en Romeinen, (Antwerpen-Nijmegen, 1949), 157 and Ueberweg-Praechter, 542.

3) Ample evidence for this statement may be found in P. Louis, Albinos Épitomé (Paris 1945), p. XIII. Epitome is the title of the best manuscripts and is therefore to be preferred to the usual name Didaskalikos.

4) "To Albinus there must have appeared to be no inconsistency" (p. 120). "Yet it would seem that Albinus himself was not aware of these difficulties" (134; cf. 142).

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cannot help getting the impression that Witt has not made any real attempt to see Albinus' doctrine from the historian's primary

point of view, viz. from the immanent one, which tries to under-

stand a system from its central point. Or to put it in another way: an intelligent and patient study of the work itself must precede an

examination of the sources and further scientific research. Moreover, Witt gives the impression of judging Albinus from a systematical

point of view which is that of Plotinus' philosophy 1). All these reflections have induced me to try to understand Albinus from within. It is therefore not my intention to discuss the historical exactness of the interpretation which Albinus gives of Plato, but

only to examine its inner consistency. Because the fundamental

criticism of Albinus touches the principal points of the theological part of his doctrine only, and particularly the relation of the

transcendent God to the world, this inquiry will not go beyond these limits. The great problems of the interpretation of Plato have their central point in the relations between God, the Ideas, the worldsoul and the world-nous. This holds good with regard to Albinus as well as to Plotinus and all modem interpreters.

The method of this inquiry is obvious. First I will make an

attempt to show that the current criticism cannot be justified and

that the above-mentioned difficulties and contradictions do not exist. After that I shall try to arrive at a deeper understanding of the logical connexion between his fundamental statements and to

show the original character of Albinus' interpretation of Plato.

In a second part I shall discuss the sources of his interpretation. But it will perhaps be useful to survey beforehand Albinus' con-

ception of the transcendent God, as far as there is no difference in

opinion between scholars, that is to say, letting apart some aspects which touch his relation to the world.

1) "Yet nowhere (sc. in Middle Platonism) is there found a coherent system, in which the relation between God and the universe is adequately explained ... the doctrine of the Plotinian One has not yet been formu- lated... Moreover, as we may see in the Didaskalikos X, the orthodox Platonists of the second century, whatever refinements they introduce into their conception of God, are unable to get rid of the belief in his per- sonality" (123-4). The impersonal Plotinian God is undoubtedly used here as one standard for judging the adequateness and coherence of Albinus' interpretation.

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Albinus undoubtedly regarded Plato's God as a principle trans-

cending the world and as an intellect (vo5q). At first he simply designates him as 6EOS (or o and vo5q (IX, p. 51 ff.) 1) After-

wards, however, when the soul and the nous of the cosmos have

been introduced, he is indicated as (6) 6EÓe; or (o) vo5q (X 2, p. 57 ff.), to avoid confusion evidently. The ideas are

his eternal, perfect, and immutable thoughts (IX 1. 2. 3, p. 51 -53 ) . On the other hand he is almost ineffable ([LLxpo5 8ew XI

p. 55; cf. X 4, p. 59) : he does not have any qualities (ol<e

yet he is not altogether without any qualities either (ours &7rotoq); he is neither part nor whole, neither different from, nor identical

with, other things; he does not move and is not moved either.

Nevertheless he can be known, not only by means of this via ne-

gationis (xaTOC M'cpoc'tpecrLv), but also by means of the via analogiae

(xaT« «vaaoyiav : Plato's comparison of the good to the sun in

508 a, b) and by means of the via eminentiae (this term is lacking: the ascent to beauty itself in the Symp. 210 a-d) (X 4-6, p. 59-61 ) .

Several other predicates, in addition to that of his being an

intellect, are attributed to him: he is eternal, ineffable, perfect; essence, divinity, truth, symmetry and the good (X 3, p. 57). With regard to his relation to the world the statement that he is

father because he is the cause of everything, must suffice here

(X 3, p. 59, 1. 2-3). This causality, however, has evidently to be

taken in the Aristotelian sense: £vepyei 8e a t 2). For Albinus'

transcendent God is indeed an Aristotelian vovq possessing the qualities of Plato's ideas of the Good and the Beautiful.

The alleged inconsistencies

I shall try to arrange Witt's objections systematically and as

concisely as possible, c. q. explain them more in detail if necessary.

Firstly Witt reproaches him (p. 120) that though in his view

the world did not come into existence in the course of time, yet, in a

i ) The Epitome is quoted according to chapters, sections, and pages of the edition of Louis.

2) Albinus uses here even the Aristotelian formula w5 To opExTOV xwci 6pciw &.X(\I1)TO\l Ú1teXPXO\l (X 2, p. 57, ll. 5-8), while he says further. that the worldsoul strives after God's thoughts XIV 3, p. 81).

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literal interpretation of the Timaeus, he maintains that matter was moving chaotically 1tpO oùpocvou Yev€a?WS (XII 2, p. 69), whereas on the other hand he makes the statement eXd sv yev£aei E6TL (XIV 3. p. 81, 1. 3). Secondly Witt stresses the fact that

Albinus ascribes to his vo5q two causal functions which

cannot be combined. On the one side he is the final cause of the

world as the principle of its movement. On the other side one has to

conclude from the literal interpretation of the Timaeus (c. XI-XII :

here god has the function of the Demiurge of the Timaezcs) that he is

at the same time the efficient cause of the world-process. Moreover,

ac;ording to Witt, the relation of matter to God remains completely in the dark (p. 133-4). The reader will undoubtedly perceive that

there is a logical connexion between these two points of criticism. For what the question comes to is that a literal interpretation of

the Timaeus brings Albinus into conflict with a) his own thesis

about the eternity of the world and b) with the essence of God,

being a vo5q and a final cause. The two contradictions

therefore concern the relation of God to the world and are the

consequence of a literal interpretation of the Timaeus. The third important point is more particularly connected with

the relation of God as volq to the lower nous (which is

subordinated to him) and the world-soul. This relation is obscure,

says Witt. Albinus here takes three principles for granted, but he does not succeed in giving them an inner metaphysical coherence.

Although he considers this nous to be superior to the soul, he does

not mention anywhere an emanation of the worldsoul from one of

the two intellects (p. 135). This criticism is founded, if I understand him all right, on Witt's opinion that according to Albinus the

subordinate vo5q is a separate hypostasis between the world-soul

and God 1). Moreover he asks himself which purpose this doubling of the nous might serve, if both possess the same activity, viz.

1) Witt nowhere says so explicitly, but attentive reading of his text shows this to be what he means. After having remarked (128-9) that Plotinus in a polemic with the Gnostics rejects a vo5q xwo6ycvoq as a separate hypo- stasis, he concludes by saying that in fact Plotinus condemns the theory of Albinus that between and 6 Tup6,roq voi5q a vo5q kv 8uv<x[jLEt and a vo5q x«T' È:\IépYELOC\l should exist. From this it appears that he attributes to Albinus a vo5q xwo6ycvoq as a separate hypostasis.

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that of the perfect knowledge of the ideas (p. 128). The text of

Albinus on which all this is founded, is the statement: vo5q

(X 2, p. 57, 1. z). So we can understand that Witt thinks it

to be a contradiction, when Albinus says that it may perhaps not

be possible for a vo5q without a soul to exist (XIV 4, p. 81; Witt

p. 127). In connexion with this problem of the relation between the

superior and the inferior nous, and more particularly the question of the metaphysical status of the latter, two more reproaches are

advanced by Witt. He concludes that according to Albinus the inferior nous does not always exist actually, which conclusion he

deduces from the latter's assertion that the worldsoul gets its

thoughts by gazing on God (cf. XIV 3, p. 81), whereas, on the

other hand, this nous is emphatically described as o xaT' èvépye:LOC'J 1tocv't'oc vocw xocv xod aei (X 2, p. 57; Witt p. 128). Further he

remarks somewhat ironically that the inferior gods, who are

generated by the first god (XVI z, p. 91) and create mortal living

beings, "are a somewhat strange progeny, if their parent really is an

Aristotelian Moreover Albinus does not ask him-

self which is their relation to the worldsoul which receives the ideas

and imparts them to matter (p. 136). This is an ample and impressive list of objections. It must be

added that with regard to the third point Witt only reproduces current opinion. In Ueberweg-Praechter this is expressed thus:

"unter der ersten Gottheit steht der vo5q (der Welt), unter diesem die Die Sonderung von vo5q und (s. oben S. 538) findet so auch auf das Weltganze Anwendung. Damit bereitet sich

die neuplatonische Lehre von den Hypostasen vo5q, vor"

(p. 542) 1). Here, too, a triad of highest principles is ascribed to

Albinus. The same view is to be found in Sassen, who adds another

point to the long list: "The theology of Gaius and Albinus is not

quite clear. On the one hand the godhead is represented as a triad, of which the 6e:óç, the vo5q and the are the members, on the other hand an è1tOUPOCVLOÇ 8elq and a 'u7cepoup('XvLor, 6so5 are

i ) The reference in Ueberweg to p. 538 regards Plutarch's theory of the separation between the soul itself and its nous : by means of a second death the nous will be separated from the soul, like at the first death the soul is freed from its mortal parts and from the body.

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distinguished, whereas it is not made clear how the relation of those

two to each other and to the 6EOS is to be understood. Where

the question of the assimilation to God is dealt with, there is no

longer question of a triad" 1).

An attempt at refutation

The criticism as a whole may be reduced to two main points, I

think. First the problem of the literal interpretation of the Timaeus

and its relation to the essence of God as a vo5q and se-

condly the relation of God to the inferior nous and the worldsoul.

As to the first problem we know from Proclus that Albinus thought "that according to Plato the cosmos, though ungenerated did have a principle becoming (Yev?6?ws so that it

would be eternal (&d Wv) and generated at the same time, in this sense that it had not been generated in the course of time, but that an explanation for its generation-it being a compound of many dissimilar parts--was necessary. Therefore its existence

had to be traced back to another more ancient cause" (In Tim.

I 219, 2). In short, according to Albinus means "not

generated in the course of time" and "metaphysically

dependent from an eternal cause". In the Epitome we find indeed

the same doctrine 2). Now it is almost incomprehensible that Witt

(himself citing this passage from Proclus and even considering it

the most convincing proof for Albinus' authorship of the Didas-

kalikos, p. 107) nevertheless thinks that Albinus seriously keeps to a literal interpretation of the Timaeus. But it is clear that when

Albinus uses the expressions 1tpO oup«vou YeveaewS and Ev

1) O.c., 157; the distinction between the È:1tOUPeX\lLOc; 6e6q and the Ú1tEPOU- pawo5 BEOS is found in Albinus XXVIII i, p. 137 (this is the only passage). The immediate source for Sassen's statement (which I did not find else- where) seems to be the study of E. Pelosi S. J., Een Platoonse gedachte bij Gaios, Albinos en A puleius van Madaura. Plat. Theait. 176 a: 8è: 6?to'Lcoatq 8c§h xaTa To 8uva<6v, Studia Cath. 15 (1939), 375-394 and 16 (1940), 226-242. See esp. 386 and 388-9. Apparently Sassen did not follow Pelosi in his wavering identification of the ??roup«vio5 8c6q with the 7rp6-coq Oe6q.

2) This appears from the following text: oTav 8è: d1t1) , (sc. IIa«Twv) ye- dvai Tov 06X olhwç (XXOUOTEOV OCÙTOU, ds 6vro; Xp6\1ou, É\I

o6x iv &ncX 8vow aet iv YE?SOe!. EQTL xOC6 El,t,?OCGVEI. (XUTOU 67ro- a,rckaewq &pXLx6,repov TL OChLOV (XIV 3, p. 81 ) .

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Y?v€asv earl, this means to him respectively "in so far as it is meta-

physically independent of the first cause" and "as far as it is eter-

nally dependent upon the first cause". Although one may find

fault with this somewhat confusing use of the terms and we have to accept it. Moreover it is not so

difficult to understand why Albinus does so. We must bear in mind

that this work is meant to give only a systematical survey of

Plato's philosophy; as such it is only an introduction, as Albinus

explicitly states and as everybody admits (Witt, too) 1). We should not be surprised, then, at the fact that Albinus, evidently, tries to

represent Plato's thoughts as faithfully and as literally as possible. A careful reader cannot help receiving this impression, and the very fact that his work consists for a great part of quotations from

Plato, often cited literally, gives sufficient proof for this. Now

every reader of the Timaeus knows that expressions equivalent to

xpo oùpocvou yev6ascoq and ocsi Ev yevlaei EaTi occur in Plato 2), and that nevertheless the greater part of the ancient as well as of the modern interpreters, from Xenocrates onward, have attributed

the same view about the eternity of the world to Plato as Albinus

did 3). So it is not Albinus' interpretation as such, but his re-

presentation of Plato's cosmological exposition, that is more or

less literal. And why should one reproach Albinus that his ability for speculative thinking was not superior to that of Plato himself?

Is he to be measured by the standard of Plotinus? Moreover Albinus applied this method consciously. This wild.

become evident from the discussion of the next point, viz. that the

vous is the final as well as the efficient cause of the world-

process. This criticism has strictly speaking already been rejected

by the above argument: Albinus explains Plato's transcendent

God as a vouS and therefore as a final cause exclusively, but in his paraphrase of the Timaeus he follows Plato's mythic mode of exposition. So from a logical point of view he does not

1) Albinus XXXVI, p. 173 (roaaura <x7T<xpxE? 1tpOç cl«aymyiv .......); ;. Witt p. 2-3.

2) xoct 1tpt\l o6paVlV ycViC8aL (Tim. 52 d); 1'0\1 <XTT<X\'T(X xp6VoV Ic xoct &\1 x«1 (Tim. 38 c).

3) See: A. E. Taylor, A Commentayy on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford 1928), 67-9.

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regard this God as an efficient cause at all. This appears from his statement that God does not make the worldsoul but only organizes it (06Z,L 1tOLÛ, xoc't'ocxocr¡J.e:?, XIV 3, p.81). To this passage we

shall have to return later. In this connection attention should

further be drawn to the remarkable fact that Albinus does not call

God a1j¡J.LOupyóe;, or uses the verb 8??.coupY?w of him anywhere in the

theological chapters proper (in which his relation to the world

is not yet discussed), whereas this is everywhere the case in the

chapters which-also after an explicit announcement (XI 3, p. 67)- deal with physics (c. XII ff.). This fact justifies the supposition that Albinus consciously applied the method of mythical repre- sentation. What is more, it can, I believe, be proved. For Witt

overlooked the fact that exactly in that passage from which he

took his example of Albinus' "crude and literal interpretation of

Plato's cosmological account" the expression xaTOC Tov eixoT« Xoyov occurs I). Everybody knows that this expression in the Timaeus is the formula to indicate the process of mythopoiie. Here we have

the positive proof of Albinus being absolutely conscious of what

he is doing. One might object to this that it is the only passage in

the Epitome where Albinus uses this expression, so that it may be

possible that he copied it blindly. But this objection is refuted by the fact that the expression does not occur at all in the corres-

ponding passage of the Timaeus (31 bc). The term is however used

repeatedly and emphatically in the preceding pages (Tim. 29 c d;

30 b; the next passage is 44 d). So Albinus has consciously inserted

the term in this place. Besides we know from Proclus that Albinus

attributed to Plato a double form of exposition, vi Z. 7) è1tLcr't'1)[J.OVL- What is more obvious than Albinus fol-

lowing Plato here? From all this it should be clear that Albinus

has consciously chosen a literal representation of the Timaeus.

1) Witt, 133-4. He fragmentarily quotes XII 2, p. 69, 11. 8-14, italicizing EY€vvr?ae ....., 8LOC\l0'Y)8dç and The end of this passage runs in Albinus: xaTa 8? Tà\l dx6TOC abYov ex oc6,r6v xai nupo5 Perhaps Louis, too, failed to see the importance of this: his usual references to the corresponding passages in Plato are lacking here and he translates "suivant ce raisonnement" ( 70 ) .

2) Proclus in Tim. 1, 340. The text is quoted amply by Witt (117), but here, too, he failed to see the real connection with the Epitome passage.

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It is not up to us to blame him for this on account of the fact that

Plotinus did not do so. As to Witt's remark that the relation of God

to. matter remains obscure, in the first place it is clear that he once

more argues from the standpoint of Plotinus, whereas Albinus here

again sides with Plato himself. Secondly, instead of being obscure

here, Albinus has succeeded in establishing a clever and coherent

theory, as we will spe below.

In this connection we can answer two more difficulties. If the

world is eternal, then it is evident that the nous of the worldsoul

in fact is always actual, whereas the transition from potentiality to

actuality (which Witt deduces from the statement that it receives

the ideas by gazing on God's thoughts) of course belongs to the

things said eLXO't'OÀOYLx<7>e;, just like the expression 1tpO oup«vou And to the same category also belong the lower gods,

who, according to Witt, form such a strange progeny of a

The Exyovot. auTOU 6e:OL of Albinus (XVI I, p. 91) are

indicated in the Timaeus by the words 8eoi 6e:<7>v, wv 31jiLoupy'oq rue £pymv (41 a). To require with Witt that Albinus ought to

have given his opinion about their relation to the worldsoul and

the world-intellect is of no use, because Plato does not speak about

it either and because Albinus writes an introductory work. But

apart from this it seems certain that he regarded these gods,

just like Plotinus himself (cf. Witt p. 136), as souls. Before there is

any question of "the gods born from God", Albinus has already mentioned two kinds of gods. First the 8soi simply, viz. the celestial

bodies which are, just as in the Timaeus, "thinking living beings"

(XIV 7, p. 87), therefore souls, and which have been "made" by God. Secondly which might also be called ye:V1j't'OL who find themselves in the sublunar region, being souls, too,

evidently xlapLov ?te'poq elv«i, XVI I, p. 8g). Which of the two kinds of gods represent his £xy6voi 6e:OL is perhaps not at once clear; anyhow it is certain that he conceived them as

souls on a cosmic level.

Now it only remains for us to discuss the second problem: the

obscure relation between the first nous, the cosmic nous, and the

worldsoul. The central point of the question is whether this inferior

nous is indeed an independent form of being, a hypostasis (to speak

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with Plotinus) between the worldsoul and the first nous (God). In

my opinion, there is conclusive proof that this is absolutely not the

case. I shall try to show that in fact the cosmic nous in Albinus is

always a function of the worldsoul voEp« in Plotinus's ter-

minology). At the same time I think I can explain where the

general misunderstanding took its origin. There are only four passages in Albinus in which a nous on a

cosmic level is mentioned and of which the status is perhaps not at

once clear, viz. X 2, p. 57; X 3, p. 59; XIV 3; XIV 4, p. 81 1). The

most important passage is surely X 2. Witt, who evidently vaguely surmised that the notion of a separate hypostasis might be open to

doubt, regards this passage as the proof by excellence of his inter-

pretation : "It is true", he says, "that in Did. 69, 32 sqq. [Louis XIV 3] vo5q is not sharply distinguished from and may even

appear to be (in the Plotinian phrase) voEp«. But the distinc-

tion is clearly made in chapter X". Witt undoubtedly admits that

in c. XIV 3 vous is not sharply distinguished from because of

the words Tov Te vouv xai (sc. ro5

which imply that this nous is a function of the worldsoul. When we

turn to c. X 2, it appears at first to be evident indeed that this

nous transcends the worldsoul as being a reality of a higher order.

For we read there that "nous is better than psyche, and the nous

which knows all things actually, at the same time and always, is

better than the nous which is only potential, the cause of this

(viz. of the actual nous) being, however, still more beautifull ...." 2).

1) For the sake of completeness I give here all the places in Albinus in which nous occurs. The human nous occurs: IV i, p. I and XXIII 2, p. I I 3 ; nous in general as an epistemological function of a soul: IV 6, p. 17; IX 4, p. 55; X 4, p. 59; XII 3, p. 73; of God: IX 2, p. 53; X 2-X 5, p. 57-61 fiassim ; XXVII i, p. 129. For a nous on a cosmic level see my text.

2) That the interpretation which assumes a metaphysical priority of the nous to the soul, is indeed the usual one, appears from the translation of Louis, which is completely wrong: "Puisque l'intelligence est supérieure à l'ame et qu'au dessus de l'intelligence en puissance se tyouve l'intelligence en acte ...." (italics mine). The relevant part of the Greek text runs: ,,'E1tEt 8i vous V05 8È TOG SV 8UWX(.LEL 6 xaT' £v£pyciav 1teX\lTOC V015V xai xed aei, TouTOU 81 xaxximv 6 aiiio5 TouTOU. Louis' translation of this text (which as such only needs to express a hierarchy of values) can only be understood in the sense of an ontological hierarchy. In his note, moreover, he explicitly states: "C'est d4jk du n6o-platonisme", and he refers to A.

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Because of the fact that there is a hierarchical relation of a meta-

physical kind between the cause (God) and the nous subordinated

to him, one might conclude from this indeed that between the

worldsoul and the worldnous, too, there exists a relation of the

same kind. The subsequent lines, however, immediately convince

us of the erroneousness of such an interpretation, for still in the

same sentence this actual nous is called the nous of the whole

heavens (TOU crú[J.1tOCv't'oe; o'upocvo5). Of course one may still ask whether the nous of the heavens

should perhaps be distinguished from the nous of the worldsoul,

although this may seem to be far-fetched. But because this little

problem, the solution of which is, in my opinion, self-evident, forms the Pièce de résistance of the current view, we have to go into

this possibility at length. Now it can be argued that in the two

remaining passages the nous of the heavens appears to be explicitly identical with the nous of the worldsoul. In X 3, p. 59, I. 3 we first

read the words: Tov OÙPOCVLOV vouv XOCL §vxiv rou xócr¡J.ou; in the

subsequent sentence, in which the same thought is once more

expressed in another way, Albinus says: Tou vou (sc. Tou So the oup<x?o<; ?ou<; is nothing else but a function

of the worldsoul. And besides we read : oS (sc. o vo54 Tou

xoapLo6) 8t.(xxo<i{jt.eE crt>[J.1toccrocv cp6aLv èv TM The conclusion

from this is evident. The passage in XIV 4, p. 81 is not less clear

FouiII6, La philosophie de Platon (Paris 1869), 285.-The conclusion of H. Dbrrie, that Albinus "anscheinend schon wusste von Versuchen, den vou5 noch durch das h6chste Eine zu iibergipfeln" (Zum Ursprung der neupla- tonischen Hypostasenlehye, Hermes 82 331 -42 ; 339 specially), mani- fests the same sort of confusion. For this statement he refers to the "wohl- bekannte Stufung Seele-vous", apparently interpreting the \IOÜç as trans- cending the worldsoul and as identical with the 1tp&TOÇ vo5q. So we can understand the sort of reasoning he adopts: ,,(Albinus) gliedert auch den vo5q in die Stufen, in denen er 8U\leX(.LEL (also wohl als Sch6pfer) und die, in denen er ivepyetqc wirkt (also als Vorbild :- Idee)". If this would be right, then the cause of the vosq could not but be identical indeed with "das Eine jenseits alles Seins". But because even to D6rrie it seems difficult to accept that this represents Albinus' own view (,,vielleicht lehnte er dies ab"), he arrives at the conclusion already mentioned. Here the confusion is even worse. At any rate one cannot with D6rrie refer to Albinus for the thesis that such a neo-platonic interpretation already existed in Albinus' time. In so far as he bases himself on the myth from Plutarch's De genio Socratis, his thesis does not seem to hold much water either.

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either: 6 6e:óe; ...... «6<Ov (sc. rov è1tOL1jcre: xoct

voepov ....... cac?5 o6x 0 LOU is vou aveu Here

again the nous of the cosmos (TOV xócr[J.ov ... voEp6v) is in fact identical with the nous of the worldsoul. And, more important still, it is also evident that a cosmic nous can, according to Albinus,

merely exist as a function of a soul i). Who would after this still wish to defend the thesis that the nous of the heavens in X 2 may be something else than the nous of the worldsoul? 2). So we must conclude that a separate hypostasis between the worldsoul and God is not to be found in Albinus. And we may add that this would be a strange thought indeed, at least in a system in which the last

principle is a nous. For this would lead to a threefold nous, and such a doubling of the cosmic nous is nonsense and nowhere to be found in Greek philosophy. The mere fact that Albinus was at least an

intelligent man makes such an interpretation appear to be a prior highly improbable. As there is no question at all of a triad in his

work, we may conclude at the same time that Albinus meant the hierarchical order - vo5q èv - vo5q xaT' Ev€pY?cav -

1tp<7>'t'oe; 6e:6ç in X 2 to be an order of values and not an ontological hierarchy. Besides the fact that in this case the potential nous itself would have to be a separate hypostasis, renders current

opinion the more improbable. Now we can try to find the reasons for the current misunder-

standing, and in doing so clear up some more aspects. The first

i ) Albinus evidently thinks that the "first nous" may exist without a soul. This might explain the addition of which is not to be found in Plato. I shall return to this question later. It is evident at any rate that a cosmic nous according to Albinus can only exist as a function of a soul.

2) I add another argument, viz. a comparison of three passages: a) (6 1tpWTOÇ 6e6q) OCLTLOÇ 67cipXwv <05 iet è:\IEPYEi\l TM ro5 «6y<av<oq oupavou (X 2, p. 57, 11. 4-5). b) (6 8EOÇ.... X)XTfXXOO[jLE?) £ycipmv xoct 1tpOç auibv ibv TS vouv xai ......., 01tWç &1to?Àé1touO"oc 1tpOç ioc

a£<05 8éX'Y)TOCL 1'tX ........ (XIV 3, p. 81). In a) God is the cause of the noetic activity of the nous of the whole heavens; in b) he awakens the noetic activity of the nous of the worldsoul. So these two are identical. With b) we may compare a third passage: c) (-r6v 8EO\l) Tov o6pckvLov vouv xoct <iv §uxiv <05 x60"(.Lou 1tpOç EauTOV xai 1tpOç .ÉOCUTOÜ vo?ae?5 (X 3, p. 59, 11. 3-4). In b) and c) the same process is dexcribed in various ways, viz. the awakening of the nous of the worlsoul and of the heavenly nous res- pectively. Both are therefore identical.

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reason is undoubtedly the metaphysical interpretation of the above mentioned order of values. It seems to me that its origin is to be found in the interpreters of Plotinus. For Plotinus concludes from the difference in value between psyche and nous to a metaphysical

priority of the nous to the soul, which view is based on the Aristote- lian doctrine that actuality is prior to potentiality (Enn. V 9, 4). Aristotle himself already let his vo5q xal come from

without. This has been wrongly applied to Albinus. From a text

already quoted it appears that, according to Albinus, a naus cannot exist in this world unless in a soul. In fact, perhaps unconsciously, Albinus takes the point of view of the Stoics-rejected by Plotinus

(VII 7, ii)-that a soul which is potentially intelligent must exist

before a nous can be actualized in it. In the case of Albinus this is of course to be understood in the sense of a metaphysical, instead of a chronological, priority.

Secondly the belief that the thesis vo5q is of Aristote-

lian origin, seems to play a part in this misunderstanding. Now I do not wish to maintain that this should not be an Aristotelian idea and expression, but I think that it can be shown that, if not

the formulation, yet the thought it represents is authentically Platonic. The later Platonists cannot be blamed for choosing a

direct and short expression of Aristotle to express a conception which is implicit in Plato. Now is this really a Platonic thought? We must remember beforehand that in Plato nous never indicates

the immortal part of the soul itself, but always and exclusively a

function of it, as I have tried to show elsewhere 1). It seems to me

that we may attribute to Plato the idea that this nous (as a

function) is of greater value than the immortal part of the soul

itself, because this part may possess or lack nous, or to put it in the

Aristotelian terminology, because the soul only possesses nous

potentially. When Plato says that a soul possessing nous is better

than one lacking nous, Albinus' statement that "nous is better than soul" is simply another formulation. For this means that the soul as such (as the principle of life and thought) is ethically and

intellectually indifferent. This thought is frequently and in various

i ) Cf. my thesis, De nous in het systeenz van Plato's Philosophle (Amsterdam 1950), 50-51 specially.

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ways expressed by Plato, e.g. in the Laws (897 b). There he says that every soul, also the cosmic soul, which is endowed with nous,

produces good only, but that on the contrary a soul endowed with

anoia cannot but produce evil. The same thought underlies his

words that a universe without nous could not possibly be more

beautiful than one endowed with nous (Tim. 3ob). His belief that

every man is born without nous and that finally only the gods and a small number of men possess nous (Tim. 5'c) implies the

same thing, because every man possesses the immortal part of the

soul of course. Now all the points of Witt's criticism have been

considered, and I hope it has become evident that all of them are

founded on some basic misunderstandings. It remains to make a

few remarks on the judgements of Ueberweg-Praechter and Sassen.

There is no reason to hold, with Ueberweg-Praechter, that

Albinus in his theology is a precursor of the neo-Platonic hypostases. Albinus knows only two principles: the transcendent God and the

immanent worldsoul with its nous-function. Moreover his highest

principle is a nous and the ideas are his thoughts. The emphasis laid on "the almost ineffable" character of this God is the only indication towards Neo-Platonism. But apart from this the mysti- cal element is completely lacking in Albinus. What is more, there is a strong dualism between God and world. From this it appears that the place of Albinus in the history of later Platonism is ab-

solutely different from that which it is generally thought to be.

Finally we come to the obscurity, alleged by Sassen, with regard to the relation between the 'e7coupo'cvto?, the 'u7cepoupc'CvLoq, and the

1tp<7>'t'oe; Albinus indeed is silent about it, but, because he does

not show "such a confusion of thought ... not uncommon in the

Platonism of the first and second centuries" 1), it may be assumed

that this relation, in his eyes, was so clear and so simple that he

did not, not even in an introductory work, think an explanation

necessary. And in fact it is a very simple problem, at least in my

opinion, and Witt, too, does not seem to have found any diffi-

culties in it. Witt casually identifies (p. 128) the "first nous" with

the 'u7repoupo'EvLoq and the è1tOUpOCVLOe; 6e:óe; with the oupav?o5 vovS

i ) Witt, i 34.

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(in X 3), and this certainly seems to be all right. What else can the

L7repoupm'vtoq 6eds be than the "first God", who is in fact the only principle transcending the cosmic nous and the worldsoul, the ideas

being his thoughts? We, too, can call this God transcendent or

extra-cosmic. This interpretation is supported by the fact that of this "super-cosmic" God it is said that he is above virtue, whereas the "first God" had already been said to have no qualities. The

identity between the È1tOUPOCVLOÇ 6EOS and the o'upo'cvto? vo5q is also

obvious, though perhaps not so easy to be demonstrated. The ' 1tp<7>'t'oç vov5 (which is at the same time 1tp<7>'t'oe; is contrasted with the nous of the worldsoul. Even if no corresponding simple 6e:óç can be found in Albinus (for simple 6eoS always means the

1tp<7>'t'oe; 6e6<;), it should nevertheless be clear that in the only place where he speaks of an è1tOUpOCVLOe; 6EOS in contradistinction to a

uTr?poupocvco5 6e6<; (which is identical with the 1tp<7>'t'oç Oe6q) he

means to indicate the cosmic nous. With this agrees the fact that

the o?.oicoac5 r6 6e6 does not consist in imitating the Ú1te:POUpOCVLOe; but the è1tOUPOCVLOÇ for the cosmic nous is a nous in a soul,

just as the human nous. Platonic influence is clear enough here

indeed. For the older Plato substituted the thesis that man has to

imitate the ideas, by that of the imitation of the cosmic nous, so

that the famous Ó¡J.O((OcrLe; TM at least in this later phase, is not to be taken as an assimilation to the transcendent God. In the Tim.

(47 bc; cf. go cd) Plato explicitly says that man must use "the

revolutions of nous in the sky" for his own thoughts, thus "imitating those of God". This god seems to be also the cosmic nous, though it would be possible to assume that Albinus as well as Plato meant the

cosmos as a whole (viz. the worldsoul and its nous together), be-

cause the cosmos, too, is emphatically called by Plato a "visible

God" (Tim. 92 a) 1). This criticism, so far only negative, has, I hope, prepared the way

for an attempt to penetrate, positively, somewhat deeper into the

i) At any rate the supposition of Pelosi (I.c., 389) that it is obvious to identify the È:1tOUPeX\lLOÇ 6e6S as the model of imitation with the 1tpÙ>TOÇ 8cOq is absolutely baseless. The cause of the whole confusion is, in my opinion, the isolation of a Platonic expression (i.c. the Ó(.LOLWcrLÇ TM 6eM, as it is defined in the Theaet. 176a) out of the whole of Plato's philosophy. Albinus evidently referred to the doctrine of the Timaeus.

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inner coherence of Albinus' work. In doing this we shall discover

that here we have a really original interpretation of Plato and not a

purely eclectic, or even syncretic, combination of Platonic and

Aristotelian thoughts.

The inner consistency '

Let us start from the heart of the matter, viz. his thesis that God

is the final cause in the sense of an Aristotelian unmoved mover.

Now, can this be understood as an interpretation of Plato? When Albinus says: "God does not make the worldsoul, which

exists always, but he organizes it and in that sense

one might say that he also makes it" (XIV 3, p. 81, 11. 4-6), this

is undoubtedly an interpretation of Tim. 34 c ff., running something like this: "when Plato says that the Demiurge makes the worldsoul, this must be understood in the sense that God is the cause of its

actual organized structure, of its nous, but not of its existence as

such, because the worldsoul has not been generated in the course

of time". Albinus at the same time, as we have seen already, conceives of God's causality as an extra-temporal process. It is

true that some lines before he says that the existence of the cosmos

presupposes a higher cause, but this is expressly stated of the

cosmos, and not of the worldsoul. From this it appears that the

term cosmos is to be taken in its most strict and proper sense of

ordered universe. So only the order in the world finds its origin in God, and He is no more than an organizing cause, a former of

the world. Still this cosmos, too, exists as a cosmos from eternity, but in dependence on God, whereas matter and the unorganized worldsoul exist from eternity independent of God. But for God

matter and world-soul-as-such would be an animated mass moving

chaotically 1). The contrast between animated chaos and cosmos

(the chaos not being pre-existent in time) is essential here. Chaos

as such actually never existed. Therefore, if God did not exist, the

universe would, but as a chaos. Now the original and revolutionary element in this interpretation is exactly, as we shall see later on,

i) Just as Plato (Phaedr. 245c-e) Albinus describes the soul as &y6v-n-roq and To ocù-rOX(\IYjTO\l (V 5, p. 27), "because it has life in

itself, being always active through itself" (XXV 4, p. 121).

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the combination of the concept of the independent eternal existence

of matter and world-soul-as-such with that of the dependent eternal existence of the cosmos as such.

Now, Albinus conceived God's organizing causality as organizing the worldsoul, as appears from the above-mentioned text. This

becomes still clearer from the following passage: "God awakens

and draws to himself its nous as well as the worldsoul itself, as

from a lethargy or a deep sleep, in order that it [the soul] by gazing at his thoughts, receives the ideas and the forms, while striving towards his thoughts" (I.c. 11. 6-9). This nous of the worldsoul

which God draws to himself, is evidently identical with the nous

which Albinus elsewhere calls its potential nous (X 2, p. 57). God is therefore the cause of the existence of an actual nous in the

worldsoul, i.e. of the knowledge of the ideas, the thoughts in God's

mind. But he does not infuse this knowledge into the worldsoul from

outside: this nous originates in the worldsoul itself, but it is

actual solely because of the existence of God. We have already seen that Albinus explicitly defines this causality in a purely Aristotelian sense elsewhere (X 2, p. 57, 11. 4-9). It is in this sense

only that Albinus, just as Plato, can call God "father", "because

he is the cause of everything and organizes the heavenly nous

and the worldsoul and draws them to himself"

X 3, p. 59, 11. 2-3). Consequently this cosmic nous must be

interpreted as the immediate (though intermediary) cause of

order and finality in the world. And in fact this conclusion follows

promptly: 8e; (sc. o vo5q §vxiq Tov x&apLo.J) xocy;jL7j6E? lxl Tou

7roc-cpoq 8KXXO(T(JLSl crú¡J.1toccrocv yu'alv èv So the cosmos as such is an autarchic whole (XII 3, p. 71), just as in Plato (Tim. 68 e). The fact that Albinus almost imperceptibly slips over the

passage referring to the creation of the worldsoul in the Timaeais

(34 c ff.) now becomes comprehensible, too. Since he rejects the

literal interpretation, this passage does not belong to his intro-

ductory work. He merely makes a few remarks about divisible and

indivisible being on account of this passage, in connection with

knowledge, but he does so with regard to the soul in general (XIV 2, P. 79).

So with regard to the relation between matter and God, or be-

313

tween the worldsoul and God, there is no question of obscurity or

confusion as presumed by Witt. Albinus appears to have solved

this problem in a personal way, in the sense of a fundamental

dualism between God and worldsoul, a dualism which is slightly

mitigated, however, by the fact that God is the final cause of all

things. This combination of Aristotle's vo6q eXxLV1j't'Oe; with the philo-

sophy of Plato has two particular characteristics. First it every- where bears the stamp of an interpretation of Plato, though of an

original character, and secondly it aims at logical consistency. It is

therefore not to be entitled as eclecticism, still less as syncretism. These characteristics ought to ensure it the position of an inde-

pendent form of Platonism in the history of philosophy, next to, and in contrast with, the neo-Platonism of Plotinus. I do not

doubt that this would still-as it was in later antiquity-be the

case, if the Plato-commentaries of Albinus would have been pre- served 1). Nevertheless it can be shown that, apart from the

all the aspects of his metaphysics are either founded

(or may be founded) on his interpretation of Plato, or are a ne-

cessary consequence of the xweiv whereas exactly this

Aristotelian notion has been introduced to solve a central problem of the interpretation of Plato. Let us check the subsequent parts of this thesis.

Modern interpreters of Plato's philosophy have often expressed the view (which I myself think to be historically wrong) that the

fundamental principle in Plato is a God who, while transcending the world, must be regarded as an intellect (vo5q). This is even

the current opinion. Probably Albinus, too, considered the figure of the Demiurge in the Tiynaeus to be the proof of this interpretation. This is a fundamental point, for, thinking consistently, in that case

the ideas can hardly be anything else than the contents of this very nous, i. e. they are, as Albinus says, God's eternal thoughts. So the

interpretation of the fundamental principle in Plato as a nous, is

i ) The list of his works is not better known to us than his life. Neveithe- less it is certain that he left numerous works (cf. Louis o.c., XIV). The data have been collected by H. Diels-W. Schubart, Anonymer Commentar zu Platons Theaetet (Berlin 1905), XXVIII-XXX. On a newly discovered little work of Albinus see: E. Orth, Les oeuvyes d'Albinos le Platonicien, Antiq. Class. 16 113-4.

314

no Aristotelian feature at all, the more so as the exemplarism defended by Albinus (e.g. IX I, p. 51), as by all Platonists, is com-

pletely lacking in Aristotle. The Aristotelian definition (Metaph. A 9, 1°74 b 33-35) of the Nous as the v'olalq is not as such to be found in Albinus 1). The definition of the causality of this nous as a xLveZv however, is certainly not Platonic, but it is still a consequence of his interpretation of Plato. For the ideas, which, according to Albinus, are God's thoughts and therefore identical with God, are defined by Plato as immutable and always self-identical.

The real problem, however, which Albinus wanted to solve, is that of the nature of God's causality. From our perspective of the

history of philosophy to-day there are a priori three possibilities with regard to the relation of God to the world-soul: Plotinian

emanation, viz. the proceeding of the soul (and of all being, in-

cluding matter) from God in a hierarchical order; Christian cre- ation out of nothing; independent, eternal existence of (matter and) worldsoul, and the causing of MOMS in that worldsoul by God 2).

i ) We do find in his work the formulation that God thinks himself (e'ocu-r6v av ... vool<), an expression which but for Aristotle would perhaps not be possible, but how we are to understand this, becomes clear at once from the addition: xod Ta iocuro5 vo7jj?(XT<x (X 3, p. 57 ). For Albinus the ideas are undoubtedly the point of departure. Now because they are God's thoughts and because there are no real distinctions in God (cf. X 3: aeYw 8i ouX 6q xmpl(mv TocUroc [viz. God's qualities], &xx' 6q xaTa Tcckvroc iv6q Albinus probably along this way, and not by simply borrowing an Aristote- lian notion, came to express himself in this manner. How far another Aristote- lian notion is contained in this concept of God, viz. that God does not know the world (cf. Arist. Eth. Eudem. 1245 b 17), is not clear in AlbinUF. For one, it is not allowed to draw any conclusion from the demiurgic activity of the first God with regard to the actual view of Albinus. But a tendency towards this Aristotelian conception seems the most probable one, espe- cially because Albinus nowhere attributes providentiality to his trans- cendent God (unless in a mythical context) and this would not fit in with his system either. But, after all, he may have found the same sort of solution as Thomas Aquinas gave a thousand years later: God then would know the world through his own ideas.

2) The third possibility has on purpose been expressed in rather vague terms. The nature of this causality is left undetermined, because there are various possibilities in this respect, as will appear below. It is rather noteworthy that, wheieas in modern interpretations of Plato the first two possibilities have been, or are being, defended, the third, as far as I know,

315

Whether the first two possibilities were known to Albinus may be

justly doubted 1), but he at any rate appears to have preferred the last possibility, and in doing so to have interpreted the causality of God, under the influence of Aristotle, more precisely as a final

causality. This question of the nature of God's causality is con- nected with another big problem (which was very much disputed already in that time and which therefore probably was the real

starting-point for Albinus), viz. that the soul was sometimes regarded

by Plato as generated, sometimes as ungenerated 2). He solved this by

interpreting the Platonic worldsoul on the one hand as being inde-

pendent of God in its existence (ungenerated), on the other hand by taking its being generated as an extra-temporal dependency of its

actual nous on God. This dependence he further understood as the

worldsoul being organized by God, and precisely on this point

(and on this point only), Aristotle proved of much use, so that he was able to interpret this organizing activity as a final causality. The choice of this Aristotelian idea is clearly determined by a desire

to get at a consistent interpretation of Plato. It means the solution

of two problems simultaneously. In Albinus' theology and physics it is moreover the only important Aristotelian notion. For though the doctrine of act and potency does play a roll in Albinus (also

e.g. VIII 3, p. 51; X 2, p. 57), yet it is only a secondary notion, for his physics are entirely Platonic. Moreover, germs of this theory are to be found in Plato, as in the case of the nous, the potential

has no adherents. Those who attribute to matter and to the worldsoul in Plato an independent eternal existence, deny the existence of a transcendent God, i.e. they interpret Plato in a pantheistic sense. So the problem of the nature of God's causality is solved for them by means of elimination. Other possibilities may, I think, be reduced to the three mentioned above.

i ) In Philo of Alexandria only the first vague traces of emanation are to be found, viz. regarding the relation between God and Logos (in which he hesitates though, cf. Ueberweg-Praechter, 577). Plutarch did not know Philo (cf. Del Re, 11 pensieyo metafisico di Plutarco, Studi italiani di filol. class. 24 (ig5o), 60). As to Albinus, there is not a single reason to assume the opposite to be true. Concerning the Christian notion of creation it must be remarked that in Albinus' time Christianity had not yet produced a thinker of real importance.

2) E.g. Phaedy. 245 c d, in contrast with Tim. 37 a., Laws 892 c. From a passage discussed above it is evident that Albinus was conscious of this problem (XIV 3, p. 81).

3I6

nous being nothing but the worldsoul as the principle of knowledge. Albinus can hardly be criticized for having made a limited use of

this Aristotelian doctrine, as long as this reproach is not directed

against Plotinus. Plotinus, however, is commonly praised for the

fact that his genius has proved capable of combining all the im-

portant notions of earlier philosophy into a new unity. Albinus must not be regarded as an eclectic 1), for he is in fact

an independent interpreter of Plato. His interpretation shows inner

consistency as well as originality: it is unique in its kind. This is

already apparent from the fact that the central point of Albinus'

doctrine has not been understood at all. This misunderstanding

may be partly explained from the fact that such an interpretation of Plato, as far as I know, has not been defended by any modern

interpreter. This form of Platonism would of course have been

i ) I do not deny at all that Aristotelian as well as Stoic elements are to be found in Albinus. Their existence has been sufficiently demonstrated. The essential point, however, is that-with the exception of the fundamental problem we are studying now-these are for the most part "technical" questions, which were almost common property in later philosophy. Cf. the critical remarks of Breshier on Witt's book (A ctualités scientifiques et indus- trielles, Philosophie I; Les études de philosophie antique par E. Br6hier, Paris 1939, 40), who mentions as such: the syllogism with its three figures, the ten categories and the induction in logic, the doctrine of matter and form and the conception of God as intellect in act in physics and theology (Aristo- telian) ; the problem of the criterion and the hypothetical syllogism in logic, and the connection between the virtues in ethics (Stoic). Although there are other elements, in which this technical feature is lacking, yet they may, at any rate, be regarded as attempts to complete Plato's doctrine by means of the terminological equipment and some definite results of post-Platonic philosophy. So e.g. the distinction between the terms 18£a and E18oq, in which et8os denotes the image of the idea in matter (IV 7, p. i9), and the corres- ponding distinction between and puJixi £vvoia, in which \IÓ1)O'LÇ indi- cates the knowledge of the idea in pre-existence, while the Stoic term is reserved for the knowledge of the idea in incarnate man (IV 6, p. 17). The distinction between "perfect virtues" (for which Albinus finds points of correspondence in the Stoa) and their synonyms, which are no more than good natural dispositions (XXIX 4-XXX, p. 145) are also to be regarded as a further elaboration of Platonic thoughts. Moreover, Albinus-in the spirit of Plato-describes these perfect virtues as summits and only secondarily with Aristotle as the mean between two, extremes (XXX 4, p. 149). Consequently, if eclecticism is taken in its specific sense, viz. as a conscious design, we are not justified in calling Albinus an eclecticist, no more than Plotinus. But of course these and other aspects of Albinus' doctrine should be reexamined in detail from a positive point of view.

317

historically impossible, if it had not been influenced by Aristotle. But this is also true for Plotinus, who would never have been able to conceive of the nous as a hypostasis in the way he does, if he had not known the doctrine of act and potency. If this does not detract

anything from Plotinus' originality, it does not so from Albinus' either.

Albinus' originality consists in the consistent combination of three notions: a) the independent eternal existence of matter and

worldsoul; b) the extra-temporal generation of the cosmos-as- such by God; c) the concept of the final character of God's cau-

sality. Notions a) and b) require for their consequent and logical connection notion c), for there is no other way of realizing a co- herent connection between the two. This is the measure by which we must judge Albinus' significance as a philosopher.

In this connection it may be useful to show more in detail that Albinus at any rate reflected on Plato quite independently. He

undoubtedly saw problems, although the character of the Epitome involved a dogmatic tone and the impression of Plato's philosophy being easy to understand. The opinion that "he proceeds with his account as though difficulties were almost non-existent" 1) is, in

my opinion, completely wrong. For there are still some other indications of Albinus having seen some fundamental problems, viz. difficulties which might be put forward against his own inter-

pretation of Plato. How he has thought himself able to refute these

objections, we can only surmise. First of all he seems to have realized that one might refer to the ineffable character of Plato's ultimate principle as being incompatible with his own interpretation of the first God as a nous, as e.g. Plotinus did (V 1, 8), basing himself on Rep. 505 ff. and on a passage from the second Letter

(312 e). This seems to appear from the fact that Albinus adds

[LŒpOU 3e?v the first time he uses the term (X I, p. 55). It is also remarkable that Albinus avoids Plato's formula è1téxe:LVOC

ovaia5 for the Idea of the Good (which is identified by him with God and with the first nous, XXVII i, p. 129), as well as the term To "Ev, with which the Good in the theory of ideal numbers was identified. From all this it appears that Albinus keeps to a

1) Wltt 0. C. p. 142.

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consistent and consciously non-mystical interpretation of Plato

(also the o?o?Mc?–concept has, according to the conclusions of

Pelosi 1) a strongly intellectualistic character). Yet he wants at the

same time to do justice to the undeniably mystical tendency in

Plato. A second and much more serious objection against the

conception of the transcendent God as a nous is implied in the

notion, repeatedly expressed by Plato, that nous cannot exist out-

side a soul. We know that Atticus, a younger contemporary of

Albinus, gave this thesis its strict meaning, viz. that Plato in

contrast to Aristotle absolutely rejected a nous outside a soul 2). So it cannot possibly be accidental that Albinus, when citing Tinx.

30 b, adds an which in Plato is lacking 3). This addition can

only have the purpose of moderating an assertion too positive according to Albinus' taste, at least so far that the thesis cannot

be accepted in its absolute sense. At any rate it may be concluded.

with certainty that Albinus saw a problem here, viz. how it might be possible to conceive of Plato's transcendent God as a nous. How did he solve this? Taking for granted that Albinus had a keen in--

tellect, he cannot have regarded this nous as a "pure soul", as.

some modern interpreters have done. For Albinus as well as for

Plato a soul, and therefore its MOMS, too, belong to the category of

the OCÙ't'OXLV1j't'OV. Consequently he cannot have regarded a vouc

eXXLV1j't'OÇ as a soul, if he wanted his interpretation to remain con-

sistent. Moreover the cosmic nous is essentially the movement of

the worldsoul towards God. So he will have supposed, like many modern interpreters, that Plato wanted to apply his statement

only to this world, perhaps in this sense that it only holds good for

the vo5q x?ou?Evot; of the worldsoul and of man, not for the

4). If this supposition should be correct, this would also-

I) O.C. p. 393. 2) In Eusebius, Prep. evangel. 15, 9, 1 ff. 3) XIV 4, p. 81. I do not see how Louis is justified in translating this

by sans doute. It may be, as in Aristotle, "non dubitanti,s .., sed cum modestia. quadam asseverantis" (Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s.v. ), but certainly sans doute is too strong a translation.

4) This supposition does not seem too artificial, if one remembers that Plotinus (II 9, i ) in a polemic with Gnostics rejects a vo5q olov as a separate hypostasis. The term does not occur, however, in Albinus-

3I9

be an original and consistent (but, in my opinion, a wrong) solution of the problem, for it does not occur in this special form in modern

interpretations of Plato. But this supposition may go too far. At

any rate Albinus did not resort to the rather week argument that the very use of the word x«p«yevla8«1 in Plato should confine this notion to the region of the yiyv6pLev«. For we find in his work the term Ú1tOcr't'?VOCL in stead of 1tOCpocye:'JÉcr6ocL 1)..

The question of Albinus' originality is of course not yet com-

pletely settled. Thus far we are only justified in stating that the

real centre of his metaphysics, viz. the consistent combination of the three notions above-mentioned is proper to him.

. (to be concluded).

LEIDEN, De Sitterlaan 66A.

1) The word 1tOCPiXYE\lécr6ocL in Plato Tim. 30 b; Ú1tOcrT?\IiXL in Albinus XIV, 4, p. 81. For the whole question of the relation nous-psyche in Plato, and its modern interpretations, see my thesis (particularly p. 55-60, 69-71 and chapter VII).

PSEUDO-ANDRONICUS DE VARIIS POETARUM GENERIBUS

Postquam :Vlnem. S. IV, V. VIII, 1955, P. 23 sq. dubia movi de auctore tractatus 1tEpt in cod. Par. 2929 traditi sub nomine Andronici et a Bekkero primo editi (Anecd. Gy. p. I46I ) , codicem illum iterum inspicere potui occasione mihi data ex pactione de viris doctis in vicem stipendio adiuvandis a Consilio Batavo Investigationi Sincerae Scientiarum Promo- vendae (Z. W.O. ) cum Francogallorum "Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique" constituta. Comperi id, quod de vero auctores iam suspicatus eram: eum sive Palaeocappam sive Diassorinum esse, scriptura codicis comprobari. Manus enim Palaeocappae est, sicut legimus in Omontii In- ventaiye sommaire III p. 61 ; codex Violayli Pseudo-Eudociae (Par. 307) comparatus nullum dubium reliquit, nec quicquam obstat, quominus P a I a e o c a p p a auctor eius tractatus habeatur.

GRONINGEN, Verl. Heereweg 141. W. J. W. KOSTER