algorithms and economics of networks: coordination mechanisms

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Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms Abraham Flaxman and Vahab Mirrokni, Microsoft Research

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Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms. Abraham Flaxman and Vahab Mirrokni, Microsoft Research. Price on Anarchy [KP, RT]. Selfish users User goal: minimize its cost Nash Equilibrium (NE) System goal (e.g. Social welfare) The worst ratio of NE cost to OPT cost. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Algorithms and Economics of Networks:Coordination MechanismsAbraham Flaxman and Vahab Mirrokni,

Microsoft Research

Page 2: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Price on Anarchy [KP, RT]

Selfish users

User goal: minimize its cost

Nash Equilibrium (NE)

System goal (e.g. Social welfare)

The worst ratio of NE cost to OPT cost

Page 3: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Price of Anarchy Concept

Not algorithmic

Only analysis

What to do if PoA is large

How to influence the system

Page 4: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Possible Solutions

Change the system (add tolls, payments)

Stackelberg strategy = control some users

Disadvantages: changing the settings, global knowledge

Challenge: influence within the same setting and locally (distributed)

Page 5: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Coordination Mechanism [CKN]Mechanism: local policy (algorithm) that assigns a cost for each strategy of the user

Advantages: local, same type of cost

Goal: achieving good NE

Example: scheduling jobs on machines

Page 6: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Unrelated Machine Scheduling m unrelated machines

n jobs – each owned by different user

p(i,j) - processing time of job i on machine j

Social Objective: minimize completion time

User goal: minimize its own completion time (Makespan: Cmax)

Page 7: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Unrelated Machines Scheduling

Machine A

A

B

A

B? ?

Machine B

Page 8: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Coordination Mechanism for Scheduling

Policy for each machine (algorithm) which

decides how to schedule jobs assigned to it

Each Policy induces NE on jobs

Page 9: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Local Scheduling Policies

A A

Shortest-First Policy Longest-First Policy

B B

A A

Page 10: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Local Scheduling Policies

Shortest-first Policy Longest-first Policy Random Order Policy MakeSpan Policy

Page 11: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Challenge

Design policies that results in

good NE (i.e. low PoA)

Page 12: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Unrelated Machines Scheduling

Machine A

A

B

A

B? ?

Machine B

Page 13: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Equilibrium for Longest First

A

B

A

B

Page 14: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

PoA of Longest First

Results in poor NE

The PoA is unbounded even for 2 machines

The optimum completion time is low

The completion time of NE is large

Page 15: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Machine Scheduling Models

Identical Machines: P||Cmax

Related Machines: Q||Cmax

(Different Speeds)

Restricted Assignment: B||Cmax

Unrelated Machines: R||Cmax

Page 16: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

PoA Results

MakeSpanPolicy

Shortest-first Policy

Longest-first Policy

Randomized Policy

P||Cmax 2-1/m2-1/m 4/3-1/3m 2-2/m+1

Q||Cmax O(log m) O(log m) 2-1/m O(log m)

B||Cmax O(log m) O(log m) O(log m) O(log m)

R||Cmax Unbounded

O(m) Unbounded O(m)

Page 17: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Pure NE Results

MakeSpanPolicy

Shortest-first Policy

Longest-first Policy

Randomized Policy

P||Cmax Exists Exists Exists Exists

Q||Cmax Exists Exists Exists Exists

B||Cmax Exists Exists Exists Exists

R||Cmax Exists Exists ??? OPEN

Page 18: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Type of Policies Local policy – depends on jobs

assigned to machine Strongly local policy - depends only

on processing time of jobs on that machine

Ordering Policy = IIA (independence of irrelevant alternative)

Page 19: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Lower Bound for Strongly Local Policy

We start with Shortest-First

Extend it to arbitrary strongly local

IIA policy

Shortest-First is interesting by its

own

Page 20: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Shortest-First

Approx factor known to be at most m

NE can be computed by shortest-first

greedy algorithm

(Alg D by Ibarra and Kim)

An open question from 1977

We show it is at least m/2

Page 21: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Idea of the Proof

m types of jobs

Type j can be scheduled on machines j &

j+1

Processing time of type j on machine j is

low and on machine j+1 is high (ratio is j)

All jobs on machine j have almost the

same processing time

Page 22: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Example for Shortest-First

?

B

C

A

? ?

Page 23: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Idea of the Proof

OPT assign all jobs of type j to machine j

Number of jobs is chosen such that OPT

has the same completion time for all

machines

Page 24: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Optimal Assignment

A

B

C

Page 25: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Idea of the Proof

In NE about half jobs of type j are on

machine j and half on machine j+1

Completion time of NE grows linearly in

m

Page 26: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Equilibrium for Shortest-First

?

B

C

A

? ?

Page 27: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Extend to Arbitrary Strongly Local Structure is similar to lower bound for

Shortest-First

Arbitrary ordering function is given

for each machine

Indices of jobs are chosen to behave

similar to the above example

Page 28: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Efficiency Based Algorithm

Order jobs on each machine by their

efficiency

Efficiency of job on machine is:

The ratio between job’s best

processing time to its processing time

on this machine

PoA of algorithm is O(log m)

Page 29: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Equilibrium Improves

?

B

C

A

? ?

Page 30: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Efficiency Based Algorithm

Unfortunately – pure NE may not

exist

Iterative improvement may cycle

Modified algorithm guarantees

convergence and pure NE with PoA

of O(log^2 m)

Page 31: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Modified Algorithm

Each machine simulate log m submachines

(by round robin)

Submachine k of machine j handles jobs on

efficiency between 2^{-k} and 2^{-k+1}

Jobs are ordered on submachine by

Shortest-First

PoA of algorithm is O(log^2 m)

Page 32: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Summary

Coordination Mechanism: Influence on the quality of the equilibrium

Unrelated Machines: m – lower bound Shortest-First is at least m Local order by efficiency O(log m) –

optimal Pure + Convergence O(log^2 m)

Page 33: Algorithms and Economics of Networks: Coordination Mechanisms

Discussion and Open ProblemsNon ordering strategies – get below log m

Extend to network routing

Show more effective usage of coordination mechanism