allan j. kuethe - the pacification campaign on the riohacha frontier, 1772-1779

The Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier, 1772-1779Author(s): Allan J. KuetheReviewed work(s):Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Aug., 1970), pp. 467-481Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2512192 .Accessed: 02/08/2012 15:42

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The Pacification Campaign on the Riohacha Frontier, 1772-1779

ALLAN J. KUETHE*

URING TUE LATE colonial period, royal government in the Viceroyalty of New Granada conducted vigorous pacification campaigns against hostile Indians on two

separate frontiers. The better known of these endeavors was waged in the Isthmus of Darien beginning in 1785.1 The other was launched during the preceding decade in the province of Riohacha. Until the present that action has remained obscure, and it is the subject of the present article.

The campaigns in New Granada were only part of a widespread intensification of frontier operations in the Spanish Empire during the closing decades of the eighteenth century. In New Spain, for example, the royal government conducted extensive actions on the northern frontier, which Teodoro de Croix highlighted with his pacification efforts, 1776-1783, as commandant general of the Interior Provinces. And in Rio de la Plata the authorities waged a wide variety of operations in Mendoza, Cordoba, and Buenos Aires, from the 1770s into the last decade of the century.3 The distinguishing characteristic of these new frontier actions was the preponderant role played by military force, betraying an increasingly secular approach to the problem of unpacified Indians. The late eighteenth-century campaigns involved large contingents of armed forces, frequently used in an offensive capacity, while missionaries, who had traditionally borne the main responsibility for pacification, found themselves rele- gated to a secondary position at best. The frontier campaign in the province of Riohacha provides an interesting illustration of such a shift in emphasis.

Riohacha was located on New Granada's Caribbean coast between

*The author is Assistant Professor of History at Texas Tech University. 1 Manuel Luengo Mufioz, "Genesis de las expediciones militares al Dari6n en

1785-86," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XVIII (Sevilla, 1961), 333-416. 2 Alfred B. Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and the Northern Frontier of New

Spain, 1776-1783 (Norman, 1941). 8 Jorge Comadran Ruiz, " IEn Torno al problema del Indio en el Rio de la

Plata," Anuario de Estudios Americanos, XII (Seville, 1955), 39-74.

468 HAHR I AUGUST I ALLAN J. KUETHE

the provinces of Santa Marta in the west and Maracaibo in the east. The northern coast of the viceroyalty was of primary military im- portance to the Spanish Empire, both because it shielded transpor- tation routes into the upland interior and because it lay near the strategic crossroads to the Pacific Ocean, the Isthmus of Panama. Long afflicted by foreign marauders, the coastal area experienced direct attack during the War of Jenkins' Ear at the hands of Spain's foremost colonial rival, Great Britain, which scored preliminary victories on the Isthmus of Panama and then in 1741 launched a full- scale assault upon the city of Cartagena. The viceroyalty managed to repulse that invasion, but the margin of victory was dangerously small, and Spain remained fearful that her archenemy might strike again at South America through New Granada. The British capture of Havana in 1762 during the Seven Years' War reinforced that concern, and thereafter the security of the Caribbean provinces, including Riohacha, took on additional significance.4

For military purposes, Riohacha formed part of the Commandancy General of Cartagena, as did Santa Marta. Cartagena was the key defense base and stronghold of coastal New Granada, and following the Seven Years' War Spain maintained from one to two battalions of regular troops there on a permanent basis as part of an intensified defense program. In addition, the crown often supplemented these forces with rotating battalions, based in Spain, but dispatched to America in time of need. Cartagena frequently had to share its troops with the commandancy general 's subsidiary provinces, although Santa Marta normally maintained a contingent of several companies in its own right. Riohacha, however, did not possess a separate regular garrison.5

The source of Indian trouble in Riohacha was the Guajiros, who occupied most of the province and had long resisted efforts to fasten royal control upon them. They were a nomadic people, dependent mainly upon cattle herding, hunting, and gathering, and their mobil- ity and the geographical features of the region made them nearly im- mune to outside conquest. They lived on a dry, open grassland spotted by trees and streams. To the south rugged hill and mountain country afforded a refuge in case of danger. Here the Guajiros could easily detect and elude invaders and at the same time command an excellent position for counterattack. Against this tribe the govern-

4 Allan James Kuethe, " The Military Reform in the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 1773-1796" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1967), chapter 1.

5 Ibid. 6 A valuable description of the Guajiros and their domain can be found in

THE PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN ON THE RIOHACHA FRONTIER 469

ment could maintain only one stronghold in the area, the coastal city of Riohacha on the western fringe of the province; elsewhere, and especially on the Guajira Peninsula which extends northeastward from that city, the Indians were firmly in control.

While there were troublesome Indians other than those around Riohacha, the authorities had come to regard the Guajiros as a special menace to the security of the viceroyalty because they commanded the coast and particularly because they had formed a close relation- ship with citizens of Spain's dangerous rival, Great Britain.7 On the one hand, they defied and harassed the local Spanish authorities at will. On the other hand, they were known to maintain a thriving com- merce with English and Dutch merchants from whom they obtained ample quantities of firearms and other supplies. Worse, during the Seven Years' War the Guajiros were believed to have provided some 600 head of beef to the British Caribbean fleet.8 These circumstances were intolerable and seemed to call for military punishment. Rio- hacha was in effect a dangerous soft spot in the viceroyalty's line of coastal defenses.

Viceroy Manuel Guirior, who assumed office in 1772, devised a major pacification program for the Guajiro Indians. His plan consisted of concerted action from three sources: the armed forces, missionaries, and colonists. In his scheme of operations he assigned a preponderant role to the military, which was to occupy strategic locations within hostile territory, construct and garrison fortified towns, and then from these bases coerce the Indians into an acceptable pat- tern of life. Behind this protective shield would function missionaries to propagate the Catholic faith and Spanish culture and colonists to populate the land and promote its economic development. Guirior's program followed nearly a century of unsuccessful efforts to subdue the Guajiros, first in the missionary field and then by outright military conquest. The events surrounding these failures merit consideration because both efforts influenced his program.

Just before the beginning of the eighteenth century, Capuchin missionaries had undertaken the pacification of the Guajiros by conversion. While at times during the ensuing decades this action may

Eliseo Reclus, Viaje a la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, CXII (Bogota', 1947), 81-97.

' Francisco Antonio Moreno y Escandon, "Estado del virreinato de Santafe, Nuevo Reino de Granada, .... afio de 1772," Boletin de Historia y Antigiedades, XXIII (Bogota', 1936), 564-567, 572-577.

8 Governor Antonio de Narvavez y la Torre to Viceroy Manuel Flores, Riohacha, August 6, 1779, in Jose Felix Blanco and Ram6n Azpuruia (comps.), Documentos para la historia de la vida pixhlica del Libertador . . . (Caracas, 1875-1878), I, 187-188.

470 HAIR I AUGUST I ALLAN J. KUETHE

have given the government a small inroad into the province, it was nevertheless far from successful. Even the missionaries themselves soon shed their illusions about the extent of their progress and frequently lamented that they served no other purpose than bearing witness to Guajiro insolence and mischief.9 Moreover, they and a small number of settlers who also managed to enter the region were there only upon the sufferance of the Guajiros and lived in constant danger of some day falling victim to their wrath.

An abrupt turn for the worse came in 1769 during the administration of Viceroy Pedro Messia de la Cerda. A band of Guajiro warriors, selected by Governor Geronimo de Mendoza from mission villages to punish a troublesome neighboring Cocino tribe, turned their wrath instead against the government and precipitated a general uprising. With mission Indians in the vanguard, the Guajiros quickly cleared their lands of intruders. They expelled the Capuchins, de- stroying six of eight missions, and they murdered many loyal vassals, sparing neither woman nor child. Soon the Guajiros had re-established full hegemony over the province and threatened the stronghold of Riohacha itself.10

Faced by this disastrous collapse of mission endeavors in Riohacha, Viceroy Messia de la Cerda expressed in his reaction de mando, 1772, his profound disillusionment with the traditional mission system for subduing frontier areas. He lamented that for the past century the missions of New Granada had remained stagnant, neither expanding nor producing lasting results, and further noted that catechized Indians were prone to flee back into the wilderness and revert to their savage, pagan ways. He blamed this failure not on any want of government fiscal or moral support but rather on a lack of evangelical fervor and vocational dedication by the missionaries themselves. Con- sequently, he advised his successor, Manuel Guirior, to be very care- ful if he intended to recover the lost ground."-

Among those who were impatient with frontier stagnation at this- I Antonio de Ale.(cer, Las misiones capuchinas en el Nuevo Reino de Granada,

hoy Colombia (1648-1820) (Bogota, 1959), 44, 52, 56-59, 138-139. 10 Mendoza to Messia de la Cerda, Riohacha, May 27, June 8, July 9, August,

1769, January 27, and March 26, 1770, Archivo Nacional de Colombia, Milicia y Marina (cited hereinafter as ANC, MM), vol. 138, fols. 839-844, 868-869, 871- 872, 968-972, 974-980, 1046-1068, and 1072-1082; Governor Manuel Herrera Leyba to Messia de la Cerda, Santa Marta, July 19, 1769, ibid., fols. 982-983; Alcacer, Las misiones capuchinas, 166-168; Moreno y Escand6n, "Estado del virreinato," 562.

'1 Pedro Messia de la Cerda, "Relacion del estado del virreinato de Santa Fe . . . 1772," Relaciones de mando: memories presentadas por los gobernantes del Nuevo Reino de Granada, Eduardo Posada and Pedro Maria Ibafiez (eds.) Biblioteca de Historia Nacional, VIII (Bogota, 1910), 97-98.


time was Francisco Moreno y Escandon, fiscal protector de indios of the royal audiencia. In a 1772 report on the state of the viceroyalty, he agreed point by point with the viceroy's evaluation of the missions.12 To contend with the problem, he advocated a larger role for military force, although recognizing that restrictions in the laws of the Indies made recourse to arms unacceptable as a general frontier policy :13

Because of the experience that the gentle leniency of admonishments, far from producing the desired end of conversion, serves rather as cause for insolence to these barbarians and to those whom they shelter, the gravity of these evils so deeply rooted in the body politic of the viceroyalty does not admit to any solution other than the chastisement of arms.

He went on to postulate that "fortunately" military rigor could be invoked against the Guajiros with good conscience because of the heinous nature of their crimes. Their excesses included, he said, re- bellion and forsaking the faith, corrupting innocent Indians, usurping the property of loyal vassals, and especially consorting with foreign enemies of the crown.'4 Significantly, military punishment was not applied as a general instrument of frontier policy in New Granada during the following years, but was restricted to the Guajiros (and later the Cunas of Darien), whose crimes were most grievous and who posed a genuine threat to the state. Meanwhile, the mission in its traditional form continued to function on the inland frontiers of the viceroyalty.

There was also serious doubt in 1772 about the utility of outright military conquest as a pacification technique, because of an unsuccessful attempt at mass invasion of the Guajiro territory in the previous year. When hostilities began in 1769, the neighboring provinces of Santa Marta and Maracaibo had sent Riohacha reinforcements to bolster a local citizens' militia defending the capital; and when the Guajiro menace displayed no indication of abating, the authorities in Cartagena dispatched 100 regulars.15 Initially, these troops were designated for defensive action while the government tried to persuade the Guajiros to cease their belligerence.'6 Much to the con-

12 Moreno y Escand6n, "cEstado del virreinato,'" 559-560. 13 Ibid., 575-577. 14 Ibid. lb Mendoza to Messia de la Cerda, Riohacha, May 27, June 8, June 10, July 9,

July 19, and August 1769, ANC, MM, vol. 138, fols. 839-844, 868-869, 871-872, 968-972, 974-980, 982-983; Governor Fernando Morillo Velarde to Messia de la (Cerda, Cartagena, October 11, 1769, and June 7, 1770, ANC, MM, vol. 65, fols. 576-582, 759-762.

's Mendoza to Messia de la Cerda, Riohacha, August, 1769, ANC, MM, vol.


sternation of the authorities, these endeavors proved unsuccessful, and the state of hostility endured into the year 1771.

Governor Geronimo de Mendoza, his successor Francisco de Baraya, and the governor of Santa Marta, Manuel Herrera Leyba, all advised Viceroy Messia de la Cerda that recourse to military action was the only plausible solution to the problem.'7 With Cartagena, the regional stronghold, garrisoned by only a battalion of regulars, however, the viceroy did not have adequate forces at his disposal to attempt such action. A Spanish rotating unit, the Battalion of Savoy, arrived early in 1771, but Spain had dispatched these reinforcements to New Granada during a war scare, when alerts had been sent to both Cartagena and the viceregal capital, Santa Fe de Bogota. There- fore, although he initiated preparations for a major expedition, the viceroy was unable to authorize an immediate departure.18

Finally, on August 30, 1771, he ordered to Riohacha an expedition of 500 regulars, 400 of these from the newly arrived battalion, the remainder from the fixed garrison of Cartagena.19 He gave command of the enterprise to Colonel Benito Encio from the Battalion of Savoy. Although Messia de la Cerda instructed Encio first to seek peaceful solutions, the viceroy dispatched the force on the assumption that it would be required to administer a sound beating to the Guajiros, and that in so doing it would teach them respect for Spanish arms and authority as well as the value of peaceful habits.20 The troops left Cartagena by sea on November 3 and arrived in Riohacha two weeks later.2'

By local standards of the time, the assemblage of military power which gathered in Riohacha during the autumn of 1771 was impressive. In addition to the main expeditionary force, Encio had at his disposal 200 regulars already there, 150 from Cartagena, the re-

138, fols. 968-972; Governor Francisco de Baraya to de la Sierra, Riohacha, June 26, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fol. 644.

17 Mendoza to Messia de la Cerda, Riohacha, June 8, 1769, ANC, MM, vol. 138, fols. 839-844; Herrera Leyba to Messia de la Cerda, Santa Marta, July 19, 1769, ibid., fols. 982-983; Baraya to de la Sierra, Riohacha, Julne 26, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fol. 644.

18 Baraya to de la Sierra, Riohacha, June 26, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fol. 644; Governor Gregorio de la Sierra to Messia de la Cerda, Cartagena, August 11, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 643, 646.

19 Instructions for Colonel Benito Encio by de la Sierra, Cartagena, October 30-31, 1771, ANC, MM, vol. 9, fols. 186-203.

20 Ibid.; Manuel Guirior, "lRelaci6n del estado del Nuevo Reino de Granada 1776," Relaciones de mando, 177.

21 "Respuestas que da el coroner del Regimiento de Savoya Josef Benito Encio a las interrogaciones," Riohacha, October 12, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 508-511.


mainder from Santa Marta, as well as roughly 340 activated militiamen.22 But the Guajiros' strength was impressive too. Contemporary estimates placed their number between 30,000 and 40,000, approxi- mately 10,000 of these warriors armed with British weapons.23 Prior to the arrival of the expedition, discussions had dealt mainly with the necessity of drastic military action; now, somewhat belatedly, the question shifted to whether the expeditionary force, for all its size, was actually capable of accomplishing its mission.

To the dismay of Viceroy Messia de la Cerda, Colonel Encio concluded after a preliminary appraisal that an offensive was impossible. This judgment was due both to the difficult nature of the terrain and to the size of the Guajiro opposition. He estimated that at least 2,000 first-class troops would be required for an effective invasion of the Guajira Peninsula, and that this maneuver would in itself accomplish nothing if retreat routes into the backland mountains were not blocked beforehand. This was a task for which there were not sufficient military forces in the whole viceroyalty. An invasion with a smaller force would pose an unacceptable danger because in all like- lihood the Guajiros would cut off its own avenues of retreat and de- stroy it. Therefore, Colonel Encio resolved to take no action. Sub- sequent urgings had no effect on him, including a scathing denunci- ation from the commandant general of Cartagena, Gregorio de la Sierra, who in effect accused the colonel of ineptitude, cowardice, and dereliction of duty.24 Events were at this juncture when Manuel Guirior arrived at Cartagena in June 1772, and was advised by his embarrassed predecessor that the viceroyalty did not possess sufficient strength to conquer the Guajiros.25 Guirior was left to find a work- able solution.

The new viceroy addressed himself to his inherited problem with vision and energy heretofore unknown on the Guajiro frontier. Dis- covering from preliminary investigations that by the middle of 1772 the Guajiros had begun to desist from their hostilities, he quickly sought new accommodations with them. First he replaced Encio with

22 Ibid. 23 Francisco Silvestre, Descripcio6n del reyno de Santa Fe de Bogota', o,qritta

en 1789, Biblioteca Popular de Cultura Colombiana, CXXI (Bogota, 1950), 60; Antonio de Narvaez y la Torre, "Relaci6n, o informe de la provincia de Santa Marta, y Riohacha. . . ." Escritos de dos economistas coloniales, Sergio Elias Ortiz (ed.) (Bogota, 1965), 36.

24De la Sierra to Messia de la Cerda, Cartagena, April 11, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 70, fols. 227-236; "Respuestas que da el coroner del Regimiento de Savoya Josef Benito Encio a las interrogaciones," Riohacha, October 12, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 70, fols. 227-236; Guirior, "Relaci6n," 177.

2 Messla de la Cerda, "IRelaci6n," 114-115.


Antonio de Arevalo, colonel of engineers at Cartagena and one of the most capable public servants in the viceroyalty, and in November dispatched him to Riohacha. In compliance with viceregal instructions, Commander Arevalo issued a general pardon, presented gifts as peace offerings, and, upon finding that these measures were having the desired effect, disbanded the bulk of the expeditionary force.26 He also conducted an investigation into the causes of the 1769 uprising and concluded that a large portion of blame fell to former Governor Geronimo de Mendoza and several henchmen, who were guilty of corruption and abuse of authority. The viceroy fined them accordingly.27

With outright military conquest impossible and the mission technique uncertain, Guirior took advantage of the lull to inaugurate a fresh pacification approach which assigned a role to the armed forces commensurate to their limited potential, and which afforded the friars a surer basis for operations. The plan established three fortified towns garrisoned by troops and under Arevalo's supervision: Bahia Honda, on the northern point of the peninsula, a former center of Guajiro trade, and because of good port facilities a departure point for activities east; Sinamaica, on the eastern side of the peninsula just inland from the Gulf of Venezuela; and Pedraza, in the interior of the province east of Riohacha. For each of these the government recruited colonists to serve as a counterbalance to the Indian popu- lation as well as to help define the locality and form the basis for a new society. By 1775 these three locations possessed a total of 231 families.28 For the Indians, four mission villages were rebuilt and four new centers were founded.29 In 1775 twenty Capuchin missionaries arrived to staff these and several other settlements remaining from the pre-1769 era.30

The military's function within the new program consisted largely of a holding action or what might be called a "defensive offense."

20 Arevalo to Guirior, Riohacha, December 26, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 93, fol. 190; idem to idem, Riohacha, January 26, 1773, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 836- 838; idem to idem, Riohacha, April 12, 1773, ANC, MM, vol. 97, fol. 248; "Estado de fuerza de la tropa al regresar," Riohacha, May 4, 1773, ibid., fol. 257; Guirior, "Relaci6n," 178; Alcacer, Las missions capuchinas, 202.

" Arevalo to Guirior, Riohacha, May 26, 1773, ANC, MM, vol. 97, fols. 235, 242; Secretary of the Viceroy Pedro de Ureta to Arevalo, Santa Fe, August 15, 1773, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fol. 721; Guirior, "IRelacion," 176-177.

28 "Estado que manifiesta la tropa, milicias, y fundadores que existen en las nuevas fundaciones," Riohacha, September 11, 1775, ANC, MM, vol. 138, fol. 1051.

29Guirior, "IRelacion, " 176, 178-179. 30I Informe a S[u] M[ajestad] del P[adre] Pedro de Altea, prefecto de las

misiones, 1788," in Alcacer, Las mnisiones capuchinas, 210-213, 226.


The method was to occupy a strategic location, fortify it, wait until the opposition had grown weary, and then gradually assert the authority of arms. This system envisioned punishing only individuals or small groups committing misdeeds and abandoned any hope of chastising the Guajiro nation as a whole. A primary aim was to divorce the Indians from foreign influence and by so doing eventually sway them to their rightful ruler. Military detachments were also provided for the missions, where in addition to taking charge of general security they assisted in conducting entradas to lure Indians into the missions.31 The operations, being essentially defensive, required fewer troops than originally allotted for all-out conquest, but subsequent events were to prove that the authorities went too far in military cut-backs.

Although relations remained uneasy, the Guajiros seemed inclined to give the government another chance. Their motive for doing so, however, is not entirely clear. They may have merely grown weary of hostilities; they may have been placated by government promises; or they may have been intimidated by the military buildup under Encio. In view of the local power ratio, the latter possibility would seem unlikely except that throughout this period, unless they enjoyed an overwhelmingly superior position, the Guajiros consistently chose to back down in the face of opposition rather than risk casualties. Whatever the explanation, many had already indicated a willingness to return to their villages prior to Arevalo's coming. Recalling that Viceroy Messia de la Cerda had admonished him first to seek peaceful solutions, Colonel Encio shortly before being relieved dared claim to have accomplished his mission on that basis.32 Subsequently, Guirior and Arevalo claimed for themselves the credit for the pacification, apparently on the pretense that their peace initiative had produced sincerer pledges from the Indians than those obtained by Encio. The crown duly congratulated both for their achievements.33

In spite of apparent successes in establishing a government foot- hold, the commanding authorities during the Guirior administration did not have enough confidence in the military position to try correc- tive action. In 1774 the newly appointed governor, Josef Galluzo, requested authority to deal with the persistent Guajiro insolence and smuggling. Arevalo, the commander of the expedition, who had returned to duties in Cartagena, but retained his Riohacha appointment

" Guirior, " Relaci6n, " 179. 82 Eneio to Guirior, Riohacha, July 26, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 93, fols. 154-155;

idem to idem, Riohacha, September 28, 1772, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 767-768. 3 Julian de Arriaga to Guirior, Spain, December 18, 1773, ANC, MM, vol.

124, fols. 422-425.

476 HAUR I AUGUST I ALLAN J. KUETHE

with authority over the governor, severely admonished Galluzo to exercise forbearance, reminding him that disciplinary measures might provoke retaliation and endanger the entire enterprise. Until the government had a tight grip on the region, he said, the military must act primarily to protect the various agents of the crown. Meanwhile the governor would have to permit the Guajiros to continue their abominations. This order was emphatically sustained by Viceroy Guirior.34

The exercise of forbearance at the outset was indeed a realistic policy. A military presence in the province was the key to the con- duct of the whole venture and vital to colonists and missionaries alike. If all the Guajiros were aroused, they would surely be more than the armed forces could handle, and premature engagements, if unsuccessful, might discredit the military and even precipitate a re- enactment of 1769. One of the major advantages of the Spanish was that the Guajiros seldom if ever acted in concert. With time, tribal divisions might be widened by the isolation of hostile groups. How- ever, the authorities never reached this point. Before they could substantially expand their influence and win the confidence of significant portions of the Guajiros, the expeditionary force did suffer serious defeat. The pacification-colonization effort never recovered from it.

The military reverse arose out of an attempt in late 1775 to establish a fourth fortified town at a site called Apiesi, on the eastern side of the peninsula between Bahia Honda and Sinamaica. There, efforts to persuade the local Indians to accept missionaries had been unsuccessful, and the authorities hoped that a new stronghold nearby might induce them to reconsider.35 Commander Arevalo went to Riohacha himself to supervise plans for the enterprise and, when all was ready, he returned to Cartagena, leaving Governor Galluzo in immediate command.36 Accompanied by some 300 troops, forty-three of whom were regulars, Galluzo began his march from Bahia Honda to Apiesi on December 3. Ominous warnings soon reached him, however, that hostile warriors awaited in ambush along the trail, and that lie would be the special target of their weapons, because they feared that he was coming to seize their lands.

34 Galluzo to Arevalo, Riohacha, January 30, 1774, ANC, MM, vol. 119, fols. 40-42; Arevalo to Galluzo, Cartagena, February 11, 1774, ibid., fols. 36-37; Arevalo to Guirior, Cartagena, February 11, 1774, ibid., fol. 43; Ureta to Arevalo, Santa Fe, March 15, 1774, ibid., fol. 35.

" Arevalo to Guirior, Riohacha, September 10, 1775, ANC, MM, vol. 138, fols. 1048-1055.

"'T''lnfo-me a SFul M[ajestad] del P[adre] Pedro de Altea, prefeeto de las misiones, 1788," in Alefaer, Las misiones capuchinas, 213.


As a precaution, the governor changed the march to an alternate route, but to no avail. On December 6 the expedition found its ad- vance blocked by felled trees. Some 1,000 warriors appeared on a nearby llill-top.37 So confronted, Galluzo stood firm, ordered his troops to reopen the trail, and dispatched a message to the Guajiros asking why they defied him. The following morning, two chiefs, one each from the Apiesi and Macuira factions of the Guajiro people, came forward to answer him. Their English and Dutch friends, they said, had advised them that the purpose of his mission was to estab- lisb a stronghold which would be used to stop their foreign trade, disarm them, and then dominate them. Counsel received from Indians dwelling within pacified localities corroborated this information. Un- able to deny the charges, Galluzo replied that he was determined to proceed in spite of their opposition, and that he had brought military forces in anticipation of just such an eventuality. The warriors withdrew rather than risk battle. The expedition then continued its march and on the same day found a suitable location for an establishment. Although several more warnings of Guajiro displeasure arrived, Galluzo started construction at once.

In spite of the safe arrival, the danger had not passed. The following morning the Indian leadership further tested the governor's resolve. A messenger warned Galluzo to give up his quest; if not, the Indians threatened to block the exit trails and begin hostilities. Galluzo remained undaunted, however, and advised the Indians to accept the fact that the Spaniards were there to stay, that they could continue the fight for years, and that in the long run the Indians would suffer greater losses than the Spaniards. Later the same morning Galluzo received a second message announcing that the Guajiro leadership had decided on war, but once again he remained calm. He replied that the Guajiros would be received as they came, whether in war or in peace.

At this juncture, events seemed more promising, for, having gained nothing by their threats, the Guajiros momentarily backed down. In a complete reversal of tactics, the chiefs admitted that war would accomplish nothing, because the Spaniards could not be prevented from ultimately establishing themselves as masters. Moreover, the chiefs went so far as to offer their services in constructing the stronghold. Although skeptical of their motives, Galluzo accepted their labor, and without incident the construction was completed by De- cember 15, including a wall, church, and interior buildings. His mission apparently accomplished, the governor assigned ninety men to

" This estimate could well have been exaggerated.

478 HAHR I AUGUST I ALLAN J. KUETIHE

the stronghold, including the regulars, and also left a missionary to care for their spiritual well-being. He departed with the bulk of his forces for Bahia Honda and from there proceeded to Riohacha.38

As soon as he had left, the Guajiros attacked. They demolished the new establishment, decimated the garrison, and murdered the missionary. Only twelve regulars and twenty-one militiamen made their way back to Bahia Honda.39 Although not apparent at the moment, the Apiesi episode was the beginning of the end for the Rio- hacha pacification-colonization venture. The defeat severely dimin- ished the reputation of Spanish arms, and the whole fragile structure began to collapse. Throughout the province Guajiros displayed new arrogance and hostility. In the missionary settlements, Indians threatened to kill the priests and burn their churches.40 Fearful for the missionaries' safety, the local director of the Capuchin order permitted those in danger to seek refuge in the city of Riohacha." Meanwhile, Arevalo returned to the peninsula. In anticipation of a general uprising, he undertook the construction of additional bat- teries and fortifications in the strongholds, while the governors of Santa Marta and Cartagena sent replacements and reinforcements.42

In June 1776 Arevalo dispatched an expedition of 325 men to punish the Indians responsible for the Apiesi disaster, but the action produced little reason for satisfaction. As Colonel Encio had pre- dicted, when the Indians were confronted by strength, they merely faded into the backlands. The whole venture netted only twenty-five victims. This time, however, the government forces did successfully establish a fortified city north of Apiesi at Sabana del Valle, but the accomplishment did little to restore civilian confidence.'3 Indeed, uncertainties multiplied, as horrifying accounts spread concerning

S Diary of Galluzo, November 20-December 16, 1775, ANC, MM, vol. 140, fols. 402-411; "Informe a S[u] M[ajestad] del P[adre] Pedro de Altea, prefecto de las misiones, 1788,'' in Alcalcer, Las misiones capuchinas, 213-214.

39 Ibid., Galluzo to Arevalo, Riohacha, February 12, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 387-391.

40Prai Miguel de Pamplona to Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores, Maracaibo, April 11, 1776, in Alcacer, Las misiones capuchinas, 218.

" Ibid., 215, 218. 42 Arevalo to Flores, Riohacha, March 17, and March 26, 1776, ANC, MM,

vol. 140, fols. 415-435; Governor Nicola's Diaz de Perea to Flores, Santa Marta, March 19, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 96, fols. 335-337; Governor Juan Pimienta to Flores, Cartagena, March 26, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 65, fols. 1115-1120.

4"Arevalo to Flores, Riohacha, April 7, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 140, fols. 388-389; Pimienta to Flores, Cartagena, April 12, April 26, and May 11, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 119, fols. 45-51; Arevalo to Pimienta, Riohacha, June 26, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 119, fols. 145-146; "Informe a S [u] M [ajestad] dcel P [adre] Pedro de Altea, prefecto de las misiones, 1788,'' in Alcacer, Las misiones capuchinas, 214-215.


the fate of deserters fallen victim to roving Guajiro bands.44 Fearful colonists began fleeing their settlements, and in view of the continuing danger, the Capuchin missionaries sharply curtailed their endeavors. Most of the priests, still only recent arrivals, transferred to other localities never again to return.45 Thereafter, in addition to serving the fortified cities, missionaries maintained only two settlements, Boronato and Camarones. Both of these were relatively advanced centers, directly supported by the military; neither was burned in 1769.46

After the reverses of 1775-1776 the pacification campaign never recaptured the initiative. Some local officials favored a substantial military buildup in hope of recovering lost ground some day, but for the most part the authorities in Santa Fe ignored such entreaties. Fearful that a large-scale deployment of troops from Cartagena might endanger its security, Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores, who succeeded Guirior in early 1776, firmly insisted on limiting regular troops from that stronghold to merely 200 men, not enough to renew the struggle.47 Efforts were made to improve the local militia, but it alone could not be relied upon for major military operations.48 Yet in the short run, although the Spanish won no new major victories, they did not lose any additional ground either.

Actually, it was not the Guajiros themselves who finally destroyed the pacification project but military demands elsewhere. Spain's entrance into the War of American Independence in 1779 precipitated an extensive reduction of military commitments in Riohacha with a corresponding curtailment of the entire frontier project. Upon viceregal order the detachment from Cartagena withdrew, leaving only forty regulars from Santa Marta. Without the core forces, there was little hope that all the establishments could be defended and indeed

Narvaez, "IRelacion, " 39-40; Arevalo to Flores, Cartagena, September 11, 1776, ANC, MM, vol. 140, fols. 659-661.

46 I IEstado actual de las misiones . . . ano de 1788," in Alcacer, Las misiones

capuchinas, 229; ibid., 219-226; Diaz Perea to Flores, Santa Marta, January 4, 1777, ANC, MM, vol. 99, fols. 531-532.

41 "Estado de la tropa de las nuevas fundaciones," Governor Ramon de Garcia tie Leon y Pizarro, Riohacha, July 25, 1777, ANC, MM, vol. 99, fol. 299; "Informe a S[u] M[ajestad] del P[adre] Pedro de Altea, prefecto de las nisiones, 1788,'' in Alcacer, Las misiones capuchinas, 211-212.

4 Ramon Garcia de Leon y Pizarro to Flores, Riohacha, July 12, and July 26, 1777, ANC, MM, vol. 99, fols. 294-296, 298-301.

48 Governor Antonio de Narvaez y la Tonre to Flores, Santa Marta, April 19, 1777, ANC, MM, vol. 95, fols. 276-282; "Estado de fuerza del ejercito," Santa Marta and Riohacha, Narvaez, August 1784, ANC, MM, vol. 101, fols. 445-446; Narvaez to Flores, Santa Marta, October 26, 1784, ANC, MM, vol. 124, fols. 229-230.

480 HAHPR I AUGUST I ALLAN J. KUETHE

a very real danger that they might fall into enemy hands. Conse- quently, the remaining expeditionary force tightened its defense line to run from Sinamaica to Pedraza to Riohacha across the base of the peninsula and totally abandoned and destroyed both Bahia Honda and Sabana del Valle.49 The colonists of the two evacuated settlements along with those of Pedraza were discharged, and Sinamaica retained only a reduced number.50 Although throughout the war local militia conducted patrolling actions to hamper British extrac- tion of beef supplies, the upland peninsula largely regressed to un- abated Guajiro activity and foreign influence.5'

In the postwar era Riohacha never regained the prominent position in the frontier policy of the viceroyalty which it had occupied during the previous decade. Rather, attention turned toward the Isthmus of Darien. The vital geographical position of the Isthmus and its deteriorating position caused the government to undertake a colonization-pacification campaign almost identical with that waged against the Guajiros. During that action Riohacha fell into the back- ground and was allowed to stagnate, although at the end of the war one unsuccessful effort had been made to reestablish the government position. That effort came in 1783 when a 100-man force attempted to reclaim Bahia Honda and Sabana del Valle, only to be destroyed by Indian attack. Motivated again by fear of a general uprising, the authorities dispatched a punitive and security expedition of 300 men, similar to those of the preceding decade.52 It was withdrawn without significant accomplishment in 1785, however, when plans for operations in Darien were activated.53 Thereafter the eastern frontier of the viceroyalty was guarded mainly by local militia, which manned the defense line along the base of the peninsula from Sinamaica to the city of Riohacha.

The Spanish did not liquidate remains of the pacification program until 1790, during the economy-minded regime of Viceroy Jose de Espeleta. At that time the Santa Fe government abandoned the central stronghold of Pedraza and transferred Sinamaica in the east

4 Narvdez to Flores, Santa Marta, October 6, 1779, and May 26, 1780, ANC, MM, vol. 117, fols. 943-964; idem to idem, Santa Marta, December 29, 1780, ANC, MM, vol. 101, fols. 823, 826.

'0Idem to idem, Santa Marta, May 26, 1780, ANC, MM, vol. 117, fols. 951- 952.

6' Idem to idem, Santa Marta, March 1781, ANC, MM, vol. 49, fol. 681. 2 Colonel Anastasio Zejudo to Viceroy Antonio Caballero y G6ngora, Rio-

hacha, January 23, 1785, ANC, MM, vol. 30, fol. 222; Aledeer, Las misiones capi'chinas, 227.

"' Narvaez to Caballero y Gongora, Santa Marta, November 24, 1785, ANC, MM, vol. 120, fols. 263, 275.

THE PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN ON TIHE RIOHACHA FRONTIER 481

to the jurisdiction of the recently created Captaincy General of Cara- cas.54 The withdrawal from Pedraza amounted to the last step in returning the Guajira Peninsula to the aboriginals and their British allies. Thereafter the city of Riohacha became the western barrier against Guajiro penetration, and government influence over the peninsula itself was almost nonexistent.55

When all factors are taken into consideration, the significance of the events in Riohacha lies not in lasting pacification but in the shift of frontier policy toward a more overt acceptance of military coer- cion. Outright conquest had to be abandoned as a course of action because it did not work. But the system of fortified towns initiated by Guirior rested upon armed intimidation to such an extent that when Spanish weakness became obvious, hopes disappeared for lasting pacification of the peninsula. In the ensuing decade, the viceroyalty employed a similar system in Darien, complete with fortified towns, military garrisons, and colonists, although with even less missionary participation.56 We do not yet have enough information from an in- stitutional point of view to form hard and fast conclusions about the empire as a whole. Nevertheless, the extensive use of military force on the frontiers of the Interior Provinces and Rio de la Plata indicates that the experience of New Granada may have been typical of a hardening imperial policy.

" Narvdez to the governor of Maracaibo, Riohacha, March 16, 1791, in Blanco, Documentos, I, 233; Alcacer, Las misiones capuchinas, 236.

6 Pedro Mendinueta, "Relacion del estado del Nuevo Reino de Granada . . . 1803," Relaciones de mando, 559-560.

"' Kuethe, " The Military Reform, " chapter 5.

allan j. kuethe - the pacification campaign on the riohacha frontier, 1772-1779

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