1

CJOS COE

Handbook

10/21/2011

Allied Interoperability Handbook

2

The Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of

Excellence (CJOS COE) was established in 2006 to provide a

focal point for Joint Maritime Expeditionary Operations expertise

for allied nations. With 13 nations represented, CJOS COE is the

only Centre of Excellence in the United States and is one of 16

accredited Centers worldwide, representing a collective wealth of

international experience and expertise.

3

Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence

Allied Interoperability Handbook

A Tool to Enhance and Measure

Interoperability

Among NATO Allied/Coalitions and US Navy

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE 5

HOW TO USE GUIDE 8

PART I - COALITION INTEGRATION INTO US NAVY EXERCISES 11

ANNEX 1: PRE- DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST 31

ANNEX 2: USFFC SUBORDINATE COMMANDS 33

ANNEX 3: CSG/ESG COMPOSITION 34

ANNEX 4: FRTP-TRAINING INITIATIVE 35

ANNEX 5: LOGISTICS GUIDE 36

ANNEX 6: COMMUNICATIONS GUIDE 48

PART II - INTEROPERABILITY HANDBOOK 54

ANNEX 1: COALITION INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY RESULTS 58

ANNEX 2: INTEROPERABILITY CHECKLIST 63

ANNEX 3: INTEROPERABILITY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS 80

ANNEX 4: LESSONS LEARNED DATA BASE 83

ANNEX 5: INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 141

PART III – INTEROPERABILITY METRICS-EVALUATING

ALLIED/COALITION USN INTEROPERABILITY 160

ANNEX 1: PREPAREDENESS ASSESSMENT SHEETS 173

ANNEX 2: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SHEETS 210

ANNEX 3: LESSONS LEARNED ASSESSMENT SHEETS 215

5

PREFACE

1. "No matter how large or small your navy or coast guard may be, we all

face similar internal constraints like shrinking budgets, aging equipment, and

populations that may not be attracted to military service. Our level of cooperation

and coordination must intensify in order to adapt to our shared challenges and

constraints. We have no choice in this matter, because I am convinced that

nobody - no nation today - can go it alone, especially in the maritime domain.”

(USN CNO ADMIRAL Michael Mullen 17th International Sea Power Symposium,

21 Sept. 2005, Newport, R.I.)

2. This quote reveals clearly that we need navies to work together efficiently

in order to fulfill Joint missions. This can only be achieved through effective

interoperability.

3. The Coalition arena is a challenging environment in which to operate. The

sometimes ad hoc manner in which Nations come together makes standardizing

doctrine, policy, or operating procedures difficult. As a result the most

burdensome challenge facing Coalitions is interoperability. This can encompass

a plethora of incompatibility issues - doctrine, policy, tactics, language, culture,

automated weapons and information systems... the list continues. Complicating

these issues are politically sensitive matters such as those that preclude one

Nation from working or sharing information directly with another Nation, or

sensitive material handling and releasability concerns.

4. Lack of interoperability permeates all levels of Command and Control. It

can slow the speed of Command and detract from building unity of effort and

purpose. Working outside a common operating environment can lead to

misunderstanding of missions, missed opportunity for decisive military action, or

in extremis “blue on blue” engagement.

5. Based on the above it was decided that Naval Interoperability would

become one of the core tasks of The Combined Joint Operations from the Sea

6

Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Program of Work (POW). Thus the Centre

was tasked by the Steering Committee (SC) to develop the following documents:

a. The Coalition Playbook. Its purpose was to provide guidance and

advice regarding the integration of Allied/Coalition ships into USN

sponsored exercises by discussing, in an easy to use guide format, the

following topics:

i. The role of CJOS COE and USN Commands (US Fleet

Forces Command – Commander Strike Force Fleet Atlantic, etc.).

ii. The general scheme of maneuver.

iii. The exercise events (Initial Planning Conference etc.).

iv. The planning process.

v. The use of Multilateral Agreements.

vi. Carrier Air Ops Specifics and Amphibious Training Specifics

vii. Information exchange in the USN.

viii. Financial issues and deployment checklists.

b. The Allied Interoperability Handbook. Its purpose was to be used by

NATO Allied/Coalition Navies to overcome the most common

interoperability problems. In that framework CJOS COE formed a working

group aimed at studying interoperability between NATO Allied/Coalition

ships involved in exercises taking place off the east coast of the United

States. Over the past year, that group conducted surveys and interviews

with personnel from Allied/Coalition ships as well as USN ships. The

surveys and interviews revealed several interoperability challenges and

concerns. Based on the aforementioned research CJOS COE developed

the Handbook that included the following documentation:

i. An “Interoperability Survey Questionnaire,” used as the

7

primary tool to uncover any interoperability issues.

ii. An “Interoperability Lessons Learned database” which listed

the Lessons Learned from the surveys and interviews conducted on

board the Coalition/Allied ships.

iii An “Interoperability Survey Results paper” that incorporated

those areas noted as successful or noted in need of further

attention and could be used as a benchmark for future operations

among Allied Navies.

iv. An “Interoperability Checklist” which was the distillate of all

the above documents and was to be considered as a user friendly

interoperability guide that approached interoperability issues from a

functional area perspective (planning, operations, communications,

etc.).

c.. The “Interoperability Metrics” which was a tool used to further

enhance and promote the interoperability, and a tool establishing best

practices in the interoperability arena. CJOS COE created a system

measuring Interoperability and the effectiveness of the Allied

Interoperability Handbook. The tool was dealing with the “Evaluation of

Allied/Coalition USN Interoperability” that outlined how CJOS COE would

formalize efforts to continue improving the “Allied Interoperability

Handbook” by assessing the following three aspects:

i. Adherence to the Checklist – It measured how well CJOS

COE, the visiting ships, the host navy, and USN Strike Groups

followed the checklist for each visiting ship. This was a measure of

preparedness; it quantified efforts made to address known

interoperability challenges.

ii. Demonstrated Interoperability – It evaluated the

interoperability of visiting ships with their host Strike Groups during

execution. Clear, objective standards were applied to evaluate how

8

early in an event the interoperability challenges were initially

overcome, as well as recording how well interoperability efforts were

maintained throughout the exercise. These were measures of

effectiveness of the units.

iii. Lessons Learned Again – It analyzed interoperability LL from

each ship to identify reoccurring issues and determined which

could be prevented through adherence to the checklist. This was

another measure of effectiveness of the units but it also provided

feedback on the effectiveness of the checklist.

6. Finally, to further facilitate the cooperation and collaboration among NATO

Allied/Coalition ships and USN ships, it was decided to merge the 3 different

interoperability products ( the Common Playbook, the Interoperability Handbook,

and the Interoperability Metrics) into one document under the name “ALLIED

INTEROPERABILITY HANDBOOK” that will eventually become the ultimate

guide and tool for interoperability on the East Coast.

How to Use Guide

7. The following 10 steps are provided to make the handbook more user-

friendly:

Step 1: Study the Coalition Playbook in order to understand how USN works

and plans. (PART 1 of this Handbook).

Step 2: Follow the Pre-deployment checklist (ANNEX 1).

Step 3: Study the USFFC SUBORDINATE COMMANDS (ANNEX 2) and Carrier

Strike Group /Expeditionary Strike Group Composition (ANNEX 3) and follow the

training program (ANNEX 4).

Step 4: Study the Interoperability Handbook (PART 2) which contains the

Coalition Interoperability Survey results (ANNEX 1) which can create the first

9

impression on what are the areas that need further attention in terms of

Interoperability.

Step 5: Follow the Interoperability Checklist (ANNEX 2) and Schedule of Events

(ANNEX 3) that will guide you safely in your preparations and to aid you in

avoiding interoperability issues.

Step 6: Study and take into consideration the Lessons Learned Data Base

(ANNEX 4).

Step 7: Study and disseminate the Survey Questionnaire to the appropriate

personnel (ANNEX 5) in order to be completed during the collaboration to

ensure all major interoperability issues are easily captured.

Step 8: Study the Evaluation Interoperability paper (PART 3) which clearly

defines what has to be done so interoperability can be measured.

Step 9: Fill out the “Other Entities Commands Preparedness Sheet” prior to the

start of an interoperability exercise. (ANNEX 1).

Step 10: Fill out the “Lessons Learned/Identified Assessment Sheet” (ANNEX 3)

accordingly.

Conclusion

8. Many different projects addressed the issue of interoperability in the past.

In their efforts they managed to reduce some interoperability issues but

unfortunately other problems came up or some of the previous remained and the

past Lessons Learned were sometimes forgotten on the shelves.

9. CJOS COE proposes a new tool, the “Allied Interoperability Handbook”, a

user friendly tool and a living document continuously updated through real life

surveys and interviews.

10

10. CJOS COE believes that this handbook will facilitate interoperability

between Coalition forces. The “Allied Interoperability Handbook” will be there for

use by any Navy, at any time.

11

PART I

COALITION ELEMENT INTEGRATION

INTO US NAVY EXERCISES

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

12

COALITION ELEMENT INTEGRATION INTO US NAVY EXERCISES

References:

A. U.S. National Maritime Strategy

B. CJOS COE MOU – I & E relationships

C. USFF Commander’s guidance

D. USFF Fleet Training Continuum

Introduction

1. The purpose of this document is to provide guidance and advice regarding

the integration of NATO and other allied units into US Navy (USN) sponsored

exercises. Since its establishment in 2006, the Combined Joint Operations from

the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) has played a major role in providing

scheduling and planning support to NATO and allied maritime forces intending to

participate in various USN sponsored exercises (either live or synthetic training

events). CJOS COE, in concert with Commander, US Fleet Forces (CUSFF) and

Commander Strike Force Training Atlantic (CSTFL) are prepared to support the

full spectrum of maritime operations. This would include supporting single ship

and aircraft operations; Joint Maritime Expeditionary Operations at the Task

Group/Task Force or Battle Group level; and augmenting a Combined/Joint

Maritime staff requirement for a Component Commander. For example, recent

training events have included the participation of individual platforms from

multiple nations and staff participation from United Kingdom Maritime Forces,

(UKMARFOR), Strike NATO Forces (SFN), French Maritime Forces

(FRMARFOR), and Standing Naval NATO Forces. This publication will help the

Fleet Planner to understand the variety of training that can be provided for a wide

spectrum of forces and serve as a guide to navigate the scheduling and planning

processes. Potential participants are highly encouraged to request training

assistance and exercise planning support from the Norfolk based team (i.e.

CJOS COE, CSTFL) CJOS COE, CUSFF and CSTFL will help shape a plan that

13

best meets deployment schedules and addresses training objectives. The team

possesses in-depth knowledge and experience in helping allied nations to fully

integrate with US forces and achieve training objectives from combined

operations.

2. CJOS COE and CUSFF will provide a continuous dialogue with Fleet

schedules about the various training opportunities that are being planned for the

Atlantic coast of the United States. This information can be obtained from the

CJOS COE NATO Secret Wide Area Network (NSWAN) website. The main

objective of this website is to inform, educate and facilitate the integration of the

participating non-U.S. group or units by identifying training opportunities well in

advance of a supporting nation’s planning requirements. At your request, CJOS

COE will help to connect your Fleet planning staff with their appropriate

counterparts in the various U.S. Fleet Headquarters. Acceptance and feasibility

of Allied integration remains the exclusive purview of CUSFF or higher U.S.

authority’s decision when warranted.

Note: Any information contained in this document is meant to inform Allies on the

complexities of organizing combined training and staffing exercise support

requests through the US Armed Forces based in the continental US. Nothing in

this document will supplant the actual rules and laws currently in effect within the

US Armed Forces concerning bi-national agreements regarding US. cooperation

with foreign nations. Commander US Fleet Forces reserves the right to accept or

refuse training support to any unit from any country at any time as a result of

national security issues or higher priority national training requirements. It is

strongly recommended that any exercise support request be submitted as early

as possible to CUSFF scheduling staff for consideration and development of

available support.

14

Role of CJOS COE

3. The Director of CJOS COE is also the US Fleet Forces Commander, of

Joint and Fleet Operations. CJOS COE was established and accredited by

NATO to enhance the interoperability of Allied Maritime Forces. The CJOS COE

is privileged to have direct access to US. Fleet commands assigned a specific

role in training maritime forces. CJOS COE has built up extensive knowledge of

the training resources and synergies that can be achieved through an

experienced cadre of NATO fleet experts.

Commander U.S. Fleet Forces - Role and Responsibility in Training

4. Commander US. Fleet Forces is responsible to man, train, equip, and

certify Carrier Strike Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups and independently

deploying units and aircraft. CUSFF forces follow a defined training and

certification process. This training program provides a logical and efficient path

which is designed to ensure each unit or group will achieve the appropriate level

of certification ranging from Major Combat Operations Ready to tailored training

packages based upon specific mission requirements. CUSFF will publish a

quarterly scheduling message which will describe training events for its Fleet

Units and designated Command staff in accordance with US. strategic military

objectives. This message is regularly sent to NATO and other Allied Maritime

Headquarters and is intended to represent a formal invitation to forces willing to

participate in those training events.

Commander Strike Force Training Atlantic (CSFTL) - Fleet Training,

Evaluation, and Certification

5. Principal among the US Navy’s training organizations is CSFTL (located in

Norfolk, VA), the executive agent for CUSFF, responsible for integrated training

and certification of all deploying maritime forces. CSFTL is responsible for

15

scheduling, preparing, planning and executing most of the classroom, live and

synthetic training events. They also provide mentorship to the training audience

during execution and collect performance measures to evaluate progression

toward final certification requirements.

Tactical Training Group Atlantic (TTGL) - Classroom & Collective Fleet

Synthetic Training

6. The Tactical Training Group Atlantic located in Dam Neck, VA conducts

classroom and fleet synthetic training (FST) events. Initially introduced ten years

ago as an experimental capability, FST events have reached a high level of

technological fidelity and interoperability such that these events are now an

integral step in the overall certification continuum of US maritime forces. FST

events are open to coalition forces and in fact rely upon Allied participation.

However, the technical requirements to enable assets to communicate and

participate require modest capital investment and can present a lengthy

integration process. CSFTL is charged with assessing technological issues,

including the training of technical and operational support teams. Establishing a

synthetic training interoperability event normally requires one to two years of

planning especially if this would be initial training for the unit involved.

Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic (EWTGL) - Collective

Training Expeditionary Warfare (Amphibious)

7. EWGTL is located in Little Creek, Joint Expeditionary Base, Virginia and

supports classroom and fleet synthetic training events in concert with TTGL.

They specifically provide specialized support to Amphibious Response Group

(ARG) (Navy) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Marine Corps) training.

16

General Scheme of Maneuver

8. When deciding to deploy abroad to participate in US training events a

participating national military headquarters must provide a clear intention of your

Fleet’s training objectives and also include the desired level of readiness

certification. This information will allow US Fleet Training organizations to

facilitate scheduling of appropriate resources and establish the required levels of

interaction with US Forces in order to accomplish the targeted aims. Additionally,

strategic level headquarters must prepare the requisite diplomatic clearances

well in advance to help identify the lines of authority to coordinate future staff

visits and port/airport visits. Any training event is an excellent opportunity for

nations to validate or improve the interoperability of their own forces with the US

naval and/or joint counterparts. However, in deploying either single units or

many elements making up a Task Group, nations must also consider the mutual

benefit that their forces can contribute to support US training objectives. This is a

critical aspect of Fleet planning and training which if overlooked diminishes the

opportunity for gaining higher level approval of your exercise support request by

the US training audience.

Determining the Right Training Event for Your Deploying Forces

9. Amongst the training events described in the next paragraphs, and based

on the calendar of events published by CUSFF in its quarterly message, the

invited nations may choose an exercise or series of exercises that best fits their

training objectives. Once a decision has been taken regarding the size/type of

military contingent to be committed to training, the requesting nation must

forward an official intention to participate via signal :

TO: COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA and COMSTRKFORTRALANT to

begin the process.

17

Identification of Participating Maritime Forces

10. The Intention to Participate message should specify the precise

composition of the forces including air, surface and subsurface assets. Each

confirmed unit will be expected to forward an OPSTAT UNIT as early as possible

in the planning process in order to confirm operational capabilities and readiness

status forecasted for the actual period of deployment. Normally the Intention to

Participate must be received a minimum of six months in advance of the

schedule exercise. Optimally, this message should be conveyed approximately

one year in advance in order to maximize US resource effort in support of the

participating nation’s training objectives. Early communication will enable

CUSFF to designate and/or allocate the right command element and balance

resources to support and maximize a mutually beneficial training enterprise.

Coordinating Authorities

11. Nations who request training support and participation in US exercises at

single unit level shall seek approval through US Fleet Forces Command. If the

participating Nation desires to deploy additional forces apart from the naval

component (army, air force or marines) the process may take a considerably

longer time to plan and coordinate due to external requests to other services,

seeking their agreement to participate.

12. If the deployed forces are numerous, entail joint expeditionary operations

covering a wide spectrum of activities, or the deployment is of such unusual

nature that it might require coordination of specialized US resources; the

requesting Nation will be asked to forward an official letter between CNO

equivalents, indicating the scope of participation and desired objectives.

Additional time for the CNO staff to provide a response can be anticipated. If time

is critical, nations who have accredited Military and/or Naval Attaché’s resident

18

within their Embassy in the U.S. are advised to contact them at the earliest

opportunity so that they may help facilitate and expedite the request.

Defining Training Objectives

13. The initial Intention to Participate message should detail as much

information as possible regarding training requirements and readiness standards

to be achieved. Nations are expected to initiate dialogue with CUSFF and/or

CSFTL scheduling counterparts in order to amplify the training objectives and

respond to questions which will help clarify the Nation’s training desires.

Reference to the U.S. Universal Naval Task List provides an expeditious means

for foreign planners to articulate national training standards into terminology that

is more readily identified by their U.S. counterparts. CJOS COE personnel can

help facilitate the interpretation of the participating maritime training objectives to

ensure they align with U.S. training process and procedures.

Training Events - Scheduling Conference

14. Scheduling conferences are chaired by USFF and are held in early

September, December, February and May each year. The conferences are held

at Norfolk or Little Creek JAB and a scheduling signal/message is produced at

the conclusion of the meetings. Participating nations are welcome to attend.

When it is not feasible or possible for national reps to attend, CJOS COE NATO

staff officers can represent the interests of the respective sponsoring nations and

other Allies when requested. Nations are invited to attend scheduling

conferences and will be provided with information regarding potential exercise

dates, participants and general scheme of maneuver.

Warfare Commander’s Conference

19

15. The Warfare Commander’s Conference (WCC) is a two week classroom

and tabletop session that marks the beginning of integrated training for the strike

group or independent deployer. A variety of presentations are offered covering

composite warfare commander procedures, current deployed operations, lessons

learned/best practices, NATO/SFN (by CJOS COE on demand) and

capabilities/limitations briefs on a variety of maritime, joint and coalition forces.

Seminars are conducted to begin development of the group’s preplanned

responses and specific tactics, techniques and procedures they will employ

based upon their Commander’s guidance. Tabletop games are conducted to

begin the integration of the warfare commanders and their capabilities into a

single strike group. Most importantly, this is when relationships are first

developed between leaders and their staffs of the group and the individual

platforms and squadrons. Whichever live or synthetic event the allied participant

intends to take part, it is highly encouraged that key members of that platform

(Commanding officer, Executive officer, Operations officers and planners) take

part in the WCC to fully integrate themselves within the strike group’s plans and

organization at this early stage.

Group Sail

16. The Group Sail is the first opportunity for a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or

AN Amphibious Raid Group/Marine Expeditionary Group (ARG/MEU) to sail

together at the start of a training program. The Group Sail entails a very basic-

level training period at sea and is not ideally suited for integrating foreign units.

The Schedule of Events (SOE) is deliberately kept focused on unit skill sets in

order to afford ships’ Commanding Officers the opportunity to maximize their

internal training requirements and align their watch and station bills. Group sails

do afford foreign ships an opportunity to work out issues in their communication

networks, including Link 11/16 connectivity. While focused at the Commanding

Officer, Group Sail training is open to allied participation.

20

Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX or C2X) and Joint Task

Force Exercise (JTFEX)

17. C2X is a 28 day live exercise at sea, with the final days dedicated to a

multi-threat free play Battle Problem scenario, now called JTFEX. The first three

weeks of this period are a stepped series of scenario driven events which guides

the deploying staff, warfare commanders and units through the certification

process integrating activities across all warfare areas. Foreign units are

welcome and encouraged to integrate in all or part of this exercise activity. Allied

training objectives are well accommodated in the scenario and participation as a

warfare area commander is available if requests are submitted early in the

scheduling and planning process. This is critical because USN units have very

strict requirements in achieving specific Warfare Commanders’ Certifications (Air

Defense Commander, Sea Combat Commander, etc). Foreign ships and Task

Group (TG) staffs should remain cognizant that your request for exercising a

specific warfare commander duty must be balanced with the US exercise goals

and objectives. One or two battle problems are played out at the end of this

training period which significantly raises the level of complexity for training but

proves to be a rewarding experience in challenging the finely honed skills of all

participants.

Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) (bi-annual event)

18. The traditional form of JTFEX is a live exercise (LIVEX) at sea. It is

scenario driven and mainly focuses on testing the operational planning skills of a

Joint Task Force (JTF) or higher headquarters in conjunction with the embarked

TG staff. The principle training audiences focus remains on the CSG and/or

ARG staff. Generally unit level training requirements while considered in

exercise planning will necessarily be subordinated to tactical and operational

level staff training objective. This training event is well suited to units who have

completed an extensive work-up or refresher prior to deploying for the exercise.

21

The traditional form JTFEX provides a unique opportunity for U.S. and Allied

partners to conduct coalition style operations within a complex joint environment

at sea while facing dynamic multiple threats and a variety of mission tasking (e.g.

Boardings, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, Search And Rescue etc.).

JTFEX involves more players with the potential to compete for resources in an

operationally constrained environment or the opportunity to work one Fleet staff

against another in a RED on BLUE scenario. Potential opportunities exist for

Allied commanders to fill command roles such as CFMCC, Expeditionary Strike

Force Commander and warfare area commander roles.

Fleet Synthetic Training (FST)

19. The FST enterprise is undergoing rapid technological development that

has seen an unprecedented level of fidelity that simulates “at sea” conditions

while remaining pier side across a wide spectrum of platforms within a wide

variety of operational scenarios. FST provides operators, platforms and tactical

staffs with controlled computer simulation in real time. Since it is a very flexible

and technologically powerful system, the US Navy is now using this capability to

certify its Strike Groups before deployment in order to better utilize precious

training time at sea, conserve resources and simulate the latest combat

conditions in theater before Strike Groups actually deploy to their forward

operating areas. These exercises cover a broad range of complexity, spanning

training at the unit level to full spectrum combat operations at the Joint

Expeditionary Task Force level. Any allied military participation requires

extensive technical commitment and involves long protracted period of time to

integrate equipment and conduct training of simulation support personnel and

individual operators. Many NATO commands have elected to participate on a

case by case basis.

20. An all encompassing training program will involve the effective integration

of live events and synthetic training events which are logically sequenced in

22

order to provide more levels of increasing complexity. This is referred to as the

Fleet Training Response Plan which is covered in detail in ANNEX 4.

Note: All the training events described above make use of a notional theater of

operations which is entitled “Treasure Coast”. The political-military scenario is

played out around a fictional group of island states which lie off of the eastern

seaboard of the United States of America. The scenario is unclassified. Digital

and paper chart overlays are available to plot the disposition of forces and force

navigation of water space around the islands such that ships and aircraft are

operating in assigned Operational Areas to conduct live firings or deploy boats or

arrays. A tailored scenario will be developed for all participants to ensure

operational continuity is maintained throughout the duration of the exercise.

Planning Process

21. It is recommended that at least one senior officer be designated as the

participating Nation primary Point of Contact (POC). This officer will be the main

pillar of his Nation’s core planning team and must be available to travel to all the

conferences at their various locations where his/her expertise is needed. This

officer must be the primary point of contact for CJOS COE, CSFTL and should

be empowered with decision making authority regarding force commitments, and

exercise employment in order to meet mutual training objectives.

22. The following activities delineate the principles of the exercise planning

process:

a. Follow the CUSFF scheduled activity changes and identify the right

training event for the envisioned forces to be deployed.

b. As soon as possible, inform CUSFF and CJOS COE of your

Nation’s intention to participate, for JTFEX participation.

23

c. Designate an official Point of Contact, assemble your planning

team and then make arrangements to attend the CSFTL planning process

including the Concept Development Conference (CDC), Initial Planning

Conference (IPC), MPC Planning Conference (MPC), and Final Planning

Conference (FPC).

d. At the IPC: Make contact with the officer in charge at CSFTL and

complete the following items: (1) provide your training objectives to the

appropriate planning syndicate; (2) start examining C4I requirements and

specific allied crypto/keymat requirements; conduct aviation/ship platform

compatibility checks (refer to HOSTAC).

e. At the MPC: confirm your participating forces and finalize training

objectives for each, identify deployment dates and sail plans, identify

support requirements, discuss exchange of Liaison Officers (LNO’s),

obtain “Treasure Coast” scenario materials (paper/digital charts,

geopolitical background notes and scenario updates).

f. Two months prior to deployment: ensure official diplomatic and visit

clearance requests have been sent to your respective Defense

Departments and Embassy authorities to coordinate for port visits or

airport service for the unit’s deployment (Provide your initial LOGREQ to

the naval station, and berthing requirements at least one month in

advance of your port visit with any updates not less than 72 hours in

advance). All personnel who will be based ashore must receive approval

on the Foreign Visit Clearance Request.

h. In the final month prior to arrival confirm the dates of visit, location

and names of Navy LNOs.

i. In the final weeks of preparation and/or at Pre-Sail Conference

confirm all kinematic data, confirm Rendezvous points, conduct face-to-

face briefings between Operation Officers, air crews, boarding teams, well

24

deck personnel, Replenishment at sea deck teams, Naval Boarding Party

teams, etc.

23. A designated CJOS COE staff officer can assist your nation in gathering

all exercise information and assisting your team at the conferences. Since CJOS

COE is co-located with CUSFF and close to CSFTL, TTGL and other USN

commands CJOS COE staff officers can investigate and clarify any issues with

the relevant desk officer upon your request. At a mutually agreeable point, CJOS

COE will withdraw from planning support in order to redirect its efforts onto other

Allied requirements. If required, CJOS COE can still assist during the exercise

as a relay ashore (Reach back) or in participating as a member of the Evaluation

Team at sea or alongside with CSFTL staff.

Bi-lateral or Multi-lateral Agreements

24. If participation in a major exercise is requested, such as JTFEX, or if

specialized assets are brought to the exercise which possess unique operational

capabilities, a formal bilateral or multilateral agreement between nation’s Fleet

commanders would be beneficial in order to address the exceptional aspects of

the cooperation.

25. As examples, the US and the U.K. signed an agreement in 2008 for HMS

ILLUSTRIOUS’ participation in a major amphibious exercise where US V-22

OSPREY aircraft were authorized to land on a Royal Navy ship. The same year,

France and the U.S. signed an agreement covering the integration of the French

Rafale Fighters and E2-C into the Carrier Air Wing 8 for JTFEX 08-4.

Establishing bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements facilitates the requisite data

information regarding operational employment limitations, liability, review

established international cooperation agreements and all documents and

processes that would allow nations to safely employ and support unique

operations. It also serves to delineate shared responsibilities, define how the

parties involved will support each other, identify additional material support,

25

including payments for target services, platforms, etc. These agreements should

also list all those references which will be required in an emergency situation to

resolve any unexpected issue. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

is one of the major references that should be used to address such activities. Any

agreed deviation to the NATO SOFA for the framework of the designated activity

shall be for instance mentioned in the bi/multi-lateral agreement.

26. Copies of past agreements can be obtained from Judge’s office in USFFC.

No official template exists but the text in former Memorandums of Understanding

(MOU’s) or Memorandums of Agreement (MOA’s) are useful in helping your

nation to prepare these instruments in advance of an exercise. It will take

several months to prepare such an agreement since both nations need time in

their own chain of command to circulate this document and obtain operational

and legal approval prior signing. The agreement would ideally be signed at least

one month ahead of the deployment to US territory.

Carrier Air Operations Specifics

27. Fixed wing aircraft carrier air operations involve catapult launching and tail

hook recoveries which are highly specialized capabilities that require high safety

standards reflected in highly trained professional skill sets and extensive

technical preparation.

28. If your nation desires an opportunity to fly carrier configured aircraft from a

US CVN deck, it is mandatory to initiate the discussions with COMNAVAIRLANT

staff at least 18 months in advance to research safety and operational

compatibility issues.

29. Platform airworthiness and aircrew training standards must be verified in

advance since the national assets will be deployed in a foreign environment. Any

issue concerning any aspects of material condition, handling gear, refueling

requirements (air, gas, oil, and any other fluids), power supply, air conditioning,

26

servicing, etc, that is the object of pre-flight and post-flight maintenance

operations must be fully addressed in order to resolve problems.

30. Personal training qualifications and experience levels must be thoroughly

discussed, from a technical and operational point of view. The discussions

should cover Landing Signal Officers’ (LSO) responsibilities, individual pilot’s

qualifications and training, deck and in-flight procedures, language proficiency,

flight deck personnel location and responsibility, preflight briefings and flight

preparation, etc. As an example of this process, in 2008 a U.S. detachment of

LSOs visited the French Carrier Aircraft Group and attended a Landing program

session ashore in France a few months before their deployment. The US/French

team verified the compatibility of the training requirements and the level

proficiency of the pilots.

31. In all cases, US Navy regulations will define the prerequisite number of

day and night traps. Sufficient time must be allocated to the foreign pilot to

acclimatize to his new surroundings and to become familiar with US operational

procedures before moving to the carrier. Most importantly, emergency

procedures must be reviewed, trained and rehearsed prior the execution of any

flight to or from the carrier. All foreign pilots/aircraft will be required to conduct

initial ground and flight training at NAS Oceana before transitioning to carrier

operations.

32. It is likely that the Carrier Air wing Commander (CAG) assigned to the

CSG will be the hosting command for the deployed squadron. As soon as

possible, the foreign CAG commander should liaise with his US counterpart to

discuss the integration of foreign squadrons.

Amphibious Training – USMC Specifics

33. Amphibious training represents an advanced level of cooperation since it

comprises at least three major stakeholders: the US Navy, the US Marine Corps

27

and the foreign navy unit. In addition another foreign armed service could be

involved (Army, Air Force or Marine Corps). These exercises will require

extensive preparation time due to the number of parties involved.

34. The nature of those operations involves significant risk to personnel and

material, which adds greater complexity to organizing an effective training plan.

The use of aircraft and sea based landing assets invokes a greater spectrum of

training and safety standards that foreign military personnel must comply with

and necessitates the full cooperation of the participating forces. The

embarkation of foreign troops must consider all aspects of their deployment,

including issues associated with accommodation, food, security and

communication concerns.

35. On initiating contact with CUSFF, it is highly recommended that both

nations’ senior leadership in all participating service branches meet together to

agree on the general scheme of maneuver and designate authorities to

subordinate commanders to plan and execute the exercise. The planning

process remains similar to the one described above, with the addition of the US

Marine Corps and additional specialized planning teams as appropriate.

Information Exchange

36. The information exchange issues are critical factors to the success of the

interoperability between the different service elements of the participating

nations. Each nation is accustomed to employing its own national procedures.

NATO procedures and doctrine are not always utilized during the US Navy

exercises. All documentation needed for the planning and the execution of

exercises must be available to all parties. The US Navy usually uses the Secret

Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) for their routine activity. A coalition

network (NSWAN, etc) must be formally designated as the main Communication

Integration System (CIS) in use for the exercise. All Allied Key Materials and

28

crypto requirements must be requested months in advance due to lengthy staff

processes.

37. The ARG/CSG staff is responsible to provide all requisite documentation

to the participating units in the appropriate format. The drafting of all exercise

orders, pre-ex messages, Operational Orders (OPORDERs), directives and

guidance must be approved by a Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO) in advance to

avoid late delivery to the foreign units. It is highly recommended that all the

messages are caveat with “REL NATO or REL NATION X.” This is an important

point that is frequently missed in coalition exercises and must be addressed in a

disciplined manner to promote the effective integration of coalition units. CSFTL

has established improved protocols to ensure participating Nations and US Strike

Groups consider all aspects of force integration in their operational planning and

decision cycles.

38. The employment of LNOs will play a very significant role in coordination as

this person will foster personal relationships that form the catalyst in developing

clear mutual understanding of the critical planning issues. LNO’s act as an

effective conduit of time sensitive information if alternate pathways are not

available. LNO’s are essential in the early stages of planning an event and help

to augment the usual military command relationships once they have been

established.

Financial Issues

39. The invited nation is responsible to cover service support expenses of its

deployed units. On arrival in the US, all expenses including the cost of living,

accommodation and other maintenance operations will be the responsibility of

the participating nation and not the host nation.

29

40. During US Fleet scheduled exercise, provided the coalition unit uses the

same infrastructure or resource services as a participating US Navy units, there

will be no requirement for payment or cost sharing. However, if any resource or

service is provided for the express benefit of the participating nation (without US

Navy participation) the costs for deployment of those services will be recovered

from the participating nation. The provision of fuel and other common fluids are

covered under existing agreements and are reimbursable on a case by case

basis. Any expendable materials like gunnery or missile targets/drones will have

to be paid by the consuming nation.

41. Allied ships may employ a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract to seek

dedicated service support. These requests must be drafted at least one year in

advance and funded. Each Embassy will hold a list of FMS cases open for

specific use. The Defense/Naval Attaché must always be involved in such a

process. The Judge Advocate General (JAG) and the USFF N413 and N7

Directorates (Logistics) have extensive knowledge and experience in this

process and will provide assistance and guidance to nations that seek their

support. It is also convenient to try to list in the agreement, if applicable, the

principles for the covering of the cost of most of the envisioned/foreseeable

services.

30

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: PRE-DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST (It should be noted that the

schedules of activity will vary from that which was planned due to other

operational imperatives, foul weather, re-tasking of participants, etc.)

ANNEX 2: USFFC SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

ANNEX 3: CSG/ESG COMPOSITION

ANNEX 4: FRTP-TRAINING INITIATIVE

ANNEX 5: LOGISTICS GUIDE

ANNEX 6: COMMUNICATIONS GUIDE

31

ANNEX 1: PRE-DEPLOYMENT CHECK LIST

TIME EVENT REMARK

Year prior CUSFF SKED MSG Identify training

opportunities

Before IPC

- Connect with CJOS COE and with CUSFF N7,

CSFTL N5,

- Address any outstanding characteristics of the

deployment.

Evaluate with CJOS COE

the relevance of the

training event

9 months

prior

- Attend IPC,

- Connect with CSFTL lead planner,

- Define forces: volume and basic training

objectives,

- Address specific issues, create dedicated

timeline.

- Forward Letter of Intention to Participate

If required due to

outstanding issues or

aspects

6 months

prior

- Attend MPC,

- Confirm the units designation,

- Refine participation ambitions (duties or task

asked) and training expectations,

- Connect with US hosting staff,

- Investigate locations of LNOs or personnel

deployment,

- Investigate payment issues.

4 months

prior Draft the agreement

JAG CUSFF, nation’s

reps.

32

2 months

prior

- Attend FPC,

- Issue Foreign Visit Request and diplomatic

clearance with the Embassy,

- Investigate customs issues for material brought

to the US,

- Agreement signed by both parties and

endorsed.

1 month prior

- Connect with Department of HDS to discuss

personnel entering US,

- Forward initial LOGREQ,

- Obtain diplomatic and official Visit,

- Clearance Request for Personnel based ashore.

Norfolk International not

fitted for massive arrival.

See local airfield

managers for assistance

One week

prior

- Attend Pre-Sail Conference,

- Update LOGREQ for Port Visit , Norfolk Port Visit preferred

STARTEX TACON transfer

ENDEX Hot wash-up Often at sea

Redeploy LNOs return home and Force re-deploys

No need to return to

Norfolk unless needed for

logistic issues

33

ANNEX 2: USFFC TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

DEPUTY COMMANDER FORCE FLEET AND

JOINT OPS -CTF 20

CTF

Over 90,000 Sailors and Marines

4 Carrier Strike Groups -5 Amphibious Ready Groups-3 Marine Expeditionary Units

34

UNCLAS

United States Fleet ForcesUnited States Fleet Forces Ready Fleet Ready Fleet …… Global ReachGlobal Reach 4k

UNCLAS

Global Force Management – Maritime Force Packages

ANNEX 3: CSG/ESG COMPOSITION

35

United States Fleet ForcesUnited States Fleet Forces Ready Fleet Ready Fleet …… Global ReachGlobal Reach 11

UNCLAS

UNCLAS

GCT

Live, Virtual, Synthetic Training Live, Virtual, Synthetic Training

Strike Group ModelStrike Group Model

TRAINING EVENT COMPLEXITY

MIS

SIO

NIN

ES

SE

NT

IAL

TA

SK

LIS

T

ULT

PhaseFST -U

Schoolhouse Inport/Synthetic Live

TSTA / FEP

WCC

FST -WC

IAC

FST–GC

Sustainment Phase

AIRWING

TRAINING

Sustainment

Integrated

Phase

Unit

Warfare

CDR &

Staff

Strike

Group

CDR &

Staff

JTF-HQ

MHQ-MOC

(JMETL)

ESGINT / Group Sail

JTFEX – Joint Task Force Exercise

CERTEX – ESG-MEU Certification

C2X – Composite Unit Exercise

RUT – Realistic Urban Training

GCT – Group Commander Training

R2P2 – Rapid Response Planning Workshop

IAC – Integrate ASW Course

FST – Fleet Synthetic Training

– U (Unit)

– WC (Warfare Commander)

-- GC (Group Commander)

-- J/F/S (Joint / Force / Sustainment)

WCC- Warfare Commanders Conference

TSTA– Tailored Ship Training Assessment

FEP – Final Evaluation Period

C2X

FST – J / F

TA

CT

ICA

LO

PE

RA

TIO

NA

L

RUT

USMC

JTFEX

FST – O

FST -S

R2P2

CERTEX

ANNEX 4: FRTP-TRAINING INITIATIVE

36

ANNEX 5: LOGISTICS GUIDE

1. Foreign ships scheduled to visit an East Coast port will be assigned a

“sister” US ship at least one month prior to their arrival in the 2nd Fleet AOR.

2. The US sister ship will act as a liaison and intermediary for any port visit

issues or concerns. Any questions regarding the assignment of a partner ship is

Mr. John Costello, john.j.costello@navy.mil, (757) 836-4043.

3. See the attached for any requirements/POCs for specific services.

Foreign ships can also contact their US Husbanding Agent to schedule any

required services. Contact Mr. Tony Nance, Tony.Nance@navy.mil, (757) 444-

1527 at Port Operations for any issues or questions regarding required services.

Refueling

4. The visiting foreign naval ship needs to coordinate with US Navy Host

Ship POC, and the contracted Ship’s Agent, to schedule fuel:

a. The Host Ship needs to transmit a Fueling Request Message.

b. The Host Ship will assist the visiting Foreign Naval Ship with

arrangements of refueling:

c. Draft DD Form 1149 for the fuel.

d. Contact Craney Island Defense Energy Support Center (DESC):

5. Speak with Ms. Beth Prevatte (757) 483-2569, to obtain accounting data

under the Fuel Exchange Agreement.

6. Speak with Ms. Kim Steward (757) 322-9045, to schedule date/time/

type/quantity.

7. The Host Ship will contact and schedule the NAVSTA Norfolk Fire

Marshall (757) 444-2324.

37

8. The Host Ship POC needs to be present at the commencement of the

fueling evolution to sign for the fuel.

Oil Containment Boom

9. The Ship’s Agent arranges for Oil Containment Boom to be deployed

around the ship prior to commencement of fueling evolution.

10. Contact NAVFAC MIDLANT: Speak to Mr. Paul Milbourn (757) 341-0800;

e-mail: paul.milbourn@navy.mil

11. Request Job Order Number, for Oil Containment Boom.

12. Provide funding for the Job Order Number.

13. The Ship’s Agent or NAVFAC MIDLANT then needs to call Environmental

Service Desk (757) 341-0412.

14. Schedule Oil Containment Boom deployment or recovery.

Oil Analysis

15. The visiting foreign naval ship needs to coordinate with US Navy Host

Ship POC, to contact the Navy Oil Analysis Program (NOAP), Bldg. V-61, (757)

445-8818.

Maintenance/Repair Support

16. If beyond the scope of husbanding support, US Navy Host Ship POC will

contact Port Ops for assistance with obtaining maintenance/repair support

approval from CNO via USFF. CJOS COE may also provide a Foreign Officer (if

available) to support with foreign embassy coordination. Contact POCs:

38

a. Port Operations Foreign Type Desk – Tony Nance, (W) (757) 444-

1527, tony.nance@navy.mil

b. U. S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND (N43) - LCDR Robert

Blackwell, (W) (757) 836-4102, (C) (757) 650-5173,

robert.r.blackwell1@navy.mil

c. NORFOLK Naval Shipyard (C1220) - Andrew (Andy) Estock (W)

(757) 443-2650 ext 4209, andrew.estock@navy.mil

Pier Side Services

17. Any issues or questions relating to pier side hotel services, such as shore

power, potable water, sewage, oily water / waste oil, cranes or man-lifts, etc.,

need to be addressed to the Waterfront Support personnel.

18. For Potable Water, Shore Power, Sewage Connection, Oily Water / Waste

Oil, Steam, etc. contact: NAVFAC MIDLANT Utilities Coordinator, Mr. Paul

Milbourn (757) 341- 0800, paul.milbourn@navy.mil.

19. For pier side Dumpsters, Oil Booms, Forklifts, Vehicle Rentals and etc.

contact: NAVFAC MIDLANT Logistics Support, Speak with Mr. Richard Seeloff

(757) 341-0803, richard.seeloff@navy.mil.

20. Cranes / JLG’s / Lifts contact: NAVFAC MIDLANT, Speak with Mr. Marvin

Pyatt or Mr. Alex Holms, (757) 341-1772, marvin.pyatt@navy.mil /

alex.holmes@navy.mil. An (E-7 or above) from the Host Ship must sign for the

JLG. The Host Ship must provide a qualified operator.

NOTE: Funding must be in place PRIOR to scheduling the Crane / JLG / Lift.

The ship or ship agent will be responsible for funding the crane.

21. Customer Service: Contact NAVFAC MIDLANT Customer Service Rep.

Speak with Mr. Dickie Clement or Mr. Dan Smith (757) 341-0804.

39

NOTE: Unless your country currently has an exchange program, your ship, ship’s

agent or embassy will be responsible for all pier side service costs.

NOTE: For additional information, Please refer to the NAVFAC MIDLANT Ship

Support Office Pamphlet.

Other Services

22. Any issues or questions relating to barges, brows, brow stands, mooring

lines etc., need to be addressed to the Dock Master personnel

23. .Main Point of Contact: BMC Itro Duncan, (757) 444-3158 (office), (757)

438-3479 (cell); e-mail: itro.duncan@navy.mil.

24. Port Operations Harbor Master: CWO3 Johnnie Pettaway, (757) 445-4426

(office), (757) 438-3848 (cell); e-mail: Johnnie.Pettaway@navy.mil.

25. Naval Station Norfolk Port Operations Officer in Charge: CDR Jose Sein,

(757) 444-0492 (office), (757) 560-2927 (cell) e-mail: jose.sein@navy.mil.

26. Naval Station Norfolk Deputy Port Operations Officer in Charge: LCDR

David Walker, (757) 444-7118 (office), (757) 438-3398 (cell);

e-mail: david.l.walker1@navy.mil.

27. Naval Station Norfolk Port Operations Duty Officer: 24 hour duty contact:

(757) 438-3839,

28. Port Operations Tower: VHF: CH 13/14/16

29. Port Control (757) 444-2351 / 1709

Pierside Flight Operations

40

30. The visiting foreign naval ship needs to coordinate with US Navy Host

Ship POC, for a Flight Operations Request message to be transmitted to

NAVSTA Norfolk Port Operations (NAVSTA NORFOLK VA).

31. The Host Ship needs to transmit a Flight Operations Request Message.

32. Port Operations will de-conflict the request, then request permission from

the Naval Station Norfolk Commanding Officer.

33. Once permission is granted, Port Operations will coordinate with

Chambers Field.

34. Once approval is granted from all required entities, Port Operations will

send a Flight Operations Request Reply back to the Host Ship.

35. Prior to Lifting Off, aircraft needs to contact Chambers Field UHF 379.15.

Diving Operations

36. The visiting foreign naval ship needs to coordinate with US Navy Host

Ship POC, for a Diving Request message to be transmitted to NAVSTA Norfolk

Port Operations (NAVSTA NORFOLK VA).

37. The Host Ship needs to transmit a Dive Request Message.

38. Port Operations will de-conflict the request and send a Dive Request

Reply back to the Host Ship.

39. Diving Operations will ONLY be approved for the 0700 – 1800 time frame.

NOTE: No diving is approved for after 1800 due to Sonar Ops from 1800 – 0600.

Decompression Chambers:

NOTE: Decompression Chambers rotate duty every month.

41

40. NAVSTA Norfolk: Code 760 NNSY Divers; (757) 444-6502; Supervisor:

(757) 373-6008

41. Little Creek: MUDSU 2: (757) 462-8801; Supervisor: (757) 434-5951

Small Boat Operations

42. The visiting foreign naval ship needs to coordinate with US Navy Host

Ship POC, for a Small Boat Operations Request message to be transmitted to

NAVSTA Norfolk Port Operations (NAVSTA NORFOLK VA).

43. The Host Ship needs to transmit a Small Boat Operations Request

Message.

44. Port Operations will de-conflict the request and send a Small Boat

Operations Request Reply back to the Host Ship.

Morale –Welfare

45. Any questions relating recreation, local sporting events or amusement

parks need to be addressed to the on base Morale, Welfare and Recreation staff.

MWR Director: Mr. Alain Berry, (757) 445-8949 (office), (757) 438-3747 (cell) e-

mail: alain.berry@navy.mil.

NOTE: For additional information, Please refer to the Discover Magazine

provided by the MWR representative.

46. Naval Ship / Base Tours or Command Visit. Any requests or questions

relating to tours of any US Naval Ship, Naval Station Norfolk, or Official

Command Visit, need to be addressed to the Public Affairs Office staff. Public

Affairs Officer: Ms. Terri Davis, (757) 322-2576 (office), (757) 438-4245 (cell) e-

mail: terri.k.davis@navy.mil.

42

47. Naval Exchange: The Navy Exchange hours of operation M – Sat: 0900-

2100, Sun 0900-2000. Foreign Military Members need only their Active Duty

Military Identification card to enter and purchase items. For any questions call

(757) 440-2200. For any questions regarding providing a shuttle to and from the

exchange, please contact the Operations Service Manager: Ms. Brenda Dell –

(757) 440-1051; e-mail Brenda_dell@nexweb.org

Security

48. Any issues or questions relating security or law enforcement need to be

addressed to the on base police force.

a. Police Emergency: (757) 444-3333.

b. Sewells Point Police Precinct (on-base).

c. Waterfront Security Operations.

e. Main Number, (757) 445-6577 / 6606.

f. MACS Paul Montayne, (757) 322-2550.

g. Security Officer LT Jeffery Eidenberger (757) 322-2500 / 2570.

h. Physical Security & Antiterrorism Officer.MACS Paul Montayne.

(757) 322-2550. e-mail : Paul.Montayne@navy.mil.

49. Hazardous Materials disposal needs to be coordinated through the Host

Ship POC and the Ship’s Agent. Host Ship needs to prepare a DD Form 1348-

1A, for each HAZMAT item to be transferred. Contact NAVSTA HAZMAT office:

(757) 445-0905, x-3012, speak with Ms. Mary Stuck, e-mail:

mary.stuck@navy.mil.

NOTE: Refer to HAZMAT Disposal Guide.

43

NOTE: Do not put everything in a tri-wall container.

Customs and Border Protection

50. Any customs, Immigration or Agricultural issues need to be addressed to

Customs and Border Protection Host Ship needs to contact CBP Scheduling,

speak with duty officer, (757) 533-4218 / 4228, fax (757) 441-6267. Provide all

required information:

a. What is your homeport?

b. When did you leave your homeport?

c. What was your last port of call?

d. When was your last inport?

e. How long have your been out to sea since your last inport?

f. What is your next port of call?

g. How many persons currently onboard?

h. How many military?

i. How many civilian?

j. Will any persons be embarking your ship?

k. Will any persons be disembarking your ship?

l. Full Name.

m. Military or Civilian.

n. Rank or Position.

o. U.S. or Foreign Citizen.

44

p. Visa / Passport Number.

q. Birth Date.

r. Will they be staying stateside or flying back home to a foreign

country?

Medical Services

51. Any medical issues or questions need to be addressed to the appropriate

medical services personnel.

52. Sewells Point Branch Medical Clinic

a. Emergency (757) 444-3333 or 911

b. Information Tree (757) 953.9000

c. Quarterdeck (757) 953-9020 (M-F after 1500)

d. Acute Care (757) 953-8760 / 8761 (M-F 0700-1900)

e. Admin (757) 9538883 / 8884 (0800-1600)

f. Optometry (757) 953-8996

g. Pharmacy (757) 953-8832 / 6337 (M-F 0700-1900)

h. Dental (757) 953-8526 (M-F 0700-1500)

i. Immunizations (757) 953-8717 (M-F 0715-1445)

j. Radiology (757) 953-8767 (M-F 0700-1530)

53. Portsmouth Naval Medical Center

a. Emergency Room (757) 953-1365

b. Quarterdeck (757) 953-5000 x-3 (for various clinics)

45

c. Pharmacy (757) 953-0258

54. Sentara Norfolk General Hospital

a. Emergency Room (757) 388-3551

b. Main Number (757) 388-3000

c. Nightingale Helo (757) 388-2500

Decompression Chambers:

NOTE: Decompression Chambers rotate duty every month.

55. NAVSTA Norfolk: Code 760 NNSY Divers, (757) 444-6502; Supervisor:

(757) 373-6008

56. Little Creek: MODSU 2: (757) 462-8801 Supervisor: (757) 434-5951

46

SENTARA NORFOLK GENERAL HOSPITAL

47

PORTSMOUTH NAVAL HOSPITAL

48

ANNEX 6: COMMUNICATIONS GUIDE

1. Coalition maritime information exchange is a complex environment with technical

solutions time consuming and costly to install. Additionally there exists a growing gap between

the US and Allied countries in terms of current capability and future areas of technical

development and investment. In the current global economic climate more must be done to

understand and make best use of existing capabilities. The table in the end of This ANNEX

lists information exchange requirements and considerations for planning purposes. The table

is not exhaustive and has been kept deliberately generic in order to fit with the overall

document classification.

2. Dissemination. Careful consideration should be given to the means by which

Communications, Documents and Orders are disseminated throughout the Coalition. It may

be advisable or even necessary to disseminate an individual Communication, Document or

Order via several means to ensure receipt by all participants. Furthermore it may be

necessary to employ relay or rebroadcast to overcome equipment incompatibility or range

issues. Additionally primary and secondary means should be identified and secondary means

tested regularly to ensure operational. Examples:

a. The Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) will produce the

Air TRAFFIC Order (ATO) on a daily basis detailing air activity for the following

72 hours. In order to ensure receipt by all Coalition participants it maybe

necessary to disseminate via the chosen Coalition Collaboration tool and Formal

Message Traffic in addition to posting to the Coalition Portal.

b. Executive Command sent via Chat to be backed-up by Formal Message Traffic.

Whilst Coalition Nations will generally act on Executive Commands received via Chat,

many require the same command via Formal Message Traffic for accountability and

archive purposes.

c. Coalition Nations have not committed the same scale of investment to SatCom

as the US, but have retained and continue to invest in HF capability. This will result in

limited Coalition UHF SatCom voice availability requiring some voice transmissions to

be relayed or rebroadcast via other means.

49

d. Virtually all Nations use voice as primary. With Chat used as primary a voice

circuit should be in place as secondary means. The voice circuit should be tested

regularly to ensure continually operational and available instantaneously in the event of

a Chat outage.

3. Restoration Priority. A clear and concise Restoration Priority Plan should be compiled

and briefed by the lead N6 and understood by all Coalition participants. This will ensure that in

the event of a catastrophic communication outage all Coalition Nations work to restore

systems/circuits in the agreed order of priority to restore C2 in a swift and controlled manner.

The Restoration Priority Plan should also detail system and circuit priorities when operating in

a satellite bandwidth denied or degraded environment, including the use of SNR.

4. Coalition Communications Capability Matrix (C3M). A detailed C3M will aid both

operators and planners in understanding the communications capabilities and limitations of the

Coalition. The matrix should be compiled centrally by the lead N6; disseminated and briefed

throughout the Coalition. An accurate matrix will inform the development of an effective and

efficient C2 structure in addition to establishing expectation management. The matrix should

be compiled in advance, once Coalition participants confirmed, and used to identify common

communication dissemination paths, primary and secondary, and aid the compilation of the

Restoration Priority Plan.

5. Publications and Procedures. Aside from the technical aspect, interoperability can be

greatly enhanced by the use of familiar tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) derived

from common publications and procedures. Whilst all Nations will inevitably have their own

variation on this theme, when operating as a Coalition NATO publications and procedures

should be employed as common to all.

50

Ser IER Medium Considerations Remarks

01 Non-secure voice LOS

(Radio) Onboard

Ship to Ship Ship to Shore Ship to Aircraft Cross Agency

HF VHF UHF

Language barriers Procedural differences

Frequency management/allocat

ion Equipment compatibility

Equipment capabilities

Onboard safety, damage control

Maritime safety (IMM)

(MMSI) Aviation safety

SAR Boat safety

STUFT coordination

Port operations HADR

02 Secure voice LOS (Radio)

Ship to Ship Ship to Shore Ship to Aircraft Cross Agency

HF VHF UHF

Crypto Language barriers

Procedural differences Frequency

management/allocation

Equipment compatibility

Equipment capabilities

C2 Reporting

Fires Aviation

coordination Amphibious

operations Logistics

Administration

03 Non-secure voice BLOS

(Radio) Ship to Ship

Ship to Shore Ship to Aircraft Cross Agency

HF UHF UHF SatCom

Language barriers Procedural differences

Frequency management/allocat

ion DAMA, Non-DAMA

Equipment compatibility

Equipment capabilities

Maritime safety Aviation safety

STUFT coordination

04 Secure voice BLOS (Radio) Ship to Ship

Ship to Shore Ship to Aircraft Cross Agency

HF UHF UHF SatCom

Crypto Language barriers

Procedural differences Frequency

management/allocation

DAMA, Non-DAMA Equipment capabilities

C2 Reporting

Fires Aviation

coordination Amphibious

operations Logistics

Administration

05 Non-secure telephony

Alongside Littoral

Land line GSM

Satellite VoIP

Conference capability Cost effectiveness P2P or via National

Operator

Maritime safety (MMSI)

Port operations HADR

51

Ser IER Medium Considerations Remarks

Underway HF phone patching

Welfare Logistics

Administration STUFT

coordination Range extension

Experimentation support

06 Secure telephony

Alongside Littoral

Underway

Land line GSM

Satellite VoIP

Crypto Conference capability

Cost effectiveness P2P or via National

Operator

C2

07 Broadcast VLF HF

UHF

Equipment compatibility

Equipment capabilities Bandwidth

C2 Reporting

Administration

08 Unclassified email and

attachments Ship to Ship

Ship to Shore Cross Agency

Internet Releasable Availability Bandwidth

Priority

Welfare HADR

Administration Logistics STUFT

coordination Port operations Experimentation

support

09 Classified email and

attachments Ship to Ship

Ship to Shore Cross Agency

System must be available to all

Coalition Training requirement Coalition installation

timeline Coalition account

creation timeline Use of Gateways

Coalition collaboration

C2 Logistics

Administration

10 Secure HF email STANAG 5066

HF National capabilities Equipment compatibility

Crypto

Satellite denied or restricted environment

11 Unclassified publishing/data

exchange

Internet Releasable Portal hosting Applications

Welfare HADR

Administration Logistics

Port operations

52

Ser IER Medium Considerations Remarks

12 Classified publishing/data

exchange

System must be available to all

Coalition Portal hosting Applications Gateways

Coalition collaboration

13 Portal CAS SharePoint

Hosting Structure

Management Replication Bandwidth

14 Unclassified Web Browsing

Internet Research News and

weather HADR

Welfare

15 Classified Web Browsing

System must be available to all

Coalition

Research

16 Chat Nations requiring executive

commands to be backed-up via

Formal Message OPTASK Chat

Cross domain Chat Number of Chat rooms

C2 Reporting Logistics

17 Formal Message Traffic

ACP 127 Communications Instructions

Tape Relay Procedures

Military Message Handling Systems (MMHS)

NATO Classifications Executive commands Logistics

Administration Welfare

18 Non-secure Real time/near real time track data

exchange

AIS Nations policy for transmission of AIS

STUFT coordination

19 Secure Real time/near real time track data

exchange

Link

Re-trans capability to accommodate

nations without dual Link capabilities

20 Receive, transmit and display

Link

Re-trans capability to accommodate

53

Ser IER Medium Considerations Remarks

secure non-real time track

data COP RMP RAP

nations without dual Link capabilities

OPTASK COP COP Manager

Crypto

21 Non-secure VTC Conference

Point-to-point

National bridge (serial to IP conversion)

P2P Available bandwidth

Equipment compatibility

Equipment capabilities

HADR Briefing

22 Secure VTC Conference

Point-to-point

National bridge (serial to IP conversion)

P2P Crypto

Available bandwidth Equipment compatibility

Equipment capabilities

C2 Briefing

23 FMV Receive

Aviation mounted UAV

mounted

Equipment compatibility

Equipment capabilities Crypto

SA

24 SNR HF UHF

National capabilities Equipment compatibility

Crypto

54

PART II

INTEROPERABILITY HANDBOOK

55

IDENTIFYING INTEROPERABILITY PROBLEMS

1. In order to overcome the most common interoperability problems when

planning to interact with each other and especially when interacting with USN

ships on the Eastern seaboard of the United States CJOS COE formed a working

group aiming to study interoperability. As already addressed in the preface, over

the past year, that group has conducted surveys and interviews with personnel

from Allied/Coalition ships as well USN ships. The surveys and interviews have

revealed several interoperability challenges and concerns; based on the

aforementioned research CJOS COE developed the “Interoperability Handbook”

comprised by the following documentation:

a. An “Interoperability Survey Questionnaire” which is used as the tool

to reveal the main areas of possible Interoperability concerns. This aims

to be the main tool to uncover any hidden interoperability issues;

b. An “Interoperability Lessons Learned data base” which lists the

Lessons Learned from the surveys and interviews conducted on board the

Coalition/Allied ships;

c. An “Interoperability Survey Results paper” that incorporates those

areas noted to be successful or noted to need attention and can be used

as a benchmark for future operations among Allied Navies;

d.. An “Interoperability Checklist” which is the distillate of all the above

documents and is to be considered as a user friendly interoperability guide

that approaches interoperability issues from a functional area perspective

(planning, operations, communications, etc.).

e. An “Interoperability Schedule Of Events” which is a general

schedule on the cooperation.

56

2. As previously stated to further enhance and promote the above mentioned

products, and in order to establish best practices in the interoperability arena,

CJOS COE uploaded the latest version of those products in CJOS COE websites

encouraging nations to review and forward those documents to those ships

designated to participate in US exercises and operations.

How It Works

3. Each NATO Allied / Coalition ship that has programmed a cooperation

with USN on the East Coast will receive through CJOS COE the aforementioned

4 documents which are included in the “Interoperability Handbook”. In that way

the ship’s staff has the opportunity and the time for the following:

a. Study the Lessons Identified/learned from previous cooperations

(through the LL database).

b. Study the main results from the surveys conducted in previous

ships.

c. Be prepared for the cooperation with USN by using the detailed

“Interoperability checklist”.

d. Be prepared to further facilitate CJOS COE Interoperability work by

filling (during the cooperation the “Survey Questionnaire” and by following

the “Interoperability Schedule Of Events”).

4. Finally but maybe the most important part is the “Interview” on board the

ship. Follow-on One-on-One interviews with selected personnel: Senior leaders

(Ship CO, Operations officer, Marine Liaison, etc.). In-person or Teleconference

as well as follow-on Group interviews with watch officers, and functional areas

(examples: Air operations, Logistics, Intelligence, Communications and

Networks, KMO, PAO, Legal/ROE).

57

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: COALITION INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY RESULTS

ANNEX 2: INTEROPERABILITY CHECKLIST

ANNEX 3: INTEROPERABILITY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

ANNEX 3: INTEROPERABILITY LESSONS LEARNED

ANNEX 4: INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

58

ANNEX 1: COALITION INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY RESULTS

SEPTEMBER 2010

“Revision 1”

1. A team from the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of

Excellence (CJOS COE) conducted surveys and interviews on board coalition

ships which revealed several interoperability challenges and concerns; most

were minor in nature and mitigated expeditiously. The information gathered

provides an indication that interoperability, while generally good, may be

declining in some specific areas resulting in needed attention. Opportunities for

improvement in efficiencies and effectiveness have been identified but it is

important to note that there were no failures in execution of operations or mission

accomplishment.

Areas Of Success

2. Advanced Parties and Liaison Naval Officers (LNOs): Continue to use

advance parties/surveys (logistics personnel were very successful as a result of

advance coordination with NAVSUPP) and robust participation at planning

conferences. Continue to expand the use of LNOs as much as resources will

allow. In particular, for communication systems, ship visits, workups, and

personnel exchanges reap immediate and lasting interoperability results.

3. Participation: Continue, and increase, the delegation of warfare

commander roles, unit missions, and staff responsibilities to coalition units and

staffs through robust communication of training objectives at planning

conferences.

4. Communications: Chat was both efficient and effective. CENTRIX

(Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System), while not a

panacea, was generally regarded as an excellent capability for communicating,

and gathering information and knowledge. Extensive employment of Foreign

59

Disclosure Officers (FDOs) on both ship and ashore assisted greatly in the

dissemination of information; continue to address the use of FDOs early in the

planning process.

Areas Of Attention

5. Communications: Voice circuits (to include HF) should be used more

extensively for Command and Control. CENTRIXS should be the primary

classified network, and an adequate number of terminals must be installed on

each ship; wider access to these coalition systems must be established by

increasing user accounts. SIPRnet (Secure Internet Protocol Router) should be

viewed as an alternate US only network. Senior communications planners need

to understand the capability and limitations of all coalition units, and construct

comms plans accordingly. Effort should be invested to ensure communications

plans are a result of early collaboration, detailed planning, disseminated as well

in advance of operations, and as many units as possible receive timely

information. It often took 2-3 days from leaving port for all communications to be

fully functional. Ensure embarked units (Ex: Marines) receive the same level of

involvement in establishing communications plans.

6. Common terminology, references, and procedures: There were minor

misunderstandings due to lack of common terms. NATO publications should be

used as much as possible to prevent misunderstandings and provide common

references. The medical community surveyed had no interoperability issues, one

reason being they follow NATO publications exclusively. Some references to

important exercise documents and orders were kept on national networks and

not posted to coalition websites.

7. Command and Control (C2): Military cultural differences have an

adverse impact on interoperability across the C2 spectrum. These differences

must be explored, discussed, and detailed agreements on common C2 principles

promulgated. Exercise orders (specifically TABORDS and OPTASKS) must be

60

distributed well in advance of scenario commencement to allow coalition partners

the time for in depth review and understanding of the content of orders. The

distribution and handling of formal orders requires coalition agreement on

method of delivery; whether it is chat, email, website postings, radio messages,

or voice.

8. Execution: Watch Officer training on coalition operations, and

publications could be better. It often took 2-3 days into an exercise before all the

warfare commanders and watch officers were “on the same page”.

Specific Near Term Recommendations

9. Build an informal terminology cross reference, a small project of this type

is underway.

10. Create a chronological checklist of actions to be taken to enhance

operability in the preparation and planning phase of an exercise.

11. Create a functional roles based list that matches the national names/titles

of watch standing positions to their generic roles. Ex: TAO (Tactical Action

Officer) (US) to PWO (Principal Warfare Officer) (UK).

12. A point paper on how to approach a common ground on the dissemination

of formal orders within Task Groups (TG to TG).

Significant Long Term Recommendations

13. Exchange Communication specialist LNOs (at the junior enlisted level)

and execute communications checks prior to sailing. If communications checks

61

cannot be executed prior to sailing, conduct them as soon as practical.

Establish focused communications systems work-up periods.

14. All coalition units must agree to and invest in the communications plans

(secure and unsecure) to ensure seamless and timely information. Specific

attention should be paid to the limitations of all units. This may involve moving

from IP based Command & Control (chat/email) to Voice Comms and record

message traffic.

15. Discuss Watch Officer experience and knowledge level expectations

during Final Planning Conference, and conduct dialogue between command

teams. On-watch personnel will be at various levels of knowledge and

experience, it is important for the more experienced watch standers to know who

the less experienced watch standers are and what roles they fulfill. Use an

unguarded net (or chat) to talk openly and perform command de-confliction, as

well as enhance knowledge transfer.

16. Issue C2 guidance in Operational Order (OPORD) that is not covered in,

or is an exception to, standards in reference material (such as NATO

publications). Need more time to work out the processes of passing information

and “formal orders”. Coalition participants must agree to methods of distributing

“formal orders” and what constitutes a “formal order”. Obtain a common

terminology book and use it. Areas to focus on: Planning horizons, timeliness of

postings to websites, mission type, Tactical Control (TACON), Operational

Control (OPCON), Situation Report (SITREP), Battle Rhythm, etc.

17. Determine a methodology to eliminate or reduce conflicts between

planning (and execution) orders, especially Operational Tasks (OPTASKS); the

coalition experienced conflicts between OPTASK ID CRIT, OPTASK ASUW, and

OPTASK AAW. Establish version controls.

62

18. Investigate the opportunity for US NAVSUP to participate along with UK in

the adoption of the NATO Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS) system

as an interoperability initiative.

63

ANNEX 2: INTEROPERABILITY CHECKLIST

Line # Syndicate EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE

1. Plans Review possession/ access/reception of/to all

related/appropriate publications/documents.

Utilize LNO’s on order to receive documentation. Request those missing from Higher/Foreign appropriate authorities in

accordance with National procedures. Ensure documents are releasable to all coalition.

2. Plans Review lessons learned data base from recent operations or

exercises

Database may not be releasable. Utilize Foreign Disclosure Officer to determine releasability of lessons learned.

3. Plans Determine Superior’s guidance and intent

This may require a one on one briefing from the Commander to subordinates in order to clear any language or cultural barriers

4. Plans Conduct Mission Analysis When possible, utilize an integrated combined planning team to ensure effective mission analysis in order to accurately identify

tasks, limitations, COG analysis, risk assessment, and to develop Commander’s intent and guidance for the combined force. Language and culture will play a considerable role in correctly interpreting and transmitting guidance for combined

forces.

5. Plans Refine participation ambitions (duties or task asked) and

training expectations.

This will ensure exercise or operations participants understand the limitations of each navy with regards to training level,

certifications, etc.

6. Plans Develop and brief C2 structure and provide reference doctrinal

reference material (e.g. CWC Manual). Promulgate clear

directives on C2 structure in OPORD. Briefings should

include graphic depictions of geographic or functional

divisions of responsibility.

Provide all commanders a briefing on C2 structure to include planned changes, geographic boundaries, mission

responsibilities, alternate commanders, and supporting communications structure. Brief SUPSIT doctrine as required.

64

7. Plans Generate mission or training timeline to include any limitations

A training or operational timeline will ensure the coalition is operating within its constraints and will ensure expectations are

understood by all participants.

8. Plans Agree, in concept, on the common set of tactics, techniques, and

procedures publications used for all participants.

In most cases this should be the NATO publication set.

Agreement at this time provides time for the training audience to become familiar with NATO publications.

Interoperability could be enhanced by using common terms, or providing a tool that relates one term to another.

9. Plans Command and Control Authorities and dissemination of orders.

- Agree on command and control authority.

- Document agreed to rules for disseminating orders.

Coalition participants must agree to methods of distributing formal orders and what constitutes a formal order. This must be

documented in OPGENs, OPTASKs, and OPORDERs. In the absence of documented procedures specific to the exercise, coalition partners should use NATO standards. Orders will be

mis-understood, unrecognized, or late due to no prescribed upon or agreed to rules for disseminating orders. Official orders, such as OPTASKs, Intentions messages, serial event messages, etc. should be sent via record message traffic as opposed to email. Contents may be coordinated by email but messages are the official order. Real time changes of course can me made by

voice or chat communications

10. Plans Investigate pre-existing OPTASKs and OPORDs for use during

combined operations or exercises. Commands such as

TTGL may be able to provide samples of pre-existing plans

documents that can be adopted and utilized for a given exercise.

Using standing OPTASK and OPORDs that are releasable to participating nations will reduce planning and work load for

planners. Pre-existing OPTASKs and OPORDs can be modified to suit the mission, available forces and the desires of the TF/TG

commander.

11. Plans BPT to develop and issue releasable OPTASKs and direct

whether issued OPTASKs superseded previous OPTASKs

Operators need to have common OPTASKS in which to work from. It needs to be made clear which OPTASKs will be relevant for a

given exercise.

65

12. Plans Discuss limitations with regards to operational tempo.

Some navies have the manning and training to operate on a rapid training tempo while others do not. It’s important to frankly

discuss what a realistic training tempo is in order to establish expectations and to ensure effective training.

13. Plans Consider exercise design that simultaneously challenges

multiple warfare areas

Depending on the level of expertise and training requirements, it is important to design exercises that realistically reflect the

challenges the participating coalition may face during actual operations.

14. Plans Integrate opportunities to share warfare responsibilities between

all participating nations

Building into the plan opportunities for coalition units to assume warfare commander responsibilities will ensure training

opportunities are equitable and will improve interoperability in the long term.

15. Plans Identify standardized wording and numbering of ROE information

A disseminated ROE matrix with common or standardized terminology will prevent confusion with regards to implementing

ROE.

16. Plans Promulgate ROE Matrix by country in order for watch standers to understand constraints and restraints with regards to

national policy

Each nation will have different authorities. Operations must take advantage of the differing national rules in order to achieve the

mission. It’s important for each unit to understand what missions and tasks each of the participating coalition units may conduct.

For example, some nations need master’s consent before boarding, while others do not.

17. Plans Include within the Battle Rhythm when serial event TABORDS are due. Ideally TABORDs should be released NLT than 72 hours prior to the event. Identify and adhere to where TABORDS will be posted on IP Networks (e.g.

CENTRIX).

Releasing TABORDS in accordance with an established battle rhythm will ensure participants have adequate time to review and

plan for serial event. The TABORD are not always received in standard NATO format as expected, thus making it difficult to

extract relevant information and ensure that all necessary details are passed prior to a serial

66

18. Plans Establish integrated battle rhythm. Provide time for lower echelon units to provide feedback on

higher echelon plans.

To ensure effective planning and execution, an effective battle rhythm that considers coalition requirements must be

established, promulgated, and adhered to in order to ensure continuity of operations.

19. Plans Use training requirements and objectives to build a plan that rotates warfare commander duties to as many units as

possible, while providing time for each unit to become proficient, and exercise interoperability.

Continue to provide more and greater responsibilities to multiple nations and units. Especially warfare commander roles (AAWC)

and Force commander roles (like ESF).

20. Plans Brief details for exercise area restrictions to include ranges, air

space and sea space restrictions, environmental

requirements, etc.

Brief on use of exercise area. Reserve areas for events (such as helo operations). Address Risk aversion. Clear differences in

Waterspace Management, environmental compliance and submarine safety procedures.

21. Plans Conduct face to face meetings and capability briefs outside of the

scheduled planning conferences. Conduct site visits with air

operations, communications, logistics, surface warfare, etc.

Pre-exercise time in Norfolk, VA, provided an extremely valuable opportunity for ships officers and specialists to visit host nation.

Discussion includes maneuvering in close company, Plane Guard duties, appreciation of CVN considerations and concerns,

escort duty with CVN operations, tactical employment discussions with DESRON Air Ops, battle rhythm, and

requirements from the staff for flying bids, maintenance cycles, etc. . . A pre exercise comms brief is very helpful to meet key

players face to face and discuss aspects that may cause concern.

22. Plans Verify Pre-exercise messages are received and understood by all

coalition participants.

Releasability issues may result in late or no release of pre exercise messages. Ensure addressing of messages include all coalition staffs and units. Refrain from labeling documents as NOFORN.

Exercise and CTG/CTF staffs must understand how to disseminate information that is as freely releasable as possible (i.e.: Rel CMFC). Use NATO formats as often as possible to enhance

releasability.

67

23. Plans Use document labeling to ensure widest dissemination

Establish releasability guidelines and ensure coalition players are included in release groups. Refrain from using NOFORN

labeling.

24. Plans LNOS Liaison Officers should be assigned at least two weeks prior to the Exercise. Both the quantity and quality (expertise) of coalition participants is the basis for the detailed interaction required.

LNOS have to make planning decisions, the command structure they are embedded within is crucial. LNOs must be paired with

a designated and corresponding ship POC.

25. Intel Brief and describe foreign disclosure requirements and

guidelines

In order to protect information, all participants must understand and adhere to foreign disclosure requirements.

26. Intel Coordinate Intelligence Preparation of the Battle space with coalition

partners.

Coalition partners must have an understanding of the intelligence requirements for the commander. Additionally, each partner

must be made familiar with the geography and characteristics of the Area of Operations, Assessment of the Enemy.

27. Intel Designate clear authority on red data base management

In order to ensure the Common Operational Picture is accurate with regards to red tracks, clear lines of authority must be

promulgated for data base management responsibilities.

28. Intel Designate the information system to use for intelligence products

and information sharing. Maritime coalition operations should incorporate accessible means of allowing data to be

transferred between units.

Information system must be identified early in the planning process to allow time for acquisition, installation, training, and testing.

Clearly identify and send all parties chat room names, passwords, and location of information. All chat rooms should

be setup and defined prior to deployment/exercise.

29. Intel Discuss, where possible, intelligence gathering

capabilities and limitations.

Intel analyst must be able to understand coalition capabilities in order to best exploit intelligence gather capabilities, which will

avoid gaps and redundancies in intelligence collection

68

Develop matrix of unit Intel gathering capabilities

30. Intel Designate and disseminate the commander’s Priority

Intelligence Requirements. Discuss Request for Information

submission procedures

All units must understand the commander’s intelligence priorities.

31. Intel Develop Enemy COAs with coalition partner input

Differing cultures and experiences will enlighten the understanding of the enemy and their potential actions.

32. Ops Conduct ship and aircraft capability review. Participants/units provide

capabilities, especially new or unique ones. (OPSTAT UNIT or

equivalent signals should be utilized).

Examples: New systems, like VDS. Standoff weapons like Exocet. Information should include current material status of weapons,

sensor, propulsion, RHIBs, and helos, and impact on operations and particular warfare areas. All OPS hands must be able to

understand coalition capabilities in order to best exploit them and will lead in avoidance of gaps and redundancies in operations.

33. Ops BPT conduct survey of amphibious ships for compatibility of various

landing craft.

A survey of landing craft and vehicles must be completed to determine the level of interoperability of amphibious units (e.g.

can a US LCAC fit into a UK Amphib or vice versa).

34. Ops Identify communications terminology and acronym

reference

All units must be familiar and practice with common communications terminology. A single code word reference

book should be identified to avoid voice communications confusion.

69

35. Ops Conduct warfare commander and watch stander discussion on differences in National policy, ROE, and safety to ensure all

participants have an equal understanding of limitations,

rules, safety etc.

Masters Consent Boarding is one example of national policy differences, and required an understanding between units of

interoperability differences.

36. Ops Establish communications doctrine for Voice and Chat circuits.

Publish doctrine within OPTASK Comms and OPTASK Chat

Operators need to understand what circuits will be used for the issuance of formal tactical orders. The tactical situation will dictate whether voice or chat will be the primary C2 medium. Additionally, the purpose of the circuit must be determined,

whether it is to be administrative in nature, complimentary to voice communications or operationally and tactically directive.

Maneuvering coalition ships is conducted exclusively over Fleet Tac UHF, in some exercises, a combination of Fleet Tac, VHF

BTB and CENTRIX chat with no particular method given primacy and on occasion conflicting orders arising from each circuit.

37. Ops Develop and provide a roles/responsibility matrix that relates the name/title of each

watch stander on the C2 nets to a common role.

Example: TAO(US) to PWO(UK)

Need to issue good C2 guidance in OPORD, or (better) use standards in reference material.

70

38. Ops Agree on tactical references that will be used for operations. The objective here is to create a list

of the primary National, Coalition, and NATO

publications used so that each participant has time to access reference documents that are

not on their national systems, or request hardcopies from other

nations.

OCE needs to direct use of appropriate tactical pubs and where there will be exceptions.

Interoperability problems can be caused due to important reference

documents available, or over-classified.

For some coalition units, chat is not a primary means of communication, and so the use of chat as a means for order

dissemination should be clear from the beginning

39. Ops Brief C2 and Communications procedures.

If chat is to be used as primary form of communications, then all participants must agree on the decision to do so, and voice circuits must be constantly tested as backup when chat is

inoperative.

Virtually all nations use voice as primary communications.

Example: For SITREPS, Use NATO prescribed TABORD format, informative as a stand-alone documents, and deliver via

message traffic and CENTRIXS at 72 hr point.

40. Ops Reinforce command and control communications doctrine.

Official orders, such as OPTASKs, Intentions messages, serial event messages, etc. must be sent via record message traffic as

opposed to email. Contents may be coordinated by email but messages are the official order. Real time changes of course

can me made by voice or chat communications.

41. Ops Communications and watch stander limitations must be

briefed to rationalize expectations.

Some units may have limited communications and available watch standers, therefore, operations must be planned around these

limitations.

42. Ops If required, brief and discuss NSFS fire control procedures and doctrine. Identify common

resources for NSFS doctrine and terminology.

Each participating unit may have differing procedures for the conduct of NSFS. In order to ensure safe NSFS events, each unit should agree on the appropriate references, procedures,

and terminology.

71

43. Ops Each OPTASK should identify the appropriate C2 circuit for tactical execution and controller of that

circuit. Brief participants.

Briefing control of voice circuits will ensure voice radio discipline.

44. Ops Discuss “safe to train” requirements Need to understand differences in tactics in general as well as new systems, perhaps via briefings ahead of the exercise. Especially

differences in Gunnery safety rules should be clear and understandable.

45. Ops Discuss cultural treatment of command and organization.

- Come to terms in areas such as: Planning horizons, the

objective of unit reports (should a SITREP be a status report, or

should it provide a tactical assessment and intentions?).

Nations differ in their expectations for unit actions when situations present themselves. Two examples: An expectation that when a

unit is assigned to a SAU for an ASW mission, it is not necessary to issue a change in TACON for the unit to the

ASWC, when in fact, it is a good practice to issue an order for clarity. Orders changing TACON or OPCON for a unit: What

format should they take, and what dissemination process should be used? Only through knowing of differences can

interoperability issues be mitigated. In some cases the differences cannot be solved, which is acceptable as long as

they are identified.

46. Ops Where voice circuits are limited, consider assigning a single

frequency for overall tactical C2.

Communications and watch stander limitations of other units must be understood to ensure effective and continuous C2.

47. Ops

Confirm the units designations, call-signs, etc.

Familiarize operators with call-sign conventions and unit warfare designations (e.g. AW, AX).

48. Ops Provide information on how Warfare Commander’s Roles are

being performed.

All units must be aware of differences and limitations when warfare commander functions are hosted in a staff, versus the typical

method of hosting within a ship’s operations center. Most coalition ships are not aware that a warfare commander can be

hosted in a staff, there will be difficulty receiving/sending information, because a staff based warfare commander is not

fully focused on the tactical situation.

72

49. Ops Timely issue of Commander’s daily intentions message (DIMs)

Ensure that DIMS messages are issued in a timely manner. Releasability procedures, unduly lengthy review cycles, and improper routing and message handling can easily delay the

DIMS from getting to the right audience quickly. Send DIMS by fastest means possible, typically email.

50. Ops Receipt of Orders: message traffic must be free of delays and reach

all participants. Ensure proper handling or dissemination of messages

Record message traffic “filters" (human and electronic) may hinder interoperability.

Record message traffic may suffer because of: 1) No-one (or very few) is reviewing message traffic for relevance. 2) Messages not being forwarded 3) Information in messages was not finding its way into the relevant information 4) Routing indicators is not up

to date.

51. Ops Avoid Non NATO terminology Use of NATO terminology should be ensured. Example: “Suspect identity” is used in NATO but some other nations don’t use it,

and can cause confusion when communication contacts intentions.

52. Ops Create a strong relationship between LNOs and Operations

watch officers

LNOS can play a crucial role helping monitoring email traffic from coalition ships. And can help keep host watch officers informed.

53. Ops (Data Link)

Discuss and Identify Force COP Manager

Identify COP management experience and link systems integration capabilities

54. Ops (Data Link)

Discuss and Identify FOTC Identify FOTC management experience and link systems integration capabilities

55. Ops (Data Link)

Discuss and Identify FTC Identify FOTC management experience and link systems integration capabilities

56. Ops (Data Link)

Brief and promulgate link Architecture

Promulgate to operators to ensue familiarity

57. Ops (Data Link)

Determine primary data link for the Common Operational Picture,

There is a need to broadcast the Common Operational Picture to as many units as possible, while maximizing the capabilities of

73

keeping in mind capabilities and limitations of participating units.

BPT to exchange data link LNOs.

the best equipped units. Additionally, there is a need to prevent cluttered pictures where multiple data line broadcasts are

pushed simultaneously.

58. Ops (Data Link)

Establish, brief, and disseminate OPTASK ID matrix and

symbology doctrine

All units must use the same ID doctrine for their data links to avoid confusion of track IDs. Based on varying degrees of link

capabilities, common ground must be found on symbology and ID criteria to ensure a Common Operational Picture. Changes to

existing unit ID criteria must be determined early enough for units to train to new ID criteria.

59. Ops (Data Link)

Determine Force Track Quality for each unit

Predetermined force track quality will reduce dual tracking in the Common Operational Picture

60. Ops (Data Link)

Provide clear direction on crypto in use, and frequency shifts.

The OTAD can be problematic at times when the shoreside originator becomes confused over the time difference and which

day’s crypto is required. The Link 11 Data frequency might change without being promulgated on the voice net or CENTRIX. The Link SITREP should be released hourly and not when there

are changes.

61. Air Ops Conduct HOSTAC review Ensures HOSTAC up to date information is available to aviation planners

62. Air Ops Schedule in port flight deck inspection

Permits HAC opportunity to determine caps/lims of helicopter flight decks to support flight operations planning

63. Air Ops Identify appropriate aviation publications and references

Ensures all aviation capable units will have appropriate references and time to absorb and apply contents

64. Air Ops

Identify primary network for ATO production (e.g. TBMCS)

Some units will not have access to TBMCS as it resides on SIPR. Therefore, a common network must be identified to support ATO

production

74

65. Air Ops

Planning and coordination of Helo Flying Ops.

Daily DOTAH/FEEDER should be employed The lack of ready access to the DOTAH/ATO and other aviation planning

information means that the majority of communication with USN is carried out via email. The usual battle rhythm employed within a NATO TG is submitting a daily DOTAH feeder and receiving a

DOTAH with the next 72Hr.

66. Air Ops

Consider using standard NATO format (such as the ICC

application) for ATO

A standard format for the ATO for all NATO Carrier Groups (ICC) should be used. NATO use of ICC software in previous

exercises with coalition assets has proved invaluable; the software is available and has been proven even if the Strike

Wing’s Daily Air Plan may have be received as well as a planning aid.

67. Air Ops Sharing of C2 duties requires detailed and easily understood

comms architecture for Air Operations.

The key issue precluding the execution of these duties is the timely and effective distribution of material and appropriate security classification between coalition units. Sharing of ADC and

Redcrown duties require consistent and robust communications architecture for the Task Group.

68. Sub Ops Develop Waterspace Management Plan and designate

SUBOPAUTH

Ensure all players are familiar with submarine operating areas

69. Sub Ops Promulgate submarine safety procedures

Ensure all players are familiar with submarine safety procedures

70. Info Ops BPT develop common terminology and doctrine for the conduct of

strategic communications.

Common terminology will ensure a synchronized information operations plan and will support effective execution.

71. Info Ops Promulgate and brief IO command and control arrangements and

To avoid confusion on IO C2 structure, each unit must be briefed on what the roles and responsibilities there are for IO operations.

75

authorities and responsibilities in the OPTASK IO.

Key personnel must be identified and POC information disseminated (e.g. email address, voice net, IP network.)

72. Info Ops Identify Theater IO Organizations Ensure all IO planners are familiar with theater IO chain of command

73. Info Ops Identify theater IO goals and objectives

Ensure all IO planners are familiar with theater IO objectives

74. Info Ops Establish Force IO/IW Policy, including restricted frequencies,

EMCON, and media policies.

Ensure all IO planners are familiar with force IO policies.

75. Logistics Determine logistics report requirements such as the daily

OPREP 5 report.

In order to conduct effective logistics planning, a common logistics format and reporting procedure must be identified.

76. Logistics Identify logistics LNOs and Forward Logistics team personnel.

Logistics LNOs are critical to ensure personnel, parts, and supplies are available to the TG.

77. Logistics Review unit capabilities and limitations in order to identify

logistics infrastructure / engineering compatibility

Fuel planners and logistics planners must refuel and other logistics systems (e.g. fuel line connections, pressure limitations, fuel and

oil types, etc) are compatible for all participating units. Early identification of incompatibility is needed to ensure solutions are

available before commencement of the exercise.

78. Logistics Investigate locations of LNOs, Forward Logistics Operating

Teams and/or personnel deployment

Location of forward logistics LNOs is critical to the success of operations

79. Logistics Replenishment Procedures Use of standard RAS signal formats in accordance with ATP 16 and OPTASK RAS should be ensured.

80. Logistics Understand shore power connection differences

The weight of the cables and the position of the shore connection boxes may preclude the use of shore power. In effect, heavy three-core cables are used in the US that does not have the flexibility of the single-core cables used in the coalition units.

Coalition units must be prepared. Some coalition vessels supply 440v whereas US shore power is nearer 480v.

76

81. Logistics Establish expeditious invoicing of Services

Mechanism not in place to provide timely invoices to foreign ships for payment of services prior to departing.

82. Logistics Approval to obtain repair services from US shipyards

OPNAV regulations require OPNAV approval in order for Navy shipyards to provide repair services to foreign ships. Upon approval, the repair services are only provided on a not to

interfere basis with US ship commitments. USFF N4, in coordination with Port OPS and the N43 community

developed a process where Port Ops would request blanket approval for the shipyards to provide repair services to foreign

ships prior to their arrival. This was done for some coalition units but it appears that the Mayport shipyard is not aware that this

approval can be obtained.

83. Comms Identify primary command and control information network (e.g.

CENTRIX). Avoid using SIPRnet which coalition ships can

not access.

A survey must be completed to determine which network can serve the most units. This will become the primary C2 network. Once

identified all interaction should be completed on the primary network to avoid confusion and redundancy. If the focus of

information flow and posting is on a national network, such as SIPRnet, Late and incomplete information, will end up posted on

CENTRIXS

84. Comms A large amount of effort can be spent in achieving effective CENTRIX interoperability

CENTRIX can be a single point of failure for coalition

interoperability and whenever connection with the server is

lost, interoperability levels plummet.

Define which enclave will be used. Program Staff assistance to engineer the required frequencies and permissions. Data

exchange from SIPR to CENTRIX is onerous. Ensure that websites are set up correctly to allow for posting of such

documents. Emailing large documents takes a long time and frequently causes the files to become corrupt or crash the

system. All in all, this process requires an inordinate amount of effort by the LNOs and Ship’s Staff.

77

85. Comms Identify appropriate crypto requirements and availability.

Brief crypto roll over and loading procedures. Identify potential

technical incompatibilities between various modems and

crypto terminals. Brief and publish crypto terminal settings.

Participants must ensure that compatible crypto is available in a timely manner. Additionally, all crypto users must be

synchronized with roll over and loading times. Crypto material should be checked thoroughly well in advance. Planning should

consider coalition availability.

86. Comms Identify realistic requirements for information systems to include

number of required PCs, printers, etc. Identify space requirements and develop

installation plan.

Survey operational commanders for information systems requirements. Units may require advance notice to begin

installing unique network systems (e.g. CENTRIX). Additionally, units and staffs will have to develop a comprehensive location plan for PCs and printers to ensure appropriate people have

access to required information systems and that those systems are located such that they adequately support operations and planning. Where possible, co-locate new systems using CPU switches, with existing systems in order to not disrupt normal

office space arrangement and seating of personnel

87. Comms Identify information systems account registration

requirements.

Personnel that need new information systems accounts normally must register in a timely manner to ensure availability of

accounts.

88. Comms Provide information systems training to appropriate personnel to include login and passwords

In order to ensure familiarity with newly acquired information systems, personnel must be provided with passwords and

information systems training.

89. Comms Ensure adequate chat rooms are available to support operations

Survey warfare commanders to determine chat room requirements

90. Comms Develop and disseminate list that includes chat room names and passwords via OPTASK chat

Ensure all participants have access to required chat rooms.

78

91. Comms Provide comms LNOs between combined forces

Comms LNOs will ensure continuity of communications throughout the exercise by providing an immediate POC that address

comms issues

92. Comms Develop communications capability MATRIX and brief operators and comms caps/lims for each unit.

Operators and planners need to understand communications capabilities and limitations of other units in order to develop an effective command and control structure. It will also establish

expectations between participating units.

93. Comms If possible, conduct pre-exercise communications circuit testing,

to include operators at their watch stations 3 days prior to

commex.

It’s important to work out communications problems in port before units begin exercising in order to maximize training at sea.

94. Comms Use NATO crypto

Using NATO Crypto will potentially eliminate issues that would arise if the coalition uses crypto provided by the host nation.

95. Comms HAVEQUICK utilization. Define settings to be used and HOPRATE. USN has been able to use training settings with this HOPRATE and therefore opted not to use war settings during C2X. Coalition units are expected to

use a different HOPRATE. It has been observed the use of different HOPRATEs and training cryptographic material put

coalition units at a disadvantage as software limitations do not allow for training cryptographic material to be used

96. Comms Message Handling System exploitation

Comms plan should address amongst others and the exploitation of MHS.

97. Comms Degrees of Confidentiality Restricted is not used by USN.

98. Comms Use of Maneuvering circuits must be well managed.

Maneuvering nets should be clarified on order to avoid interoperability issues. Furthermore NATO signaling methods

should be applied.

99. Medical Identify medical planning doctrine and procedures to be used

during exercises.

Medical emergency plans must be compatible to ensure rapid response for injured or sick personnel.

100. All Identify and BPT exchange LNOs for all areas.

The more robust of an LNO plan there is the better likelihood of being able to rapidly resolve conflicts in tactics, doctrine,

79

communications, and logistics. LNO engagement cannot be overemphasized. It is the only method by which Coalition units will realize the complexity of the exercise. Coalition ships must

provide detailed requirements during planning.

101. All Ensure that all OPTASKs, OPGEN, TABORDS or other planning or directive messages reference only those documents that are releasable to action and info

address.

Units cannot reference a document they do not have access to, thus, their ability to execute assigned tasks may be inhibited.

The standard format table in AXP 2C for signal formatting could be used to save confusion in signal orders

102. All Identify Planning Conference Participants

Staff planners (CSG, ATG, etc.) from all participants should attend critical planning conferences. These attendees should be

consistent through all planning conference, and the exercise, personnel should not be rotating to a new command in the next 8

months.

103. a All C4 (command, control communications, computers)

architecture design must receive primary focus during planning

conferences.

C4 architecture should be thoroughly checked and reviewed prior to the exercise; coalition must understand how to attain visibility to higher level (CFMCC, CJTF) comms and info management

and flow. Experts in C4 must attend all planning phases. Verify which units will be on certain enclaves. OPTASK Comms

must encompass networks, command, control, and information management. Coalition terminals must be manned.

104. All Releasability of orders and information.

Exercise planners, and CTG/CTF staffs must create, review, and

label orders and other information for maximum

release.

Procedures for maximum releasability must be addressed early in the planning process, and used continuously during the exercise.

Examples of documents that must not be labeled NOFORN: OPTASK Comms, planning conference presentations, OPORDER

6000, Pre-exercise workups (FST-GC) information. Use NATO formatted orders.

80

ANNEX 3: INTEROPERABILITY SCHEDULE OF EVENTS (SoE)

TIME Action EVENT REMARKS

Prior to IPC

And/Or

Prior to Ship

Leaving

Homeport

CJOS LNO Obtain Ship’s schedule and

Plan of Intended

Movement (PIM)

Keep CJOS COE Deputy Director

informed.

CJOS LNO and

CJOS

Interoperability

Team Leader

(TL)

Provide Interoperability

survey and checklist

package to ship(s).

Ensure the “Exercise

Playbook” is provided to

Ship from CSFTL.

Communicate with CO and OPS,

address any questions. Consider

issuing a formal message through

USFFC N3 or N7.

CJOS TL Compare Ship’s schedule

with USFFC (N7, N3) and

CSFTL exercise

schedule.

Need to understand if Ship is coming

“late in the game” or is integrated

starting with IPC.

CJOS LNO Ensure Ship participation in

IPC

Ensure participants have reviewed

Interoperability checklist

IPC CJOS TL Identify primary reference for

acronyms and

terminology

CJOS is developing references to

cross-match terminology.

CJOS TL Be prepared to publish

common terminology and

acronym list

A acronym & terminology list will

provide operators a quick reference

to avoid communications confusion

Post IPC CJOS LNO and

CJOS TL

Follow up with IPC

Participant(s)

Receive feedback on usefulness of

checklist.

Prior to

MPC/FPC

CJOS LNO Ensure Ship participation in

MPC/FPC

Ensure participants have reviewed

Interoperability checklist

MPC/FPC CJOS TL Ensure CSFTL has sent

Interoperability checklist

CSG/ESG staffs are the planners, and

issue the OPORDS and OPTASKS.

81

and surveys to Host

Nation (US) Ships/Staffs.

Releasability and NATO standards

must be considered.

Post

MPC/FPC

CJOS LNO and

CJOS TL

Follow up with MPC/FPC

Participant(s)

Receive feedback on usefulness of

checklist.

Prior to

PSC/WCC

CJOS LNO and

CJOS TL

Schedule Face to Face

meeting with Ship. Inform

CJOS chain of command,

including Deputy.

Keep CSFTL informed, as well.

CJOS TL Create Draft Mission Order

(objectives) for Ship

Engagement.

Provides Draft Objectives for Ship’s

review. Sets expectations for

schedule, participation and

products.

Coalition Ship Provide feedback on Mission

Order.

If required, depends on complexity of

the ship visit, such as a 2 day at-

sea interview evolution.

CJOS TL Coordinate USFFC PAO

coverage

Inform PAO, possible coverage of

Face-Face meeting

CJOS TL Welcome package Assemble welcome package for Face-

Face: CJOS brochures, mementos

for CO…

PSC /WCC

Events

CJOS TL Ensure Ship’s personnel

have copies of the

Survey.

Same for Host Nation (US) Ships and

staffs; liaison with CSFTL

CJOS LNO and

CJOS TL

Conduct meeting, report

back to CJOS COE

Deputy Director.

Post PSC None Identified

Execution Coalition

Participants

Complete Surveys This includes identified US Ships and

Staffs. These surveys will be used a

guide during the interview process.

CJOS LNO and

CJOS TL

a) Confirm schedule for follow-on visits,

teleconferences, and interviews.

b) Resend Mission Order to Ship CO/XO, with plan on splitting

interviews into

Follow-on One-on-One interviews with

selected personnel: Senior leaders

(Ship CO, Operations officer, Marine

Liaison, etc.). Follow-on Group

interviews with watch officers, and

functional areas (examples: Air

operations, Logistics, Intelligence,

82

groups. Communications and Networks, KMO,

PAO, Legal/ROE).

Coalition

Participants

Forward completed Surveys

to CJOS.

Post

Execution

CJOS TL Conduct Follow-on visits,

teleconferences, and

interviews.

Inform PAO, CJOS COE Deputy

Director.

CJOS TL, Team

members for

Operations, Air,

Logistics, C2,

Comms.

a) Team members review surveys.

b) Team members split into groups.

c) Use completed surveys or blank surveys to guide

interviews.

One-on-One interviews with selected

personnel. Group interviews with

watch officers, and functional

areas.

CJOS TL Update Lessons Identified

“database”,

Interoperability Checklist.

CJOS TL Provide after-action report If required.

CJOS TL Conduct meeting with

CSFTL, USFFC N7

If required.

CSFTL: COMMANDER, STRIKE FORCE TRAINING ATLANTIC

FPC: FINAL PLANNING CONFERENCE

IPC: INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE

LNO: LIAISON OFFICER

MPC: MAIN PLANNING CONFERENCE

PAO: PUBLIC AFAIRS OFFICER

PSC: PRE-SAIL CONFERENCE

TL: TEAM LEADER (FOR INTEROPERABIL; ITY PROJECT)

WCC: WARFARE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

83

ANNEX 4: INTEROPERABILITY LESSONS LEARNED DATA BASE

Area Title Observation Discussion Conclusion Recommendation

1 Air Helicopter

Flying

Operatio

ns

No major helicopter

flying issues

came up. Minor

issues were with

common

terminology and

landing

procedures.

Nothing was

unsafe, and after

working through

exercises,

comfort levels

were increased.

UK Sea King helicopters offer a

great source of information

which is not common

knowledge to the US forces.

They have a good capability

with LTIDS and Link-16

which isn't fully utilized within

the NATO battle group/ATG.

Interoperability

among aircrews is

almost a non-

issue. Procedures

set up through

normal chains

have been

embraced and

used. Would be

good to have UK

Sea King operate

more tactically with

US/coalition forces

in order to

decrease common

terminology and

landing

procedures

interoperability

problems.

Ensure there are updated

publications readily

available to all

participating countries.

Provide NATO aviation

elements briefing and

publications on CV ops

(i.e. CV NATOPs brief).

Get as familiar as

possible with flight decks

etc. prior to exercise.

Use common terminology

when operating. Have a

common terminology

publication to identify

missions. Have countries

share unclassified

mission publications.

One example would be

the SAR TACAID. This

would be beneficial if an

actual SAR scenario took

place with a multi-

national search. Send

UK Sea King personnel

to participate in Air Wing

84

training at NSAWC.

2 Air Helicopter

Flying

Operatio

ns

Planning and

Coordination of

sorties was

hampered by

lack of

information.

The lack of ready access to the

DOTAH/ATO and other

aviation planning information

that was passed out to the

Battle Group meant that the

majority of communication

with DESRON Air Ops and

HEC had to be carried out

via email. The usual battle

rhythm employed within a

NATO TG of submitting a

daily DOTAH feeder and

receiving a DOTAH with the

next 72Hr Intend fly was not

employed. It was

understood that the required

information was promulgated

via CENTRIX/SIPRNET

WebPages that we were

unable to access.

The NATO procedure

of submitting Daily

DOTAH /FEEDER

wasn't employed.

The use of NATO DOTAH

/FEEDER procedure

should be discussed prior

to each exercise.

85

3 Air Aviation

Comms,

SIPR

Key observation

points were in

the area of

communications.

The US tended

not to use signal

message and

relied mainly on

SIPR

transmissions

which are not

always readily

available to

coalition forces.

Reference

material was not

always readily

available.

Overall in the planning phases,

there were no critical

interoperability issues, but

everything could be much

easier if SIPR was easier to

get, or the US used other

modes of communication as

their primary means.

No major

interoperability

issues were noted.

Things could only

work smoother if

other forces had

the same system

to work from.

Make it easier to get SIPR

to the other forces.

86

4 Air HOSTAC HOSTAC mis-

information

HOSTAC states that US DDG

could land a Merlin, after

SQN 814 reps visited, it was

determined that ship's flight

deck was short by at least 1

foot and by more than 1

degree in incline

Formal

documentation

may be dated or

incorrect.

Good practice identified

here was a site survey to

validate documentation.

5 Air TBMCS US seems to only

use a TBMCS

system and not

the ICC system

when producing

the ATO. This

causes extra

work and could

cause

miscommunicati

on in the long

run.

Get a better NATO-wide

chat system.

87

6 Air Air

Terminol

ogy

All terminology was

not standard.

Using one term

for a mission in

the US is not the

same in the UK.

Get a common terminology

book and use it.

Corporate knowledge is

working, but could cause

an issue later.

7 Air Mode IV

Crypto

Mode IV was not

loaded correctly

on some aircraft

All aviation units need to

ensure availability and

commonality of Mode IV

crypto. All aviation units

must be certain of the

rules regarding Mode IV

usage and it should be

outlined in the ATO/ACO

8 Air ATO Information sharing

was pure due to

luck of use of a

NATO ICC

standard format

for ATO thus

disabling units of

charring out the

RED CROWN

function.

NATO use of ICC software in

previous exercises with

coalition assets has proved

invaluable; the software is

available and has been

proven (JOINT

WARRIOR/OP

MARINER/AURIGA etc.)

even if the Strike Wing’s

Daily Air Plan may have be

received as well as a

planning aid.

A standard format for

the ATO for all

NATO Carrier

Groups (ICC)

should be used.

Use of standard format of

ATO is strongly

recommended in order to

avoid any loss of

information or inability of

units to carry out the

function of REDCROWN

88

9 Air Planning Pre-exercise

meetings highly

successful.

Liaison by the Ship’s Flight and

the FCs on board with the

squadrons at Norfolk Naval

Base prior to exercise start

was invaluable. USN was

happy to provide up to date

Charts, Publications and

Procedures for the exercise

areas. Lynx Flight –

The ability to conduct

face to face

capability briefs

and tactical

employment

discussions with

DESRON Air Ops

prior to the start of

the exercise

proved invaluable.

During these

meetings, the

battle rhythm was

discussed and the

requirements from

the staff for flying

bids, maintenance

cycles, etc.

Without these

briefings and

contact details it

would have proved

almost impossible

to integrate and

operate effectively

as part of the

exercise.

It is recommended that any

non-US nation joining the

exercise in the future has

these face to face

briefings serialized in the

programmed prior to the

start of the exercise.

89

10 Comms GRIFFEN SIPR Rel needs to

be Griffen

enabled for full

access to Email

and Chat.

Griffin is an extremely useful

tool, but takes a lot longer to

set up than the recommend

10 days to establish a fully

functioning griffin account

amongst all the gateways.

SIPR Rel allows capital

units connectivity between

US SIPR users whose

accounts are not griffin

enabled.

To interoperate with

US personnel who

do not have griffin

obtaining Griffin

enabled UK SIPR

Rel would greatly

reduce time

required to cross

the "air gap".

Because of long

lead time for

account creation

and activation,

process must start

well in advance of

the exercise

Obtain griffin enabled

CSD/CSS accounts at

the early stages of

planning. Teach

GRIFFEN at TTGL during

workups. Any

USN/USAF/USMC

person requiring

interaction with UK units

via secure email should

get their SIPR accounts

griffin enabled. FDO

process is lengthy and

must be started early for

GRIFFEN users

11 Comms CENTRIX

KM / IM

Difficult to find and

exchange

information.

Information exchange was at

times difficult to find on

CENTRIX and usually was

sent via e-mail and then

dispersed to required parties.

Passwords to chat rooms

were difficult to receive at

times and had to be sent via

a third party oftentimes.

CENTRIX chat was

confusing and took awhile to

get a hang of.

Maritime coalition

operations, should

incorporate

accessible means

of allowing data to

be transferred

amongst units.

Clearly identify and send all

parties chat room names,

passwords, and location

of information. All chat

rooms should be setup

and defined prior to

deployment/exercise.

90

12 Comms CENTRIX

systems

The proper mix,

configuration and

accesses of the

IP networks is

critical to

operational

success.

Units were able to exchange

data via CENTRIX easily. A

challenge with CENTRIX

was the monitoring of

chat…some units did not

have enough terminals for

frequent monitoring of chat.

Some units had limited seats

and monitoring was done by

the CSG staff vice ships

company. The number of

CENTRIX and NSWAN

computers were limited and

inhibited effective planning

and coordination CENTRIX

to US units is a system

comprised of 3 different

enclaves (CNFC, NDITS,

etc..) used at different times

and for UK units CENTRIX is

an all-in-one system

comprised of all enclaves.

Once that was established it

became easy to facilitate the

use of CENTRIX.

Interoperability will

be enhanced using

a robust suite of

systems that

support CENTRIX.

CENTRIX was a

great tool for

communicating

between units, but

required great

coordination and

understanding

between units.

CENTRIX needs to be the

classified network of

choice during Alliance or

Coalition operations

/exercises. Increase the

number of CENTRIX and

NSWAN computers

available to staffs and

units. If possible, route

CENTRIX and NSWAN to

the required existing

computers using CPU

switch boxes for more

efficiency

91

13 Comms CENTRIX

systems

A large amount of

effort was

expended in

achieving

effective

CENTRIX

interoperability

Whilst it was expected to

conduct the C2X as a

coalition exercise on the

GCTF enclave, it became

apparent that the CNFC

enclave was to be used.

Coalition units needed

CSFTL Staff assistance to

engineer the required

frequencies and

permissions. The use of

CNFC precluded some

coalition ships from

interacting over the main C2

net for the exercise. Whilst

briefed extensively during

the Pre-Ex briefs that

CENTRIX would be the

primary means of C2, the

majority of signals and briefs

were produced on SIPR and

data exchange from SIPR to

CENTRIX proved onerous.

Often, the websites were not

set up correctly to allow for

posting of such documents.

Emailing large documents

took a long time and

frequently caused the files to

become corrupt or crash the

system. All in all, this

CENTRIX was the

single point of

failure for coalition

interoperability and

whenever

connection with

the server was

lost,

interoperability

levels decreased

significantly.

Clearly identify the proper

CENTRIX enclave to be

used from all coalition

and US forces and clarify

the rules of using its full

potential in order to

achieve the highest and

continuous degree of

cooperation

92

process required an

inordinate amount of effort

by the LNOs and Ship’s

Staff.

93

14 Comms Kick

procedur

es

US units not carrying out Kick

procedures on voice circuits.

This was carried out on

SIPRnet and CENTRIX.

Carry out Kick procedure

IAW APP 1C. (NATO

CONF)

15 Comms Capabilitie

s and

Limitatio

ns

Too many fighting circuits were

allocated I/E DD/FF

equipment limitations. Using

secure/non-secure voice

circuits at times posed

problems if there were

limitations on the availability

of cryptographic equipment.

Some circuits did not have

the ability to be used both in

plain and cipher. Each unit

had specific Caps/Lims on

cryptographic equipment.

Units compiling signal must

have a better

understanding of other

units capabilities and

limitations

94

16 Comms COP

(Neutral

tracks)

Unable to use

neutral track

designation

This caused problems when

both TG came together.

Neutral which is in APP7

was not authorized to be

used by the KEARSARGE in

their OPTASK ID CRIT

however UK units used

neutral in their OPTASK

AAW and their OPTASK

ASUW. Surface neutral

tracks transmitted from UK

units were received by US

units as Suspect.

ID CRIT caused

problems between

US/UK units as

each TG had

different ID CRIT

contained within

their OPTASK’s.

Interoperability

suffered slightly

because neutral

track designations

could not be used

in some cases.

95

17 Comms COP (Dual

Tracks)

Dual Tracks Some unit failed to extract

important information for

signals which lead to major

duel tracking issues. Either

some units didn't want to in

house there tracks, and/or at

times couldn't reach units on

voice comms to pass to a

unit that there dueling tracks.

However when units were

redirected by the FTC the

issues was resolved. (Track

Quality settings) .

The main issue was

the tactical picture,

dueling of tracks

and trying to

coordinate to

reduce the issue

was a constant hit.

18 Comms COMM

Plans

OPTASK and

TABORD issues.

US OPTASK Comms, lay out is

different from NATOs and

the naming of circuits is

different. OPTASK ID supp

from KEARSARGE

contained references to US

navy wide OTL which UK

units do not hold. The

TABORD were not always

received in standard NATO

format as would have been

expected, thus making it

difficult to extract the

relevant information and

ensure that all necessary

details had been passed

Non US units must

be sent relevant

references prior to

issue of exercise

signals. The

standard format

table in AXP 2C

for signal

formatting could

be used to save

confusion in signal

orders

NATO format and

publication must be used

when operating with

coalition units.

96

prior to a serial.

19 Comms COMM

Plans

Lack of visibility of

the OPTASK

COMMS until the

day before

starting the

exercise caused

the majority of

interoperability

problems.

It was later discovered that the

OPTASK COMMS was not

passed to coalition units at

first as it was not releasable

to non-US units

Interoperability was

affected by the

difficulties in

dissemination of

OPTASK COMMS.

Releasability should always

be addressed when

operating with coalition

units.

20 Comms COMM

Plans

USKAT crypto on

secure circuits is

an issue.

When the OPTASK COMMS is

re-written using NATO crypto

it eliminates USKAT issues.

Interoperability is

hampered by the

use of NON NATO

Crypto material.

Use of NATO Crypto

material when coalition

forces cooperate with

USN.

97

21 Comms COMM

Plans

HAVEQUICK

(HQII) remained

an issue

throughout the

exercise as USN

used a specific

HOPRATE which

coalition units

can only utilize

with war settings.

USN was able to use training

settings with this HOPRATE

and therefore opted not to

use war settings during C2X.

Coalition units expected to

use a different HOPRATE

which was used in previous

coalition Ops. Prior

information indicated that it

would be possible to

establish and maintain an

agile capability with USN

thought-out the exercise.

However, the use of different

hop rate and training

cryptographic material put

coalition units at a

disadvantage as software

limitations do not allow for

training cryptographic

material to be used

Different HQ settings

hampers the

effective use of the

devices amongst

coalition units.

HQ settings should be

arranged in the planning

process taking into

consideration coalition

limitations.

98

22 Comms Track

Coordin

ation

Coordination to

reduce dual

tracks was

difficult

Some units did not want to in-

house their tracks. At times

we couldn't reach units on

voice comms to pass to a

unit that they had dual

tracks. There were issues

with data loops and the

tactical picture. Most units

were up on multiple links

with the same units, causing

looping, and the picture to be

cluttered and disorganized.

23 Comms Lack of

Underst

anding

General lack of

knowledge and

understanding of

terminology,

procedures, and

capabilities.

Initial communications were

hindered/difficult due to: (1)

Lack of

knowledge/understanding of

communications

messages/publications/termi

nology; (2) Lack of

understanding of

communications procedures;

(3) Lack of knowledge of

units' capabilities and

limitations. Interoperability

difficulties were only a factor

with one communications

circuit. Each unit had to

modify settings on their

different communications

equipment in order to

communicate with one

A general

understanding of

the

Communication

capabilities and

operating

procedures would

have helped. It is

difficult to work

with foreign navies

due to different

equipment,

procedures, and

mission

effectiveness.

All communicator's should

attend a pre-planning

conference and conduct

a ship visit. This would

give all communicator's

an opportunity to t/shoot

and identify any issues

and clear up any

misunderstandings.

99

another. All settings did not

equally apply to all units.

24 Comms Planning

and

Coordin

ation

A coalition ship was

not included in

several Pre-Ex

signal messages

Optask Comms, can depict the

amount of thought spent on

interoperability with non-US

units. The use of US only

key mat causes concern.

ATO/OPTASK COMMS

amends/WASEX/CTTGEX/C

ard of the Day/PRE-EX

signal message were not

received until a week of the

exercise had taken place.

Again, it came to light that

the issue was to do with

releasability rights for these

signals: it was not until the

seriousness of the situation

was appreciated at higher

levels, that efforts were

made to resolve the matter

(assisted primarily by the

work done by the LNOs ).

There was no pre-

exercise

communications

brief. This would

have been helpful

to meet key

players face to

face and discuss

aspects that may

cause concern.

Releasability due

to incorrect

classification as

NOFORN.

Pre exercise comms brief is

crucial for the

interoperability of the

force.

25 Comms Net owner

/

controlle

r

Not clear who was

in control of

some nets. Nets

can get too busy.

Due to limited equipment on

some coalition units, some

nets will become busy and

even overloaded with

information.

Interoperability

suffers when

communications

nets are

overloaded

Logistics/Fuels planners

need to brought into the

planning process at the

earliest possible stage to

address these

compatibility items.

100

26 Comms Data Links Difficulty in

forwarding Link

16 COP to Link

11 ships.

Difficulty in maintaining the

Link16 picture, and then

forward to Link 11 only

capable ships. No LNO from

other nation available at

beginning of exercise. Not

all units were always on the

same page. Units were not

always keeping all other

participants informed when

changing link structure. It

was sometimes unclear what

OPTASK were using.

Sometimes there was

information coming from

multiple OPTASKS that we

were using for link structure.

Units were not

always keeping all

participants

informed when

changing link

structure. The

OPTASK in use

was sometimes in

question.

More tactical planning and

communication would

mitigate this issue.

Forceful back up from

Force Track Coordinator

on maintaining the

picture. Use LNO/SME

cross-deck to address

issues early.

101

27 Comms Data Links Difficulty with Link

11 and Link 16

The OTAD was problematic at

times when the shore side

originator became confused

over the time difference and

what day’s crypto was

required. At times crypto

was corrupt and had to be

re-transmitted (2 hours later)

incurring a loss of situational

awareness on Link 16. The

Link 11 Data frequency

would change without being

promulgated on the voice net

or CENTRIX: this was highly

frustrating as operators

would proceed to trouble

shoot equipment. At regular

intervals, operators would

cycle through all Link data

frequencies on the chirp

sounder to find the Data net

in use. The Link sitrep was

only released on CENTRIX

hourly and not when there

were changes.

Link coordination

issues can hamper

significantly

interoperability.

LINK procedures should be

always address early

enough in pursuit of the

best LINK exploitation in

coalition ops.

28 Comms Comms

procedur

es

UK and US TAOs

used different

procedures when

monitoring

Command Nets

causing loss of

UK procedure was for the TAO

to switch between warfare

nets depending on the

scenario, whereas US units

would stay up a "common"

war fighting net. This would

Inability to maintain

voice comms on

all warfare circuits

may have been a

result of reduced

manning. This will

Establish as doctrine the

requirement to maintain

voice comms on ALL war

fighting nets, or, as an

alternative establish a

warfare "common" net to

102

voice

communications

cause temporary loss of

voice comms

have to be verified. ensure continuous voice

comms.

29 Comms Air Assets

not on

primary

"fighting

net"

ASW air assets not

on fighting

circuit" (ASWC

control net).

Some air assets

were on a land-

launch control

frequency,

exclusively.

Some units were not following

OPTASK COMMS or ATO

SPINS. Some units not

following NATO procedures

for air control. Units were

only communicating on

frequencies NOT in the

OPTASK COMMS, and

should have been on the

ASW control net. During

ASW serials, Air assets

(MPA, Rotary Wing) were

controlled on separate circuit

to surface units, and not

formally organized into an Air

SAU. Air control and contact

reporting were occurring on

the same ASWC net.

No interoperability

between some air

units and

remainder of ASW

action units. Lack

of adherence to

C2 and Comms

procedures. Lack

of understanding

of air control nets

in use.

More robust Air control and

Comm plan. Detailed

instructions, such as:

Contact reporting and

mission orders on ASWC

net, with a separate net

for air control (safety,

exercise, etc). Aircraft

must cover BOTH nets.

30 Comms Communic

ations

work-

ups

It took 3-5 days

once ships were

at sea, to be able

to communicate.

ATO not fully

integrated for

Even after ships had

established good comms

prior, after going into port

and returning to sea for

operations, it would take 3

days to become

Interoperability would

be enhanced if

communications

were fully operable

once the ships

Face to face briefings and

understanding need to

occur in advance of

exercise. Conduct a

Comms-Focused

workup/certification

103

first few days. interoperable. Could have

been due to maintenance

periods in port. Links (11,16,

etc.) did not experience this

problem.

leave port. period.

31 Comms Timeliness

of

postings

to

Website

s

SITREPS often

took 8 hoursto

be available on

CENTRIXS.

DIMS, as

provided on chat

or message

traffic was often

came much later

than the posting

to CENTRIXS.

KSG C2X US elements posting

of info during the pre-

exercise was slow to

materialize, with SIPR being

the first website used to

publish info. Once

publishing on CNFC was

carried out it worked well and

timely.

32 Comms Red

Databas

e

manage

ment

There lacked clear

lines of

responsibility for

red force track

management

within the TG

Designate clear authority on

who is responsible for red

track database

management

104

33 Comms C4

Architect

ure

C4 (command,

control

communications,

computers)

architecture was

poorly designed

and

communicated.

Information flow

was poor for the

first 4 days of the

exercise.

All ships did not have a good

understanding of the C4

architecture. Some units

were on GCTF while others

were on CSMTF enclaves.

OPTASK Comms was RF

based, did not encompass

networks, command, control,

and information

management. GCTF

terminals on some ships

were not used, or were

unmanned. Only information

flow between some coalition

ships was the "DESRON

staff" - no visibility to higher

level communications.

C4 architecture did

not receive

primary

importance during

all planning

phases, resulting

in interoperability

problems.

Experts in C4 must attend

all planning phases.

34 Comms Crypto Coalition ships had

incorrect Crypto

Coalition ships believed that

host nation provided Crypto.

Unable to

communicate

securely for

several days, while

correct crypto was

obtained.

Must have clear

communications on use

of crypto during planning

process.

105

35 Comms SIPRnet Coalition ships

unable to access

SIPRnet

SIPRnet was used extensively,

but coalition ships could not

access. Late and incomplete

information, was posted on

CENTRIX.

Poor information flow

hindered

interoperability

Must use CENTRIX (or

other enclave) more

extensively.

36 Comms Exploitatio

n of

MHS

USN ships do not

monitor MHS

Although discussed prior to the

exercise it was never

followed by USN.

Comms plan should

address amongst

others and the

exploitation of

MHS.

Exploitation of MHS should

always be addressed

during planning

conferences.

37 Comms Degrees of

Confide

ntiality

USN doesn't use

RES.

- - Coalition units must know

that USN doesn’t use

RES degree of

confidentiality.

38 Comms Capabilitie

s &

limitation

s of

Coalition

units

into

consider

ation

Coalition units

unable to watch

all needed

comms nets

Caps and Lim,

should always

taken into

consideration

Planning conferences

should include a cap.

Presentation as well as

the OPORDER

39 Culture Differences

in

Some units used

shorter planning

There was some frustration in

using the daily intentions

106

Planning

Horizons

horizons than

others.

message (DIMS) for

changing plans. The DIMS

typically looked out only 3

days; 5 to 7 days would have

been appropriate.

40 Culture Command

and

Control

Misunderstandings

between warfare

commander

roles

Coalition units tend to be more

multi-roled and focused on

composite warfare; serials

that targeted training in one

particular warfare sphere

sometimes lacked the multi-

dimensional warfare aspects

that the number of OPFOR

assets could have provided.

It is important to

cross-map C2

organizations

(CSC vs. non-

CWC) and reach

agreement early.

107

41 Culture Culture

and

differenc

es

Culture of different

militaries cause

interoperability

issues.

Nations differ in their

expectations for unit actions

when situations present

themselves. Two examples:

An expectation that when a

unit is assigned to a SAU for

an ASW mission, it is not

necessary to issue a change

in TACON for the unit to the

ASWC, when in fact, it is a

good practice to issue an

order for clarity. Requests for

information (ex: SITREP)

from a unit through the units

command chain were met

with some questioning, when

it is typically best practice to

follow and inform the chain

of command. Orders

changing Knowledge of the

difference between TACON

or OPCON can mitigate

interoperability issues. In

some cases the differences

cannot be solved, which is

acceptable as long as they

are identified.

There can be some

significant

differences that

need to mitigated

prior to starting

operations that

involve cultural

treatment of

command and

organization.

Need to issue good C2

guidance in OPORD, or

(better) use standards in

reference material. Need

more time to work out the

processes on working

together.

108

42 Culture Serial start

times

Some units would

not start actions

until exactly at

the designated

serial start time,

instead of 30-60

minutes earlier.

When units were not task

organized until just before

serial start time, there was a

potential for loss of coalition

training time

Interoperability was

only slightly

affected, the only

issue was that

some units were

expecting to start

early while other

did not, and some

time and

efficiencies were

lost.

43 Culture Boarding

and

Personn

el

Control

differenc

es

US can perform

Masters consent

Boarding, and

"personnel under

control", whereas

other Nations

cannot.

Masters Consent Boarding is

one example of national

policy differences, and

required an understanding

between units of

interoperability differences

Not an

Interoperability

issue, but an

example of how it

is important to be

knowledgeable of,

and consider

National policy

differences to plan

certain evolutions.

109

44 Culture Technolog

y

Progres

sion

Technology in the

non-military

organizations is

often better than

in the military,

especially in

regards to IP

networks

45 Culture IO C2 Confusion existed

on who was the

information ops

lead for the TG

was and what

the roles and

missions were.

Appropriate

Networks, like

GRIFFEN, need

to be available to

support planning

requirements

Determine a publish clear

IO C2 guidelines via an

OPTASK IO

110

46 Culture Chat Learning curve for

Chat.

For some coalition units, chat is

not a primary means of

communication, and there

was some mis-

understandings that could

have been avoided with

clearer communication.

Establish a C2, or "overall

coordination" chat room

to work out mis-

understandings.

47 Culture Warfare

Comma

nder

Coalition not used

to warfare

commander

being a staff

function

The ASWC was hosted in the

CTF staff, as opposed to a

ship. Coalition ships had

difficulty receiving/sending

information, as the staff was

not fully focused on the

tactical situation. Conversely,

the AAWC/AADC was

hosted by a ship, and there

were no interoperability

issues.

All units must be

aware of

differences and

limitations when

warfare

commander

functions are

hosted in a staff.

111

48 Logistics Logistics

Referen

ces

Restricted access

to the US Navy

Logistics

publications and

information

systems limited

seamless

exchange of

information.

The UK Group Logistics

Commander (GLC) could not

access the NAVSUP

information system. C2F N4

and USS BARRY Supply

Officer provided a work

around point of contact.

Sharing of

information and

access to logistics

library systems

could enhance the

interoperability

planning tools.

Coordinate with NAVSUP

an agreement/MOU to

allow NATO partners

access to the NAVSUP

library and information

systems.

49 Logistics Logistic

reporting

,

Comms,

and

docume

ntation

NATO Logistics

daily

sustainment

reporting system

(LOGSITREP)

provides limited

information.

At pre-deployment planning it

was very clear that there

were different support

arrangements for each

participant. The CSG GLC

needed a report that tracked

these differences and status.

The OPREP 5 (US tool) was

used for this purpose.

The use of the

OPREP 5 report

provided a

comprehensive

tracking tool for

the many different

coalition

sustainment

needs. This gives

the CSG

Commander

mission

assessment and

risk management

info.

Early pre-deployment

discussions concerning

Logistics/Sustainment

reporting systems. Long

term recommend NATO

review of the

LOGSITREP reporting

systems to increase

capabilities.

112

50 Logistics Logistics

LNO/FO

T

Use of LNOs and

Forward

Operating

Teams (FOT)

were invaluable

tools for logistics

interoperability.

The UK use of LNO and

Forward deployed small

teams in Norfolk contributed

to early planning

coordination and exercise

operations efficiency. The

FOT expedited medical RFI

for cold storage during the

exercise.

Require the early

participation of Logistics

LNOs and Forward

Operating Teams in the

planning process and

during the exercise.

51 Logistics Logistics

Comms

Logistics

communication

needs were

addressed early

in the planning

meetings.

Pre-deployment logistics

meetings established SOP

contact by

NIPR(US)/NavyStar(UK)

non-secure systems

compatible systems.

Secondary comms by voice.

Secure comms would not be

possible due to limited

availability and lack of

experience by staff.

Logistics has very

limited needs for

secure networks

but the need will

most likely expand

during real world

events.

Support communications

lessons learned and

recommendations.

113

52 Logistics Eng

Systems

The AURIGA staff

Maritime

Engineer

(ME)planned and

exercised a

"Battle Damage

Repair" livex with

ships in the

CSG.

This mini-exercise included US

and UK ships and crews to

test interoperability response

to a damaged ship requiring

repair crews and parts from

other PN ships.

The HMS Ark Royal

ME will be

releasing a report

and its

demonstrated

interoperability

lessons learned.

This type of exercise should

be considered in the pre-

deployment planning.

53 Logistics NATO

Logistics

systems

R&D

UK Maritime War

College is

studying the

NATO Logistic

Functional Area

Services

"LOGFAS"

system. Using

the CSG HMS

Ark Royal for

testing.

This system appears to have

several database systems

paralleling US logistics

systems; Database tracking,

common operating picture,

visibility movement and

resource optimization.

There maybe an opportunity

for the US NAVSUP to

participate in this effort.

Providing input and

experience in NATO

systems that can be used

in future exercises.

114

54 Logistics Replenish

ment

Procedu

res

Fuel was twice received

successfully from USNS

including at night. Email

communication was

frequent and effective, and

use of standard RAS signal

formats indicated the use of

common messages.

Discrepancy between USNS

RAS stations in ATP16D and

her OPTASK RAS. Distance

line measured in feet rather

than meters specified in

ATP16D and in use by

COALITION ships. VHF was

primary comms whereas

coalition uses either flashing

light or flag hoists, but this

was pre-warned in the

OPTASK RAS as a result of

manpower constraints in

USNS. Lights/shapes were

invoked by USNS as

coalition ship was ordered to

approach, whereas coalition

unit hoists these once

messenger line passed.

RAS procedures should be

clarified in the planning

process.

115

55 Logistics Shore

Power

Compati

bility

US shore power has been used

by RN vessels on previous

visits even though the

voltage is higher than that

used on board. RN vessels

supply 440v whereas US

shore power is nearer

480v. Due to the reasons at

L3.5 shore power was not

connected and therefore the

ship remained powered by

her own Diesel Generators.

56 Logistics Payment of

services

Mechanism not in

place to provide

timely invoices to

foreign ships for

payment of

services prior to

departing.

NANSEN received fuel from

both ARCTIC and

KANAWHA and services

from NAVSTAs Norfolk and

Mayport. She only received

invoices from the ARCTIC.

This makes it difficult

closing out the

books from a

budget perspective

if the invoices are

not received prior

to the end of the

financial/calendar

year.

C2F amend its process to

coordinate with services

providers to provide

invoices upon providing

services.

116

57 Logistics Approval to

obtain

repair

services

from US

shipyard

While in port

Mayport,

NANSEN was

not able to use

US shipyard

repair services

due to a US

requirement to

obtain prior

approval from

OPNAV.

OPNAV regulations require

OPNAV approval in order for

Navy shipyards to provide

repair services to foreign

ships. Upon approval, the

repair services are only

provided on a not to interfere

basis with US ship

commitments.

C2F N4, in

coordination with

Port OPS and the

N43 community

developed a

process where

Port Ops would

request blanket

approval for the

shipyards to

provide repair

services to foreign

ships prior to their

arrival. This was

done for the

DARING and the

NANSEN

however, it would

appear that the

Mayport shipyard

was not aware that

this approval was

obtained.

Amend the process to

ensure that all shipyard

activities are copied on

the request and approval

from OPNAV.

Additionally, provide a

copy of the approval

message to the US Host

Ship that is assigned to

the foreign ship.

58 Medical Medical

Doctrine

The medical

emergency plans

and procedures

were based on

NATO standards

and fully

understood by all

UK and US maritime medical

personnel have been using

NATO standards for many

years and interoperability

issues are minor terminology

and civilian coordination.

NATO Medical

continues to

review and

improve their

standards and

interoperability

with great

Use the medical

inoperability as a model

for future planning.

117

participants. success.

59 Medical Medical

Supply

and

Services

The fuel line fittings

for UK ships

have a single

headed hose

and US used

double.

Review NATO

technical

standards for

fueling.

Logistics/Fuels planners

need to be brought into

the planning process at

the earliest possible

stage to address these

compatibility items.

60 Orders Distribution

of formal

orders

Some units not

comfortable with

power point

slides, email,

website posts,

and chat as

methods to issue

orders. Orders

provided via

formal (radio)

message traffic

have been the

standard in he

past.

No common understanding of

what constitutes formal

orders. Ambiguity exists in

the understanding of a

formal order. Should chat

directions be used as a

formal order? NATO has

standard procedures and

formats for orders, some

units did not follow these

standards. Power point

briefs were used a few times

as formal direction or orders.

Some orders were

mis-understood,

unrecognized, or

late due to no

prescribed upon or

agreed to rules for

disseminating

orders.

Interoperability

within the C2

structure was

affected.

Coalition participants must

agree to methods of

distributing formal orders

and what constitutes a

formal order. This must

be documented in

OPGENs, OPTASKs,

OPORDERs. In the

absence of documented

procedures specific to the

exercise, coalition

partners should use

NATO standards. Power

point slides should never

be used for orders or

formal direction.

61 Orders OPTASKs Uncertainty in

which OPTASKS

were in effect.

OPTASKs were

not generated

early enough to

There was confusion on

occasion when it was

unknown what OPTASKS

were in use.

Generate OPTASK early

enough into the planning

process to ensure units

have an opportunity to

practice new procedures

118

enable units to

review and

adjust

62 Orders NOFORN

orders

and

informati

on

Orders, messages,

and

presentations

were issued as

NOFORN,

preventing timely

information to

coalition

participants.

OPTASK Comms revisions

were not releasable to

coalition partners.

Presenters at planning

conferences used mostly

NOFORN presentations.

OPORDER 6000 was not

releasable. Pre-exercise

workups (FST-GC) had vital

information that was not

releasable. NATO formatted

orders were used

infrequently.

Exercise planners,

and CTG/CTF

staffs did not

create, review, and

label orders and

other information

for maximum

release.

Interoperability

was hindered due

to lack of

information.

Exercise and CTG/CTF

staffs must understand

how to disseminate

information that is as

freely releasable as

possible (i.e.: Rel CMFC).

Use NATO formats as

often as possible to

enhance releasability.

63 Orders DIMS Daily Intentions

Messages

(DIMS) worked

"just OK" for

interoperability.

The DIMS format and content

were useful to coalition ships

in understanding tasking,

and for planning. However,

these messages were not

issued in a timely manner to

coalition.

Messages must be

issued (posted) on

coalition networks

in a more timely

manner.

64 Orders Receipt of

Orders

Appeared there

was no proper

handling or

dissemination of

messages from

some coalition

Record message traffic from

some coalition ships had

several issues: 1) No-one (or

very few) was reviewing

message traffic for

relevance, 2) messages

Record message

traffic "filters"

(human and

electronic)

hindered

interoperability.

119

ships. were not being forwarded, 3)

information in messages was

not finding its way into the

relevant information

channels (C2), 4) Routing

indicators were not up to

date.

65 Orders Overlappin

g ways

of order

dissemin

ation .

There were issues

in receiving

orders via chat

and email, VHF,

UHF, CENTRIX,

even through

presentations.

Tasking and orders came via

"bits and pieces" when using

Chat as a primary medium

for tasking. Tasking

sometimes came embedded

in presentations provided via

email or posted. Orders

detailing how the force would

counter the threat in each

environment were more

prescriptive than expected.

Lack of discipline in

issuing orders via

chat or

presentations

hinders

interoperability.

The use of

prescriptive orders

instead of formal

preplanned

responses

increases reaction

time.

Consolidated messages in

NATO format should be

used to follow-up on

information provided via

other means. The use of

NATO preplanned

responses is imperative.

66 Participa

tion

Planning,

LNOs

Staffs integrated

with exercise

planners well in

advance. Staffs

were back-

briefed and kept

up to date on

scenario

changes. Staff

N5 had good

Planning conferences, for the

most part enough people

were sent to cover all

syndicates. MPC, FPC, Pre-

sail are most important.

Continuity is very important,

in many cases not the same

people were attending all the

conferences.

LNOs are extremely

valuable, must be

knowledgeable

and active; but, do

not use LNOs as a

primary conduit or

briefer, should only

assist. Assign

more LNOs, and

Continue robust use of

LNOs, and attendance at

planning conferences.

Additionally, set up a

compulsory port visit for

watch officer's to

collaborate, and talk shop

just prior to the exercise.

The ships need to send a

representative to the pre-

120

contacts from

planning

conferences, ad

a good list of go-

to experts, as a

result of

participation in

early planning

cycles.

earlier. sail conference.

Recommend more cross

decking: sailor from each

ship rides another units

ship to see how other unit

operate.

67 Participa

tion

Battle

Rhythm

For the most part,

the battle rhythm

worked well. In a

few cases, plans

were changed at

CTF level

without feedback

to CTG level.

Example: DIMs assigned a unit

to MSO duties, instead of FP

duties, as planned at CTG

level. Cause: Lack of

feedback events in the Battle

Rhythm between CTG and

CTF or ESF. Otherwise the

matching of lower level battle

rhythm with HHQ worked

well, and is extremely

important for interoperability.

Telecoms and VTCs were

very valuable, especially for

setting up exercises and

serials.

121

68 Participa

tion

Participatio

n

Almost entirely,

participation was

good. Some

exceptions: Time

for ESF play,

RCCE

contributions,

ROE work, Battle

damage,

surface-to-

surface

engagement.

Full RCCE capabilities from

coalition not used. Coalition

play as ESF (expanded

Strike Force) commander

should have lasted longer (3

days more) to get maximum

training and work on

interoperability. A clear air

tasking organization should

have been set up earlier.

Watch standers and staff

were expecting more tactical

interaction and serials to

explore actions such as

Battle damage response,

ROE adjustments, and

surface to surface

engagements. Coalition

partners were not involved in

the estimate phase of the

planning process,

interoperability will be

enhanced with their

additional input.

Increased Delegation

of duties to other

units helps them

learn the

challenges of

interoperability.

122

69 Participa

tion

Interopera

bility

Coalition units were

ready and

capable to

provide the

Force Enabling

duties of

REDCROWN,

DCA/CAP

control, ADC and

RMP/RAP duties

(T45 primary aim

of the exercise)

when working

with the CSG

from the very

first day if

interoperability

issues had been

resolved.

The key issue precluding the

execution of these duties

was the timely and effective

distribution of material and

appropriate security

classification between the

USN and coalition units; the

former struggled to release

signals to the latter. If

coalition units had received

access to e-mail this would

have been of major benefit

for a more seamless and

less time consuming manner

of transferring necessary

data for REDCROWN, ATO,

CONOPS, PRE-EX

information

123

70 Participa

tion

Responsibi

lity,

Involve

ment,

participa

tion, and

Value

Personnel and

Units were highly

satisfied with

duties assigned

and involvement.

Strike Group planners were

integrated with exercise

planners well in advance.

Personnel were back-briefed

on the scenario and kept up

to date on changes. ASWC,

FP commander, MIO

commander, and ASUWC

duties were distributed

extensively to many different

units. The OCE "bent over

backwards" in an effort to

satisfy coalition training

requirements and objectives.

The role of AAWC should

have been transferred to

more than 1 or 2 units.

Responsibilities of Expanded

Strike Force (ESF)

commander should have

been scheduled for an

additional 72 hours to

maximize training and

interoperability availability.

Coalition units were

able to plug into

US exercises and

provide value,

positive

contributions

flowed in both

directions,

benefitting the

exercise as a

whole and each

individual unit and

staff. A significant

amount of

interoperability and

understanding was

demonstrated.

Delegating

responsibilities to

other units helped

them experience

and overcome

interoperability

problems.

Continue to provide more

and greater

responsibilities to multiple

nations and units.

Especially warfare

commander roles

(AAWC), and Force

commander roles (ESF).

124

71 Participa

tion

shared

responsi

bilities

Warfare

commander

responsibilities

were distributed

well throughout

units, but could

have been even

better.

Sharing warfare commander

responsibilities around the

TG allowed most of the units

to take charge of other

nation assets, thus

increasing interoperability.

Swapping duties such as

AAWC allowed increased

interoperability with units

learning from different

warfare kinds of approach.

Sharing of ADC and

Redcrown duties highlighted

again the importance of

having a consistent and

robust communications

architecture for the Task

Group.

125

72 Participa

tion

Procedure

s

Consistent use of

standard NATO

procedures

would have

aided coalition

interoperability

including the use

of the Standard

Order Table to

format Pre-Ex

Messages

73 Planning Draft

Releasa

ble

OPORD

s/OPTA

SK

KSG ESG was

required to

develop a

parallel but

releasable

OPORD and

OPTASK to

accommodate

UK warships

Having a standing releasable

OPORD/OPTASKs for

NATO and CMFC would

alleviate requirement for

each CSG/ESG to develop

all new OPORDS/OPTASKs

for training and operations

TTGL and CSFTL

can have standing

releasable

OPORDS and

OPTASKs for

training and

operations that

can be provided to

each ESG and

CSG for

modification as

required

TTGL and CSFTL develop

standing

OPORDS/OPTASKs that

are REL NATO and REL

CMFC. The standing

OPORD must remain

flexible enough for the

CSG ESG CDR to adjust

based on preference,

mission, and assigned

assets

126

74 Planning Event

Tempo

US units need more

time in between

events in order

to implement

required safety,

risk

management,

and mission

briefings.

The exercise event tempo did

not allow time for units to

properly debrief the

preceding event, in order to

capture lessons learned, and

to prepare for the next event

with the required mission

and risk management briefs.

Mission briefs and

debriefs are

integral to effective

training as they

permit ships crews

time to prepare for

the next event and

to absorb and

reapply lessons

learned.

Additionally, event

risk management

briefs help mitigate

hazards to forces

and mission.

Build in sufficient time

between events to enable

US units to properly

prepare for follow on

events.

75 Planning Event

Design

NATO needs to

train to events

that task multiple

warfare areas

simultaneously

Today's threats will likely

present themselves in

several mediums

simultaneously such as both

combined surface and air

attacks.

Training events that

test multiple

warfare areas

simultaneously are

more realistic to

today's potential

threats

Build events that test

multiple warfare areas

simultaneously

76 Planning Focus of

US

Training

US ESG was going

through a

certification

Establish expectations with

allies with regard to the

training requirements with

127

process and its

attention was

focused on

ensuring its

success. In that

regard, US focus

on integration

with coalition

partners

received less

attention than it

deserved.

the US and the limits that

this imposes on coalition

training.

77 Planning Geographi

c

boundari

es and

warfare

comman

der

duties

Confusion existed

on the

geographic

boundaries that

separated

warfare

commander

duties

Develop and distribute

graphic depictions of

warfare commander

boundaries and

responsibilities along with

the corresponding C2

arrangements to include

assigned

communications circuits

78 Planning Event

Design

NATO needs to

train to events

that task multiple

warfare areas

simultaneously

Today's threats will likely

present themselves in

several mediums

simultaneously such as both

combined surface and air

attacks.

Training events that

test multiple

warfare areas

simultaneously are

more realistic to

today's potential

threats

Build events that test

multiple warfare areas

simultaneously

79 Planning Pre- Crucial for early Pre-exercise time in Norfolk, Pre-exercise visits on

128

Exercise

Meeting

solving of

interoperability

issues.

VA, provided an extremely

valuable opportunity for

coalition Navigators and

OOW to visit USN ships and

discuss maneuvering in

close company with her,

including for Plane Guard

duties. This enabled full

appreciation of CVN

considerations and

concerns.

board ships should be

deemed essential for

escorts not familiar with

CVN operations.

80 Planning LNOs Advance party

coordination for

Air Operations

was successful

Coalition units sent several

experts to host nation air

wing and squadron

commands, resulting in

seamless air operations.

Robust engagement

proved worth the

time and effort.

81 Planning LNOs Not enough

participants

provided by

coalition in

conferences.

Both the quantity and quality

(expertise) provided by

coalition participants did not

provide the level of detailed

interaction required.

Coalition ships did not

LNO engagement cannot be

overemphasized.

Coalition units did not

realize the complexity of

the exercise.

129

provide detailed

requirements during

planning, or the

requirements were not

voiced firmly enough.

82 Planning Written

plan for

solutions

to

address

ed

problem

s

Although

Norwegian

representatives

addressed

specific issues

during the

planning

conferences no

written plan

addressing

issues was

generated.

Releasability, communications

publications and many other

issues were raised and

promises given that would be

solved until the start of the

exercise.

A plan ahead that will

initiate solutions and

accountability is essential

as a result of any

planning conference.

83 Planning Synthetic

Training

attendan

ce

Participation of

coalition

personnel is

crucial

Non participation of coalition

personnel probably

increased interoperability

problems.

Participation is vital

as interoperability

issues can be

identified early

enough.

Attendance of Synthetic

training is vital for the

exercise.

84 Planning POC for

LNOS

LNOS had no POC

onboard ENT

A POC dedicated for LNOS

would make their lives

easier.

Address POC for

LNOS on board

USN ships

To be addressed to CSFTL

85 Planning Releasabili

ty of

OPORDER was not

released to

What are the main concerns Investigate the issue OPORDER should be

releasable to coalition

130

OPORD

ER 6000

coalition ships not to release it? units .(At least the

essential parts of it )

86 Planning Structure

of

Warfare

Comma

nder

conferen

ce

Coalition

participants had

to attend part of

it due to national

restrictions

How can we change the

structure of it for courtesy

purposes

A new structure

needed

Planning conferences

structure should be

tailored to facilitate the

attendance ofcoalition

units representatives.

87 Planning PRE-

EXERCI

SE

CONFE

RENCE

S

Certain aspects

were not briefed

during planning

conferences like

use of CENTRIX

or signal release

restrictions

88 Planning LNOS LNOS have to

make planning

decisions thus

thorough

understanding of

the command

structure they

are embedded

within is crucial.

LNOS should have

background and

experience as well as the

authority to make

planning decision.

131

89 Restricti

ons

Course of

Fire

Charts

Some units do not

use paper charts

for course of fire.

4 ships conducted IMPASS

range course of fire. During

that event, it was discovered

that one county's procedures

for NSFS were different, did

not use paper charts for their

course of fire. Units were

able to exchange that

information to make a very

successful event during the

Onslow Bay course of fire.

Good pre-planning will

identify differences.

90 Restricti

ons

New

systems

not used

to full

extent

VDS sonar could

have been used

more robustly.

Perceived safety

issues. French

SSN exocet

capabilities not

understood, and

affected exercise

play.

New systems, and their

Concept of employment

were not understood well

enough to create (or relax)

op-area rules for robust

tasking. New systems

coming to an exercise can

have a profound effect on

exercise play, this can be

both a positive and negative

training experience. The

Units were unable to

exercise full

interoperability of

some systems and

tactics due to lack

of understanding.

Need to understand

differences in tactics in

general as well as new

systems, perhaps via

briefings ahead of the

exercise.

132

HMS Ark Royal deployed

with Sea King AEW aircraft

that could have considerably

expanded the TGs C4ISR

capability. Unfortunately this

capability was not integrated

into the TG operating plans

91 Restricti

ons

TSC play

and

Scenario

play

conflicts

TSC play at the

same time

prevented some

scenario play,

and the ability to

exercise reacting

and responding

to the scenario

threat.

TSC serials at times conflicted

with exercise scenario

planning and response

92 Restricti

ons

Landing

craft

interoper

ability

Swapping landing

craft between

NATO

amphibious

ships is inhibited

by lack of

technical

information

needed to

ensure

Helo's have a NATO guide

book that provides the

required information to

enable helos to operate

safely between various

NATO ships.

Develop a NATO technical

guide book for

amphibious craft in order

to ensure interoperability

of landing craft

133

compatibility

93 Terminol

ogy

NATO

Pubs

need

update

NATO publications

are major

combat

operations

focused and task

group focused.

Many operations

are now

conducted by

independent

units

Need a common language for

"influence operations" and/or

Strategic communication, for

joint and coalition operations.

134

94 Terminol

ogy

Common

Terminol

ogy

Terms between

nations require a

common

reference. It

appears that

doctrine and

TTPs are not as

closely followed

as in the past.

C2 structures

were not fully

understood.

Would like to have a common

dictionary/thesaurus that is

easy to use. (TAO vs. PWO,

CIC vs. Operations center,

etc.). Some units did not

seem to read the OPORD,

OPGENs, OPTASKS, or

NATO publications. Names

of control circuits were

provided in OPTASK

comms, but some units did

not use the correct terms for

these circuits. The "target

allocation message" was not

understood as "take these

targets out". Differences on

AAWC circuit with sitreps

and assessment frequency.

Would help to know the right

person to talk to, by

referencing their role to their

title.

Knowledge of

documentation

was lacking,

causing

interoperability

issues.

Interoperability

could be enhanced

by using common

terms, or providing

a tool that relates

one term to

another.

Watch officer must read up

on exercise documents.

Recommend that warfare

syndicate breakout

meetings be scheduled

during each pre-exercise

conference as well as

LNOs embedded on

ships. Face-to-face

briefings: earlier, the

better. Interoperability

can be enhanced by

providing enough time

prior to exercises or

operations to understand

differences, and then to

practice linkage in a

deliberate manner.

135

95 Terminol

ogy

Voice and

Chat

Reportin

g

differenc

es

National differences

in procedures for

reports

hampered

interoperability.

Air Defense voice and contact

reporting procedures were

different from what US ships

are accustomed to.

Attempted to work out the

different details when

personnel cross deck to get

further insight and guidance

on the proper procedure.

The cross deck did not seem

to help in this matter as there

was still a gray area of the

information that was being

reported.

Standards of NATO

voice reporting

and use of ATP 1

VOL II enhanced

the ability to

operate with

NATO units.

Most ACP publications are

great references and

provide a standard for

interoperability. The

standards can be

implemented, but must

be understood by all

parties involved before it

can be used successfully

136

96 Terminol

ogy

Reference

s not

available

Exercise OPGENs,

OPTASKS, etc.

referenced

documents

unavailable to

coalition, as they

were stored on

national

networks.

TACNOTES that

detailed SUPSIT

requirements

were not

available. Some

information is

over-classified.

SITREP templates were not

made available due to

security concerns. Difficult to

decode and understand

SITREP messages from

other units. Format and

details for SUPSITS not

available. The LAC (a TLAM

role) does not have access

on UK ships to information

on a TLAM operation [this is

a UK issue to be solved thru

MOD]

Interoperability

problems were

caused because

important

reference

documents were

not available, or

over-classified.

Establish a list of all

references that will be

used during the exercise

and operation during the

planning cycle.

97 Terminol

ogy

Use of

NATO

publicati

ons

NATO standard

code words and

duty numbers

were not

understood by

some operators

NATO procedures not always

well understood. Some units

were not familiar with APP-

11 (AAWC, ASUWC). NATO

format not used for ROE,

Serials (TABORD), etc. Lack

of experience in NATO terms

and procedures was evident.

Typically, would use NATO

pubs (EXTACs) for

supported and supporting

requirements. Positive

comment: Changes in OCS

NATO publications

were not

referenced as

often as

necessary,

resulting in

misunderstanding

in terms and

procedures. Need

to delve into NATO

pubs earlier and

often.

OCE needs to direct that

use of NATO pubs is a

priority, and where there

will be exceptions.

Decide at planning

conferences. One

particular item that

helped, was having an

officer with strong NATO

experience, who can

mentor other officers.

137

allowed all units to

experience NATO signal

writing, allowing less

experienced officers to gain

knowledge. It was hard for

personnel to find information

in NATO pubs due to

unfamiliarity.

98 Terminol

ogy

ROE US SROE

numbering and

wording are

different from

NATO ROE

US ROE writers should

endeavor to use NATO

ROE organization and

numbering as much as

possible

99 Watch

Office

r

Warfare

comman

der

SITREP

S.

Too reliant on chat

rooms to pass

SITREPS.

SITREPS were

passed at a set

time (ex: on the

hour) rather than

as the tactical

situation

changed.

SITREPS were

too lengthy.

SITREPS tended to be very

long (included Link data, and

other duplicative data).

SITREPS were not in NATO

format. SITREP format of

1,2,3,…. With no explanation

of what 1,2,3 meant made

interpretation difficult.

Message traffic and

CENTRIX chat

seemed to be the

main area of focus

when something of

great importance

needed to be

passed

Suggest NATO-based

format for SITREPs:

"Situation-Assessment-

Intentions".

138

100 Watch

Office

r

Warfare

comman

der

respons

es too

scripted

Warfare reactions

seemed very

procedural with

some units slow

to react to

emergent

threats.

Ships heavily reliant on

Warfare commander orders

before carrying out routine

procedures (streaming

arrays, joining sectors,

radiate sonar, etc.). Could be

due to lack of experience of

Warfare coordinators.

Seemed that ships would not

follow tactical orders unless

CO was pre-briefed. Also,

concerns on burning fuel to

shift stations may have been

a limitation. Units appeared

to be sticking to rigid

adherence to timelines and

move station or patrol areas

following orders released

well in advance. During

operational phase, fluid

changes and scheme of

maneuver seemed to cause

confusion and angst,

especially if involving higher

speeds and fuel burn.

Aircraft checking into Green

Crown was acknowledged

as "sweet/sweet", even

though IIF was off, because

the a/c was expected as part

of the script.

139

101 Watch

Office

r

Limited

watch

officer

respons

es to

orders

and

question

s

Questions to other

units would just

be answered

"roger" (chat or

voice), with no

answer attached.

May be due to interoperability

issue in understanding the

question and terminology.

Rather than query, there

seemed to be a tendency to

answer roger. Perhaps a fear

that the watch officer would

look unknowledgeable.

Watch offers also had a

tendency to answer "roger,

standby", and then not follow

with an answer or action.

Units appeared reticent in

asking questions due to

perceived risk of placing their

units into disrepute, or with

an apprehension of

monitoring staff or observers.

Recommend all nations

become more familiar

with each others training

levels and procedures at

the unit level. What is

different between watch

stations? What is

different between CIC

and the Ops Room?

What are the bridge

requirements/expectation

s for OOW/DIVTACS?

102 Watch

Office

r

SITREPS Some SITREPS

provided only a

summary of past

events and

current status.

SITREPS can be of greater use

if they include an analysis

("so what") of the situation.

Some warfare commanders

were not providing robust

assessments, they were

providing mostly status

reports, with no assessment

and intentions.

140

103 Watch

officer

BW

officers

duties

BW officers didn't

monitor email

traffic 24H.

LNOs had to play the role of

alerting the BWO for

incoming email by coalition

units

In any case BWO should be

monitor email traffic

especially when comms

issues have been arise

due to interoperability

problems

141

ANNEX 5: INTEROPERABILITY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Command-Level Discussion Topics (CDRE, CO,…) Answer

S-1 In which areas do you experience the main interoperability issues arising? Examples:

Decision-Making, Planning, Force Execution. How do these issues affect the operations and

C2 of the combined TG?

S-2 How did lack of interoperability hinder meaningful contributions by coalition partners? Do you

have ideas to propose for mitigating interoperability issues?

S-3 Any comments on the importance of early liaison with participating nations for equipment fits (cost

can be a key issue)? Ex: The value of liaison officers, both ways.

S-4 Any comments on the importance/value of promulgating an agreed command battle rhythm

(including when Commanders should provide direction and guidance to subordinates)? Also,

ensuring it matches your higher HQ battle rhythm.

S-5 What National rules (Safety, ROE, policy) are a

major hindrance to interoperability?

S-6 What issues are enduring, and never seem to be solved?

What issues are new, and need fresh corrective strategies?

Does the current state of personal interaction and development of working relationships fall short

in identifying and solving interoperability issues? How so?

142

S-7 What significant interoperability issues arise from inability to access information? Where have we fallen short in communicating and exchanging

information?

S-8 Describe any media issues caused by differing multinational agendas. Visitors - Have you had

too many?

S-9 Do you think the value of maritime forces (in senior leader's eyes) has been fully exploited?

143

Documentation - Questions for all CSG staff

members

Answer

D-1 Which documentation do you use as a

reference?

US NATIONAL NATO ?

D-2 Do you have easy access to the reference

documentation? If not what are the

reasons?

D-3 Are your national procedures different? Are

there any contradictions with your national

procedures? What are the reasons for that

contradiction/difference (eg. Operational,

doctrinal, legal etc.)?

D-4 Do you have access to foreign/NATO Standing

OPTASKs? Is there significant divergence in

operational procedures/standards? If yes

describe the areas and the reasons.

D-5 Are the TABORD (serial orders) promulgated

and received on time? Are the instructions

accurate, and reflect balance of operational

standards/procedures? Are they explicit

enough? What are the specific points/areas

for improvement?

D-6 Do you need more time to analyze and develop

internal preps to meet objectives of the

144

TABORD and if yes why?

D-7 What are the main issues/problems with

documentation (ROE, COMPLANS, etc.)?

145

Planning phase - Questions for Exercise planning team

IPC MPC FPC PSC

P-1 Are you using NATO Bi-sc exercise directive 75-

3? For non NATO what document are you

using?

P-2 Were you able to send the adequate number of

qualified personnel to the different conferences?

If not how did you address the likely issues of

interoperability?

P-3 How were conflicting issues resolved during the

conference solved? Did your planning team

acquiesce to host nation standards, was there a

compromise or did your team withdraw national

participation from contentious serials?

146

All Participants to answer the questions in this section Answer

G-1

Did you feel like you were involved at the right

level in the Exercise? If not, was this due to a

lack of interoperability? How so? Example:

Were you integrated into the warfare areas,

planning, and operations? Did you and your

organization provide value or not? Could you

have provided value? What could be done to

increase your value to training and the

exercise?

G-2 Provide examples of tactical difficulties or

operational friction experienced. Which of

these do you consider to be due to a lack of

Interoperability and why. Provide any proposed

solutions.

147

G-3 What conflicts and issues occurred due to

interoperability problems? Please consider the

following:

Staff interoperability, personal interaction, mutual

understanding of TTPs, establishing and

meeting training requirements, inability to

participate or conduct a serial due to conflicting

national process or doctrine, decision-making,

planning, force execution, lack of common

terminology, restrictive or ambiguous safety

rules, conflicting safety rules, ROE,differences

in national policies and procedures, differing

multinational agendas, early liaison with

participating nations for equipment fits,

exchange of LNOs, communication with LNOs,

battle rhythm, fire (gunnery) chain of

commands, the exercise construct, non-

standard targets, non-standardized emergency

procedure during situations of proximity (RAS,

towing, personnel transfer), .

**Provide potential solutions or mitigating factors

to the issues you describe.

G-4 Describe some significant interoperability

problems that prevented the sharing of

information, or limited command and control, or

reduced knowledge management. This could

be due to technologies, procedures, and

access restrictions. Provide any potential

solutions.

148

G-5 Shared responsibilities: How does the sharing of

responsibilities address (reveal and mitigate)

the challenges of interoperability? Provide

some examples. Some areas to consider:

ASW responsibilities, OCS (Officer Conducting

Serial), AADC, etc.

G-6 Do you know of standards (NATO or otherwise) that enable coalition interoperability? Can you

implement these standards? Why not?

149

Aviation (For the Air Wing, Air Department, Staff, and

Pilots)

Answer

A-1 What conflicts and issues occurred due to

interoperability problems? Please consider

the following:

Air publications (example: HOSTAC),

interoperability to deploy foreign aircraft,

platform interoperability, facilities for flight

planning, different aircraft approaches,

personnel transfer (day, night), uncommon

terminology, vertical replenishment

(VERTREP), Search and Rescue (SAR)

procedures, common safety issues, refueling.

**Please provide potential solutions or mitigating

factors to the issues you describe.

150

Data Networks – CENTRIXS &

CSD/Griffin

Answer

C1.1 What interoperability

challenges have you

encountered with the

use of CENTRIX?

Consider: adequate

number of

workstations, location,

permanent vice fitted

for this deployment,

what enclaves are

available(e.g. CMFC,

CMFP, etc), does it

satisfy your IER for

interoperability with

US units, preference

for an alternate

network (e.g.

NSWAN), are US

elements posting to

CENTRIX in a timely

manner?

Recommendations to

enhance CENTRIX

information exchange?

151

C1.2 How familiar is the Staff

on the use of

CENTRIX

applications?

Email

(Mail

server)?

Email(

Web

serv

er)?

Chat? Persistent

Chat?

CAS

Web

(user)

?

CAS Web

(admin)

?

C2PC

(COP)

?

Other? Other?

C1.3 What interoperability

challenges have you

encountered with the

use of CSD & Griffin?

Consider: adequate

number of

workstations, location,

permanent vice fitted

for this deployment,

was CSD used by US

LNOs to email SIPR

users, was CSD

utilized by UK Staff to

email US SIPR users,

was Griffin utilized by

UK Staff to email

RNCSS to SIPR and

vice versa?

Recommendations to

enhance CSD and

Griffin information

exchange.

152

Miscellaneous Answer

C3.1 What additional C4I

interoperability

challenges have you

had. Consider: impact

of the US preference to

conduct C2 via chat and

web portals, use and

availability of OPTASKs,

provision of CIS circuits

& effectiveness of the

IM plan, use of voice

circuits (sufficient

/successful and non-

secure/ secure),

availability of C2 circuits

normally used on your

navy’s deployment?

C3.2 What was your FDO

process? How did it

facilitate or hinder

interoperability?

C3.3 Did you know who in the

US to speak to for Link

16, TACAN, distribution

of the COP and

SATCOM/DAMA? Who

has the POC, was the

Link 16 TACAN

COP SATCOM/DAMA

153

use successful?

C3.4 What CIS Lessons

Learned have you

noted?

154

Planning phase – C5I Syndicate IPC MPC FPC PSC

C2.1 How many people have attended planning

conferences?

C2.2 What was their expertise and was it sufficient

to cover all the issues? Would you send

more or different SME?

C2.3 Were your training requirements taken into

account?

C2.4 Were the issues raised previous conferences

solved?

155

Logistics/Engineering/Environmental Answer

L1

What National/US/NATO rules (Safety, ROE, policy) are a major hindrance

to interoperability?

What issues are enduring, and never seem to be solved?

What issues are new, and need fresh

corrective strategies?

L2

Does the current state of personal

interaction and development of

working relationships fall short in

identifying and solving

interoperability issues? How so?

Example questions below.

L2.1 Are you able to coordinate your US

logistics requirements thru Standing

Operating Procedures (SOP) and/or

Liaison Officers (LNO) ?

L2.2 Do you use your host ship to assist in

coordinating your logistics support

requirements?

L2.3 Are you familiar with and using the

Fleet Industrial and Supply Center

(FISC) & Defense Logistics Agency

(DLA) to support requirements that

ship’s agent can not meet?

156

L2.4 Are you familiar with the processes by

which logistics supplies and services

are requested through the US if your

ship’s agent/chandler can not meet

your requirements?

L2.5 Have you established communications

with the Medical planners in the

numbered Fleet where you are

operating at? Have you

synchronized your medical

emergency plans with the facilities

ashore in conducting patient transfer

from sea?

L3

What significant interoperability issues

arise from inability to access

information? Where have we fallen

short in communicating and

exchanging information?

Example questions below.

L3.1 Does your country have a reciprocal

health care agreement with the US?

If not, be advised that all medical

expenses incurred by your personnel

has to be paid for upon discharge by

the originating ship/unit.

157

L3.2 Are the aviation and marine fuels/oils

used by the US compatible with your

engineering and aviation systems?

Are you able to provide compatible

fuel types?

L3.3 Does the Logistics Requirement

(LOGREQ) process meet your

support requirements?

L3.4 Are your replenishment at sea (RAS)

procedures compatible with the US

procedures?

L3.5 Are your hoses, couplings, fittings,

and/or adapters compatible with the

US fittings required to bring on fuel,

water, electricity?

L3.6 Is your power generation/distribution

system compatible with the US shore

power system or do you have to “aux

steam” in port to generate electricity?

L3.7 Are you able to communicate needs

through CENTRIX, voice

communications, Internet or other

National systems? Does every

country require different

communication system?

158

L3.8 Provide examples where you are

unable to participate or conduct a

serial because you have conflicting

or different national process or

doctrine (EX: boarding exercise).

L4

Discuss operability

conflicts/solutions/mitigation

examples below and add any others.

Example questions below:

L4.1 Do you have a funding mechanism

either through your Defense

Attaché/Embassy or other agency

that is compatible with the US

funding mechanism requirements?

Does your country have logistics

related agreements with the US ( i.e.

Acquisition Cross Servicing

Agreement (ACSA) or Foreign

Military Sales (FMS) that enables

you to exchange/obtain support

with/from the US?

L4.2 Are you able to use direct

Contracting/Acquisition to meet your

support needs?

L4.3 What safety regulations/environmental

standards impede exercise support?

159

L5 Describe issues introduced when

dealing with other NATO partners

(other than US) during an exercise.

Third and fourth party logistics

support issues.

160

PART III

INTEROPERABILITY METRICS

EVALUATING ALLIED/COALITION –USN INTEROPERABILITY

161

Background

1. Now that we have gone deeply into Interoperability having in place the

Coalition Playbook (PART I) and the Interoperability Handbook (PART II) the

next step is to determine whether they improve interoperability and, if so, in what

ways.

Purpose

2. The purpose of this part is to outline our efforts to answer the following

points. It should also formulate efforts to continue to improve the previous parts

(particularly the Interoperability Checklist). Here are the three aspects of

interoperability that we will assess:

a. Adherence to the Checklist – Measure how well the CJOS COE,

the visiting ships, and the hosting navy, USN Strike Groups follow the

checklist for each visiting ship. This is a measure of preparedness; it

quantifies efforts made to address known interoperability challenges.

b. Demonstrated Interoperability – Evaluate the interoperability of

visiting ships with their host Strike Groups during execution. Clear,

objective standards are applied to evaluate how early in an event the

interoperability challenges are initially overcome, as well as recording how

well interoperability efforts were maintained throughout the exercise.

These are measures of effectiveness for the units.

c. Lessons Learned Again – Analyze interoperability LL from each

ship to identify the repeat issues and determine which should be

prevented through adherence to the checklist. This is another measure of

effectiveness for the units but it also provides feedback on the

effectiveness of the checklist.

162

Methodology

3. Adherence to the Checklist, Demonstrated Interoperability, and Lessons

Learned again must be measured separately. But applying a common

framework will enhance each of them by enabling cross-correlation. To evaluate

the checklist, it will be critical to know what efforts were made to follow those

recommendations. If we don’t know whether a ship followed a particular

recommendation then it will be impossible to determine whether it was of value.

Efforts to follow the checklist are “inputs” into the process that should output

interoperability. Recording which checklist items were completed (and when,

relative to the exercise timeline) will form the key measures of performance

(MOPs) in the larger assessment framework.

4. Adherence to the Checklist (Measure of Preparedness) – There are over

one hundred checklist items and often multiple items related to a single topic so it

is important to group them by topic. Establishing a set of interoperability topics

based on the checklist items and using it to organize the results of the

performance and LL evaluations will allow us to tie the process “inputs” to the

“outputs.”

5. How to: divide the existing checklist into two sections – items for CJOS to

complete and items for the visiting ship and the hosting Strike Group. Ask each

party to record completion (Y/N) of each checklist item. Request comments for

items not completed (there may be many legitimate reasons). These metrics are

scored as percent “Yes” in each checklist topic area using the checklist to record

the data.

163

CJOS Preparedness Assessment Sheet (example)

Line # TIME Action EVENT REMARKS Yes No

1. Prior to IPC

2. And/Or Provide Interoperability

survey and checklist

package to ship(s).

3. Prior to Ship Leaving

Homeport

Ensure the “Coalition

Playbook” is provided

to Ship from CSFTL.

CJOS LNO Obtain Ship’s schedule

and Plan of Intended

Movement (PIM)

Keep CJOS COE Deputy Director

informed.

CJOS LNO

and CJOS

Interoperabilit

y Team

Leader (TL)

Communicate with CO and OPS,

address any questions. Consider

issuing a formal message through C2F

N3 or N7.

CJOS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Item Completed?

Totals

29

Yes

No

Percent Completed (X<=1) X

X is the final result

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

INFOPS 1 BPT develop common terminology

and doctrine for the conduct of

strategic communications.

Common terminology will ensure a

synchronized information operations plan

and will support effective execution.

INFOPS 2 Promulgate and brief IO command

and control arrangements and

authorities and responsibilities in the

OPTASK IO.

To avoid confusion on IO C2 structure,

each unit must be briefed on what the roles

and responsibities there are for IO

operations. Key personnel must be

identified and POC information

disseminated (e.g. email address, voice

net, IP network.)

INFOPS 3 Identify Theater IO Organizations Ensure all IO planners are familiar with

theater IO chain of command

INFOPS 4 Identify theater IO goals and

objectives

Ensure all IO planners are familiar with

theater IO objectives

INFOPS 5 Establish Force IO/IW Policy,

including restricted frequencies,

EMCON, and media policies.

Ensure all IO planners are familiar with

force IO policies.

Totals 5

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y7

Items Completed?

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS INFO OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

164

Other Entities/Commands Preparedness Assessment Sheet (example)

6. The final metrics will be two scores:

a. An X score as a percentage of items CJOS COE prepared (e.g.

X=80%=0.8 which means that CJOS COE was able to comply with the 80% of

the CJOS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET).

b. A Y score as a percentage of items that other entities and Commands

prepared (to include coalition /allied ships and USN Commands.e.g. Y=60%=0.6

which means that Coalition /Allied Ship and probably USN Commands were able

to comply with the 60% of the OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS

PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET). In that series of sheets we assume

equal weight for each assessment area i.e. INTEL, OPS, COMMS etc. thus Y will

be the average of the partial percentages Y1, Y2… Y10.

7. Demonstrated Interoperability (Measures of Effectiveness) – The

demonstrated interoperability evaluation (should be focused on metrics tied

directly to successful cooperation). Individual metrics are categorized using

mission-focused labels but are also tied to the checklist topic areas. This will

MISSION AREA SCORE

PLANS Y1

INTEL Y2

OPS Y3

LINL Y4

AIR OPS Y5

SUB OPS Y6

INFO OPS Y7

LOG-MED Y8

COMMS Y9

GENERAL Y10

Overall Average = Y

Y is the final result

165

provide data for a post-exercise analysis of how well the checklist prepared the

ship for the exercise being evaluated.

8. How to: An assessor that USN will provide should be tasked with

evaluating interoperability using two performance evaluation guides provided

separately. Figures representing the data sheets are included in the last section

(Table 1 and Table 2). Table 1 is used to evaluate timing-based metrics of when

interoperability was initially demonstrated. Table 2 is used to evaluate how well

interoperability was maintained through the course of continued execution.

Tables 1 and 2 can be used independently; the data in Table 2 are more

resource intensive to collect. When assessors are not provided we can rely on

the coalition /allied ship to assess the Time based metrics (Table 1).

Table1

1st

Demonstrated

Prior to Fast

Cruise

1st

Demonstrated

During Fast

Cruise

1st

Demonstrated

During live

Exercise

Never

demonstr

ated

1.00 0.75 0.25 0.00

National

Interests

ROE - Discuss implications and roles

National Policy (regional objectives,

etc. beyond ROE) implications

IO (PAO) coordination

Doctrine

C2 Construct (CWC roles)

Orders propogation

Unit reports (use, format, frequency)

COMM pathways and priorities

TIME-BASED EVALUATION SHEET

E.g. 2.75/4=.69=Zt2

Time-based

metrics for

initial capability

E.g. 2/3=.75=Zt1

THE FINAL SCORE WILL BE Zt THE AVERAGE OF Zt1,..., Zt5

166

Table 2

9. The final metric will be two scores:

a. A Zt score that is the average of scores in the topic areas table 1 is

evaluating. Since this sheet is more quantitative the score represents when

interoperability was initially demonstrated. The higher the score the earlier

interoperability was achieved on average.

b. A Zc score that is the average of scores in the topic areas table 2 is

evaluating. Since that sheet is more qualitative the score represents how

well interoperability was maintained. The higher the score the better

interoperability was maintained. It must be emphasized that the common

5 topic areas that are represented in both tables are correlated with the

Other Entities/Commands Preparedness Assessment sheets. Thus it is

very easy in the analysis process to identify what went wrong in the

preparation and what we should change in the checklist in order to avoid

# of Opportunities or

# of Operating Hours

desired

# of times interop

considered or # of

hours functional

(interoperable)

% Interoperable

National

Interests

ROE - Discuss implications and roles 3 2

National Policy (regional objectives,

etc. beyond ROE) implications

IO (PAO) coordination

Doctrine

C2 Construct (CWC roles)

Orders propogation

Unit reports (use, format,

frequency)COMM pathways and priorities

CONTINUED EXECUTION EVALUATION SHEET

Continued

execution

metrics during

exercise

E.g. 2/3=.75=Zc1

E.g. /4=.69=Zc2

THE FINAL SCORE WILL BE Zc THE AVERAGE OF Zc1,..., Zc5

167

interoperability problems in the same area in the future. Correlation of

each area with the checklist items is given in the enclosed items.

10. Lessons Learned Again – Post event, the lessons identified by the visiting

ship and their host Strike Group should be compared to the CJOS LL database.

If checklist recommendations on a particular subject were followed and the issue

still arose, then the associated checklist items may require revision. But if all

three assessment efforts are built around a common framework—a common set

of interoperability focus areas—then we should be more readily able to isolate

the strengths and weaknesses of the checklist.

11. How to: After Lessons Learned are submitted, they should be organized

around the same set of interoperability topics as the checklist and the

performance evaluation. They should then be compared with items in the

existing LL database to determine whether these items are “repeat offenders.”

The data should be collected using a tool similar to the Lessons Learned

Assessment Sheet included in the last section (Table 3).

168

Table 3

12. The final metric will be a score L that is the percentage of items for which

(the ship was prepared + items that were not problematic) divided by (the total

number of items presented in the exercise)—a perfect score is 100%, meaning

that there were no repeat LL.

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 Lack of use of

common

terminilogy and

doctrine for info

ops.

LL #2 Command and

control

arrangements

/authorities

/responsibilities

were not clear due

to lack of OPTASK

IO or poor data in

it.

LL #3 IO orgs in the

theatre were not

identified.

LL #4 IO goals abd

objectives were

not clear.

LL #5 Force IO policy

was poorly

established.TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

INFO OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

L is the final result.

A+B+C+D=NUMBER OF ALL LL

Sum (SumTotal As+SumTotal Cs)/Sum(SumTotal As+SumTotal Bs+SumTotal Cs)=L<=1

169

13. After evaluating these three aspects of interoperability we hope to tie

performance and LL back to the checklist. If a ship follows all/most

recommendation related to a particular topic, performs well in that topic during

execution, and repeats no LL in this area, then we have initial evidence that

following those particular checklist recommendations may be helpful. If checklist

items are not followed and/or the performance is not good in a particular area,

further analysis may provide insight and the potential need to revise the checklist.

14. We should be able to do this by determining what fraction of checklist

items from each topic were followed correctly and then compare those statistics

with performance scores and LL reported in that area.

Overview of Metrics

15. Measure of Preparedness

CJOS COE

COMPLETES

PREP.

ASSESSMENT

SHEET

COALITION SHIP

COMPLETES

PREP.

ASSESSMENT

SHEET

STRIKE GROUP STAFF

COMPLETES PREP.

ASSESSMENT SHEET

X-score Y-

sco

re

Y-

sco

re

Y-score

170

16. Performance Evaluation

17. Lessons Learned Repeats

18. Final Report/Result

USN ASSESOR OR SHIP

COMPLETES TIME

BASED EVAL.

SHEET

USN ASSESOR

COMPLETES

CONTINUED

EXECUTION EVAL.

SHEET

Zt-score Zc-score

SHIP COMPLETES

LESSONS LEARNED

ASSESSMENT

SHEET

L-score

171

19. The scores shown above are the basis for future comparisons and

assessments. By analyzing the after action reports and the coalition/allied ship’s

survey as well as the new LL reported by the ship and by including any

explanatory variables noted by the ship or observers we can evaluate in which

areas performance suggests that following the checklist may have been

beneficial and which areas may need revision. This report will be submitted with

recommendations from the interoperability team regarding any actions they will

take. This evaluation should be objective and the standards outlined in this

document should be followed where possible. When an exception seems

necessary or prudent, a brief comment explaining the deviation and the

motivation for it will be added.

Summary

20. The tools presented in this guide should be useful for evaluating the

overall interoperability of partner ships working with the US Navy. It should also

provide useful information to the CJOS COE for improving its interoperability

checklist. Any questions should be directed to the POCs below.

21. POCs:

CDR Themistoklis Papadimitriou (CJOS COE, Hellenic Navy) – 757.443.9850

x47132 themis.Papadimitr.gr@navy.mil

Dr. Charles Nickerson (USFFC Fleet Analyst) – 757.443.9850 x47313

charles.nickerson1@navy.mil

172

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEETS

ANNEX 2: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SHEETS (WITH CORRELATION

OF EACH AREA WITH CHECKLIST ITEMS)

ANNEX 3: LESSONS LEARNED / IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEETS

173

ANNEX 1: PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

CJOS

Item Completed?

Line # TIME Action EVENT REMARKS Yes No

1. Prior to IPC CJOS LNO Obtain Ship’s schedule and Plan

of Intended Movement (PIM)

Keep CJOS COE Deputy Director informed.

2. And/Or CJOS LNO and CJOS

Interoperability Team Leader

(TL)

Provide Interoperability

survey and checklist package

to ship(s).

Communicate with CO and OPS, address any questions. Consider

issuing a formal message through USFFC N3 or N7.

3. Prior to Ship Leaving

Homeport

Ensure the “Coalition Playbook” is

provided to Ship from CSFTL.

4. CJOS TL Compare Ship’s schedule with

USFFC (N7, N3) and CSFTL

exercise schedule.

Need to understand if Ship is coming “late in the game” or is

integrated starting with IPC.

174

5. CJOS LNO Ensure Ship participation in IPC

Ensure participants have reviewed Interoperability checklist

6. IPC

CJOS TL Identify primary problems.

7. CJOS TL Be prepared to give solutions if any.

8. Post IPC CJOS LNO and CJOS TL

Follow up with IPC Participant(s)

Receive feedback on usefulness of checklist.

9. Prior to MPC/FPC

CJOS LNO Ensure Ship participation in

MPC/FPC

Ensure participants have reviewed Interoperability checklist

10. MPC/FPC CJOS TL Ensure CSFTL has sent

Interoperability checklist and

surveys to Host Nation (US) Ships/Staffs.

CSG/ESG staffs are the planners, and issue the OPORDS and OPTASKS. Releasability and

NATO standards must be considered.

11. Post MPC/FPC

CJOS LNO and CJOS TL

Follow up with MPC/FPC

Participant(s)

Receive feedback on usefulness of checklist.

175

12. Prior to PSC/WCC

CJOS LNO and CJOS TL

Schedule Face to Face meeting with Ship. Inform CJOS chain of command, including Deputy.

Keep CSFTL informed, as well.

13. CJOS TL Create Draft Mission Order (objectives)

for Ship Engagement.

Provides Draft Objectives for Ship’s review. Sets expectations for schedule, participation and

products.

14. Coalition Ship Provide feedback on Mission Order.

15. CJOS TL Coordinate USFFC PAO coverage

Inform PAO, possible coverage of Face-Face meeting

16. CJOS TL Welcome package Assemble welcome package for Face-Face: CJOS brochures,

mementos for CO.

176

17. PSC /WCC Events

CJOS TL Ensure Ships personnel have

copies of the Survey.

Same for Host Nation (US) Ships and staffs; liaison with CSFTL

18. CJOS LNO and CJOS TL

Conduct meeting, report back to CJOS COE

Deputy Director.

19. Execution Coalition Participants

Complete Surveys This includes identified US Ships and Staffs. These surveys will be used a guide during the interview

process.

20. CJOS LNO and CJOS TL

a) Confirm schedule for follow-on visits, teleconferences, and interviews.

Follow-on One-on-One interviews with selected personnel: Senior leaders (Ship CO, Operations officer, Marine Liaison, etc.).

Follow-on Group interviews with watch officers, and functional

areas (examples: Air operations, Logistics, Intelligence,

Communications and Networks, KMO, PAO, Legal/ROE).

177

21. b) Resend Mission Order to Ship CO, plan on splitting interviews into

groups.

22. Coalition Participants

Forward completed Surveys to CJOS.

23. Post Execution

CJOS TL Conduct Follow-on visits,

teleconferences, and interviews.

Inform PAO, CJOS COE Deputy.

24. CJOS TL, Team members for

Operations, Air, Logistics, C2,

Comms.

a) Team members review surveys.

One-on-One interviews with selected personnel. Group

interviews with watch officers, and functional areas.

25. b) Team members split into groups.

26. c) Use completed surveys or blank surveys to guide

interviews.

178

27. CJOS TL Update Lessons Identified

“database”, Interoperability

Checklist.

28. CJOS TL Provide after-action report

If required.

29. CJOS TL Conduct meeting with CSFTL, USFFC.

If required.

Totals 29

Yes

No

Percent Completed (X<=1) X

X is the final result

179

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS PLANS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Item Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

PLAN 1. Review possession/ access/reception of/to all related/appropriate

publications/documents.

Utilize LNO’s on order to receive documentation. Request those missing from Higher/Foreign appropriate authorities in accordance with

National procedures. Ensure documents are releasable to all coalition.

PLAN 2. Review lessons learned data base from recent operations or exercises

Database may not be releasable. Utilize Foreign Disclosure Officer to determine releasability of

lessons learned.

PLAN 3. Determine Superior’s guidance and intent This may require a one on one briefing from the Commander to subordinates in order to clear

any language or cultural barriers.

PLAN 4. Conduct Mission Analysis When possible, utilize an integrated combined planning team to ensure effective mission

analysis in order to accurately identify tasks, limitations, COG analysis, risk assessment, and to develop Commander’s intent and guidance for the combined force. Language and culture will play a considerable role in correctly interpreting and transmitting guidance for combined forces.

180

PLAN 5. Refine participation ambitions (duties or task asked) and training expectations.

This will ensure exercise or operations participants understand the limitations of each navy with regards to training level, certifications, etc.

PLAN 6. Develop and brief C2 structure and provide reference doctrinal reference

material (e.g. CWC Manual). Promulgate clear directives on C2

structure in OPORD. Briefings should include graphic depictions of

geographic or functional divisions of responsibility.

Provide all commanders a briefing on C2 structure to include planned changes, geographic

boundaries, mission responsibilities, alternate commanders, and supporting communications structure. Brief SUPSIT doctrine as required.

PLAN 7. Generate mission or training timeline to include any limitations

A training or operational timeline will ensure the coalition is operating within its constraints and will ensure expectations are understood by all

participants.

PLAN 8. Agree, in concept, on the common set of tactics, techniques, and procedures publications used for all participants.

In most cases this should be the NATO publication set. Agreement at this time provides time for the training audience to become familiar with NATO publications. Interoperability could be enhanced by using common terms, or providing a tool that

relates one term to another.

181

PLAN 9. Command and Control Authorities and dissemination of orders. - Agree on

command and control authority. - Document agreed to rules for

disseminating orders.

Coalition participants must agree to methods of distributing formal orders and what constitutes a

formal order. This must be documented in OPGENs, OPTASKs, and OPORDERs. In the absence of documented procedures specific to

the exercise, coalition partners should use NATO standards. Orders will be misunderstood, unrecognized, or late due to no prescribed upon

or agreed to rules for disseminating orders. Official orders, such as OPTASKs, Intentions

messages, serial event messages, etc. should be sent via record message traffic as opposed to

email. Contents may be coordinated by email but messages are the official order. Real time changes of course can me made by voice or

chat communications

PLAN 10. Investigate pre-existing OPTASKs and OPORDs for use during combined

operations or exercises. Commands such as TTGL may be able to provide

samples of pre-existing plans documents that can be adopted and

utilized for a given exercise.

Using standing OPTASK and OPORDs that are releasable to participating nations will reduce

planning and work load for planners. Pre-existing OPTASKs and OPORDs can be

modified to suit the mission, available forces and the desires of the TF/TG commander.

182

PLAN 11. BPT to develop and issue releasable OPTASKs and direct whether issued

OPTASKs superseded previous OPTASKs

Operators need to have common OPTASKS in which to work from. It needs to be made clear

which OPTASKs will be relevant for a given exercise.

PLAN 12. Discuss limitations with regards to operational tempo.

Some navies have the manning and training to operate on a rapid training tempo while others do not. It’s important to frankly discuss what a realistic training tempo is in order to establish expectations and to ensure effective training.

PLAN 13. Consider exercise design that simultaneously challenges multiple

warfare areas.

Depending on the level of expertise and training requirements, it is important to design exercises

that realistically reflect the challenges the participating coalition may face during actual

operations.

PLAN 14. Integrate opportunities to share warfare responsibilities between all

participating nations.

Building into the plan opportunities for coalition units to assume warfare commander

responsibilities will ensure training opportunities are equitable and will improve interoperability in

the long term.

PLAN 15. Identify standardized wording and numbering of ROE information.

A disseminated ROE matrix with common or standardized terminology will prevent confusion

with regards to implementing ROE.

183

PLAN 16. Promulgate ROE Matrix by country in order for watch standers to understand constraints and restraints with regards

to national policy.

Each nation will have different authorities. Operations must take advantage of the differing national rules in order to achieve the mission. It’s important for each unit to understand what missions and tasks each of the participating

coalition units may conduct. For example, some nations need master’s consent before boarding,

while others do not.

PLAN 17. Include within the Battle Rhythm when serial event TABORDS are due.

Ideally TABORDs should be released NLT than 72 hours prior to the event.

Identify and adhere to where TABORDS will be posted on IP

Networks (e.g. CENTRIX).

Releasing TABORDS in accordance with an established battle rhythm will ensure participants have adequate time to review and plan for serial event. The TABORD are not always received in

standard NATO format as expected, thus making it difficult to extract relevant information

and ensure that all necessary details are passed prior to a serial

PLAN 18. Establish integrated battle rhythm. Provide time for lower echelon units to

provide feedback on higher echelon plans.

To ensure effective planning and execution, an effective battle rhythm that considers coalition

requirements must be established, promulgated, and adhered to in order to ensure continuity of

operations.

184

PLAN 19. Use training requirements and objectives to build a plan that rotates warfare

commander duties to as many units as possible, while providing time for each unit to become proficient, and exercise

interoperability.

Continue to provide more and greater responsibilities to multiple nations and units. Especially warfare commander roles (AAWC)

and Force commander roles (like ESF).

PLAN 20. Brief details for exercise area restrictions to include ranges, air space and sea

space restrictions, environmental requirements, etc.

Brief on use of exercise area. Reserve areas for events (such as helo operations). Address Risk

aversion. Clear differences in Waterspace Management, environmental compliance and

submarine safety procedures.

185

PLAN 21. Conduct face to face meetings and capability briefs outside of the

scheduled planning conferences. Conduct site visits with air operations,

communications, logistics, surface warfare, etc.

Pre-exercise time in Norfolk, VA, provided an extremely valuable opportunity for ships officers and specialists to visit host nation. Discussion includes maneuvering in close company, Plane

Guard duties, appreciation of CVN considerations and concerns, escort duty with

CVN operations, tactical employment discussions with DESRON Air Ops, battle

rhythm, and requirements from the staff for flying bids, maintenance cycles, etc. . .A pre exercise comms brief is very helpful to meet key players

face to face and discuss aspects that may cause concern.

PLAN 22. Verify Pre-exercise messages are received and understood by all

coalition participants.

Releasability issues may result in late or no release of pre-exercise messages. Ensure

addressing of messages include all coalition staffs and units. Refrain from labeling

documents as NOFORN.

PLAN 23. Use NATO format in order to achieve releasability.

Exercise and CTG/CTF staffs must understand how to disseminate information that is as freely releasable as possible (i.e.: Rel CMFC). Use

NATO formats as often as possible to enhance releasability.

186

PLAN 24. Use document labeling to ensure widest dissemination.

Establish releasability guidelines and ensure coalition players are included in release groups.

Refrain from using NOFORN labeling.

PLAN 25. LNOS Liaison Officers should be assigned at least two weeks prior to the Exercise. Both the quantity

and quality (expertise) of coalition participants is the basis for the detailed interaction required. LNOS have to make planning decisions, the

command structure they are embedded within is crucial. LNOs must be paired with a designated

and corresponding ship POC.

Totals 24

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y1

187

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS INTEL PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Item Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

INTEL 1 Brief and describe foreign disclosure requirements and guidelines

In order to protect information, all participants must understand and adhere to foreign disclosure

requirements.

INTEL 2 Coordinate Intelligence Preparation of the Battle space with coalition

partners.

Coalition partners must have an understanding of the intelligence requirements for the commander.

Additionally, each partner must be made familiar with the geography and characteristics of the Area of

Operations, Assessment of the Enemy.

INTEL 3 Designate clear authority on red data base management.

In order to ensure the Common Operational Picture is accurate with regards to red tracks, clear lines of

authority must be promulgated for data base management responsibilities.

INTEL 4 Designate the information system to use for intelligence products and

information sharing. Maritime coalition operations should

incorporate accessible means of allowing data to be transferred

between units.

Information system must be identified early in the planning process to allow time for acquisition,

installation, training, and testing. Clearly identify and send all parties chat room names, passwords, and

location of information. All chat rooms should be setup and defined prior to deployment/exercise.

INTEL 5 Discuss, where possible, intelligence gathering capabilities and

limitations. Develop matrix of unit Intel gathering capabilities

Intel analyst must be able to understand coalition capabilities in order to best exploit intelligence gather

capabilities, which will avoid gaps and redundancies in intelligence collection.

188

INTEL 6 Designate and disseminate the commander’s Priority Intelligence

Requirements. Discuss Request for Information submission procedures,

All units must understand the commander’s intelligence priorities.

INTEL 7 Develop Enemy COAs with coalition partner input,

Differing cultures and experiences will enlighten the understanding of the enemy and their potential actions.

Totals 7

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y2

189

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Items Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

OPS 1 Conduct ship and aircraft capability review. Participants/units provide

capabilities, especially new or unique ones. (OPSTAT UNIT or

equivalent signals should be utilized).

Examples: New systems, like VDS. Standoff weapons like Exocet.

Information should include current material status of weapons, sensor, propulsion, RHIBs, and helos, and impact on operations and particular warfare areas. All OPS hands must

be able to understand coalition capabilities in order to best exploit them and will lead in avoidance of

gaps and redundancies in operations.

OPS 2 BPT conduct survey of amphibious ships for compatibility of various

landing craft.

A survey of landing craft and vehicles must be completed to determine the level of interoperability of amphibious units (e.g. can a US LCAC fit into a

UK Amphib or vice versa).

OPS 3 Identify communications terminology and acronym reference.

All units must be familiar and practice with common communications

terminology. A single code word reference book should be identified

to avoid voice communications confusion

OPS 4 Conduct warfare commander and watch stander discussion on

differences in National policy, ROE, and safety to ensure all participants

have an equal understanding of limitations, rules, safety etc.

Masters Consent Boarding is one example of national policy

differences, and required an understanding between units of

interoperability differences.

190

OPS 5 Establish communications doctrine for Voice and Chat circuits. Publish doctrine within OPTASK Comms

and OPTASK Chat.

Operators need to understand what circuits will be used for the issuance

of formal tactical orders. The tactical situation will dictate whether voice or chat will be the primary C2

medium. Additionally, the purpose of the circuit must be determined,

whether it is to be administrative in nature, complimentary to voice

communications or operationally and tactically directive. Maneuvering

coalition ships is conducted exclusively over Fleet Tac UHF, in some exercises, a combination of

Fleet Tac, VHF BTB and CENTRIX chat with no particular method given primacy and on occasion conflicting

orders arising from each circuit.

OPS 6 Develop and provide a roles/responsibility matrix that

relates the name/title of each watch stander on the C2 nets to a

common role.

Example: TAO(US) to PWO(UK). Need to issue good C2 guidance in

OPORD, or (better) use standards in reference material.

OPS 7 Agree on tactical references that will be used for operations. The

objective here is to create a list of the primary National, Coalition, and

NATO publications used so that each participant has time to access reference documents that are not

on their national systems, or request hardcopies from other

nations.

OCE needs to direct use of appropriate tactical pubs and where there will be exceptions. Interoperability problems

can be caused due to important reference documents available, or over-classified. For some coalition

units, chat is not a primary means of communication, and so the use of

chat as a means for order dissemination should be clear from

the beginning

191

OPS 8 Brief C2 and Communications procedures.

If chat is to be used as primary form of communications, then all participants must agree on the decision to do so, and voice circuits must be constantly

tested as backup when chat is inoperative. Virtually all nations use voice as primary communications.

Example: For SITREPS, Use NATO prescribed TABORD format, informative as a stand-alone

documents, and deliver via message traffic and CENTRIX at 72 hr point.

OPS 9 Reinforce command and control communications doctrine.

Official orders, such as OPTASKs, Intentions messages, serial event messages, etc. must be sent via

record message traffic as opposed to email. Contents may be coordinated

by email but messages are the official order. Real time changes of

course can me made by voice or chat communications.

OPS 10 Communications and watch stander limitations must be briefed to

rationalize expectations.

Some units may have limited communications and available watch standers, therefore, operations must be planned around these limitations.

OPS 11 If required, brief and discuss NSFS fire control procedures and doctrine. Identify common

resources for NSFS doctrine and terminology.

Each participating unit may have differing procedures for the conduct of NSFS. In order to ensure safe

NSFS events, each unit should agree on the appropriate references, procedures, and terminology.

OPS 12 Each OPTASK should identify the appropriate C2 circuit for tactical execution and controller of that

circuit. Brief participants.

Briefing control of voice circuits will ensure voice radio discipline.

192

OPS 13 Discuss “safe to train” requirements. Need to understand differences in tactics in general as well as new

systems, perhaps via briefings ahead of the exercise. Especially

differences in Gunnery safety rules should be clear and understandable.

OPS 14 Discuss cultural treatment of command and organization. Come to terms in areas such as: Planning

horizons, the objective of unit reports (should a SITREP be a

status report, or should it provide a tactical assessment and

intentions?).

Nations differ in their expectations for unit actions when situations present

themselves. Two examples: An expectation that when a unit is assigned to a SAU for an ASW

mission, it is not necessary to issue a change in TACON for the unit to the

ASWC, when in fact, it is a good practice to issue an order for clarity. Orders changing TACON or OPCON for a unit: What format should they

take, and what dissemination process should be used? Only

through knowing of differences can interoperability issues be mitigated.

In some cases the differences cannot be solved, which is acceptable as

long as they are identified.

OPS 15 Where voice circuits are limited, consider assigning a single

frequency for overall tactical C2.

Communications and watch stander limitations of other units must be

understood to ensure effective and continuous C2.

OPS 16 Confirm the units designations, call signs, etc.

Familiarize operators with call-sign conventions and unit warfare designations (e.g. AW, AX).

193

OPS 17 Provide information on how Warfare Commander’s Roles are being

performed.

All units must be aware of differences and limitations when warfare

commander functions are hosted in a staff, versus the typical method of hosting within a ship’s operations

center. Most coalition ships are not aware that a warfare commander can

be hosted in a staff, there will be difficulty receiving/sending

information, because a staff based warfare commander is not fully

focused on the tactical situation.

OPS 18 Timely issue of Commander’s daily intentions message (DIMs).

Ensure that DIMS messages are issued in a timely manner. Releasability

procedures, unduly lengthy review cycles, and improper routing and

message handling can easily delay the DIMS from getting to the right audience quickly. Send DIMS by fastest means possible, typically

email.

OPS 19 Receipt of Orders: message traffic must be free of delays and reach all participants. Ensure proper

handling or dissemination of messages

Record message traffic “filters" (human and electronic) may hinder

interoperability. Record message traffic may suffer because of: 1) No-

one (or very few) is reviewing message traffic for relevance, 2)

Messages not being forwarded, 3) Information in messages was not finding its way into the relevant

information, 4) Routing indicators is not up to date.

194

OPS 20 Avoid Non NATO terminology. Use of NATO terminology should be ensured. Example: “Suspect

identity” is used in NATO but some other nations don’t use it, and can

cause confusion when communication contacts intentions.

OPS 21 Create a strong relationship between LNOs and Operations watch

officers.

LNOS can play a crucial role helping monitoring email traffic from coalition ships. And can help keep host watch

officers informed.

Totals 21

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y3

195

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS DATA LINK PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Items Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

DLINK 1 Discuss and Identify Force COP Manager

Identify COP management experience and link systems integration capabilities

DLINK 2 Discuss and Identify FOTC Identify FOTC management experience and link systems integration capabilities

DLINK 3 Brief and promulgate link Architecture

Promulgate to operators to ensue familiarity

DLINK 4 Determine primary data link for the Common Operational Picture,

keeping in mind capabilities and limitations of participating units.

BPT to exchange data link LNOs.

There is a need to broadcast the Common Operational Picture to as many units as possible, while maximizing the capabilities of the best equipped units. Additionally,

there is a need to prevent cluttered pictures where multiple data line broadcasts are pushed simultaneously.

DLINK 5 Establish, brief, and disseminate OPTASK ID matrix and

symbology doctrine.

All units must use the same ID doctrine for their data links to avoid confusion of track IDs. Based on varying

degrees of link capabilities, common ground must be found on symbology and ID criteria to ensure a Common Operational Picture. Changes to existing unit ID criteria

must be determined early enough for units to train to new ID criteria.

DLINK 6 Determine Force Track Quality for each unit.

Predetermined force track quality will reduce dual tracking in the Common Operational Picture.

196

DLINK 7 Provide clear direction on crypto in use, and frequency shifts.

The OTAD can be problematic at times when the shoreside originator becomes confused over the time difference and which day’s crypto is required. The Link 11 Data

frequency might change without being promulgated on the voice net or CENTRIX. The Link SITREP should be

released hourly and not when there are changes.

Totals 8

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y4

197

OTHER ENTITIES / COMMANDS AIR OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Items Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

AIR 1 Conduct HOSTAC review. Ensures HOSTAC has up to date information is available to aviation planners.

AIR 2 Schedule in port flight deck inspection.

Permits HAC opportunity to determine caps/lims of helicopter flight decks to support flight operations

planning.

AIR 3 Identify appropriate aviation publications and

references.

Ensures all aviation capable units will have appropriate references and time to absorb and apply contents.

AIR 4 Identify primary network for ATO production (e.g.

TBMCS).

Some units will not have access to TBMCS as it resides on SIPR. Therefore, a common network must be identified

to support ATO production.

AIR 5 Planning and coordination of Helo Flying Ops.

Daily DOTAH/FEEDER should be employed The lack of ready access to the DOTAH/ATO and other aviation

planning information means that the majority of communication with USN is carried out via email. The

usual battle rhythm employed within a NATO TG is submitting a daily DOTAH feeder and receiving a

DOTAH with the next 72Hr.

AIR 6 Consider using standard NATO format (such as the ICC application) for ATO.

A standard format for the ATO for all NATO Carrier Groups (ICC) should be used. NATO use of ICC software in previous exercises with coalition assets has proved invaluable; the software is available and has been

proven even if the Strike Wing’s Daily Air Plan may have be received as well as a planning aid.

198

AIR 7 Sharing of C2 duties requires detailed and easily understood comms architecture for Air

Operations.

The key issue precluding the execution of these duties is the timely and effective distribution of material and appropriate security classification between coalition units. Sharing of ADC and Redcrown duties require

consistent and robust communications architecture for the Task Group.

Totals 7

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y5

199

OTHER ENTITIES / COMMANDS SUB OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Items Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

SUB 1 Develop Waterspace Management Plan and

designate SUBOPAUTH.

Ensure all players are familiar with submarine operating areas.

SUB 2 Promulgate submarine safety procedures.

Ensure all players are familiar with submarine safety procedures.

Totals 2

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y6

200

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS INFO OPS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Items Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

INFOPS 1 BPT develop common terminology and doctrine for the conduct of strategic

communications.

Common terminology will ensure a synchronized information operations plan and will support

effective execution.

INFOPS 2 Promulgate and brief IO command and control arrangements and authorities

and responsibilities in the OPTASK IO.

To avoid confusion on IO C2 structure, each unit must be briefed on what the roles and

responsibilities there are for IO operations. Key personnel must be identified and POC

information disseminated (e.g. email address, voice net, IP network.)

INFOPS 3 Identify Theater IO Organizations. Ensure all IO planners are familiar with theater IO chain of command.

INFOPS 4 Identify theater IO goals and objectives. Ensure all IO planners are familiar with theater IO objectives.

INFOPS 5 Establish Force IO/IW Policy, including restricted frequencies, EMCON, and

media policies.

Ensure all IO planners are familiar with force IO policies.

Totals 5

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y7

201

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS LOG. PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Items Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

LOG 1 Determine logistics report requirements such as the daily OPREP 5 report.

In order to conduct effective logistics planning, a common logistics format and reporting procedure

must be identified.

LOG 2 Identify logistics LNOs and Forward Logistics team personnel.

Logistics LNOs are critical to ensure personnel, parts, and supplies are available to the TG.

LOG 3 Review unit capabilities and limitations in order to identify logistics infrastructure /

engineering compatibility.

Fuel planners and logistics planners must refuel and other logistics systems (e.g. fuel line connections,

pressure limitations, fuel and oil types, etc) are compatible for all participating units. Early

identification of incompatibility is needed to ensure solutions are available before commencement of

the exercise.

LOG 4 Investigate locations of LNOs, forward Logistics Operating Teams and/or

personnel deployment.

Location of forward logistics LNOs is critical to the success of operations.

LOG 5 Replenishment Procedures. Use of standard RAS signal formats in accordance with ATP 16 and OPTASK RAS should be ensured.

202

LOG 6 Understand shore power connection differences.

The weight of the cables and the position of the shore connection boxes may preclude the use of shore

power. In effect, heavy three-core cables are used in the US that does not have the flexibility of the

single-core cables used in the coalition units. Coalition units must be prepared. Some

coalition vessels supply 440v whereas US shore power is nearer 480v.

LOG 7 Establish expeditious invoicing of Services.

Mechanism not in place to provide timely invoices to foreign ships for payment of services prior to

departing.

LOG 8 Approval to obtain repair services from US shipyards.

OPNAV regulations require OPNAV approval in order for Navy shipyards to provide repair services to

foreign ships. Upon approval, the repair services are only provided on a not to interfere basis with US ship commitments. C2F N4, in coordination

with Port OPS and the N43 community developed a process where Port Ops would request blanket

approval for the shipyards to provide repair services to foreign ships prior to their arrival. This was done for some coalition units but it appears that the Mayport shipyard is not aware that this

approval can be obtained.

LOG 9 Identify medical planning doctrine and procedures to be used during exercises.

Medical emergency plans must be compatible to ensure rapid response for injured or sick personnel.

Totals 9

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y8

203

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS COMMS PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Item Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE YES NO

COMMS 1 Identify primary command and control information network (e.g.

CENTRIX). Avoid using SIPRnet which coalition ships can not

access.

A survey must be completed to determine which network can serve the most units. This will become the

primary C2 network. Once identified all interaction should be completed on the primary network to avoid confusion and redundancy. If the focus of information

flow and posting is on a national network, such as SIPRnet, late and incomplete information, will end up

posted on CENTRIX.

COMMS 2 A large amount of effort can be spent in achieving effective CENTRIX

interoperability. CENTRIX can be a single point of failure for coalition

interoperability and whenever connection with the server is lost, interoperability levels plummet.

Define which enclave will be used. Program Staff assistance to engineer the required frequencies and permissions. Data exchange from SIPR to CENTRIX is onerous. Ensure that websites are set up correctly

to allow for posting of such documents. Emailing large documents takes a long time and frequently causes the files to become corrupt or crash the

system. All in all, this process requires an inordinate amount of effort by the LNOs and Ship’s Staff.

COMMS 3 Identify appropriate crypto requirements and availability. Brief

crypto roll over and loading procedures. Identify potential

technical incompatibilities between various modems and crypto

terminals. Brief and publish crypto terminal settings.

Participants must ensure that compatible crypto is available in a timely manner. Additionally, all crypto users must be synchronized with roll over and loading times. Crypto material should be checked thoroughly well in advance. Planning should consider coalition

availability.

204

COMMS 4 Identify realistic requirements for information systems to include

number of required PCs, printers, etc. Identify space requirements

and develop installation plan.

Survey operational commanders for information systems requirements. Units may require advance notice to

begin installing unique network systems (e.g. CENTRIX). Additionally, units and staffs will have to develop a comprehensive location plan for PCs and printers to ensure appropriate people have access to required information systems and that those systems

are located such that they adequately support operations and planning. Where possible, collocate

new systems using CPU switches, with existing systems in order to not disrupt normal office space

arrangement and seating of personnel

COMMS 5 Identify information systems account registration requirements.

Personnel that need new information systems accounts normally must register in a timely manner to ensure

availability of accounts.

COMMS 6 Provide information systems training to appropriate personnel to include

login and passwords.

In order to ensure familiarity with newly acquired information systems, personnel must be provided with

passwords and information systems training.

COMMS 7 Ensure adequate chat rooms are available to support operations.

Survey warfare commanders to determine chat room requirements.

COMMS 8 Develop and disseminate list that includes chat room names and passwords via OPTASK chat.

Ensure all participants have access to required chat rooms.

COMMS 9 Provide comms LNOs between combined forces.

Comms LNOs will ensure continuity of communications throughout the exercise by providing an immediate

POC that address comms issues.

205

COMMS 10 Develop communications capability MATRIX and brief operators and comms caps/lims for each unit.

Operators and planners need to understand communications capabilities and limitations of other units in order to develop an effective command and control structure. It will also establish expectations

between participating units.

COMMS 11 If possible, conduct pre-exercise communications circuit testing, to include operators at their watch stations 3 days prior to commex.

It’s important to work out communications problems in port before units begin exercising in order to maximize

training at sea.

COMMS 12 Use NATO crypto. Using NATO Crypto will potentially eliminate issues that would arise if the coalition uses crypto provided by the

host nation.

COMMS 13 HAVEQUICK utilization. Define settings to be used and hop rate. USN has been able to use training settings with this HOPRATE and therefore opted not to use war settings during C2X.

Coalition units are expected to use a different HOPRATE It has been observed the use of different

hop rate and training cryptographic material put coalition units at a disadvantage as software

limitations do not allow for training cryptographic material to be used

COMMS 14 Message Handling System exploitation.

Comms plan should address amongst others and the exploitation of MHS.

COMMS 15 Degrees of Confidentiality. Restricted is not used by USN.

COMMS 16 Use of Maneuvering circuits must be well managed.

Maneuvering nets should be clarified on order to avoid interoperability issues. Furthermore NATO signaling

methods should be applied.

206

Totals 16

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y9

207

OTHER ENTITIES/COMMANDS GENERAL PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT SHEET

Items Completed?

Line # EVENT REMARK / RATIONALE Yes No

GEN 1. Identify and BPT exchange LNOs for all areas.

The more robust of an LNO plan there is the better likelihood of being able to rapidly resolve conflicts in tactics, doctrine, communications, and logistics. LNO

engagement cannot be overemphasized. It is the only method by which Coalition units will realize the

complexity of the exercise. Coalition ships must provide detailed requirements during planning.

GEN 2. Ensure that all OPTASKs, OPGEN, TABORDS or other planning or

directive messages reference only those documents that are releasable

to action and info addressees.

Units cannot reference a document they do not have access to, thus, their ability to execute assigned

tasks may be inhibited. The standard format table in AXP 2C for signal formatting could be used to save

confusion in signal orders.

GEN 3. Identify Planning Conference Participants.

Staff planners (CSG, ATG, etc.) from all participants should attend critical planning conferences. These

attendees should be consistent through all planning conference, and the exercise, personnel should not be rotating to a new command in the next 8 months.

Verify which units will be on certain enclaves. OPTASK Comms must encompass networks,

command, control, and information management. Coalition terminals must be manned.

208

GEN 4. C4 (command, control communications, computers) architecture design must receive primary focus during planning

conferences.

C4 architecture should be thoroughly checked and reviewed prior to the exercise; coalition must

understand how to attain visibility to higher level (CFMCC, CJTF) comms and info management and

flow. Experts in C4 must attend all planning phases.

GEN 5. Releasability of orders and information. Exercise planners, and CTG/CTF

staffs must create, review, and label orders and other information for

maximum release.

Procedures for maximum releasability must be addressed early in the planning process, and used

continuously during the exercise. Examples of documents that must not be labeled NOFORN:

OPTASK Comms, planning conference presentations, OPORDER 6000, Pre-exercise

workups (FST-GC) information. Use NATO formatted orders.

Totals 5

Yes

No

Percent Completed Y10

209

MISSION AREA SCORE

PLANS Y1

INTEL Y2

OPS Y3

LINL Y4

AIR OPS Y5

SUB OPS Y6

INFO OPS Y7

LOG-MED Y8

COMMS Y9

GENERAL Y10

Overall Average = Y

Y is the final result

210

ANNEX 2: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SHEETS (WITH CORRELATION OF EACH AREA WITH CHECKLIST ITEMS)

TIME-BASED EVALUATION SHEET

Time-based metrics for initial capability

1st Demonstrated Prior to Fast Cruise

1st Demonstrated During

Fast Cruise

1st Demonstrated During

live Exercise

Never demonstrat

ed

1.00 0.75 0.25 0.00

National Interests

E.g. 2/3=.75=Zt1

ROE - Discuss implications and

roles

National Policy (regional

objectives, etc. beyond ROE) implications

IO (PAO) coordination

Doctrine

E.g. 2.75/4=.69=Zt2

C2 Construct (CWC roles)

Orders propogation

Unit reports (use, format, frequency)

COMM pathways and priorities

211

Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures

E.g 6/9=.67=Zt3

Waterspace (surface and

subsurface)/airspace management

procedures

Force employment (including NSFS

and helos)

Intel sharing (methods &

expectations)

Capabilities and limitations

(comms, fires, aviation support, intel collection,

etc.)

ATO/HOSTAC generation

Replenishment and logistics

Vocabulary

EW tools & procedures

(deconfliction)

IO

Technical

E.g 1.75/2=.875=Zt4 Voice, Data, Email circuits

212

SA tools (LINK, etc.), CAS and network

tools

Equipment

E.g 2/3=.67=Zt5

RAS hoses/connectors

Aviation Requirements

Amphibious requirements

THE FINAL SCORE WILL BE Zt AVERAGE OF Zt1,..., Zt5

213

# of Opportunities or

# of Operating Hours

desired

# of times interop

considered or # of

hours functional

(interoperable)

% Interoperable

National

Interests

ROE - Discuss implications and roles 3 2

National Policy (regional objectives,

etc. beyond ROE) implications

IO (PAO) coordination

Doctrine

C2 Construct (CWC roles)

Orders propogation

Unit reports (use, format,

frequency)COMM pathways and priorities

Tactics,

Techniques,

and Procedures

Waterspace (surface and

subsurface)/airspace management

procedures

Force employment (including NSFS

and helos)

intel sharing (methods &

expectations)

capabilities and limitations (comms,

fires, aviation support, intel

collection, etc.)

ATO/HOSTAC generation

Replenishment and logistics

Vocabulary

EW tools & procedures

(deconfliction)

IO

Technical

Voice, Data, Email circuits

SA tools (LINK, etc.), CAS and

network tools

eg. A 7 days

exercise is 7*24

eg functinal only

the 5 days 5*24

Equipment

RAS hoses/connectors

Aviation Requirements

Amphibious requirements

CONTINUED EXECUTION EVALUATION SHEET

THE FINAL SCORE WILL BE Zc THE AVERAGE OF Zc1,..., Zc5

E.g 5*24/7*24=.71=Zc4

E.g 2/3=.67=Zc5

Continued

execution

metrics during

exercise

E.g. 2/3=.75=Zc1

E.g. /4=.69=Zc2

E.g /9=.67=Zc3

214

NATIONAL INTERESTS CHECKLIST ITEMS

ROE - Discuss implications and roles SUB OPS/OPS4/PLAN15/PLAN16

National Policy (regional objectives,

etc. beyond ROE) implicationsPLAN3/PLAN4/PLAN5/PLAN9/OPS4

IO (PAO) coordination CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

/LNOS/INFO5/OPS21/INTEL1/PLANS2/PLAN24

DOCTRINE

C2 Construct (CWC roles) PLAN22/PLAN23/OPS5/OPS8/INTEL6/OPS14/PLA

N2/PLAN9/PLAN10/PLAN11/PLAN14/PLAN19/ALL

4/AIR5/AIR7/OPS6/OPS14/OPS15/OPS17/PLAN6/

PLAN12/PLAN13

Orders propogation PLAN22/PLAN23/OPS5/OPS8/INTEL6/OPS14/PLA

N2/PLAN9/PLAN10/PLAN11/ALL5/COMMS16/AIR

5/OPS5/OPS9/OPS18/OPS19/PLAN1/PLAN18

Unit reports (use, format, frequency) PLAN22/PLAN23/OPS5/OPS8/INTEL6/OPS14/PLA

N2/PLAN9/PLAN10/PLAN11/ALL2/INFO1/AIR3/OP

S3/OPS7/OPS14/OPS19/PLAN18

COMM pathways and priorities PLAN22/PLAN23/OPS5/OPS8/INTEL6/OPS14/PLA

N2/PLAN9/PLAN10/PLAN11/ALL3/COMM5/COM

M11/COMM9/COMM8/COMM7/COMM1/LINK/OP

S12/INTEL1

TTPS

Waterspace (surface and

subsurface)/airspace management

procedures

SUB1/SUB2/AIR5/PLAN8/PLAN13/PLAN20

Force employment (including NSFS and

helos)

SUB1/SUB2/AIR3/AIR5/OPS11/PLAN7/PLAN13/PL

AN17/PLAN20

intel sharing (methods &

expectations)ALL2/ALL1/COMM15/PLAN8

capabilities and limitations (comms,

fires, aviation support, intel collection,

etc.)

PLAN7/PLAN8/PLAN12/PLAN13/PLAN21/COMM1

0/LOG3/LOG1/SUB1/SUB2/OPS1/OPS4/OPS10/OP

S13/INTEL1/INTEL5

ATO/HOSTAC generation AIR1/AIR4/AIR5

Replenishment and logistics LOG

Vocabulary OPS3OPS7OPS20/PLAN8/PLAN15

EW tools & procedures (deconfliction)LINK/INTEL5

IO INFO/INTEL4/INTEL6/INTEL7

TECHNICAL

Voice, Data, Email circuitsCOMM15/COMM14/COMM13/COMM12/COMM6/

COMM5/COMM4/COMM2/OPS5/OPS15/OPS14

SA tools (LINK, etc.), CAS and network

tools

COMM6/COMM4/COMM3/LINK/OPS16/INTEL3/IN

TEL4/INTEL7

EQUIPMENT

RAS hoses/connectors LOG

Aviation Requirements AIR

Amphibious requirements OPS2

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ITEMS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH CHECKLIST

215

ANNEX 3: LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEETS

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue

and were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not experience

situation

LL #1 No / limited plan for LNOs

(numbers, areas, ships e.t.c)

LL #2 Terms of References used in

exercise documentation

wasn't available or releasable

to all participants.

LL #3 Participants of planning or

other exercise conferences

(pre-post etc) weren't

identified/agreed.

LL #4 C4 architecture design didn't

receive appropriate focus.

LL #5 Info releasability was

poor/limited.

TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

ALL (GENERAL) LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not prepared

Was not an issue Did not experience

situation

LL #1 Problems in possession

/access/reception of all

publications/ documents

related with the

cooperation.

LL #2 No or limited access to LL

data base from recent

exercises/operations due

to releasability issues.

LL #3 Undetermined/not clear

superior's guidance

/intent.LL #4 Poor or no mission

analysis.

LL #5 Not clarified participation

ambitions and training

expectations.

LL #6 Not clear C2 structure and

reference doctrinal

material. Not clear

geographical and/or

functional divisions of

responsibilities.

LL #7 Limited or no training

timeline.

Limitations/constraints

not included thus

expectations difficult to

be met by participants.

LL #8 Lack of predefined

common set of TTPs .

PLANS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

216

LL #9 Lack of predefined

methods of

distribution/dissemination

of orders and of command

and control authority.(e.g.

OPGEN, OPTASKS e.g.)

LL #10 No exploitation of pre-

existing documentation

(OPGEN, OPTASKS) for

such type of exercises.

LL #11 Restrictions on

releasability of

orders/documentation of

the exercise.

LL #12 Limitations with regards

to operational tempo not

clarified .

LL #13 Exercise design didn't met

expectations /training

requirements (e.g. lack of

multiple threat scenario).

LL #14 Warfare responsibilities

weren't shared among the

participants.

LL #15 ROE info didn't follow

accepted standards.

LL #16 All participants ROE

matrixes weren't

available to watch

standers to ensure

understanding of

restraints and constraints.

LL #17 Limited or misuse of

TABORDS for the serials.

Not included in the Battle

Rhythm, not released

timely, not posted on the

predefined networks.

LL #18 Problems with the

established Battle

Rhythm. Not enough time

for feedback and analysis

in order to ensure

continuity of

ops/exercise.

LL #19 No or limited planning to

ensure linear increase of

proficiency and

interoperability by

rotating duties among

LL #20 Exercise restricted areas,

waterspace management,

environmental restrictions

and safety procedures

above on and below the

surface were not detailed

/clear.

LL #21 Limited or no face to face

meetings, site visits

/surveys, to ensure clarity

in all exercise aspects.

LL #22 Pre-exercise

documentation wasn't

received timely or was not

clear.

LL #23 No use of NATO formats

in order to avoid

releasability issues.

LL #24 LNOs were assigned late

or had no experience for

decision making, couldn't

be embedded in the

command structure, had

limited or no expertise for

the exercise/ops. They

were not paired with a

designated and

corresponding ship POC.

TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

217

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 Foreign disclosure

requirements and guidelines

were not described/cleared.

LL #2 Poor coordination of

intelligence preparation of

the Battle Space with all

participants. Intelligence

requirements were not clear.

LL #3 No clear lines of authorities

were promulgated for data

base management

responsibilities, so picture

was not accurate with

regards to red tracks.

LL #4 Poor coordination of

intelligence warfare

(information system in use ,

means for transferring data ,

info sharing policy , products

sharing e.t.c).

LL #5 Intelligence gathering

capabilities and limitations

not clear/available to all

participants.

LL #6 Commanders Intelligence

priorities were not clear.

LL #7 Enemy COAs were not

produced with coalition

inputs.TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

INTEL LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

218

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 Ships and Aircrafts

capabilities reviews were

not conducted . Unique

capabilities were not clear

and OPSTAT UNIT was not

utilized. Thus gaps and

redundancies were obvious

during the cooperation.

LL #2 Compatibility of various

landing crafts with

participating amphibious

ships was not clear.

LL #3 Comms terminology and

acronym reference were

not defined.

LL #4 Differences in National

Policies, ROEs, and safety

rules were not known from

watch standers .

LL #5 Communication doctrine for

voice and chat circuits was

not established and not

published through OPTASK

COMMS and OPTASK CHAT.

LL #6 Roles /responsibilities

matrix relating names/titles

of each watch stander on

the C2 nets to a common

role was not developed.

LL #7 Lack of list of the primary

national, coalition and

NATO publications that are

used for the

exercise/cooperation.

OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

219

LL #8 C2 and Comms procedures

agreed were not briefed.

LL #9 Orders were not sent via

record message traffic no

matter how they were

initially disseminated.

LL #10 Comms /watch standers

limitations were not known

iot allow planning around

them.

LL #11 NSFS fire control

procedures/ terminology

and doctrine was not clear.

LL #12 OPTASKS didn't identify

appropriate C2 circuit for

tactical execution.

LL #13 "Safe to train" requirements

were not clear .

LL #14 Different

tactical/command/organiza

tion expectations e.g.

planning horizons, reports

objectives etc.

LL #15 Lack of voice comms or

inefficient use of voice

comms for overall tactical

C2.

LL #16 Not common use of units

designations and call signs.

LL #17 Different perception on

Warfare Commanders roles

and how these are

performed.

LL #18 Improper use of DIMS (in

terms of time ,info etc).

LL #19 Difficulties in message

traffic (routing indicators,

forwarding, recording , info

etc)

LL #20 Use of non NATO

terminology.

LL #21 Not proper linkage of LNOs

with Ops watch standers.

TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

220

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 Force COP

manager and link

systems

integration

capabilities not

efficient.

LL #2 FTC's

management

experience in

conjunction with

link systems

integration

capabilities not

taken into

consideration in

planning .

LL #3 COP cluttered and

capabilities of the

ships not taken

into consideration

for maximum

efficiency. No data

link LNOs

exchanged.

LL #4 Problematic ID

doctrine , id

criteria , lack or

misuse of OPTASK

ID.

LL #5 Force track quality

was not

determined for

each unit in order

to avoid dual

tracking.

LL #6 Problems in use of

crypto material

and frequency

shift plan.TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

DATA LINK OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

221

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 Waterspace

management plan

was not clear.

LL #2 Submarine safety

procedures were

not clear/known to

all participants

/watch standers.TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

SUB OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 Lack of use of

common

terminilogy and

doctrine for info

ops.

LL #2 Command and

control

arrangements

/authorities

/responsibilities

were not clear due

to lack of OPTASK

IO or poor data in

it.

LL #3 IO orgs in the

theatre were not

identified.

LL #4 IO goals abd

objectives were

not clear.

LL #5 Force IO policy

was poorly

established.TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

INFO OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

222

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 HOSTAC info was

not up to date and

available to all

aviation planners.

LL #2 Capabilities and

Limitations of

Helos were not

known and

available to all

planners.

LL #3 No use of

common NATO

aviation

publications and

references.

LL #4 No primary

network to support

ATO production

was defined.

LL #5 Use of

DOTAH/FEEDER

for planning and

coordination of

Helo ops was

limited .

LL #6 No use of ATO

NATO standard

format.

LL #7 Poorly planned

comms

architecture

decreased the

capability of

sharing AIR

DUTIES (ADC,

REDCROWN etc.)TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

AIR OPS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

223

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 No use of common

primary command

and control

information

network (e.g.

CENTRIX).

LL #2 Primary command

network

parameters were

not clear thus

interoperability

was reduced. (e.g.

enclaves, web

sites, passwords,

etc.)

LL #3 Crypto

requirements

/availability/

compatibility

problems.

LL #4 Information

systems plan was

not adequate to

support

operations.

LL #5 Information

systems accounts

/registration

process were

problematic.

LL #6 Training for the

use of information

systems was not

adequate to

support

operations.

LL #7 Available chat

rooms not

adequate to

support

operations.

LL #8 OPTASK CHAT info

was poor.

LL #9 No coomms LNOs

between combined

forces iot ensure

continuity of

comms.

LL #10 Comms

capabilities and

limitations not

available to all

planners and

watch standers.

LL #11 No execution of

comms checks

prior to exercise or

serials.

LL #12 No use of NATO

crypto material.

LL #13 Misuse of

HAVEQUICK.

LL #14 Poor exploitation

of Message

Handling Systems.

LL #15 No common set of

degrees of

confidentiality.

LL #16 No management

of Maneuvering

nets. NATO

signaling methods

didn't applied.

TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

COMMS LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

224

A B C D

Was an issue but

were prepared

Was an issue and

were not

prepared

Was not an issue Did not

experience

situation

LL #1 Common logistics

format and

reporting

procedures were

not identified and

established.

LL #2 Logistics LNOs and

Forward Logistics

team personnel

was not identified.

LL #3 Capabilities and

limitations review

iot identify logistic

infrastructure

/engineering

compatibility was

poor or not

available to all

planners /watch

standers.

LL #4 Locations for

Logistic LNOs and

Forward Logistic

Teams were not

appropriate.

LL #5 No use of standard

NATO

replenishment

procedures. (e.g.

(ATP-16, OPTASK

RAS etc.).

LL #6 Shore based

logistic support

planning was not

adequate.

LL #7 Expeditious

invoicing of

services was not

established.

LL #8 Mechanism to

obtain approval for

repair services in

US shipyards was

not clear or

defined.

LL #9 Medical planning

doctrine and

procedures were

not identified.

TOTAL As TOTAL Bs TOTAL Cs TOTAL Ds

LOG LESSONS IDENTIFIED ASSESSMENT SHEET

225

L is the final result.

METRICS ON LESSONS LEARNED ASSESSMENT SHEET

A+B+C+D=NUMBER OF ALL LL

Sum (SumTotal As+SumTotal Cs)/Sum(SumTotal As+SumTotal Bs+SumTotal Cs)=L<=1