AlsobyPeterReese

TheScottishCommanderWallace,ABiography

Flodden:AScottishTragedyCromwell’sMasterstroke:

Dunbar1650TheLifeofGeneralGeorge

Monck:ForKingandCromwell

PETERREESE

BANNOCKBURNSCOTLAND’SGREATESTVICTORY

Tomyson,Martin

PublishedinGreatBritainin2000byCanongateBooksLtd,

14HighStreet,EdinburghEH11TE

Thisneweditionpublishedin2014

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Copyright©PeterReese2000Introductionto2014edition©

PeterReese2014

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Illustrations©ascreditedMapsbasedonOrdnanceSurveyPathfinder1:25,000seriesmapsbypermissionofOrdnanceSurveyonbehalfofthecontrollerofHerMajesty’sStationeryOffice©CrownCopyrightMC

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CONTENTS

ListofMapsandBattlePlans

Introductionto700thAnniversaryEdition

IntroductionandAcknowledgements

Prologue

SectionOne:The

PathtoBattle

1. ScotlandunderSiege2. DividedLeadership3. WinningaKingdom

SectionTwo:TheContenders

4. TheTwoArmies

5. TheScottishCommanders

6. TheEnglish

Commanders

SectionThree:Bruce’sMasterstroke

7. AdvancetoBattle8. Encounters–DayOne9. WeighingtheOdds10. BattleJoined11. ThePursuit

Aftermath

Notes SelectBibliography Index

LISTOFMAPSANDBATTLE

PLANS

BattleofStirlingBridge,1297BattleofFalkirk,1298WinningBackScotland,1307–14EdwardII’sInvasionandRetreat,1314

BannockburnandStirling,1314Bannockburn–TheEnglishapproach,23rdJune1314Bannockburn–overnightpositions,23rd–24thJune1314TheBattleofBannockburn,24thJune1314

INTRODUCTIONTOTHE700TH

ANNIVERSARYEDITION

I needed no persuading towrite this book for,whateverBannockburn’s qualities as abattle–anditscoreshighlyinthisregard–italsomarksthe

greatest victory ever gainedbytheScotsovertheEnglish.WilliamWallace’s success atStirling Bridge seventeenyears earlier was also foughtagainst superior forces who,with their heavy cavalry andfamed bowmen, enjoyedtechnological superiority. AtStirling Bridge however,Wallace merely prevailedover an army led byEdwardI’s representative, JohnWarenne, Earl of Surrey,

whereas at BannockburnRobert the Bruce utterlydefeated the English Armyled by its monarch, EdwardII. Following Wallace’svictoryitwaspredictablethattheredoubtableEdwardI(theso-called Hammer of theScots) would respond byleading another army intoScotland to hunt Wallacedown and complete hisprocess of subjugation.Bruce’s success, however,

released him from having toappeal for peace fromEdwardII.Hehaddonesoin1310,1 attempting togain themoralhighgroundalongwithmore time to gather hismilitary strength.His victoryat Bannockburn gave himnewopportunitiestocontinuewith his own diplomatic andmilitary initiatives to freehiscountry from Englishdomination. In 1320, the

Declaration of Arbroathjustified Scotland’sindependence and fourteenyearslater,withtheTreatyofNorthampton, the Englishparliament recognisedScotland as a sovereign stateand Robert Bruce as itslegitimate king. WithoutBannockburn he could neverhave succeeded, thusenabling Scotland’srepresentatives to voluntarilyenter into a process of union

with England almost 400yearslater.In light of the battle’s

pivotal importance it issurprising that relatively fewaccounts had been writtenabout it until recently. It isalso curious that despite thepresence of a singularcontemporarysource–ontheScottish side at least – thereshould be such divergenceabout where the battleoccurred – a debate that

continuestothepresentday.When this book first

appeared in 2000 it wasbelieved to be the firstdedicated analysis of thebattle for some seventy-fiveyears. Since then interest inScottish history and thecountry’s most successfulbattle has grown, and withBannockburn’s 700thAnniversary approachingmore books on the subjecthave emerged. Despite

predictable differences ininterpretation, without majornew archaeologicaldiscoveries or the emergenceof any hitherto unknownsources about the battle, allwriters – like theirpredecessors–dependlargelyon the four contemporarynarratives used in this book.These sources recount alargely similar sequence ofevents. Foremost is thegraphic verse account The

Bruce by Archdeacon JohnBarbourofAberdeen,writtensome sixty years after thebattle. It is in the style ofother fourteenth-centuryromancesratherthanablow–by-blow account of events,but Barbour did have accessto contemporary chroniclesand talked with thedescendants of men whofoughtinthebattle.Whileanundoubted work of art, thegeneral accuracy of The

Bruce has also beenacknowledged by severalsubsequentwriters.Although far shorter, there

are contrasting commentariesrepresentingtheEnglishside.There is the Scalacronica –the so-called ‘ladderchronicle’ due to its author’sdesiretosurveyeventsfromadetached position – writtenby Sir Thomas Grey, theyounger, whose father wastaken prisoner at

Bannockburn.2 His soldier’saccount was completed in1355–1356 and drew freelyon his father’s experiences.The second, Vita EdwardiSecundi(LifeofEdwardII)isnot strictly a chronicle but ajournal about the King’sreign, probably written in1326 by the well-connectedJohn Walwayn, agent to theEarlofHereford.AfragmentoftheChronicleofLanercost

constitutes the third accountand was written by anAugustinian monk – or asuccession of monks – fromthe Priory at Lanercost. ThePriory was the target ofrepeated Scottish raids andunsurprisingly the accountshows strong Englishprejudices.Invaluable as such sources

are for studying the battle,their failure to give a clearindication about where the

main engagement occurredhas led to remarkableconsequences. Initially itwasthought to be in the localityof Bruce’s Borestone (inwhichheplacedhisstandard)wheretheRotundaMemorial,Pilkington Jackson’sequestrian statue of Robertthe Bruce, and theBannockburnHeritageCentrestand today. However, in1913 a book by WilliamMacKay MacKenzie

conclusively disproved thissite as the location of thebattle, althoughMacKenzie’ssuggested alternative to theeast,closetotheRiverForth,has also been conclusivelyrejected. Contemporarywriters have further limitedthe site but still differ overwhether the battle occurredon Carse Land nearBalquhiderockorwithincornland nearby, with some stillunwilling to commit

themselves either way. Bothsites however, lie over one-and-a-quarter miles from theHeritageCentre.Whileresearchingthisbook

andwalkingthebattlefieldtohelp me determine thelocation of themain clash ofarms, I resolved to examinethe conflict by assessing theopposing leaders’ militaryexperience and capabilities(together with those of theirsubordinate commanders). I

also considered thecharacteristicsofbotharmiesincluding their weaponry,favoured tactics and theirreported use of the ground.As a result, I concluded thatthemost likely location isonCarse land enclosed by thetwo water courses, theBannockburn and thePelstreamBurn adjoining thedry field of Balquhiderock.However on 24 June 2014when the Battle’s 700th

anniversary celebrations takeplace they are to be held onthe Borestone site which hasbeen newly landscaped. TheRotunda Memorial andequestrian statue of Robertthe Bruce have beenrefurbishedandanewvisitorcentre created. Here visitorswill be able to experience avirtual recreation of the two-daybattle.While this undoubtedly

represents amassiveadvance

over previous facilities,fundamentalquestionsremainabout the actual site of thebattle. To date noarchaeological survey hasbeen commissioned for themost favoured area (andtherefore no mass graveshave been discovered) andmore serious still nopreservation methods havebeen put in place to protectthis site.Unlike theHeritageCentre which enjoys the

protection of the NationalTrust,themostlikelytruesiteof the battle remainsvulnerable to further urbandevelopment, if not eventualobliteration. To help avoidsuchatragedyIbelievethataban should be placed onfurtherbuildingandthatstepsbeundertakentopurchaseallavailable ground for theScottishnation.In the meantime a

battlefield trail should be

designed for those visitorswishing to explore the mostlikely site of the conflict.Without such initiatives, andin spite of all the admirablework recently carried out inthe vicinity of the Borestonesite, the commemoration ofScotland’s greatest victoryremains wanting. With suchexpectations in mind, thisbook’sessentialpurposeistogive an accurate, balancedand graphic account of the

epic military confrontationthat occurred on the Carseduringthe23rdand24thJunein the lea of Stirling’s greatcastle. At present theopportunity for visitors toappreciate it fully isincomplete. For those withlimited time or physicalabilities the virtualexperiences at the visitorcentre, and awritten accountsuchasthismightsuffice,butthemajorityshouldalsohave

the opportunity of retracingtheactualmovementsofbotharmies across the field ofbattle. Such additionalfacilitieswillgiveallvisitorsa genuine opportunity toappreciate the remarkableevents that took place there.At Bannockburn, a lesserarmy under its outstandingwarrior king – who hadpreviously served theformidable English monarchEdwardI,andwasconsidered

ausurperbymanyofhisowncountrymen – maintained aunityofpurposetoovercomeadisunitedEnglishforceandenabledScotlandtoregainitsnationalvoice.Whatever people’s

knowledge of the battle, its700thanniversarygives themthe chance to makejudgements about it.Contemporary observersinvolvedinthecurrentdebateonScottishindependence,for

instance, are likely to reachconclusions that favour theircause, with thosechampioning independencebelieving that the Scottishvictory at Bannockburn,owing much to patrioticfervour and loyalty, canprovide fresh inspirationtoday. Those favouringcontinued union might wellpointtothesubsequentseriesofdefeatssufferedbyequallypatriotic Scottish armies and

looktothecontinuingpatternof Scottish achievementswithinthewidercanvasoftheUnitedKingdom.Whatever such reactions,

this book sets out to portray,faithfully, a singular andnotable engagement which,like so many others,experienced a ‘grindingphase’ when things couldhave gone either way. AtBannockburn there weremomentswhen luckplayeda

significant part, but therewere other moments – asthere were in many otherbattles between determinedmen – when insight, beliefand the spark of inspiredleadershipcountedmost.

PeterReeseAshVale

November2013

T

INTRODUCTIONAND

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

HE BATTLE OFBANNOCKBURN was thegreatest victory ever

gained by the Scots over theEnglish. As such it gaveScotland new confidence tocontinue with the series of

military and diplomaticinitiatives that enabled thecountry to regain its freedomfromEnglishdomination.Yetapart from the action’ssignificance, both to theScottish nation and to thefortunesofScotland’swarriorking, Robert Bruce,Bannockburn standscomparison with otherwesternbattlesof the time inthe tactical skills andmasterlycontrolshownbyits

victoriouscommander.Itwasalso an heroic and, bymedieval standards, aprolongedencounter.Unlike many other battles

during this period,Bannockburn is welldocumented. Foremostamong its chroniclers isArchdeacon John Barbour ofAberdeen.Althoughhewrotehis magisterial work TheBruce sixty years after thebattle he interviewed a good

numberofthosewhoactuallytook part and mentionedmanybyname.Fromhispostin Aberdeen Barbour wasable to keep in touch witheminent men from theScottish court and ordinarypeople alike, and he alsolistened to the songs andtraditional stories associatedwith the great battle. As aresult the comprehensivework of this ScottishChaucer, written in graphic

verse usingmetre and rhymeand running to 13,000 lines,represents not only apowerful romantic story inthe genre of other chivalricromances of the fourteenthcenturysuchasTheRomanceof Fierabras, but it gives athorough-going andauthoritative account of theconflict.Italsohappenstobethe most detailed life of anymedieval king in the west.Read in the prose translation

of George Eyre-Todd itsaccuracy has, for instance,beenacknowledgedbypeopleas far apart as Barbour’scontemporary, Andrew ofWyntown, in his OrygynaleCronykil of Scotland, and bythat demanding andpertinacious writer ofcomparatively modern times,JohnEMorris.InhisbookonBannockburn, Morris wasinitially determined to behighlycriticalofBarbourbut

ended up acknowledging theaccuracyofTheBruce.While there is nothing on

the English side to comparewith The Bruce for detail,three accounts are ofparticular use. There is theScalacronica – the so-called‘ladder chronicle’ because ofits author’s desire to surveyevents fromadetached, loftyposition – written by SirThomasGreytheyounger,ofHeton, whose father was

taken prisoner atBannockburn before beingsubsequently released.1Thomas Grey was himselfcapturedbytheScotsin1355when, as constable ofNorham Castle, south ofBerwick, he made anunsuccessful sally againstsuperior numbers. Whileconfined for two years inEdinburgh Castle he had therunofitsconsiderablelibrary.

There Grey wrote hisScalacronica, including anaccount of Bannockburnwhich would have inevitablydrawn on his father’sexperiences.Another English authority

of particular interest is acomprehensiveaccountcalledVita Edwardi Secundi, theLife of Edward II. Theauthorship of this isuncertain, but it wasobviouslywrittenbyahighly

educated layman of matureyears who was an authorityon civil law; evidence pointshere to it being JohnWalwayn, who was the Earlof Hereford’s agent in bothEngland and Scotland. Theaccount is written with flairand outspokenness and itends abruptly in 1326, theyearinwhichWalwayndied.It is, therefore, highlyprobable that it was writtenno more than twelve years

after the actual battle, and isallthemorevaluableforthat.The third ‘southern’

account was the work of anAugustinian monk, orsuccession of monks, mostprobably from the priory ofLanercost near Carlisle, andshows strong Englishprejudices – unsurprisingfromaclericwhosereligioushousewasaninevitabletargetfor successive Scottish raids.The writer claimed he was

told about the battle ‘bysomebody worthy to bebelieved who was presentthere himself and saw it’.2Although the Lanercostaccount is quite short, it isinvaluable both for itsEnglish perspective and forbeing a relativelycontemporarydescription.Other contemporary

chronicles and documents,together with later

commentaries, areacknowledged at the end ofthe book. Of the laterauthorities fourmen and onewoman deserve particularacknowledgement. They areProfessor Geoffrey Barrow,whose truly authoritativebookonRobertBruce(1998)is essential for anyoneexamining the king’s path topower aswell as his greatestbattle, Ronald McNair Scott(1993) for his graphic

biography of the Scottishking, and Caroline Bingham(1998) for her own elegantlywritten account of the king’slife. With regard to the twowriters on the battle itself,John Morris’ Bannockburn(1913) is both an acute anddistinctive commentary,while William MackayMacKenzie’s Battle ofBannockburn (1913)changedradicallyallpreviousthinkingaboutitslocation.

Since the two latter bookspublishedalmostninetyyearsago – and MackayMacKenzie’s is acomparatively short work –nocomprehensiveaccountofBannockburn has appeared.This is despite the fact thatduring the interim, andespecially in recent years,renewed attention has beenpaid to the early Wars ofIndependence and toScotland’spremierbattlefield

success. During the lastquarter century, for instance,thenumbersofvisitorstotheScottish Heritage Centre atBannockburn have increasedmarkedly.In such circumstances,

particularly when oneconsiders that not allobservers are even agreedupon its actual site, somefurther consideration aboutthe great confrontation thattook place near Stirling

Castleduringthetwodaysof23 and 24 June 1314 seemslongoverdue.The most notable analysis

of the battle in relativelyrecentyearsisbyGeneralSirPhilip Christison whosefindings, since 1964, arecontained in a bookletproduced by ScottishNational Heritage. However,in spite of GeneralChristison’sworkandfurtherdescriptionsof thebattle that

occurinbooksontheWarsofIndependence, such as PeterTraquair’s Freedom’s Swordor Raymond CampbellPaterson’s For the Lion, thepresent book is the first fulllength account to appearsincebeforeWorldWarOne.In it I go somewhat furtherthan MacKenzie and Morrisinattemptingtotracehowtheconflict stands in relation toBruce’s overall plans torecover Scotland. More

attention is also paid to theindividuals involved, not justthe two kings but their chiefsubordinates, together withthe two sides’ contrastingmilitarydoctrines.

With respect to myresearches,Ioweanimmensedebt to the staff of theNationalLibraryofScotland,both in its main building onGeorge IV Bridge inEdinburgh and when in its

temporary base atCausewayside, for givingmean opportunity to consult theearly chronicles andcontemporary documentsheldthere.Other libraries which have

given valuable support are:the Edinburgh CentralLibrary, EdinburghUniversityLibrary,theRoyalMilitary Academy Library,Sandhurst, the Services’Central Library and the

Prince Consort’s Library,Aldershot, where the greaterpart of the writing has takenplace.ForillustrationsandmapsI

acknowledge the collectionsin the National PortraitGallery,theScottishNationalPortrait Gallery and theScottish Map Library. Thedetailed battle maps havebeen produced by Mr PaulVickers, the British Army’stechnical librarian, who has

both walked and measuredthebattlefieldwithme,poredover Ordnance Survey mapsand considered the differentinterpretations of thebattlefield made by otherwriters.The draft manuscript was

produced by Mrs ChristineBatten with her ‘sparkling’word processor and mostvaluable preliminaryobservations on it have beenmade by Mrs Jennifer

Prophet and Dr LeslieWayper.MrsProphetandhersonCharlesalsoproducedtheindex.With regard to Canongate

Bookswhichis,ofcourse,ofcrucial importance, theproject would not havecommenced without theproposalfromHughAndrew,continued without the everpresent support from JamieByng and Neville Moir, andcome to publication without

the sensitive, acute andconstructiveeditorialworkofDonaldReid.Despite such remarkable

support,asinthepastIcouldnot think of such a projectwithoutBarbara,mywifeandmainstay.Any errors are, of course,

the author’s responsibilityalone.

A

PROLOGUE

T DAWN ON 22 JULY1298 the peremptoryshoutsofdrillsergeants

followed by their soldiers’shorter acknowledgementsinterrupted the regularbirdcallsandthesloughingofthewindonapeacefulhillockadjoiningMumrills Brae justeast of Falkirk. The Scottish

army was preparing to takeup its battle stations on thehill’s crest. It was by nomeans the first time militarycommands had been heardthere; some eleven centuriesbefore, Mumrills had carriedoneofnineteenfortsstandingon the Roman wall thatstraddled thenarrowwaistofScotland between the twogreatinletsoftheriversFirthandClyde.Withinfiftyyearsthe Romans had abandoned

their northernmost wall andfallen back to the muchlonger one built by theEmperor Hadrian on whatwas to become the Scoto-Englishborder.The soldiers on their way

up to Mumrills’ flat crestwere not peering northwardsfor marauding tribesmen,however.Instead,theScottishhost assembled by WilliamWallace, who, at twenty-sixyears of age had already

proved himself a brilliantnatural soldier anddetermined guardian of hiscountry on behalf of itsdeposed king, John Balliol,waslookingeastforsightofaformidable army under theveteranEnglishking,EdwardI, approaching along the oldRomanroadfromLinlithgow.The English column hadreached Linlithgow the daybefore and as the Scottishspearmen left their bivouacs

in nearby Torwood to formup, Wallace’s scouts hadalready provided him with asteady commentary onEdward’s progresswestwards. In fact, theEnglish were ahead of timefollowing an injury to theirkinginflictedbyhisownwarhorse. Like other chargers ithad remained bitted andsaddled while being keptclose to its rider who couldthen quickly mount in the

eventofanysurpriseScottishattack.AsEdwardlayrestingon the ground his chargerbecame excited and trampledon him, apparently breakingtwoofhisribs.Reportsabouthis injuries soon spread andmultipliedandasenseofnearpanic arose in the Englishcamp. But Edward I hadnever lacked courage norresolve and although it wasstill dark, the fifty-nine-year-old monarch immediately

mounted his horse andresumed the advance. Thekinghaltedhisarmyclose toMumrills before the greymorningskygavewaytofulldaylight where he orderedthemtohearmassonthis,thefeast day of St MaryMagdalene.While tired fromtheir wearisome pursuit andtheshortestofrestsduringtheprevious night the Englishhad strong cause to feelconfident about the outcome.

Theyhad finally run to earththe one Scottish leader whohad succeeded in thwartingtheir battle ranks. With theirforces’marked superiority inarchers,bothlong-andcross-bowmen, and their totaldominance in heavy cavalry,they would surely soonovercomehim.On the Scottish side

Wallace relied largely on hisschiltrons, novel formationsof spearmen aligned into

circular formations. As theschiltrons formed upWallace’s engineers arrivedwith carts full of woodenstakessharpenedateachend.Working in pairs with oneman holding a stake and theother hammering it into thefirm ground they erected aprotective circle of spikespointingoutwardswhichtheyafterwards roped together tohelp withstand the fearsomecharges of English armoured

knights.Wallace gave further

protectiontohisspearcirclesbypositioninghisownshort-bowmenbetween themwhilefurther detachments ofarchers covered his openflanks. The third element inWallace’shumanredoubtwashis cavalry, just an eighth ofthe English strength, dressedin lighter armour and ridingsmallerhorses.Notonlywerethe Scottish cavalry utterly

outnumbered and outclassedbut they had been sent bysuch nobles as John Comyn(the Red) and the earls ofAtholl,Menteith,LennoxandBuchan, while a furthercontingentwaslikelytohavecome from Robert Bruce,Earl of Carrick. Such seniormagnates were unlikely toallow their riders to comeunderWallace’sfullcontrol.With his fewer numbers,

Wallace had been forced to

conclude he could not spareany part of his force tomeetthe attackers before theycame to close range.Committed to theirformations on the hilltop hisbowmen and spearmen hadno option but to await theforthcoming attacks.However, Wallace had goodreason to expect the Englishhorses which, like theirsoldiers, had lived on shortrations and had been hard

used during the pursuit,would become windednegotiating his coveringobstacles. In the worst case,he knew he could move hisarmy back into the extensiveTorwoodstretchingroundhisrear where the Englishcavalry would itself becomevulnerable.Wallace’sfinalcontribution

before the battle was thetraditional address ofencouragement to his

assembled men. ‘I havebrought you to the ring,’ hesaid,‘dancethebestyoucan.’

The initial attacks weremountedbyEdward’smassedheavy cavalry, mounted ontheir massive shire horses.ThefirstwasledbyNorfolk,the earlmarshal,who set offtowards the Scottish right-hand schiltron beforedisappearing from Wallace’ssight as it encountered the

band of heavy marshbounding the West Quarterburn. While it was stillhidden from the Scottishcommander’s view, theEnglish second division,commandedbytheBishopofDurham, was ordered tobegin its attack against theScots’left.Simultaneous assaults on

both flanks supported by afrontal attack from theEnglishmainbodywasquite

the worst scenario Wallacecould have expected.However, while approachingfast,themainbodyunderthekinghadyet toengagein thefighting. The initial Scottishresponse to the two flankingattacks was both determinedand effective. The left handspear ring fully justifiedWallace’s formation; theywithstood all assaults madeuponthemandimpaledmanyEnglish horses on their

massed spikes.UnfortunatelyforWallacethebraveconductof his spearmen was notequalled by the cavalry,whofledthefieldwithoutstrikinga blow. As a result theEnglish cavalry, deprived ofanymountedopponents,wereable to turn from thespearmen to easier targets.Thundering between andaround the schiltrons, thearmoured juggernautssucceeded in riding the

Scottish archers down. Asthey attempted to stand theirground thesewerekilled toaman, along with theircommander,SirJohnStewart.WiththeflightoftheScottishcavalry other Englishhorsemen were free to circlethe rear of thehill andblockWallace’s escape route. Atthis point the English kingmoved his third divisionforward. Instead ofdespatching his cavalry

against the serried spears heordered bowmen to loosevolleys of arrows at pointblank range into thebeleagueredcircles.Fromthisshort distance only thespearmen’s wooden targescould successfully withstandsuch missiles. Taper-headedarrows tore through helmetsand the plated armour of theday which in any case wasonly worn by a privilegedfew.Theshaftshadevenless

difficultyinpenetratingchainmail. The defenders wereunder no illusions that ifarrows entered their bodies,theywerelikelytodie,whileanylimbsthatwerehitwouldneed rapid amputationperformed in the crudefashionofthetime.As medieval battles went

Falkirk was both bitter andprotracted. Despite alternateassaults on them by bothcavalry and bowmen, the

schiltrons showed amazingcourage and continued toresist doggedly. ButWallaceknewtherecouldbeonlyoneoutcome.With the schiltronstrapped theEnglishkingwasinnohurryashedirectedhisbowmen’s fire against eachone in turn. Evenwhen theirshafts had been despatchedthe defenders gained littlerespite for the archers wereorderedtopickupflintslyingon the burn bed and on the

hillside. Using slings orsimply relying on theirheavily muscled right arms,they were able to takedeliberateaimat the facesorlegs of the stationary Scots.As the rocks found theirtargets, bones fractured andcheeks reddened with blood;many spearmen went downjoining those transfixed byarrows and the mail-cladcavalry began to break intothe circles. Once inside, the

heavy horses bowled overdefenders before tramplingthem with their iron-cladhooves, while their riders’swords,macesandaxeswereused to terrible effect onthose still struggling to keeptheir footing and point theirlances outwards. Within thecircles discipline loosenedand theWelsh bowmen nowgleefully joined in the hand-to-hand fighting that hadbecome a slaughter. Of the

Scottish nobles who foughtdismounted, Wallace’s greatfriend Sir John the Graham,together with MacDuff andhis two sons and AndrewMoray of Bothwell, diedwhere they stood.1 About athird of the spearmen, manycarrying serious wounds,reached whatever cover theycould and Wallace rallied agroupthatturnedsavagelyonthe English who pursued

them into Callendar Wood.Duringtheengagementitwasprobably Wallace himselfwho killed Brother Brian deJay,themasteroftheEnglishTemplars. But nothing couldreversethescaleofthedefeat.Many spearmen who foundtemporary hiding places inthe open were subsequentlykilled as they attempted toflee north, run down by therampaging cavalry as theysearched desperately for

opportunities to cross theslippery,treacherousbanksoftheriverCarron.

Following thebattle,Scottishpatriots were bound to askeach other, ‘Where canScotland go now?’ Wallacehad assembled the best armyhis country could supply andafterequippingandpreparingit thoroughly he had notrisked it in open battle untilhis English pursuers were

half-starved and wearied dueto a continuing lack ofsupplies. While his chosendefensive position onMumrills Hill wasundoubtedly not thatimpressive, it enjoyedprotectiononthreesidesfroma burn and wet brokenground.AndaftertheEnglishhad taxed their horsesascendingittheycameontoaflat top that favouredWallace’sformationsquiteas

muchastheirs.The soldiers who survived

the defeat and succeeded inreturning to their townshipswouldhaveleftnooneinanydoubt about the stringenttraining they had undergonewith Wallace, and they hadgood reasons to be proud oftheirownperformance in thebattle. Such survivors wouldhave doubtless felt fardifferentlyabouttheircavalry– men who from childhood

were trained in war but whofledthefieldattheverysightof the larger numbers ofEnglish knights. However,theplainfactwasthatinspiteof the courage and tenacityshown by both the ScottishspearmenandtheirarchersatMumrills, they had beenunable to counteroverwhelmingEnglisharms.Given England’s superior

military resources, Scottishfighting men, nobles and

soldiers alike, had thestrongest reasons to questionhow anyone could do betteragainstsuchadverseodds.

SectionOne:ThePathtoBattle

CHAPTERONE

SCOTLANDUNDERSIEGE

(Edward I)‘decided with anoaththathewouldlay the whole ofScotland wastefrom sea to sea

I

and force itspeople intosubmission.’

ChronicleRishanger

N THE LATE THIRTEENTHcentury Scotland faced achallenge to its continuing

survival from a strong andacquisitive English kingwhoasearlyas1291toldhisprivy

council that he had it in hismind ‘to bring under hisdominion the king and therealm of Scotland’.1 WhileScottishmonarchshadalwaysin some respects heldsubordinate positionscompared with their morepowerful Englishcounterparts (the Pope, forinstance, withheld their rightto be anointed at theircoronations) they had

consistently rejected anysuggestionsthattheycouldbeconsidered vassals of theEnglishcrown.Inaccordancewith this tradition, on 29October 1278 KingAlexander III stood beforetheCourtofWestminsteranddeniedthathisbrother-in-lawEdward I had any degree offeudal superiority over him.‘(Although) I become yourman for the lands which Ihold of you in the Kingdom

of England for which I owehomage…Noonehasarightto homage for my Kingdomof Scotland save God alone,andIholditonlyofGod.’2Notwithstanding such close

family ties and the generallyfriendlyrelationsbetweenthetwo countries, Edward, whobythe1280shadbecomethemost respected monarch inEurope, became obsessedwith extending his own

claims of suzerainty overScotland. Such a challengecouldnotbetakenlightlyforEdward was a monarchwhose ambitions werematched by endless energyand single-mindedruthlessness. He had, forinstance, already codifiedEnglish law to his ownpattern,justifyingthechangesby citing previous cases ofcorruption and miscarriagesofjustice,andhadgoneonto

abrogate Welsh powers ofjurisdiction in those parts oftheprincipalitybroughtunderhiscontrol.Whether a subtle-minded

reformer or not (particularlywhen it was to his ownadvantage), this tall,commanding figure wasessentially a warrior kingwho was quite prepared toachieve his objectives bymountingamilitarychallengeto Scotland. However, with

his on-going conquest ofWales,andalmostcontinuouswarfare with France, a thirdmilitary front seemed verylikely to place almostunbearable strains on theEnglishexchequer.Edward could never have

doubted that Scotland, withits unbroken line of kingsstretching back to beforeWilliam the Conqueror andits geographical remoteness,represented a quite different

andmoredifficultpropositionthan Wales. Apart from theamicable relations betweenthe two crowns many ofEdward’s powerful andambitious nobles, such asBalliol, Bruce andUmfraville, held lands onboth sides of the border andtheirallegiancewas thereforedivided. Edward needed astrong pretext to involvehimself in the affairs ofScotland and to justify

despatching an English armyintothatcountry.Such an opportunity

presented itself throughwhatmanymen inmedieval timesconsideredastrokeoffate.InMarch 1286 Alexander IIImet with a sudden anduntimely death; on a storm-swept night he was hurryingto join Yolande, his newFrench wife, at Kinghorn bythe Firth of Forth when inblizzard conditions he

outdistanced his escort andhis horse carried him over asteep crag along theforeshore. The role of themonarch was pivotal in theaffairsofamedievalstateandthe tragedy for Scotland wasthat Alexander had no livingmale issue. A strong, wiseking was succeeded by hisfour-year-old granddaughter,Margaret, the Maid ofNorway, the only child ofAlexander’s daughter

Margaret, who had diedgiving birth, and Eric II ofNorway.Alexander had shown

himself well aware of thedangersthatcouldcomefrominternalunrestintheeventofhisdeathandhehadarrangedthat prior to the Maid’senthronement, no fewer thansix men should act as jointguardians of the kingdommade up from tworepresentatives of the

country’s senior nobles, itsearls, two representatives ofthe bishops and tworepresentativesof thebarons.The two most likelycontenders for the Scottishthrone, Robert Bruce, knownas the Competitor, and JohnBalliol, were not includedbecause the king foresaw avery real threat of civil warbetween their two factions.However, he had seen thatsupportforBruceandBalliol

was evenly divided amongthesixguardians.Bruce was much the older

of the twomen.By 1286, inspite of his continuingambitions and still abundantenergy,hewasfullyseventy-fiveyearsofage.Evenintheevent of his claim to thethrone proving successful hewas unlikely to have reignedfor long. Fortunately for theBruces their male line waswell represented. The old

Competitor’s eldest son,another Robert Bruce, wasLord of Annandale, a vastestate in the Scottishsouthwest. Bruce ofAnnandalewasfortyyearsofageatthistimeandhiseldestson also carried the familyname of Robert Bruce.Althoughstillaboyoftwelvehe was destined to becomeKing Robert I. In 1286 JohnBalliol too, had a son, calledEdward, from his marriage

during 1281 to Isabel,daughterofJohndeWarenne,EarlofSurrey.One of the guardians’ first

actions was to inform theirseemingly friendly seniormonarch, Edward I, of theplans being made to governScotlandintheabsenceoftheMaid. It is also likely theyinitiated thearrangements fora marriage to be negotiatedbetweenEdwardCaernarvon,Edward I’s heir, and

Margaret, theMaid, for withEdward I acting as herguarantortheguardianscouldfeel sure Margaret’ssuccession would beimplemented. Their concernsseemed justified for whiletheirenvoyswereinEnglandthe Competitor and his sonseizedthetworoyalcastlesofDumfriesandWigtownalongwith the Balliol fortress ofBuittle in a bid to strengthentheirpositioninthesouthwest

againstJohnBalliol.Throughtheir concern for internalstability, however, theguardians seemed willing toignore the even greateradvantagesoftheuniontotheEnglish king, including hisuse of it as a first steptowards assimilatingScotland.Anysuchplansfellthrough when, in 1290,Margaret died as she madeherwaytoScotland.With thirteen men

possessingsomesortofclaimto the vacant Scottish thronetheEnglishkingwasgivenafresh, and potentially moredangerous, opportunity toexert his control over thecountry. One of theguardians, Bishop WilliamFraser(BishopofStAndrewsand a Balliol supporter),fearing with somejustification that the Bruceswouldmakeafullbidforthecrown, wrote to Edward I

asking him to come to theborder to prevent bloodshed.In response, working on theassumption that he was theirfeudal superior, Edwardissued a summons for theScots to meet him – not inScotland but at a parliamentacross the English border atNorham. While they hadexpected Edward to act asarbiter he came as overlordand judge demanding theclaimantstorecognisehimas

boththeirfeudalsuperiorandLord Paramount of Scotland.To support his dictates hebrought troops at his backcallingupEnglishleviesfromthenortherncounties tomeethim at Norham on 3 June1291. Nine of the claimantsquicklyacknowledgedhimastheir feudal superior and on11 June, avowedly to avoidinternal unrest, EdwardorderedallScottishcastlestobe turned over to him until

two months after thesuccessionhadbeendecided.He thenproceeded to replacemany Scottish officials withEnglishmen.Edwardadoptedameasured

andunhurriedapproachtotheso-called ‘Great Cause’ ofdeciding who had the bestclaims to theScottish throne,and eighteen months passedin deliberation (duringwhichEdward enjoyed considerablecontroloverScotland)before

JohnBalliolwasdeclaredthestrongest candidate. Unlikehismainrival, thebelligerentCompetitor, Balliol was ayounger son so probablydestined for a churchappointment and thereforeunprepared for suchelevation.3 The LanercostChronicler for instancedismissed him as brainless.4While such seeminglimitationsdidnotdebarhim,

he had fewer obviousinterests in Scotland than theCompetitor for, althoughBalliol had become Lord ofGallowayon thedeathofhismother, he had estates inseventeen English countiesand his main demesne wasacross the Channel, inPicardy.Balliol was duly enthroned

inNovember1292andduringthe next month paid homagefor his kingdom to the

English monarch. Edward,givingBalliol no opportunityto establish himself as king,rapidly let it be known thatauthoritytohearappealsfromBalliol’s courts lay with himand Balliol was, therefore,required to defend thejudgementsinhisowncourtsby making the long journeyfrom Scotland to Londonwhere he was also liable forany damages if the verdictswereamended.

Edward appeareddetermined to goad theScottishkingintorebellion,asituation which would, ofcourse, allow him to seizeScotland as a forfeitedfiefdom. The final insultcame in June 1294 when heopenlytreatedScotlandashisfeudal property bysummoning Balliol, togetherwith ten earls and sixteenbarons including RobertBruce, the Competitor, to

serve with him againstFrance. In July 1295 acouncil of twelve leadingfigures assumed thedirectionof Scottish affairs from theirtimid king. They reassertedthe rights of the northernkingdom by declaring forfeitthelandsofEnglishnoblesinScotlandandfollowedthisbymaking overtures to Francefor assistance; they alsoproposed that John Balliol’sson, Edward, should marry

King Philip’s niece, JeanneValois, thus marking theformalbeginningofthe‘auldalliance’. At the same timesummonses were put outacross Scotland to raise anarmy in its defence to be ledby a representative of thepowerfulComynfamily.In February 1296, under

Edward’s command, aformidable English army,with a large component ofarmoured cavalry and

stiffenedbyveteransfromtheWelsh and French wars,began a deliberate movetowards the Scottish border,butonEasterMonday itwaspre-empted by the Scottishfeudal host that crossed intoEngland. Their traditionalmeans of recruitment hadenabled the Scots to raisequickly a respectable armyfrom able-bodied men agedbetween sixteen and sixtywhichinthemaincamefrom

the country’s earldoms northof the Forth. However,becausetheirlastencounter–no more than a skirmish –had been against theNorwegians at the Battle ofLargs twenty-three yearsearlier, itwasunderstandablyinexperienced. Lessexcusably, its supportingequipment and level ofdiscipline were also lacking.With the Comyn Earl ofBuchan as the senior

commander, the usemade ofwhat was predominantly anarmyoffootsoldierswasalsodisappointing. Buchan wasnot much gifted militarilyand,lackingsiegeequipment,hefailedtocapturetheborderfortress of Carlislecommanded for the Englishon this occasion by theCompetitor’s son, RobertBruce,LordofAnnandale.Infact, the Scottish soldierscould do no better than

ravage the countryside ofNorthumberland.Inanycase,their forces were weakenedby the number of influentialScottishnobleswhowereoutof sympathy with JohnBalliol and the Comyns andwho remained loyal to theEnglish king, including theearls of March and Angus,and the Bruces, both ofCarrickandAnnandale.In contrast, the English

army, with the king at its

head, moved against theprime target of Berwick,Scotland’smain port and thecentre of its wool trade. TheEnglish soon pierced thetown’s long-neglecteddefences but, as it stillrefused to yield, the kinggranted his troops three daysofpillage,rapeandmurder.Itwas said he did not finallygivetheordertostopuntilhesawapregnantwomanputtotheswordandherdeadinfant

sprawled beside her.5Chroniclers varied in theirestimates of the dead, from7000 by Hector Boece to60,000 by Matthew ofWestminster,6 but corpseswerepiledhighinthestreets.Whatever the actualcasualties,fromhisbehaviourScotland could have noillusions about Edward’sintentions.The first clashbetween the

two main armies occurred atDunbar, where the Earl ofMarch had his castle. Theopportunity came about dueto the Scottish nobility’sdivided loyalties at this time.March was an Englishsupporter but his wife,MarjorieComyn,allowedtheScots to occupy the castle,thus prompting the Englishking to send one of hiscommanders, John Warenne,Earl of Surrey, togetherwith

a strong contingent ofarmouredknights,toretakeit.The defenders appealed forhelp and the main Scottisharmy set out to relieve them.Warennedecided tomeet thechallenge by threatening thegarrisonwith detachments ofsoldiersunderhismorejuniorcommanders, while hisveteran horsemen met theadvancingScottisharmyasitcameoverthecrestofnearbySpottsmuir Hill. As the two

sides closed with each otherthe English had to cross asteepvalleyintersectedbytheSpot burn, and when theydisappeared from sight theScots thought they wereeitherwithdrawingorhadlostcohesion. Not for the firsttime their horsemen left acommanding position as,blowing wildly on theirhorns,theygallopeddownthehill in their anxiety to meetthe enemy. Those with the

strongest horses pulled theirway to the front but by thetime they came withinstriking distance, the Englishcavalry had regained theirclose formation. In theensuing encounter they putthe piecemeal Scottish attacktosuchflightthatsomeofthecavalrydidnotstopuntiltheyreachedSelkirkForest, aboutfortymilesaway.AbandonedbytheirhorsetheunfortunateScottish infantrywere ridden

down and suffered heavycasualties, which Englishsourcesputashighas10,000men. As a result of hisconclusive victory Edwardreceived the surrender ofDunbar Castle on thefollowing day, together withthat of three earls, Atholl,RossandMenteith,aswellas130knightsandesquires.Scotland’s feudal host had

proved wholly inadequateagainstthesuperiordiscipline

and skilled leadership of theEnglish; their defeat laid thecountry open to Edward’sfurtherconquest andhewenton to occupy its centralregionwithoutmeetingmorethan token resistance. Theformidable castle of Stirling,for instance, was desertedexcept for a porter whotamely handed its keys overto the invaders. On 21 Junethe English king reachedPerth where he received two

FranciscanfriarssentbyJohnBallioltoaskforpeace.Theirrequestwasgranted,althoughthepricepaidbyBalliolwasexorbitant. On 8 July atMontrose he was forced tosurrender formally theKingdom of Scotland and toacknowledge his errors‘throughevilcounselandourown simplicity’, followed bya humiliating publicceremony in which the armsof Scotland were ripped off

his surcoat. Ever afterwardshe was given the harshsoubriquet of ‘ToomTabard’– empty coat. Thisaccomplished, Edwardproceeded on a triumphalmarch northwards to theMorayFirth.Having traversed the

conquered kingdom, Edwardleftnooneinanydoubtabouthis respect for Scotland’sindependencewhenhehaditssacred relics, the symbolic

StoneofDestinyuponwhichthe kings of Scots hadtraditionally been enthronedalong with the fragment ofthe true cross bequeathed byMargaret, wife of MalcolmIII, sent to WestminsterAbbey. Edward also sent theScottish royal records andplate toEngland,never tobeseen again. At a parliamentheld in Berwick duringAugust1296theEnglishkingendorsed his authority by

requiring all substantialScottishlandownerstopayanoath of fealty to him as lordof Scotland. About 1500,includingclergy,signedwhatbecame known as theRagman’s Roll – from themass of tangled ribbons thatcarriedtheirsealsofauthority– following which Edwardissued his orders forgarrisoningthecountry.The short war was

apparently over. In both its

main engagements Englishleadership had provedmarkedly superior. Giventheirlimitationsinequipmentthe Scots could never havereasonably hoped to seizetheir chosen objective, thestrong border fortress ofCarlisle, and they werecompelled to contentthemselves with the lesserone of burning and lootingthe surrounding countrysidewhiletheEnglishexperienced

no such difficulty with theirown chosen prize, thepreeminent trading centre ofBerwick. Similarly, atDunbar, Warenne kept hismilitary priorities clearly inmind. When it came to achoice between destroyingthe main Scottish army orrelieving Dunbar Castle hemuch favoured meeting thearmy. He knew that if hecould defeat the Scottisharmy they would have the

greatestdifficultyinretainingthecastle.Warenne thereforeattemptedtopreventanysallyfrom the castle’s garrisonagainst his rear by dividinghis forces. However, in thishewascarefultousehisless-seasoned personnel tothreaten the castle, keepinghis experienced leaders andthebulkofhis troops to facethe advancing Scottishcavalry. One can onlyspeculate about the possible

outcome if the English andScottish leadership had beenequallycompetentbutintheireagerness to exchange blowsthe Scots revealed startlingnaïveté and over-optimism,playing directly intoWarenne’s wily hands andallowing themselves to becaught at a massivedisadvantage.In September 1296 the

English king crossed theChanneltoconducthiswarin

Gascony.Thecountryhenowliked to think of asnorthernmost Englandseemed cowed; its nobilityhadsworntheirloyaltytohimandtheirdisgracedking,JohnBalliol, was held securely inthe Tower of London. Theothermain contender for theScottishthrone,RobertBruce(his father, the Competitor,had died in the previousyear), was being made toprove his loyalty as

commanderofCarlisleCastlewhile his son, the youngRobert Bruce, was for themoment living quietly on hisownestates.

In reality Scotland was farfrom cowed. Although largenumbers of English troops,including armoured cavalry,were now garrisoned acrossthe country, there was deepresentment against thisEnglishoccupationfrommen

of all classes, especiallyamongseniormembersoftheScottish church, whosupported two remarkableyoung leaders, WilliamWallace andAndrewMoray,in spearheading a newrebellion. Wallace was asquireandtheyoungersonofSir Malcolm Wallace ofElderslie near Paisley.Certainly no more thantwenty-five years of age hewastallandextremelystrong,

and quickly demonstratedconsiderable powers ofleadershipwhen,inthespringof 1297, he began the fight-back by assassinatingEdward’s officials. His firsttarget was Selby, the son ofDundee’s English constable,andinMay1297hefolloweditbykillingWilliamHeselrig,the English appointee asSheriff of Lanark. Heselrig’sdeathcausedmanymenfromsouthernandcentralScotland

to unite with the daringguerrilla fighter, including anobleman and professionalsoldier, William Douglas,former commander ofBerwick Castle. Togetherthey planned to kill one ofEdward’s most seniorofficials, William Ormsby,his justiciar, who onlynarrowlyescaped.At this time another focus

of revolt emerged headed bytwo senior figures, James

Stewart, Wallace’s feudalsuperior,andRobertWishart,Bishop of Glasgow. UnlikeWallace, who kept to thegreat forests of Selkirk, theytook the more conventionaldecision of openly raisingtheir standard at Irvine inAyrshire where they werejoined by the twenty-three-year-old Robert Bruce, Earlof Carrick. In response anEnglish cavalry force underHenry Percy, Yorkshire

nobleman and grandson ofWarenne, together withRobert Clifford, a majorlandowner and keen soldierfrom Westmorland, wasrapidly despatched to attackthem. Although its leaderswere from the Scottishnobility, by far the largestproportion of the Scottishforce at Irvinewere infantry.In addition, the Scottishnobles, particularly RobertBruce and the Balliol

supporters, were unable toagree on their respectiverights to command and onwhose behalf they werefighting. It was a disastroussituationforanyarmyandasa result Stewart andDouglasemerged from the Scottishlines to meet the advancingEnglishandaskforsurrenderterms. These proved lenientenough although hostageswere demanded to act asguarantors of the Scottish

leaders’goodfaith.With thisshameful capitulation theremaining hopes forresistance in southernScotland depended onWilliam Wallace and hisgrowing numbers offollowers. Although, withsupreme confidence,WallaceorderedtheScottishnoblestojoin him, most remainedunpersuaded of a modestsquire’s ability to meet theall-conquering English, and

fewansweredhissummons.Meanwhile further north a

secondyoungmanhadraisedhis standard against theinvaders.AndrewMoray,sonof Sir Alexander Moray ofPetty, came from one ofScotland’s great Highlandfamilies. He started out withsmall bodies ofmen loyal tohisfamilybeforebeingjoinedby a burgher from Inverness,Alexander Pilché, togetherwith other citizens from the

town. Initially he ambushedsmall English detachmentsbut, as his numbers rose, hewentontoattackandcaptureanumberofnortherncastles,including the pivotal one atInverness.FurthersouthWallaceknew

the English were certain toseek him out and although,after Dunbar and Irvine,muchthesafestcoursewouldhave been to continue withhis guerrilla tactics, he took

the amazingly courageousdecision to meet the Englishinopenbattle – if strictly onhisownterms–inanattemptto regain control of centralScotland. Wallace movednorthwards to Dundee whilethe majority of his infantrycontinuedtobetrainedintheforest of Selkirk. At Dundeehebesieged thecastle,whichas Wallace had foreseen,provoked Edward’s seniorcommander, Warenne, into

leaving his safe haven atBerwick. Together withfurther military units underHughCressingham,Edward’sScottish treasurer,hedecidedto seek out and destroyWallaceandhisrebels.On learning of their

advance Wallace broke offhis siege andmoved towardsStirling where anyoneintendingtomovenorthwardswouldhavetocrosstheRiverForth. Shortly before this

Wallace andMoray had metand agreed that they wouldwork together and, equallyimportantly, that Moraywould serve underWallace’scommand. Their joint forces,together with Wallace’sinfantry from Selkirk forest,converged on Stirling whereWallace’s conduct was tomark him, despite his youthand lack of formalexperience, as a giftedmilitarycommander.

The battle of StirlingBridge was a David andGoliath contest. Wallace andMoray’s forces totalled10,000 men at the most,againstmorethanthreetimesas many English. Althoughmainlyfootsoldiers,theScotsincluded a small cavalryelement under the separatecontrol of nobles such asMalcolm, Earl of Lennox,and James Stewart, whoseearlier behaviour at Irvine

had been less than heroic.The infantry, drawn fromwidelydifferentbackgrounds,had been together for lessthan a month and theirexperiencesofarwaslimitedto irregular operations. Incontrast the Englishfootsoldiers were not onlynumericallysuperiorbut theyincluded a company of thefamedWelshbowmen.7Mostimportantly, the

comparatively large numbersof English heavy cavalrycompletely outmatched itsfew Scottish counterparts. Inthe Scots’ favour their twoyoung leaders weredetermined towin back theircountry’s freedom and theyhadalsobothenjoyedastringof successes, albeit in small-scale operations. Cruciallytheyweregiventhechancetochoosethebattlefield.As for the English

commanders, in the absenceof the king, commanddevolved on John Warenne,EarlofSurrey,inpoorhealthand older than the combinedages of the two youngScottish commanders. Hisexperience of war, however,was immeasurably greaterthantheirs,eventhoughmosthad been gained on thebattlefieldthirtyyearsbefore.His ability had been clearlyevidentatDunbar,butsucha

contest had been sufficientlyundemanding to give him adangerous measure of over-confidence. Nor wasWarenneongood termswithHugh Cressingham, hisvanguard commander, whoseown troops despised him forbeing both a bastard and avain, self-opinionatedindividual.Wallacepositionedhismen

on Abbey Craig, an isolatedvolcanic eminence rising a

hundredfeetfromtheflatandmarshyplainwheretheRiverForth meandered in greatbends below it (see map).Abbey Craig overlooked themain road northwards at thepoint where it crossed theRiver Forth by a long andnarrow wooden bridge.Despite some qualms onWarenne’s part Cressinghamaccepted the option ofcrossing by the bridge underWallace’s full gaze, even

when there were other fordsdownstream which couldhave been used to outflanktheScots’position.Wallacehadchosenabattle

site with many advantages:fronted by wet and roughwater meadows it gave theapproaching English noopportunity to use theircavalry effectively; equallyimportant for Wallace’ssmaller force, movementacross such a narrow bridge

ontothemeadowswasboundto be slow and would allowthe Scots the opportunity oftaking the offensivethemselvesbeforetheEnglishhad brought a significantportionoftheirtroopsoverit.Finally,itofferedagoodlineofwithdrawalifrequired.However, to succeed

against such superior forcesrequired uncommon powersofleadership.Wallaceneededcool nerves and sound

judgement together with theability tokeepa tightcontrolover his irregulars. For atleast two hours the Englishcavalryand infantryclatteredacross thebridgeand formeduponitsfurthersidewithinaloopoftheriver.Thenwithablast on Wallace’s horn theScotscamerunningdownthesteep slopes in tightformation, leaping across theturf hummocks to close withthe English. Their speed of

movement gave theiropponentsnotimetodrawuptheir battle lines nor bringtheir bowmen into action,while the English cavalryexperiencedmajordifficultiesinholdingtheirfootingonthewetandbrokencarseland.Asthe Scots crashed into theirpacked ranks the Englishgavewayandbeingunabletofight properly they started topanic.Wallacehadappointeda dedicated group of soldiers

to block the bridge andWarennewasforcedtowatchboth the destruction of hisvanguard and the killing ofCressinghambeforeheturnedand fled to Berwick, leavinghis army to themercy of theScots as it sought to followhim.StirlingBridgewas a great

victory for William WallaceandAndrewMoray,althoughMorayreceivedwoundstherefromwhichhedied.Theyhad

trapped as many of theEnglish as Wallace thoughthecouldbeatwithinthebendof an impassable river onground unsuitable for heavycavalry, and he joined battleso quickly that the Englishwere prevented from usingtheir archers in their normaldeadly fashion. His astutechoice of ground avoidedusing his own weak andsuspect cavalry, said to havebeen ‘lurking in the woods

near the hills’,8 although itwent on to play a part in thepursuit. The victory alsoowed much to English over-confidence and fataldifferences among itscommanders.

However, while StirlingBridgewasasingularvictory,therewasnopossibilitythatitwould end the war. What itdid,ontheotherhand,wastobuy time for the Scottishleadership to rethink itspossible response towardssubsequent invading armiesand tohelpdevelopagreatersenseofnationalpurpose.Duringthenexttenmonths

Wallace did everythingpossibletogathertogetheran

army capable of meeting theEnglish,whothistimewouldbecommandedby theirking.Although initially retreatingbefore the invaders anddevastating thecountryashewent, Wallace eventuallyoffered battle on a relativelymodest hill near Falkirk,standing on the line of theRoman Antonine wall. Whyhe chose such a position haspuzzled commentators notfully appreciative of the

conditions needed for hisspearmen, although severalother important factors nodoubtinfluencedhisdecision.He knew, for instance, thathis delaying tactics had notonly caused the Englishsupplysystemtobreakdownbut the army’s morale hadfallen to an alarming degree.He might also have had hischoices limitedby thenoblesamonghiscavalry,forwhomWallace’s tactics of scorched

earth and evasion werecontrary to their chivalriccodes of military behaviour.They might even havethreatenedtodeserthimifhedidnotstandandfight.9Suchnobles, including the proudand powerful John Comyn(the Red Comyn, JohnBalliol’s brother-in-law),werevirtuallycertaintohavechafed against beingoverbornebyamodestsquire,

however skilled he mighthave shown himself the yearbefore.With theComyns thefact that Wallace’s feudalsuperior, James Stewart, wasasupporterandfriendoftheirrivals, theBruces,would nothave helped either. Wallacecould not risk their non-co-operation nor, worse still,their defection. Finally, healso had good grounds fordoubting whether he couldkeep such a large army in

being much longer andwhether he could raise asimilar one in the followingyear. Unless Wallace couldbeattheEnglishdecisivelyatFalkirk, Edward I’sdetermination to subdueScotland would keep him inthe border regions with hishousehold troops ready toresume operations over thenext campaigning seasonwhenWallace would be lesswellsupported.

Although such factorsundoubtedly played asignificant part in persuadingWallace to fight at Falkirk itwashiscreationofschiltronsexpresslydesignedtocounterthe English heavy cavalrythat was likely to haveweighed most heavily in hiscalculations. He placed hisfourdetachmentsofspearmennumbering somewhat fewerthan two thousand men eachin a rough semi-circleon the

forward edge of Mumrills’small rounded crest. Thesesoldierswiththeirtwelve-footspears and wooden targeswere aligned in circularformation at the edge ofwhich men knelt shoulder toshoulder with the butts oftheir iron-tipped spearsresting on the ground.Immediately in support wereafurthertworankswiththeirspears either grounded andpointing outwards or, more

likely, lifted intoahorizontalposition to fendoff attackinghorsemen. Additional menwaited in the redoubts readyto make good any gapsappearingasmenfell.The schiltrons, or shield

rings as the chroniclerGuisborough called them,were in some respects liketraditional Greek phalanxes,although unlike the Greekformations they were static.In the Scottish phalanx its

members’ fighting qualitieswere enhanced by thecontemporary practicewhereby a proportion ofknights chose to fightdismounted with theirfollowers.Standingalongsidetheir clan or householdsuperiors such as MacDuff,theEarlofFife,orSirNicholde Rutherford, who broughtsixty followerswith him, thespearmen would not havedared let their comrades

down. The ordinary levieswouldalsohavebeenkeptupto their task by Wallace’sdrill sergeants placed atstrategic points within theranks.Theseweregivenwideauthority by a leader whoseown determination wasevidentbythegallowswhichhe ordered to be erected inevery town ‘on which allwithout a reasonable causeabsenting themselves fromthe army under foreign

pretextsshouldbehanged’.10In theory if the spearmen

held firm armoured cavalrywould be unable to subduethem, being literally kept atspears’length.Inpractice,thecavalry enjoyed additionalsupport from their owninfantry,includingthedeadlylongbowmen. To counterthese opponents Wallacebuttressed his schiltronswithScotland’s short bowmen.

While their weapons’ rangeand penetrative power weremarkedly inferior, once theEnglish had moved onto thesmall hill to close with thespear circles the short bowscouldcomefullyintoplay.By skilful use of ground

Wallace had therebycountered the superior rangeof theEnglish archersbuthehad no equivalent means ofhelping his other fightingcomponent, theScottish light

cavalry,heavilyoutnumberedby their English opponents.Hehadtriedtheonlywayheknewhow tomakegood thisdeficiency by requestingassistance from the Frenchnobleman,CharlesdeValois,along with his heavyhorsemen, but this had beenrefused. Nonetheless whilecompletelyoutmatchedbytheEnglish heavy cavalry thefew Scottish horsemen werestill important to Wallace to

help counter the Englishinfantry and bowmen. Theirpresence alone prevented theEnglish footsoldiers fromranging freely over thebattlefield.Whatever his concerns

about the other arms, theessence of Wallace’s armylaywithhis spearmen.Thereis little doubt hewould haveknownabouttheearlierbattleof Maes Moydog (1295)where the English had

demonstrated how theirskilful use of cavalrysupported by bowmen coulddefeataWelshinfantryarmy.Wallace knew he had to dobetteratFalkirkandthereforeensured his men would alsobe supported by bowmen asthey stood on the forwardedge of Mumrills hill. Heknew that they awaited anarmy that was not only tiredand weakened from lack ofprovisions but whose Welsh

bowmen were mutinous. Insuch circumstances he hadreason to hope the Englishwould expend their energiesagainst his resoluteformations and that Scottishcourage and determinationwould cause them to loseheart as had happened withthe English main army atStirlingBridge.

The weakness of suchreasoning lay in his limitedoptions if the English werenot rebutted and gained theascendancy. The schiltronswere admirably drilled tohold their ground but in thetime allowed him and withhis soldiers’ inexperience hehad been unable to extendtheirmovements to themorecomplex ones of moving offthefieldinacohesivefashionor–ifithadevercrossedhis

mind– the farmore difficultone still of taking theoffensive against theiropponents.In the early stages of the

battle Wallace’s tacticsseemed fully justified evenwhen he faced the Englishcavalry totalling some 2400riders formed into threedivisions. Of these no lessthan 1300 were full-time(including some mercenariesfromGascony) together with

1100 nobles who,accompanied by theirretinues,werehonouringtheirfeudal obligations to theking.11 He not onlysucceeded in beating off thefirst two attacks but heinflicted heavy losses on theaggressors.Thebalancebegantomove

infavourof theEnglishafterWallace’s cavalry fled butevenwhen his schiltrons lost

their covering archers andwere pinned down andsurrounded by the Englishcavalry it took massedbowmen firing from theshortest range into theirpacked ranks to seal theirfate. By this point, however,Wallace had no furtheralternatives.Hewasforcedtowatch the destruction of hisarmy,andfamiliesacross thewhole of Scotland would beobliged tomournmen lost in

the battle, including shortbowmen who, until newarchers had completed theircomparatively lengthytraining, were irreplaceable.Wallace himself was forcedto give up the guardianshipand during the next sevenyearsbeforehisterribledeathat the hands of the Englishnever again commanded anysizeablemilitaryforce.

CHAPTERTWO

DIVIDEDLEADERSHIP

‘Forifthetrumpetgive an uncertainsound who shallprepare himself tothebattle?’

1Corinthians

T

14:8

HE SEVEN YEARS OR sobetween Wallace’sdefeat at Falkirk and

Robert Bruce’s finalcommitmenttothenationalistcause proved cruel ones forScotland, despite thecountry’s fleeting diplomaticandmilitary successeswhichdelayedEdward’sprogramme

of conquest and at one stageeven promised to unravel it.At no time did the Scottishforces feel themselvescapable of standing in battleagainst the main Englisharmies. By 1304, whenEdward extinguished the lastremnants of Scottishresistance by capturingStirling Castle, prospects forScotland’s survival as anindependentkingdomseemedextremely poor. Its former

allies had disappeared likesnow in springtime, withFrance moving into theEnglish camp and a papacybecoming unsympathetic.Equally serious was thedisunited nature of Scottishleadership during the period.With the absence of thelawful king, John Balliol,attempts to rule throughguardiansactingonhisbehalfwere seriously hampered,largely because rivalry

between the Bruce andComyn factions preventedthem from acting with thesame authority and single-minded commitment shownearlier byWallace.Themostnotable result was that, aftertaking part in the uneasysystem of joint guardianship,RobertBruce,heirelectofhispowerful family and a manwiththepotentialtobecomeagenuine leader of the firstrank, both on and off the

battlefield, had, by 1302,deserted theScottishnationalcause and made his peacewiththeEnglishking.It was a less surprising

decision than might beconsidered today. While theComyns had continuedthroughout to support JohnBalliol, formuchof the timetheBrucesofferedtheirfealtyto Edward I, the scourge oftheir countrymen, in theconvictionthatifBalliolwere

deposed Edward wouldsupporttheirowncandidaturefor the Scottish kingship,even if he was likely todemand some restrictions onits power. Indeed, it wasEdward’s reneging on hispromise to Bruce’s fatherwith regard to the Scottishthrone and his attempt toincorporate Scotland withinthe English crown that in1297 first led Robert Bruce,Earl of Carrick, to take the

momentousdecisionoftakingacontrarycoursetohisfather– who remained true to theEnglish king – and join theoppositionforcesinScotland.At the time Edward I was

stillconfidentenoughofbothBruces, father and son, forhim to order Robert Bruce,Lord of Annandale andGovernor of Carlisle, tocharge his son with seizingthe Douglas estates after SirWilliam Douglas had united

with Wallace. UnexpectedlyBruce,whohadonlyrecentlyregained his lands fromComyn control following theEnglish victory at Dunbar,made no more than a mockattack on Douglasdale and,after assembling his father’sknights of Annandale,explained that his oath offealtytotheEnglishkinghadbeen given under duress andas a consequence he haddecided to move into the

nationalistcamp.He justifiedhis decision by citing theloyalty he felt for hisfollowers on the Carrickestate and to his country ofScotland. ‘No man holds hisownfleshandbloodinhatredand I am no exception … Imustjoinmyownpeople(themen of Carrick) and thenationinwhichIwasborn.’1There seems no reason todoubtRobertBruce’sfeelings

for both his own followersand the land of his boyhood,those wide Carrick estatesthathehadriddenandhuntedacross with his brothers andsisters.Allied to thiswas thebeliefwhichhadalsofiredhisgrandfather, that his family’sroyal blood gave them anundeniable right to occupythethroneofScotland.Itwasthis that became the verypurpose of his life and withthe removal of John Balliol

he might well haveconsideredthatmanyScottishpatriots would now turn tohim as the most likelycontender for the Scottishthrone. In the event most ofthe Annandale knightsrefusedtojoinhimsincetheirownlordstilltookthepartoftheEnglishking.Robert Bruce, however,

was not to be deflected and,after raising additionalrecruits from among his

followers at Carrick, he tookthedangerousstepofmovingto join James Stewart andRobert Wishart, Bishop ofGlasgow,atIrvine.Followingtheir tame surrender to theEnglish,Brucepaid thepricefor his show of patriotism –andpossibleearlybidfor theScottish throne – by beingdeprived of his lands oncemore. This time they wererequired by the English whoalso directed him to hand

overhisdaughterMarjorie,assuretyforhiscontinuinggoodbehaviour, a directive hemanagedtoavoid.ItwasaswellBrucedidso

for afterWallace’s victory atStirling Bridge in September1297, he and his men ofCarrick were out again. InMarch 1298 it was probablyBrucewho knightedWallacefor his achievements and,although Bruce himselfremained in the southwest of

Scotland it is likely that heprovided mounted elementsfor Wallace’s army at thebattleofFalkirkinJuly1298.Having defeated Wallace atFalkirk,Edward I showedherecognised Bruce’s abilityand potential threat byattempting to go on and dealwith him as well, but Brucewas too quick for him; afterburning Ayr and destroyingitscastleheandhisfollowersmoved into the desolate hill

regions ofCarrick out of theking’sreach.When Wallace was

compelled to surrender hissoleguardianshipofScotlandyoung Bruce became anobvious candidate to replacehiminheadingtheoppositiontotheEnglishking, theotheroutstanding contender beinganother young nobleman,JohnComyntheRed,headofthe senior branch of theComynfamily.UnlikeBruce,

John Comyn had neverwavered in supporting hiskinsman John Balliol. InApril 1296 he hadaccompanied the Scottishforces that crossed theEnglish border during thefirst engagement of theIndependence Wars, and hewas not likely to forget thatwhen the Scottish forcesfailed in theirattempt to takeCarlisle Castle it was beingheldonbehalfof theEnglish

king by Robert Bruce, LordofAnnandale,RobertBruce’sfather.FollowingtheScottisharmy’s defeat at Dunbar andthe fall of JohnBalliol, JohnComyn had been one of themany Scottish noblesimprisoned in England,whereas Robert Bruce hadbeengrantedthereturnofhislands at Carrick which JohnBalliol had confiscated onbehalf of the Comyns.Although the senior Scottish

prelatesandnoblesappointedthem as joint guardians toorchestrate resistance againstthe English, the chances oftheirsuccesswerenothelpedby the fact that, powerfulfigure as he was, Comynentirely lacked Bruce’smagnanimityandcouldneverequal his powers ofleadership. The intenserivalry between their twofamilies did not augur wellfor a smooth working

relationship and, in addition,by all accounts John Comynwas a most difficult man todeal with. Their uneasyrelationship was firstdissolved after an attemptwas made in July 1299 toretake Roxburgh Castle inLothian.Theattackfailedandas the disappointed partymoved back into Peebleswoods to reconsider theiroptions a disagreementoccurred over lands held by

WilliamWallace,who,asSirDavid Graham (a Comynsupporter) maintained, wasleaving the kingdom withoutthe guardians’ permissionand, therefore, should forfeitthem. In the argument thatfollowed John Comyn leaptupon Bruce and seized himbythethroat.ThequarrelwasonlypatchedupwhenBishopWilliamLambertonagreedtobe appointed senior guardianoverthemboth.

Inthelightofsuchdisunityit was as well for Scotlandthat the English king wasexperiencing seriousdifficulties with his ownnoblesovermountinganotherruinously expensiveexpedition against Scotland.Due largely to Edward’sinactivitytheScotswereableto take the initiative. By theend of 1299 they succeededinretakingStirlingCastleandplanswereraisedtobringthe

men of Galloway over toScotland’s national cause.The latter, however, broughtadditional strains on theScottish leadership. TheGallovidians were not onlytraditional separatists butlong-standing enemies of theBruces, whose estatesadjoinedtheirterritory.Bruceundoubtedlyhadotherseriousdisagreements with JohnComyn but the need topreservehisfamily’sinterests

against the Gallovidians wasthe likely cause of his finalresignation as joint guardianin early 1300.His placewastaken by Sir IngramUmfraville, a strong ally ofthe Comyns, while Brucereturned to his estates in thesouthwest where over thenext two years he continuedto direct opposition againsttheEnglish.Edward I pre-empted all

Scottish plans affecting

Galloway,however,when, inthe summer of 1300 aftermuch lobbying with hissenior nobles, he headedanother army into Scotlandwiththeintentionofsubduingthe southwest, includingGalloway. This force wasalmostas largeas thatwhichfacedWallace at Falkirk butbecauseof incessant rainandthe Scots’ refusal to offerbattle Edward had to becontent with the capture of

just one castle, that ofCaerlaverock. On oneoccasiontheguardiansmovedto prevent him crossing theRiverCreeinGallowaybutatthe approach of his heavycavalrytheythoughtbetterofit and fled into the hills. Bythe end of August Edwardhad returned to SweetheartAbbeynearCaerlaverockandwhile there, as a result ofScottish approaches to thePope,hereceivedavisitfrom

Robert Winchelsey,Archbishop of Canterbury.Both countries had beenprotesting to the Pope aboutwhether or not Edward’soccupationofan independentScotlandwaslegaland,astheresultofScottishadvocacyinRome, the archbishopbrought the English king apapal bull ordering him tocease inflicting injuries uponthe Scots and to withdrawfromtheircountry. Infuriated

ashewasEdwardrecognisedthe need for a pause in hismilitaryoperationstomarshalhis counter-arguments, andtherefore agreed to therequestfromPhilipofFrancefor a truce until May 1301and to the release of RobertWishart, Bishop ofGlasgow,from prison. However, it didnot change his determinationto conquer Scotland for,while his experts werecomposinghisresponsetothe

Pope, Edward startedpreparing for his sixthinvasion in the summer of1301.OntheScottishside,during

thespringofthatyearBishopLambertonattempted tokeepthe Bruce and Comynfactions from breaking apartcompletely by persuadingJohn Comyn and IngramUmfravilletoresigninfavourofasingle‘neutral’guardian.The proposed candidate was

Sir John Soules, related bymarriagetotheComynsbutaclose neighbour of theBruces. Soules assumed hispost in the spring of 1301 intimetomeetthenextEnglishinvasion.A strong indicationthat Soules was in fact anomineeofJohnBalliolcamethrough the new procedurethat was adopted fordocumentssentunderthesealof Scotland. These wereissued under the name of

King John, or of EdwardBalliol as his heir, with theguardianstandingaswitness.For his 1301 campaign

which again aimed atdestroyingScottishresistancein the southwest Edward Isplit his invading forces intwo. One detachment underhiscommandwastoadvancefrom Berwick on the eastcoast towards Stirling, whilehis son, Edward Caernarvon,PrinceofWales,wastomove

along the western side ofScotland;theintentionwastoclosethepincersnearStirlingand catch the defenders in agreat net. However thestrategy failed, largelybecause Soules slowed theking by threatening his linesof communication, while inthe west Robert Bruce, whohad built up his forces inCarrick,succeededinholdingon to Turnberry Castle untilSeptember. As a result the

Prince of Wales got nofurther than Whithorn onGalloway’s southern coastand eventually returned toCarlisle before joining hisfather,who decided to spendthewinteratLinlithgow.Edward I choseLinlithgow

as a convenient base inreadiness for a furthercampaignduringthespringof1302butinthefaceofFrenchpressurehe agreed to anine-month truce which, in fact,

meant there could be nofurther invasion of Scotlanduntil early 1303. Throughout1301 political events hadswungintheScots’favour:atthe papal court their brilliantadvocate, Master BaldredBisset,effectivelydemolishedEdward’s arguments over hisright to occupy Scotland andin the summer of the sameyear John Balliol wasreleased from papal custodyand allowed to return to his

estatesatBailleul inPicardy.There was even talk of aFrench army being sent toreinstatehiminScotland.These events were not to

thelikingoftheEnglishkingnorRobertBruce.Whileasapatriot he had demonstratedhe would do everythingpossible to oppose Englishinvasions, the restoration ofJohn Balliol promised tobring Balliol’s son, Edward,to Scotland who would

effectively block Bruce’sclaim to the throne. In anycase,whileBrucehad foughtfor Scotland since 1297 hehad arguably not exercisedthe influence in affairs heconsidered his positionwarranted. He had beenunable to exercise his duepowers as joint guardianthrough the hostility of hisfellow titleholder towardshim and his supporters. HisScottish estates had been

devastated and the chance ofJohn Balliol resuming powernot only threatened hisambitions for the throne butendangered his chances ofinheriting Annandale on theimminent death of his sickfather. The prospect of thecountrybeingrunbyComynsalong with French forcescommitted toholding in trustanylandsofnobleswho,likehimself,hadopposedEdwardI, was his worst nightmare.

His best chance of securinghis rightful estates lay withEdward I and because theScottishpatriotshadturnedtothe Balliol family as theirregal leaders, any chanceBrucemighthavewithregardto the Scottish throne alsoseemed to lie in thehandsoftheEnglishking.Onthebasisof such reasoning Bruce leftthe Scottish patriots andjoinedhisfatherintheserviceofEdwardI.

Despite their undoubtedsuccesses during 1301 theloss of Bruce, a leader ofoutstanding potential and defacto leader of his powerfulfamily, was a major setbackin Scotland’s struggle forindependence and a greatbonus for Edward. TheimportanceofBruce’schangeof allegiance can be seen inthe wording of the openmemorandum drafted by theEnglish king upon Bruce’s

submission. By it Bruce’stitles and claims wereacknowledged, including thekeyonetotheScottishcrown–althoughhowmuchEdwardwould have supported thelatter in reality is open toquestion – ‘… (if) theKingdomofScotlandmayberemoved from out of theKing’s hands (which Godforbid!) and handed over toSir JohnBalliolor tohis sonor that the right may be

brought into dispute, orreversedandcontradictedinafresh judgement, the Kinggrants Robert that he maypursuehisrightandtheKingwill hearhim fairly andholdhim to justice in the King’scourt.’2Along with Bruce’s

defection the Scots sufferedother serious setbacks during1302.On 11 July the Frenchcavalry were defeated by

Flemish peasant soldiers atCourtrai and the importanceof France’s support forScotland was weakenedproportionately.At about thesame time relations betweenFrance and the papacy brokedown and by August PopeBoniface was writing to theScottish bishops orderingthem to recognise Edward Iastheirlegalruler.Notwithstanding, military

resistance continued to be

mounted against the English.In November 1302,immediately after theexpiration of the trucebetween the two countries,theEnglishkingdespatchedalarge reconnaissance forceinto the countrysidesouthwest of Edinburgh togather information for hisprojected expedition the nextyear. The Scots, under JohnComyn and Simon Fraser,withWilliamWallacealikely

addition to their ranks, fellupon the leading elementsand at Roslin inflicted heavycasualties upon them.However, no such reversecould prevent Edward I’sfull-scale invasion in thefollowing spring. In early1303 theScots took the fieldfirst and succeeded incapturing Selkirk Castle butthe English appearedunstoppable; Edward wasdetermined to conquer

Scotland once and for all,whatever men and resourcesit required. Usingprefabricatedpontoonbridges(built at enormous expense)he moved across centralScotland and from there toKinloss on the Moray Firth,which he reached inSeptember. Returning tosouthern Scotland he stayedat Dunfermline Abbey whilehis forces were kept in thefield until, on the 22

December, the Scotssignalledtheywerewillingtonegotiateforpeace.On19January,1304,terms

wereagreedbetween the twosides. The senior Scottishleaderswere treated lenientlybut Edward summoned aparliament to meet at StAndrews to commencediscussions on the fullincorporation of the country.This time he determined tobringScottishnoblesintothe

process and in September1305 ten Scottishrepresentativesjoinedtwenty-one English officials to drafta new constitution. Inaccordance with a new legalcode, the land – no longer arealm–was tobe ruledbyalieutenant appointed by theEnglish king aided by achancellorandchamberlain.From the time of his

submission early in 1302BrucewasusedbyEdward I

tohelphimconquerScotland,but although Bruce wascareful to convince theEnglishkingofhisloyalty,inreality he offered little morethanlipserviceanddisplayedscarcely anything of themilitary brilliance evident inhis later years. He seemeddetermined to contributenothing more than wasabsolutely necessary againsthis native country. Forinstance, in March 1302 he

assuredthemonksofMelroseAbbey that he would notbring out his ‘army ofCarrick’ again for his ownpurposes ‘unless the wholerealmisraisedforitsdefence,when all inhabitants arebound to serve’. In otherwordshewouldnotbringhismenoutinsupportofEdwardI.3 During Edward’s twin-pronged invasionofScotlandin 1303 Bruce’s role was

limited to serving as SheriffofLanarkandAyrandactingas keeper of the castle there,hardlyademandingoneforagifted young leader.4 Duringthe spring of 1304,when theEnglish king asked him toforward siege engines forEdward’s planned assault onStirlingCastle he did so, butomitted to send a vital pieceof machinery without whichthey could not function.5

Following an order from thekingtoprovidetroopsforthesiege he wrote to himexplaining his difficulties indoingso.6In March 1304 Bruce,

together with Sir JohnSeagrave,wasorderedtoleada mounted raid on WilliamWallaceandSimonFraser inSelkirk forest, which wassingularly unsuccessful, forwhilesomeoftheirfollowers

weretaken,bothleaderswerealerted to the raid andescaped.ThisearnedBruceasurprisingly gentle scoldingfromthekingwiththewords,‘as the cloak is well made,alsomakethehood’.7Shortly afterwards on 21

AprilBruce’sfatherdiedandthere was now no questionthat the Bruce claims to thethrone depended upon him.With his past record and

strong ambitions he wasplaying a highly dangerousrole but until late 1305 itappeared to be working. Inspite of a secret compact tohelpBrucegainthecrownofScotland made between himand Bishop WilliamLambertonatCambuskennethAbbey during the siege ofStirling Castle from May toJuly 1304, Bruce succeededin remaining Edward’sfavoured son. The written

part of the Cambuskennethcompact included theenigmaticclause,‘thatneitherofthemshouldundertakeanyimportant business withoutthe other of them’. This wasaccompanied by a spokenagreement that Bruce wouldassume the Scottish thronefollowing Edward’s death.Meanwhile Edward’s grantsto Bruce continued; hemadehim guardian to the youngEarlofMar,aconcessionthat

allowed Bruce effectivecontrol of the extensive Marestates along the Scottishnortheastcoast, togetherwiththe castle of Kildrummy. InMarch 1305, Bruce wasgranted the Umfraville landsin Carrick and enjoyed aleading role in advisingEdwardIonthefeasibilityofhis proposals concerning thegovernmentofScotland.After October 1305 things

changed markedly. While

Edward I was seriously ill(andnotexpectedtorecover),according to the Scottishchroniclers Bruce made adaring proposal to his rivalJohnComyn. If JohnComynwould be prepared to helpBruce become king ofScotlandhewouldreceiveallBruce’sestatesand if,on theother hand, Comyn gaveBruce his estates Brucewould undertake to supporthim for the crown. It is

difficulttobelievethatBrucewouldkeephiswordtohelpamanhedislikedsoheartilytogainthethronebutBarbour–always sympathetic to Bruce– had Comyn opting for theadditional estates rather thanthe crown and even signingan agreement between themto this effect.8 On the otherhand, although the Englishchronicler Walter ofGuisborough also has Bruce

contacting Comyn hemaintaineditwasafterBrucehad fled from the Englishcourt and followed the visitby Bruce’s two brothers,ThomasandNeil (sometimescalled Nigel), to Comyn’scastle at Dalswinton with arequest for Comyn to meethimattheGreyfriarsChurch,Dumfries, to discuss certainbusiness, most likely theplacing of Bruce on the

Scottishthrone.9To everyone’s surprise

Edward I quickly recoveredand, with the capture ofWallace, certain documentswere foundwhich,while notdirectly incriminating Bruce,served to confirm hisambitions for the crown ofScotland. Edward’s attitudetowardshimcooledmarkedlyand in September he orderedBruce to place Kildrummy

Castle into the hands ofsomeone‘forwhomhewouldbe responsible’, andUmfraville’s lands werereturned to their originalowner.Any trace of friendly

relationship still remainingbetween the king and Brucewas destroyed when,according to the Scottishsources, John Comyn toldEdward I of Bruce’s plottingagainst him, even informing

him about their mutualcovenant concerning thethrone of Scotland andundertook to produce thedocument signed and sealedbyBruce as proof.10 Edwarddecided to wait until he hadthe evidence and took painsnot to arouse Bruce’ssuspicions about the alteredsituation but, one eveningwhen he had taken a largemeasureofwine, thekinglet

slip he intended to arrestBruce the next day and tryhim for treason. Among hisguests was Raoul deMonthermer, Earl ofGloucester, a long-standingfriendoftheBruces,whosentthekeeperofhiswardrobetoBrucewith twelvepenceanda pair of spurs. The coinscarriedtheking’sheadandnodoubt implied being sold orbetrayed while the spursclearly indicated theneedfor

haste.11 The two men musthave agreed on the signalbeforehand for Brucereturned the twelve pencewith his thanks and, aftertellinghisstaffhewasnot tobedisturbed,tookasquireforescort and leaving London,rode by day and night toScotland. One Scottishchronicler, Fordun, even hadthem meeting a Scotsmantravelling south to England

whose suspicious conductcaused them to search himand find a letter from JohnComyn enclosing the bondsupportingBruce’sbidfortheScottishthrone.Five days after leaving the

English court Bruce reachedhis familyatLochmabenandtoldthemwhathadhappened.By chance the localmagnates, including JohnComyn, were attendingsessions held by English

justiciars at neighbouringDumfries and Bruce sentword for theComyn tomeethiminGreyfriars’Kirkthere.Thereareconflictingversionsof how their conversationwent on 10 February 1306.The English chronicler SirThomas Grey said that aftertraditional words of greetingBruce turned on Comyn andaccused him of betrayinghim,whileGuisborough–nolover of Bruce – has John

Comyn refusing to listen toBruce’s planned treasonagainstEdwardI.Whatever was said there

was a quarrel, daggers weredrawn and the Comyn fellwounded on the steps of thealtar.12 Comyn’s uncle, SirRobert Comyn, struck Brucewith his sword but Bruce’sarmour deflected it and SirRobert was killed byChristopher Seton, Bruce’s

brother-in-law. As Brucecameout of the church thereis a strong tradition thatanother of his followers,Roger Kirkpatrick, askedwhat had happened and,being told he returned to thechurch and made sure JohnComynwasdead.Whether or not Bruce

killed, rather than wounded,the Comyn is intriguing butnot important. Responsibilityfor Roger Kirkpatrick’s

actionsrestedwithhismaster.In any event themurderwasmost unlikely to have beenpre-planned. In medievaltimes a strong contender forthe throne would neverdeliberately commit bothmurder and sacrilege.Undoubtedly Bruce andComyn hated each other andifComynhadalertedEdwardtoBruce’sprojectedbidtobeking and had caused him tofleefromEnglandthesewere

even more reasons for aheatedexchangetotakeplacebetween them. Both wereyoung, powerful and proudmen and they had alreadycome to blows overWilliamWallace.Whatever the reasons the

murder in the Greyfriars’church committed Bruceirrevocably to the Scottishpatriotic camp and causedhim to face the justifiableanger of a failing but still

formidable English kingalongwith the full enmityofthe powerful Comyns andtheir followers,whowith theexception of the southwest,controlled most of Scotland.At this time,beforeBruceorthe Comyns were able tocome out on top, Scotland’sleadership was more dividedthanever.Facingsuchterribledangers

Bruce needed above all toestablishthelegitimacyofhis

position, without whichuncommitted men wereunlikely to join him, whilesimultaneously securing abase from where he couldbuild up his military forces.As his sister was QueenDowagerinNorwayhecouldhave moved away from hisenemies and assembled afollowing with the object ofreturning to Scotland afterEdward’s death. In fact heoptedforthemorehazardous

course of remaining in hiscountry from the beginning.In Scotland he could call onthesupportofhis familyandtheir traditional adherentswho together with theirretinues of fighting menofferedhimtheframeworkofan army, however poorly itmight compare with thestrengthofhisopponents.Of equal importance was

thequestionofhislegitimacy.This received a powerful

boost from the Scottishchurch where men likeBishop William Lambertonhad already acknowledgedhim as the best hope torecover their country’sindependence. BishopWishartofGlasgowabsolvedhim for his dual sin and inreturnBruceagreedtorespectthe church’s traditionalliberties.In his perilous situation it

was Bruce’s personal

attributes that were likely toproveall-important.Whilehehad already shownoutstanding skills in thejoustingfieldandbefore1302his activities as a guerrillaleader in the southwest hadactedasa thorn inEngland’sside,afterjoiningtheEnglishking he had given littleindication that he had theability to become a genuinemilitary commander. Energyandresiliencewerevitalnow

and the hot-headedness thathadcharacterisedhisconductagainst John Comyn – andwhichhadplacedhimandhiswhole family in suchjeopardy–hadtobecurbed.To survive at all Bruce

neededpracticalandstrategicawareness.JohndeSoules,asguardian, had alreadydemonstrated theeffectiveness of manoeuvreand evasion against theEnglish. Conversely

Wallace’s victory at Stirlingalong with the initialachievements of Scottishspearmen at Falkirk showedthat Bruce needed stand-upbattles to win back ScotlandfromhisComynenemiesandhopefully eventually againsttheEnglishtoo.With so many powerful

opponents and the stronglikelihood of defeat andcapturebeforehimBrucehadlittle time for exhilaration at

assumingwhathehadsolongbelievedwashisrightfulrole.Nor was there at this stagemuchopportunity toconsiderpossible tactics before heknewthesizeornatureoftheforce he could raise.Decisions would have to bemade in the saddle andlonger-term thinking wouldbe restricted to his shortperiods of rest. Whether theone-time self-seekingnobleman had the ability to

take on the mantle andresponsibilities of a warriorking was soon to becomeevident.

CHAPTERTHREE

WINNINGAKINGDOM

‘Potential is morethan mass,decision andcourage of morevalue thannumbers, and

B

energy thedecidingfactor.’

HilaireBelloc

RUCE HAD GOOD REASONtobelievethatfewotheraspirants to the Scottish

crown had ever faced somany powerful andimplacable enemies.Consequently, during the sixweeks between 10 February

1306 when he killed JohnComyn and his coronation atScone, his energy was nevermore marked. This wasessentialforamanwhomtheEnglish maintained hadmurderedComyn because hewould not join Bruce infighting King Edward,1someone with the effronteryto declare himself ruler of acountry whose strongholdswere all garrisoned by the

English and the largemajority of whose noblessupported theComyns.As ifthis were not enough hissacrilegious act of murderhadputhimatoddswith thepapacy and much of theScottish church. Howevertenuous his hold, Bruce’sdeclared heritage must alsohave seemed unpromising,formiddleScotlandhadbeenlaid waste from ten years ofwar. In comparison, although

Edward I’s Scottishcampaigns had stretchedEngland’s finances tobreaking point, it remained afar more powerful andinfluential country than itsnorthernneighbour.InthesesixweeksBruceset

out to strengthen his base insouthwest Scotland with hisfamily’s estates at Carrickand Annandale as its core.These were opposite thewestern approaches from

UlsterwithwhomtheBruceshad traditional ties and fromwhere they could bringreinforcements. TheMacDonalds of the WesternIsles were Bruce’s allies andtheir galleys could eitherbringhimmoremenfromtheOuter Isles or if everythingfailed, place him safely onone of the remote islands orin Ulster. Along with hisfollowersBrucesucceeded inobtaining a string of castles

among which were Ayr onthe west coast, Dumfries,Dalswinton and Tibbers inGalloway, and the trioInverkip, Rothesay andDunaverty that commandedthe Firth of Clyde. These heprudently stocked withprovisions and supplies. InGlasgow Bruce ordered allmenofmilitary age to beontwenty-four hours notice ofmobilisation as he sent aformal request to Edward I

that he should be recognisedas king of Scotland.Unsurprisingly, Edwardreplied by furiouslydemanding him to return thecastles he had seized, towhich Bruce responded thatuntil Edward acknowledgedhimaskinghe‘woulddefendhimselfwiththelongeststickhehad’.2His next stepwas to adopt

the revered mantle of

kingship. Here Brucereceived notable assistancefromtheone-timeguardianofScotland and staunchlynationalist Bishop ofGlasgow, Robert Wishart,who after absolving him forhis crimeprovidedvestmentsfor his coronation togetherwith a royal banner carryingthe lionandscarlet lilies thatWisharthadlongbeensavingfor such an occasion. As yetthere was no crown and

urgent orders had to be sentout tomake up the circlet ofgold tobeplacedonBruce’shead.3With so many enemies it

was crucial that Bruce’scoronation should be asdignified and heavilysupported as possible. In theeventtheScottishchurchwaswell represented not only byRobert Wishart but byScotland’s two other senior

bishops, William Lambertonof St Andrews and David ofMoray, while the bishops ofDunkeld and Brechin wereprobably in attendance,together with various abbotsand other senior clergy.Foremost among the non-clerics were the four earlssympathetic toBruce,Atholl,Lennox, Menteith and Mar,aswellasBruce’sownkin.Ahundred lesser noblesattended, including Robert

Boyd, Reginald Crawford,Neil Campbell and theteenage James Douglas,disinherited by Edward fromtheDouglasestates,whowasto become Bruce’s foremostcommander.AsawardoftheEnglish court the young EarlofFifewasunabletoperformhis hereditary office ofcrowning the new king buthisauntIsabel,marriedtotheEarl of Buchan, whosupported Edward I, seized

herhusband’sbesthorsesandrode to Scone to act on hernephew’s behalf. She arriveda day late but on 25March,forty-eight hours after thefirst inauguration placed thecoronetuponBruce’sheadina second ceremony. Scotlandmight have a fighting kingagain but he was as yet soweakmilitarily thatwhenhiswifeElizabethheardthenewsof his coronation sheexclaimed ‘Alas we are but

KingandQueenoftheMay’.The chances of her fears

being realised appeared alltoolikelywhenby5ApriltheEnglish king appointedAymer de Valence, his ownhalf-cousin and the RedComyn’s brother-in-law, asspeciallieutenantinScotland,and armed him with thewidest powers. Valence wasauthorised to ride under thedragonbannerwhichreleasedhim from the few restraints

on warfare at this time;knightssupportingBrucelosttheirprivilegesofransomandwere to be regarded asoutlaws: a terrible endawaited any of Bruce’sfollowers, or anyone foundsheltering them. By June1306 Valence had capturedbishops Lamberton andWishartwhowereonlysavedfrom hanging by their cloth,although this did not preventthem being despatched to

England in chains. By 18June Valence reached Perth,while Bruce was in thenortheastraisingsupportbothfrom the Atholl and Marestates and from among thefollowers of Bishop Moray.By such means Brucemanagedtocollectasizeablemilitary force of some 4500men, although it wasconsiderably smaller thanValence’s and lacked hisarmouredcavalry.

Bruce moved his menacross to Perth where, nodoubt exhilarated by all hehad achieved so far, heshowed a degree of over-confidence about his chancesof defeating Valence, a manwhom he probably did notrespect highly as acommander. In the chivalrictradition Bruce rode toPerth’s city gates andchallenged Valence either tocome out and fight or to

surrender, to which Valencereplied that as it was lateafternoonitwasimpossibletofight the same day, but thaton the followingmorning hewould accept the offer.4Bruce took him at his wordand withdrew to Methvensome six miles away tobivouac his troops for thenight, neglecting in hisconfidence to set out pickets– an omission he came to

regret. Working on theunprincipled advice givenhim by veteran Scottishcommander, IngramUmfraville,whonowpledgedhimself to the English,Valence fell on Bruce’smenduringthenightof18/19Junewhen they were eithersleepingordispersed.Bruce’sforcewasdestroyed,althoughhe and a group of knightsmanaged to escape.Many ofhis bravest and devoted

supporterswerecapturedandunder Edward’s orderssixteen were executedwithout trial, of whom twoweredrawnandquartered.Ofthe senior men only ThomasRandolph, a close friend ofValence, was pardoned oncondition he promised tofight for the English. Thiswasnot all: at the same timethe Prince of Wales movednorth from Carlisle,subjecting the southwest

lowlands to a reign of terrorthat cowed the inhabitants inan area where Bruce mightnormally have expectedconsiderable support. In lessthan three months as king,Bruce’sarmyhadbeenwipedout and many of his mostnotable followers killed orscattered. Yet worse was tocome.In early July 1306 Bruce

sought refuge in Drumalban,the mountainous country

between Perthshire andArgyll but, at a place nearTyndrum, Bruce’s remainingdetachment was againdefeated, this time by theComyn supporter, JohnMacDougall of Argyll. Atthis he sent off hiswomenfolk, including thequeen and his daughterMarjorie, on the party’s fewremaining horses through themountains towardsKildrummy Castle on

Donside.BruceappointedtheEarl of Atholl, Neil Bruce(his brother), AlexanderLindsay and Robert Boyd asescorts to the party but ontheir way they learned theEnglish were bringing upsiege engines to invest thecastle and decided thereforeto move further north in thehope of taking ship toOrkney. It appeared to be asensible decision for,although Kildrummy was an

immensely strong fortresscapable of withstanding aprotracted siege, in earlySeptember 1306 the castle’sblacksmith, Osborne, set fireto the grain store in itsmainhall, thus guaranteeing itsearly surrender. For histreachery the Englishsubsequentlyrewardedhimingold–moltengoldwhichwaspoureddownhisthroat5–butwiththefallofthecastleNeil

Bruce, Robert’s youngerbrother was captured to besubsequently hanged andbeheaded.However, the women and

theirescortsfaredlittlebetter,fortheywerecapturedatTainon the Dornoch Firth whilethey were staying at StDuthac’s shrine.At this timeit must have seemed therewas no escaping the EnglishkingfortheEarlofRoss,whofavoured the Comyns, broke

the rules of sanctuary whenhe took them and handedthemover toValence.6Mostof themenwere hanged andbeheaded at Berwick whilethewomenweresentsouthtoEdwardIunderescort.Therethey met his full anger andthe Countess of Buchan andBruce’s sister, Mary, wereconfined in wooden cagesjutting from the battlementsof Berwick and Roxburgh

castles, their only concessionbeing the use of privieswithin thewalls.7There theywere to stay in solitaryconfinementforthenextfouryears. A similar cage wasprepared at the Tower ofLondon for Bruce’s twelve-year-old daughter, Marjorie,buttheorderwasrevokedandshe was sent to a nunnery.Christina Bruce, whosehusband Christopher Seton

was hanged, drawn andquartered after beingcaptured, was similarlylodged in a convent andQueen Elizabeth, wife ofRobert Bruce but alsodaughter of Edward’spowerful supporter the Earlof Ulster, was placed underhouse arrest in spartanconditions where she was toremain for the next eightyears.In the meanwhile Robert

Bruceandhissmallgroupoffugitives made their way viaLoch Lomond to DunavertyCastle near the Mull ofKintyre, where they werewelcomed byBruce’s friend,Angus Og (‘the young’)MacDonald of the Isles.8From Dunaverty it is likelyBruce and his companionswenttotheIsleofRathlinoffthe coast of Ireland oralternatively to Islay, the

centre of MacDonaldterritory.Moreimprobablyhecould have continued toUlster itself. AlthoughRathlinwasjustsixandahalfmiles longbyone and a halfmiles wide and there wereenemies all around him hewould certainly have beenable to use Angus OgMacDonald’s galleys to callon his estates for men andmoneyinorder torebuildhisstrength.Whereverhiswinter

base,bythespringof1307hehadgatheredenoughstrengthto undertake a two-prongedattackonthemainland.Brucehimself with thirty-threesmall galleys went to Arranprior to making landfall onthe Ayrshire coast while histwo younger brothers,Thomas and Alexander,accompaniedbySirReginaldCrawford along with severalhundred northern Irishrecruits, made for Galloway,

with the intentionofcreatinga diversion to cover Bruce’smore northerly attack. Onlanding, Crawford’s partywas ambushed andCrawfordhimself, together withThomas and AlexanderBruce,were taken toCarlisleand hanged, drawn andquartered. The fact thatThomas Bruce had receivedserious wounds in theencounter did not save himfrom being spread-eagled on

ahurdleanddrawnbyhorsesthroughthestreetsofCarlislebeforebeingexecuted.Meanwhile, Robert Bruce

had arranged for a fire to belit on the mainland coast ifthe localpeoplewerewillingto joinhim.Seeinga firehissmall band landed only tofinditwasnottheworkofhismessenger,whoappearedinanear frenzy telling them thenearby castle of Turnberrywas garrisoned by 100

English under theircommander, Henry Percy,while a further 200 weregarrisoned in the adjoiningvillage, and that CarrickwassothickwithEnglishsoldiersno locals dared rise to assistBruce. With so little to loseBruce and his men opted totake the offensive. Theysurrounded the village andsurprised its soldiers, killingthemallexceptonemanwhoalerted Henry Percy.

Uncertain about the size ofBruce’sforcePercyremainedin the castle while Brucecaptured much-neededsupplies, including warhorses, before moving intotheCarrickhills.9With his limited strength

Bruce had little choice oftactics. Faced with suchmassively superior Englishgarrisons and with themajority of Scottish nobles

and their followers eithercontinuing to support theComyns or regarding Bruceas nothing better than ausurper following a lostcause,hehadtoremainintherugged hill country and usethe classic guerrilla methodsof speed, surprise andelusiveness. Yet as Bruce’shandful of followerscontinued to avoid capture,smallnumbersofmenstartedto join him, including one

sizeable party of forty mencommanded by Bruce’sformermistress,ChristianaofCarrick.ItwasChristianwhotold Bruce about the fate ofhis womenfolk and the menwho had been captured withthem.Afterdespatchinganescort

toleadherbacktoherestate,legend has it that Bruce wasso overcome by hismisfortunes and theimmensity of his self-

appointed task to regainScotland that he consideredleaving the country for ever.When lying in a dark cavewhere he was accustomed totake his rest he noticed asmallspiderhangingfromtheroof by a thread.By agitatedmovements it attempted toswing on its thread until itcouldreachawallandanchoritselfbeforebeginningaweb.Sixtimeshewatcheditswingand fall back before, on the

seventh, it made itself fast.Bruce decided that if a littlecreature could so perseverethekingoftheScotscoulddonoless.Whether or not inspiredby

the spider, from this timeBruceandhismenconducteda series of breathtakingescapades againstimmeasurably strongerEnglish forces commandedby Valence and his co-commander, Robert Clifford,

who attempted to bring theminto exposed positionswherethey could be destroyed.Bruceavoidedtheirtrapsandthrough a combination ofinspired tactics and notablephysical energy even beganto achieve a number ofsuccessesofhisown.Moving south into

Galloway he established abase near Loch Trool withinthe deep glen of the samename. Warned of an

impending attack by 1500knights, Bruce and 300spearmen successfullychecked the horsemen beforemoving off into newfastnesses. The two Englishleaders directly involved, SirRobert Clifford and Sir JohnVaux, were so frustrated byBruce’s escape that theycametoblowsastheyblamedeach other for the rebuff.Bruce went north and on 10May 1307 at Loudon Hill, a

rocky upthrust nearKilmarnock, with a force ofsome 600 men, hedeliberately chose to meetmassively superiordetachmentsofcavalryunderValence. Bruce selected astrong natural positionwherehe could not be outflankedandhemadethegroundevenmore hazardous by cuttingtrenches to impede theEnglish horses. As theygalloped towards theScottish

lines the English cavalrycame upon his hiddentrenches and were thrownintoconfusion;morethan100riderswere unhorsed and theScots thereupon went ontothe attack. At this the 3000English gave way and alongwith their commanderretreated to the protection ofBothwell Castle. Loudonshowed Bruce’s evolvingthought towards counteringthe offensive capability of

English heavy cavalry. Heselected a locationwhere theopposing cavalry werefunnelledontoanarrowfront,and his man-made obstaclescould both check theirmomentum and causecasualties at which hismassed spearmen drawn upbehind the three lines oftrenches could themselvestakeuptheinitiative.Just three days later Bruce

andhismenshowedtheyhad

no undue fear of armouredhorsemen for they metanother large cavalrysquadron, this time underRaouldeMonthermer,EarlofGloucester and, despitesuperior English numbers,rebuffed them, forcingGloucester to seek theprotection of Ayr Castle.Such successes against thoseattempting to hunt Brucedownbegantogivenewhopeto others suffering from

EdwardI’ssavagerepression.Men reasoned that if Brucecouldgoonwinningitwouldbe far preferable to join himthanbecomedeclaredoutlawsthreatened underEnglish lawbydrawingandhanging.TheLanercost Chronicle reportedbitterly about Bruce’sgathering strength: ‘Despitethe fearful revenge inflictedupon the Scots who adheredtoBrucethenumberof thosewilling to strengthen him in

his Kingship increaseddaily.’10From now on Bruce’s

strategy became clear. Headopted theclassicprinciplesof guerrilla warfare devisedby the Chinese General SunTzueighteencenturiesbeforeby choosing engagementswhere theenemyappearedata disadvantage, while at thesame timeattempting togivea sense of his own

invulnerability.Thisapproachwas summed up later in thecentury by the followingverse.

InhiddenspotskeepeverystoreAndburntheplainlandsthembeforeSo,whentheyfindthelandliewasteNeedsmusttheypassawayinhasteHarriedbycunningraidsat

nightAndthreateningsoundsfromeveryheight,Thenastheyleave,withgreatarraySmitewiththeswordandchaseaway.ThisisthecounselandintentOfGoodKingRobert’sTestament.11

Through such successes,limited as they were so far,

Bruce aimed to convincethose living in thevicinityofhis operations that he wassuretoovercomehisenemiesand they would do well togive him any informationthey had about the Englishand their allies. JamesDouglas had already shownthekingbyhisdespoilingandburning of Douglas Castlethat, when the localinhabitantswerehostiletotheEnglish, without the

protectionofsuchthickwallsthe invaders were put at adistinct disadvantage. Brucerealisedthatifheadoptedthetactic of taking similarfortressesandthendestroyingthemhewouldnotonlyenjoylocal successes butcommence winning back thecountry.

On 7 July 1307 the Scottishinsurgents received the newsthey must have been most

eagerlyawaiting.Inhissixty-ninth year their fearsomeadversary Edward I died atBurgh-on-Sands just southoftheborderashewasbringinganother large army intoScotland. In the last ninemonths of his life he eitherlodged at Lanercost PriorynearCarlisleor stayed in thecity itself, and althoughbecoming increasingly weakphysically he despatched anunending stream of urgent

instructions on how to dealwith Bruce.12 With the oldking’s death Bruce knew theslacker direction of his sonEdward Caernarvon (nowEdward II) would soon belikely to work to hisadvantage. In fact when theEnglish army came underCaernarvon’s command itonly reached Cumnock inAyrshire before returning toEngland.Hewasnottocross

the border for another threeyears, thus giving Bruce thevitalopportunity tochallengehis most powerful Scottishenemies and extend hisprecarious fingerholds in thesouthwest toother regionsofScotland.Edward II offered Bruce

another bonus: on 13September he replacedValence, his father’s toughand energetic, if not over-imaginative, Lieutenant of

Scotland, with John ofBrittany, Earl of Richmond.As a commander Brittanybore no comparison withValence: he switched fromactively hunting theinsurgents down to a policyof containment, based onholding the line ofClydesdale. This eased thepressureonBrucewhosebaseat the timewas still so smallthat his guerrilla fighters hadto survive on whatever food

they could take from others.He seized the increasedopportunities for manoeuvre,and moved to attack theMacDouallsinGallowaywhohadcapturedhistwobrothersand delivered them up forexecution. So successfulwashe and so thorough was hiswasting of their lands thatmanyoftheirtribesmenwerecompelled to leave theirScottish homes and drivetheir livestock into the forest

ofInglewoodinCumberland.From Galloway Bruce

continued his offensive bymarching north and breakingthrough the English defencelineontheClydeandmovinginto the Western Highlands,although he took pains tocoverhisbackbyleavinghiskeen young commander,James Douglas, in commandof the southwest. Theerstwhile guerrilla leader hadnowmoved into the open as

far as his Comyn opponentswere concerned. And asBruce proceeded up thewestcoast gathering strength allthe while, he continued toenjoythepricelesssupportofAngus Og and his fleet ofgalleys.Commandof the seaenabled him to make bothrapidandsurpriseraidsonhisenemies.Whilstonhiswaytothe far north, where heintended tobreak theComynpower, he forced the

MacDougalls of Argyll andLornetoaskforatruce.Johnof Lorne tried to avoid theanger of theEnglish king byexcusing himself, saying,‘Robert Bruce approachedthese parts by land and seawith 10,000men they say or15,000. I have no more than800 men.’13 In fact, Brucewas unlikely to have thatmany more soldiers himself,but his string of successes

against the English, togetherwithhiscombineduseoflandand sea, alarmed lessdetermined men and helpedto disguise his relativeweakness.Protected by his trucewith

the MacDougalls Brucemoved northeast through theGreat Glen, where hecaptured Inverlochy at itssouthern end before takingUrquhart and Invernesscastlesinthenorth.Emerging

at Inverness he joined forceswiththeBishopofMoray,hisconstant and long-standingsupporter in that region. ByOctober1307Brucewasinaposition to threaten the Earlof Ross, whose estatesstretched across a largeswatheofthenortheastcoast.Rosshadbeenresponsibleforthe capture of Bruce’swomenfolkbut,puttingasideanypersonalbitterness,BruceofferedhimatruceuntilJune

1308, which Ross accepted.Bruce’s decision to start hiscampaignagainstRoss in theautumn was soundly basedfortheuncertainweatherandroughseasmadeanyEnglishattempt to send militaryassistance extremely difficultif not impossible. Like Johnof Lorne, the cautious earlalsowrote toEdward IIwithexcuses, but Bruce believedthat if he could gain furthermilitary successes the earl’s

allegiance was likely tochange in his favour. WiththeEarlofRoss immobilisedBruce was now able toconfront the Earl of Buchan,the greatest of the Comynlandowners, whose fertileestatesstretchedfaralongthenortheast coast from theMoray Firth to Aberdeen.Bruce knew the proudBuchan was highly unlikelytooffertermsand,ashedrewnear, Buchan duly came to

meethimwithhisownarmy.So far events had gone

remarkably well for Bruce,whose forces were nowjoined by those of SirWilliam Wiseman and otherknights of Moray. However,as he was about to make anassault on Inverurie, thecapitalofBuchan’sestatesinGarioch, he becamedesperatelyill,mostlikelytheresult of the strain andceaseless exertions of his

eighteen months’campaigning. Encouraged bythis,Buchan,supportedbyanEnglish contingent and withothers provided by DavidStrathbogie, Earl of Atholland the Scottish baron JohnMoubray, threatened Bruce’sforceswhowerecompelledtoretreat from the lowlandssouth of Banff to the morewooded uplands at Sliochnear Huntly. It was winterand snow lay on the ground;

Bruce’s men were both coldand short of foodwhile theirleader, who lacked anymedicine, remained very ill.However, Bruce’s onlysurvivingbrother,Edwardledthe party by Huntly to theGarioch where they enjoyedsome support but Buchanfollowed up and in lateJanuary his troops surprisedBruce’s outposts and madereadyforafullattack.AtthisBruce, who had partially

recovered,calledforhishorseandwasliftedontoit.Witharideroneachsidetohelphimstay in the saddle headvanced and the king’sappearance helped to put theattackerstoflight.Bruce took further time to

recover fullybut, on23May1308, his forces met anddefeated Buchan’s close toInverurie,followingwhichhewent on to destroy Inverurie

Castle.14 Edward Bruce wasgiven the commission toravagetheBuchanestatesandofsmashingthemainComynpower base. So thoroughlydid he go about his task bybreaking down castles,killing, destroyinghomesteads, slaughtering,burningcattleandcorn,thatitwas said men grieved overthe herschip (harrying) ofBuchan for fifty years or

more.15Brucewasknownforhiscomparativehumanityandgenerositybut, likeEdward I(andany successfulmedievalking), he showed he couldalsouseterroreffectively.Bruce’s barbarous

treatment of the east coastserved not only to crush agreat Comyn, who fled toEnglandwherehediedwithinayear,butalsoasapowerfulincentive to persuade others

to come to terms. In themeantimeJamesDouglaswasextending Bruce’s controlover Douglasdale, UpperClydesdale and eastwards toSelkirk and Jedburgh.Douglas also capturedBruce’s nephew ThomasRandolphandbroughthimtothe king, with the result thatRandolph eventually becameanother of his notablecommanders. During thesummer of 1308 Bruce

continuedhisconquestofthenorth by capturing anddestroying further Comynfortresses such as Tarradaleon theBlack Isle, Slains andDundarg to theeast followedby English strongholds atElgin,FyvieandAboyne,andwith the surrender ofAberdeeninJulyhegainedamajor seaport through whichhe could resume the trade ofScottishproducts,particularlywool,withScandinavia.

Bymid-August1308Brucewas ready to take on theMacDougalls of Lorne, forwhich offensive he orderedJames Douglas to join him.To reach the MacDougallsBrucehadtomovethroughanarrowpassatBranderwhichwas flanked on one side bythe steep slope of BenCruachan (1124 metres)whileontheotherthegroundfellawaysharplyintoanarmof Loch Awe. The

MacDougalls planned toambush Bruce by rollinglargerocksuponhimandhismen and then driving theminto the loch but the kingforestalled them by sendingHighlanders under Douglasinto positions above theattackersandbystringingouthis forces. The tumblingrocks were successfullyavoided and as Bruce’s mencharged uphill, theMacDoualls were assailed

from above by Douglas’Highlanders. They wereunable to resist the doubleattacks and Bruce pursuedthem to their headquarters atDunstaffnage Castle nearDunbeg which quicklysurrendered and wasdestroyed. In mid-AugustBruce sent his brother toGalloway on anothercampaign of devastation andkilling, in the process ofwhich theMacDougallswere

driven out of the region andsomewereforced to lookforrefugeinEngland.Bruce’s conquest over the

Comyns and other Scottishnobles who opposed himbecame virtually completewhen the Earl of Rosssubmitted on 31 October1308. Bruce’s response wasmagnanimous. Ross wasgivenbackhis lands togetherwith the burgh of Dingwalland the lands of Creich in

Sutherland. Such leniencygained its reward, for fromnowonRosskepthispromiseto serve Bruce well andfaithfully.Within little more than a

year Robert Bruce hadtransformed his militaryposition. To the south hecontrolled a broad band ofterritory right across thecountry from Ayr toRoxburgh and Jedburgh.Galloway now paid him

tribute and the MacDouallsthere were scattered. Up thewest coast in Argyll, he haddefeated the chief branch ofthe MacDougall clan, whilefurthernorththeEarlofRosshadbecomeanadherentand,most importantly of all, theEarl of Buchan had fled toEngland. By conquest Brucehad forced many prominentmembers of the Scottishnobility to recognise him asking,butinprivatetherewere

still a significant number, inaddition to theComyns,whodoubted the legality of hisclaimtothethrone.While his achievements so

far had been immense andgained against all the odds,thetasksstillfacinghimweremoredifficult.AconsiderablenumberofcastlesremainedinEnglish hands, includingthose centres of power thatstretchedrightacrossLothianScotland. Until the English

garrisons were driven out ofhislandBrucecouldneverberecognisedabroadasthelegalmonarch of an independentkingdom. Yet howeverdifficult the task of clearingthecastlesmightproveitwassure to bring him largerproblems still. Despite theserious conflicts Edward IIwas experiencing with hisnoblessuchactionwasboundbefore long to provoke theEnglish king into sending

overwhelming armies intoScotland both to relieve thecastles, and to restore hismilitarycontrolthere.It had taken Bruce just

eighteen months from spring1307 until the autumn of1308 to defeat his Scottishopponents (although somestill opted to fight with theEnglish), but he faced morethan five years of furtherconflict before he would bebrought to his ultimate test,

themeetingofbothcountries’nationalarmiesinafull-scaleengagement. Such a greatbattle was not directly ofBruce’s seeking: his chosenpolicyso farwas tocontinuewith his guerrilla warfarewhile at the same timecapturing and demolishingEnglish fortresses. In face ofevery invading army Brucestill favoured the tacticsusedby Wallace before the greatopportunity given him at

Stirling Bridge and his morereluctant acceptance of battleat Falkirk, namely usingscorched earth to cut off hisenemies’ supplies therebyforcing them to withdraw,while in the process leavingthemselves open to spoilingattacks. By such methodsBruce could take fulladvantage of Scotland’sgeography to persuade theEnglish the conquest of thecountry was not worth the

frustration and expenseinvolved and bring them tomake peace on Scottishterms.

Such a prospect lay far inthe future: not onlywere thevast majority of Scotland’smain castles still in Englishhands but Edward IIcontinuedtousehisinfluencewith the papacy and otherEuropeancountriestopreventthe recognition of Bruce asking of Scotland. Althoughby March 1309 Philip IV ofFrance addressed Bruce asKing of Scots, itwas largelybecause of the French king’s

wishforScotlandtojoinhimonaplannedcrusade.Bruce’spredictable reply to such arequest was that, once theEnglish stopped ravaging hiscountry, all Scotland wouldrallytothecrusade.Itwasnocoincidence that on the dayfollowingBruce’sresponsetothe French king, the firstScottishparliamenttobeheldfor eighteen years endorsedits support for him anddeclared Bruce the nearest

heir of King Alexander III,denigratingJohnBalliolasanEnglish puppet put on thethronebyEdwardI.16In the same year military

activitytookanewturnwhenBruce was required to faceEdward II’s much-delayedinvasion. The English kinghad come to terms with hisbarons sufficiently to bringhis favourite,PiersGaveston,backfromexileanddespatch

majorforcesintoScotland.Infact Edward sent two armiesnorth, one under the Earl ofHereford to Berwick, theotherunderRobertCliffordtoCarlisle, but Bruce refusedbattle and with theunfavourable prospects ofwinter campaigning beforethem the Englishcommanders proposed atruce. This was until March1310 and was later extendedto June because as the

Lanercost Chronicleobserved,‘theEnglishdonotwillingly enter Scotland towage war before summerchiefly because earlier in theyear they find no food fortheirhorses’.17Meanwhile, Edward II’s

continuing problemswith hisnobles brought a surprisingnewtwist,givinghimamostpowerful incentive to pursuethe war with Scotland. The

king faced fierce hostilityfrom his nobles over hislavishgiftstoPiersGaveston,and from Philip of Francewho, furious at Edward’sneglect of his daughter,Isabella(Edward’swife),hadsummoned him to Paris tojustify himself. Edward IIdecided he could foil bothchallenges by gainingmilitarysuccessesinScotlandandaccordinglya royaledictwas issued for men to

assemble at Berwick by 8Septemberforanewinvasionattempt.(PiersGavestonwas,in fact, already in the north.)The army compared in sizewith any his father had ledagainst Scotland althoughonly three great barons, theearlsofCornwall,Gloucesterand Surrey, answered thesummons.Characteristically, after

devastating the country lyingin the English army’s path

Bruce continued to avoidbattle. When the Englishmoved from Berwick toBiggar in central Scotlandtheyfoundnocornnorcattlewithin an area that had notonly been wasted but wassuffering from widespreadfamine. To add to theirdifficulties James Douglashovered nearby eager to killor capture any stragglers.On28 October Edward II wascompelled to lead his army

backtoBerwick,harassedallthe time by Bruce’s raiders.The effectiveness of Bruce’stactics was fullyacknowledged by achronicler, the so-calledEnglishmonkofMalmesburywhowrote:

For Robert Bruce,knowinghimselfunequalto the strength of theKing of England instrength or fortune,

decided that it would bebetter to resist our Kingby secret warfare ratherthan dispute his right inopen battle. Indeed Imight be tempted tosound the praises of SirRobertBrucedidnot theguiltofhomicideandthedark stain of treacherybidmekeepsilent.18

Edward (still accompaniedbyPiersGaveston)continued

to avoid the demands of his‘Lords Ordainers’ byremaining at Berwick,although his army was nowmuch reduced after many ofthe infantry had completedtheir forty days feudalservice. He stayed there forthe next six months, duringwhich time he attempted torefurbish his castles inLothian by contracting withleading English commanderssuch as Robert Clifford (at

Berwick), Henry Beaumont(at Perth) and RogerMortimer (at Roxburgh), tooccupy individual fortressesfor a set period of time,usually not less than a year.However by midsummer1311, despite such devices,hewassoshortof funds thathe was forced to return toLondonhavingachievedverylittlemilitarily.Once Edward II and his

men had gone, Bruce

assumed the offensive bymaking his first major raidacross the border, movinginto Northumberland wherehe burnt and looted cropsbefore returning to Scotlandfifteen days later. Thisopened Bruce’s campaign ofnot only taking grain andlivestock but extortingransoms from the Englishnorthern counties, and soeffective were hisdepredations in

Northumberland that thecounty paid the enormoussumof£2000asanimmunityagainstanyfurtherraidsuntilFebruary 1312. One majoradvantage of these raids wasthat despite the valuablerewards such ‘soft targets’brought virtually no risk tohissoldiers.Engrossed as never before

in its civil war, Englandappearedtohavenomeansofresponse. From mid-October

1311 until February 1312Piers Gaveston was againbanished and on his returnEdward II sent him to York,whereupon the ‘LordsOrdainers’ decided to takemilitary action. Theyassembled their individualarmies and moved northagainst Gaveston, whosurrendered to Valence, Earlof Pembroke, during May1312. But as Gaveston wasbeing moved into safe

keeping he was captured bythe Earl of Warwick andbeheaded,atwhichtheking–together with Valence whoconsidered his honour hadbeencompromised–tookthefield against the earls ofLancaster andWarwick. Theking and Valence weresuccessful and by October1313 the majority of theestranged nobles indicatedthat they were anxious tomakepeace.

Inthemeantime,Brucehadboth continued and extendedhis incursions. During July1312 theparliament,meetingatAyr,decideduponalarge-scale invasion of England,and after crossing the borderthe Scottish forces sackedLanercost Priory beforemoving on to Chester LeStreet and Durham wherethey took immense booty.The leading men of Durhamnegotiated a truce to last for

ten months until midsummer1313 on the payment of£2000, with the additionalhumiliatingconditionthattheScots could retreat throughDurham at their will. Freshimmunitieswerethengrantedto other counties but onlyupon the same heavy cashpayments.Bruce’s campaign,savage as it was, was adisciplined one. Those whopaid were spared, those whodid not had their estates

ravaged and they themselveswere taken back to Scotland.The aim was twofold: torestore Bruce’s bankruptedkingdom and force theEnglish to recogniseScotland; the former was sosuccessful that within threeyears Bruce received morethan£40,000intributes.19Supported by suchmilitary

successes Bruce continuedwith his political initiatives.

On 29 October 1312, atInchture near Perth, Brucemetwith the envoys ofKingHakon V of Norway andrenewed the Treaty of Perthmade in 1266 between thetwo countries, by which theNorwegians recognised thelossof theHebridesinreturnforaperpetualannuityof100marks from the Scots. Thisrestoration of links withNorway and that country’srecognition of Robert Bruce

as king marked another steptowards the normalisation ofrelations between Scotlandand the rest of Europe. Bynowregular tradewas takingplace with the HanseaticLeague and otherprincipalities of the LowCountries as well asunofficial – but significant –trade with some northernEnglish sea ports and, ofcourse,withUlster.Within the country, two

thirds of which was underBruce’s control, the ScottishkingwonoverDavid,EarlofAtholl, the son of John, Earlof Atholl, who had beenhanged earlier by Edward Ifor supporting Bruce.Atholl’s lands were restoredtohimandhewas appointedConstableofScotland.Atthesame time Bruce’s nephew,Thomas Randolph, wascreated Earl of Moray withlands stretching between the

earldomsofRossandAtholl.While Edward was

embroiled with his barons,Bruce was able to continuewith his dual strategy ofmaking regular raids intonorthern England andcontinuing to take anddestroy English castles inScotland. Both elementsyielded encouraging results.The raids were valuablebecause not only were theyhighly profitable but by

terrorising the northerncounties Bruce demonstratedthe ineffectiveness of theEnglish king. And by 1312the number of castles underEnglish control was beingsignificantly reduced. Northof the Tay, only Perthremained in English hands,withStirling,Linlithgow andBothwell occupying the lineof the Firth of Forth and theClyde; in the southwestDalswinton, Dumfries,

Buittle and Caerlaverockremained, while in Lothian,stillmainly inEnglishhands,the four strongest of all,Edinburgh, Roxburgh,Jedburgh and Berwick wereunsubdued.Takinganddestroyingsuch

castles represented amammoth task even forforces with heavy siegeequipment. Without it,ingenuity and great daringwereessential. In fact, itwas

the attempt to take one ofthese castles that led directlyto the confrontation betweenthe two countries atBannockburn, althoughBruce’s threat in November1313 that his Scottishenemies had but a year tomake peace or sufferperpetual disinheritance alsomade another English attackon Scotland highly likely.Efforts to take theseremaining castles met with

mixed fortunes. On 6December 1312 Bruce andDouglas attempted to seizethe great castle of Berwickusing hemp scaling laddersthat could be lifted atspearpoint and placed overthe walls for the attackers toascend;on thisoccasion theydid not succeed for thegarrisonwasalertedbyadogbarking.Onemonthlateron7January 1313 Bruce joinedthe troops who were

unsuccessfully besiegingPerth: feigning amove away(tounderstandable jeers fromthe garrison), they returnedsecretlyeightdayslaterwhenhe personally led theattackers across a shallowpoint of the moat. Brucehimself placed a rope ladderon the wall and was thesecond to climb it. Next tofall was Dumfries, starvedinto surrender by 7 February1313, followed quite quickly

by Dalswinton, Buittle andCaerlaverock.Outside Lothian only two

castles held out, Stirling andBothwell. Bothwell could besafelyignoredasitsgovernorremained inactive,waiting togive his allegiance towhoever gained the upperhand, but Stirling, whichEdwardBrucewasorderedtoassault, was far different. Itsmassive fortifications couldwithstand any number of

attacks,whethertheassailantswere equipped with siegeenginesornot.EdwardBrucehadnone;hisonlyoptionwasto starve the garrison intosubmission.Forthreemonthshe camped round it andsucceeded in sealing it offbut, impatient and rash as hewas,thiswastheverytypeofwarfareforwhichhewasnotsuited. The castle’s governorwas a Scot, Sir PhilipMoubray, and he tempted

Edward Bruce with theseemingly chivalrousproposal that ‘if bymidsummer a year hence(1314)hewasnotrescuedbybattle, he would yield thecastle freely’. Robert Brucewas away seizing the Isle ofMan, and Edward acceptedMoubray’s offer withoutbothering to consult theking.20In mitigation, Edward

Bruce might justly havethought theEnglishking andhis nobles would continuetheir warring and remain inno position to meet thechallenge.Butthiswasarashassessment given that hisagreementwithMoubraywasmade for twelve months’time. The English couldhardly have ignored Bruce’sthreat of perpetualdisinheritanceonhisScottishenemies but after things had

been going so seriouslyagainst them, the agreementbetween Edward Bruce andMoubray gave a Godsentopportunityforrelationstobepatched up between the kingand his nobles and for themto unite against the Scotsapparentlynowready to facethem in open battle. On theScottish side Bruce wouldhave been understandablyangry because of thechallenge’sunifyingeffecton

the English, but much moreimportantly because he hadbeen put on the spot by it.Barbour had him remarking,‘We are set in jeopardy tolose or win all at onethrow.’21 The pledge hadbeen given by a brotherwhoon themale sidewas nearestin succession to RobertBruce’s throne. AlthoughBruce had practised stealthand deception in his tactics

against the English it wasmuchmoredifficultforamanaccused by many of being ausurperkingnottohonourhisbrother’s word. Bruce wasthusputunderfiercepressureto meet the English in openbattle,howevermuch itwentagainst his painstaking andhitherto successful strategy.At least he retained theadvantage of choosing theterrain–forbytheagreementthe English had to come to

Stirling. The agreement alsostill left him some choiceabout the nature of theconflict. Theoretically hecouldrebufftheinvadersandthen move off withoutpursuing things in a life ordeathstruggle.Whetherintheheat of battle such an optionwould be left open to himwas,ofcourse,incalculable.Over the intervening

months the Scottish king’schief task was to raise and

train a force capable ofmeeting the English but hecould also increase theinvading army’s logisticalproblems by capturing theothergreatcastlesofLothian,a task whichwould keep hisown forces occupied andalert. Edinburgh was ofprincipal importance; it wasclosest to Stirling andpresentedavitalrevictuallingpoint,whereasRoxburghandBerwick (which was also a

seaport) were good startingoff points for any invasionbutstilloverfiftymilessouthof Edinburgh, with Jedburghthe most southerly of themall. Outside Lothian theclosest castle to Stirling wasLinlithgow,half-waybetweenStirlingandEdinburgh.The taking of Linlithgow

Castle owed nothing toBruce’seagercommanders:itwas achieved by a simplecountryman named William

Bunnock who conceived theidea of concealing eightmeninaloadofhayandjamminghis cart under the portcullis.Bunnock himself killed theporterwhilethoseinthecart,along with others concealednear the gate, overcame thegarrison. Roxburgh Castlefell to JamesDouglas duringthenight ofShroveTuesday,27 February 1314, whoadoptedthebrilliantdeviceofdressing his men in black

cloaks and making themapproachitontheirhandsandknees in the guise of thesmallblackcattleofthetime.The garrison was celebratingthe last religious feast beforeLent and Douglas and hissixty men were over thecastle walls and among theroisterers in the great hallbeforetheyhadtimetoreact.Nottobeoutdone,Thomas

Randolph took EdinburghCastle on 14March. He and

thirty men, all mountaineers,were led up the sheer cragsbyacertainWilliamFrancis,son of a watch-keeper in thecastle.Asayoungmanwithalover in the city he hadregularly gone down one ofthe castle walls by ropeladder before descending thecrags, and returned by thesameroute in theearlyhoursof the morning. After onealarmwhentheythoughttheyhad been observed as they

pausedforbreathon a ledge,Randolph and his menclimbed over the castle wallas others created a diversionat the east port before thestronghold fell to hiscombinedattacks.Berwick Castle was not

taken until 1318, and theEnglish used it as a musterpoint for their cavalry beforesetting off to relieve StirlingCastle.Onlytwoothercastlesremaineduncaptured,Dunbar

andJedburgh.Dunbarwas toplayavitalpartintheescapeof Edward II after the battlebut Jedburgh had nosignificantrole.With the fall of Edinburgh

Castle in March 1314 thethirty-nine-year-old RobertBrucehadadvancedhiscausefurther than anyone couldhave imagined possibleduring the seven years sinceFebruary 1307, when he andhis small band of followers

were fugitives in the Carrickhills. After a succession ofvictories all Scotland, exceptsomepocketsofLothian,hadcome toacknowledgehimasking, however many doubtsmight remain concerning thelawfulnessofhisclaimtothethrone, while his series ofraids into northern Englandhad not only confirmed hisoffensivepowersbutbroughtmuch-needed supplies andmoney to his impoverished

country. Within Scotland atleast three parliaments hadapproved the restoration ofthe country’s fiscal andjudicial system and theChurch continued with itsstrong support, while tradeand diplomatic relations hadall but returned to normalwithEurope.However,Bruce had by no

means secured Scotland.Edward Bruce’s truce atStirlingCastlemeant that the

Englishhadeverymotivationtheyneededtomountamajorinvasion. England stillpossessed the ability toassembleanarmysuperiorinboth weaponry and numbersto any that Scotland couldraise.Ithad,however,learnedfromitspastmistakes, touseeastern sea ports such asBerwick and Dunbar,together with anaccompanying wagon train,to keep the army adequately

supplied during its northerncampaigns.IfBrucecouldnotfind a way of defying suchoddsallhisworkcouldeasilybe reversed. If the Englishinvasion was successful theycould go on to rebuild theirScottish castles, restore theirofficials, reinstate theComyns who accompaniedthem, purge the Scottishchurch of Bruce supportersand, if hewere not killed, toarraign him like Wallace for

his manifold crimes. Withsuch an outcome Scotland’schance of becoming a fullyindependent country wouldbelost.NowonderBrucehadnever opted for such aconfrontation. THE PATH TOBATTLE like Wallace for hismanifold crimes. With suchan outcome Scotland’schance of becoming a fullyindependent country wouldbelost.NowonderBrucehadnever opted for such a

confrontation.

SectionTwo:TheContenders

CHAPTERFOUR

THETWOARMIES

‘They made readyweapons andarmour, and allthat pertains towar.’

Barbour,The

I

Bruce

N THEIR PREPARATIONS FORthe expected confrontationEngland and Scotland

faced contrasting problems.Scotland’s primary difficultywas to raise sufficientnumberstomatchthoseoftheanticipated English invaders.Its population wasapproximately400,000,justafifth of England’s, and after

eighteen years of almostcontinuousfighting,includingcostly civil warfare, theavailablemanpowerhadbeenreducedstill further. IfBrucehad attempted to use thedecree of ‘ServitumScoticanum’ in 1313 to raisethe country’s traditionalfeudal host of men agedbetweensixteenandsixtyitisverydoubtfulifhecouldhaveraised anything like thenumbers that manned

Wallace’s battle lines atFalkirk. There were alsosevere economic constraintson both the equipment andfood needed to support alarge army after years offighting and enemyoccupation had seriouslyinterrupted the country’slegislative processes anddislocateditseconomy.Itwasnot until 1309, for instance,thatRobertBrucewasabletohold his first parliament, and

his request for burghers toattendtheInchtureparliamentof three years laterdemonstrated the importancehecametoplaceontheburghproviding a vital source ofstate revenue, as well asfightingmen.Although from 1310

onwards Bruce’s financialproblemswere helped by hisraids on northern England,which brought considerablesums in protection money

together with cattle, horsesand corn, these were neithernormalnorregularsourcesofincome. Compared withEngland,Scotlandwasapoorcountry and, until BrucerecapturedtheIsleofMan(in1313)Englishshipswereabletothreatenitsshortestsupplyline from abroad through thesouthwestern approachesbetween Scotland andIreland.Inspiteofthepartialblockade, from 1310 at least

the Scots had been receivingsome foodstuffs from Irelandand, more importantly still,badly needed iron and steelweapons along with armour,in addition to the supplies ofthese coming fromScandanavia.1 Militaryweapons were unlikely tohave been made in Irelandand were probably re-exportedafterbeingobtainedfrom the continent or from

England.Recruitment was not the

majorEnglishdilemma.Theynormallyhadnoneedtoordera full national levy for theycouldhardlyhavecopedwiththe numbers thatwould haveresulted, and so it becamecommonpracticetotakemenfrom specific regions. ThereignofEdward Ialsosawagreat extension in the systemof paying troops and raisingprivate contracts in addition

to relying on the feudal orgeneraldutiesofvassals.Forthe battle of Falkirk, forinstance, theEnglish infantrywas levied from Wales,ChesterandLancashire,inall29,400foot,supplementedbymercenaries from Gascony.2Admittedly, prior toBannockburn things weresomewhatdifferent,since theunsettled state of the countrycaused especial difficulties

overraisingmen,andEdwardII was obliged to extend hisearlier calls to includethirteenmidlandandnortherncounties with specialistarchers coming from the farsouth.3 This brought furtherproblems, particularly overthe need to pay the militiaoncetheyservedoutsidetheircounty boundaries. Facedwith the huge debtbequeathed by his father and

dissatisfaction of his ownmaking among the baronageEdward II attempted to raiseadditional foot soldiers byrequiring one from eachtownship, whose wageswould be paid for by thatcommunity.4AnotherofEngland’sgreat

strengths was in thequalitative superiority of itsarmy. England’s morenumerous and wealthier

aristocracy, togetherwith thegrowingnumberofmenwhoownedtwentylibratesoflandormore,enabledittoraisefarlarger numbers of armouredcavalry, the battlefield-winning weapon of the day.Each English magnate wasrequired to supply a fixedquota of knights, fullyprotected by chain mail,mounted on large andpowerful shire horses whichwere themselves protected

not only by heavy clothtrappingsover theirhaunchesbut by metal chaffrons overtheirheads.By any standard it was

undeniably expensive toequipaknight.Whenarcherswere paid two old pence aday, a heavy destrier horsecostbetween£40and£80andeven cheaper horses costbetween £10 and £20, quiteapart from their otherequipment. Each knight

needed a minimum of twohorses and most more still.Knights were customarilysupported by at least twotroopersonsomewhatinferiorhorsesthatcouldbevaluedaslow as £2 but on someexpeditions even the Englishtroopers were allowed threehorses.5 The shire horsesneededtobepowerful,for inaddition to their riders’ mailwhich could total more than

60lbs (27kg), their warsaddles weighed from 21 to33lbs (9.5 to 15kg).6Additionally,undertheirmailthe knights wore heavyquilted garments to helpabsorbanyblowsandover itsurcoatsemblazonedwiththeknights’ arms. By this time,as the contemporaryinventory of Piers Gavestonrevealed, many knights hadcome to enjoy the increased

protectionof ironplatesovertheir chest and back whichwereoften facedwith silkorvelvet.7Whenfullyaccoutredthe knights topped off theirlayersofbodyprotectionwithgreat metal helms coveringtheir heads and faces which,despite admirable defensivequalities, brought attendantpenalties, for even with slitsor small windows for theeyes, their vision was much

restricted.Foroffensiveactionknights

carried twelve-foot lances,together with swords andbattleaxesormacesforclosequarterfighting.Theheadsoftheir lances were fitted withsmall pieces of cloth or silk,the forerunners of armouredpennons,which,when lancesfound their mark, preventedthem from becomingembedded and enabled theweapons to be removed for

further use.8 Their swordswere quite often highlydecorated and most maceswith their protruding ‘knobs’were the work of skilledcraftsmen.Someindicationofthe cost of armoured knightstogether with their weaponsand horses can be gatheredfrom Edward I’s attempts toraise cavalry for an invasionof Scotland following theEnglish defeat at Stirling

Bridge.Hesubsidisedseveralof his nobles by providingthemwithupto500horsesatthe amazing cost of£7691.16s.8d.9Scotlandcouldnevermatch

thisoutlay.Wallacewasveryweak in cavalry at bothStirling Bridge and Falkirk,while Bruce’s cavalrycontingent at the time ofBannockburn would not bemuch above a fifth of the

English strength. Moreoverhis riders were mounted onsmall wiry ponies or‘hackneys’, standing around14handshigh,comparedwitha destrier of up to 17 handswith its much heavier buildandmore powerful shouldersandhaunches.Althoughsomeof the Scottish riders woremail, or were protected bystout coverings of boiledleatheracrosstheirchestsandbacks, in the main their

horses were incapable ofcarrying the equivalent ofEnglish knights equipped forbattle. The Scottish cavalrywere also incapable ofwithstanding charges fromthe English juggernauts,although they did have theadvantage inmanoeuvrabilityand adaptability: carryingsuch a weight of armour,English knights were mosteffective when charging instraight lines. Most seriously

of all, if for some reason theEnglish riderswere unhorsedthey became highlyvulnerable to theweapons ofordinary foot soldiers.Daggers could be thrustwithin the eye slits of helmsand axes swung against theunprotected backs of theirlegs.Notwithstanding, at thistime armoured cavalry werestill theunquestionedarbitersofthebattlefield.The English were also

superior in bowmen. InEngland the shortbow wasbeing replaced by thelongbow with its muchsuperior qualities, a factwellappreciated by Edward I atFalkirk. The longbow wasstrung with hemp whippedwith light linen cord and itsshafts of English yew werealmost two metres long.These were equipped withdifferent tips: some couldpierce armour while others

were designed for inflictinglargefleshwounds.Althoughthe longbowhadamaximumrange of 350 metres itsarmour-piercing qualitieswerebestatthemuchshorter,if still considerable, distanceof 100–150 metres. A goodarcher could fire as many asfifteenaimedarrowsaminuteandcouldbelikenedtoatypeof medieval machine gun.When the English usedmassedarchers firinghigh in

the air their shafts wouldmake up a dense cloud ofmissiles, which descendingwith a destructive swishingnoise could inflict heavycasualties on opposinginfantry or cavalry. TheEnglishsubsequentlycametoratethelongbowsohighlyasa weapon that six feathersfromeverygoosekilledwereto be handed in for arrowfletching.10 Like allweapons

it was not without somelimitations, the main onebeing the high draw powerrequired – between 150–170pounds. In battlelongbowmen needed to takeup their stations on firmgroundstanding sideonwiththeir feet planted well apartand even more than otherinfantrymen they werevulnerable to cavalry, if itcould get amongst them.Good longbowmen needed

strength and stamina and ittookyearsratherthanmonthsfor them to become fullyeffective. For protection thearchersworejerkinsorchain-mail on their shoulders inadditiontosomeformofheadcovering. As well as theirbows they carried shortswordsordaggers.TheEnglish army also had

a considerable number ofhighly regardedcrossbowmen. These had to

crank their weapons forloading but once loaded theycouldberetainedinthatstatewithout further effort. Somecrossbows were carried byEnglishmen and many bymercenary bowmen fromregionssuchasGascony.Theweaponwasequalorsuperiorin range to the long-bowandvery much superior to theshortbow. The penetrativepowerofitsshaftswerequiteequaltothoseofthelongbow

as their leather or parchmentflightsmade the shafts rotatethus increasing both theirvelocity andpenetration.Thecrossbow’s rate of fire,however, was slower with amaximum of six aimed boltsaminute.Nonetheless, itwasat leastasaccurateandcouldbeaimedprecisely.In comparison the Scottish

shortbows had a far shorterrange and poorer penetrativeability. They had, in fact,

reached the limit of theirdevelopment, although theirskilledarcherscouldfireevenmorequicklythantheEnglishlongbowmen. Unlike theEnglish the bulk of theScottish bowmen tended tocome from a particularlocation, in Bruce’s time theforestofEttrick.In one arm only, that of

infantry spearmen, were theScots not outmatchedqualitatively.Bothsideswere

similarly equipped. Forprotection the Englishfootsoldiers wore quiltedcoats, often topped by chainmail over their heads andshoulders, mail gloves andbassinets(ironhats),andeachcarried a shield. Forarmament they carried atwelve-foot spear togetherwithashortswordordagger.Their Scottish equivalentswerealsoprotectedbyquiltedjackets. At the time of

Bannockburn fewer hadchainmail than the Englishbut theyalsoworeprotectivegloves and bassinets.Although contemporaryevidence is lackingconcerning their actuallength, the Scottish spearswere probably also betweentwelve and fourteen feetlong.11 In addition eachScottishsoldiercarriedadirkoranaxe,aswellasacircular

wooden targe or shield. Thelatter was usually made byfastening layers of close-grained wood at right-anglesto eachother,making it verydifficult for arrows topenetrate, althoughsometimesitwasmadeoutofstring wickerwork. Even iftheir spears were no longerthan twelve feet they werecapable of keeping Englishcavalry at a distance, for theriders’ twelve-foot lances

wereunlikelytostretchmuchmore thansix feet in frontoftheir horses’ heads. Whiletheir equipment was almostthe same, the Scottishinfantry had a distinctadvantageinthecalibreofthemenwho filled the ranks, asnobles, knights and yeomenfarmers were accustomed tofight on foot together withtheir followers,whereas suchmen in the English armyservedwiththecavalry.

The actual size of the twoarmies at Bannockburn hasprovoked much discussion.Apart from thecontemporarychroniclers,twomajorstudieshave been made of therespective strengths. During1913 both John Morris andWilliam Mackay MacKenziepublishedbooksonthebattlewhich included estimatedtotals for each side, althoughit has to be acknowledgedthat Mackay MacKenzie

followed many of Morris’calculations.12 Later writers,including the redoubtableProfessor Barrow, have beengenerally content to followMorris’ and MacKenzies’figures, although PeterTraquair in his recent bookFreedom’s Sword has scaleddown both armies stillfurther.13The total cavalry available

in England at this time was

about 7000 to 7500, but it ishighly unlikely that such anumber was mobilised.14Like his father Edward IIused the feudal levy to raisethemajorityofhiscavalrybutfor Bannockburn only threeof the eight English earlsanswered his summons, theother five sending theminimum number of knightsrequired. Fortunately for theEnglish king many of his

noblesbelowtherankofearlattended enthusiastically andwere likely to havecontributed more than thebare numbers of additionaltroopers required. Added tothese were the Scottishknights still opposed toBruce, as well as knightsfromIrelandandothers fromEurope.BetweenAugust andOctober1313EdwardIItookconsiderable pains to call onsuch men: he wrote eleven

letters, for instance, to gainthereleaseofasingle–albeitoutstanding – knight, GilesD’Argentan,tofightwithhimatBannockburn.15One contemporary English

chronicler put the totalEnglish cavalry atBannockburnatslightlymorethan 200016 although at theother extreme John Barbourset their cavalry strength at3000bardedhorsesalone,i.e.

thosecarryingfullyarmouredknights.17Followingacarefulcalculation of the rolls JohnMorris came to theconclusion that the EnglishcavalryatBannockburncouldnot have been above 2400.18This, of course,wouldbynomeansbethetotalnumberofhorses required. Apart fromtheir front line mounts theEnglishknightswerelikelytoridecoursersorlighterhorses

on the approach march,saving their destriers for theanticipated battles. In fact,their battle chargers werenormallyledbythesquireonthe knight’s right hand, forthe name destrier comesdirectly from the Latindextra,meaningright.In contrast there is relative

unanimity about the numberof Scottish cavalry. Raisedfrom among a much smallerforce of knights and other

magnates, quite apart fromthefactthatthefeudalsystemof knight service did notoperatecountrywide,thiswasputat500,alllighthorsemensince large-boned destrierhorses were not available inScotland and the Englishmade sure they remained so.In January 1310 Edward IIhadbannedexportsofhorsesandarmstoScotlandonpainof the highest penalties andunder Edward III it was a

felony to export horsesthere.19 Taking the lowestestimated figures the Englishcavalry with their heavierhorsesstilloutnumberedtheirScottishopponentsbyfourtoone.Comparable discussion has

takenplaceoverthenumbersof foot soldiers. Barbour, forinstance, put the totalstrengths of the two armies(including cavalry) at

100,000 English and 30,000Scots. In contrast, bypainstaking analysis andworking on the pattern ofrecruitment that operatedduring Edward I’s Welshwars, JohnMorris calculatedthatEdward II sent outwritsfor 21,640 men, includingarchers, and that heprobablysucceeded in assembling nomore than 15,000, including2400 cavalry.However thesetotals probably did not

includetheoverseasandIrishcontingents whom Barboursaidwere‘agreatfollowing’.WMMacKenzie comes to asomewhat higher totalestimating the Englishcavalry and infantrycombinedat20,000.Thereisevenlessevidence

to help calculate the size ofthe Scottish infantry.Working on Barbour’s ratiosbetween the two forces andusing Morris’ figures, the

Scottish strength would totallessthan7000.Allauthoritiesagree on the Scottish smallfolk(retainersandtroopswhocame late to the battle) atsome 3000.20 These figuresare not far from GeneralChristison’s,whoinhisstudyof the battle for theNationalTrust for Scotland calculatedthere were some 20,000English foot faced by 5500trained Scottish soldiers

(together with thecomplement of small folk).21Only one English writer,Major A F Becke, whoseconclusions are includedwithin The CompletePeerage, and who lacks thedistinction of authorities likeBarrow,MorrisorChristison,comes to the remarkableconclusion that the Scottishinfantry was ‘scarcely at allinferior in numbers to the

Englishinfantry’.22Thesewerethefacts,along

with the commentators’interpretations, that facedmeand from which I needed tocometomyownconclusionson the size of the opposingarmies. Like all students ofBannockburn I found thatalthoughJohnBarbour’snearcontemporary account of thebattle has proved remarkablyaccurate in somany respects

(despiteitsScottishbias),likeothermedievalchroniclershetended to exaggerate thestrengths of the respectivearmies. Such chroniclers’figures were not only highlyinflated but wild differencesoccurred between them.Abbot Bernard of Arbroath,for instance, in hiscontemporary poem of thebattle put theEnglish foot at40,000 with their cavalry at

3100.23 Thiswas remarkablyat variance with Barbour’sfigure of 100,000 Englishinfantry although not that farfrom Barbour’s 3000 bardedcavalry among a total of nofewer than 40,000 mountedtroops! As far as manychroniclers were concernedthelargerthefiguresthemoredramatic would the clashappear. W M Mackenzie,however, comes to the more

logical conclusion thatBarbour’s massive figures offootsoldiers probably arosefrom his guess that each ofthe English ten battles (ordivisions) at Bannockburnwere 10,000 strong.24Whatever inspired Barbour’sfigures for the Englishinfantry it would have beenimpossible for Edward II tohave marched this host fromtheScottishbordertoStirling

in the time and mannerdescribed. However,Barbour’s ratio of strengthlevels between the EnglishandScottishinfantryoftentothree appears far morefeasiblewheretheaccountofthe battle is concerned andneither I nor the majority ofcommentators find any goodreasontodiscountit.OfallthelaterwritersJohn

Morris made the mostthorough investigation of the

Englishmethodsofrecruitingalongwith theproportionsofmenwhowere likely tohaveturned up during theirWelshand Scottish wars.Accordingly his estimatedEnglish strength atBannockburn of 15,000(including cavalry) plus Irishand overseas contingents hasnot been seriously disputedby the most distinguishedlater authorities, includingProfessor Barrow and

GeneralChristison.Using Barbour’s strength

ratio the Scottish infantrywouldbeexpectedtonumberno more than 6600. Morris’calculations of Scottishrecruiting patterns also putsthem at below 7000 withProfessor Barrow incliningtowards 6000 and GeneralChristison going somewhatlower still. Although theselevels seem very low incomparison with the English

infantry it should beremembered that Bruceplaced much more faith onpersonal qualities and skillsthan in mere numbers. Afterfollowing the earlydescriptions of the battle andapplyingthemtothegroundIbelieve Bruce did in factrequire something like 6000meninordertoformandholdhis continuous spear wallsagainst theEnglishcavalry. Iamthereforeinclinedtothink

Peter Traquair’s estimate of4500 spearmen rather toolow,and forawholenumberof reasons to discount theconclusions made in TheComplete Peerage that thenumbers of infantry werescarcely different on bothsides.On the question of the

English heavy cavalryfigures, at the higher end arethe totals of 3100 and 3000fromAbbotBernardandJohn

Barbour with Vita EdwardiSecundi putting them twothirds lower at 2000. Withregard to later commentatorsthe meticulous John Morrisreckons them at a maximumof2400.Itisimpossibletobeexact here although theEnglish cavalry strength washighlyunlikelytobelessthanthe 2000 estimated by theEnglish commentator in VitaEdwardi, who for patrioticreasons would be inclined to

havereckonedthemaslowaspossible.Withlessthan2000the English would not havebeen able to mount suchcontinuousattacksagainsttheScottish spearmen nor, afterthe bruising battle, to havesuppliedthetwolargebodiesofEnglishhorsemenwholeftthefield.With regard to theScottish

lightcavalry,JohnBarbourisquitedefinite inputting themat 500 strong, a figure

supported by his account ofthebattle’s finalstages.Suchafigureisfullyinaccordancewith Scottish cavalrystrengths both at Falkirk andsomewhat later at HalidonHill (1333) and it has notbeen contested by latercommentators.The most likely strength

figures of the opposingarmies at Bannockburn aretherefore:

EnglishCavalry of 2000–2400;infantry, including bowmen,16,000–16,500.

ScottishLight cavalry 500; trainedinfantry 5000–5750, togetherwith 3000 ‘small folk’(includingwomen).

By any standard, with orwithout their qualitative

advantages, the Englishnumerical superiority wasoverwhelming.In addition to the numbers

and armaments involved, theorganisational arrangementsforbotharmiesareobviouslyimportant. As mentionedalready Barbour has theEnglish army split into tenbattlesforthemarch(thefirstofwhichwaslikelytobethevanguard), formations hesuggested were retained in

the conflict.25 Most laterauthorities accept Barbour’s‘battles’, although PeterTraquair argues that tenbattles would be unwieldyandpointsouttheillogicalityof great earls likely to beactingasjointcommandersofcavalry battles when lessernobleswereinsolechargeofsome infantry ones. Hesuggests it ismore likely theEnglish would have adopted

the traditional militaryformationsofvanguard,mainbody and rearguard –which,of course, they could havedone – aswell as having tenbattles. Despite Traquair’sdoubts, Barbour’s account ofthe battle has provedremarkably accuratewith theexceptionofhisinflatedforcelevels. In any case, theEnglish aristocracy’s love ofcavalry is a long-standingtradition; at the beginning of

the twenty-first century it isstill safe to say that manyBritish army officers wouldbe willing to accept joint orlesser command roles withthe cavalry than with theinfantry.Infact, the tenfolddivision

of the battles could go far toexplain many of the Englishdifficulties during the battle.The army’s strength wasundoubtedly impressive, butgathered as it was from so

many different sources,cohesion was particularlydifficult.Thiswasnotall.Anenquiry held during EdwardII’s reign discovered thatlocal officials wouldsometimes choose good menat an assembly attended bythe king’s arrayers butsubstitute poor ones after thearrayers had departed.26 Thearrayer’staskwastodrawupthe county muster rolls

wherever the men could begrouped into vintenaries andcentenaries strength (roughlyequivalent to today’s Britisharmy’s platoons at somewhatunder 30 men strong andcompanies of around 100men). In any case whatevertheir quality, the army’s16,000 infantry were leviedfromcountiesacross thefaceof central and northernEngland, with otherdetachments coming from

much further south, togetherwith 5000 from north andsouth Wales and perhaps afurther4000fromIreland.Withthecavalrythepattern

wassimilar,noblesansweringthe feudal summons camewith their groups of knightsand retainers from all overEnglandandUlstertojoinupwithprofessionalmenatarmsand cavalry paid for by theking’s household. To add tosuch remarkable diversity

additional soldiers, bothinfantry and cavalry, camefrom Europe to answerEdwardII’sgeneralinvitationfor what he saw as a greatmilitaryadventure.Not only did they journey

from widespread locations,they had little or no time topractise together. Thoseinfantry soldiers from southWales or Lincolnshire whowere gathered into theirgroups of 100 men (the

centenaries)andputunderanofficer who was horsed, hadto march 200 miles beforethey even joined the generalmuster on the border. It islikelythecavalrywerefirsttoarrive at Wark where theycould have been formed intothree of Barbour’s battles,possibly the vanguard, thenthe force under Clifford’scommandandthethirdunderthe king (which wouldcertainly have been the

largest of the three). Theother seven battles wouldhavefilledupasmenarrivedand no sooner had theyassembled than they wererequired to set off on theirmove northwards intoScotland. During the marchsome sort of unit cohesionwouldbeexpectedtodevelopbut, even if theyhad thoughtit necessary, little or notactical training could havebeencarriedout.

AsfortheScottisharmyallcommentators (except PeterTraquair and the account inThe Complete Peerage)accept theywereformed intofour battles. The probablereason for any disparityamong the observers wasbecause at BannockburnRobert Bruce’s battlefollowed behind the otherthreeanditwasthereforenotimmediately visible to theEnglish. Barbour, however,

gavespecificdetailsaboutthemen in the king’s battle. He‘had in his company all themenofCarrickandofArgyll,Kintyre and the Isles, amongwhom were Sir Angus ofIslay and Bute and all hisfollowing.Hehadalsoagreathost of armed men from thelowlands.’27Brucereliedhereon the valuable leadership ofAngus Og MacDonald, theLord of Islay, who had been

his firm supporter ever sinceBruce made his bid for theScottish throne. ProfessorBarrow reasonably concludesthat those men in Bruce’sbattle, whom Barbour saidcame from the ‘plainland’,were from the CentralLowlands and perhaps FifeandStrathmore to theEast.28With a larger formation thanthe other Scottishcommanderssuchawidearea

of recruitment was likely tohavebeenrequired.Working on the premise

that each of Bruce’s seniorcommanders would beexpected to followtheking’slead and commandmenwhoowed them prior allegiance,Ronald McNair Scott makesvalid assumptions about thecompositionofthethreeotherbattles. Edward Bruce, heconcluded,drewonmenfromthe southeast, from Buchan,

Mar, Angus, the Mearns,Menteith, Strathearn andLennox,includingsomefromGalloway. Those in JamesDouglas’ and WalterStewart’s battle would comefrom Lanark, Renfrew andthe border region, whileThomas Randolph, Earl ofMoray’s battle was made upwith men from Moray’searldom,fromRossandotherparts of the far north,including burghers from

Inverness, Elgin, Nairn andForres.29 This was not all.Men coming from certainlocalities were likely to bekepttogetherundertheirownsub-commanders andappointed to particularstations in the spear lines.There they would occupy allthree or four ranks of thesegment. If Bruce came toinspect a schiltron he wouldknow that a particular flank

wouldbetheresponsibilityoftheMacDonaldswhilefurtheron he would come upon hisownmenofCarrick.Bysuchmethods loyalty andresponsibility wereencouraged within the smallScottisharmy.

On paper English superioritywas such that Bannockburnshould have been no contest.As in past battles, however,neither favourable strength

levelsnorsuperiorequipmentcan guarantee victory.Qualities of leadership,training and force cohesionare all important too. Thearmies’ commanders aredescribed in the next twochapters but Bruce had notonly selected his well beforethe coming battle but underhistutelagehemadesuretheyhad progressed. With thedangers facing him he couldnot afford to retain

commanders of moderateability. Many of the soldiersin the Scottish battles hadalso been together longenoughtodevelopafirmtrustin their leaders and manywere justly proud of whatthey had already achievedundertheirdirection.Edward II enjoyedno such

relationship having clashedwith all the senior Englishcommanders over hisfavourite, Piers Gaveston.

Mutual trust was not onlylackingbetweenthekingandhis nobles but amongst thenobles themselves dependingonhowfar theyhadopposedtheir monarch. As for theScottish commanders servingin Edward II’s ranks, theywere Comyn supportersprimarily motivated by thewish for revenge againstRobert Bruce and for therestitution of theirpossessionsinScotlandrather

than any devotion for theEnglishking.

Inhis roleasdefenderBrucehad another advantage, theopportunity of selecting thelikely site of the battle andpreparing his men for theanticipated shape of theencounter. The English werecomingtorelievethegarrisonat Stirling Castle and justbeforethecastletheirwaysofapproach were limited. He

could thereforedetermine thepattern of the likelyconfrontation. In fact, afterEdwardBruce and Sir PhilipMoubraymadetheircompact,bothsideshadthebestpartofa year to prepare, a periodwhich they used in ratherdifferentways.Brucekepthisforces sharp by setting themto capture the remainingEnglishcastlesinLothian(inthe full awareness that anysuccesses could only make

things more difficult for aninvading army), but as thetime for Stirling Castle’srelief drew closer heconcentrated on training hismeninthetacticshebelievedcould bestmatch theEnglishinvaders. Bruce was verylikely tohave talked to someofthesurvivorsfromFalkirk,and he had already usedmassed spearmen, if still inrelativelysmallformations,atLoudon Hill and Glen Trool

against English heavycavalry. Unlike Wallace’sspearmen at Falkirk Brucehad made them advance butonly when their flanks weresecured by steeply slopingground.AftertheirsuccessatLoudon Bruce, likeWallace,determined to make hisspearmen the nucleus of thearmythathewaspreparingtomeettheEnglish.Theywouldconstitute thehumananvilofimpenetrable pikes against

which the English cavalrywould shatter their lancesand, hopefully, break theirhearts.As with the Greek

phalanxes, drillmasterswereneeded to train his men tochange their formation,notably from straight filesthree to six ranksdeep,oftenfacing both ways, to acircular formation offeringall-round defence. When inmotion the schiltrons would

have tomovewithmeasuredsteps in order to preservetheir order and formation.When in circular formationwiththefrontrankgroundingtheirpikesandpointingthemoutwards,therearoneswouldneed to practise leaning theirpikes forward upon theshoulders of the first rank.Endless drill was alsorequired to strengthen armsand shoulder muscles thebetter to handle the clumsy,

head-heavy spears and holdthem straight forward forrelatively long periods.Above all the spearmen hadtobetrainedtoactinunison,thus preserving cohesion, theessential strength of such aformation.EvenifEdwardhadwanted

to undertake a trainingprogramme with his army,which was extremelydoubtful,hehadfirsttosettlematters between himself and

his nobles followingGaveston’s execution. Onlyafter much diplomaticpersuasion by Valence andLouis,brotherofPhilipIVofFrance, did the noblesapologisefortheircrimesanditwasnotuntilOctober1313,after thekinggranted themageneralpardon, thathecouldstarthisdetailedpreparationstoassembleaninvasionforce.It was December before hesent out writs to eight earls

and eighty-seven barons,ordering them to bringthemselves and theircontingentstoBerwickby10June 1314. During FebruaryEdwardrepeatedhisintentionof leading an army againstBruce but surprised hisfollowers by letting themknow he intended a mainlyinfantry campaign.30 Thiswas not a popularannouncement: his barons

wantedacavalryenterprise.Itwas not until March 1314,after restoringValence tohispost as Viceroy of Scotland,thatthekingwasabletoissuea succession of detailedorders to raise bothmen andsupplies.In any event Edward II

faced a most formidablelogistical undertaking and itwas problems of movementand supply rather thantraining that occupied the

Englishcommand.Morethansixty ships were required tosupport the expedition, quiteapart from the organisationrequired to bring the leviestogether, and in May anembargo was put on theexportoffoodfromEngland.Atabout thesame timemorethan two hundred wagons,together with the animalsneeded to draw them, werecommissioned to helptransport the army north. In

fact, the scale of thevictualling required exceededanythingachievedbyEdwardI. Funds for the campaigncame through arrangementsmadewith theItalianbanker,Antonio Pessagno. In themonths leading up to thecampaign he lent at least£21,000 to the Englishexchequer together withfundsforthreequartersofthewheat and oats stockpiled at

Berwick.31In early June1314Edward

moved to Berwick andawaited the concentration ofhis invasion force.At nearbyWark, where they gathered,nomonarchcouldhavefailedto be moved or to feelanythingbutoptimismas thegreat assembly of heavycavalry and the endlessinfantry detachments camemarching in, however raw

some of them might be. Hecould be sure he hadsufficient resources ofinfantry, including highlyregarded Welsh bowmen, tocomplement his unparalleledforceofheavycavalryagainstwhich the Scots apparentlyhadnocounter. Ina showofconfidence he distributed theestates of the opposingScottish commanders to hissupporters.Someofhisproudknights so shared his

certainty of victory that theybrought tapestries, plate andfurniture to deck the housestheywouldpossess.32On the other hand, in

ScotlandasBrucedrilledandredrilled his men he knewthat if hemet theEnglish hewouldbefightingforhisownand his country’s veryexistence. He had still notresolved the question ofwhere best to meet them on

their way to Stirling, and itwasstilltheoreticallypossiblehe would avoid a full scaleencounter.In spite of their

overwhelming superiority itwasonethingfortheEnglishto assemble an army, quiteanother to move it into thebattle area in good heart andthen bring its full strength toplay against a smaller butbattle-hardenedadversary.

CHAPTERFIVE

THESCOTTISHCOMMANDERS

‘It greatly pleasedhis[Bruce’s]heart,and he waspersuaded thatmenofsuchmind,if they set their

M

strengthtoit,mustbe indeed righthardtovanquish.’

JohnBarbour,TheBruce

UCHHASALREADYBEENsaid about theachievements, both

militarily and politically, ofRobert Bruce before theexpectedbattle,actionswhich

had enabled him and hisgroupoffollowers,originallyhemmedinbyenemiesonallsides, to become themastersof Scotland with theexception of isolated Englishstrongholds. His militarysuccesses owed much to hisnaturalvigourbut also tohisgrowing mastery of tacticaland strategic factors whichreinforcedhisundoubtedskillat arms. In their turn hischosen commanders had

Bruce as both model andtutor;twoofthem,hisbrotherEdward and James Douglas,had shared the dangers andreversesofhisearlydaysandwhen the tide began to turnthey were given majorresponsibilities.In1307–8forinstance,Douglas,whoasyethadfewmenandstillneededthe protection offered by thewide forests of Ettrick,Selkirk and Jedburgh wasgiven the massive task of

winning back the borderregions. No pastachievementsbyBruceorhisleaders, however, couldcompare with the task ofhaving to meet a massiveEnglisharmyunderitsking.From the perilous days

following his coronation themantle of the leader sat wellonBruce’s shoulders andhisdetermination and cool nerve(notably illustrated during1306 when, surrounded by

large numbers of enemy, heopenly read a lightheartedFrench romance whilewaitingforhisfewsupportersto rejoin him) were coupledwith undoubted acumen andgraciousness.Bruce’santecedentswereof

obvious importance in hisdevelopment as a leader,although the adversity of hisearly days as a fugitive kingprobably never allowed himtoforget thecommonfatehe

shared with those who keptfaithwith him. BothBruce’sparents were accustomed toexercise power andresponsibility.AsCountessofCarrick, Bruce’s mother wasdirectly descended fromFergus, Lord of Galloway,the proud prince who hadruled a virtually independentCeltic kingdom in southwestScotland and it is possiblethat in the Gaelic fashionduring his early boyhood

Robert Bruce had theegalitarian experience ofbeing fostered in anotherhousehold. On his mother’sunion with the Bruces shebrought the vast estates ofCarrick, close by theirprincipalScottishpossessionsat Annandale, whichthemselves totalled some200,000 acres. The Bruces,on the other hand, were ofAnglo-Norman stock whocame over to England with

William the Conqueror andfor their role in overcomingthe native resistance theywere granted much land inthe north of England as wellasinScotland.So powerful, in fact, were

theBrucesinScotlandthatby1238 when the ageingScottish king, Alexander II,hadnoheir,hisGreatCouncildecreed that unless he hadfurther issue, Robert Bruce,Lord of Annandale (Robert

Bruce’s grandfather, knownlaterastheCompetitor)aselfconfident, vibrant man whowasdescendedfromHenryofNorthumberland,sonandheirof theScottishking,DavidI,should be the true andlegitimate heir to thekingdom.1 In fact,AlexanderIIremarriedandthesonbornto him relatively late in lifebecame King Alexander III.YetonAlexanderIII’sdeath,

despite the presence of hisroyal grand-daughter, the‘Maid of Norway’, RobertBruceclaimedhewas,infact,the proper heir, not only byright of succession but byvirtue of the nominationmade during the reign ofAlexanderII.Whatever criteria came to

beusedbyEdwardI in1292in deciding the succession tothevacantScottishthroneandhowevermuchhetookcareto

demonstrate that JohnBalliolwas the strongest claimant toit (which by the law ofprimogeniture heundoubtedly was) theCompetitor still argued thatas thesonofayoungerchildofKingDavidheshouldtakeprecedence over Balliol’sright through the daughter ofan older child. The Brucesalways regarded Edward I’sdecision unjust andthemselves as the rightful

heirs. Apart from hispowerfullegalclaims,RobertBruce the Competitor couldjustly feel he had personalqualitiesthatmarkedhimasaworthy bearer of the Crown.The Lanercost Chronicledescribed him as a giftedspeaker, of handsomeappearance, remarkable forhis influence and, of equalimportance, ‘mostdevoted toGodandtheClergy’.2Hewas

amazingly hospitable and,like his grandson, renownedfor abundant energy. At theage of sixty, after resigningallhisoffices,hetookhissononanextendedcrusadetotheHoly Land at a time whensuch campaigning wasextremely hazardous andcarried high risks fromdisease. On his return in1272, discovering Edward Ihad ascended the Englishthrone,hedecidedtosettleon

his Scottish lands and in thefollowing year strengthenedhis Scottish connections bymarrying again, taking as hiswife a widow, Christiana ofIreby, from an adjoiningestate.In 1286 on the death of

AlexanderIIItheseventy-six-year-old Competitor still hadthe energy and belief toemerge from retirement andpresshisclaimsforthethroneashewoulddoeven lateron

the Maid of Norway’s deathwhen, at eightyyearsof age,hemovedwithastrongbodyofarmedmentoPerth,wherethe Scottish council was insession, to ‘safeguard’ hisroyal title. Once his claimshad been rebuffed by thedecision of King Edward’sadjudicators, Bruce returnedto his estates but roundlyrefused to pay homage toBalliol.Robert Bruce, the future

Robert I of Scotland, wasborn in 1274 (the same yearas William Wallace) atTurnberry Castle in Carrick,about sixty miles from hisgrandfather’s seat atLochmaben.Asaboyhesawa considerable amount of theindomitable Competitor andwould have been left in nodoubt abouthisgrandfather’sopinions regarding therightfulpositionoftheBruceswith respect to the Scottish

crown.McNair Scott is sure,forinstance,thatasasixteen-year-old squire heaccompanied the force raisedby the Competitor and hisfatherwhichwent toPerthtofurther the Bruces’ casethere.3Inhisturntheoldmanwould be sure to haverecognisedthefuturepromiseof his grandson, comparedwith his calculating, ifspinelessson.

In November 1292 theCompetitor formally investedthe Bruce claims to theScottish throne upon his son(Bruce’s father) Lord ofAnnandale and Earl ofCarrick, and his heirs afterhim. In his turn, two dayslater, Bruce’s father resignedtheearldomofCarrick to thefuture Robert I. Bruce’sfather also took considerablepains to avoiddoinghomageto John Balliol as king of

Scotland,sinceitwouldhavejeopardised the family’sclaim to the throne, and hewent on a protracted visit toNorway with his daughterIsabeltogiveherinmarriageto King Eric of Norway.4ThisleftyoungRobertBruceas the virtual head of thelarge family. When Bruce’sfatherreturnedtoEnglandonthe Competitor’s death in1295 he still refused to pay

homage to John Balliol andEdward I appointed himgovernor of Carlisle Castle,probably to make certain ofhisloyalty.Edward’s decision seemed

soundly based for during1297, the year following theScottishdefeatatDunbarandthe submission of JohnBalliol to the English king,the Earl of Annandale feltcompelled to remind EdwardI of the Bruce claims to the

Scottishthrone.Thiswasmetwith Edward’s scornful andnegative reply, ‘Have wenothing else to do but winkingdomsforyou?’Whenthefuture Robert I came outagainst Edward I at Irvineduring1297 theEnglishkingrelieved his father of hisgovernor’s post at Carlislefollowing which he puthimself out of contention,retiring permanently to hisEnglish estates, and

remaining there until he diedin1304.From 1297 the Bruces’

hopesofgainingthekingshipwould rely on theCompetitor’s grandson. Themainsprings of RobertBruce’s actions thereafterwere his determination toright theinjusticedonetohisfamily togetherwith his ownfierceambitionforthethroneofScotland.Unlikehisfatherand for all his loyalty to a

family with strongconnections in both Englandand Scotland, Robert Bruceidentified himself stronglywith Scotland. This is lesssurprising than someobserversmightbelievewhenone realises that he was infact the first born of a unionbetween a mother whoseCelticancestrystretchedbacktoantiquityanda fatherwhowas one of Scotland’spremier earls whose family

while originally Norman(from Norse descent) haddirect connections withScotland, including its RoyalHouse, for over sixgenerations. Robert Bruce’sconnectionwithScotlandhadbeen strengthened by hismarriage to Isabel, daughteroftheEarlofMar,whowasagreat friend of the oldCompetitor. Although adaughter, Marjorie, resultedfrom the union, Isabel died

tragically early, probably in1297.As we have seen already,

from 1297 until 1301RobertBrucesupportedhiscountry’snational cause againstsuccessive invasions byEdward I, but it was Comynattemptstosidelinehimfromthe senior decision-makingprocessesinhisowncountry,aswell as thepossible returnof John Balliol to Scotland,that led him to join an

English king who at leastprofessed toacknowledgehisclaim to the Scottish throne.The decision was also likelyto have been influenced byhisdesireforamaleheirandwith it his interest inmarryingforasecondtimetoElizabeth, daughter of thepowerful Richard de Burgh,Earl of Ulster, a strongsupporter of Edward I.Whatever the outcome ofEdward’s attempts to

subjugateScotland thematchpromised to bring benefits tothe twenty-eight-year-oldBruce. It would serve torevive the Carrick alliancewith the Earl of Ulster and,‘as Bruce’s future wife wasJames Stewart’s niece bymarriage, it would confirmthe long-standingBruce/Stewart friendshiptoo’.5Theprominenceof theStewart family within

ScotlandatthistimewasseenbythefactthatJamesStewarthadbeenappointedasoneofthe joint guardians followingthe death of King AlexanderIII.Bruce’s behaviour during

his five years at the Englishcourt before being forced toflee to Scotland can also beseen both in terms ofattempting to balance hisregard for Scotland whilepreserving his own regal

prospects. No doubt hisComyn rivals in Scotland,strugglingagainstEdwardI’sinvasions, would haveobserved that compared withtheir continuing armedstruggle his ambition for thethrone seemed equal orgreater than any feelings ofpatriotism.Ontheotherhandanyone who believed in thejustice of his royal claims asstronglyasRobertBrucewasnot likely togivehis support

– even conditionally – to anEnglish king who hadannexed Scotland and haddealt unfairly with theCompetitor and his ownfatherwithoutstrongreasons.The astute English kingwouldknowthiswellenoughand he favoured both Bruceand other members of hisfamily – Edward tookEdward Bruce into thehousehold of the Prince ofWaleswhile another brother,

Alexander,wasmadeDeanofGlasgow. Despite theirdifferences it is also quitepossible that some degree ofgenuine respect existedbetweenBruceandEdwardI.Bruce would be likely toacknowledge the ability anddetermination along with theharsh cruelty of a greatmedieval king while Edwardwas sure to see inBruce notonlycourageandgreatskillatarms but a longsightedness

quite absent in his own son.No recognitionof theother’squalities, however, stoppedeither Bruce or Edward Ifrom pursuing his chosenaims, in Edward’s case thesubjection of Scotland, withBruce his country’s throne.As Edward’s siege enginespummelled the garrison ofStirlingCastle,Brucemadeasecret compact with BishopLamberton over a future bidfor the throne. Two years

later while still in Edward’speace he concluded a furthercontract with John Comyn(theRed), hismost powerfulrival in Scotland, with thesamepurpose.In an age when men still

felt free to change theirallegiance if they consideredtheiroathsoffealtyhadbeengiven under duress or whenpromisesmadeforsuchoathshad not been kept – likeEdward’s promise to Bruce

over the Scottish throne –Bruce’s commanders couldbetter appreciate his markedopportunism during 1297–1306 than some latercommentators.6Whatnoneofthem could fail to appreciatewas his long-feltdetermination to be king andoncekinghiscommitment toScotland. Under the mostadverse conditions this one-timeduplicitouscourtierwent

on to display qualities ofresolution and perseverancethat brought them notablemilitary successes. WhileRandolph might not, at first,understandBruce’s tactics ofguerrilla warfare he wouldsoon do so. Moreover oncemen gave their allegiance tosuch a spirited and attractiveleader theyquickly tended togive him their devotion aswell.To a greater degree than

Edward I with his habituallysuperior forces and in a wayunknown to Edward II withhis limited experience oncampaigns,Brucehad sharedthe hazards of hiscommanders, usually againstadverse odds. By the natureof society at the time theywould normally be selectedfromarelativelysmallgroupof privileged men but,because, with the exceptionof Edward Bruce, all the

king’s brothers, along withhis other senior leaders, hadbeen executed, he needed tospread his net further thannormal to look for seniormilitary commanders. As aresult Bruce discovered theoutstandingJamesDouglas,aminor noble and unlikelycandidate, as well as thejusticiarandadministratorSirRobert Keith, who so ablytookthefieldatBannockburnwhen Bruce needed his

regular cavalry commanderstocommandtheschiltrons.Traditionally the most

successful commanders havetaken pains to appointsubordinates whom they canbe sure are willing to carryouttheirdirectiveswhetherinasinglebattleorthroughoutaprotracted campaign. When,for instance, during the earlynineteenth century, the Dukeof Wellington was fightingthe French in the Iberian

peninsula he chose assubordinatecommandersmensuch as Roland Hill andThomas Picton, steadysoldiers who gave him theunquestioning concurrencehis method of leadershiprequired. Under his directionthey proved immenselydifficult soldiers to beat. AtBannockburn under Bruce,his commanders needed toexercise equal steadinessagainst superior English

numbers. Sometimescommanders have had tovalue the unquestionedloyalty of their subordinatesmorethantheirability,asforinstance Hannibal, theoutstanding Carthaginiancommander of ancient times,whonotonlyhad to face theRomans but also manyenemiesfromwithinhisownhomeland.Asaresultheusedhis two brothers, Hasdrubaland Hamilcar, as supporting

army commanders but,although he undoubtedly hadtheir loyalty, they failed tomatch either his militaryskills or those of his Romanenemies. At BannockburnBruce was more fortunatebecause his commanders notonly had the opportunity toshow their loyalty but theirskills had been developed inearlier engagements. Duringthe battle his luck heldbecause all his important

leaders survived and wereable fully to justify his faithinthem.

Thomas Randolph, 1stEarl of Moray (d1332)The first schiltron atBannockburn was given toThomas Randolph, first Earlof Moray, Bruce’s nephew.

Randolph was accustomedsince childhood to beinginvolved in important affairsof state, and as a minor heaccompanied his father toNorham during December1292, where he witnessedJohn Balliol swearing fealtytoEdward I for thecrownofScotland. However, despitehis father’s support for JohnBalliol,afterhismarriageintothe Bruce family, RandolphwasexpectedtoassistRobert

Bruce. After Bruce’s murderof the Red Comyn and hisroutatMethveninJune1306,Randolphwas taken prisoneralongwithotherclosefamilymembers. While those likeNeilBruceandSimonFraserwere drawn, hanged andbeheaded, Randolph was theonlymajorfiguretobesparedexecution,veryprobablyasaresult of his family’sfriendship with Aymer deValence, the English

commander.Despite this Randolph

could not expect to escapeEdward I’swrath completelyand on 24 July the Englishking ordered him to be keptunder close guard in thecastle of Inverkip until heshould be arraigned at eitherCarlisle or Perth.7 It wasprobably to save his life thatRandolph swore fealty to theEnglish king and agreed to

take up arms against Bruce,yet once he had given hispledge he served Edward Ifaithfully. His knowledge ofBruce’s bases and likelymovementsprovedinvaluabletotheEnglish.Valence,usingRandolphasaguide,togetherwithhelpfromoneofBruce’spet blood hounds, narrowlyfailed to capture the Scottishking and Randolph got closeenoughtoseizehisbanner.In the following year the

tables were turned whenBruce’s own commander,JamesDouglas,surprisedandcaptured Randolph at thewaters ofLyne near Peebles.Randolph remained defiantwhen brought before Bruce,evenreproachingthekingforcowardice because of hisreluctance to meet theEnglish in open warfare.According toBarbour,Brucereplied with heavy irony,‘Mayhap it shall come ere

very long to such endeavour.But since thou speakest soroyally, there ismuch reasonto reprove thy proud words,tillthouknowestwhatisrightand bowest to it as thououghtest’.8 In fact, Bruceappreciated suchhonestyandboldness, even againsthimself. He orderedRandolph ‘to be kept in firmkeeping’, but Randolph wassoonhisloyalfollowerandin

the years to come, next toDouglas,hebecamehismostfamousgeneral.Bruce’sowntrust was demonstrated in1312whenhemadehimearlover the warlike men ofMoray, who had alreadyserved the cause of Scottishindependence so well, andpartly as compensation toRandolph for his estates inEngland that were forfeitedand subsequently transferred

toHughDespenser.9The approving Barbour

described Randolph as being‘of medium height’ with a‘broad visage, pleasant andfair, courteous at all points’and a man ‘full of allnobleness and made of allvirtues’ who ‘esteemedhonourandliberalityandeverupheld righteousness’.10Barbour’s eulogy aside,Randolph went on to prove

himself a brave and popularcommander. Mostimportantly he showedhimself capable of learningthe more subtle arts ofwarfare from the sharperminds of the king and JamesDouglas. It was Douglas’seizure of Roxburgh Castlethat led Randolph to exploreunorthodoxwaysofcapturingEdinburgh Castle, whichseemed so secure on itsdaunting volcanic crag. His

brilliant success there on 14March 1314 made it certainhewould be given commandofamainScottishdivisionatBannockburn.

Edward Bruce (d1318)Bruce’s second schiltroncommander was an obviouschoice. Edward Bruce, the

king’s brother and overallcommander in the king’sabsence, was just a yearyounger than Robert and theonly one of Bruce’s fourbrotherstoescapeEdwardI’sexecutioners. He wasundoubtedlyanambitiousandarrogantman – qualities thatmay have been fed to somedegree by the removal of histhree brothers – although asthe next in line to Robert hewould, in any case, have

enjoyed superior rights ofsuccession over them. Hiscloseness to the crown wasshown by a tailzie or entailpublished by Bruce’s Ayrparliament of 1315, stating‘withtheconsentofMarjorieBruce, the king’s daughter,thatifthekingdiedwithoutamale heir the crown shouldgo to Edward: as a man ofgreat prowess in warlikeactionsfor thedefenceof therights and liberties of the

Scottish realm’.11 Barbourhinted at a strong rivalrybetweenEdwardandthekingwhen he wrote that Edward‘thought Scotland too smallforhisbrotherandhimself’.12If Edward had regalambitions himself, he wasalso autocratic and rash bynature, and afterBannockburnthemanwhosocoveted a crown was givenhis brother’s permission and

support toinvadeIrelandandtake tohimself the titleKingof Ireland. It was always anoptimistic venture andeminent Scottish historianGeoffrey Barrow was in nodoubt ‘the notion that hecould lead a successfulnational revolt in IrelandandrulethereaskingonthesamefootingashisbrotherruledinScotland was preposterousand foredoomed to

extinction’.13However,itcanalsobearguedhewas takingnogreater risks than thoseofhis elder brother in 1306–7,but support from the Irishproved variable and atDundalk in 1318 he wasdefeatedandkilled.The manner of his death

was entirely in character. AttheheadofathousandScots,together with a number ofIrish,Edwardsetouttoattack

Dundalk. Their route wasbarredbyRichardClare,LordLieutenant of Ireland, with aforce of knights many timesgreaterthanthatoftheScots.EdwardBrucehad,accordingto custom, divided his forcesinto a vanguard, main bodyand rearguard, but his initialbriefinghadbeensketchyandthey failed to keep contactwitheachother.Thefirsttwobodies of men wereseparately destroyed and

whenEdward’s three veterancommanders,SirJohnSoules,Sir Philip Moubray and SirJohnStewart, advisedhim toturn back as reinforcementswerenot farawayherefusedtolisten,flewintoarageandswore‘thatnoman,whilehelived should ever say that anenemy had made him giveway’.14 The Irish among hisforces refused to fightsuchasuperior force but his small

body of Scottish knightsstayedandwerekilledtakingpartintheheadstrongattack.Such irresponsibility made

Edward Bruce totallyunsuitable for the highestlevel of command, but underRobert Bruce’s closedirection he played animportant role prior to andduring the battle ofBannockburn. He was neverhappierthanwheninsightofthe enemy. Ronald McNair

Scott was sure that, like theherooftheChansondeGeste,Edward Bruce would havedeclared,‘IfIhadonefootinParadise Iwouldwithdraw ittogoandfight’.15Therewasno shortage of hard fightingduring Robert Bruce’s earlydays and acting as hisbrother’s mailed fist Edwardgainedmore responsibility asthe king’s successesaccumulated. After Robert

Bruce had defeated the EarlofBuchanat Inverurieon23May 1308 he used Edward,the heedless and hardthrustingcavalrycommander,to ravage the Buchanprovince from end to end.Bruce then appointed him torange over the ruggedprovince of Galloway,‘killing rebellious nobles andmaking all subject to theking’. Well aware of hisbrother’s love of titles,

meaningful or not, Brucefollowed this by naming himLordofGalloway.Edward Bruce also took

part with James Douglas inlightning and destructiveraids into northern England,beforegoingon to attack theEnglish-held castles which,with his troop of engineers,he dismantled. It was, ofcourse, Edward’s dislike ofsieges that led him to betrapped by Sir Philip

Moubray, Stirling Castle’swily commander, into theagreement to fight thatbrought strong pressure onRobert Bruce to depart fromthecarefulstrategyhehadsofarsuccessfullypursued.Andit was typical of EdwardBruce that he made noattempt to consult the kingbeforehand.The same lack of

judgement was seen in hispersonal life: he seduced the

Earl ofAtholl’s sister Isabel,made her pregnant and thendeserted her in favour of theEarl of Ross’ daughter. Aswith his decision at Stirling,this was to have widerrepercussions for, partly as aresult,duringthefirstnightofthebattleatBannockburn,theEarl of Atholl, who wasapparently coming to joinBruce, surprised Sir WilliamAirth and killed him alongwith many others who were

guarding the Scottish basecamp. While not withoutemotion Edward was not acommander particularlysensitive to hismen’s needs:he was said to have wepttwiceinhislife,oncewhenatBannockburn he heard aboutthe death of his friend andparamour’s brother, SirWalter Ross, and two yearslater at Carrickfergus inIreland when Neil Flemingand a group of knights sold

their lives to give him thenecessary time to recoverfromasurpriseattack.In many ways Edward

Bruce was a loose cannon.Whenleft tohisowndeviceshe could be almost asdangerous tohisown side astheenemy,butforall thathewas a doughty soldier,practisedandhardenedinwarwho, under Robert Bruce’sguidance,wasafearsomeandirrepressibleopponent.

James Douglas (the‘Black’ or ‘Good’Douglasd1330)Bruce’s third division ofspearmen in the great battle,though nominally under thecommand ofWalter Stewart,High Steward of Scotland,was led by Stewart’s cousinJames Douglas, Bruce’sfinest soldier. Traditionprecluded the subordination

of the Stewart to acommander of lesser socialrank and for Bruce’s sakeDouglas accepted the title ofjoint commander for a forcethat was, in fact, largelypeopledbyhisownfollowersand under his control. JohnBarbour’s Bruce madeDouglas its co-hero and hehad, in fact,beenwithBrucesince his crowning,distinguishing himself incountless actions before

Bannockburn. While aveteran in terms of combatsDouglas was only twenty-sevenyearsofageatthetimeof the battle and his stillunscarredfaceboretestimonytohisamazingskillatarms.Douglas came from a

military family. William, hisfather,alsofoughtagainsttheEnglish and in 1296commanded Berwick Castleduring its siegebyEdward I.AfterEdwardputBerwick to

the sword William Douglassurrendered the castle andwas sent into captivity fromwhich he either escaped orwas released since he joinedWilliam Wallace at thecommencement of Wallace’srebellion. He left Wallace tojoin Bruce and the Stewart,andwasamongotherScottishleaders who surrendered tothe English at Irvine. Mostwere allowed to go freeproviding they produced

hostages to guarantee theirfuture good behaviour butWilliam Douglas refused tosurrenderhisson,James,whowould certainly have beenacceptable. He was thereforesent in chains to BerwickCastle where his captorsdubbed him ‘savage andabusive’. Such an obstinateprisoner was bound to havebeen dealt with severely andin 1299 after his transfer tothe dreaded Tower of

London, William Douglasdied,stilladeclaredenemyoftheEnglish.JohnBarbourforone was sure he had beenmurderedthere.16James Douglas was sent

away to complete hiseducationinParis,notforthequality of the instruction butto remove him from Englisheyes.Alone ina foreigncity,among people of all classes,he enjoyed no favours and it

was while in Paris thatDouglas learned of hisfather’s death and theforfeiture of the Douglasestates which Edward I gaveto his own commander, SirRobertClifford.FromthenonJames’whole purpose in lifewas to fight the English andregain all that was rightfullyhis. Fortunately for Douglashemet Bishop Lamberton inParis, who took the destituteyoung man into his

household. By the timeDouglasreturnedtoScotland,Lamberton (togetherwith thevast majority of the Scottishnobility) hadmade his peacewith the English king. In1305 when Edward I wasmountinghisshowpiecesiegeagainst Stirling Castle – thelast stronghold still inScottish hands – Lambertonbrought his ward beforeEdward hoping the clemencyhehad shown toother rebels

wouldbeextendedtoayoungmanwhoseonlyoffencewasbeinghisfather’sson.Buttheeighteen-year-old’s petitionfor a return of his landswasbrusquely refused andDouglas was quicklyremoved from Edward’ssight.In March of the following

year Douglas was withBishopLambertonatBerwickwhen they received themomentous news thatRobert

BrucehadproclaimedhimselfKing of Scots. AlthoughBruce, obeying Edward’sorders, had in 1297 ravishedDouglasdale and earlierabducted Douglas’ motherand her other children, thesituation had much changed.Bruce was now Edward’sdeclared enemy and at oddswith the Comyns too. Underthe circumstances Douglashad reason to hope anembattled Bruce would

welcome his pledge ofsupport. The prudentLamberton gave Douglaspermission to seekBruceout(andalsosomemoneytohelphimonhisway)providinghedid not go as the bishop’sofficial representative. JohnBarbour hasDouglas leavingBerwickonthebishop’sownpalfrey,Ferrand,tomeetwithBruceashemadehisway tohiscrowningatScone:17

And when Douglas sawhim coming he rodeforward in haste andgreeted him and madeobeisance verycourteouslyand toldhimall his conditions andwho he was and howClifford held hisinheritance. Also that hecame to do homage tohim as his rightful kingand was ready ineverything to share his

fortune.AndwhenBrucehad heard his desire hereceived him with muchpleasure and gave himmen and arms. He feltassured he should beworthy,forhisfathersallweredoughtymen.Thusthey made theiracquaintance that neverafterwardsbyanychanceof any kind was brokenwhiletheylived.18

Theyoungslimfigurewithhis pale complexion andblack hairwho sought Bruceoutwassoontobeknownfora personality that capturedmen’s loyalty and for apronounced and unorthodoxmilitary ability. In normalcircumstances hewas said tobe gentle and courteous,speakingquietlywithaslightlisp,butinbattlehebecameadifferentman–bold,swiftinthoughtandact,‘alwaysbent

on plots’ to deceive hisenemy.Forthetimebeinghewas one of Robert Bruce’sleast impressive followers,bringing neither money norfollowers, not even the basicmilitary equipage of agentleman.Whatever his initial

disadvantagesJamesDouglasquicklydistinguishedhimselfduring Bruce’s disastrouscampaigns of 1306. Physicalhardships did not deter him

and he soon established aclose bond with the king.After Bruce’s rout atMethvenandwithenemiesallaroundthem,thekingandhiscompanions arrived at thewest shore ofLochLomond.To avoid a long detour theywere desperate to cross theloch and, after tirelesslyscouring its banks, JamesDouglas discovered a littlesunken boat in which theylaboriously crossed two at a

time, the first two beingBruce and Douglas. Brucethensplithisforcesand,asamark of the confidence healready felt, entrusted thetwenty-year-oldDouglaswiththesecondgroup.In the following year

Bruce’s forces were reducedto a few score men seekingrefuge in the hills nearTurnberry; their capture ordeathseemedonlyamatteroftime for most of their

supporterswerecowedbytheterrorcampaignwagedbytheEnglish king. Even at thistime Douglas continued tothink aggressively and heaskedBruceforpermissiontotry to redeem his property atDouglasdale, only some fiftymiles away. With just twocompanions he reached hisestates and identified himselfto Thomas Dickson, one ofhis most loyal tenants, whosucceeded ingatheringa few

extra supporters. With thisadded strength Douglasdecided to ambush thegarrisonofDouglasCastleastheyattendedchurchonPalmSunday three days later.Although the ambush wasrevealed prematurely, iteventually succeeded andDouglas either killed or tookprisoner all the soldiers inchurch. With characteristicnerve he led his followersback to thecastlewhere they

sat down to the dinnerprepared for the garrison onits expected return. Afterransacking the castle’s storesand poisoning its watersupply they piled anyequipment surplus to theirrequirements in the cellar,brought in the prisoners andbeheaded thembefore settingfiretothecastle.The grim affair became

known as ‘the Douglaslarder’ butDouglas’ act, like

William Wallace’sassassinations of Englishofficials ten years before,posted a warning of ScottishintentandraisedthespiritsofBruce’sbeleagueredparty.Atfirst sight his killing of theprisoners appears barbaric,but it should be rememberedthe English king had alreadyinstituted the policy ofexecuting any of Bruce’ssupporters without trial, forthe most part hanging,

drawingandquarteringthem,and Douglas could not riskthe prisoners givinginformation liable tojeopardise the families ofthose retainers who hadrecently joined him. InDouglas’ case, as inWallace’s, it was total waragainst an enemy who notonly made him destitute butwas committed to destroyinghis master Bruce and all hissupporters.

The same intensityaccounted for Douglas’treatment of English archers.Every one caught by him orhis men suffered the loss ofeither his right hand or righteye. No longer able to takemoreScottishlivestheywerethenreleased.Theside-effectofsuchactionwastoterroriseany bowmen acting againsthimand therewere instancesof them being filled withwinebeforeagreeing to fight

him.19Over themonths following

‘the Douglas larder’ heplayed a leading role inharassing Bruce’s opponents,always placing the greatestemphasis on reconnaissanceand good intelligence. AfterEdward I’s death, whenBruce was able to displaymore aggression, Douglas’speed and skill at deceptionmade him the ideal

commander for tactics thatdepended on swiftness andsurprise.By 1310 Bruce had

succeeded in bringing thegreaterpartofScotlandunderhis control andhad turned toharryingnorthernEngland,atthe same time attempting tocapture the Scottish castlesthat were still in Englishhands, and for both activitiesJames Douglas was ideallysuited. He showed himself a

master at lightning raidswhere much spoil and manyprisoners were taken beforethe defenders had time toretaliate, while his audacityand resourcefulness wereinvaluable when it came tocapturing castles.He deviseda collapsible scaling ladderwith rope sides and woodensteps that was subsequentlyused by other commanders.Its topmost rungwas of ironequipped with a socket into

whicha spearpoint couldbeplaced to raise the ladder upandhookitoveracastlewall.On 27 February 1314

(Shrove Tuesday) Douglas’ingenuity came into full playwhen he captured RoxburghCastle. At nightfall Douglasand his men at arms woreblack surcoats over theirarmour, approaching thecastlelikeaherdofthesmallblack cattle common at thetime. Some of them carried

collapsible ladderssuspendedbeneath their bodies andwhen all arrived below thecastle walls and the ladderswere raised on the tips oftheir spears, they climbedrapidlyovertherampartsandovercamethegarrison.Asthecattle-like raiders approachedthey had been observed bytwosentrieswhoremarkedtoeach other that their farmer-owner must have beenfeasting to let them escape

andbecomepossiblepreyforthe marauding BlackDouglas.Thiswas the calibre of the

man who commandedBruce’s third infantrydivision at Bannockburn, buthis responsibilitiesduring thebattle by no means endedthere. He played a premierroleinthepursuitandhadhebeengrantedmorecavalryforthis purpose the outcomewould have been far worse

for the English and the warmightevenhavebeenended.

Robert Keith,Marischal of Scotland(d1346)Apartfromhislong-timeandmuch-valued ally Angus OgMacDonald,LordoftheIsles,who fought directly underBruce’s command with the

fourth and reserve schiltron,Bruce’s other eminentcommander at Bannockburnwas Sir Robert Keith, leaderof his light cavalry. Olderthan Bruce’s infantrycommanders, Keith had heldposts of high responsibilityfor both the Scots and theEnglish until he becameconvinced of Bruce’simportance to Scotland’sfutureindependence.Asearlyas1294Keith acted asGreat

Marischal of Scotland underJohnBalliol. In 1300hewascaptured by the English andimprisonedinCarlisleCastle.ReportedtoEdwardIas‘oneofhisworstenemies’and‘ofbad repute’, Keith was thenremoved further intoEngland. On his release hebecame active on behalf ofthe Scots until their generalsubmission to the Englishking in 1304. Following thisKeith acted as one of two

English justices whosejurisdictionstretchedbetweentheForthandtheMounth,forwhich he was variouslyrewarded for his loyal andefficient service.20 As anabidingpatriothemightwellhave reasoned that in such acapacity he could at leastensure that impartiality wasgiven to his countrymen aswellastheEnglish.In 1308 Keith became the

first Lothian lord to joinBruce, and in the followingyear he united with otherScottish nobles in sending aletter to France requestingthatcountry’srecognitionandsupport for Scottishindependence. Brucereinstated him in his post asMarischal of Scotland, anoffice held by the Keithfamily for more than acentury, and also made himJusticiarofScotlandfromthe

Forth to Orkney.21 At thesame time the king broughtKeith closer to him bygranting him extensive landin the northeast of Scotlandfar away from the family’sformer main interests inLothian. In Keith, Bruce felthe had yet anothercommander in whom hecouldplacehisfulltrust.Thedecision to make Keithcommander of the cavalry at

Bannockburn was shrewdbecausehewasnotmerelyanable man but one of highrank, an important factor asthe cavalry was certain tocontain a greater proportionofnoblesthanthedivisionsofspearmen. Such menexpected a commander ofequal status and, althoughKeith was not nearly asexperiencedincavalrytacticsas either Edward Bruce orJames Douglas, Bruce knew

that, unlike WilliamWallace’s horsemen atFalkirk, Keith’s cavalry atBannockburn could be reliedupon to carry out his orders,however demanding. THECONTENDERS spearmen. Suchmen expected a commanderof equal status and, althoughKeith was not nearly asexperiencedincavalrytacticsas either Edward Bruce orJames Douglas, Bruce knewthat, unlike William

Wallace’s horsemen atFalkirk, Keith’s cavalry atBannockburn could be reliedupon to carry out his orders,howeverdemanding.

CHAPTERSIX

THEENGLISHCOMMANDERS

‘Right brave werethey, and believedif they came tobattle no strengthcould withstandthem.’

I

JohnBarbour,TheBruce

N THE SAME WAY as thecharacter of Robert Brucewould set the tone and

unite the purpose of theScottish forces, the characterof the English king, EdwardII, formerly EdwardCaernarvon, first Prince ofWales, was of equal

importance to the Englisharmy. In their ruler theScotswerewell-served;theEnglishwere not. In fact hisbiographer, MichaelPrestwich, concluded thatEdward II ‘was one of themost unsuccessful kings everto rule England’.1 However,by1314thereignwasonlyathirdofthewaythroughand,despitethegrievousdivisionsthat had occurred between

EdwardIIandhisnobles,theking’s much-hated favourite,PiersGaveston,wasdeadandan uneasy peace existedbetweenthem.Amajorbattlewith Scotland presented aclassic occasion for theleading English nobles toclose ranks round their king.However, divisions were sodeep that only three of theEnglish earls agreed to servepersonally under him,although the others sent the

retinues required by theirfeudal obligations and manyof the younger nobility gavehim their personal support.This support was not alwaysoffered for purely patrioticreasons and certainly not outofloveforthisparticularkingbut because success on thebattlefieldwasthegoalofanyfeudal knight: for theambitious it offered uniqueopportunities to be grantedland,thebasisofallwealthat

this time, and foradvancement into the moreseniorranksofthepeerage.

Edward Caernarvon was tenyears younger than RobertBruce, the fourth son ofEdward I and his queen,Eleanor of Castile. By thetimehewas fourmonths oldthe last of his older brothershad died leaving him heirapparent to one ofEngland’s

most formidable kings. OnepenaltyofEdwardI’ssuccesswas that for much of theprince’s boyhood his fatherwas away fighting and up toher death when he was justsevenparentalguidancecamelargelyfromhismother.Asaresult, the robust youngprincespentmuchtimeinthehandsofhisgeneraltutor,SirGuy Ferre, who apparentlykept his royal charge on avery loose rein. The prince

did not distinguish himselfeducationally although heundoubtedly developed awide range of interests,including a love for‘gambling on dice’ that wasshared by many of hissubjects. In an age wheneveryone could ride he wassoon considered an excellenthorseman, albeit favouringthe more self-indulgentactivities of hunting andhorse racing rather than the

jousts that trained men forwarandallowedafuturekingthe chance to assess theirpotential worth on thebattlefield. In addition theprince enjoyed boating andswimming and, morecontroversially, rustic craftssuch as thatching andditching, wrought iron work,evenshoeinghorses.2Hewasmusical and, when king,Genoese instrumentalists

were commissioned toentertain him, while hehimself played the crwth orCelticviolin.An orthodox rather than

fervent believer, he was farless inclined to pay publictribute tohisGod thaneitherhis father or, for thatmatter,his future opponent atBannockburn. In fact, theEnglish chronicler fromLanercost strongly criticisedhim for not commending

himself to the saints whencampaigning. On Edward’sjourney to Bannockburn thesame chronicler went on tosay he marched with greatpomp and elaborate statepurloining goods from themonasteries as he went; itwas also reported that hedidand said things to theprejudice and injury of thesaints.3 The pleasure-lovingEdward could also be

amazingly generous: he oncegave £50 to a surgeon whocured one of his stable boyswho was bitten by a stallionfrom the royal stable and,more controversially, inMarch 1312, the sameamount to Geoffrey deSellinges, one of PiersGaveston’sretainers,whenhelearned that Gaveston haddecided to remain inEngland.4 He was less

celebrated for his emotionalstability,forlosinghistemperover relatively minor issuesand,more importantly, beinghesitant or mistaken overmajor ones. DenholmYoung’s witheringintroduction toVita EdwardiSecundi attributed many ofthe king’s shortcomings to alack of good preparation forhis role, calling him anaimlessmanwithoutpoiseorsenseofvalues.

In spite of anydeficienciesin Edward II’s training forkingship whether serious ornot,itwouldbewrongtosaythatEdwardIlackedpaternalregard for he tookconsiderablepainstohelphisson gain commandexperience in Scotland, butby 1300 the old king wasstrugglingwithmany seriousproblems, and after the lossof his first wife he becamenoticeably more impatient

and harsh. In that year theprinceaccompaniedhisfatheron amajor campaign againstScotland where heundoubtedlycuta fine figureandaboutwhomitwassaid:

Hewasofawell-proportionedhandsomeperson,Ofacourteousdisposition,andwellbredAnddesirousof

findinganoccasionTomakeproofofhisstrength.5

In the event the expedition,like so many others againstthat inhospitable anddetermined country, proveddisappointing. Confronted bysuch a strong English armythe Scots wereunderstandably unwilling torisk amajor engagement andthe prince’s active role was

limited to a single skirmish.Nonetheless his father wasnot displeased with hisdemeanour, appointing himPrince of Wales and Earl ofChester.In1301hejoinedhisfather

on another invasion ofScotland and this time theking entrusted him withcommand of a separate forceduetoenterthecountryfromthe southwest, with theintention that ‘the chief

honouroftamingtheprideofthe Scots should fall to hisson’.6 Unfortunately, theScots proved too strong andfar too elusive for thePrinceofWalestogainthegloryforwhich his father had hoped.He reached no further thanWhithorn and Loch Ryanalong the coast of Gallowaybefore he was compelled torejoin his father who hadmoved into quarters at

Linlithgow. Two years laterEdward I assembled anothermajor army and completedhis occupation of Scotland(except for Stirling Castle)but since he met with onlynominal resistance his songained little furtherexperience in battlefieldcommand.Apart from such

difficulties, Edward I’stutelage of his son as futurekingandmilitarycommander

was punctuated by violentdisputes between them. Oneincident occurred in 1305when the nominal cause wasthe prince’s poaching deerfrom the estate of WalterLangton, the king’s favouriteminister. In reality it resultedfrom the prince’s continuingobsession with PiersGaveston, the handsome andwitty son of one of EdwardI’s household knights.Gaveston was required to

leave the country and theprince was humiliated bybeing banned from court andrequiredtofollowitsprogressat a distance of some tenleagues.In 1306, followingBruce’s

revolt, Edward I’s healthbegan to fail and he realisedthathissonwouldsoonhaveto lead the English forcesagainst Scotland. In fact, awrit dated 25 April 1306described the projected

movement north in that yearasan‘expeditionbyEdward,PrinceofWales, tobejoinedafterwardsbytheKing’.7Theking mended relationsbetweenthemand,tosealtheprince’smoreinfluentialrole,held amagnificent ceremonyto knight him before he setoff for Scotland, a ceremonythat brought together thelargest grouping of knightsever seen at Westminster.

Unfortunately the solemnityof the occasion was marredwhen the preceding night offastingandprayerturnedintoone of drunkenness andturmoilwiththeprincetakinga leading part. Edwardknighted the prince in thepalacechapel,assistedbytheearlsofLincolnandHerefordwho fastened on his spurs,and the prince himself thenknighteda further267youngmen, including Piers

Gaveston. A banquetfollowedatwhichallpresentpledged themselves to defeattheScotsandsubsequentlygoon crusade; the prince, forinstance, swore he wouldnever sleep twice in the oneplace until he had reachedScotlandandrevengedRobertBruce’s murder of JohnComyn. However, in theresultant campaign, it wasAymer de Valence, Earl ofPembroke, who gained the

initial battlefield successesagainst Bruce, while thePrince ofWales followed upbehind. At this time hebecame known more for hisharsh treatment of theordinary people in southwestScotlandthanforhisprowessinbattle,atactichoweverthatsucceeded in drivingunderground any supportremaining there for RobertBruce.8 Although the prince

undoubtedly shared hisfather’s determination tosubdue Scotland, it soonbecame apparent that,compared with Edward I’sfierce dedication, his ownpleasures would take anequallyhighpriority.Duringthewinterof1306–

7whenEdwardIwasstayingwith his son at LanercostPriory near Carlisle inpreparation for a renewedcampaign against Scotland,

fresh trouble flared upbetweenthem.Thecausewasagain Piers Gaveston who,with twenty-two other youngknights, had angeredEdwardby deserting the war inScotland(whichwithBruce’sseconddefeatat thehandsofJohn MacDougall seemedvirtually over) and movingacross to the continent toattendatournamentthere.Alltheir landswereseizedbutatthe intervention of his young

queen, Marguerite, Edward Ipardoned them with theexception of Piers Gaveston.Despite his father’s strongdispleasure at theirrelationship and Gaveston’srecent behaviour, the princerashly attempted to use theking’s treasurer, WalterLangton, to help gain hisfather’spermission tobestowoneoftheprince’sowntitles,Count of Ponthieu, on hisbeloved. His father’s

response left theprince innodoubt about the king’sfeelingsorabouthisestimateof his son’s achievements sofar: ‘You baseborn whore-son! Do you want to givelands away now, you whonever gained any? As theLord lives, if it were not forfear of breaking up theKingdom you should neverenjoy your inheritance!’ Inhis rage Edward seized theprincebythehairandtoreout

as much as he could beforethrowing him out of hispresence. The Prince ofWales delayed carrying outthe king’s order to banishPiersGavestonforas longashe dared beforeaccompanying his favouritetoDover,whereheshoweredhim with gifts of tapestriesand rich tunics.9 He had, infact, not yet rejoined hisfather for the projected

campaign northwards whenEdwardIdiedatBurgh-upon-Sandsneartheborder.With Edward I’s death the

new king moved back intoEnglandanddidnotreturntoScotland for three years, adecision that gave Bruce thepriceless opportunity toextend his power.Characteristically, EdwardII’sfirstactwasaselfishonethat antagonised his nobles;he brought Gaveston back

and created him Earl ofCornwall, a title customarilygiven to a member of theroyal family. In spiteof suchill-judgement Edward II’sreign appeared to startpromisinglywithhismarriagein France to Isabella,daughter of the French king,although on his return tocourt, the king’s kisses andrepeated embraces for hisfavourite, whom he hadappointed Keeper of the

Realm while he was inFrance, allied to his obviouspreference for Gaveston’scompanytothatofhisqueen,infuriated both her and otherseniornobles.Asifthiswerenot enough, at Edward II’scoronation on 25 February1308whileothernobleswerecontenttowearclothofgold,Gaveston, inhisvanity,woreregal purple trimmed withpearls. The barons – assistedby the queen – banded

together and demandedGaveston’sbanishmentby25Juneat the latest. In the faceofsuchoppositionEdwardIIwas forced to concur, buteven then he continued tomake grants of land to hisfavourite and softened thesentence of exile byappointing him as hisLieutenantinIrelandinplaceof the powerful Richard deBurgh,EarlofUlster.One of Edward II’s most

serious shortcomings as kingwas his carelessness atalienatingsomeofthemenheneeded most. However, withGaveston no longer on thesceneEdward II showed thatwhenhewasmindedhecoulduseroyalpatronageaswellasotherkings.Byashrewduseof bribes he succeeded individing the baronialopposition and persuadingthem to allow his favourite’sreturn, but in his delight at

their reunion he no longerbothered to treat his seniorbaronswiththedegreeoftactthey warranted, whileGaveston too soon showedhow little he had learned bybecomingevenmoreabusive,callingRalphdeMonthermer,Earl of Gloucester, ‘awhoreson’ and the venerableEarl of Lincoln, who headedthe opposition to him, ‘oldburst belly’. As a result theearls understandably refused

to attend Parliament ifGaveston was present andinstead held aRoyalCouncilof Assembly which theyattendedinarmourandwherethey forced theking to agreeto a commission of reformcomprising twenty-one oftheir number called the‘Lords Ordainers’. Theirmain grievance was againstGaveston, but many of theircomplaints were about thestate’s finances and the

expenses involved inmilitaryexpeditions.While they were

considering their findingsEdward embarked on a longoverdue campaign againstScotland, as much frompersonal motives asobjectives of state, forwhilston campaign he would beexcused from being inLondon to face the report oftheOrdainers’committeeandavoid having to explain the

treatmentofhisqueen toherfather,PhilipofFrance.Onlytwo earls, Gloucester andWarwick, agreed to takepartintheprojectedcampaignandin the event its modestobjectives of strengtheningand reprovisioning thegarrisons still in Englishhands were not fullyachieved.With the defection of the

other earls, Gaveston had anopportunity to demonstrate

his military ability but,althoughhemarchednorthtoPerth while Gloucesterconcentratedhisforcesinthegreat forest of Selkirk, theScottish forces stayed out ofreach, denying him anychance of battlefield success.If Gaveston had proved anotable military leader itwould have strengthened theking’scaseagainsthiscriticsandpossiblyreversedEnglishmisfortunes in Scotland; but

he did not and byNovemberthe king was back in theborder fortress of BerwickwhereheremaineduntilJune1311. Although Edward IIintended to lead anotherexpedition that summer, acrippling shortage of moneyforced him to return toWestminster and hear theOrdainers’ verdict. Theirmain demands included therenewed exile of PiersGavestonandare-orderingof

royal finances, which theyconsidered had beensquandered on the king’sfavourite rather than used inpursuit of the Scottish war,but after another short exilethekingallowedGavestontoreturn and by January 1312allhislandshadbeenrestoredtohim.At this, even those barons

who had remainedsympathetic towards thekingunited in arms against

Gaveston. After his captureand subsequent execution theking was so enraged that hebegan togatherarmed forcesagainst his nobles. In such asituation any warlikeoperations against the Scotswerenecessarilysuspended–therewasnoquestionevenofcountering the Scottish raidsagainst northern England –andastheScottishchroniclerFordun wrote, exultantly,‘The fruitlessEnglish nation,

which had unrighteouslyattacked many a man, wasnow, by God’s righteousjudgement made to undergoawfulscourges.’10In April 1312 the Scots

took further advantage ofEnglish inaction byrecapturing Berwick, but thepower vacuum in Londoncould only be temporary andgradually the balance beganto swing back in the king’s

favour. A certain revulsiondeveloped against the earlswho had executed Gavestonand in November 1312 theking’s cause was furtheraided by the birth of an heirto his queen, Isabella. Themore moderate among thenoblesbeganactivelyseekinga reconciliation. Two papalemissaries, together with theKing of France’s brother,Louis of Evreaux, toiled forseveralmonthstobringabout

asettlementbetweenthekingandhisnoblesand,afterlongandbitterexchanges,notleastover the custody of thevaluable jewels which theking had given his favourite,afinalsettlementwasreachedon 14October 1313. By thisthe earls admitted their faultandofferedahumbleapologyto the king who, in turn,granted a general pardon tothemandtheirfollowers.No amount of agreement,

however, could alter the factthat for more than six yearsafterhisaccessionEdward IIhadoutrageouslymisusedhisroyal patronage in favour ofone man. Nor could thesettlement bring immediateconcord;theking’shatredforLancaster, for instance, wasfar too marked for that.Seriousdifferencesremained,not only between the noblesandthekingbutalsoamongstthemselves. The full price of

Edward’s infatuation withPiers Gaveston to theexclusionofallelsewasonlytoo likely to be paid in thecoming battle withScotland.11 As a leaderlargely inexperienced inwar,EdwardIIwouldcommandagroupofnobleslackingsomeof their most powerfulrepresentatives, while thosewho remained, howeversinceretheirloyalty,hadlong

been accustomed to suchrancour and discord betweenmonarch and others of hisnobles that the actionsof theking no longer bore the fullstamp of authority. In suchcircumstances it needed astronger king possessingbetterjudgementthanEdwardII toobtain thebest fromhissubordinatecommanderswhoinanycasehadyettowitnesshisdemeanourandpowersofdecision-making in the heat

of battle. Their own fixationon attacking the enemy,whateverthesituation,wouldprobably cause them seriousdifficulties, as at Falkirkwhen they had needed therestraining influence ofEdwardI.

ThethreeearlswhoansweredEdwardII’scallandcouldbeexpected to take seniorpositionsof commandduringthe coming battle were

Aymer de Valence, Earl ofPembroke, Gilbert de Clare,Earl of Gloucester andHumphreydeBohun,EarlofHereford.

Aymer de Valence,Earl of Pembroke (d1324)Valence’s biographer, J R SPhillips,wascriticalofallthe

English nobles who servedunder Edward II at this timebut, although not judging hissubject anAlexander inwar,he‘cametoratehimthebestof a moderate group and amanessentiallyfaithfultothemonarch’.12 Valencewas theson of William de Valence,one of Edward I’s marcherlords. With extensivepossessions both in Walesand Montignac in Europe,

and twice married to Frenchwomen of distinction,Valencecouldbeexpectedtotake a wider view of affairsthansomeothersofhispeers,whoseinterestswereconfinedto England and Scotland.WithsuchimmaculateFrenchconnections he was uniquelyqualified to conduct relationsbetween England and Franceand his high level ofperformance on suchmissions led Professor

BarrowtoratehimastheoneEnglish noble during theearly years of the fourteenthcentury who displayedqualities of statesmanship.WhileitisValence’smilitaryqualities that are of primeconcern, his diplomatictalents were not irrelevant tohis roleasacommandernor,in such troubled times, wasthe fact that he loyallysupportedbothEdwardsuntilhis death in 1324. It needed

exceptional stupidity on thepart of Edward II to driveValence into opposition but,although he allied himselfwith his fellow Ordainersbetween 1310–12, it is morethan likely that at heart heremainedloyaltotheconceptofkingshipasopposedtoanyalignmentsofrivalnobles.Valence’s military career

beganin1296withEdwardIin Flanders and he fought atthe battle of Falkirk. From

thenon,withtheexceptionofbesieging Piers Gaveston inScarborough Castle, he wasexclusively concerned withthe Scottish wars. AlthoughValence was the RedComyn’s brother-in-law andtherefore not likely to feelanywarmthforRobertBruce,hisappointmentbyEdward Ias hisLieutenant in Scotlandat the time of Bruce’s revoltalsodemonstratedconfidencein his military ability.

Valence’ssuccessoverBruceatMethven has already beendiscussed,thoughhisconducton that occasionwas heavilyinfluenced by the Scot, SirIngramUmfraville,who alsohatedBruceandwhoadvisedValence to ignore acceptedpractice by moving againstBruceduringthenight.13At Edward II’s accession

Valence was deprived of hisScottish lieutenancy,

apparently on the advice ofPiersGavestonwhoinanageof universal hatred for Jewsalso insulted him (andamused Edward II) bynicknaming him ‘Joseph theJew’ because of his heightandpallidcomplexion.Whenin1310EdwardIImarchedtoScotland with Gaveston,Valence, along with most ofhis fellow nobles,understandably refused toaccompanytheking,although

he sent his feudal quota ofknights, about ten innumber.14 As a supporter ofthe Ordainers he removedGaveston from ScarboroughCastleandimprisonedhiminDeddington but it wasseemingly without hisknowledge thatWarwickhadthe king’s favourite removedand executed. In apparentdisgust Valence returned tothe court party, although he

was certainly no firmsupporteroftheking’spolicyregardingGaveston.15Inspiteof their serious differencesover the royal favouriteValence continued to enjoyclose personal relations withEdward II who, for instance,even went so far as to givehimanumberof falcons thathad previously belonged toGaveston,whilethekingalsoused Valence’s diplomatic

skills to conduct peacenegotiations with his noblesandwiththeFrenchking.16In1314Valencesupplanted

thefeebleJohnofBrittanyasLieutenant of Scotland andwas given correspondinglywide responsibilities. Hewent on to play an energeticand creditable role atBannockburn, although,unfortunately, there is noevidence as to the nature of

his participation in theEnglishcouncilsofwarthere.Militarily, particularly interms of personal energy,Valence appears to standcomparison with Bruce’smuch younger commanderThomas Randolph, Earl ofMoray. However, underEdward II Valence was notgiven the same opportunitiesasMoraytodevelophisskillson the battlefield and thecriticalJRSPhillipscameto

conclude that neither hisaverage military virtues norhis leadershipqualities in thefieldofpoliticswereequaltothedemandsplaceduponhimby the serious crises ofEdwardII’sreign.17

Gilbert deClare, EarlofGloucester(d1314)The Clares were another

marcher family that servedwith Edward I in Wales.Despite Phillips’ sombrejudgement of all Englishbaronsat this time theyoungEarl of Gloucester, agrandson of Edward I andnephew of Edward II, wasconsidered one of theoutstanding nobles of hisgeneration and ‘bothintellectually andmorally thenoblest representative of his

great house’.18 His motherwas Edward I’s thirddaughter, Joan of Acre andhisfatherGilbertdeClare.Aboy prodigy, at fifteen yearsof age he was made acompanion to Edward II andservedhiminScotlandduring1306.DespitehistenderyearsGloucester not only attendedamusteroftheEnglishforcesatCarlislebutwasselectedtonegotiate a truce there with

Robert Bruce.19 Rapidadvancement followed: on 3December 1308 he wasappointed commander of theEnglish forces sent to relieveRutherglen Castle and in thefollowing year – when stillonly 18 – he becamecommander of the Englishforces on both sides of theForth.20In spite of such swift

promotion for one so young,

Gloucester lacked practicalbattlefield experience. Hisadvancement was veryprobably due to his seemingincorruptibilityandtothefactthat he was a consistentsupporter ofEdward IIwhenso many others were againsthim. While Gloucester, likeValence, supported some ofthe reforms proposed by theEarlofLancaster’sOrdainers–inparticularthosedesignedto check the king’s undue

generosity towards Gaveston– he opposed the use ofextreme measures inobtaining them. In 1308 hedistanced himself from thosewho called for Gaveston’sbanishment, although heappeared tohavenopersonalsympathy for the favourite.As a mark of Edward II’strust in him, in 1313, whilethe king was absent inFrance, he was appointed

regentofEngland.21Gloucester brought a large

retinue to Bannockburn,although it was certainlysmaller than the 500 menattributed tohimbyBarbour.Inhiseagerness tobefirst tomeet the Scots in battleGloucester disputed withHereford over who shouldlead the vanguard but, thisapart, he was widely knownforhislevel-headedness:after

the disappointments of thefirstencountershewasoneofthosewhoadvisedthekingtodelayuntilthefullstrengthofthe English army could bemobilised. His death at theoutset of the main battledeprivedthekingofsomeonecapable of understanding thedangers inwhich theEnglisharmyhadplaceditselfandtheneed to take fundamental, ifunpopular, decisions toimprovethesituation.

Humphrey de Bohun,Earl of Hereford (d1322)Humphrey deBohun’s fatherhadservedEdwardIinWalesand Humphrey himself hadaccompanied him during hisinvasionofScotlandin1300.At the time of Bannockburnthe twenty-eight-year-oldbaron was Constable ofEngland and was married to

Elizabeth, seventh daughterof Edward I and widow ofCount John of Hainault. Aman of vast wealth, DeBohun was a noble ofconsiderable importancewithafortunesufficientforhimtoleave the amazing sums of£2000 to each of his fouryoungersonsand1000marksto his son-in-law, Hugh deCourtenay.22 Although helacked the campaigning

experience of men like theveteranHenrydeLacey,Earlof Lincoln (who died in1311),DeBohunenjoyedthestrongconfidenceofhispeersand was chosen, withValence, as a negotiator inthequarrelsbetweenthekingandhisnoblesbothoverPiersGavestonandthen,followingBannockburn, with theDespensers.WhileDeBohunshared his peers’ alarm andangerconcerningEdwardII’s

favourite he was, likeValence and Gloucester, amoderateopponent.Skilledinpersonal combat, De Bohunlisted(unsuccessfully)againstGaveston in the greattournaments held at Fulhamin1305and1307butlikehisbrother earls, his experienceof military leadership wasstrictly limited. Apart fromjoining Edward I’sdisappointing Scottishcampaign of 1300 he

accompanied the Earl ofGloucester against RobertBrucein1308withouthavingany chance to distinguishhimself, and was afterwardspresentat thebloodlesssiegeof Piers Gaveston inScarboroughCastle.Having returned to the

king’speaceafterGaveston’sdeath, Herefordenthusiastically answeredEdward II’s call in 1314 butalthough he fought bravely

enough at Bannockburn, hisdistinctionarosenotfromhisability as a commander therebutastheScots’mostnotableprisoner.Despitehis eminentpositionand the largeretinuehe brought onto the field, hehad littlepracticalexperienceofcommandinwarandnoneof large-scale engagements.His battlefield philosophywas to reach the enemy assoon as possible, and hewasunlikely to have contributed

anything original to thecouncilsofwarheldthenightbefore the main encounter.Duringthebattleitselfhewasbehind the forward elementsof his vanguard when theyclashed with Bruce on dayone, and during the mainactionhebecametooquicklyinvolved in hand to handfightingtoexerciseanoverallinfluence.

The two other English

commanders with anopportunity to influenceevents at Bannockburn,particularlyinitsearlystages,were the joint leaders of theEnglish army’s secondcavalry division, Sir RobertClifford and Sir HenryBeaumont.

Sir Robert Clifford (d1314)

Clifford came fromNorthumbria, and his fatherhad been a friend andcompanion toEdward I fromtheircrusadingdaystogether.Cliffordhimselfwasinvolvedin several of the clashes thattook place between Englandand Scotland from the 1290sinto the early years of thenew century. His militarycareer began promisinglywhen, together with HenryPercy,hemadeabrilliantraid

into Scotland which wasrewarded by the surrender oftheScottishforcesatIrvineinJune 1297. During April ofthe previous year, when justtwenty-threeyears of age, hehad been present at theEnglish victory at Dunbar23and over a period of almosttwenty years the spirited anddetermined cavalrycommander accompanied asuccession of English

invasionsnorthwardsuntilhisdeathinbattle.OnEdwardI’sexpedition in 1300 Cliffordwas responsible for thecampaign’s one notablesuccess, the capture ofCaerlaverock Castle nearDumfries in July and as arewardEdwardmade him itsguardian.In the light of such long

experience of the Anglo-Scottish clashes Cliffordwould have been familiar

with the ground on whichBannockburn was fought. Atrusted supporter of the oldking, Clifford was present athis deathbed where he wasgiven instructions relating tothe banishment of PiersGaveston of whom, with themajorityofhispeers,Cliffordwas a strong opponent.Notwithstanding this EdwardII alsohad a highopinionofClifford both with regard tohismilitaryabilityandforhis

honesty and directness. In1308, for instance, heappointed Clifford, alongwith the Earl of Angus, asCaptainGuardianofScotlandon either side of the Firths.As late as March 1310Clifford showed he had notyetfullyalignedhimselfwiththe fiercest baronialopposition to Edward II bystating that any concessionsmade by the king to themshould not be seen as a

precedent.24 However, in1312 on rumours ofGaveston’s returnfromexile,Cliffordguarded thenortherncounties against any possiblecollusion between thefavourite and England’senemy, Robert Bruce.Clifford despised Gavestonandon4May1312,hejoinedwiththeEarlofLancaster,theking’s bitterest enemy, tobesiege him in Scarborough

Castle.Yet Gaveston apart,

Clifford was as loyal to hissovereign, Edward II, as tohis father, willinglyanswering his call to musterat Berwick for the relief ofStirling Castle. He wasalready at Berwick in April1314, for he was excusedattendance at the Aprilparliament for that reason.Ameasure of the regard bothmonarchs felt for Clifford’s

military and administrativeabilitiescouldbeseenintheirgenerousawardswhichmadehimoneofthelargestEnglishlandowners. He was, forinstance, granted RobertBruce’s forfeited manor ofHert and Hertlepool,Christopher Seton’s estate atSkelton in Cumberland andWilliam Douglas’Douglasdale(thisonpaymentof500crownsayear).At Bannockburn Edward

II’sowntrustinthisvigoroussoldier and long-timeopponent of the Scots wasshown by appointing him(along with Sir HenryBeaumont) as commander ofthe English army’s secondcavalrydivision.HisdeathatBannockburn during theopening moves of the mainbattleundoubtedlyrobbedtheEnglishkingofacapableandhighly respected commanderwhom the chronicler

Rishanger referred to as a‘milesillustris’.InthelightofClifford’s unhappyexperience against spearmenthe day before it is virtuallycertainhewouldhavetriedtobring up bowmen as soon aspossible in support of theEnglish cavalry during themainbattle.

SirHenryBeaumont(d

1340)Although Clifford wasundoubtedly the moreexperienced soldier, EdwardII unwisely attempted tospread his bounty byappointing Sir HenryBeaumont as co-commanderof the second cavalrydivision. Originally fromBeaumont in France, SirHenry was Edward II’scousin and a knight of the

royal household who hadserved with Edward I andthenwiththePrinceofWalesin their Scottish wars. AtEdward II’s accessionBeaumont stood high in thenew king’s favour andreceived extensive lands inLincolnshire and, morecontentiously,theIsleofMan–tothefuryofotherEnglishnobles. In 1310 Beaumontmarried Alice Comyn, nieceof JohnComyn, thirdEarlof

Buchan, and this gave himeven more reason to fightagainst Robert Bruce.Certainly no more capablethan Robert Clifford, duringhis and Clifford’s firstexchange with the ScotsBeaumonthadone ideaonly,how best to attack. When amore cautious approach wassuggested by a fellowcommander, Thomas Grey,he utterly rejected it andcontinuedintheenergeticbut

ultimately fruitless assaultsagainst the Scots. Despitesuffering such unexpectedfailure, on the seconddayhecontinued with the Englishvanguard, but again withoutsuccess since insufficientbowmen were brought up inits support. Beaumont wasdemonstrably not anoutstanding tactician,preferring tobludgeon inall-out attack with little respectforhisopponents.

There appear to be nogrounds whatever forquerying Beaumont’s loyaltyto Edward II during thebattle, either during thepreliminary clashes, or whenamongthelargecontingentofcavalry that fought with andgavethekingprotectionasheleftthefield.Laterhebecameinvolved in conspiracies atcourt against his king andshowed himself as anadventurer. He turned his

coat, paying allegiance toQueenIsabellainherattempttodeposeEdwardII,andlateralongwithEdwardBalliolhebecame chief of thedisinheritednoblespledgedtoregaintheirScottishestates.

It is not known whomEdward II selected tocommand the English forcesat Bannockburn in the eventof his becoming a casualty.Oneislefttowonderwhether

the relatively inexperiencedbut arrogant monarch, forinstance,everfelttheneedtoappoint a deputy. If so it islikely to have been Valence,but in the light of Edward’sidiosyncraticdecision-makingthis is by no means certain.There is also no record ofwho commanded the largenumbers of English infantryand bowmen, but whoevertheywere, theywereallowedlittleopportunitytoswingthe

battle in favour of theEnglish. A strong and self-willedleadersuchasEdwardI permitted little deviationfromhisorders,andthisgavepoor training for the seniorEnglish commanders underhim, while the seven yearsunder Edward II prior toBannockburn were highlyundistinguished in themilitarysense.Phillips could well have

beenrightinratingtheability

of Edward II’s subordinatecommanders as moderate,even if they wereundoubtedly vigorous andbrave; after trickingBruce atMethven Valence allowedhimself to be consistentlyoutfoxed and outfought bythe Scots; Gloucesterremained startlinglyinexperienced and his deathprevented him showing anyoutstanding qualities atBannockburn;anddespitehis

greater age De Bohun hadbeen as much engaged inconflictswithEdwardIIashehadwiththeScots.Beaumontproved himself as a goodmiddlepiececommander,butno more. Clifford was thepossibleexceptionbuthewaskilled before he coulddistinguish himself further.Among other experiencedsoldiers there was SirMaurice Berkeley, whoappeared to have acted as a

senior retainer to Valenceratherthanasacommanderinhis own right, and Sir PainTiptoft (also killed in themain battle’s early stages)who had acted as companionto Edward II from his earlyyears without acquiringsignificant commandexperience. One of the mostcharismaticfiguresamongtheEnglish at Bannockburn wasGiles D’Argentan, amagnificent fighting soldier

said by John Barbour to rateas the third best knight inChristendom for his skill atarms (the first two wereEmperor Henry and KingRobertBruceinthatorder).25D’Argentan enjoyed nosimilar rating for his powersofcommand.EdwardIIwentto great pains to bring thepaladin back from hiscrusading to support him atBannockburn but, while

brave to a fault, D’Argentanmade no impression as acommanderthere.Together with Valence the

most senior of Edward II’sadvisers was IngramUmfraville,cousinoftheEarlof Angus, related to JohnBalliol, and long-timeopponent of the Bruces.Umfravillehadheldanumberof significant civil andmilitarypostsinScotlandandin 1302 he acted as a senior

envoyduringthenegotiationsheldinParistoagreeapeacetreaty between France andScotland. During 1300 hereplaced Bruce as jointguardian of Scotland alongwith Bishop Lamberton andJohn Comyn (the Red). Hehad been active militarilysince 1299 when, with otherScottish nobles he conductedalarge-scaleraidsouthoftheForthwithbothbardedhorseand infantry. In1301,heand

John Soules conductedspoiling attacks against theEnglish forces commandedby both Edward I and thePrince ofWales, including abold assault on LochmabenCastle. With Scotland’sgeneralsubmissiontoEdwardIin1304Umfraville’sestateswereforfeited, theconditionssetfortheirredemptionbeingthe payment of up to amaximum of five years’income. It was a mark of

Umfraville’s importance inthe rebellion along with hislate submission that hisredemption terms were theharshest of all the Scottishnobles, i.e. for the full fiveyearsvalue.26By 1308 Umfraville was

fighting on behalf of theEnglish against EdwardBruce in Galloway but itwould therefore have beenamazing if, as a Scot, even

one who had changedallegiance, his advice hadbeen given precedence overthat of Edward II’s Englishcouncillors. In any event,experiencedsoldierornot,byBannockburn his judgementseemedtobecloudedbyhate.HisadvicetoKingEdwardatthe outset of the main battle(aswillbeseen)wasfancifulin the extreme and althoughpositioned near the king inordertoinformhimaboutthe

Scottishmethodoffighting,itisunlikelythathewouldhavebeen trusted with the maindirectionofthearmy.SadlyfortheEnglish,inthe

coming battle their highcommand would be headedby an unpopular king largelyuntried inwar and supportedby a considerable body ofnobles, all of whom hadpreviously opposed him forfavouring another overthemselves or like the Scot,

Umfraville, joinedEdward IIbecauseofhishateforRobertBruce. Like the Earl ofGloucestertheyhadgrownupin a climate of feuding anddid not seem prepared tosubordinate their owninterests to the generaladvantage on the field ofbattle. While many hadconsiderable experience ofwarfare both in Britain andelsewhere they had beengiven relatively little

opportunity for independentcommand, and during thebattle’s early stages some ofthe most promising becamefatalities. In any case, soconfident were they in theirsuperior numbers andarmament bringing successthat the English leaders feltno need to dwell on thetacticalproblemsfacingthemortoconsiderovermuchwaysof best combining theirfighting strength.Apart from

the battle at Stirling Bridgeagainst William Wallace in1297,when themainEnglisharmy was led by Warenne,Earl of Surrey, rather thantheir king, and where it hadbeen prevented from usingeven half its strength, theEnglishsimplydidnotlosetothe Scots. Their opponentsmight elude them and theymightevenhavetoturnbackfor want of food andprovisions,butdefeatinopen

battlewasunthinkable.

SectionThree:Bruce’s

Masterstroke

CHAPTERSEVEN

ADVANCETOBATTLE

‘Wearesofewagainstsomany.’

Barbour,TheBruce

WHETHER IT WAS DUE toa measure ofoverconfidence, or,

more likely, because someimportant units had still toreach the concentration area,Edward II did not give theorderforhisarmytocrosstheborderbefore17June1314,aweek later than planned. Tofulfil the challenge, Stirlinghadtoberelievedbythe24thfor which he had allowed

himself no leeway forunexpected delays or enemyaction along the arduousninety-mile journey.Whatever his commandersthought about such arestrictedtimetabletheymusthave been pleasantlysurprised by the weather:instead of rain, which hadaccompanied so many otherEnglisharmies intoScotland,it was hot and dry. This,however, brought problems

of its own: the potholes onthe uneven roads were ironhard,causingcartstojoltandbuck, while the unyieldingsurface led to sore feet foranimalsandmenalike.Mostoftheheavytransport

wouldprobablyhavegoneonfromWarktoBerwick,whereit would cross the TweedbeforetakingtheRomanroadover the Lammermuir hills.Other detachments probablycrossedtheriveratthevillage

ofColdstream.Evidence thatthe English did, in fact, usetheRomanroadcamefromaroyaldespatchmadeatSoutra(probably from the ancienthospital there) on 18 Junewhichwas sent to the king’scouncil and the Archbishopof Canterbury.1 From theheights of Soutra where theroad climbed to over 1000feet the invaders had theirfirst clear sight ofEdinburgh

and,dependingontheamountof heat haze, possiblyglimpsesofStirlingtoo,lyingfurther north beyond thewestern shoulder of thePentlandhills.Theyhaddonewell to reach Soutra, almostforty miles from Coldstreamby the end of day two butEdward’sstrongpacewasfarfaster than the Monk ofMalmesbury liked. ‘Hehastened day by day to theappointed place, not as if he

were leading an army tobattle but as if he was on apilgrimage to St James ofCompostella. Brief were thehaltsforsleep,brieferstillforfood,hencehorses,horsemenand infantry were worn outwith toil and hunger.’2 Thechronicler’s observationswere surely justified whenone realises that with suchextended columns ofmarching men interspersed

with heavily burdened carts,progress could not bereckonedtoexceedtwomilesper hour. At times the menwouldbemarchingsomewhatfaster than this but inaccordance with normalmilitary practice they werelikely to have paused fairlyfrequently, possibly for tenminutes each hour, to dealwith blisters and to patch uptheircrudefootwear.ToreachSoutrawithintwo

days the marching columnswouldhavebeenon the roadforatleasttwelvehourseachday. (From Soutra they hadanother sixteen-mile journeybeforeenteringEdinburgh.)Despite his criticismof the

king the same chroniclerobserved with pride that heled ‘a very fine and largearmy’ with ‘more than 2000armoured horse and a verylargenumberofinfantry’andadded proudly that all ‘who

were present agreed thatnever in our times has suchan army gone forth fromEngland’ with ‘enoughwaggonstohavestretchedfortwentymilesiftheyhadlinedup end to end’. Anothercontemporary source wasquite specific about theirnumbers: ‘106 waggonsdrawn by four horses each,and110waggonseachdrawnbyeightoxen,makingatotal

of424horsesand880oxen.’3Thesenumbersappliedtothedraught animals alone, andthecavalryhorses,whosefeetneeded careful maintenance,were numbered in thousandsrather than hundreds. ForEdwardI’searlierinvasionofScotland in 1300, 3000horseshoes and 50,000 nailswererequiredtobecarriedinseven three-horse carts.4 Farmore shoes were required in

1314 when just 200lbs wasthe normal load for horse-drawn carts.5 Even moreimportant than horseshoeswere the war supplies,includingbows,togetherwiththeir shafts, lances and otherspare personal weapons.Along with such militaryequipment they carried food,including grain, bacon,mutton, fish and wine.Whatevergrasswasavailable

on theway, somehaywouldalsohavebeenneededforthevastnumberofhorses.Withsomanywaggons the

army’smovementwasboundtobe tediousand it needsnoimagination to realise thedifficulties experiencedwhenit came to steep gradients atthe base of which werestreams that needed fordingorotherplaceswheretheroadhad been partially washedaway. If the vehicles had

carried food and warmaterials only the logisticalproblems would have beendifficultenough,butwith thepleasure-loving Edward thiswasfarfromthecase.Wherethe king led his nobles werevirtually bound to follow,carrying with them not onlytheir personal tentage butother material comforts suchas silver eatingvessels andawide choice of wines. In theexpectationof certainvictory

some, like theyoungerHughDespenser, whose rights tohis lands and tenements inScotlandhadbeenrestoredtohim by the king’s charter,carried domestic equipmentto assist in their re-occupation.6Whatever the mandatory

halts, straggling wasinevitableandthearmy’slineofmarchbecamesoextendedthat Barbour described it as

covering ‘hills and valleys’.Local people who hadremoved themselves from itspathtowatchfromthesafetyof adjacent hill tops had nodifficulty whatever intracking it. The vanguard’sprogress, for instance, wasdistinguishable by a movingcloud of dust through whichthe sun’s rays caught fireupon burnished breastplates,lance points and the brassbosses of harnesses.

Accompanying these camethe soundsofmassedhorses,not only destriers but secondline animals and remounts;the jinglingof tackle and theclatter of hooves on theboulder-strewn road wouldhave easily marked out thehorsemen from the moreregular crunching noises oftheaccompanyingcarts.This evidence was as

nothing compared to thesoundsofthemainbodywith

its endless line ofcumbersome waggons, overhalfofwhichweredrawnbyteams of slow phlegmaticoxen, heads swaying at eachstride. The banshee-likesquealsmade by thewoodenaxles might well have takentheir toll on theaccompanyingtroops,astheydidalmostfivecenturieslaterwhen they almost drove SirJohn Moore’s soldiers todistraction during their epic

retreat across northern Spainto the seaport of Corunna.With such repetitious andnerve-fraying screechingcametherhythmofmarchingfeet, thousands of them,interspersed with sporadicshouts of command andsnatches of song. As theMonk of Malmesbury hadalready observed, for themajority of those involved,particularly the footsoldiers,it was undoubtedly a

demanding experience.Burdenedby thick jerkins,ormail, and carrying unwieldyspears along with their otherequipment they were forcedtoplod through chokingdustclouds amid the droppingsand the ammoniac pools ofthe horses, unable to seemuch further than the rankimmediately to their front,while from time to timeselected detachments wouldbe ordered to break ranks in

order to manhandle cartsstuckfastinpotholes.Duringtheovernighthaltstheneedtotake their turn at standingguard further deprived thesoldiersofmuch-neededrest.

Suchamarchwascertaintotellonbothmenandanimals.Some of the men whosustained gashed or raw feetmight be allowed to ride inthe waggons but others withstrained muscles or brokenbones would have been leftunder escort in one of thevillages on the way. As thearmy advanced ever furtherinto a country stripped offood and shelter, initialoptimism was also liable to

have given way to somefeelings of vulnerability.TheScots’ reputation for raidinghadbeenwell-earned and, aspart of a seemingly endlesscolumn, men must havethoughttheypresentedanearperfect target for attacks bymaraudersonfasthorses.TheEnglishwerenottoknowthatBruce had no plans to attackthem until much later, butthey dared not ignore thepossibility.

Althoughthedaylighthourswerelongatthattimeofyear,many soldiers had additionalresponsibilities toperformbythe light of their camp fires.Men not allocated for guardduties,forinstance,stillfacedtheenormous taskof feedingand watering the animalsbefore they could rest theirown leg muscles and achingshouldersandbeginpreparingfood. No wonder some ofthem remained hungry for

mostofthejourneyandwere‘outon their feet’by theendofit.The king had badly

underestimated the timeneeded to move such amassive army but failure tomeet the date agreed byEdwardBruce and Sir PhilipMoubray would meanhandingthecastleovertotheScots. After so much timeallowed for mobilisation itwould represent a massive

blowtoEnglishprestigeapartfromtheevenmoreimportantmilitary considerations.Foremostamong thesewouldbe Robert Bruce’s releasefrom the compactmadewithSirPhilipMoubray.Hecouldtherefore place a stronggarrison in the castle andkeephismainarmyhiddeninthesurroundingwoods,readytoharassanyassaultmadeonitbytheEnglishwhosearmyin anycasewasdesigned for

open combat rather than forsiege operations. By keepinghis forces in being, and nothazarding them in battle,Bruce could wait until theEnglish experiencedinevitablelogisticalproblems,whether or not they camefrommountingamajorsiege.In the event of an Englishwithdrawal the advantagewould pass to Bruce and hecould resume his guerrillatactics. The army was,

therefore, driven onrigorously. The Englishreached Edinburgh on 19June but more time was lostwhen two days were spenttaking on and distributingstores from the shipswaitingat Leith docks. This was avery necessary procedure asnot only was it the army’sfirst opportunity forreplenishment since settingout over the hills7 but itwas

of particular importance tothose who had joined thearmy following a longapproach march, and whosefootwear and clothing wasprobably already in tatters. Itwas not until 22 June, withjusttwodaysbeforethecastlewas due to be relieved, thatthe host set off again.Completing a punishingmarchinthehot,dryweatherthey covered the twenty-twomiles to Falkirk in a single

day–buteventhentenmilesseparated them from theirgoal,whichbytheagreementwasapointthreemilesorlessfromStirlingCastle.Under such an insensitive

commander theEnglisharmyundoubtedlybecamemorelegweary than it needed to beandinfantrysoldiersandtheircommanders were likely tohavereactedangrily.Yetwiththe cavalry it would havebeen different. Rapid

movement was everything tothem and they would havefound the great army’sprogress painfully slow. Forboth infantry and cavalry,however, theproblemssetbythe march were bound toprevent any considerationabout their detaileddispositions or the degree ofnecessary co-operationbetween them when theyfinally brought the Scots tobattle.

The Scottish forces facedquite different problems.Being relatively close to theanticipated battle area, nodebilitating approach marchwas needed although nothingcould change the fact thatthey were heavilyoutnumbered and had a lesswell-balanced force. To helpoffset this Bruce continuedwith his plans to bring hisarmy up to the higheststandards of training.

Constant drilling with heavylances helped hisinfantrymen’s levelof fitnessand after inevitabledifficultiesintheearlystagesthe smooth movements bywhich his individualschiltrons were able tochange formation frommassed lozenge to circularpatterns must have donewonders for theirconfidence.AttheendofMay,beforetheEnglish had even come to

muster,hisinitialtraininghadgonesowellthathewasableto move his schiltrons frominside the Torwood to themoreopen–andlikelybattle– area of New Park wherethey could practise againstdummy attacks mounted byScottish cavalry units. NewPark had been KingAlexander III’s huntingdemesne, close to StirlingCastleandimmediatelysouthof theKing’s Park, the royal

hunting ground of earliercenturies.From New Park’s higher

ground the Scottish forceswould be able to watch theEnglish army approachingalong theRomanroadbeforeit descended into the valleycontainingtheBannockBurn.IftheEnglishkepttotheroadthey would soon come intoview again as they ascendedthe valley’s nearside andenteredtheparkontheirroute

towards the castle. As adefensive position it was agoodone; thepark’s forwardhills were perfect forobserving the English whileits crests and rear slopes hadenoughwoodedareas togiveBruce the opportunity towithdrawandmakehisarmysafefromanypossibleattacksfrom English cavalry.When,on the morning of Saturday,22 June, Bruce’s scoutsgalloped up to tell him the

English had at last set outfrom Edinburgh with lessthan two days before themidsummerdeadline,hemusthave reasoned they had littlechoice but to keep to thedirect route of the RomanroadtoStirlingwhichraneastto west roughly in line withthe old Antonine wall. AftertheEnglishforcesreachedthepoint where the BannockBurn crossed the road theywould be entering the zone

where he could bring hisdefensive preparations intoplay.

Before considering theattributes of his position it isnecessary to become familiarwith the terrain involved. Ofparticular interest is therectangular piece of landbounded on its west side bytheforwardhillsofNewParkand theRomanroadwhere itcrossed the Bannock Burn,

andonitseasternsidebythecrossing places close to thetinysettlementofSkeochandthepointwherethePelstreamand the Bannock Burn meet(seemap).Tothewestoftherectangle the road to StirlingisboundedbyGilliesHillandthe King’s Park while to itseast the Bannock Burneventually disgorges into theRiver Forth. The rectangleitself splits conveniently intotwo,with thePelstreamBurn

asitsdividingline.Ontheuppersectionandto

the west of the rectangle isthe relatively dry land of theKing’s Parkwhere horsemencouldgallopalongitswoodedrides,while to theeastof theRoman road cultivated landstretches for a quarter of amileuntilasteepbank(sheerin places) descends at the 30metre contour on to flat,wetmeadows(carse)stretchingtothe River Forth. During the

fourteenth century the areaclose below the castle wasstill used for gathering peatsfor fuel and it was wet anduneven, but in any case thewhole carse of Stirling southof the castle was dangerousground intersected bysluggishstreamscalled‘pols’from theCeltic, or ‘pows’ inlaterScots.8ProfessorBarrowdescribed these as tending torunthrough‘deeppeatypools

with crumbling, overhangingbanks’.9Thelargestpowwasthe Bannock Burn itself butthe entire area of the carsewas known in the fourteenthcentury as Les Polles, theareaofsluggishstreams.10The lower section of the

rectanglebelowthePelstreamwas, in fact, where the mainbattlefield action would takeplace. Here, looking againfrom west to east, there are

therolling(andwooded)hillsofNewParkwith thicketsoftreesborderingthesideoftheRomanroad.Beyondtheroadis the small plain ofBalquhiderock, including StNinianstownship,wherecornwas grown and subsequentlythreshed in mills along theBannockBurn.Ontheplain’seastern flank the landdescends steeply, at the 30metre contour, to the carsewith its pows and patches of

fresh moss which were astreacherous as quicksand. Atrack follows along the footof thescarpfromitscrossingplaceover theBannockBurnnorthwards towards StirlingCastle. At the base of thewhole segment the BannockBurn represents aconsiderable barrier, bothwhere the Roman roadcrossed it but particularlywhereitrunsthroughagorgeup to 10 metres deep at the

small settlement ofBannock,until its banks become lowerasitenterstheflatcarseland.

Thiswas the area inwhichBruce chose to meet theEnglish army. Although hecould be reasonably sure theEnglish in their haste wouldbelikelytofollowthelineofthe Roman road (if they didnotactuallykeeptoit)hestillhad to decide where best toposition his own forces.Bruce no doubt hoped theEnglisharmy,confidentinitssuperiority,wouldattempttheobviousandkeep to the road

itself, which he could thenstraddlewithhiddenobstaclescoveringthefrontofhistrooppositions. But he also had toconsider other possiblechoices open to them.WhilestillfollowingthedirectionoftheroadtheEnglishcouldfanout along the woods to itswest, but this was unlikelysincearmies,especiallythosewith a large number ofcavalry, are vulnerable inwoods, and Bruce made it

virtually unthinkable byblockingall the trackswithinthe forest. A more probablealternative was for theEnglish to move onto theroad’s eastern flank and tokeep parallel with it throughthecultivatedgroundsouthofSt Ninians, where the goingwas ideal for cavalry. Thiswouldbefarmoredifficulttocounter.Brucehadtodisplayallhis

tactical skills to position his

soldiers so that they couldboth cover the obvious linesof approach and still retainsufficient flexibility to meetany thatwere less likely.Hehadalreadydecidedhismainarmy would depend verylargelyonitsfourdivisionsofspearmen in schiltronformation and on Sunday 23June he posted them. Hepositioned his own strongschiltron to meet the mostlikely English approach,

where the road crossed theBannock Burn, at the placelater commentators havecalled ‘the entry’. The otherthree schiltrons werecommitted to blocking therelativelygoodground to theeast of the road should theEnglish decide to fan outthere. This was much themore difficult option tocounter; as vanguard heplacedMoray’sschiltronatStNinian’skirktothenorthend

of New Park with the twoschiltrons of Douglas andEdward Bruce lying somewaybetweenhimandMoray,Douglas being nearer toMoray(seemap).Intheeventof the English declining touse ‘the entry’ andapproaching along thecornfields, the plan was forMoraytoblocktheiradvance,atwhichpointBruceand theothertwoschiltronscouldfallontheexposedEnglishflanks

andrear.Inadditiontotheschiltrons

the Scots had their 500 lightcavalrywhich their kingwasunwillingtocommittoosoon.Muchwould depend on howthe English decided to usetheir archers. If they wereunwiseenoughtomovethemonto open ground withoutprotection from cavalry orspearmen his small body ofhorsemen might yet play adecisive part. Finally there

wasthequestionofwhatrolehe might give to his campfollowers and servants whowere collectively termed‘small folk’, along withothers who arrived late formuster and who were eithertoo ill-armed or notsufficiently trained to entertheranksoftheschiltrons.Inthe event Bruce decided toplace them to the rear in thevalley between Gillies andCoxet hills, fromwhere they

could be brought up into theactionifthesituationbecamecritical.Having decided on his

dispositions the kingassembled his commandersand formally revealed hisplans. Bruce’s own style ofleadership and the intrinsicmerit and confidence of hisleaders would almostcertainly have led toquestions and somediscussion. In a confident

toneheconfirmedwhatmosthad already come to believe,thattheEnglishwerelikelytopass through New Park,‘unlesstheymarchedbeneath(us) and go over themorass.Thus shall we have them atadvantage … If we fight onfootweshallalwayshavetheadvantage for in the Parkamongthetreesthehorsemenmust always be encumberedand the ditches below mustalso throw them into

confusion’.11ToreinforcehisadvantageBrucealsoadopteda device which he had usedearlier atLoudonHill,wherehe canalised his opponentsalonganarrow track.At ‘theentry’ he honeycombed theground on each side of theRoman road with small pits,orpots, thedepthofaman’sknee (and about a footacross),soclosethatBarbourlikenedthemtothewaxcomb

of a hive.12 Bruce and hismentoiledallSaturdaynight,digging them and thencovering the relatively smallsnares with sticks and grass.This ‘medieval minefield’would be quite enough tobreak horses’ legs andBarbourforonewassatisfiedwiththeeffectivenessofsuchdevices. However, a singlecontemporaryauthority,FriarBaston,whoaccompaniedthe

English,saysthatBrucemadethem more deadly still byplacing iron spikes in theholes. Two latercommentators,ChristisonandTraquair, have gone furtherandspeakofcalthrops(three-prongedironspikes)standingin the pots to maim thehorses.13 Bruce’s intentionwas to force theEnglish intoa position where they couldnotusetheirgreaternumbers,

particularly of horsemen, toadvantage. With ‘minefields’of pots on both flanks theywould be forced onto anarrowfrontwherehewouldmeet them with massedspearmen. In any case withhorsestrappedinthepotsthewhole momentum of thechargewouldslacken.On themorning of Sunday

23 June, the eve of the feastof St John the Baptist, theScots heard mass and ate a

frugal breakfast. After massBruce inspected the pots andthen assembled his forces.Acommander’s address wasoften transmitted (section bysection)byappointedheraldsto the whole army butBruce’s force was so smallandclose-packedthathewentdown the lines talking andlooking into the faces of hismen. Even then, after somany engagements together,he offered them a choice,

namely ‘whatsoever manfoundhisheartnotassuredtostand and win all, and tomaintain thatmightystruggleor die with honour, shouldbetimes leave the field, andthat none should remain butthose who would stand byhim to the end, and take thefortune God sent’.14 As theking fully expected, allanswered with a great shoutthat they would not fail him

for fear of death until thebattlewaswon.At thispointthe servants and ‘small folk’were sent to the base ofGillies Hill for theirprotection.

Meanwhile the English armyhadbegun the final legof itsjourney. Two men hadparticularreasonsforwantingto learn more about theEnglish line of advance andthetacticstheywerelikelyto

adopt. Theywere, of course,Moubray, the Scot whogoverned Stirling Castle forthe English and hadwatchedwith growing unease thecarefuland thoroughScottishpreparations for defence, andBrucehimself.Brucedecidedto send out James Douglastogether with Keith, hiscavalrycommander,toreporton the English army’sprogress. What they in factsaw has been graphically

described by Barbour whowould certainly not want tounder-emphasise the taskBruce faced, ‘… so manybraided banners, standards,and spear pennons, and somany mounted knights allflaming in gay attire, and somany broad battles takingsuchvast space as they rode,asmight,bytheirnumberandbattle array, have dismayedthe greatest and boldest and

besthostinChristendom’.15The observers, of course,

couldnotknowhowtiredtheEnglish felt although theycould have suspected thatunder Edward II’s directionthearmywasprobablynotaswell trained as it might be.There would, of course, beopportunities to test theiropponent’scohesionandtheirdiscipline later but,meanwhile,Bruceorderedhis

observers to say that theenemy were in ‘ill-array’ tohelp raise the spirits of hismen.Sir Philip Moubray came

upon the English army justaftermiddaywhenitwasstillabout three miles from thecastle.To reach themhe hadriddenround theScots’ flankbyway ofGilliesHill and itappears he might have beengiven safe conduct to do so

by Bruce.16 Bruce’s purposehere is not altogether clearbutMoubrayaskedtoseetheking and told him the Scotshad blocked ‘the entry’ andthat any attack upon them inthat region could thereforeprovedifficult. In anycase–and this could have beenBruce’s reason for the safeconduct – he remindedEdward that by comingwithin three miles of the

castle the army hadtechnically relieved it.17 Inpractice the largenumbersofScotsclosebystillcontrolledthearea.What happened then will

never be completely clear.WhileMoubraywasmeetingEdward, theEnglish advanceparty continued to make itsway towards the castle alongthe Roman road. We do notknow whether the king took

Moubray’s warningsseriously or not, norwhetherhe felt he was unable – orunwilling – to stop theadvance party’s approach.However, both the Lanercostchronicler and Thomas GreyinhisScalcronica,areagreedthat for some reasonorothertheadvancepartydidnotstopbut that – in the highlyunlikely case of it sufferingsome check – the Englishdecided to send forward an

additional force of 300horsemen under Sir RobertClifford and Sir HenryBeaumont (Barbourhad theirnumbers as high as 800)alongopengroundtotheeastof the road either to helprelieve the castle or tosurroundthewoodsatitsbaseto prevent the Scots gettingaway.18Whether the English main

body halted before Clifford

and Beaumont’s powerfuldetachmentwasdespatchedisnotaltogetherclear.Itismorethan possible that it did.However, the directionCliffordandBeaumontchosefor their own sweep isindisputable. To reach thecastleunawares theirobviousapproach was by Moubray’sroute, fording the BannockBurn at a point west of theRomanroadandmakingtheirwayroundthebackofGillies

Hill. In fact, theyopted foramuch shorter route, crossingthe burn where the gorgelevelledoutandfollowingthebridlepaththatranbelowthesharp descent onto the carse.They must have thought it agood decision for they couldsee Stirling Castle directlyaheadofthemoutlinedinthebright sun. To theirimmediate front the plainappearedtobeclearofenemytroops and, after they had

forded the fast-flowingPelstream and spurred theirhorses up its further bank, itseemed as if nothing couldprevent them from reachingtheirgoal.Meanwhile, the English

vanguard continued itsprogression up the Romanroad directly towards theScottish positions. IfMoubray had come upon theEnglish column at a pointbehind the vanguard he

would not have been able totell them about the Scots’dispositions and, even if theking had taken Moubray’swarnings seriously anddespatched a herald forward,he would not have reachedthevanguardbeforetheymetthe Scottish opposition.Barbour,foroneisquiteclearthe vanguard were toldnothing of Moubray’swarningsforhedescribesthearmy halting and taking

council whether they shouldpitch camp that night or joinbattle at once. But, saysBarbour, ‘thevanguardknewnothingofthishaltanddelayand rode with good array,without stopping, straight tothe Park’.19 For this tohappen one must questionwhethertheEnglishkingwasfullyincontrolofeventsand,if not, whether he hadappointed one of his veteran

commanders, such asValence, to co-ordinatematters on his behalf. Forwhatever reasons, twoseparate groups were nowrapidly approaching theScottishpositions,thecavalrybattle under Clifford andBeaumontmovingbywayofabridlepathbelowthescarp,seeking a route to StirlingCastle in order to relieve it,and the vanguard, the corpsd’élite of the English army,

movingtowardsthecastlebyway of the Roman road.Neither seemed aware of theother. The English commandsystemwasalreadystartingtounravel.Equallyserious,theEnglish

problems of command werenot only felt at the highestlevel, but further down thehierarchyaswell,forthekinghad allowed bothdetachmentstobeunderjointcommand, a disastrous

situation during a battle. TheRomans had operated theunwieldycommandsystemofconsuls taking control onalternate days, but on eachday no one could doubtwhowas in charge. BarboursuggeststhatCliffordhadthechief command of his andBeaumont’s forces, althoughthis is by no means certain.More serious still, there wasnoacknowledgedcommanderof the vanguard where the

young, spirited Gilbert deClare,EarlofGloucester, theking’s nephew, sharedcommandwith the imperiousHumphreydeBohun,EarlofHereford, hereditaryconstable of England, and abitterrivaloftheClares.Both advancing formations

movedwitha lackofcautionsuggesting theywere still farfrom convinced the Scotswould dare to take on heavycavalry in open battle. A

clash between the Englishand Scottish forces was nowcertain: on what scale andwithwhatresultswouldsoonbecomeevident.

CHAPTEREIGHT

ENCOUNTERS–DAYONE

‘Hastthoufoundme,Omine

T

enemy?’I

Kings21:20

HE ENGLISH VANGUARDPRESSED on through theTorwood. After being

restricted earlier to the paceofthemainbodyitmusthavebeen exhilarating swingingalong the road towards the

castle. They could hardlybelieve they would beallowed to reach itunopposed,butafter the longmarch the previous day theyhadbeenslowtosetofffromFalkirkandasitwasnowlateafternoon Hereford wasconscious there was littletimetostrikeattheScotsthatday. A detachment of youngknights and esquires alongwith some of Hereford’sWelsh soldiers, all well-

mounted, rode ahead of theirseniors. Coming out ofTorwood at Snabhead theycaughtsightoftheirgoal,thegreat castle standing on itslofty grey crags, seeminglyclose enough to touch, withtrails of smoke from itskitchen fires drifting lazilyabove.Before them they sawtheroaddescendintoavalleyand, after making their waydown its steep incline, theycame upon a considerable

stream (the Bannock Burn)thatcrossedit.They splashed through it

andafterclimbingtheroadontheothersideshoutedtoeachother in delight when theysighted a number of Scottishfootsoldiers apparentlywithdrawing into the woodsof the New Park.1 In realitythey were being marshalledinto formation. Bruce’sscouts would certainly have

kept him posted about theprogress of the Englishmainbodybut hemightwell havebeen surprised by the speedyprogress of the vanguard. Itneverseemedtohavecrossedthe minds of the young menthatthedefenders,whosofarhad not contested theirinvasion, would dare towithstand armouredhorsemen in broad daylightandinopencountry.Mostoftheridershadonethought,to

catch the Scots before theyentered the protection of thewoods. Spurring their horsesforwardtheleadinghorsemenrodepell-mell for theenemy.As they were seemingly notaffected by Robert Bruce’s‘pots’ positioned on bothsides of the road it is likelytheyrodestraightdownitandcontinuedtofollowitscourseup the hill towards theenemy’sposition.To the rear of the group

was Hereford’s nephew, SirHenrydeBohun,who, rathermore thoughtful than hisbellicosecompanions,noticedthat although the Scots hadundoubtedly seen them theywere not in fact running forthe protection of the woods.He paused and shrewdlysignalledhismentopullbacka little towards the burn toawait further reinforcements.De Bohun then caught sightofafigurewhorodeoutsome

30 metres in front of theScottish soldiers, dressed inmail, riding a sturdy greyhack with a light hand axehanging from its saddle. Onhis head he wore a conicalsteelheadpiece andabove ita cap of hardened leathersurmounted by a crown. Inspite of his earliercautiousness this wassomething de Bohun couldnot resist: he realised he hadbeen given a unique chance

notonly to endwhat seemedan interminable war but togain personal fame, for didmennot say that theScottishking was the second mostrenowned knight inChristendom? De Bohunhimself was mounted on abarded horse and was fullyarmed and protected. He didnot hesitate. From some 200metres away he lowered hishelm, pointed his lancestraight forward and picking

up his horse cantered acrossthe rough grass towards hisopponent before acceleratinginto a full charge over thefinal50metres.Withsuchanuneven contest, Bruce hadgood reason to seek theprotection of his spearmenbefore re-emerging when hewas properly equipped. Butwhatever prudence mighthave dictated, the Scottishkingwas standing in frontofsoldiers prepared to hazard

their lives for him. In anycase,ashecaughtsightoftheDeBohunarmsontheyoungknight’s surcoat, it wouldhave been hard for him toforget that it was the DeBohunswhohadreceivedhisAnnandale and Carrickestates after they had beenseized by Edward I. Brucecoollyheldhisgroundandletthe young knight thunderclose until, a moment beforethe galloping rider could

impale him, he pulled awayfrom De Bohun’s line ofstrike, remaining closeenoughtoraisehimselfinhisstirrups and swing his axedown upon the knight’shelmet. His stroke was tosuchgoodeffect that the axe‘cloveskullandbrain’beforeitsshaftbroke.Bruce’s first blow of the

campaign had a predictableeffect on his followers.Withatriumphantshouttheymade

a concerted forwardmovement with their spearsextended to meet the rest oftheEnglishvanguardthathadfollowedDeBohunbutasthevanguard attempted to formup into battle order itexperienced seriousdifficulties with Bruce’s‘pots’. In the subsequentmeleé De Bohun’s squire,whogallantly rushedforwardto stand over his fallenmaster, was killed, while

Gloucester the English co-commander was unhorsed.The clash developed into aconsiderable engagement inwhich Bruce’s full schiltrontookpart.Itendedwhen,aftersuffering a number ofcasualties and being unsurehow far the ‘pots’ extendedonbothsidesoftheroad,theEnglish withdrew down thelineoftheroadtothesouthoftheBannockBurn.TheScotscommenced to pursue but

they were recalled by Brucelesttheylostcohesionandletthemselves becomevulnerable to the horsemen.When they came back thesoldiers gathered round theirkingindelight,althoughtheircommanders,consciousofhisunique importance to theircause,reproachedhimforhisrash action. Bruce made noattempttojustifyhimselfandseemed quite content to lethis deeds speak for

themselves, except formakingthewrycommentthathe was sorry to have brokenhisgoodaxe.2Whilethisengagementwas

taking place, the secondEnglish cavalry force hadalso been advancing; aftercrossing the Pelstream theywere almost level with StNinians. The route they hadtakenalongthecarsehadnotbeen anticipated by Bruce,

although Moray’s scoutsshould have picked them upbelowStNinian’skirk.Inthestress of action Scottishleadership was also showingsome deficiencies, although,if the English actedpredictably, there was still afair chance to retrieve thesituation. Inevitably it wasBruce who spotted Cliffordand Beaumont ridingnorthwardsintheirattempttocircle New Park from the

east.Morayhimselfwhowaswith the king rather than hisown schiltron was quiteunaware of the Englishmovement and Bruce turnedon himwith a flash of angertelling him that, ‘a rose hadfallen from his chaplet’. Inother words, he had let hisking down by allowingEnglishcavalry tomovepasthim, thus heavilycompromising the Scottishdefensive position. At this,

Moray turned and rodehurriedly back to his men,just in time to lead them outof thewoodsnearStNiniansand make towards thearmouredknights.

Beaumont was in the leadand although he could haveswung his riders round thespearmen and, by makingstraight for thecastle, cutoffthe Scots’ retreat, noEnglishman at this timeseemed willing to avoid abattle. Beaumont’s firstreactionwastheneedtomakespaceinordertosurroundthespearmen and he shouted atthose close to him, ‘Let uswait a little; let them come

on;givethemroom’.3Besidehim the veteran Sir ThomasGreywaslesssanguineaboutseekingbattleinthiswayandwith the prospects ofunsupported cavalry againstmassed spearmen. He turnedto Beaumont and said: ‘Mylord,givethemwhatyoulikenow;I’mafraidthatinashortwhile they will haveeverything.’ What Grey’ssombre words meant is not

clear but there was likely tohavebeenbadground tooneormoreoftheirflankswhichprevented the English fromtaking full advantageof theirmobility. With the exceptionofGrey and, no doubt, somefew others, the vast majorityof English knights seemedhaunted by the possibility ofshowing any trace of fearagainst their Scottishopponents and incapable ofconsidering more measured

actions against them.Beaumont’s hot and utterlyinappropriate rejoinder toGreywas, ‘Flee then. Flee ifyou’re afraid.’ Grey shoutedback,‘Fearwillnotmakemeflee, my Lord,’ and, inmindlessgallantry,hespurredhis horse on betweenBeaumont and Sir WilliamDeyncourtwhowereheadingstraight for the spears.Deyncourt was killedimmediately while the Scots

pulled Grey off his dyinghorseandtookhimprisoner.A fierce and prolonged

engagement followed as therest of the cavalry came up.UnderMoray’scommand theScottish infantry took upcircularformationastheyhadbeen taught and presented adouble line of spear pointstowards the horsemen. They,lacking archers, had nochoice but to move aroundthem, then charge forward at

anypossiblegapappearinginthe ranks. The spearmen settheir points straight forward,directlyatthehorses,probingfor vulnerable areas. If themounts could be broughtdown their armoured riderswere likely to be pinnedunder them, or if the horsesreared up in face of theblood-stained tips, someriders would suffer heavyfalls and find themselveslying helpless on the ground

amidthreshinghooves.It was the same story as

Falkirk until Edward Ibroughtuphisarchers.Asthemembers of the schiltronstood shoulder to shoulderofferinganimpenetrablewallof spears it appearedinvincible. The Englishmounted attack after attackwithout success and, in theirrage and frustration at notbreaking through the shieldwall their knights hurled

spears, darts and maces –even swords – into the heartof the formation in vainattempts to maim itsoccupants,untilapileofsuchweapons built up inside it.Whereas the English werewithout bowmen, there werepossiblysomemenwithintheschiltrons carrying shortbowswhobrought downbothmenand horses, although EvanBarron, forone,wassure theLanercost chronicler was

more likely to be describingindividual footsoldiers who,dashing out from the spearwalls, stabbed and cut downtheirfallenassailantsatclosequartersor,ashappenedwithThomas Grey, dragged theminside the spear walls to beheldprisoner.The noise and movement

created by the horsemensurrounding the beleagueredschiltron was unceasing. Yetalthough theEnglishcavalry,

like a pack of hunting dogsaround a boar, had trappedthespearmentheywerequiteunable to get beneath theirspear tusks to reach theformation’s soft underbelly.All thoughts about thecavalry’s tacticalobjectiveofjoining up with the castle’sgarrisonwereforgottenas, intheir pride and rage at beingthwartedbyfootsoldiers,theymounted sally after sallyagainst their obdurate

opponents. The plunginghorses raised choking cloudsof dust around the schiltronwhile a cloud of steam roseabove it from the close-packed spearmen clad inthick tunics and clumsybassinets, as they strained tokeep the heads of their long,unwieldy spears facingforward.James Douglas, who

commanded the schiltronnearest to Moray’s, and was

never happier than when hewas fighting, approached theking with offers of help. Atfirst Bruce refused. He wasconfident of the schiltron insuchconditions,andsurethathe detected some waveringamongsttheattackers.Morayshouldbeallowedtotakehisrightful credit. However,whenafterafurtherperiodofdin and dust matters stillremained unresolved Bruceeventually agreed toDouglas

joining in. As Douglasbrought his spearmen closertoMorayhesawthekingwasright: the English attackswere plainly losingmomentum as their knightsbecamebaffledandfrustratedatbeingkeptatspears’lengthby the Scottish formation.Chivalrously he stopped hisownschiltrontoallowMorayawell-earnedvictory,butthevery sight of his approachconfused the English cavalry

andsomeattempted towheelabout to meet the freshenemy.At this Moray saw his

opportunity and assumed theoffensive, charging rightthrough their ranks.Onepartof the broken Englishsquadron galloped towardsthe castle, while the largeronemade for themainarmy.Bothwereseentobeingreatdisorder after sufferingserious casualties and

following such a surprisingturn of events. Amazingly,duringthewholeengagementMoray’s schiltron lost justone yeoman, although manyof his men were bound tohave sustained cuts andbruises.Wornoutandsoakedin sweat, at Moray’scommand his men slumpeddownontheground,tookofftheir helmets and began torelishtheirtriumph.Theyhadseen off the enemy – for a

time at least. After a scoutreported their victory to theking, together with theamazingly low casualtyfigures, the rest of the armymoved over to congratulatethemandsalutetheearl.4In the exhilaration of the

moment suchmen – or theiropponents for that matter –would scarcely have beenaware that their successmarkedanewdevelopmentin

warfare. The signs had beenthere at Falkirk beforeEdward I intervenedwithhisarchers, but now spearmenhad not only defendedthemselves successfullyagainst armoured cavalry,theyhadthenmovedontotheoffensiveanddriventhemoffthe field. While in 1302, atCourtrai, Flemish peasantinfantryprotectedbyastreamhad defeated French nobilityontheirhorses,Moray’smen,

unlike the Flemings,challenged cavalry in theopenandongoodground.By the time Clifford

returned to the main Englisharmy he was compelled toadmit he had failed to openuparouteforthemtorelieveStirling. In any case, it wasnow so late that no furtheroffensive action could becontemplated before thefollowingday.AlthoughtheEnglishlosses

during thatafternoonhadnotbeen heavy and they stillretained theirgreatnumericalsuperiority, the effect of thetwoclasheson themoraleofboth armieswas tremendous.As the English chronicler ofLanercost said: ‘From thatmomentbeganapanicamongthe English and the Scotsgrew bolder.’5 Napoleon, agreat commander by anystandard, considered good

morale crucial for success,goingasfarastosaythatthiswastothematerialasthreeistoone. If thatwerereallyso,theeventsatBannockburnonday one were worth aminimum of 5000 extramentoRobertBruceandhisarmy.Whatever the effects, with abreak in hostilitiescommanders on both sideshad the opportunity to digestthe lessons of the earlyencounters and decide on

theiractionsforthenextday.

CHAPTERNINE

WEIGHINGTHEODDS

‘Heeitherfearshisfatetoomuch,OrhisdessertsaresmallThatputsitnotuntothetouch

B

Towinorloseitall.’

JamesGraham,1stMarquisofMontrose

OTH SIDES NOW HAD toconsider their nextmoves. Among the

English there was someconfusionandamoodofnewcaution,1replacingtheearlierblind presumption of victory

andcontemptfortheirenemy.As yet, however, apart fromthe cavalry detachments, noone in the English army hadeven seen the enemy, muchless contacted them.Most ofthe soldiers were not onlyunaware of what was goingon but were unable to breakranks to find out. In thecircumstances, the cavalrywould have been reluctant toproclaim their misfortunes,and hard news would be

substituted by rumours, thescourge of any militaryorganisation. However, thesight of once proud knightsreturning, weaponless, somewith their surcoats ripped ormissing, others bloodstainedand leading injured horses,needed no embellishing.Rumours said they had runfrom infantry spearmen andsome of the footsoldierswould have been less thanhuman if they had not been

pleased to see the cavalry‘peacocks’ so humbled. Atthesametimethesemenwerebound to feel that if Scottishspearmen could beat Englishcavalry what chance wouldthey, ordinary English leviesso despised by their ownhorsemen,haveagainstthem?Standing immobile along theroadside the English hadample time to wonderwhether their latest invasionwould prove as easy as they

had been led to believe.Barbour had the traditionallysuperstitious soldierswhispering together ‘in fivehundred places or more’saying, ‘Our Lords willalways use their mightagainst the right and whenthey wage war unrighteouslyGod is offended and bringsmisfortune and so it mayhappennow’.2Manymust have suspected

that something had alreadygone seriously wrong for aking whom everyone knewwas no equal to his fatherwhen it came to eitherfightingorpraying.The rankandfilequiteexpectedhimtosharetheirownbarons’scornfor footsoldiers but to theiralarm he was also generallythought to have little regardfor archers either.3 As theywaited amid the lengthening

shadows their draughtanimals would have grownfractious in their need forwater and grazing. After thephysical demands of thejourney both men andanimals were tired and thelonger the army stoodimmobile the greater thesoldiers’conviction–andformany their relief – that therewould be no further fightingthat day. Not all the leviesswept into the ranks by the

sheriffs’ summons were themostenthusiasticor fittestofsoldiers, nor were theyenamoured by the long hothours spent plodding alongdusty roads in a countrystripped of people andlivestock. Such men wouldnot hesitate to admit theirweariness and start enquiringwhen and where they wouldbemakingcamp.Insuchcircumstancesgood

leadershipwasofthegreatest

importance, but instead ofshowing himself to his armythe king sent heralds downtheseeminglyendlesscolumnto explain and justify therecentsetbacks.Themessagethey carried was reasonableenough. So far, they told thesoldiers, there had been onlyskirmishing but ‘in the greatbattletheycouldbynomeansfail, and thatwhen the Scotsfled full amends should

indeedbemade’.4Nohintofplunder, however, couldchange what these menalreadyknew.Theirso-calledinvincibleknightshadalreadybeen given bloody noses. Inallfairnessonehastowonderwhat else could have beendone, although the samemessagedeliveredwithanairofauthoritybythekingorhissenior representative wouldsurely have been far more

effective. But it is unlikelyEdwardappointedadeputy;itprobably suited him better tokeep his nobles in perpetualrivalryofeachother.Yetadecisionwasrequired

urgently; it was getting lateand the Scots still held theentry route to the castle. Anarmystretchedalongmilesofroadhadtobegatheredintoasuitableassemblyareabeforeit could resume offensiveaction the next day. The

English commanders knew itwas imperative they madecamp and brought theirscattered units together butgiven Bruce’s renownedaggressiveness – and recentsuccesses – the chosenlocationhadtobesuitablefordefence against any surprisehitandrunattacksduringthenight. The nature of theground before the castle andthe very size of the forcemade selection difficult. The

army could, of course, havebeen drawn back intoTorwood but retracing theirstepsinsuchawaywouldnothave been good for moraleandtheforestwouldgivetheenemy good opportunities toapproach unobserved.Equally important in such alocation, water was likely tobe short and their animals,includingtheprecioushorses,werebecomingdehydrated.After the armyhad learned

about the unexpected rebuffsto its cavalry any decisionwasboundtobesomethingofa compromise, especially asthere seems to have been noprior consideration aboutsuitable laagering areasbeforethecastle.Ithadneverbeen thought they would beneeded. In the event theEnglish commanders decidedtosend theircavalry,and thegreater part of their infantryontothecarselandtwomiles

eastwards away from theScots’ positions both at theentry and in the region of StNinians. Most of the heavytransport would, however,have to laager nearer theroad. Another seemingadvantageofthesitewasthatit allowed the cavalry andinfantry to move beyond thedeep gorge containing theBannock Burn to a pointwhere the land levelled outand they would be able to

fordtheburnrelativelyeasily.Although many of theiraccompanyingwagonswouldstill be unable to cross over,the carse promised plenty ofwateranditwasopenenoughto prevent any surpriseattacks from the Scots. Suchthinking was legitimateenough;butwhattheEnglishdid not fully anticipate wasthe scale of the problemsinvolved inmaking camp onsuch wet and treacherous

terrain,northoseposedbyitsconfiningwatercourses.Both Barbour and Grey

describedthechosenlocality.Barbour is quite matter-of-fact: ‘The host thereforequartered that night in thecarseandmadeallready,andgottheirgearinorderagainstthe battle. Because of thepools in the carse theybrokedown house and thatch andcarried themtomakebridgesthat theymight pass over…

so that before day they hadbridged the pools, and thehosthad all passedover, andwiththeirhorsesoccupiedthefirm ground, and, arrayed intheirgear,stoodreadytogivebattle.’5 Barbour probablythought he hardly needed toemphasise theyhadstruggledall night to get so organised,especially as any colourfuldescription of Englishexhaustion would tend to

detract from the performanceofhisScottishchampionsthefollowing day. TheEnglishman Grey gives analtogether darker picture.‘The king’s host whichhaving already left the roadthrough the wood haddebauched upon a plain nearthewater of theRiver Forth,beyondBannockburn,anevil,deep, wet marsh where thesaid English armyunharnessedandremainedall

night, having sadly lostconfidence and being toomuch disaffected by theevents of the day.’6 TheLifeof Edward II confirmed theEnglish had moved over theBannockBurntothecarse,asdid the Lanercost Chronicle,describing the obstacle as ‘agreatditchintowhichthetidecomes from the sea, calledtheBannockburn’.7ThemassiveEnglishforces,

unsettled by conflictingrumours about the reversessuffered by their heavycavalry,were about to spendan exhausting and sleeplessnight on the carse with theirhigh command still far fromunanimous about the king’swishtofightthenextday.The Scots were in a very

different position although atthis stage they had notdecided on their own courseof action. By now Bruce

knew any coming battlewould not take place on hischosen site where theBannock Burn crossed theRoman road to Stirling. Hecould not expect to trap theEnglish in his minefield asecond time. In any casehavingmoved onto the carsethe English were mostunlikelytoreturntotheentrypoint before resuming theirprogresstothecastle.Bruce’sknowledgeofthegroundand

the decision taken by theEnglishcommanderstocampon thecarse ledhim to thinkthe invaders would nowchoose to advance over theopen ground between theNew Park and the carse,where defenders could notuse woodland for protectionand which was too wide for‘pots’ to be dug to hamperthem. It also representedrelatively good terrain forcavalry. Bruce, too, had an

important decision to make.Having inflicted twohumiliating reverses on hisopponents he could either besatisfied with that andwithdraw westwards to wildcountry where the Englishcould not pursue him, or optforthemuchmorehazardouschoice of taking on the greatEnglish host. While the firstwasbymuchthesafercourseof action it would allow theEnglish to claim they had in

fact succeeded in theircampaign objective, namelythe relief of Stirling Castle.There are two versions ofhow he arrived at hisdecision.The first account by

Barbourreferredtotheperiodbefore the English hadmadecamp when Moray’svictorious schiltron rejoinedtheScots’mainarmyandwassurrounded by happy andexcited men. Barbour has

Bruce taking the opportunityof sounding outmany of thesoldiers standing together byputting the most crucial ofquestions to them, speakingasfollows:

‘I am full well assuredthat many an (English)heart shall waver thatseemed erstwhile ofmightyvalour.Andiftheheart be dismayed, thebodyisnotworthamite.

I trow, therefore, that agoodendingshall followthis beginning.Nevertheless, I say notthis to you in order thatyeshallfollowmydesiretofight;forwithyouwillrest the whole matter. Ifyou think it expedientthat we fight, we shallfight; and if ye will thatwe depart, your desirewill be fulfilled. I shallconsent to do in either

fashion right as ye shalldecide. Therefore speakplainlyyourdesire.’

Barbourhas themrespondinginaheroicvein:

‘Good King, withoutmoredelay,tomorrow,assoon as ye see light,ordainyouwhollyforthebattle. We shall not failyouforfearofdeath,norshall any effort be

wanting till we havemadeourcountryfree.’8

It sounds almost too good tobe true, although the Scots’initial success against theEnglish cavalry would havedonewondersformoraleandaportionofthesemenwouldhave already accompaniedBruce during some of hisearlier engagements againstEnglish forces. After hissuccesses they were quite

likely to be happy to go onfollowing him. TheEnglishman Grey gaveanother version. He said theScots being well satisfiedwith their day’s work aftercalling a conference of theirsenior commanders, haddecided to break offhostilities and were on thepoint ‘of decamping in orderto march during the night tothe Lennox’ when SirAlexander Seton, a Scots

knight in theEnglishservice,repelled by the lack ofleadership and sense ofdefeatismintheircamp,madehiswaytoBruceandtoldtheking, ‘MyLordKing, this isthetimeifeveryouintendtoundertake to reconquerScotland. The English havelost heart and arediscouraged, and expectnothing but a sudden, openattack.’ He described theirunhappy condition and

pledged his head on pain ofbeinghangedanddrawn,thatif he (Bruce) would attackthemonthemorrowhewoulddefeat them easily without(much)loss.9Setonwasunlikely to have

been fully trusted in spite ofhis offering to stake his lifeontheaccuracyofhisreport.Thenewshebrought,though,gave Bruce further evidencefor his growing conviction

thattheEnglishactionssofarhadbeenfarfromimpressive.He realised well enough thatas yet he had repulsed onlytwo relatively small Englishdivisions, albeit from thecream of the English cavalryand it would inevitably bevery different when hissoldiers had to face the fullEnglish army, with itsunrivalled complement ofcavalry who this time wouldbe supported by archers and

overwhelming numbers ofinfantry. Conversely afterblundering into his preparedpositions the English hadcompounded their difficultiesbydecidingtomakecampona stretch of wet and brokencarseland. For such reasons,whetherornotBruceandhiscommanders had actuallydecided to move away, theynow decided to take on themassiveEnglisharmy.Understandably, neither

sideenjoyedmuchsleep.TheEnglish cavalry spentvirtually the whole night inutilising planks and beamsstripped from nearby housestohelpmovetheirhorsesandstores onto firm ground and,once there they kept aproportion of their excitablechargersbittedandtackeduptomeet any surprise Scottishattacks. As for the Englishinfantry allotted the wettestpartofthecarse,withnotents

for shelter, they dulled theirdiscomfort from soddengarments and clouds ofvoracious insectswith strongdrink, keeping up theircourage with endless shoutsof ‘Wassail’ and‘Drinkhail’.10 The few whodid not join in would havefound it difficult if notimpossible to sleep throughthe noise. Such revelling,which must have been

countenanced by theirleaders, was not good fordiscipline nor for the coolheads needed on the comingday. As Friar Bastonsubsequently wrote bitinglyabout their revels, ‘They killthee Scotland with vainwords upbraiding’.11 In anycase, at this time of year thenight was remarkably short;at Stirling it was down tothree hours of dusk rather

than full darkness, and asearly as 3.45 a.m. on the 24June the lightening of dawnbegantobeapparent.

BythentheScottishkinginarepeatofEdwardI’sactionsbefore the battle of Falkirk,whenhehadsenthisarmytohear mass, made hisconfessiontoMaurice,AbbotofInchaffrayandcommandedhimandotherpriests tooffermass for his soldiers whichtheydidonasmallfeatureatthe edge of awood.12 AbbotMaurice had brought therelics of St Fillan to whom

Bruce was devoted, andAbbot Bernard of Arbroathcarried the casket containingthe remains of St Columba(the Monymusk reliquary)withwhichtoblessthearmy.BysuchmeansBrucehadhistroops commit their bodiesandsoulsintothesafekeepingof their Maker and as afurther pledge of their faithonthisimportantfeastdayofSt John the Baptist they ateplain bread and water. After

their frugal meal they beganto assemble in theirrespective schiltrons carryingdistinguishing banners as theking had commanded them.When the ranks were drawnup they watched Brucecarrying out the traditionalceremony of knightingselected individuals,including the young WalterStewartandhecreatedJamesDouglasaknightBanneret(asenior cavalry commander),

an award conferred only onthe battlefield. They wouldhave seen the king slashingoff the forks of Douglas’knight’s pennon with hissword and replacing it withthe banneret’s squarestandard.Such religions and civil

ceremonies both helped toremind Bruce’s men whatwasrequiredofthemandalsoserved to emphasise theworthoftheirleaders.Shortly

afterwards Bruce addressedthe assembled army withwords that sounded the samethemes. His speech wasrecorded by Bernard, Abbotof Arbroath, Bruce’schancellor who, some sixyears later, was almostcertainly responsible for thedeclaration sent fromArbroath to the Pope insupport of Scotland’sindependence. Bruce’saddresswas notable not only

for its powerful moral andpatriotic tone but also for itsegalitarianism:

My lords, my people,accustomed toenjoy thatfullfreedomforwhichintimes gone by theKingsof Scotland have foughtmany a battle. For eightyears or more I havestruggled with muchlabourformyrighttotheKingdom and for

honourable liberty. Ihave lost brothers,friends and kinsmen.Your own kinsmen havebeen made captive, andbishops and priests arelocked in prison. Ourcountry’s nobility haspoured forth its blood inwar. These barons youcan see before you, cladin mail, are bent upondestroying me andobliteratingmykingdom,

nay, our whole nation.They do not believe wecan survive. They gloryin their warhorses andequipment. For us, thenameoftheLordmustbeour hope of victory inbattle … if you heartilyrepent of your sins youwill be victorious, underGod’scommand.

Finally Bruce offeredmaterial benefits to those

among his men who likemanyothersoldiersdowntheages,would have joined himto escape from the law,probably for misdemeanourscommitted in their nativetownships or localities ‘Asfor offences committedagainsttheCrown,Iproclaima pardon, by virtue of myroyalpower,toallthosewhofight manfully for thekingdomofourfathers’.13

For the men of substanceBrucepromisedtheremissionoffeudalduesfortheheirsofany killed in battle. Bruce’sordertocommencehostilitiesfollowed immediately. Notonly had he decided to fightbut he devised a calculatingand highly daring plan, onethat depended on his armybeing able to confine theEnglish within the area oftheir chosen camp. With thetwo armies so close together

hewas unable to conceal hispreparationsandasitbecamefully light English scoutsreported that the Scotsseemed fully prepared forbattle.In contrast, on the English

side there was no suchurgency,virtuallytheirwholeconcern over the last fewhourshadbeenmakingcampinwhat had turned out to bemost difficult circumstances.Theyassumed theywouldbe

able to move their army’sdifferent units into battleformation before proceedingtowardsthecastle,whetherornot they were to meetopposing forces on the way.The news of the Scots’preparednessthereforecaughttheEnglishleadersoffguard.The night before Edward’sveterancommanders,togetherwith the Earl of Gloucester,hadrecommendedpostponingany advance on Stirling

Castle for twenty-four hours.Both moral and practicalarguments were voicedagainst advancing the nextday, namely that it was asaints day – a fact not ratedthat highlyby theking–butmore importantly becausemuch reordering of theirformationswasneededbeforetheycouldmeetanassembledenemy,andinanycase,afteritshardmarch, thearmywasclose to exhaustion. None of

these considerations seemedtocarrymuchweightwiththeking nor with the hot-bloodsamong his councillors towhom any further delay wasanathema.Notwithstanding such

different points of viewwithin the English camp,even those who counselledcaution and time to balancethe army did not proposetaking up a position of all-round defence involving

mixed units of cavalry,bowmen and infantry. Noneof the English commandersconsidered the possibility ofanattackbytheScottishmainarmy. This was particularlyso with the king. While hemay have felt some slightreservationsaftertheoutcomeof the previous day, hedeclared himself fullyconfident in his far superiorforce and it seems thatdetailed tactics were

apparently not discussed atanytime.Infairness,standingthere on broken groundenclosedbytwotidalstreamswithamajorriverathisback,any commanderwould knowthat major changes information would best be leftuntil the army moved outontotheplain,whereitcouldexpect to meet the Scots ifthey tried to block itsprogress to the castle. In anyevent,thereseemednoundue

haste for, although the Scotswere apparently ready tomeet them, and they had putcavalry to flight on theprevious day, they wouldneverdareleavetheshelteroftheir prepared positions toattack the entire Englisharmy.Before recounting the

dramatic events of the battleit is worth being as clear aspossible about its locationanditishopedthereaderwill

find themap at p123 helpfulhere. Although we arefortunate to havecontemporary descriptions ofthe battle, recounted as theyare in considerable detail,there are still conflictingtheories about exactly wherethemainScottishandEnglisharmies met. The initialproblem arises because intheir descriptions, neitherJohn Barbour nor ThomasGrey gave the battle a clear

name (which would surelyhavehelpedtopinpointit).Infact, twonameswereusedinletters written about it from1314–19: Englishmen calledit the battle of Stirling andearly Scottish writers (fromthe early fourteenth until thefifteenth century) referred toit as thebattleofBannock,14both versions giving way tothegeneral title, thebattleofBannockburn.

It would be far simpler ifthe different interpretationshad been restricted to theseplace names but over theyears historians on the battlehave come up with fourdifferentsiteswithavariationof up to twomiles. It seemshardly credible that despitethehighlyacidicnatureofthesoil, there should be noevidence of the mass gravesdug after the battle whichwould materially help define

its location. However, adetailedanalysisofthesoilinthemost likely areas has yetto be carried out andunfortunately much recentbuilding has made any suchstudy considerably moredifficult, if not impossible.Withnoclearscientificproofone can only continue, likeearlier historians, to makedeductions from thecontemporary accounts,combined with a detailed

examinationoftheground.Thefirst,ortraditional,site

was at the borestone to thewest of the map’s lowersegment which adjoins thepresent National Trustheritage centre and RobertBruce’s great equestrianstatue. This can be rapidlyeliminated. While Bruceconceivably used the area ofthe borestone to watch theEnglish army approach theBannockBurnandplacedhis

reserveinitsgeneralvicinity,it is virtually certain that themain battle on 24 June wasnot fought there. Admittedlyin 1913, the same year asWilliam Mackay MacKenziepublished his pioneeringaccountof thebattle, anothercommentator was still of thebelief that the site of theborestone was not open todoubt, but followingMacKenzie’s powerfularguments against this

location no serious authorityhas subsequently supportedit.15 Contemporary accountsof the battle describeenclosed flanks and thedifficulties experienced bythe English in getting theirinfantry forward – but whiletheborestonesitetothenorthof the Bannock Burn offerssome protection for theScottisheast flankbyasteepslope, on the opposite flank

open ground gives ampleopportunity for cavalry,together with supportinginfantry, to circle and thuscompromise the wholeScottishposition.MacKenzie argued that the

true site was on the carse ofStirling,nearMuirtown,sometwo miles northeast of theborestone and almost thesame distance from thevillage of Bannock. On thissite the opposing forces

wouldbeconfinedwithinthewater courses of the Forthand the Bannock Burn. YetMacKenzie’s site was onlyhalf the story. Unlike earliercommentators, who placedtheScottisharmynorthoftheBannock Burn and theEnglish to its south,MacKenzie turned theopposingforcesroundalmostninety degrees to have theScots facing east and theEnglish confronting them

from a westerly directionwithinanareaboundedbytheBannock Burn and anenclosing bend of the riverForth. Along with hisrelentless and carefulreasoningMacKenziecitedinconfirmation an illustrationfrom an early manuscript ofthe Scotichronicon whichshows the Scots atBannockburn with StirlingCastle to their left and theBannock Burn on their

right.16Although subsequent

commentators have acceptedMacKenzie’s east/westalignment theyhavedisputedhis proposed location.Professor Barrow, forinstance,haspointedout thatMacKenzie mistakenlyinterpreted the Celtic word‘pol’ as pool, whereas polswere, in fact, sluggishstreams. Barrow concluded

that MacKenzie’s confusionabout the pols led him toplacehissiteinthebuckleoftheForthfurthertotheeastofBannockburnvillage than thedescriptions indicated.According to Barrow thename of the battle alsocontradicted MacKenzie’s‘fareastern’site. If thebattlehad been fought that far eastitwouldhavecontinuedtobenamed after Stirling ratherthan Bannock, a long-

establishedsettlementquoted,for instance, in theChronicleof Melsa during the earlyfifteenth century.17 If,following MacKenzie’sdetailed arguments, theborestone site to the extremewest is rejected and,following Barrow,MacKenzie’s Muirtown siteto the extreme east is alsorejected, one is left with alocation within an area

stretching from the Dryfield(where corn was planted)eastwards to the carse ofBalquhiderock.Although this rules out the

sites at the two extremitiestheproblemremainsofwherethe two sides clashed withinthe carse of Balquhiderock.The Rev Thomas Millerwriting with BrigadierGeneralCarruthersin1931,18favoured the area of the

Dryfield to the west of thecarse (also supported byProfessor Barrow) but in thelate1950sGeneralChristisonargued powerfully for a sitesomewhat further east, at themouthofatriangleformedbythe Bannock Burn, itstributary the PelstreamBurn,and the steep slopedescendingfromtheDryfieldat thebaseofwhich runs thebridle path from Bannock to

Stirling.19ChristisoncitesthePelstream Burn as playing avital part in confining theEnglish army. This site iscurrently supported by theNational Trust for Scotland,although later writers remaindivided on the question.Ronald McNair Scott20supportsChristison’sversion,while Peter Traquair21 inreverted to theMiller/Carruthers

interpretation, reasoning thatwith his relatively smallforces Bruce needed to fightonanarrower front than thatof Christison’s site. Tosupport his interpretationTraquair endeavoured topoint out instances of deepgulliesontheDryfieldthathebelievescouldhaveprotectedBruce’sflanks.After walking the ground

and considering the differentproposals against a series of

earlymapsunclutteredbythewide-ranging modernbuildingsandbefore the landwas so extensively drained,the author comes to virtuallythe same conclusions asChristison. Christison’s maincontributions have been toconsider the role of thePelstream Burn in confiningthe English right flank – fortheScots to think they couldwin they must have beenconfident about some

obstacle here in addition tothe Bannock Burn on theEnglish left flank – and torejectthepossibilityofheavycavalry climbing the steepescarpment bordering theDryfieldinordertoapproachtheScotsposition.Infact,theold general was very fiercewith Mr Hugo Millar,secretary of the GlasgowArchaeologicalSociety–andother civilian analysts –whowerequitepreparedtoaccept

thattheEnglishclimbedontothe escarpment. As anexperienced soldier he toldMillarthat‘acriticalstudyofthe military factors of timeandspace,physicalobstacles,fatigue, morale, training,discipline, armament,leadership and tactics isabsolutely vital in appraisingany battle, however old’.Christisonaskedhimwhetherhe (could) really see EdwardII moving up it at night or

even less probably, sendinghisheavycavalrychargingupsuch a steep escarpmentagainst the Scots entrenchedinawell-preparedposition.22Aftercheckingthescarp,itisindeed hard to envisageheavy destriers being set upit, especially as there are noreferences in thecontemporary descriptions tothe monumental difficultiesthat would have been

experienced during such anundertaking or to the Scotsmoving back to enable theEnglish to occupy it. If theEnglish did not climb thescarp, then GeneralChristison’s picture of theEnglish being trapped withinanarrowpocketofcarseeastof the scarp, bounded by thePelstream and Bannockburns,with theForth to theirrear, carries the mostconviction.

Another problem is raisedwith Peter Traquair’sassertionthattheneckoflandbetween the two burns wasover one and a half mileswide. In this case, one mustagreewithhimthat thesmallScottisharmycouldnotblockthe mouth of the pocketeffectively. However, furtherworkonthemapsrevealsthatthe actual dimensions of thelandbetweenthetwoburnsisnot 1.5 miles but somewhat

lessthan0.7ofamilewide,adistance which the Scottishforces could certainly haveoccupiedwiththeirspearmen.This was confirmed by re-walking the ground andchecking the course of thetwo burns on either side ofthechokepoint.TheBannockBurngaveno troublesince itis well defined throughout,although it has been robbedof much water by hydroschemesand isno longer the

torrent it was in thefourteenth century when itslevel was raised further bytidal waters from the RiverForth. With the extensivedrainage of the surroundingarea its banks are no longersoslipperyalthoughthedepthof thegorgeonbothsidesofthe present township ofBannockburnisstilldaunting.The Pelstream Burn is verymuch diminished due tomajor changes in the

surrounding water tabletogether with drainage and‘smoothing’ of the oncebroken carseland foragricultural use. However,despite everything its courseis still clearly definable andthe burn continues to be fastflowing.Although today it isdifficult to imagine such anarrow stream acting as agenuineobstacleagainstbothcavalry and infantry it mustbe remembered that in the

fourteenthcenturyit,too,wastidalwhereitflankedtheareaof the battlefield. In additionwithinlivingmemorythebeltof land stretching from itsfurther bank continued to beexceedingly treacherous andlocal people have citedinstances of horses beingdrowned there as late as the1950s. After checking thedimensions between the twoburns and considering thenature of the two water

courses during the fourteenthcentury, Christison’sarguments for the battletakingplaceeastwardsof theDryfield within the carse ofBalquihiderock seemoverwhelming.Workingon suchpremises,

I have indicated on map 3where I believe the Englishwere camped, together withthepositionsoftheirScottishadversaries during the nightof 23/24 June 1314, and

where the clash between thetwoarmiestookplace.

CHAPTERTEN

BATTLEJOINED

‘Letusdoordie!’

RobertBurns,Bruce’sMarchtoBannockburn

HAVING CONCLUDED THERELIGIOUS and knightlyceremonies and

delivered his powerful, iftraditional, address beforebattle, Bruce gave themomentous order to advanceacross the open carse againstthe mighty English army,treblethestrengthofhisfrontline units and equipped withfarsuperiorweapons,lyinginits encampment between theBannock and Pelstream

burns.This was the second

definitive moment forScotland in the Wars ofIndependence, the first beingWilliam Wallace’s blast onhis horn at Stirling Bridgethat signalled the charge ofhistroopsdowntheslopesofAbbeyCraigontotheEnglishformations confined in thebend of the river below.Given the enormous risks,Bruce’s directive was only

possible because of theinnovativewayhehadtrainedhis schiltrons to moveforwardinechelonformation.Despite the clashes of thepreviousday,andtheforwarddash made by Moray’sschiltron against Clifford’sopposing cavalry, BrucehopedtheEnglishwouldstillview his schiltrons asessentially defensiveformations, like WilliamWallace’s, and fail to

appreciate fully how vitaltheir mobility was for hisplans.Leaving the protection of

the woods the first threeschiltrons picked their waydown the steep inclineof theDryfieldandformedupat itsbase before starting theirmoveeastwardsupthegentlyrising ground of the carse.Compared with the Englishthe Scottish army travelledlight. Their many recent

engagements had compelledthem to jettison unnecessarystores and their fightingmenwere remarkably self-sufficient, which wasfortunate since there was noquestion of waggons beingused in support. Spearmenhad to rely on their personalweapons and the equipmentthey carried, including sparespears. Bruce had orderedeach schiltron to carrybannersbearingtheirleader’s

arms, suchas the threewhitestarsonabluebackgroundofSir James Douglas or theproud emblem of the blackgalley against a yellowbackcloth for Angus OgMacDonald,LordoftheIsles.From the base of the scarp

theyhadsomethingoverhalfa mile to travel beforereaching the enemy. As theyascended the gentle slopethey could see flashes ofcolour – reds and blues,

bright greens and gold, fromamongthemanydomedtentsin the cavalry lines. Soundscarried across on the clearmorning air, swords beingsharpened on whet stones,horseswhinnying, the burbleof talk together with theclanking of cooking potsbeing stowed away as theEnglish appeared to bebreaking camp. The Scottishspearmen knew that if theEnglish brought even a

fraction of their archersforward, their deadlyfirepower would make thetask of crossing the grassyplain fronting the Englishposition beyond them. Brucegambled on the element ofsurprise and the fact that,although the English wereunquestionably far stronger,theywereasyetdisorganisedand above all lacked aplannedresponse.The Lanercost chronicler

had the schiltrons precededby Scottish archers acting inthe role of skirmishers, anexcellent way of using thelimited number of Scottishshortbowmen. Apart fromsacrificing his small cavalryforce in a preliminary attack,it was Bruce’s onemeans ofgiving his spearmen somedegree of protection. SomeEnglish bowmen, probablythose attached to the cavalryunits, immediately moved

forward to counter this and,although their numbers wereonly a fraction of thoseservingwiththemainbodyofEnglish infantry, thebattlefield observer fromLanercost reported that theyscattered their Scottishopponents. However, thisclash of archers inevitablydiverted fire from theschiltrons as they pressed ontoreducethegapbetweenthetwo armies and Traquair has

theEnglisharchersunable tofollow up their earlysuccesses because of theEnglish vanguard chargingoutacrosstheirlineoffire.Edward Bruce’s schiltron

took the lead with theappointed task of anchoringits right flank against theBannockBurn. Coming afterhim and immediately to hisleft wasMoray, followed byDouglas. Moving up in thisorder the spearmen began to

usher the opposing archersagainsttheEnglishrightflankby the Pelstream Burn. TheLanercost chronicler referredto just three Scottishschiltrons and these were allthe English could have seenat this stage, although thefourth and largest formationof spearmen directly undertheking’scommandfollowedsome distance behind them.1Bruce’s concern for his men

was, of course, by nomeansconfined to the dangers fromEnglish archers, deadly asthesemight prove. Themainthreatwouldcomefromtheircavalry, and his audacity ingiving the order to advanceover ground favourable forhorsemen is all the moreremarkable. It should not beforgotten, however, as otherScottish commanders did atFlodden two centuries later,that a schiltron’s strength lay

in keeping its formation andfor this it too needed goodground.Pre-eminently,Bruceknew that in order to reducetheoddshehad first to seizeand then retain the initiativeanditwasimperativetomeettheenemyheadontogivehisplan any chance of success.Onlythencouldhesucceedinimprisoning the Englishwithin their treacherousgrassy rectangle,encompassed on three sides

by the barriers of the RiverForth, theBannockBurnandthe Pelstream Burn, allswollen by the morning’stidalfloodwaters.Athightidethe waters of the Forth (andits tributaries)were only oneortwofeetbelowthegenerallevel of the carse and inplaces they spilled over intoadjoiningpools.Given thepackednatureof

the English forceswithin therivers,Bruce’stacticswerean

even more effective versionof those used by WilliamWallace under the lea ofStirling Castle seventeenyears before. If Bruce couldfirst trap and then, equallyimportantly, startcompressingtheEnglish,theywere bound to experiencegrave difficulties in bringingmore thana smallproportionof their forces into actionagainst his lines of spearmenthat had proved so effective

the previous day. Speed andsurprisewere vital for, if theEnglish emerged from theircamp area and moved ontothe plain of Balquhiderock,their numbers would be ableto envelop the Scottishinfantry and subject it todeadly volleys of arrowsbefore crushing it withcombined assaults fromcavalryandinfantry.Whetheror not the English highcommand at Bannockburn

was actually capable ofrapidly mounting and thenco-ordinating their attacks insuch a way was somethingBruce couldnot risk.Hehadto push his advance forwardwithallspeed.Whatever their

shortcomings in leadershipand despite their king’saversion to bowmen, if theEnglish had suspected for amoment that theScotswouldemerge from the woods and

attack as they did, the moreexperienced of Edward’scommanderswoulddoubtlesshavealreadybroughtforwardnumbers of foot archers toprovidedirectsupportforthecavalry. From theirexperiencesofthedaybefore,Beaumont and Gloucesterespecially would have beenaware of the problemsexperienced by cavalryagainstScottishspearmenandit was, therefore, somewhat

surprisingthatnoonepressedforsomedetachmentsoffootarchers to be placed in theforward lines, howeverunlikely the event of aScottish attack. NoEnglishman could havedoubted Bruce’s previoussuccesses against adverseodds, nor his ability as acommander, marks of whichhehaddemonstratedonlytheday before. However, in thatparticulararmy,withEdward

II as its commander, theEnglishcavalrywereunlikelytoyieldtheirpositionsonthecarse or jeopardise theiropportunity of being the firsttoengagetheenemyforsuchanimprobablesituation.The English archers were

suretohavebeenmuchinthethoughtsofBruce’sspearmenas they moved across openground in close formations.Veterans from Falkirkwouldhave told their companions

how arrows could tear intothem in a hissing, death-dealing cloud. Asexperienced soldiers theywould know that in spite ofcarrying their proud armorialbanners, the schiltrons couldrapidly have holes rent inthem by the lethal shafts.Eveniftheydidarrivewithinarm’s length of the enemypositionstheywerestilllikelyto meet archers able to firepoint blank into their ranks.

As seasoned soldiers theywould try to blank out suchdangers and concentrate onthe immediate problems inhand, striving to obey theirsergeants’ instructions tokeepgoodlines,topointtheirspears straight ahead and,with the hummocks in theground, to take especial careover their footing. As theycontinuedtoadvance,though,they must have felt the urgeto tilt their helmeted heads

forward and hunch theirbacks the better to meet theexpectedarrowcloud.Insuchareligiousage,andconsciousof their vulnerability, theywould also have welcomedthe signal from theAbbot ofInchaffray, who waspreceding them bearing acrucifix, for them to kneelbriefly and join him inrecitingthePaternoster.Butonceon theopencarse

there was no turning back.

Bruce’s most experiencedsoldiers customarily held theflank positions but in anycase, walking shoulder toshoulder with friends fromtheirownclansandfromtheirown localities – like thosemembersofPalsbattalionsinan infinitelymore costlywar600 years later – such menwere better able to subduetheir fears and even grow inconfidence as theyapproachedeverclosertothe

enemy. Had they not donewell the previous day underthe same commanders? Inanycase,allsharedtheheadyfeelingofbeingcommittedtoa long-awaited battle and,above all, of going onto theattack.On the English side

arrangementswere,ofcourse,at a much earlier stage.Whichever cavalrycommander had despatchedthe archers forward as

skirmishers probably sentwordforthekingtojoinhimwith all speed. Once amongthe front detachments,Edward could only watch inamazement as the Scottishspearmen, in virtual silence,moved steadily across thecarsetowardshisposition.Bynow theywere less than twobowshots away and theforwardphalanxcontinueditsrelentless advance with theother schiltrons following

close behind. In their tightformations the king musthave thought themremarkably few comparedwith his own great armyspread over the carse behindhim,especiallyashehadnotseenhow the samespearmenperformed on the previousday. Most importantly, theyshowednosignsofslowing.‘What?’heshoutedtothose

besidehim.‘Will thoseScotsfight?’ Barbour’s account of

the battle places the veteranScotsman, Sir IngramUmfraville, past guardian ofhis country, long-standingBalliol supporter and enemyoftheBruces,besidethekingto advise him. InitiallyUmfraville’s reply seemed toreflect admiration for hiscountrymen, as well as thecertaintytheywerecomingtotheirdeath.‘Oftruth,sir,nowI see the most marvelloussightbyfarthateverIbeheld

– Scotsmen undertaking tofight against the might ofEnglandand togivebattle inthe hard open field.’ ThisScot who so hated theScottish kingmust then havehad second thoughts aboutthe result, for he proposed astrategem for the English tofall back beyond theirbaggagetherebytemptingtheScotsintoplunderingit,whenthey could easily be attackedand destroyed. Umfraville

plainlydidnotappreciate theiron discipline exerted byBruce nor could he haveproperly anticipated thedifficulties of such anundertaking within thecramped English position.The king rightly rejected theabsurd suggestion out ofhand, largely because he hadnointentionofgivingwayinfront of ‘such rabble’, butalso due to the fact that hestill could not bring himself

to believe the Scots hadactually come to fight him.Astheschiltronsstoppedandknelt in prayer he grasped atthepossibilitythattheymightbe asking for mercy. Thistime Umfraville knew hisfellow Scots well enough toanswer him, ‘You are right;they ask for mercy, but notfrom you. They cry to Godforforgiveness.Itellyouonethingforcertain,yondermenwillwinallordie.Nonethere

shallfleeforfearofdeath.’Inany case, as the Scotsresumed their approach, thekingcoulddoubthis eyesnolonger. ‘Now so be it,’ hesaid, ‘we shall seepresently.’2Edward’s wish for battle

thatdaywasgranted,butnotonthetermshehadimaginedandfurthermoreoneofhisill-considered and unrestrainedresponses the night before

came to have serious results.During the king’s council ofwar the young Earl ofGloucester had joined withmore experienced heads torecommend a further day’spreparation before movingtowards Stirling Castle, butEdwardhadnotbeencontentwith rejecting Gloucester’sproposal, accusing him ofcowardice,theultimateinsultfor a Christian knight andsenior member of such a

proudfamily.3Edward’s order to sound

the trumpets for battlebrought a frantic response. Itwas relatively easy forfootsoldiers and bowmen tosnatch up their weapons andshake themselves into theirclothing, but far less so forthe cavalry stationed in theforefront of the army. Theknights had the painstakingtask of getting into their full

armour, including theirhelms; their horseshad tobereadied and their lances andother weapons brought fromnearby tents before theycould be helped onto theirmounts. Among the cavalrythevanguardwasexpectedtorespond quickest of all andsome of its members werelikelytobefullyarrayedbut,having given the order toarm,nothingmoreseemed tofollow in the way of

commands, the kingapparently gave no tacticaldirectives beyond hasteningtogetintohisownarmourinreadiness forcombat. In fact,neither the king nor hiscommanders seemedpreparedtoconsideranythingbeyond an immediate sally.Even so there was discord.Among the vanguard,Gloucester, who was stillsmartingfromtheking’sslur,disputed with Hereford over

who should have the honourof leading. Hereford arguedthat as Constable of Englandit was his prerogative, whileGloucester maintained hisancestorshadalwaysheldthepremier place in the attack.4Refusing to spend any moretime inwranglingGloucestercalled for archers to supporthim,althoughhedidnotwaitfor their arrival or even forhis knight to place his

surcoat, emblazonedwith theDe Clare coat of arms, overhis head, before mountingand putting his spurs to hishorse. Heading thevanguard’s other knights hecharged headlong across thespace between the two sides,crashing against EdwardBruce’s schiltron where hewas killed on the wall ofspears raised tomeet him.Anumberofseniorfigureswhofollowed close behind him,

includingSirRobertClifford,joint leader of a cavalrybrigade the day before, SirJohnComyn, son of theRedComyn murdered by Bruce,Sir Edward Mauley, stewardof the king’s household, andSirPainTiptoff, engaged theScottish spearmen and werealsokilled.It was a disastrous

beginning for the English.The vanguard had succeedednobetterthanontheprevious

day and such mindless actscost themsomeof theirmostdependable and experiencedcommandersbeforethebattlehad properly begun. Thosewho so rashly charged at theforward schiltron caused anadditionalproblem;withbothmen and horses lying on theground other cavalry had thegreatestdifficultyinforcingawayoverthemtopresshometheir assaults. In any case,when the foremost-placed

horsemen found themselveschecked they were notprepared to retire and allowothers to attack. Thespearmenwho had paused tomeet the horsemen’s firstassault now resumed theirforward movement andsucceeded in placingthemselves against theBannock Burn therebyanchoring the Scottish rightflank. The first segment ofthetraphadbeenmovedinto

place.OncethereEdwardBruce’s

men were able to hold theirown against fresh cavalryattacks by jabbing their longspears through the horses’trappings and, like Moray’smenthedaybefore,whentheanimals reared, lunging fortheir hearts and entrails. Atthe same time the otherschiltrons continued theirforward movement. AsMoray’sschiltroncameclose

to the forward one it clashedheadlong with some of themaincavalryunitsmovingupto threaten Edward Bruce’sleftflank.Suchlargenumbersof English cavalry weredespatched and so manyhorses milled around theschiltronthatobserverssaiditdisappeared from sight ‘likemen plunged in the sea’.5With notable courage theEnglishmountedasuccession

of spirited attacks, ‘spurringhaughtily on’, but Moray’smen had been through asimilar experience the daybefore. Like EdwardBruce’sspearmen they resolutelystood their ground andsucceeded in bringing theforwardriderscrashingdown.Once more the pronecasualtieshelped toblunt theEnglish assaults and gaveMoray’s schiltron the chancetomoveintostationalongside

theright-handone.Morethanhalf the entrance wasblocked.DouglasandStewartapproaching on Moray’s leftoffered their own thicket ofspearmen to the impetuouscavalryandasmoremenandhorseswereimpaled,Douglascame into lineandclosedofftheentrance.Through lack of

imagination born ofoverconfidence the Englishking and his fellow

commandershadplaced theirarmyinapotentialtrap.Withsuch fewnumbers, itwas, ofcourse,onethingforBrucetoseal thepocket,quiteanothertoholditshut.Theintervaloflandbetweenthestreamswasabout1200yardswideatthispoint. With each spearmanoccupying about a yard offrontage and with onlynarrow intervals between theschiltrons their steel-tippedbarrier was likely to have

been just three or four ranksdeep.Robert Bruce, watching

from a vantage pointrelatively near to his fourthschiltron, which he held inreserveclosebehindtheotherthree, must have wonderedhow such flimsy humanranks, precursors of the thinredlineofScottishsoldiersatBalaclava,couldholdagainstthe vastly superior numberslocked in the salient. As a

gifted soldier he must alsohave thought it inconceivablefortheEnglishtocontinuetofightsodisconnectedlyandtoleaveunusedsomuchoftheiractualstrengthbut,iftheydidnotdeployit,thereseemednoreason why his spearmenshouldnotholdthecavalryatbay as they had a few hoursearlier. In the spearmen’sfavour, the great numbers ofcavalryatthefrontendofthepocket were becoming so

jammed together they coulddevelop nothing like themomentum they had on theDryfieldthedaybefore.Foratimeeventscontinued

to follow the same grimpattern. The Scottishspearmen held their groundagainst bruising rushes ofhorsemen issuing from themain body of cavalry,repeatedagainandagainwithexemplary bravery. Thephysical demands on

individual spearmen musthave been enormous, for theLanercost chroniclerdescribed the clashes as ‘agreat and terrible crash ofspearsbrokenandofdestrierswounded to death’.6 On theEnglish side, some of thehorses, riderless andwounded, ran amok. In theirattemptstoescapetheterribleblood-tipped spears they notonly galloped back through

the cavalry squadronsscattering other horsemen,but trampled over squads ofunfortunate footsoldiers asthey attempted to pushforward to take part in thefighting. As on the previousday the disciplined spearmenshowed greater unity andcontrol against the sporadic,if frequent, attacks from theEnglish cavalry. They notonly rebuffed the charginghorses but every so often

succeeded in edging theirway forward further into thenarrowingpocket.More and more cavalry

units eager to becomeinvolved crowded againsttheir own forward elements,merging into what Barbourcalled ‘one great schiltron oftheir own’, and among itsforwardunitsthekingandhisescort fought as hard asanyone. Admirable as thiswas, it quite prevented him

from seeing the overallpicture and exercising thecontrol required of acommander-in-chief,particularly over his 5000archerswhohadthepotentialtogivehimvictory.In fact, so tight was the

wedge of heavy horsemenlocked in desperate combatwith the schiltrons thatwithoutsomefundamentalre-ordering neither the Englishbowmen nor the other

infantry seemed able to tiltthe balance in Edward’sfavour.Norwasthis thecaseonly with the footsoldiers:many cavalry units failed tocome within arm’s reach oftheenemyandweresotightlypackedthat200knightswerenot even able to draw theirswords.Finally,despitetheextreme

difficulties, those incommand of the archersordered them to fire at the

schiltrons. At first theydischarged their shafts overthe heads of the foremostcavalry,butwiththeranksoftheschiltronsbeingsonarrowand so closely engaged theyfell harmlessly beyond them.The bowmen were thenordered to fire past thecavalry directly at thespearmen. This expedientalso failed for the spearmenwere dwarfed by theopposinghorsemenwhofrom

their horses’ hooves to theirhelmet crests stood overseven feet high. In any case,the leaping and plungingriders repeatedly masked thearchers’ line of fire with theresultthattheyhit‘fewScotsin the breast but (were)striking more English in theback’.7One can imagine the

cavalry’s rage at this but thebowmen’s leaders persisted

and led a considerable bodyof their men over thePelstream Burn to link upwith those archers who hadearlier acted as skirmishers.TogethertheygatheredontheScottishleftflank,andtakingup positions some six pacesapart,begantounleasharainof deadly missiles that soontore gaps in Douglas’ lines.As Barbour reported, ‘TheEnglish archers shot so fastthathadtheirshowerlastedit

had gone hard with theScots’.8ThewatchingBruce,quickly appreciating theextent of the danger, orderedup his light cavalry underMarischal Keith to try anddisperse them.After crossingthe burn, most probablywhere the bridle path fordedit, they bore right and withlevelled lances rode at a fullgallop across the open carse.Their fierce charge against

the archers’ flank was sosuccessful that the Englishbowmenwereeitherkilledorfled. Unlike the Englishheavy cavalry who haddifficultywheelingatthetrot,thewiryScottishhorseswiththeir lightly protected riderswere far more difficult toelude.WhilenomatchfortheEnglish cavalry this was atask for which they wereideally suited.When the fewarchers who survived

recrossed the stream andrejoined other Englishsoldiers they were greetedwith abuse and even blowsfortheirfailure.Following their success the

Scottish cavalry continued topatrol the Pelstream’snorthern bank to deter anyfurther detachments ofbowmen from crossing over.With the threat from theEnglish archers removed –from that flank at least – the

Scots continued to edgeforward, particularly EdwardBruce’s schiltron on theScots’rightflank.Therewereeven reports about the fewScottisharcherswhosurvivedthe initial exchange enjoyingan opportunity of being abletofireattheopposingcavalryfromshortrange.9The hard-fought battle had

now reached its savageattrition stage, although the

success of the Scottishcavalry in seeing off theEnglish archers was animmensebonusfortheirside.At this point Bruce sentforwardhisown–and last–schiltron to bolster Douglas’weakened formation and togiveadditionalimpetustohisattacks. By doing so Bruceplayed his full hand, for hecouldnotafford the situationto arrive at stalemate.Although his Scottish

footsoldiers with their spearsandLochaberaxeshadshowntheycoulddefendthemselvesagainst mailed knights andhislightcavalryhadrepulsedthe first major Englishattempt to bring theirbowmen into the struggle,withthingssofinelybalancedthe English could still findsomeopportunity formakingbetter use of their otherforces. If, despite inevitablecasualties from drowning, a

commander had the nerve toleadadetachmentofEnglishinfantry across thetreacherous Bannock Burn,then move them along itsbank before recrossing atsome point before the gorgehe could attack the Scottishspearmen from the rear andthe situation could swiftlychange.Ashe committedhisown schiltron the Scottishking emphasised theimportance of their role by

tellingAngusOgMacDonaldand its other leaders, ‘Myhope is constant in thee’,adding, in encouragement,that if they could give someadded force the daymust betheirs.Inresponsesomefilledthe gaps made in Douglas’spear lines while others tookup rearward positions amongthe schiltrons and, leaningwithall theirstrengthagainstthe backs and shoulders ofmen whose knees were

buckling and whose armscould hardly keep the tips oftheirlongspearsfromsinkingto the ground, attempted toimpel them forward. Theirpresence was not lost on theEnglish whose armouredknights experienced evengreater difficulties with theirspiritedhorsesas the jabbingspearmen began a concertedforwardmovement.So effective was this

addition to the Scottish

strength and so highly didBruceratetheentryofAngusOg and his clansmen at thebattle’s climax, that hesubsequently granted theMacDonalds the honour ofalwaystakingtherightoftheline in the royal armies.While in the absence of anyfresh English initiatives theadvantage appeared to bemoving in the Scots’direction, where the sidescame together the fighting

continued with unceasingferocity. Barbour wrote,‘Mightywasthedinofblows,as weapons struck uponarmour, and great was thecrashing of spears withturning and thrusting,grunting and groaning …’10Within the heart of thediminishingsalientconditionswere worsening: men andhorses were becoming sopacked together thatnotonly

were they unable to fightproperly, but if a knight fellor was unhorsed he becamenot only vulnerable to theenemybutwasinthegreatestdanger of being trampled onbyhisownside.The vital difference

betweenthecontendersatthispointwasthattheEnglishhadstill only succeeded inbringing a limited portion oftheir forces into contactwiththeenemy.However,withthe

commitment of Bruce’s lastregular formation and theresumption of some forwardmovement, however modest,Scottish spirits began to riseand with their growingelation signs of desperationstarted appearing among theEnglish.As the Scots sensedsome crumbling in theresistance they let out atriumphant shout that rolledalongtheirbattlelineaseachschiltron took it up. The

English attempted to shoutback but the Scottish crieswould not be rebutted. Theyroared out exultantly, ‘Onthem,onthem,onthem,theyfail.’11 The shouts wereaccompaniedbyattacks fromall along the line and in aremarkable reversal offortune Barbour had theScottish short bowmenbeginning to enjoyconsiderable success as they

shot boldly ‘amongst theenemy and harassed themgreatly’.12While at the front of the

salient the fighting went onunabated, elsewhere in theEnglish encampment eventswere taking a different turn.A number of the levies,whosaw no chance of beinginvolved in the action butsensed the likely outcome,begantodriftoffandattempt

to cross the surroundingwatercourseswith the aim ofmaking for the Englishborder. Such desertions had,of course, no immediateeffect on the king and hiscavalry for there were morethan enough horsemen toreplace their casualties in theforward ranks. For outrightvictory the Scots needed toadminister a new blowagainst their largeropponent,otherwisethelongandcostly

struggle seemed destined tocontinue for some time andmutual exhaustion wouldbecome an increasing factorand one likely to tell againstthesidewithfewernumbers.At this point a fresh body

entered the reckoning,namelythe‘smallfolk’,thoseScottish soldiers who hadarrived too late to undergoBruce’s specialised trainingor were without the requiredmilitary equipment, together

with the ‘poveraill’, numbersof labourers and campservants, both men andwomen. This body movedforward from where BrucehadplacedthembelowCoxetHill and appeared at the topof the Dryfield slope inmilitary formation, withcrude banners flying andcarrying all manner ofimprovised weapons, nodoubteagerfor theirshareofbooty from the failing

English.Asthemenamongstthem began to descend theslope they roared out ‘Slay,Slay.Onthemhastily.’Tothebeleaguered Englishstruggling in their bloody-slippery pocket the sight ofmore than 2000 fresh men –equalinnumbertotheking’sschiltron–musthaveseemedlike a new Scottish armyenteringtheconflict.Compared with the

schiltrons’ total strength the

numerical addition was, ofcourse,considerablebut theirfighting ability was quiteanother matter. The Scottishking himself might have haddistinctlymixedfeelingsoversuch unruly elements joininghis veteran fighters – menwhowouldnodoubtbereadyto kill indiscriminately,whethertheiropponentswereworthy of valuable ransomsor not. No chroniclersuggested they came to the

battlefielddirectlyonBruce’sorders but it is likely theysent observers who returnedand told themtheScotsweregetting the better of things.An English defeat meantenormous plunder and theywoulddearlywanttobeinatthe death. All plunder asidetherewerelikelytobestrongpatriotsamongthemwhohadserved this king and hisfollowers on other fields. InBarbour’s account of the

battle he writes that theyappointed one of theirnumber captain saying theywouldhelptheirlordstotheirutmost.13A recentwriterhasput forward the somewhatoutlandish theory that the‘small folk’ were in factmobilised by the KnightsTemplar whose own warbanner, the Beauseant,coming over the hill wasbound tobringdismay to the

English.14 Representatives ofthe St Clairs, the principalTemplar family in Scotland,did fight with Bruce atBannockburn but whetherthey were the self-appointedleaders of the small folkremains unanswered.15 Noneof the contemporaryobservers upon the battlesupportssuchatheory.Reputedly the sight of the

‘small folk’ coming towards

himmadeBruceall themoredetermined to try and decidethings before they actuallyjoined in.He shoutedouthisownbattlecryandalongwithhis spearmen pressed theEnglish so hard that it wassaidmoreandmorebegan toleavetheground.With the outcome now

virtuallycertaintogoagainstthem the English leadersdetermined to get their kingaway. His departure would

seal their defeat but theScottishspearmenwerecloseabout him; some of theScottish knights among theirranks were even thengrasping at his horses’housings and he had to clearhimself with his mace.16 Noone could deny that Edwardhad fought bravelythroughout, having had onehorse killed beneath him andlosingSirRogerNorthburgh,

thekeeperofhis shield,whohadbeencaptured.Atfirsthewas unwilling to withdraw.But at all events he must beled to safety, theresponsibility for which fellupon his personal escortincludingAymerdeValence,Earl of Pembroke and SirGilesd’Argentan.Bothknewit would be a nationaldisgrace if the king werekilled and probably worsestill if he were captured; the

ransom set would be hugeand the conditions for hisreturnwere bound to includethe recognition of Bruce astrue King of the Scots,together with a demand forhis country’s renewedindependence.Despite the king’s protests

they turnedhishorse’sbridleandmoved to the flank withno fewer than500knights inattendance (many of whomwere doubtless glad to leave

the ill-fated field).This forcewas far too powerful to bechecked by the Scottish lightcavalry and they made acrossing place over thePelstream Burn and gallopedhim northwards away fromthe Scots army and up thecarsewherehedeterminedtofind protection in StirlingCastle. To withdraw 500knights at such a time notonly guaranteed defeat, buttriggered the beginning of

undisciplined flight by manyothers causing men to startrunning in all directions.Understandably there werenotableexceptions,likeGilesd’Argentan, who, once theking was close to the castle,declared his honour wouldnot allow him to run awayand returned to the salient.There he threw himselfagainst Edward Bruce’sthicket of spearmen whokilled him instantly. The

HighlandpatriotEvanBarronwent as far as to say theking’sflightwasfollowedbya panic to which there is noparallel in the history ofEngland or Scotland.17 ThisseemsanoverstatementwhenBannockburn is comparedwith the chaotic aftermaththat occurred amongScottishforcesfollowinglaterEnglishvictories such as at Flodden,andtheinevitabledisorderon

any battlefield once cohesionis lost. However atBannockburntheEnglishwillto fight was undoubtedlybroken, a fact which theEnglish chronicler fromLanercost acknowledgedwhen he wrote that‘Horsemen and foot alike,noblemen, knights andsquires, archers and infantrywere seizedwith the need toescape.’18

Many fugitives gatheredround the base of StirlingCastle while others tried tocross the River Forth wheremost were drowned in theattempt. Even more wentsoutheast to cross theBannock Burn which,particularlyinplaceswhereitwas non-tidal, was reckonedto have a hard base suitablefor horses although where itran across the carse the

bottom was boggy.19 It wasnotonly thebase thatprovedtreacherous.Itsbanksweresoslipperyandliabletocrumblethat once committed mencould not climb back, and inits gorges north of thetownship of Bannockhorrendous casualties weresuffered. Barbour reportedthatbetweenitsbankswassofilled ‘with men and horsesthat men could pass over

dryshod upon the drownedbodies’.20Thiswasagreedbyall observers, including theEnglishones.Greywrotethat‘thetroopsintheEnglishrearfell back upon the ditch ofBannockburn, tumbling oneover the other’21 and theLanercost chroniclerunderlined the effects ofpanic, ‘there was a big ditchcalled the Bannockburn intowhichthetideflows…many

noblemen and others withtheirhorsesfellintothisditchbecause of the great press ofmenbehindthem’.22

Once committed, Brucesucceeded at Bannockburnbecause he was willing toventure everything against amuchsuperioradversarywhowas ill-prepared andcomparatively untrained,whoseknightshadnorespectfor their own archers or

footsoldiers, and who wereledbyakingwhothoughtthescience of tacticsunnecessary. As a result theEnglish force was closer tobeing an armedmob– albeitof brave men – than adedicated force committed todefeating an enemy. In thisrespect it is difficult toquarrel with ProfessorBarrow’s statement that theEnglisharmywascondemnedbyitsleadershiptofightwith

the wrong tactics, the wrongweapons and on the wrongground. Such Englishdeficiencies,however,cannottake away from Bruce thecredit for leading his small,highly disciplined force to avictoryagainstall thecurrentoddsofwarandonethatwillalways rank as the premiertriumph for Scotland againsttheEnglish.

CHAPTERELEVEN

THEPURSUIT

‘Itwasvictory,butitwasnotsuccessyet.’

AgnesMureMacKenzie,RobertBruce,KingofScots

L IKE ALL VICTORIOUSCOMMANDERS the fullrewards of Bruce’s

success would depend uponhow effectively he couldpursue the enemy’s brokenforces and how far he wasable to seize the chance itgave him to bring the bitterconflict between the twocountriestoanend.Bannockburn was unusual

in battlefield terms for beinganabsolutevictory.Although

theEnglishkingleftthefieldaccompaniedbyaremarkablystrong cavalry escort therewas no question in his mindofmaking it thecaucus forafurther attack. Edward’s oneobject was to free himselffrom Bruce’s fearsomespearmenbyseekingsecuritybehind the thick walls of afortressstillunderhiscontrol.A second large body ofEnglish horsemen which leftthe field intact also had

nothing but escape in mind.As for the footsoldiers theyscatteredinalldirections.Nounit marched off under itsofficers in any semblance oforder or with its bannersflying, although one sizeablebody of men wassubsequently guided to theborder and safety. The plainfact was that the huge armywhich had so recentlymarched into the Scottishheartlandnowceasedtoexist.

Evenso,asProfessorBarrowpointed out, in one vitalrespect at least the Englishescaped more cheaply thanthey deserved. While theylost considerable numbers ofnoblerank,manyescapedandthe biggest prize of all, theEnglishking,gotaway.In hindsight Bruce might

conversely have been moresingle-minded in his pursuit,yet he is not alone amonggifted commanders in

neglecting to take fulladvantage of a victory.Afterbreaking an army’s outershell of resistance attackersaregivenasignalopportunityof annihilating it but fornumerous reasons, includingtheir own exhaustion, theyhave often failed to do so.Few military leaders haveever come close to equallingHannibal’s great victory atCannaein216BCwhere,aftersurrounding and compressing

a larger Roman army hebroke its will and continuedthe slaughter until virtuallythe whole force was wipedout. In more modern timesthe Russians gained asweeping victory atStalingradduringWorldWarTwo, when they surroundedan army which, after a twoand a half month siege, wasthree-quarters starved beforetheir final attacks compelledtheremaindertosurrender.

At Cannae and Stalingradnooneescaped,butitismoreusual for there to becomparatively large numbersof survivors. Even when theDuke of Cumberlandruthlessly hunted down theJacobites following hisvictory at Culloden, sizeableremnants gathered afterwardsunder their commanders.Bannockburnwouldneverbea Stalingrad or Cannae, forthe English could escape by

crossing the water coursesencompassing their positioneven though this involved arelatively high level ofcasualties.ComparedwiththeDuke of Cumberland atCulloden Robert Bruce hadmuch better reasons for notpursuing his enemy to theutmost. He was mostcertainlydeficient in cavalry,the traditional means ofpursuit andexploitationquiteapart from any feelings of

sympathy hemight have hadforthedefeatedafterhisownexperiencesasafugitive.Histotalnumbersoflightcavalrywere no match for the 500barded knights whoaccompaniedtheEnglishkingonhisdashsouthnor,forthatmatter,didtheyseemcapableof checking the othercontingentof600cavalryand1000 infantry under the Earlof Hereford which made forBothwellCastleontheClyde.

Bruce therefore wascompelled to keep hisschiltrons intact in case theEnglish decided to turnagainsthisfootsoldierswithamixed cavalry and infantryforce (such as Hereford’s),and thisundoubtedlyreducedhis capability to follow upvigorously.In any case, with Bruce’s

army not much more than athird of the English strengthwhen the battle commenced

he was forced to considermounting a full-scale attackusing both cavalry andinfantry upon the largenumbers of English infantrywho, failing to gainadmittance into StirlingCastle gathered themselvesonthecragsatitsbase.Inthelight of his own determinedand successful strugglesagainst superior forcesBrucewould expect the English toattempt some form of re-

grouping and understandablyhewould be reluctant to riskcompromising his victory.Brucealsohadreason to feelhimself unlucky whenEdward lookedforprotectionin Stirling Castle. The kingandhispowerfulescortmadestraight for it but on theirarrival its commander eithertoldthekingthatifheenteredthe castle he would be takenby the Scots ‘as none in allEngland … (will) bring you

succour’orMoubrayactuallyraised thedrawbridgeagainsthim.1 If the governor hadbeen a less strong individualand had admitted the king,rather than pointing out hisagreement to hand the castleovertotheScots,theywouldcertainlyhavebesiegeditandin all likelihood captured theking along with all his 500cavalry.At Moubray’s refusal

Edwardandhisescort turnedthrough King’s Park roundthe rear of the Scottish armyuntil they reached theTorwood and came onto thehigh road to Linlithgow.However, Bruce’s chance ofcapturing the English kinghad not disappearedcompletely. Had he used allhis cavalry to pursue theking’s force he could havemade things exceedinglydifficult for them, for while

their horses were better-armed they were also moreponderous. The Scottishhorses were not only muchfaster but with their riders’knowledge of the countrytheycouldhavebeenused inambushes.However,thiswasnottohappen.AlthoughDouglas,withthe

anticipation and swiftness ofthought that so distinguishedhim as a soldier, left hisschiltron as soon as he saw

the English king movenorthwards and asked forBruce’s permission to leadthe Scottish cavalry inpursuit, Bruce refused. Quiteapart from Edward’s largecavalry escort and thenumbers of footsoldiers thatbeganfollowing theirking toStirling Castle the remainderof the English cavalry forcestill heavily outnumberedBruce’shorsemenandhefeltittoogreatarisktouseallhis

cavalry on a single mission,however important. In factthemoveawayby theking’sescort caused the other largegroupofcavalryandinfantryto start moving south andBarbour was sure the largenumbers around the castlewerethechiefreason‘thattheKing of England escaped tohis own country’.2 Bruceeventually compromised byallocating Douglas just sixty

horse for the pursuit.Undeterred by the unevenodds he set off after theEnglishking.On the roadhewas fortunate tomeetwith afellow Scot, the young SirLawrence Abernethy who,with eighty horse, had cometo join theEnglish.Onbeingtold the result of the battle,Abernethy was persuaded tochange allegiance and joinDouglas. Pausing briefly totakepublicpledgesofloyalty

fromAbernethyandhismen,Douglas set off with a forcemore than double in size,although it was still heavilyoutnumberedbytheEnglish.He caught upwithEdward

and his party just afterLinlithgow, but instead oftaking the expected routeovertheLammermuirhillstoBerwick, theking turneddueeast along the shorter coastroad toDunbar.Douglaswasthus deprived of many

favourable ambush pointsalong theRoman roadbut sourgently did he shadow theparty that, as Barbourremarked, no Englishmancould stop even to makewater and any whose horsesbroke down were swiftlycaptured. Aymer deValence’s biographerbelievedthatValenceandhisfollowers were responsiblefor defending the party andfighting a prolonged

rearguard action againstDouglas’attacks.Ifthisisso,their heavy casualties wereequallyormorelikelytohavebeen caused by this actionthan during the main battle;from Valence’s retinue oftwenty-twoknights and fifty-nine men at arms, fourknights were killed and tentaken prisoner with a similarproportion of losses amongthemenat arms. It isknownfor certain that just one

knight, John Comyn (son ofJohn Comyn of Badenoch),hadalreadybeenkilledonthefield of Bannockburn and ifjust a proportion of thesecasualties occurred later itpointstothedeterminationofDouglas’pursuit.3When the king and his

knights reached DunbarCastle, owned by thesympathetic Earl Patrick ofDunbar,theyjumpedofftheir

horses and ran in leavingthemunattendedoutside.Theking and a few chosenknightssailedtoBamburghinan open boat and from therewent by land toBerwick butthemain bodywho followedhim by land had a far moredifficult journey. They werechased for a full fifty milesby Douglas and Abernethyand although they shed theirarmour to help increase theirhorses’ speed some still fell

intotheirpursuers’hands.4 IfDouglas had commanded thewhole complement ofScottish cavalry it is morethan possible he could havecaptured the king. EvenwithDouglas’restrictednumberofpursuers Edward had nodoubt about the good luckassociated with his escape,for in thanksgiving this lessthan religious monarchsubsequently founded the

Carmelite college of Oriel atOxford.5Bruce enjoyed better luck

with the other contingent ofmore than 600mountedmenand1000 footunder theEarlofHereford.Theymadetheirway to the stronghold ofBothwell Castle lying abouttwenty-five miles southwestof Stirling, where itsconstableadmittedtheparty’sleading commanders who,

along with the two seniorearlsofHerefordandAngus,had included Sir JohnSeagrave, SirAnthony Lucy,Ingram Unfraville andMaurice, Lord of Berkeleyamountingtofiftyinall.Thecastle’sconstablewasaScot,Sir Walter FitzGilbert, whohitherto had inclined to thestrongersidewhichuptothistime had been the English.Whenhoweverhelearnedthereasonforhishavingsomany

distinguished guests and,even more importantly, theextentoftheScottishvictory,he promptly removed theirweapons and made themprisoners.6 On the arrival ofEdward Bruce, whom theking had sent in pursuit,FitzGilberthandedthemover.After Edward II himself,

theEarl ofHerefordwas thegreatestsingleprize fromthebattle:inreturnforhisrelease

Bruce was granted fifteenScottish captives amongwhom he specified his wife,Elizabeth, his daughterMarjorie,hissisterChristianaandthatgreatpatriotfromthetime of William Wallace,Robert Wishart, Bishop ofGlasgow,nowblindandsickafter eight years of harshcaptivity. In return forHereford Robert Bruce’snephew,theEarlofMar,wasalso given release but as he

had formed a warmfriendship with the Englishking he opted to remain inEngland. Deprived of theirsenior leaders fewmen fromthe rest of Hereford’s largeforcereachedEnglandsafely:some were killed close toBothwell Castle while manyothers were killed bycommon folk as they madetheirwaytotheborder.7Anywho escaped apparently only

didsoinabjectconfusion.8Intheir flight it was everymanfor himself, for even if thenobles avoided injury, in theevent of their being capturedthey became liable to pay aransom. This could havegrave results. In 1317, forinstance, when Aymer deValence himself was on alater mission to France onbehalfofthekinghesufferedthe misfortune not only of

being captured but having ahuge ransom of £10,400 seton his head. Although thekingpaid the first£2,500 theransom caused Valenceseriousfinancialproblemsfortherestofhislifeandwasthereasonforhisdyingindebtin1324.9The large numbers of

ordinaryEnglishsoldierswhoescaped the battlefield andcongregatedinlargenumbers

at the base of Stirling CastledidnotgiveBrucethetroublehe expected. They soontamelysurrendered.Onlyone sizeablegroupof

men–allfootsoldiers–madegoodtheirescapetoEngland.Thereissomedoubtwhowasresponsiblefortheirdelivery.The Lanercost Chroniclereported a large body offugitives fleeing to CarlisleandithasbeensuggestedthatAymer de Valence, after

leading the king towardsStirling Castle, wasresponsible for shepherdingthe half-naked Welsh leviesrecruited from within hisearldom to the border city.Certainly the greater part ofone organised party, possibleseveral thousands strong,safely crossed the borderdespite being harried allalong the 100-mile route toCarlisle.10 No chronicler,

however, actually mentionsValence by name andBarbour is quite specific insaying that Sir Maurice deBarclay set forth from thebattle with a great host ofWelshmen.11 Barclay wascertainly inValence’s retinueof knights and Valence mayhave ordered him to takechargeoftheWelshleviesor,afterleadingthemoff,handedover responsibility to

Barclay. J R S Phillips,Valence’s biographer, citesevidence supporting thepresenceofValencewith theking on his flight to Dunbarand sailing to Berwick fromthere.12WhetherValencewasresponsibleornotforleadingoff and then handing hisWelsh levies over toBarclaybefore subsequently fightingoffDouglas and his pursuerson the road to Dunbar, he

emerged from Bannockburnwithmorecreditthanmostofhiscontemporaries.From the nature of the

battle it was inevitable asizeable proportion of thevast English army wouldleave the field quite apartfrom those who negotiatedthePelstreamBurnandmadenorthwards for StirlingCastle. How many otherfootsoldiers actuallysucceeded in escaping to

England is far more difficulttosay.Whilethearchershadonly briefly been in actionand the foot virtually not atall, both faced the initialproblem of crossing the fast-flowing and deep BannockBurn before moving southtowards the English borderover 100 miles away. Afterthe burn had claimed itsproportionofvictims, for thesurvivors, demoralised,frightened, with little or no

food, the journey to Carlisleacross barren border countrymust have seemed endlessanditwasindeedbeyondthecapabilityofmany.Withonlyone organised group comingoff thebattlefieldit iscertaina large proportion fell to theavenging Scots. If two-thirdsof the horsemen and infantrywho did not gain admittanceto Bothwell Castle failed toreach the border it is notlikelythatmanyotherswould

do much better. It seemsdoubtfulifevenathirdofthefootsoldiers returned toEngland. But incontemporary eyes suchordinary soldiers (the poorbloody infantry of latercenturies) counted for lessthan men of noble blood:fresh levies could be raisedfairly easily and such menearned no bonuses for theircaptors. Some of those whosucceeded in crossing the

border still had someweeks’walking before they returnedtotheirhomevillages.As for the nobility, if their

casualtieswerenotashighasthey might have been theywere still undoubtedly highcomparedwithmostmedievalbattles, partly because manynobles were killed in thesavage early encounters.Gloucesterdiedtogetherwiththirty-fourbaronsandseveralhundred knights, but every

knight was accompanied byone or more squires, andother members of theirpersonal household, many ofwhomwouldhavebeenkilledalong with their masters.While he might be guilty ofsome exaggeration in thisrespect, Barbour relates howon the battlefield 200 goldenspurs – the spurs ofknighthood – were takenfrom the bodies of the deadknights, a total which

exceeded Scottish losses atFlodden two centuries later,although in that battle itincluded their king. AtBannockburnallsuchknightswere buried in sanctifiedground, while dead soldierswere placed in great pitsactingascommunalgraves.13On the Scottish side the

casualties were very light.Barbour wrote that twoknights were killed, Sir

William Vipont and SirWalter Ross (much mournedby EdwardBruce),while SirWilliam Airth was killed ashe guarded the Scotsbaggage. As for the privatesoldiers, if the one deathsufferedbyMoray’sschiltrononthefirstdayofthebattleisany guide, then theircasualties would also havebeen relatively light, as theykept their cohesionthroughout. Although

Douglas’ schiltron founditselfa target for thedreadedarchers it was only for acomparatively short timebefore these weresuccessfully dispersed, andthe phalanx was unlikely tohave sufferedmore than 200casualtiesforthisreason.As in other medieval

battles, equally or moreimportantforthevictorsthanthose killed were those theycaptured: after Bannockburn

therewereprobably500orsomen of rank, nobles, knightsand squires,whowereworthransoming. The barons,baronets and knights amongthem amounted tomore than100,muchthemostimportantbeing Humphrey de Bohun,Earl of Hereford. After hisvictoryBrucecouldafford tobe magnanimous, but whilethe details of their ransomswere being discussed theScottish king apparently

treated his prisoners with somuch kindness and courtesythat even the Englishwitnesses acknowledged hewent far to winning theirhearts.14In certain cases he also

showed a willingness towaivetheirransom.Onesuchcase was that of SirMarmaduke Twenge, theEnglish hero of StirlingBridge. Twenge found

himself surrounded and afterdiscarding his arms andarmour hid himself all night,appearing before Bruce nextmorning dressed only in hisshirt. His humiliation andstate of undress would haveamused many a victoriousmonarch but Barbour relatedhow the king greeted him.‘Welcome, Sir Marmaduke,to what man art thouprisoner?’‘To none,’ he said, ‘but

here to you I yield to be atyourpleasure.’‘“And I receive thee, sir,”

saidtheKing.’15Brucemuchvalued bravery; he grantedTwenge freedom withoutransom and gave the veteransoldiergiftstotakebackwithhim. Another prisoner whounderstandably enjoyedBruce’s special favour wasRalph de Monthermer,stepfather of the young Earl

ofGloucesterwhowaskilledin thebattle’s early stages. Itwas Monthermer who, whenBruce was at the court ofEdward I, reputedly senthima pair of spurs, a hint thatBruce acknowledged byescaping from Edward’svengeance. Bruce repaid thedebt by both entertainingMonthermer and releasinghimwithoutransomwhichasEdward II’s brother-in-lawwouldhavebeensetatavery

highlevel.Althoughsuchconspicuous

courtesytowardsthedefeatedenhancedBruce’scausethereseemsno reason todoubthissincerity towards suchvictims of war. He mournedthedeathoftheyoungEarlofGloucester as a cousin.AfterhavingGloucester’sbodylaidout in a nearby church hekept a night’s vigil over it,before sending the corpse toKing Edward at Berwick

togetherwith thatof thenexthighest-ranking magnate,RobertClifford.16In addition to the material

benefits from the ransomsScotland profited from theproceeds of the EnglishbaggagetrainwhichtheScotscaptured in its entirety. Aswell as money to pay thesoldiers, it carried largequantities of gold and silvervessels,armour,cloths,wine,

hay and the family plate ofthose nobles who had beenpromised estates in Scotland.At the time itwas said to beworth£200,000.17Someideaof its modern value can begauged from a comparisonbetween the pay of a soldierthenandnow.JEMorrissettheaveragewageforsoldiersin the Welsh Wars at 2d aday,18 a figure that remainedconstant until 1333 when

Edward III had greatdifficulties raising men tofight in Scotland andincreasedit toaninflationary3d a day. Working on thefigureof2daday,asoldier’sannual pay was about £3.00.Comparedwith thewages ofa trained British soldier in1998 of £13,000 a year thebaggagetrainwouldbeworthroughly £866,000,000. Thematerial rewards to Scotlandfrom Bannockburn would,

therefore, certainly be morethan a billion pounds inmodern figures and,with therelative scarcity of monetarytransactions in the fourteenthcentury, in practical terms itwould certainly be muchhigher. The value of thebaggage train wassupplemented by theconsiderable spoils taken byindividual soldiers from boththe dead and captured. Inaddition to such material

benefits the battle allowedBrucetobereunitedwiththefemalemembersofhisfamilyafteranintervalofeightyearsor more and for thepossibility of a male heir tobe revived. Even then theywere not actually releaseduntil the autumn. Theoutcome also brought thetransfer of the two greatcastlesofStirlingandDunbarinto Scottish hands. On theday following the battle both

Sir Philip Moubray andPatrick, Earl of Dunbarsurrendered and sworeallegiancetoBruce.

Bannockburn wasunquestionably the greatestvictory Scotland everachieved against the Englishand by the same reasoningEngland’s worst defeat sincethe battle of Hastings. Theimmediate benefits of thebattle to the victors were

enormous: the challengemountedbya fearsomearmyled by an English king hadbeen eliminated; long-heldScottish captives, includingBruce’s immediate family,were released; and thematerial advantages fromransoms and booty were feltthroughout Scotland. Bruce’shereditary right to the throneofScotlandandhiscountry’sclaimforaseparateexistencehad now been justified by

success in battle, along withthe support givenhimby themajority of Scotland’speople. The Englishwere byno means ready toacknowledge officiallyBruce’sright tothethroneofScotland, but whateversubsequent machinationswere pursued by the Englishking and the English churchagainst the northernkingdom’slegalandreligiousposition, Bannockburn

enabledScotlandtoregainitsconfidenceasan independentcountry which it was toexpress inamostmemorablewayin1320.If only the Scots had

succeeded in capturingEdward II then peace andEngland’s full recognition ofScotland as a sovereignpower under Robert Brucemust have followed quickly,but thiswasnot tobe.Whilethe battle was undoubtedly a

great triumph its resultswerenot as beneficial as Scotlandcouldreasonablyhavehoped.Like Wallace’s triumph atStirling Bridge and EdwardI’svictoryagainsthimayearlater, Bannockburn did notsucceed in bringing about animmediateendtosuchabitterwar, although, as the nextchapter reveals, it gaveScotlandapowerfulplatformupon which to pursue hercampaign for peace and so

deploy her forces thatEnglandwould eventually beforced to recognise herindependence.Conversely, inthe years following, thebattle’s military lessonswouldbetakenmoretoheartby the defeated than bysubsequent generations ofScottishsoldiers.

O

AFTERMATH

‘Wemakewarthatwemayliveinpeace’

Aristotle

NCE EDWARD II HADeludedhispursuers, thechances that a single

victory, however conclusive,would bring hostilitiesbetween England andScotland to an end becameminimal for, while he wasregarded as indecisive andincompetentwhere his fatherwas feared and respected, hewas equally arrogant andobstinate towards Scotland.TheEnglishking’sgreatsealand royal shield werecaptured by the Scots alongwiththeotherspoilsofbattle,

butifBruceeverreallyhopedhis conciliatory gesture ofreturningthemwouldbringapositive response regardingpeace he was disappointed.English aims towardsScotland remained the same,namely to prevent therecognition of Robert Bruceas legitimate king and tocontinue their claims ofsuzeraintyoverthecountry.In spite of this

Bannockburn was significant

inmanyways.ItundoubtedlystrengthenedBruce’spositionandmarkedtheendofearlierComyndominancewithinthekingdom, although it shouldnot be forgotten that he stillfaced continued externalopposition from the Balliolfaction where ‘In Argyll andIreland John of Argyll andother émigrés continued towhip up bitter resistance’.1As with Stirling Bridge

sixteen years before, thebattle caused people fromacross the land, the so-called‘community of the realm ofScotland’, to feel a strongersenseofidentityandpridefortheirnationand,inthecaseofBannockburn, for theirwarriorkingaswell.AsEvanBarron expressed it, afterBannockburn Scotland had‘anunconquerableconfidenceinherabilitytoholdherownat all times, and under any

conditions against the wholemightofEngland’.2An immediate and tangible

result, of course, was thepassing of the militaryinitiativeintothehandsofthenorthern kingdom. AfterBruce found his initialattempt at making peacerebuffed he returned tomilitarypersuasion,resumingandextending the tactics thathad succeeded before the

great battle: the raids intonorthern England werecontinued and major newinitiatives undertaken.He setout, for instance, to captureBerwick, the last Scottishstronghold still in Englishhands (together with theEnglish border fortress ofCarlisle)and,inresponsetoarequest from the sub king ofTyrone, undertook acampaign to conquer Ireland.Theraidscontinuedtoholda

central place in his attemptsto compel England to agreepeaceterms,fortheynotonlychallenged Englishsovereignty across thenorthern counties buthighlighted the crown’sinability todefend itspeople.In addition, the regularsupplies of booty accruingfrom them, togetherwith thefinancial contributions madeby areas seeking to buyimmunity, were of

considerable benefit to hisimpoverished country. In thebattle’s immediate aftermathand before their comingdifficulties in Ireland, thoseconducting such raids werelikely to feel such assuranceineachotherthatdefeatatthehands of the defendersseemed virtuallyinconceivable. As long asDouglas retained a pivotalrole, however, they werenever likely to develop the

same attitude of mindlessoverconfidence exhibited bythe English prior toBannockburn.Bruce’s motives for a

conquest of Ireland were farless clear, but in allprobability they includedsome ideal of a pan-Celticbrotherhood between thekingsofScotlandandIreland(andalsohiswish to removehis over-ambitious brother,Edward, from Scotland).

Military success there couldalso eliminate Ulster as asourceofsupplyforanynewEnglishinvasionsofScotlandand provide a base fromwhere Bruce couldconceivablyattackWalesandMiddleEngland.All such military actions

couldalsojustlybeviewedasapowerfulplatformfor freshdiplomatic and constitutionalinitiatives. Just two monthsafter the great battle

following a particularlydevastatingraid intonorthernEngland by Edward Bruce,James Douglas and John deSoules (grand nephew of theone-time guardian), Brucewrote to Edward offeringpeace. This was discussed atanEnglishparliamentheldatYork but, although theEnglish king was willing toaccept an armistice, herefused outright anyrecognition of Scottish

autonomy.InNovember1314Bruce held a parliament atCambuskennethwherewithaconfidence buoyed bymilitary success he bothtightened his control overScotland and distinguishedfurther between the twocountries by confirming hisearlier threat that all thoseholdinglandinScotlandwhorefused to pledge loyalty tohim should be disinherited –although he subsequently

gave them a further year inwhich to make up theirminds. In December 1314Bruceagaindemonstratedhisability to invade the Englishnorthern counties virtually atwill by leading a major raidalong the Tyne valley andafterwards received paymentfor a truce until midsummer1315. Even less to theEnglish king’s liking, heaccepted the feudal homage

oftheinhabitantsthere.3However able their leader,

such incursions could nothave been pursued sosuccessfully without goodsubordinate commanders.Douglas and Moray inparticular developed theirraidingtechniquesintoaformresembling those of theVikingsintheninthcentury.4Theydevelopedahighdegreeofmobility:mountedontheir

wiry, sure-footed horsescalled ‘hobins’ (from whichthey took the name of‘hobelars’), they travelledlight, each attacker carryinganironplateunderhissaddleupon which he could bakeoatcakes–bannocks–onthecamp fires at the end of thedaytobeeatenwithsteaksofbeef fromstolencattle.Theirreturn journeys wereinevitably slower sincetogether with horses, cattle

and prisoners for ransom,their pack horses would beburdened by coin and otherbooty, but such was theirreputation that they usuallycame back unchallenged. Soregular and damaging didthese raids become thatNorthumberland,forinstance,suffered from considerabledepopulationandlawlessness.Equally serious for Englishmorale, there seemed noeffective counter measures

against them. Capable oftravelling more than twenty-five miles a day suchredoubtable raiders appearedable to pick their targets atrandom.With thebreakdownof local administration thesituationwasmadeworse bybandsofmountedfreebooterscalled ‘schevaldores’ whoseexcesses were often blamedonBruce’sraiders.UnderBruce’sdirectionthe

skills and daring of his

commanders enabled him tomaintain the militarydominance gained atBannockburn, first overEdward II, seriouslyhampered as he was bycontinuing conflict with hisnobles, and then over theyoung Edward III before hisown development into anoutstandingkingcommander.This was all the morenoteworthy in the light ofEngland’s far superior

resourcesanditsmilitaryanddiplomaticsupportfromothercountries, particularly fromthe Vatican. With relativelylittle scope politically Bruceknewwellenoughthatitwasonly by keeping up, orincreasing, the militarypressure over a protractedperiod if necessary, thatEngland could finally becompelled to recogniseScotland’s right to fullindependence. The very size

of the task became evidentwhen, despite continuedEnglish disunity, this tookfourteen further years, andsuccess did not come untilBruce was sick and neardeath.That it took so long owed

asmuchtoScotland’slimitedmilitary resources as toEngland’s resoluteness.Theirbrilliant commander alsocommittedwhatturnedouttobeamajorstrategicalblunder

by allowing his Irishadventure to drain off forcesthat, in the periodimmediately afterBannockburn, could surelyhave been used to far bettereffect on the mainland. Yetwhen theIrishcampaignwasbehind him, while heunderstandably lacked theability todealhisopponentaconclusive final blow, Bruceshowed an unwillingness tohazard his forces against

English armies invadingScotland.Geographical factors

weighed heavily againstoffensiveoperationsmountedby either country. England’sproblems were primarilyconcerned with supplying itsarmies as they marchedthrough the desolate regionsofthebordersbeforereachingthe Scottish heartland.Scotland on the other handwasnotcapableof sendinga

sufficiently large force farenough into England todamage it severely.Effectiveas they were, Scottish raidshadarelativelylimitedeffect,asEngland’struestrengthlaya longway from its northernborder.Not onlywas its seatof government in the south,butalsomostof itsshipping,the greater bulk of itsindustry, its main centre ofpopulation,andthebulkofitsfood production. Even

relatively deep raids intoEngland’s northern countiescould, therefore, neverthreatenthecountry’svitals.Scotland’s military

limitations were probablymost clearly apparent during1316–18 when their borderraids were seriously affectedby the demands of EdwardBruce’s Irish campaign, aswereotherinitiativesthatmetwith disappointing results. InJuly 1315 the Scottish king

attempted to capture Carlislebutwasdrivenbackforwantof adequate siege equipment,togetherwithamostefficientdefenceofthecityconductedbythesheriffofCumberland,Sir Andrew Harcla. InDecember of the same yearBruce and Douglas made asecond attempt to captureBerwick, again withoutsuccess. In Ireland, too, theirforces were thinly spread.Although the Scots’ invaders

enjoyed initial victories inUlsterandEdwardBrucewascrowned King of Ireland atDundalk in May 1316, thecampaign was soon to gobadly wrong. A combinedexpedition ledbyRobert andEdward Bruce during thewinter of 1316–17 wasseriously affected by famineconditions, together withunexpectedly determinedopposition. In the spring of1317 Robert Bruce was

compelledtoreturnhomeandat the end of 1318 the Irishcampaign ended in defeatwithEdwardBruce’sdeathinbattle.During 1316 and 1317,

with so many troops away,much of the border raidingdepended on the skill andenergy of James Douglas,whoheavilydefeatedastronggroupofEnglishandGasconknights venturing out fromBerwick. Soon afterwards he

met two other cavalrydetachments, one sent fromJedburgh by the Earl ofArundel, the other from nearBerwickunderRobertNevilleof Raby, the so-called‘Peacock of the North’,whom Douglas killed. Inrecognition, during 1317BruceappointedhimWardenorLieutenant of Scotland. Inthe spring of 1318 DouglassucceededatlastincapturingBerwickandfollowedthisup

in the autumn of 1319 bycarrying out his mostdestructive and penetratingraid yet, burning all thegathered harvest and seizinglarge numbers of men andanimals from Gilsland andWestmorland.5 If all Scottishmilitary resources had beenused as effectively and theraids had penetrated deeperstill, there would have beensuch a continued and

increasing outcry fromnorthernEnglandthatthewarmightnothavecontinued forsolong.Another reason for its

length was the obduracy andcapacity for intrigue shownby Edward II. Although hismilitaryineptitudehadcausedsuch humiliation, he wasmore successful in otherways. Through his closerelations with the papacy heconducted a religious (and

diplomatic) offensive againstBrucetopreventhimgainingScottish independence. In adeeply religious age thiswasapowerfulcardtoplay.SinceBruce’s sacrilegious murderof John Comyn in 1306 andthe subsequent support hereceived from the Scottishbishops, the Gascon PopeClement V, whether or notfavourably inclined towardsthe English, wasunderstandably not well

disposed towards him.Clement not only servedsentenceofexcommunicationupon both Bruce and theScottish church but repeatedittimeaftertime.After Clement’s death in

1316 the new Pope, JohnXXII, sought an end tohostilities in Europe so thatits monarchs could join himonaprojectedcrusadeagainstthe Turks. This, of course,required peace between

England and Scotland and in1317 he attempted to forcethe Scots into a two-yeartruce. Bruce received thePope’s two cardinalscourteously but refused toconsidertheirpeaceproposalsaslongastheyaddressedhimas ‘Governor of Scotland’and not as its true king.Continuinginthesameironicvein he told them he couldnotopentheirsealedlettersasthey might be intended for

another Robert Bruce. TheScottish king was able toadopt such a stance partlybecause theEnglishappearedincapable of gaining themilitary advantage theirgreater resources warranted.Infact,theScotsshowedtheyhadnointentionofobservingthe Pope’s proposed trucewhen Douglas besieged andsucceeded in capturingBerwick during the two-yearperiod. This provoked the

Pope into ordering the fourseniorScottishbishops,ofStAndrews,Aberdeen,DunkeldandMoray, to appear beforehim at the papal curia, andwhen they refused heexcommunicated themtogether with Bruce; whilethis was not an uncommonoccurrence for any of them,in a religious age itsseriousness could not bedoubted.In response, during April

1320 the Scots sent aremarkable document to thePope justifying theircountry’s independence andtheir own love of liberty.William Wallace hadexpressed the samesentimentsinearlieryearsbutthe confidence behind thiselegant and remarkabledocument could only havecomeafterBruce’ssuccessatBannockburn with itsunifying effect upon

Scotsmen of all classes. Theletter, known as theDeclaration of Arbroathbecause it was dated at theabbey there, was, in theopinion of ProfessorBarrow,likely to have been first sentasaroundrobintobeseenbyas many earls, barons andother people as possible.Probably drafted by BernardofLinton,AbbotofArbroathand Scotland’s Chancellor, itwassignedbyeightearlsand

forty-four other seniorlaymen, many of themprevious supporters of JohnBalliol and the Comyns, andalso by a relatively largenumber of modestfreeholders, collectivelyrepresenting ‘the wholecommunity of the realm ofScotland’.The declaration was a tour

deforcewritteninanelegantbut restrained style andpurporting to represent the

Scottish nation rather thanany current royal power. Itasserted the country’sindependence since ancienttimes, condemned theaggression of the twoEdwardsandbeggedthePopetohelpbringsuchaggressionto an end by persuading theKingofEnglandtobecontentwith his own country and‘suffer us to live in thatnarrow spot of Scotland,beyond which is no

habitation, since we desirenothing but our own’.Approaching the end of theletter the language rose to aclimax: ‘for as long as ahundred of us remain alive,we intend never to besubjected to the lordship oftheEnglishinanyway.ForitisnotforgloryinWar,richesor honours that we fight butonly for the laws of ourfathers and for freedom,which no good man loses

exceptalongwithhis life’. Itconcluded with theadmonition, ‘But if yourholiness too credulouslytrusts the talesof theEnglishfully or does not leave offfavouring the English to ourconfusion then we believethattheMostHighwillblameyou for the slaughter ofbodies, the destruction ofsouls and other misfortunesthat follow, inflictedby them

onusandbyusonthem’.6However far it was

orchestratedbyRobertBruceand his ministers such apatriotic claim for nationalindependencewasremarkablein the early part of thefourteenth century. Itssentiments were to bemirrored in theUnitedStatesDeclaration of Independence,directed against the Britishover four centuries later.But

howeverpowerful,neitherthePope nor the English kingwasasyetwillingtoheedthemessage. Admittedly thePope did ask the English tojustifytheirclaimtoScotlandbut by 1325, after renewedEnglish pressure, he still hadnotraisedhis interdictonthenorthern kingdom, althoughbynowhe at least addressedBrucebyhisroyaltitle.In reality Scotlandwas not

nearly so united as the

Declarationpretended:indeedwhileitwasbeingconsideredby the papacy charges oftreason were being preparedagainst several who hadactually placed theirsignatures on it. Thereluctanceofmen likeRogerMoubray, William Olifantand William Mowat to signwas demonstrated by theirnames not appearing in themain draft but being addedlast of all. Such men were

supporters of Balliol and theComyns who, according tothe three chroniclers,Barbour, Fordun and Grey,during1320plottedtokilltheking. With Bruce’s successagainsttheEnglishseeminglyso close they probably feltforcedtorevealtheirhandsinadesperatebidtoseizepowerbyassassinatingRobertBruceand placing their owncandidate on the throne, inthis case William de Soules,

grandson of AlexanderComyn, Earl of Buchan. DeSoules, who had also signedthe Declaration, was thehereditary Seneschal (orbutler) of Scotland. Duringthe previous year he hadhelped to negotiate the trucewith England but he was byno means a strong orcharismatic figure. On theplot being discovered DavidBrechin, Gilbert Malherbe,John Logie and a squire,

Richard Brown, werecondemnedtobeexecutedbyaparliamentheldatSconeon4 August 1320. GilbertMalherbe, John Logie andRichard Brown wereaccordingly drawn, hangedand beheaded while DavidBrechin was hanged andbeheaded. Although anotherconspirator, Roger Moubray,died before being convicted,his body was brought beforethe judges to be quartered as

atraitor.HoweveronBruce’sintervention the body wasspared and given decentburial.DeSouleswas treatedcomparativelylenientlybeingcondemned to perpetualimprisonment. He wasconfinedinDumbartonCastlewhere he was said to havedied ina towerofstone.Thesamesentencewaspassedonthe Countess of Strathearn,widowofthepro-ComynEarlMalise, who was also

involvedintheplot.With the conspiracy firmly

suppressed, Bruce’s positionbecame stronger than ever.Although evidence of a lessthanunitedcommunitywithinScotland so soon after theDeclaration was submittedmusthavecausedadegreeofembarrassment, none of theconspirators, except DeSoules,hadheldhighrankorbelonged to the king’s innercircle of councillors. Such a

short, limited andunsuccessful uprising couldnot compromise Scotland’sclarioncallforindependence.However the Scottish

military initiatives werecontinued, and by Christmas1319 their superiority in theborderareaswassuchthattheEnglish were compelled toask for a truce of two years.This was accepted at ameeting between the twosides at Newcastle, where

Scotland was represented bya deliberately restrainedScottish delegation led byWilliamdeSoules.Althoughthe English delegates weregiventheauthoritytodiscussalongertermpeacetheywerestill not allowed to recogniseScottishsovereignty,and thiswas not pursued. During1321,asaresultofnewpapalpressure, envoys from bothcountriesmetagaintodiscussamorepermanentpeace–but

werenonearertoreachinganagreement.On 6 January 1322, six

days after the two-year truceended, Douglas and Morayresumedthemilitarypressureand restarted raiding.For thefirst two months the Englishwere as divided amongthemselves as ever untilunder the command ofAndrew Harcla (who hadalready distinguished himselfagainst the Scots at Carlisle)

the king’s levies fromCumberland andWestmorland, clearlyimitating Bruce’s tactics atBannockburn, defeatedEdward II’s bitter enemiesthe earls of Hereford andLancaster. Hereford waskilledandLancaster,whohadbeen secretly correspondingwith Douglas, was takenprisoner before beingexecuted.As a result, in July 1322

Edward was able to lead hislast expedition intoScotland.Bruce responded by refusingto be drawn into a majorbattle and reverting to hisscorched earth tactics.Apparently, in the whole ofthe normally fertile Lothianregion they found just onelame cow that could not bedrivenoff.Seeing it, theEarlof Surrey remarked, ‘This isthe dearest beef that I yetbeheld; for of a certainty it

has cost a thousand poundsand more’.7 As Bruceintended, the English armywas soon brought close tostarving and the king had nooption but to withdraw. Theinitiative passed to hisopponents who were notlikely to miss such anopportunity.After Edward II and his

forces re-entered Englandmany of themdispersed, and

Bruce seized the chance ofleadingapowerfulcontingentinpursuitoftheEnglishking.Edward fled from BylandAbbey in Yorkshire toRievaulxAbbeynearMalton.Douglas and Moray, whowere characteristically in theforefront of the Scottishforces, found their directroute toRievaulxblockedbyEdward’s household knightsunder the Earl of Richmond,John of Brittany. Without

hesitation the Scots attackedthe powerful position, withDouglas and Moray leadingthe assault uphill whileHighlanders charged alongthe evenhigherground to itsflank. Faced with a twinassault theEnglishbrokeandran, although they delayedBruce long enough forEdwardtoescape.HerodetoBridlington where he tookship to York, but againsuffered the humiliation of

defeat, this time in his owncountry, and of having toabandon his personalequipment, including silverplate and jewellery, even hishorse trappings and harness.Richmond himself wascaptured together with othernobility including a Frenchlord, Henry de Sully, whomBruce, unwilling toantagoniseFrance,orderedtobe released without ransom.Sully however developed

suchanadmirationandlikingfor the Scottish king that,beforehisreturntoFrance,heoffered to take part innegotiationsbetweenEnglandand Scotland for a new andlong-standing truce.Whatever approaches werebeing considered by thecountries’ two governments,from early 1323 manynorthern noblesmade privatetreatiesof immunitywith theScots in an effort to protect

theircommunities.Byfarthemost serious was made byAndrew Harcla, now Earl ofCarlisle, who concluded that‘theKing of England neitherknew how to rule his realmnor was able to defend itagainst the Scots, who yearbyyearlaiditmoreandmorewaste, [and] he feared lest atlast theKing should lose theentire kingdom’.8 Harclaenteredintosecretnegotiation

withBruce andon3 January1324negotiatedadraftpeacetreaty which he openlyproclaimed within hisearldom. Edward II wasenraged, proclaiming Harclaa traitor, and when a friend,Sir Anthony de Lucy,betrayed Harcla, Edward IIhad him taken prisoner and,after a summary trial,inflicted on him the traitor’sfate of being hanged,disembowelledandquartered.

Carlisle no longer had astrong leader to defend itagainst the northern raidersand the likelihood of itscapture gave the English aparticularly strong reason toproposeanewtruce,thistimefor the remarkable period ofthirteenyears.Itwasacceptedand ratified by Bruce atBerwick on 7 June 1324. Atruce of such a length wentfar towards the Englishacceptance of Scottish

independence and Brucemade his ratification asKingof Scotland. By hisacceptance Bruce must havebelieved a full-scale peacetreatywassuretofollowlongbefore the thirteen yearselapsed.Intheshort termthetruce’s most importantoutcome was that Englandagreed not to oppose theScottish supplication to thePope requesting the removalof his interdict against their

country. Moray was sent toRome as Bruce’srepresentativesupportedthereby Henry de Sully. DespiteEdward II’s promise not tointerfere,in1324healsosentapowerfuldelegationtopressthePopetocontinuewithhisinterdict and, as a result, theonly concessionmade by thepapacy was the formalrecognitionofBruceasKingofScots.InthesameyeartheEnglish king commanded

Edward Balliol, son of kingJohn, to come to Englandfrom Picardy where he hadbeen living on the ancestralestates. The motive wasplainlytorunEdwardBalliolasacontenderfortheScottishthrone. Despite Edward II’scontinued machinations, thetrucesucceededinbringingacessation of hostilitiesbetween the two countriesand laid the foundation forgenuine peace talks to

commence at York in 1324,although Scottish hopes herebrokedownuponEdwardII’scontinued intransigence.Earlier in the year, however,Scotland had been able tocelebrate the long-awaitedbirth of an heir to RobertBruceandhisqueen.In 1326 Scotland’s

reacceptance as a sovereignEuropeanstatemovedastagecloserwhenrelationsbetweenEngland and France declined

and the ‘auld alliance’ wasofficially renewed withScotlandandFrancesigningadefensive treaty wherebyeach country would come tothe other’s aid if they wereattacked by England.Whateverthesedevelopmentsin Europe might herald, itwas England’s recognitionthat remained all-important.The convulsions therefore intheEnglishcourtwhichledtoEdward II’s deposition in

favour of his fourteen-year-old son, and the king’ssubsequent murder by hiswife Isabella and her lover,Sir Roger Mortimer, broughta new and dangeroussituation for Scotland,especiallyasEdward’slossofScotlandhadbeencitedasanimportant reason for hisdeposition.Brucewasnolongerrobust

physically and a seeminglyendless truce while England

regathered its militarystrength appeared to beneither in his nor Scotland’sbest interests. He thereforedecided to remind the newEnglish ruler of his militarypresence by attacking thecastle of Norham on 1February 1327, the very dayof Edward III’s crowning.The attack failed when thecastle’s commander receivedwarning of it, and Bruce didnot follow it up with further

hostile acts. On 6March theEnglish Council of Regencyunder Henry, Earl ofLancaster, confirmed theirdesire for a renewal of thetruce between the twocountries, but althoughScottishenvoyswenttoYorkavowedly to negotiate itsrenewal, what both countriesnow wanted, in fact, was aresumption of warlikeoperations. On the Scottishside it was hoped that new

military successes would atlast force England toacknowledge their country’sindependence, and onEngland’s part there was anewdeterminationtore-exerttheirholdoverwhattheysawas a rebellious Scotland andto inflict punishment for itsdestructive raiding. Therecould be no better fillip forthenewregimethanavictoryover the Scots. From earlyApriltheEnglishissuedwrits

to commence militarypreparations and sent troopsunder the command of twoearls, Lancaster and Kent, toNewcastle.Following the inevitable

breakdown of negotiations atYork James Douglas wastednotimeinmakingaraidintotheEnglishnortherncounties,thusmarkingthebeginningofa freshScottishcampaign. Inearly July, Douglas, MorayandEarlDonaldofMarleda

far more considerable forceinto northern England,through the Kelder gap anddown the North Tyne, withWearsdale as their objective.Despite poor health, BrucehimselfwenttoIrelandwherehe obtained a truce from theUlster seneschal, Sir HenryMandeville, that stoppedhimhelping the anticipatedEnglish invasionofScotland.Bruce also brought away apromiseofmuch-neededfood

supplies for the northernkingdom.As Bruce had rightly

anticipated, the new Englishgovernment showed its owneagerness for military actionby sending a large army toseek out and crush theScottish forces. In supportweremanyHainaultersundercommandofJohnofHainaultto whose niece the youngEnglish king was betrothed.These included 700mounted

men at arms.9 The Englishalso brought a frighteningnew weapon in the shape ofsmallcannonsbutduringthiscampaign they remainedimpotent,asitrainedsomuchthat their gunpowder wasrendereduseless.Thefifteen-year-old Edward III was thearmy’s nominal commander,although in practice thedirectioncamefromtheearlsof Lancaster and Kent, with

John of Hainault leading thecavalry. James Douglas wasthe overall Scottishcommander and, in Bruce’sabsence,Douglas’remarkableleadership skills, clearlyevidentbeforeandduringthegreat battle of Bannockburn,cameintotheirown.The success of Scottish

tactics during the campaignofJulyandearlyAugust1327and the correspondingbafflement andmisery of the

English have been describedin graphic fashion by aHainaulter, LeBel. From theoutsetDouglas’lightlyarmedforce, burning and pillagingas theywent, led theEnglisha rare dance throughWearsdaleandTeesdale.TheEnglish were determinedenough but their pursuit wasimpeded by theircumbersometrainofwaggonsand the other equipmentrequired by an orthodox

force.AsLeBeldescribedit,Douglas led them ‘throughwoods and swamps andwildernesses and evilmountainsandvalleys’.10At length Douglas chose a

gooddefensivepositionsouthof the Wear and waited forhis pursuers. The next day itstarted raining heavily and itcontinuedtorainforafurthereight days. On the ninth daythe Scottish scouts captured

anEnglishsquire,ThomasofRokebury, but Douglasreleasedhimsothathecouldbrief the English about thewhereabouts of the Scottishcamp. There was muchmanoeuvring as the Englishmoved up and the Scotsexchanged one gooddefensive position foranother, but althoughDouglaswasfarbetterplacedas a master of speed andsurprise commanding a

smaller andhandier force,hedetermined to take no risks.At one point he and hisfellow commanders refusedEdward III’s naı¨ve request(insomewaysreminiscentofthe young Bruce’s atMethven against Valence)that the Scottish forces leavetheir strong defensiveposition and fight superiornumbers of English on theplain. As Le Bel reported,‘They said they would do

neither theonenor theother.They said that, as the Kingand his staff could see, theywere in his realm and hadburneditandwastedit;andifthisvexedhimhecouldcomeandstopthem,fortheywouldstay where they were for aslongastheypleased’.11InsuchasituationDouglas’

cunningcameintoitsown,ashe played on the enthusiasmof theEnglish to pursue him

and bring him to battle. Onthenightof3AugustDouglassuddenly decamped, but kepthis camp fires burning todeceive his opponents.Moving across the Wear toStanhope Park, one of theBishop of Durham’s huntingdemesnes,hetookupastrongposition,withariverbeforeitand an impassable marsh toits rear. The next day theEnglish duly resumed theirpursuit, and made camp on

the river’s opposite bank,from where they planned tosurround Douglas’ positionandthenstarvetheScotsout.However,theEnglishweresotiredafter theirmoveandthelabour involved in setting uptheirtentsthattheyneglectedto put out an adequatenumber of picquets. Thatnight Douglas led a raidingpartyintotheopposingcamp,cutting down large numbersof sleeping and bewildered

menashewent.Spurringintothecentreoftheencampmenthe slashed the guy ropes ofthe royal tent and attemptedto seize the young monarch,but despite inflicting manycasualties on the king’shousehold, including itschaplain, he failed. In fact,thetableswerealmostturnedfor as he waited to shepherdhis men out of the camp, heonly narrowly avoidedcapture.

The next day the Englishset about investing StanhopePark, certain that Douglaswouldbeforcedeventuallytoattemptabreak-outandsufferdefeat in the process.Douglas’ co-commanderMoray also saw no otheroption than to fight. But theScottish commander knewdifferently: on 6 August hearrangedforaScottishknighttobe‘captured’who told theEnglish that Douglas was

planning a break-out attemptthat evening. In expectationtheEnglish stood to arms allthroughthenightasDouglas’heraldsblewtheirhornsinanendless series of commandsand his camp fires continuedtoburnbrightly.Undercoverof this activity the Scottisharmy stole away over theseemingly impassable marsh,which theycrossedby layingdown wooden hurdles thatthey afterwards retrieved.

When dawn came and theEnglish could make out theempty camp on the oppositehillside,theiropponentswerefour or five miles north ontheirwaytoScotland.During the campaign

Douglas gave the English aclassic lesson inwagingwar.If his despoiling tactics andavoidance of battle appearedunchivalric to both hisopponents and possibly tomany young bloods in his

own force, they were theresult of his long experienceof warfare against theEnglish, both before andduring the great battle atBannockburn.LikehismasterBruce, he knew how muchthat victory had owed toshortcomings in Englishleadership. During theWearside campaign herealisedtheonlyhopefortheEnglishwastopinhimdownand destroy his forces. He

wasdeterminedtodenythemthat and in the process todemoralise the large armythey had assembled at suchcost: this achieved, northernEngland would be open tofurtherdestructiveraids.Meanwhilegazingacrossat

thegutteringcampfiresintheScottish camp the Englishleadershipknewonlytoowellthey had no further militaryoptions. Their army wasutterlywornout, their horses

ruinedandthemen’spersonalequipment rottedby the rain.Their only course of actionwas to return south, baffledand empty-handed. Facedwith such humiliation theyoung Edward III burst intotears in his disappointmentandfrustration.BackinYorkit became clear that althoughthe English might issuefurther writs for militaryservice, their offensivecapability had been

temporarily destroyed. Withthe exchequer empty (thecrown jewels had beenpawned to pay for themercenaries) and theHainaulters dismissed,Douglas’skillshadmadesurethe military initiative stayedin Bruce’s hands. Once theScottish army had rested andbeen given new horses thedestructive raids wereresumed acrossNorthumberland together

with attacks upon its castles,andBrucenowbeganopenlyto grant lands to hissupporters there as a clearsignal that he intended toincorporate the county intoScotland, to be followed nodoubtbyothers.12As intended, the English

now seriously entered intopeace negotiations and theirdelegates arrived inEdinburghon10March1328.

Agreement between the twonations, including a dynasticunion between Bruce’s son,David Bruce, and KingEdward’s sister, Joan, wasreachedwithin seven days tobe ratified by an EnglishparliamentatNorthamptonon4 May. The thirty-two-yearwar had finally ended andwith it Bruce achieved hislifelongaim.

Bannockburn provided the

martial platform that led toScotland’s eventual re-emergence as a sovereignstate free from Englishsuzerainty and to therecognition of Robert Bruce,the usurper claimant, as herlegitimate king. It gaveScotland a militaryascendancy over Englandwhich under Bruce it neverlost, and an increased prideand confidence that led theScottish leaders to address,

even to chide, the Pope notjust on behalf of their kingbut the whole community ofthe realm to remove hisinterdict over the country.Without the outstandingpersonal qualities of RobertBruce, the rare skills andcommitment of hiscommanders, and theconstancy of the Scottishchurch it is extremelydoubtfulwhether the Englishwould have finally been

forced to sign the Treaty ofNorthampton. Without theirdefeat at Bannockburn theywould certainly not havedoneso.

No later consideration caninvalidate the primarycontribution of Bannockburntowards the regaining ofScottish independence.However, Bruce’s death ayear later was followed bythose of his leading

commanders in the battle,Douglas in 1330 and bothMorayandKeithin1332,thelatter in battle at DupplinMoor.WiththepassingofthemenwhofullyunderstoodthegraverisksBrucehadtakenatBannockburn and knew thetrueextentofEnglishmilitaryincompetence there, laterScottish commanders wereliable to be less circumspect.Raymond Campbell Patersoncondemned subsequent

Scottish military leaders forhaving ‘an illusory sense ofinvulnerability’: this may betoo harsh, but they certainlydeserve to be criticised for adisastrous lack ofimagination.13Traditionally, serious

defeats cause nations torethink theirmilitaryoptions;from Wallace’s defeat atFalkirk Bruce realised hisschiltronshadtobetrainedin

mobility, and following theirdefeat at Bannockburn theEnglish realised the need toco-ordinate their differentarms in battle. The fractiousEnglishknights,whoin1314decried both archers andspearmen,were soon to fightdismounted shoulder toshoulder with ordinarysoldiers, and withlongbowmen on their flanks.Thisdeadlycombinationwasto give them victories over

Scotland at Dupplin Moor(1332), at Halidon Hill(1333), Neville’s Cross(1346) and at Flodden Field(1513). It also gave themascendancy over France atCrécyin1346andPoitiersin1356, despite being heavilyoutnumbered. At Crécy allthe English infantry werebow-armed, but while it wasprimarily a victory for theEnglish longbow,Edward IIIalso adopted earlier Scottish

tactics to reinforce hissuccess by, for instance,digging pits to slow theadvance of the opposingcavalry.14 SignificantlyCrécy,likeBannockburn,wasa victory for a smaller,well-disciplined army against amuch more powerfuladversarywhofailedtomakehis numerical superioritycount.Bannockburn had a quite

different effect uponScottishcommanders. It established atradition, or at least re-emphasised the favouredScottish characteristic oftaking the offensive, but indoing so at Dupplin Moor,Halidon Hill and Neville’sCross – against Englisharchers supported bydismounted knights – theysuffered terrible casualties inthe process. There also cameinto being an enduring faith

intheschiltron,thethicketofyeoman spearmen who hadproved so formidable underBruce’s direction. This faithpersisted into the mid-sixteenth century with thedisastrous battle of PinkieCleuch (1547) where theScottish schiltrons,unsupported by cavalry orarchers, were assailed fromall sides by heavy Englishcavalry, supported by longand shortbowmen together

with mounted arqubusiers,and most deadly of all bymassed guns firing at shortrange,whoseshottorebloodycorridors in their massedranks. With their dedicationboth to the offensive and theschiltron Scottishcommanders forgotwhatwasarguably Bruce’s greatestlegacy to Scottish arms, theability to switch theirformationsfromtheoffensiveto the defensive. Weaker

leadership would allow fataldivisions to appear in thecommand structure as atDupplin Moor, when therivalry between Lord RobertBruce and his overallcommander, Donald of Mar,led to them disputing whowould be first to charge theenemy, with the result thatbothwerekilled.Itmightseemalltoosimple

toattributetheScottishdefeatat Pinkie Cleuch to their

victory at Bannockburn overtwo centuries before,although the Scottishcommander there, JamesHamilton, Earl of Arran,ordered his army to leave astrongdefensivepositionandattack in a tragic parody ofBruce’s initiative. At Pinkie,unlike Bannockburn, Arranwas fighting an enemy whohad gained greater militaryexperience from fighting onthe continent. It is also true

that Scottish tactics hadremained static andunimaginative,with too littleappreciation of the fact thatcavalry would re-emerge asthe arbiter of war supportedby a new military arm. ThiscouldinparthavebeenduetoScotland’s lack ofinvolvement in Europeanwars, but not entirely sincemany Scottish mercenarieshad taken prominent roles inthe continuing conflicts

abroad. Victory atBannockburn wasundoubtedly a factor, and animportant one at that, inScottish over-confidence thatled to costly and repeateddefeats.

Even still, Bannockburn’spositive attributes areincomparably greater.HowevermanytimesScottisharmies might have beensubsequently beaten by the

English, however weak thecountry’s monarchs ordivided its national councils,evenwiththeirkingacaptivein English hands, Scots stillremembered that they hadsucceeded in checkingEnglish ambitions toincorporate their country intoa greater England. By theTreaty of Northampton,Edward,grandsonofEdwardLongshanks, Hammer of theScots,whoseaimwasnothing

shortoffullconquest,‘willedand consented that the saidKingdom, according to itsancient boundaries, observedin the days of Alexander IIIshould remain unto RobertKing of Scots, his heirs andsuccessors, free and dividedfrom the Kingdom ofEngland, without anysubjection, right of service,claim or demand whatever;and that all writings whichmight have been executed at

any time to the contraryshouldbeheldasvoidandofnoeffect’.15This remains the true

measure of Robert Bruce’svictoryatBannockburn.

NOTES

INTRODUCTIONTOTHE700THANNIVERSARYEDITION

1

Letter fromRobert theBrucetoEdwardII(London,BritishLibrary, MS Cotton Titus AXIX,f.87r).

2

As a result the crestsubsequently adopted by theGrey family took the formofascalingladder.

INTRODUCTION

1

As a result the crestsubsequently adopted by theGrey family took the formofascalingladder.

2 ChronicleofLanercost,208.

PROLOGUE

1 Murison, A F, Sir WilliamWallace,105.

CHAPTERONE

1 Fergusson, J, WilliamWallace,9.

2Barrow,GWS,RobertBruceand the Community ofScotland,12.

3 Traquair, Peter, Freedom’sSword,31.

4 ChronicleofLanercost,145.

5Andrew of Wyntoun’sOrygynale Cronykil ofScotland,Bookvii,ch.xi.

6Paterson, RaymondCampbell,FortheLion,9.

7 Morris, JE,TheWelshWarsofEdwardI,283.

8 Fergusson,J,op.cit.,39.

9

Neither Agnes MureMacKenzie in her RobertBruce,KingofScots, nor theauthoritative ProfessorBarrow pointed to thepresence of the nobles withWallace’s cavalry at Falkirkas a potent factor in hischoosing to fight where hedid.

10Murison, A F, Sir WilliamWallace,35–6.

11 Morris,JE,op.cit.,286–92.

CHAPTERTWO

1Barrow,GWS,RobertBruceand the Community of theRealmofScotland,84.

2ibid., 123; Stones, E L G,Anglo-Scottish Relations,1174–1328,No.32,120.

3 Barrow,GWS,op.cit.,124.

4Calendar of DocumentsRelating to Scotland, Vol. ii,1420,1437,1653.

5 ibid.,1071.6 ibid.,1978.7 ibid.,1092,1111.8 Barbour,John,TheBruce,13.

9 ChronicleGuisborough,366–7.

10

Bower, Walter,Scoticronicon, Vol. 7, Bookvi, 309–13; Scott, RonaldMcNair, Robert the Bruce,72.

11 LiberPluscardensis,Bookix,229.

12 Barrow,GWS,op.cit.,148.

CHAPTERTHREE

1Wright, Thomas (ed.),Chronicle of Pierre deLangtoft,367.

2 Stones, Anglo-ScottishRelations,No34,237–9.

3 ChronicleRishanger,211.4 Barbour,John,TheBruce,24.

5

Scott,RonaldMcNair,Robertthe Bruce, 87 (Sampson,Official Guide, KildrummyCastle).

6Barbour, John, op. cit., 54;Bingham, Caroline, Robert

theBruce,141.

7Palgrave,F,(ed.),Documentsand Records Illustrating theHistoryofScotland,358.

8 Barbour,John,op.cit.,50.9 ibid.,76,77.10 ChronicleLanercost,182.

11Scott, Ronald McNair, op.cit., 242 (King Robert’sTestament).

12Gough,Henry(ed.),Itineraryof King Edward I, Vol. ii,266–275.Calendar of Documents

13 Relating toScotland,Vol. iii,80.

14

AccordingtoBarbourthedateof the battle was 31December 1307. This isplainly wrong and ProfessorBarrow inclines to a laterdate, likely to have been 23May1308.

15Barbour, John, op. cit., 148;Young, Alan, Robert theBruce’sRivals,14.

16

Acts of Parliaments ofScotland, Vol. I, 1124–1423,289.

17 ChronicleLanercost,190.18 VitaEdwardiSecundi,12.19 ibid.,48.20 Barbour,John,op.cit.,182.21 ibid.,184.

CHAPTERFOUR

1 RotuliScotiae,I,86.

2

Morris, JE,TheWelshWarsof Edward I, 286–93;Calendar of DocumentsRelating to Scotland, Vol. ii,956.

3 Morris,JE,Bannockburn,40.

4Powicke, Michael, MilitaryObligation in MedievalEngland,Oxford,1962,135.

5 Morris,JE,op.cit.,82–3.

6 MacNamee, Colm,TheWarsoftheBruces,23.

7 Hyland, Ann, TheWarhorse,1250–1600,7.

8 NewFoedera,ii,203.9 Hyland,Ann,op.cit.,31.

10Davidson, Martin and Levy,Adam, Decisive Weapons,33–6.

11

Caldwell, David H, ScottishWeapons and Fortifications1100–1800(Edinburgh1981),254.

12Morris, J E, Bannockburn;MacKenzie,WilliamMackay,Bannockburn.

13 Traquair, Peter, Freedom’sSword.

14Round,JH,FeudalEngland,292;Morris,JE,WelshWarsofEdwardI,41.

15Barrow, G W S, RobertBruce,207.

16 VitaEdwardiSecundi,201.

17 Barbour, John, The Bruce,186.

18 Morris, J E, Bannockburn,292.

19Calendar of DocumentsRelating to Scotland, Vol. ii,1882;Vol.iii,190.

20 Traquair,Peter,op.cit.,183.

21

General Christison is theauthor of Bannockburn: TheStory of a Battle, NationalTrustforScotland,1962.

Becke, Major A F, ‘The

22 Battle of Bannockburn’ inTheComplete Peerage 1949,Vol.xi,Appendix13,15.

23 Scoticronicon (1759 edition)ii,xxi,248.

24 MacKenzie,WM,opcit.,23.25 Barbour,op.cit.,I,426.

26 Calendar of ChanceryWarrants,I,436.

27 Barbour,op.cit.,191–2.28 Barrow,op.cit.,210.

29Scott,RonaldMcNair,RoberttheBruce,146,7.

30 RotuliScotiae,I,120a.

31 MacNamee,op.cit.,125.

32 Scott, Ronald McNair, op.cit.,144.

CHAPTERFIVE

1Documents and RecordsIllustrating the History ofScotland,19–20,29–31.

2 Chronicle Lanercost, 111–112.

3 Scott,RonaldMcNair,RoberttheBruce,23.TheScotsPeerage, edited by

4 Sir James Balfour Paul, ii,432.

5 Barrow, G W S, RobertBruce,124.

6

Ranald Nicholson, forinstance, has writtencausticallythatby1306Bruce‘seemed to have purgedhimself of any excessiveScottishness’. [Nicholson, R,Scotland: the later MiddleAges(Edinburgh1974),70.]

7Calendar of DocumentsRelating to Scotland, Vol. ii,1807.

8 Barbour, John, The Bruce,160.

9Calendar of DocumentsRelating toScotland,Vol. iii,76and362.

10 Barbour,John,op.cit.,169.11 Barrow,GWS,op.cit.,293.12 Barbour,op.cit.,237.13 Barrow,GWS,op.cit.,436.

14 Scott, Ronald McNair, op.cit.,188.

15 ibid.,173.16 Barbour,John,op.cit.,9.

17

Taking full advantage ofLamberton’ssecretagreementDouglas struck down theBishop’s groomwho tried toprevent him from taking thehorse.

18 Barbour,op.cit.,21.

19

ThiswasthecaseatWeardalein 1327 when the EnglishfoughtagainstScottishforcesledbyDouglasandMoray.

20 Acts of the Parliaments ofScotland,I,119.

21Royal Commission onHistorical Manuscripts, 5th

Rep.Appendix,626.

CHAPTERSIX

1 Prestwich, Michael, TheThreeEdwards,79.

2

Afterhehadbecomekingonehousehold account stillincluded quantities of ironand plaster for his privateworks.CottonianMS,57.

3 ChronicleLanercost,206.4 CottonianMS,84.

Wright, Thomas,The Roll of

5 Arms of the princes, baronsand knights who attendedKingEdwardItothesiegeofCaerlaverock,1864.

6Calendar of DocumentsRelating to Scotland Vol. ii,1191.

7 Foedera Conventiones,Litterae,I,ii,983.

8Calendar of DocumentsRelating to Scotland, Vol. ii,1909.

9

Hamilton, J S, PiersGaveston, Earl of Cornwall1307–1312 (Wayne State

UniversityPress,1988),35.

10

Skene, W (ed.), Johannis deFordun, Chronica GentisScotorum (Edinburgh 1871),346.

11

Edward’s remarkabledevotion to Gaveston wentbeyond the grave; the king’soutlay on his burial and fordevotion to be paid to hismemory amounted to £850,apart from his subsequentgrants to Gaveston’s familyand servants. [Hamilton, op.cit.,100.]

12 Phillips, J R S, Aymer deValence,21.

13 Barbour, John, The Bruce,24–5.

14 VitaEdwardiSecundi,11.

15Chronicles of the Reigns ofEdward I and Edward II, ii,183,195.

16 Phillips,JRS,op.cit.,61,62.17 ibid.,280–1.

18Thompson, Edward Maunde,Dictionary of NationalBiography(OUP,1995).

19 Chronicle of Walter of

Guisborough,274.

20 Parliamentary Writs, Vol. ii,676.

21Chronicles of the Reigns ofEdward I and Edward II, ii,191.

22

Turner, T H, ‘The Will ofHumphrey deBohun,Earl ofHereford and Essex’,Archaeological Journal, Vol.2,1845,346.

23 Chron.Knyghton,2480.

24Chronicles of the Reigns ofEdward I and Edward II, i,171.

25 Barbour,John,op.cit.,224.

26 Foedera Conventiones,Litterae,I,974–5.

CHAPTERSEVEN

1Calendar of DocumentsRelating toScotland,Vol. iii,365.

2 VitaEdwardiSecundi,50.3 RotuliScotiae,I,127.

4Calendar of DocumentsRelating to Scotland, Vol. ii,1168.

5 Hyland,Ann,TheWarHorse,34.

6Calendar of DocumentsRelating toScotland,Vol. iii,361.

7 MacKenzie,WM,TheBattleofBannockburn,41(note).

8 Some of the old cuttings arestillclearlyevidenttoday.

9 Barrow, G W S, RobertBruce,302.Earlier commentators,including W M MacKenzieinterpretedthepowsaspools,MacKenzie calling them

10 ‘great blobs or lagoons ofwater’ but Professor Barrowhas effectively demolishedthis explanation byestablishing them as streams,whetherslow-runningornot.

11 Barbour, John, The Bruce,190–191.

12 ibid.,192.

13

Christison,GeneralSirPhilip,Bannockburn National TrustGuidebook 1997, 15;Traquair, Peter, Freedom’sSword,185.

14 Barbour,John,op.cit.,193.15 ibid.,195.16 Barrow,GWS,op.cit.,217.17 ChronicleLanercost,225.18 Barbour,John,op.cit.,200.19 ibid.,200.

CHAPTEREIGHT

1 VitaEdwardiSecundi,51.2 Barbour,John,TheBruce,202.3 Scalacronica,54.

4 Barrow,GWS,RobertBruce,221.

5 ChronicleLanercost,225.

CHAPTERNINE

1 VitaEdwardiSecundi,51–2.

2 Barbour, John, The Bruce,209.

3 Morris,JE,Bannockburn,39.4 Barbour,John,op.cit.,209.5 ibid.,210.6 Scalacronica,54–5.

7 Vita Edwardi Secundi,51;ChronicleLanercost,206.

8 Barbour,John,op.cit.,204–5.9 Scalacronica,55.

10Barrow,GWS,op. cit., 319(ChroniconGalfridileBaker,Thompson(ed.),7).

11 Morris,JE,op.cit.,72.

12 Scoticronicon, Vol. VI, Bk12,Ch.22,365.

13 ChronicleBower,ii,249–50.14 Barrow,GWS,op.cit.,215.

15

Ramsay, Sir James ofBamff.Genesis of Lancaster,Vol. i, 1307–1368 (Oxford1913),65.

16MacKenzie,WM,TheBattleofBannockburn,92(MSheldin Corpus Christi College,Cambridge).

17Chronica Monasterii deMelsa,Bond,EA(ed.),1867,Vol.II,331.

18Miller, T, The Site of theBattle of Bannockburn,HistoricalAssociation1931.

19

His arguments here arecontained in Christison’sBannockburn: the Story of aBattle (National Trust forScotland,1962edition).

20 Scott,RonaldMcNair,RoberttheBruce,150–151.

21 Traquair, Peter, Freedom’sSword,90.

22Letter of General Christisonto Hugo Millar in theScotsmanof5July1960.

CHAPTERTEN

1 ChronicleLanercost,225.

2 Barbour, John, The Bruce,212.

3Traquair, Peter, Freedom’s

Sword,192.4 VitaEdwardiSecundi,204.5 Barbour,John,op.cit.,214.6 ChronicleLanercost,225.

7

Chronicle, Baker ofSwinbroke (edited with notesby Edward MaundeThompson)(Oxford,1889),8.

8 Barbour,John,op.cit.,217.

9 MacKenzie,WM,TheBattleofBannockburn,79.

10 ibid.,220.11 ibid.,221.12 ibid.,222.

13 ibid.,223.

14 Sinclair, Andrew, The SwordandtheGrail(1993),46–7.

15

On the anniversary of thebattle Scottish Templars stillpay tribute to theirpredecessors who foughtthere.

16 Scalacronica,142.

17 Barron, Evan, The ScottishWarofIndependence,472.

18 ChronicleLanercost,228.

19Becke, Major A F, TheComplete Peerage, Vol. xi

1949,AppendixB.20 Barbour,op.cit.,225.21 Scalacronica,56.22 ChronicleLanercost,226.

CHAPTERELEVEN

1Barbour, John, The Bruce,255;Vita Edwardi Secundi,54.

2 Barbour,John,op.cit.,227.

3Phillips, J R S, Aymer deValence, Earl of Pembroke1307–1324,75.

4 VitaEdwardiSecundi,55.

5 Chronicle, Baker ofSwinbroke,9.

6 Barron, Evan, The ScottishWarofIndependence,473.

7 Barbour,John,op.cit.,227.

8 Phillips, JRS,op. cit., 116–17.

9 Chronicles of the Reigns ofEdwardIandII,iii,231.

10 Phillips,JRS,op.cit.,116,7.11 Barbour,John,op.cit.,227.

12Chronicle Lanercost,209;Vita Edwardi Secundi,

55;Scalacronica,143.13 Barbour,John,op.cit.,234.

14

Riley, HT (ed.), HistoriaAnglicani of ThomasWalsingham, 2 vols, RollsSeries (London 1863–4)Vol.i,141–2.

15 Barbour,John,op.cit.,230.

16 Barrow, G W S, RobertBruce,230.

17Mackenzie, Agnes Mure,Robert Bruce King of Scots,282.

18 Morris,E J,TheWelshWars

ofEdwardI,88,98.

AFTERMATH

1 McNamee, Colm, The WarsoftheBruces,1306–1328,66.

2 Barron, Evan, The ScottishWarofIndependence,479.

3 ChronicleLanercost,229.

4Barrow,GWS,RobertBruceand the Community of theRealm,337.

5 ibid.,342.

6Scoticronicon,Vol. vii,Book

13,3.

7 Barbour, John, The Bruce,318.

8 Paterson, RaymondCampbell,FortheLion,82.

9 Fryde, N, Tyranny and Fall(Cambridge1979),185–92.

10 Chronique de Jean le Bel(Paris1894),55/6.

11 Davis, I M, The BlackDouglas,138.

12 RotuliScotiae,2216.

13 Paterson, RaymondCampbell,op.cit.,104.

14Wailly, Henri de, Crécy:Anatomy of a Battle (1987),51.

15 Ramsay,SirJH,TheDawnoftheConstitution(1908),196.

SELECTBIBLIOGRAPHY

Acts of Parliament of Scotland1124–1423.

Barbour, John, The Bruce,translatedbyGeorgeEyre-Todd,Edinburgh,1907.

Barron, Evan McLeod, TheScottish War of Independence,1914.

Barrow,GWS,RobertBruceandthe Community of the Realm ofScotland,Edinburgh,1988.

Bingham, Caroline, Robert theBruce,1998.

Bower, Walter, Scoticronicon,edited and translated by D E RWatt,Aberdeen,1991.

Brooke, Daphne, Wild Men andHolyPlaces,Edinburgh,1998.

CalendarofDocumentsRelatingtoScotland, Joseph Bain, Vol. 3,1307–57,Edinburgh,1887.

Caldwell, David H, Scotland’sWars and Warriors, The

StationeryOffice,1998.Chronica Majora Matthew Paris,1880.

Chronica Monasterii S. Albani,edited by H T Riley, London,1863.

Chronicles of the Reigns ofEdwardIandEdwardII,editedby W Stubbs, Rolls Series,London,1882.

The Complete Peerage, Vol. xiRickertontoSisonby,1949.

Bartholomaei de Cotton, HistoriaAnglicana,1859.

Christison,Philip,Bannockburn:AStudy in Military History.

Proceedings of the Society ofAntiquaries in Scotland, VolXC,1959.

Davis, I M, The Black Douglas,1974.

Documents and RecordsIllustrating the History ofScotland, edited by F Palgrave,1837.

Dodge, W P, Piers Gaveston,1899.

EnglishHistorical Review, ArticlebyJGEdwards,xxxix.

Fergusson, J, William Wallace,Guardian of Scotland, Stirling,1938.

Fergusson, Sir James, TheDeclaration of Arbroath,Edinburgh University Press,1970.

Flores Historiarum of MatthewParis,editedbyHRLuardLord,1890.

Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae,edited by Thomas Rymer,London1816–18.

Gough, H, Itinerary of Edward I,1900.

The Chronicle of Walter ofGuisborough, edited by HRothwell, Camden 3rd SeriesIxxxix.

Royal Commission on HistoricalManuscripts, 5th Rep,Appendix.

Chronicon Walteri deHeminburgh,Vol.II.

ItineraryofKingEdwardI,editedbyHenryGough,1900.

Johnstone, Hilda, Edward ofCarnarvon,Manchester,1946.

ChronicleofLanercost,editedandtranslated by Sir HerbertMaxwell,Glasgow,1913.

Chronicle of Pierre de Langtoft,editedbyThomasWright,1866.

Mackenzie, Agnes Mure, RobertBruce,KingofScots,1934.

MacKenzie, W M, The Battle ofBannockburn,Glasgow,1913.

McKisack, M, The FourteenthCentury1307–99,Oxford,1959.

McNamee,Colm,TheWarsof theBruces,TuckwellPress,1997.

Morris, J E, The Welsh Wars ofEdwardI,Oxford1968.

Murison, A F, Sir WilliamWallace,1818.

Nicolas, N H, The Siege ofCaerlaverock,1818.

Palgrave, F. Documents andRecords Illustrating the HistoryofScotland,2vols.

Paterson,RaymondCampbell,FortheLion,Edinburgh,1996.

Paterson, RaymondCampbell,MyWound is Deep, Edinburgh,1997.

LiberPluscardensis,editedbyFSHSkene,Edinburgh,1877.

Powicke, M,Military Obligationsin Medieval England, Oxford,1962.

Prestwich,M,EdwardI,1988.Prestwich,M,TheThreeEdwards,1996.

The Scots Peerage, edited by SirJamesBalfourPaul,Vol.2.

Phillips,JRS,AymerdeValence,Earl of Pembroke 1307–1324,Oxford1972.

Ramsay, J H, Genesis ofLancaster,Vol.I,Oxford,1913.

Reese, Peter, William Wallace,Edinburgh,1996.

Chronica Willelms Rishanger,edited by H T Riley, RollsSeries,1865.

Rotuli Scotiae, edited by DMacpherson,1814–19.

Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grayof Heton, translated by SirHerbert Maxwell, Glasgow,1907.

Scott, RonaldMcNair,Robert theBruce,Edinburgh,1993.

Stones, E L G, Anglo ScottishRelations1174–1324,1965.

Traquair,Peter,Freedom’sSword,

1998.Tout,TF,ThePlaceof theReignofEdwardII,Manchester,1914,1936.

Vita Edwardi Secundi, notes andintroduction by N Denholm-Young,1957.

Walsingham, Thomas, HistoriaAnglicani,1863.

Watson, Fiona, Under theHammer: Edward I andScotland 1286–1307, TuckwellPress,1998.

Andrew of Wyntoun’s Orygynale

Cronylcil ofScotland, edited byDavidLang,Edinburgh,1872.

Young, Alan, Robert the Bruce’sRivals: The Comyns, 1212–1314,TuckwellPress,1997.

INDEX

AbbeyCraigref1Aberdeen, Bishop of see Cheyne,Henry

Abernethy,SirLawrenceref1Airth,SirWilliamref1,ref2Alexander II, King of Scotlandref1

Alexander III, King of Scotlandref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

Alexander, Earl of Menteith ref1,ref2,ref3

Angus, earls of see UmfravilleArbroath, Declaration of ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

Archers, English ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

Archers, Scottish ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

Archers, Welsh ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4

Argentan,Gilesd’ ref1,ref2, ref3,ref4

Arundel, Earl of see Fitzalan,Edmund

Atholl,earlsofseeStrathbogieAyrref1AyrCastleref1,ref2,ref3

Ayrparliamentsref1,ref2

Balliol, Edward ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5

Balliol, John, King of Scots ref1,ref2, ref3; enthroned and payshomage to Edward ref4; ref5;submission and abdication ref6;ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10, ref11,ref12; possible return to powerref13, ref14; ref15, ref16, ref17,ref18, ref19, ref20, ref21, ref22,ref23

Bannockburn, Battle of (1314)ref1;relativestrengthsref2;ref3,ref4; Scottish leaders ref5;

English leaders ref6; localityref7; ref8, ref9; alternative sitesref10; day one ref11; day tworef12; king departs the fieldref13;English rout ref14; ref15;escape of the king ref16; ref17,ref18, ref19, ref20; significanceref21;resultsref22,ref23;ref24,ref25, ref26, ref27; assessmentref28

Beauchamp, Guy de, Earl ofWarwickref1,ref2

Beaumont, Sir Henry ref1, ref2,ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8,ref9,ref10

Bek, Anthony, Bishop of Durham

ref1Berkeley,SirMauricederef1,ref2Bernard of Linton, Abbot ofArbroathref1,ref2

Berwickref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10,ref11,ref12

Berwick Castle ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5

Berwickparliamentref1Bigod,Roger,EarlofNorfolk,ref1Bisset,MasterBaldredref1Bohun,SirHenryderef1,ref2Bohun, Humphrey de, Earl ofHereford ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9, ref10,

ref11,ref12Bothwell Castle ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4

Boyd,Robertref1,ref2Brechin,Davidref1Brittany, John of, Earl ofRichmondref1

Brown,Richardref1Bruce, Alexander (brother ofRobert)ref1,ref2,ref3

Bruce, Christian (sister of Robert)ref1,ref2

Bruce,David (sonofRobert, laterDavidII,KingofScots)ref1

Bruce,Edward (brotherofRobert,KingofIreland)ref1,ref2;siege

and compact at Stirling Castleref3, ref4, ref5, ref6; ref7, ref8,ref9, ref10, ref11, ref12, ref13,ref14; at Bannockburn ref15,ref16,ref17, ref18; ref19, ref20;inIrelandref21,ref22

Bruce, Lady Isabel (sister ofRobert,QueenofNorway) ref1,ref2

Bruce, Marjorie (daughter ofRobert) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4,ref5

Bruce,Mary(sisterofRobert)ref1Bruce, Neil (also called Nigel,brother of Robert) ref1, ref2,ref3

Bruce, Robert, Earl of Carrick(Robert I of Scotland) familyand claim to crown ref1, ref2,ref3; early days ref4, ref5; ref6;supports national cause ref7;transfers toEdward I ref8, ref9;escapetoScotlandref10; claimsthe crown ref11; initial defeatsref12; guerrilla tactics ref13;growing success ref14; Englishinvasion ref15; developingstrategy ref16; battlepreparations ref17, ref18, ref19;ref20, ref21, ref22, ref23, ref24,ref25, ref26, ref27, ref28, ref29;Bannockburnref30,ref31,ref32,

ref33, ref34, ref35, ref36; finalphase ref37; ref38; significanceref39; continued fighting ref40;Declaration of Arbroath ref41;attemptedassassinationofref42;final years ref43, ref44;assessmentref45

Bruce,Robert,LordofAnnandale(theCompetitor)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7

Bruce,Robert,LordofAnnandale,Earl of Carrick ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9

Bruce,LordRobert(bastardsonofRobert)ref1

Bruce,Thomas(brotherofRobert)

ref1,ref2,ref3Buchan,earlsofseeComynBuittleCastleref1Bunnock,Williamref1Burgh, Elizabeth de (wife ofRobert I, Queen of Scotland)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

Burgh, Richard de, Earl of Ulsterref1,ref2,ref3

CaerlaverockCastleref1,ref2,ref3CambuskennethAbbeyref1Cambuskennethparliamentref1Campbell,Neil,ofLochaweref1Carlisleref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5,ref6

Carlisle Castle ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8

Carrick,Countessof seeMarjorie,CountessofCarrick

Cavalry, English ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9,ref10, ref11, ref12, ref13, ref14,ref15, ref16, ref17, ref18, ref19,ref20,ref21,ref22,ref23

Cavalry, Scottish ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9,ref10,ref11

Cheyne, Henry, Bishop ofAberdeenref1

Christiana (Bruce’s mistress) seeMacRuarie,Christiana

ChristianaofIrebyref1Clare, Gilbert de (senior), Earl ofGloucesterref1

Clare, Gilbert de, Earl ofGloucester ref1, ref2, ref3 ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9, ref10,ref11,ref12,ref13,ref14,ref15

Clare,Richardref1Clifford,SirRobertref1,ref2,ref3,ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9,ref10, ref11, ref12, ref13, ref14,ref15,ref16

Comyn,Alexander,EarlofBuchanref1,ref2,ref3

Comyn,Aliceref1Comyn, John, 3rd Earl of Buchan

ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6,ref7

Comyn, John, Lord of Badenoch(the Red) ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9, ref10,ref11,ref12,ref13,ref14

Comyn, John (son of the RedComyn)ref1,ref2

Comyn, Marjorie, Countess ofMarchref1

Comyn,SirRobertref1Cornwall, Earl of see Gaveston,Piers

Courtenay,Hughderef1Crawford,SirReginaldref1,ref2Crecy,Battleof(1346)ref1

Cressingham, Sir Hugh ref1, ref2,ref3

DalswintonCastleref1,ref2David I, King of Scotland ref1,ref2

David,BishopofMorayref1,ref2Despenser,Hugh(theelder)ref1Despenser, Hugh (the younger)ref1

Donald,2ndEarlofMarref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5

Douglas, James (the Good, orBlack) ref1; emerging abilityref2; ref3, ref4; acknowledgedleader ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8; at

Bannockburn ref9, ref10, ref11,ref12, ref13, ref14, ref15, ref16,ref17; pursues the king ref18,ref19, ref20; ref21; furthercampaigningref22, ref23, ref24,ref25, ref26, ref27; outwits theEnglishforcesref28

Douglas, Sir William ref1, ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

DouglasCastleref1,ref2DumbartonCastleref1DumfriesCastleref1,ref2DunavertyCastleref1,ref2Dunbar,Battleof(1296)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

DunbarCastleref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,

ref5Dunbar,EarlofseeMarch,PatrickDuncan,4thEarlofFiferef1Dundalkref1,ref2DundeeCastleref1DunfermlineAbbeyref1Dunkeld, Bishop of see Sinclair,William

Dupplin Moor, Battle of (1332)ref1,ref2,ref3

Durham, Bishop of see Bek,Anthony

EdinburghCastleref1,ref2,ref3Edward I, King of England ref1,ref2, ref3; designs on Scotland

ref4; early military successesref5; with Bruce ref6; resistsBruce ref7, ref8, ref9; deathref10; ref11, ref12, ref13;military resources ref14, ref15;ref16, ref17, ref18, ref19, ref20,ref21, ref22, ref23, ref24, ref25,ref26; relations with his sonref27; ref28, ref29, ref30, ref31,ref32, ref33, ref34, ref35, ref36,ref37, ref38; at Falkirk ref39,ref40, ref41, ref42; ref43, ref44,ref45,ref46,ref47

Edward II, King of England (alsoEdward Caernavon, Prince ofWales) ref1; youthful

campaigning ref2, ref3; ref4,ref5, ref6; war renewed ref7;ref8; military resources ref9,ref10, ref11, ref12, ref13, ref14;ref15; character deficienciesref16, ref17, ref18; ref19, ref20,ref21, ref22, ref23, ref24, ref25,ref26; advance to Bannockburnref27, ref28, ref29, ref30; mainbattleref31,ref32,ref33; escaperef34; ref35, ref36, ref37, ref38,ref39, ref40, ref41, ref42; lastexpedition ref43; setbacks anddepositionref44

Edward III,KingofEngland ref1,ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7,

ref8Eleanor of Castile, Queen ofEngland(firstwifeofEdwardI)ref1

ElizabethofHainaultref1Emma,CountessofStrathearnref1EricII,KingofNorwayref1,ref2

Falkirk,Battleof(1298)ref1,ref2,ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8,ref9, ref10, ref11, ref12, ref13,ref14, ref15, ref16, ref17, ref18,ref19,ref20,ref21,ref22

Ferre,SirGuyref1Fife,EarlofseeDuncan,4thEarlFitzalan,Edmund,EarlofArundel

ref1FitzGilbert,SirWalterref1Fleming,Neilref1Flodden, Battle of (1513) ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

France ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5,ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10,ref11,ref12

Francis,Williamref1Fraser,SirSimonref1,ref2,ref3Fraser, William, Bishop of StAndrewsref1

Gaveston, Piers ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9,ref10; ref11, executed ref12;

ref13,ref14,ref15,ref16GlenTrool,Battleof(1307)ref1Gloucester, Earl of see Clare,Gilbert de; Monthermer, Raoulde

Graham,SirDavidref1Graham,SirJohntheref1Grey,SirThomasref1,ref2,ref3Grey, Sir Thomas (the younger)ref1,ref2,ref3

Greyfriars Church, Dumfries ref1,ref2,ref3

Hainault,Johnofref1HakonV,KingofNorwayref1HalidonHill,Battleof(1333)ref1,

ref2Hamilton, James, Earl of Arranref1

Harcla, Sir Andrew, Earl ofCarlisleref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

Henry,EarlofLancasterref1,ref2Henry, Earl of Northumberland(sonofDavidI)ref1

Hereford, Earl of see Bohun,Humphreyde

Heselrig, William, sheriff ofLanarkref1

Highlandersref1,ref2

Inchtureparliamentref1Independencewarsref1,ref2

Infantry, English ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9

Infantry, Scottish ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5

InverkipCastleref1,ref2Inverurie, Battle of (1308) ref1,ref2

InverurieCastleref1Ireland ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8

Irvine, Battle of (1297) ref1, ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7

IsabeldeWarenneref1IsabelofFife,CountessofBuchanref1,ref2

Isabella of France, Queen of

England (wife of Edward II)ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

Jay,BrotherBrianderef1Jedburgh Castle ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4

Joan(daughterofEdwardII)ref1JoanofAcre (daughterofEdwardI)ref1

JohnofBrittany,earlofRichmondref1

Keith, Sir Robert ref1, ref2; atBannockburnref3,ref4;ref5

Kent, Edmund, Earl of (halfbrotherofEdwardII)ref1,ref2

KildrummyCastleref1,ref2Kirkpatrick,Rogerref1,ref2

Lacey, Henry de, Earl of Lincolnref1,ref2,ref3

Lamberton,William,Bishop of StAndrews ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9

Lancaster,earlsofseeHenry,Earlof Lancaster; Thomas, Earl ofLancaster

LanercostPrioryref1,ref2,ref3Langton, Walter (Bishop ofLichfield)ref1,ref2

Largs,Battleof(1263)ref1Lennox,EarlofseeMalcolm,2nd

EarlLindsay,Alexanderref1Linlithgowref1,ref2,ref3,ref4LinlithgowCastleref1,ref2LochmabenCastleref1Logie,Johnref1Lords Ordainers ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4

LoudonHill,Battleof(1307)ref1,ref2,ref3

Louis,CountofEvreauxref1,ref2Lucy,SirAnthonyderef1,ref2

MacDonald, Angus Og, Lord ofIslay ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5ref6,ref7

MacDougall, John,LordofArgyllandLorneref1,ref2,ref3

MacDougallsofLorneref1,ref2MacDuff, (son of Malcolm), 2ndEarlofFiferef1,ref2

MacRuarie,Christiana,LadyoftheIslesref1

Maes Moydog, Battle of (1295)ref1

Malcolm,2ndEarlofLennoxref1,ref2,ref3

Mandeville,SirHenryref1Mar,EarlofseeDonald,2ndEarlofMar

March,Patrick,4thEarlofDunbarref1

March,Patrick,5thEarlofDunbarref1,ref2

Margaret of Scotland, Queen ofNorwayref1

Margaret, Queen of Scotland (StMargaret)ref1

Margaret, the Maid of Norway(Queen of Scotland) ref1, ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5

Marguerite of France, Queen ofEngland(secondwifeofEdwardI)ref1

Marjorie,CountessofCarrickref1,ref2

Maurice,AbbotofInchaffrayref1,ref2

MelroseAbbeyref1Menteith, Earl of see Alexander,EarlofMenteith

Methven, Battle of (1306) ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

Monthermer, Raoul de, Earl ofGloucesterref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

Montroseref1Moray, 1st Earl of see Randolph,Thomas,1stEarlofMoray

Moray, Sir Alexander, of Pettyref1

Moray,Andrewref1,ref2,ref3Moray,Andrew,ofBothwellref1Mortimer,SirRogerref1,ref2Moubray,SirJohnref1

Moubray, Sir Philip ref1, ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8

Mumrills Brae ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5

Neville,Robert,ofRabyref1Neville’s Cross, Battle of (1346)ref1

Norfolk,EarlofseeBigod,RogerNorhamref1,ref2Northampton, Treaty of (1328)ref1,ref2

Northburgh,SirRogerref1

Ormsby,Williamref1

Papacy ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5,ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10,ref11,ref12

Percy, Sir Henry (the elder) ref1,ref2,ref3

Perth,Treatyof(1266)ref1Philip IV, King of France ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

Pilché,Alexanderref1Pinkie Cleuch, Battle of (1547)ref1,ref2

Poitiers,Battleof(1356)ref1

Ragman’sRollref1Randolph, Thomas, 1st Earl ofMoray ref1, ref2, ref3; ref4;

takes Edinburgh Castle ref5;ref6, ref7; atBannockburn ref8;ref9; raids into England ref10,ref11;ref12,ref13,ref14

Roslin,Battleof(1302)ref1Ross,EarlofseeWilliam,2ndEarlRoss

Ross, Sir Walter (younger son oftheEarlofRoss)ref1,ref2

RothesayCastleref1Roxburgh Castle ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5

Rutherford,SirNicholderef1

StAndrewsparliamentref1ScarboroughCastleref1,ref2

Schiltrons ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9, ref10,ref11,ref12,ref13,ref14

Sconeref1,ref2,ref3Scone,Stoneofref1Seagrave,SirJohnref1,ref2Selbyref1SelkirkCastleref1Selkirkforestref1,ref2,ref3, ref4,ref5,ref6

Seton,SirAlexanderref1Seton,Christopherref1,ref2,ref3Sinclair, William, Bishop ofDunkeldref1

‘Smallfolk’ref1,ref2Soules, Sir John ref1, ref2, ref3,

ref4Soules, John de (grandnephew ofSirJohnSoules)ref1

Soules,SirWilliamderef1,ref2Soutraref1,ref2SpottsmuirHillref1Stewart, James ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6

Stewart, Sir John (brother ofJames)ref1

Stewart,SirJohn(possiblybrotherofWalter)ref1

Stewart,Walterref1,ref2,ref3Stirlingref1,ref2,ref3Stirling Bridge, Battle of (1297)Wallace’stacticsref1;ref2,ref3,

ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9,ref10,ref11

Stirling Castle ref1; captured andretaken ref2, ref3, ref4; assaultand compact ref5, ref6; ref7,ref8, ref9, ref10, ref11, ref12;approachofEnglisharmyref13;ref14, ref15; Scottish attackref16, ref17; English defeatref18,ref19,ref20,ref21

Strathbogie,David,EarlofAtholl,ref1,ref2

Strathbogie,Isabelref1Strathbogie, John, Earl of Athollref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

Strathearn,CountessofseeEmma,

CountessofStrathearnSully,Henryderef1,ref2Surrey,EarlofseeWarenne,JohnSweetheartAbbeyref1

Thomas, Earl of Lancaster ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

ThomasofRokeburyref1Tiptoft,SirPainref1,ref2Torwoodref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5TurnberryCastleref1,ref2Twenge,SirMarmadukeref1

Umfraville, Sir Gilbert, Earl ofAngusref1,ref2

Umfraville, Sir Ingram ref1, ref2,

ref3,ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7Umfraville, Sir Robert, Earl ofAngusref1

Valence, Aymer de, Earl ofPembrokeopposes Bruce ref1, ref2, ref3;ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9,ref10, ref11; opposes Gavestonref12,ref13; ref14, ref15, ref16;at Bannockburn ref17, ref18ref19,ref20

Valence,Williamderef1Valois,Jeanneref1

Wallace,SirMalcolmref1

Wallace, William ref1, ref2, ref3,ref4; Stirling Bridge ref5;Falkirk ref6; ref7, ref8, ref9,ref10, ref11; capture ref12,ref13,ref14; influenceonBruceref15;ref16, ref17, ref18, ref19;ref20, ref21, ref22, ref23, ref24ref25,ref26,ref27,ref28,ref29

Warenne, John, Earl of Surreyref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6,ref7,ref8,ref9

Warwick,Earl of seeBeauchamp,Guyde

William, 2nd Earl of Ross ref1,ref2,ref3,ref4

Winchelsey,Robert,Archbishopof

Canterburyref1Wishart, Robert, Bishop ofGlasgow ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4,ref5,ref6,ref7

Yorkref1,ref2,ref3,ref4,ref5

ROBERTTHEBRUCE:KINGOFSCOTS

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WALLACE:ABiographyPETERREESE

‘Ihavebroughtyoutothering,nowhopifyoucan.’

Wallace’sfamousinjunctionbeforethebattleofFalkirkisstillrememberedtoday.The

firstsectionofthismajorbiographydealswiththehistoryofWallaceandhistime.Wallace’scourageandheroismduringScotland’s

darkestdayswereinstrumentalincreatingasenseofnationalidentity.Fromtheearlykillingofthe

SheriffofLanark,SirWilliamHaslerigg,throughhiscrowningtriumphat

StirlingBridgetohisterribleend,Wallacewasunswerving

inhisdevotiontothecauseofScottishfreedom.Thebrutalityofhisendisatestamenttothefearand

humiliationhisnameinspiredinEdwardI.

Thesecondsectionofthebookstudiestheimpactofthemanandthemythonlatergenerations.TheguerrillatacticsinitiatedbyWallacewerelaterusedbyRoberttheBrucetogreatsuccess.Blind

Harry’sepicpoem(1478)personifiesthewillanddesire

ofScottishpeopleforindependenceinthefigureofWallace.Over200yearsafterhisdeathScotland’sgreatestknightcontinuestoinspirenationalistsinthiscountryandthroughouttheworld.

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