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There has always been an exception-al narcissism at the heart of Am-erican self-understanding. Thanks

to her Puritan settlers, America imaginedthat she had a special obligation to fighton behalf of the Almighty against theforces of evil. For example, “The BattleHymn of the Republic” identifies theUnion Army at the Potomac with “theglory of the coming of the Lord,” whose“truth is marching on.” The army is pre-sented as God’s instrument, with whichHe will crush the serpent once and for all.

American exceptionalism combinesthe apocalyptic spirit of Christianity withthe progressive spirit of Enlightenmentrationalism. Together, they account forthe belief that America is unlike any othersociety in world history. Her manifest des-tiny is to be a servant of truth and justice,an inspiration to all humanity, and a bea-con of freedom and progress—a nationunder God, and a Zion that will light upthe world.

American neoconservatives are not atotally homogeneous group, but for differ-ent reasons, they all endorse the traditionof American exceptionalism. And someof them have pushed these American fan-tasies to new and laughable heights. Theyimagine that America can accomplishwhat Rome and Hitler hoped but failed to

accomplish—namely, world domination.But they assure us that there is nothing tobe feared from American global hegemo-ny, because America is a “Behemoth witha conscience” (Robert Kagan, OfParadise and Power). They imagine thatthe world will be better off as a result ofAmerican domination, and they endorsea double standard for America and theworld. For example, America should havea huge nuclear arsenal but should notallow anyone who is hostile to her plansto have any weapons of mass destructionof any sort. Anyone who thwarts, orshows any sign of wishing to thwart,America’s wonderful plans for the worldmust be ready to pay the price.

In his earlier book, The End ofHistory and the Last Man (1992),Fukuyama popularized the ideas of Kantas modified by the modern architect ofglobalization—Alexandre Kojève. Kantimagined that as the world becomes morerational, war will be replaced by perpetu-al peace and cooperation between states.This progress of the world toward peacewill happen gradually, but not automati-cally. It will require the leadership of aleague of republican states that will guideand dominate international affairs. Theserepublican states will be highly commer-cial and prosperous. Under their interna-tional leadership, the belligerent states ofthe world will eventually realize that com-merce is a more successful way of amass-ing wealth than war. And when “our con-tinent” succeeds in “legislating” for allother continents, all will be well with theworld. Kant’s vision contains a combina-tion of naïveté and chauvinism.

Alexandre Kojève managed to shedthe naïveté of the Kantian perspective butnot its chauvinism. Kojève was the power

behind the throne at the French foreignministry under Valéry Giscard d’Estaingand the architect of the European Union.He saw the latter as the first step in thecreation of a global capitalist world orderthat would “end history” as we know it—the history of violence, war, and struggleover ideas and ideology. He declared thathistory will not end with communism asMarx anticipated but with capitalism. Heassumed that there will be an interna-tional consensus that the justice andequality of the capitalist and liberal worldorder with its free market prosperity can-not be surpassed.

However, Kojève was not naïve enoughto expect that absolutely everyone willacquiesce to this new world order. Heanticipated that the “end of history” willrequire a global tyrant with sufficientforce and violence to keep order and tocrush any irrational or rogue states thatare unwilling to submit to the rationalorder of things. Kojève did not think thatthe “shock and awe” that the globaltyrant would inspire would be frequentlyused. And since it would only be usedagainst madmen and rogue states, therest of the world would have no objec-tions.

In the wake of the collapse of theSoviet Union and the fall of the BerlinWall, Fukuyama surmised that Kojèvewas right and the end of history was athand. It seemed that the triumph of capi-talism over communism was accom-plished, and the new world order thatKojève had anticipated had become areality. In The End of History and theLast Man, Fukuyama provided a narra-tive that proved irresistible to the ears ofneoconservatives. Charles Krauthammerhailed it as “bold, lucid, scandalously bril-liant!” And with history on their side(along with God, morality, and militarysupremacy), is it any wonder that theneoconservatives were not cautious,moderate, or restrained?

In his new book, America at theCrossroads, Fukuyama has surprisedeveryone by chastising the Bush adminis-tration for its excessive self-confidence,its arrogance, and its failure to anticipatethe virulent backlash against its benevo-lent hegemony. Yet, it was Fukuyama him-self who provided the triumphal narrativethat bolstered the confidence, zeal, andhubris of the neoconservatives. Now thatthe venture in Iraq has failed, Fukuyama

AMERICA: BEACON OR BULLY?

Shadia B. DruryAmerica at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and theNeoconservative Legacy, by Francis Fukuyama (New Haven and

London: Yale University Press, 2006, ISBN 03001113994) 226

pp. Cloth $25.00.

Shadia B. Drury is the CanadaResearch Chair in Social Justice atthe University of Regina in Canada.She is author of Alexandre Kojeve: TheRoots of Postmodern Politics (NewYork: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). Hermost recent book is Terror andCivilization: Christianity, Politics, andthe Western Psyche (Palgrave Mac-millan, paperback, 2006).

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is critical of the policies he did so much toinspire.

It is important to note that Fukuyamawas never a starry-eyed idealist about theend of history. Like Kojève, he knew thatthere would be rebels, or rogue states, thatwould object to the march of reason in his-tory. And he knew that these rogue stateswould have to be crushed by the solesuperpower that must assume the dutiesof the global tyrant in Kojève’s scheme ofthings. Nevertheless, the transition to theuniversal and homogeneous state wassupposed to be relatively smooth. Exceptfor a few madmen, the rest of the worldwas supposed to be on board.

From this vantage point, Iraq underSaddam Hussein was a perfect embodi-ment of the rogue state—the enemy ofrest of the history, reason, and theAmerican way. So, Fukuyama was natu-rally “hawkish on Iraq,” as he admits. Butthe demonstrations that took placearound the world, including demonstra-tions in Britain, Spain, Italy, andAustralia—countries that were officiallypart of the American coalition—tookFukuyama by surprise, and led him toreconsider.

In this new book, Fukuyama docu-ments the tactical errors of the Bushadministration. He tells us that the Iraqwar has destroyed America’s credibilityaround the world; it has fueled cynicismabout the promotion of democracy in theMiddle East and elsewhere; it has alien-ated America’s European allies; it waspoorly planned; there were not enoughtroops on the ground to secure the coun-try; and now, the United States is mired ina deadly insurgency and a guerrilla warthat its mighty military machine is ill-pre-pared to handle.

Despite these criticisms, Fukuyama’sbook is nevertheless an apology for theBush administration. They did not lieabout the weapons of mass destruction;they did not purposely take the nation intoa needless war to promote their wild-eyedagenda; they did not engage in any cam-paigns of deception; they did not under-mine the Constitution by illegal wiretap-ping or the incarceration of citizens indef-initely without trial or charge. Fukuyamadoes not mention Guantánamo Bay. AbuGhraib is mentioned only in passing.Fukuyama’s point is that the administra-tion was the victim of poor intelligenceand difficult circumstances. It is guilty of

arrogance, overconfidence, exaggeration,honest mistakes, a poor mindset, badjudgments, and tactical errors, not mis-guided goals. Fukuyama is not in the leastcritical of the exorbitant goals or aspira-tions of the administration.

As soon as Fukuyama’s book was pub-lished, The New York Times BookReview sported the headline, “Neo NoMore.” And reviews on Slate, in TheNation, and elsewhere announcedFukuyama’s historic defection from theneoconservative ranks. But nothing couldbe further from the truth. Fukuyamaremains as devoted to the ends of the neo-conservative project as he has alwaysbeen—Americanizing the global econo-my, creating a global climate conducive toAmerican values and American interests,interfering in the internal affairs ofstates, and promoting democracy aroundthe world.

Fukuyama wrote the book because herealized that the methods used by theBush administration have failed. Thewhole point of the book is to suggest newmeans by which to pursue the project ofworld domination, despite the setbackrepresented by the failure in Iraq.

Far from being skeptical about theimperial project itself, Fukuyama’s bookendorses it. It is not the ends of neocon-servative foreign policy that he questions,but the disastrously unsuccessful meansused by the Bush administration.Fukuyama has finally come to the real-ization that the military can no longer bethe centerpiece of the neoconservativeagenda. After all, it is irrational to thinkthat we can force people to accept ourprinciples by aerial bombardment. This isthe simple truth that Fukuyama hasthankfully grasped.

The book is intended to provide con-structive suggestions that might rescuethe neoconservative project. First, givethe project a new name, because the neo-conservative label has been tarnishedbeyond redemption—it is too closelyassociated with George W. Bush and his“preemptive wars.” Second, revise theNational Security Strategy (NSS) of theUnited States, not in order to abolish pre-emptive wars but to limit their scope byoutlining strict guidelines regarding theiruse (p. 104). As it stands, the NSS makespreemptive war the center of its policyand sets absolutely no limits on it. It givesthe impression that America can bomb

any country at will. Fukuyama thinksthat this gives a bad impression and fuelsanti-American sentiment around theworld. Third, he suggests that Americashould conceal its power by not actingunilaterally but through multilateralinstitutions—other than the UnitedNations, for which Fukuyama has nomore regard than any of his neoconserv-ative colleagues. Accordingly, Fukuyamasuggests the creation of a plurality ofoverlapping multilateral institutions, sothat the United States can use the onethat best suits its goals in any given cir-cumstances. In this way, the UnitedStates will appear to be acting multilater-ally, despite opposition from members ofthe United Nations Security Council.Fourth, Fukuyama suggests relying moreon “soft power” and not on military force,or “hard power,” to effect the desiredchanges around the world (p. 133).

By “soft power,” Fukuyama does notmean the ability to get what you want inthe international arena simply by thesheer attraction of your example. Hemeans the creation of multilateral institu-tions and agencies that grant conditionalloans—conditional on the recipientsdoing things the way we want them donearound the world. The idea is to createincentives to change the economic envi-ronment and political cultures of recipi-ent states (p. 149 ff.). The book is a how-to manual for the next neoconservativeadministration—of course, it will requirea new team and a new label. Fukuyamasuggests “Wilsonian realism.”

In the final analysis, Fukuyama’s bookis hypocritical and disingenuous. First,he fails to take any responsibility for fuel-ing the hubris of the neoconservatives bythe triumphal narrative of his earlierwork. Second, the criticisms he directs atthe administration are equally applicableto his own position—then and now.Fukuyama fails to realize that the errorsof the Bush administration are not simplyerrors in judgment about the most suc-cessful means to achieve given ends.They are flaws integral to the ends them-selves—ends that Fukuyama endorsedand continues to defend against the limit-ed aspirations of classic conservativesand foreign-policy realists, such as HenryKissinger. There is no reason to adoptHenry Kissinger’s policy of propping updictators, but Fukuyama fails to see thatthe mistakes made by the administration

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are intimately connected to the gargantu-an nature of the goal involved—shapingthe world in their own image—an imagethat is not universally endorsed, not evenin America.

What went wrong in Iraq cannot besummarized in terms of tactical errors,failures of judgment, or poor intelligence.It is the end itself that is at the root of thetrouble. Seeking to impose a single visionon the world, no matter how delightful itmay be, is bound to backfire. Not every-one will be willing to affirm American“values” and bow down to American“principles.” No matter how prosperousor free, a single global model is bound toincite rage, for it smacks of a globaltyranny that puts an end to all humanplurality and diversity. A situation inwhich only one flower is allowed to bloomtriggers a stupefying impotence. And ter-rorism is born of impotence. Global tyran-ny and senseless terror are twins.Fukuyama has some inkling of theresentment that global hegemonyinspires, but his solution is to proceedwith greater circumspection.

Nor has Fukuyama abandoned the

delusional assumptions of the neoconser-vatives. He continues to believe thatAmerican global dominance will be goodfor the world and will have moral purpos-es. He continues to see America as a bea-con that will light up the world.

The trouble is that being a beacon andbeing a bully are not mutually exclusive.When other nations fail to succumb to theinspiration of the beacon, the bully invari-ably emerges—fully armed with all thereligious and moral self-righteousness ofthe beacon. The brutality of Americanforeign policy in the neoconservative ageis a function of the fact that the beaconhas turned into a bully. Since there are noobstacles to the beacon’s exercise ofpower in the unipolar world at the end ofthe Cold War, it is not surprising that theworld has been subjected to a rough ridewith no imminent reprieve in sight.

There is an ineradicable connectionbetween the insistence on spreadingdemocracy around the world and thequest for global dominance. The convic-tion that our values, way of life, politicalinstitutions, and economic arrangementsare the very best that are humanly attain-

able is not only egocentric, pompous, anddelusional, it is also a dangerous politicalposture. But Fukuyama continues tobelieve that promoting democracyaround the globe will make the worldmore peaceful and prosperous. But intruth, democratic governments are notnecessarily more pacific than other formsof government. As evidence, witnessIsraeli and American foreign policies.

Nor does democracy guarantee liberty.On the contrary, democracy may lead toless liberty, as it has done in Iran, Iraq,and Palestine. Democracy allows peopleto choose their leaders, but there isabsolutely no guarantee that they will notchoose religious fanatics who are ene-mies of freedom.

Despite the shortcomings of his book,Fukuyama remains a beguiling futurist.No sooner does he paint a picture of ourcollective future, then history deals anasty blow. Like every futurist, he isdoomed to fail, yet he remains splendid-ly indefatigable. Like Wile E. Coyote, hejust picks himself up and proceedsundaunted. That sort of resilience is asadmirable as it is entertaining.

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This new book deals with the philosophy of PaulKurtz, especially as it relates to Promethean love,

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In an introductory essay, Kurtz outlines “Prome-theus Unbound,” and in the concluding piece heresponds to his critics and commentators.

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PROMETHEAN LOVEBY PAUL KURTZ

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