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American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

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Page 1: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

American FederalismAmerican

FederalismSeeming Paradoxes?

John Kincaid

Lafayette CollegeEaston, Pennsylvania

Seeming Paradoxes?

John Kincaid

Lafayette CollegeEaston, Pennsylvania

Page 2: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Biblical Root of FederalismBiblical Root of Federalism

Federalism

From the Latin foedus Meaning

Covenant

Federalism

From the Latin foedus Meaning

Covenant

Page 3: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

The first federal political ideas articulated in North America were those of the Puritans’ Reformed Protestant

Covenant Theology

Federal Theology

The first federal political ideas articulated in North America were those of the Puritans’ Reformed Protestant

Covenant Theology

Federal Theology

Page 4: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Articles of Confederation, 1781Articles of Confederation, 1781

“Whereas the Delegates of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, did … agree to certain articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland and Providence Plantations ….”

Preamble

“Whereas the Delegates of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, did … agree to certain articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland and Providence Plantations ….”

Preamble

Page 5: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Powers of Confederal GovernmentPowers of Confederal Government

War, peace, treaties, and alliances Appoint all U.S. land and naval officers Build and equip a navy Send and receive ambassadors Decide rules for capture on land or water Grant letters of marque and reprisal Try piracies and felonies committed on the high seas Settle inter-state boundary disputes Regulate value of coinage Fix standard of weights and measures Regulate trade with Indians outside states Establish post offices and postal rates Borrow money or emit bills of credit on U.S.

War, peace, treaties, and alliances Appoint all U.S. land and naval officers Build and equip a navy Send and receive ambassadors Decide rules for capture on land or water Grant letters of marque and reprisal Try piracies and felonies committed on the high seas Settle inter-state boundary disputes Regulate value of coinage Fix standard of weights and measures Regulate trade with Indians outside states Establish post offices and postal rates Borrow money or emit bills of credit on U.S.

Page 6: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Articles of Confederation, 1781Articles of Confederation, 1781

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

Article I

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

Article I

Page 7: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

U.S. Federal Constitution, 1788U.S. Federal Constitution, 1788

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

Preamble

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

Preamble

Page 8: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Principal Federal PowersPrincipal Federal Powers

Commerce

Foreign affairs and defense

Commerce

Foreign affairs and defense

Page 9: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Federal Commerce PowersFederal Commerce Powers

Borrow money Regulate interstate, foreign, and Indian commerce Enact uniform naturalization laws Enact uniform bankruptcy laws Coin money and regulate its value Fix national weights and measures standards Punish counterfeiting of securities and coin Establish post offices and post roads Grant patents and copyrights Create courts inferior to the Supreme Court

Borrow money Regulate interstate, foreign, and Indian commerce Enact uniform naturalization laws Enact uniform bankruptcy laws Coin money and regulate its value Fix national weights and measures standards Punish counterfeiting of securities and coin Establish post offices and post roads Grant patents and copyrights Create courts inferior to the Supreme Court

Page 10: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Federal Foreign Affairs & Defense PowersFederal Foreign Affairs & Defense Powers

Define and punish piracies and felonies on high seas and offenses against law of nations

Declare war Grant letters of marque and reprisal Make rules for captures on high seas Raise and support armies Provide and maintain a navy Govern land and naval forces Call up militia to execute federal laws, suppress

insurrections, and repel invasions Organize, arm, and discipline militia Govern D.C. and territories

Define and punish piracies and felonies on high seas and offenses against law of nations

Declare war Grant letters of marque and reprisal Make rules for captures on high seas Raise and support armies Provide and maintain a navy Govern land and naval forces Call up militia to execute federal laws, suppress

insurrections, and repel invasions Organize, arm, and discipline militia Govern D.C. and territories

Page 11: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

James MadisonJames Madison“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”

Federalist 45

“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”

Federalist 45

Page 12: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Tenth AmendmentTenth Amendment

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

Page 13: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Federal a.k.a.

National Government

State Governments

Local Governments

Common View of Federal System as “Levels”Common View of Federal System as “Levels”

Page 14: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Federal System as Matrix of GovernmentsFederal System as Matrix of Governments

States

Local Govts

Commerce

Defense and Foreign Affairs

Social Welfare

Civil Rights

Page 15: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Expansive Federal Power ClausesExpansive Federal Power Clauses

Necessary and proper clause (Article I, Section 8) a.k.a elastic clause, implied powers clause, sweeping clause

Supremacy clause (Article VI)

Necessary and proper clause (Article I, Section 8) a.k.a elastic clause, implied powers clause, sweeping clause

Supremacy clause (Article VI)

Page 16: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Dual Federalism, 1789-1932Dual Federalism, 1789-1932 Federal and state governments occupy separate

spheres of sovereign power and should not interfere with each other

U.S. Constitution does not grant federal government authority to fund state internal improvements (i.e., infrastructure)

“national government is one of enumerated powers only; Also, the purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are “sovereign” and hence “equal”; and The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension rather than collaboration.” Edward S. Corwin

Federal and state governments occupy separate spheres of sovereign power and should not interfere with each other

U.S. Constitution does not grant federal government authority to fund state internal improvements (i.e., infrastructure)

“national government is one of enumerated powers only; Also, the purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are “sovereign” and hence “equal”; and The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension rather than collaboration.” Edward S. Corwin

Page 17: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Debate Over Nature of the UnionDebate Over Nature of the Union

Federal Constitution as Compact among the States

Federal Constitution as Covenant of the People

Federal Constitution as Compact among the States

Federal Constitution as Covenant of the People

Page 18: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Civil WarCivil WarWar Between the States

War of Northern Aggression

1861-1865620,000 Deaths

War Between the StatesWar of Northern Aggression

1861-1865620,000 Deaths

Page 19: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Fourteenth Amendment, 1868Fourteenth Amendment, 1868

“No State shall … abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;… deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Section 1

“No State shall … abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;… deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Section 1

Page 20: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Texas v. White, 1869Texas v. White, 1869

“The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”

“The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”

Page 21: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Dawning of Federal PowerDawning of Federal Power

Interstate Commerce Commission Act, 1887 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 1890 Federal Bankruptcy Act, 1898 Pure Food and Drug Act, 1906 Meat Inspection Act, 1906 Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism, 1910 Federal Reserve Act, 1913 Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, 1913 Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 1914

Interstate Commerce Commission Act, 1887 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 1890 Federal Bankruptcy Act, 1898 Pure Food and Drug Act, 1906 Meat Inspection Act, 1906 Theodore Roosevelt’s New Nationalism, 1910 Federal Reserve Act, 1913 Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, 1913 Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 1914

Page 22: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Power-Booster AmendmentsPower-Booster Amendments

Sixteenth Amendment, 1913 authorized federal income tax

Seventeenth Amendment, 1913 provided for election of U.S. senators by voters in each state

Sixteenth Amendment, 1913 authorized federal income tax

Seventeenth Amendment, 1913 provided for election of U.S. senators by voters in each state

Page 23: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Creeping Cooperative FederalismCreeping Cooperative Federalism Morrill Act, 1862 (land grants for colleges) Weeks Act, 1911 (forest-fire prevention) Smith-Lever Act, 1914 (agricultural extension) Federal-Aid Road Act, 1916 (highway construction) Smith-Hughes Act, 1917 (teachers’ salaries for

vocational education) Fess-Kenyon Act, 1920 (vocational rehabilitation for

disabled veterans) Sheppard-Towner Act, 1921 (expectant mothers and

infants)

Morrill Act, 1862 (land grants for colleges) Weeks Act, 1911 (forest-fire prevention) Smith-Lever Act, 1914 (agricultural extension) Federal-Aid Road Act, 1916 (highway construction) Smith-Hughes Act, 1917 (teachers’ salaries for

vocational education) Fess-Kenyon Act, 1920 (vocational rehabilitation for

disabled veterans) Sheppard-Towner Act, 1921 (expectant mothers and

infants)

Page 24: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

FDR’s New Deal EraFDR’s New Deal Era

Vast expansion of federal power into private-sector economy

Rise of social welfare as federal responsibility

Few intrusions into traditional prerogatives of state and local governments

Vast expansion of federal power into private-sector economy

Rise of social welfare as federal responsibility

Few intrusions into traditional prerogatives of state and local governments

Page 25: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

New Deal CooperationNew Deal Cooperation Increased federal aid Little federal supervision Maintenance of dual regulation and taxation of

banking, securities, communications, public utilities, and others

Continuance of state regulation of insurance Federal-law exceptions for state and local

governments (e.g., Social Security Act of 1935 and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938)

Increased federal aid Little federal supervision Maintenance of dual regulation and taxation of

banking, securities, communications, public utilities, and others

Continuance of state regulation of insurance Federal-law exceptions for state and local

governments (e.g., Social Security Act of 1935 and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938)

Page 26: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Historic ReversalsHistoric Reversals Reversal of fiscal fortunes: federal spending

as percent of all own-source government spending increased from 25% in 1929 to 51% by 1939 and 70% by 1959; local share dropped from 54% in 1929 to 28% in 1939 and 16% in 1959; state share was 21% in both 1929 and 1939 but only 14% by 1959.

Tenth Amendment “states but a truism” United States v. Darby, 1940

Reversal of fiscal fortunes: federal spending as percent of all own-source government spending increased from 25% in 1929 to 51% by 1939 and 70% by 1959; local share dropped from 54% in 1929 to 28% in 1939 and 16% in 1959; state share was 21% in both 1929 and 1939 but only 14% by 1959.

Tenth Amendment “states but a truism” United States v. Darby, 1940

Page 27: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Cooperative Federalism, 1932-1968Cooperative Federalism, 1932-1968 Virtually all public functions are shared, not divided, federal-

state-local responsibilities Power is distributed in a non-centralized (rather than

decentralized) manner, making it nearly impossible to identify a single locus of decision-making power

Federalism is not a zero-sum game; increased federal power does not necessarily decrease state powers

Chaotic non-centralized political parties mediate conflict and facilitate systemic IGR consent

IGR bargaining and negotiation produce systemic cooperation and collaboration that minimizes IGR coercion

Federal, state, and local officials are colleagues, not adversaries “the American system is … one government serving one

people.”

Virtually all public functions are shared, not divided, federal-state-local responsibilities

Power is distributed in a non-centralized (rather than decentralized) manner, making it nearly impossible to identify a single locus of decision-making power

Federalism is not a zero-sum game; increased federal power does not necessarily decrease state powers

Chaotic non-centralized political parties mediate conflict and facilitate systemic IGR consent

IGR bargaining and negotiation produce systemic cooperation and collaboration that minimizes IGR coercion

Federal, state, and local officials are colleagues, not adversaries “the American system is … one government serving one

people.”

Page 28: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Coercive FederalismCoercive Federalism

Contemporary era of federalism (1968 - present) in which the major political, fiscal, statutory, regulatory, and judicial practices entail centralization, state and local cooptation, and the imposition of many federal dictates on state and local governments.

Contemporary era of federalism (1968 - present) in which the major political, fiscal, statutory, regulatory, and judicial practices entail centralization, state and local cooptation, and the imposition of many federal dictates on state and local governments.

Page 29: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Rise of Coercive Federalism During the Late 1960s

Rise of Coercive Federalism During the Late 1960s

Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968 Nationalization of U.S. Bill of Rights, 1961-

1969 Rise of national television by 1960s Supreme Court’s “one person, one vote”

reapportionment decisions, 1964 Triumph of primary elections over smoke-

filled rooms after 1968 Democratic National Convention, 1968 Collapse of traditional confederated party

system, 1964 - 1970

Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968 Nationalization of U.S. Bill of Rights, 1961-

1969 Rise of national television by 1960s Supreme Court’s “one person, one vote”

reapportionment decisions, 1964 Triumph of primary elections over smoke-

filled rooms after 1968 Democratic National Convention, 1968 Collapse of traditional confederated party

system, 1964 - 1970

Page 30: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Rise of Coercive Federalism During Late 1960s

Rise of Coercive Federalism During Late 1960s

Rise of social movements demanding nationwide equality and national policies to remedy spillovers

Rise of institutional lobbying in Washington, D.C.

Rise of state and local public employee unions and associations

Interstate mobility and massive migrations Collapse of bicommunal federalism, 1964 - 1970

Rise of social movements demanding nationwide equality and national policies to remedy spillovers

Rise of institutional lobbying in Washington, D.C.

Rise of state and local public employee unions and associations

Interstate mobility and massive migrations Collapse of bicommunal federalism, 1964 - 1970

Page 31: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Confederate States of AmericaConfederate States of America

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confederate_States_of_America, accessed July 1, 2008.

States under CSA control States and territories claimed by CSA without formal secession and/or control

Page 32: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Official Support for Coercive FederalismOfficial Support for Coercive Federalism

Democrats and Republicans in Congress and the White House

Democrats and Republicans in state legislatures, governors’ mansions, county courthouses, city and town halls, and school boards

Democrats and Republicans in Congress and the White House

Democrats and Republicans in state legislatures, governors’ mansions, county courthouses, city and town halls, and school boards

Page 33: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Characteristics of Coercive FederalismCharacteristics of Coercive Federalism

Federal Aid

Shift of federal aid from places to persons

Federal Aid

Shift of federal aid from places to persons

Page 34: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Summary Comparison of Total Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments, 1940-2015

*2010-2015 are estimated.Source: Executive Office of the President, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2011, Historical Tables (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), pp. 249-250.

Page 35: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Federal Grants-in-Aid to State and Local Governments for Persons and Places as Percentages of Total Grants, 1940-2015

*2010-2015 are estimated.Source: Executive Office of the President, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2011, Historical Tables (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), pp. 249-250.

Page 36: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Consequences of Federal Aid Shift from Places to Persons

Consequences of Federal Aid Shift from Places to Persons

Place-based aid for infrastructure, economic development, education, criminal justice, government administration, etc. has declined steeply

State budgets have been locked into programs involving rising federal regulation and escalating state matching costs (e.g., Medicaid)

Federal aid to local governments has declined significantly

Place-based aid for infrastructure, economic development, education, criminal justice, government administration, etc. has declined steeply

State budgets have been locked into programs involving rising federal regulation and escalating state matching costs (e.g., Medicaid)

Federal aid to local governments has declined significantly

Page 37: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Characteristics of Coercive FederalismCharacteristics of Coercive Federalism

Federal Aid

Shift of federal aid from places to persons Intrusive conditions of aid (i.e., crossover and

crosscutting conditions) Increased earmarking

Federal Aid

Shift of federal aid from places to persons Intrusive conditions of aid (i.e., crossover and

crosscutting conditions) Increased earmarking

Page 38: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Characteristics of Coercive FederalismCharacteristics of Coercive Federalism

PreemptionUnder the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI, Para 2), a federal law prevails over any conflicting state laws.

PreemptionUnder the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI, Para 2), a federal law prevails over any conflicting state laws.

Page 39: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Types of Preemption

Types of Preemption

1. Explicit/Express: Congress states explicitly in a statute that it intends to preempt incompatible state laws.

2. Implied: The courts or federal agencies assume preemption if [a] a federal law and a state law are in direct conflict or [b] a state law hinders the achievement of a federal-law objective.

1. Explicit/Express: Congress states explicitly in a statute that it intends to preempt incompatible state laws.

2. Implied: The courts or federal agencies assume preemption if [a] a federal law and a state law are in direct conflict or [b] a state law hinders the achievement of a federal-law objective.

Page 40: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Degrees of PreemptionDegrees of Preemption

1. Total (or Occupy-the-Field) Preemption prohibits state action in the field occupied by federal law.

2. Partial Preemption allows state action, usually equal to or greater than the regulatory standard set by federal law.

1. Total (or Occupy-the-Field) Preemption prohibits state action in the field occupied by federal law.

2. Partial Preemption allows state action, usually equal to or greater than the regulatory standard set by federal law.

Page 41: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Federal Preemption Statutes Enacted per Decade: 1790-1989

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

<1900 1900-1909

1910-1919

1920-1929

1930-1939

1940-1949

1950-1959

1960-1969

1970-1979

1980-1989

Years

Number of Statutes

Banking, Finance, and Taxation Civil Rights and OtherCommerce and Natural Resources Health & Safety

Source: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Statutory Preemption of State and Local Authority: History, Inventory, and Issues. Washington, DC: ACIR, September 1992.

Page 42: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Federal Preemption Statutes Enacted:1790-2004 (520 total)

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

<1900

1900-19091910-19191920-19291930-19391940-19491950-19591960-19691970-19791980-19891990-19992000-2004

Years

Number of Statutes Enacted

Source: U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal Statutory Preemption of State and Local Authority: History, Inventory, and Issues. Washington, DC: ACIR, September 1992 and National Academy of Public Administration, Beyond Preemption. Washington, DC: NAPA, May 2006.

Page 43: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Characteristics of Coercive Federalism

Characteristics of Coercive Federalism

MandatesDirect federal orders requiring state or local governments to execute federal policy rules under pain of possible civil or criminal penalties.

MandatesDirect federal orders requiring state or local governments to execute federal policy rules under pain of possible civil or criminal penalties.

Page 44: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Growth of MandatesGrowth of Mandates

1 enacted in 1931 1 enacted in 1940 0 enacted 1941-1963 9 enacted 1964-1969 29 enacted 1970-1979 27 enacted 1980-1989

1 enacted in 1931 1 enacted in 1940 0 enacted 1941-1963 9 enacted 1964-1969 29 enacted 1970-1979 27 enacted 1980-1989

Page 45: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Mandate ReliefMandate Relief

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 1995

Eleven mandates exceeding UMRA threshold enacted since 1995

UMRA does not apply to some policies such as civil rights

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 1995

Eleven mandates exceeding UMRA threshold enacted since 1995

UMRA does not apply to some policies such as civil rights

Page 46: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Conditional MandatesConditional Mandates REAL ID Act, 2005State participation is voluntary and federal aid is

providedBut, if a state does not participate, its residents’

driver’s licenses will be invalid for any federal-government purpose, such as boarding an airplane, riding Amtrak, applying for federal benefits (e.g., Medicaid and Medicare), opening a bank account, buying a firearm, and entering a federal building.

REAL ID Act, 2005State participation is voluntary and federal aid is

providedBut, if a state does not participate, its residents’

driver’s licenses will be invalid for any federal-government purpose, such as boarding an airplane, riding Amtrak, applying for federal benefits (e.g., Medicaid and Medicare), opening a bank account, buying a firearm, and entering a federal building.

Page 47: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Federal Rules Affecting State and Local Governments, 1994–2007

Source: Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., “Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State” (Competitive Enterprise Institute, 2008), p. 24. Accessed July 18, 2008, http://cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/0/10KC_2008_FINAL_WEB.pdf. Data compiled from “The Regulatory Plan and Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions,” Federal Register, various years’ editions; and from online edition at http://reginfo.gov.

Page 48: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Characteristics of Coercive FederalismCharacteristics of Coercive Federalism

Taxation Tax Reform Act of 1986: elimination of state

sales tax deduction and limits on tax-exempt private-activity bonds

Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 1992 Internet Tax Non-Discrimination Act, 2007 Lack of concern about federal tax-code changes

on state and local taxes Presumption that Congress has constitutional

authority to levy a sales tax or VAT

Taxation Tax Reform Act of 1986: elimination of state

sales tax deduction and limits on tax-exempt private-activity bonds

Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 1992 Internet Tax Non-Discrimination Act, 2007 Lack of concern about federal tax-code changes

on state and local taxes Presumption that Congress has constitutional

authority to levy a sales tax or VAT

Page 49: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Characteristics of Coercive FederalismCharacteristics of Coercive Federalism

Demise of Federal IGR Institutions

Dismantling of OMB IGR Office in early 1980s Decline of U.S. Senate and House IGR

committees Dismantling of IGR unit in GAO in early 1990s Death of U.S. Advisory Commission on

Intergovernmental Relations (1959-1996) Politicization of agency IGR offices

Demise of Federal IGR Institutions

Dismantling of OMB IGR Office in early 1980s Decline of U.S. Senate and House IGR

committees Dismantling of IGR unit in GAO in early 1990s Death of U.S. Advisory Commission on

Intergovernmental Relations (1959-1996) Politicization of agency IGR offices

Page 50: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Characteristics of Coercive FederalismCharacteristics of Coercive Federalism

Decline of Political IGR Cooperation Decline of willingness of elected and politically

appointed federal officials to cooperate regularly with elected state and local officials as co-equal representatives of the people

Washington, D.C., view of state and local governments as merely lobbyists

NGA is just “another liberal lobbying group” (Americans for Tax Reform)

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI): “There is no political capital in intergovernmental relations” 1989.

Decline of Political IGR Cooperation Decline of willingness of elected and politically

appointed federal officials to cooperate regularly with elected state and local officials as co-equal representatives of the people

Washington, D.C., view of state and local governments as merely lobbyists

NGA is just “another liberal lobbying group” (Americans for Tax Reform)

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI): “There is no political capital in intergovernmental relations” 1989.

Page 51: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Characteristics of Coercive Federalism

Characteristics of Coercive Federalism

Federalization of Criminal LawFederalization of Criminal Law

Page 52: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Crimes in the U.S. ConstitutionCrimes in the U.S. Constitution

… the Constitution of the United States … delegated to Congress a power to punish [1] treason, [2] counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, [3] piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and [4] offenses against the laws of nations ….”Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, 1798

… the Constitution of the United States … delegated to Congress a power to punish [1] treason, [2] counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, [3] piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and [4] offenses against the laws of nations ….”Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions, 1798

Page 53: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Source: John S. Baker, Jr., “Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes,” Legal Memorandum 26 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, June 16, 2008): 1-8.

4

30003300

40004450

Page 54: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Table 1A Is your state/province treated with the respect it deserves in the federal system of government?Yes No 2002 2007 2009 2002 2007 2009

All Canadian Respondents 45.4% 48.0% 43.1% 47.9% 46.7% 50.3%All U.S. Respondents 61.1 56.8 52.7 27.3 34.7 37.9 Canadian Regions

Atlantic Provinces 38.0 36.8 30.6 58.6 63.2 69.4Quebec 42.1 47.3 39.7 52.9 52.7 60.3Ontario 64.3 59.7 51.5 27.0 40.3 48.5Manitoba/Saskatchewan 26.9 36.4 53.2 66.8 63.6 46.8Alberta 30.9 52.2 38.9 60.7 47.8 61.1British Columbia 24.0 47.2 54.5 70.1 52.8 45.5 Canadian Federal Political Parties Alliance 24.8 69.6Bloc Quebecois 23.8 24.3 16.3 74.7 75.7 83.7Conservative 59.0 57.7 41.0 42.3Green and Others 38.9 46.4 61.1 53.6Liberal 59.4 60.3 48.8 36.8 39.7 51.2New Democratic 45.7 53.7 38.9 43.2 46.3 61.1PC 52.0 45.1 Sources: Author Reference Deleted 2002; Author Reference Deleted 2005; Author Reference Deleted 2008; and authors’ 2009 survey. Note: Percents exclude “Don’t know” and “No Answer” responses.

Page 55: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Table 1B Is your state/province treated with the respect it deserves in the federal system of government? Yes No

2002 2007 2009 2002 2007 2009 All Canadian Respondents 45.4% 48.0% 43.1% 47.9% 46.7% 50.3%All U.S. Respondents 61.1 56.8 52.7 27.3 34.7 37.9

U.S. Regions

New England 79.5 69.0 60.8 18.2 28.6 23.5Mid-Atlantic 60.3 54.4 60.9 24.0 36.1 27.8East North Central 60.9 51.7 47.0 23.2 40.0 45.7West North Central 62.5 65.0 44.3 26.3 27.5 40.0South Atlantic 60.5 59.6 51.6 30.3 31.6 41.3East South Central 50.8 46.7 42.0 31.1 45.0 49.3West South Central 64.8 51.4 60.0 25.0 42.3 32.9Mountain 72.9 50.0 53.9 22.0 37.5 40.4Pacific 54.3 63.1 54.0 36.0 27.5 34.3

Sources: Author Reference Deleted 2002; Author Reference Deleted 2005; Author Reference Deleted 2008; and authors’ 2009 survey.

Note: Percents exclude “Don’t know” and “No Answer” responses

Page 56: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Table 2 Trust and confidence in the various orders of government, 2002-2009

Canada United States Mexico 2002 2004 2007 2009 2002 2004 2007 2009 2004 2009

Federal Government Great Deal/Fair 46.5% 37.0% 51.5% 48.9% 68.0% 66.4% 53.1% 50.0% 42.6% 38.3% Little/None 54.1 62.0 45.0 48.2 30.0 31.8 44.5 47.4 57.4 60.2 State/Provincial Governments Great Deal/Fair 50.8 45.0 53.6 58.0 64.8 68.3 66.0 54.6 43.7 37.4 Little/None 47.0 53.0 42.8 37.7 32.4 29.5 31.6 43.9 56.3 61.2 Local Governments Great Deal/Fair 64.1 69.0 55.6 60.0 67.3 73.4 68.0 62.3 52.0 33.3 Little/None 32.2 29.0 40.3 36.0 30.3 24.5 30.0 36.5 48.0 64.2 Note: Percents do not add to 100 due to exclusion of “Don’t Know” and “No Answer” responses.

Page 57: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Most for Money Canada United States Mexico

2002 2004 2009 2002 2004 2009 2004Federal 21.7% 19.0% 23.8% 32.0% 32.6% 29.0% 38.0%Province/State 29.0 32.0 31.1 24.0 21.4 26.0 25.0Local 20.8 34.0 19.6 25.0 35.8 31.0 23.0None 17.9 --- --- 7.0 --- --- ---DK/NA 10.6 15.0 25.5 12.0 9.5 14.0 14.0 Note: In 2004 and 2009 “none” and “Don’t know” responses were combined. Least for Money

Canada United States Mexico 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003

Federal 42.8 41.0 29.8 40.8 34.9Province/State 25.1 23.4 23.4 26.0 17.7Local 18.0 18.9 19.5 23.5 22.9All of the Above 7.6 --- 9.7 --- 12.0 None 1.9 13.8 6.6 1.0 4.8DK/NA 4.5 2.9 11.1 8.7 7.8 Note: “all of the above” was not a response option in 2007

Table 3 From which level of government do you feel you get the most/least for your money?

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Table 4 Which level of government has too much power / needs more power today?

Canada United States Mexico 2003 2007 2009 2003 2007 2009 2003 2009

Has Too Much PowerFederal 56.2% 47.7% 50.6% 51.7% 66.1% 60.1% 65.4% 54.9%Province/State 28.3 18.8 18.9 15.8 14.5 22.4 13.1 24.1Local 4.7 5.7 6.5 5.9 14.7 6.3 6.1 9.2All of the Above 3.7 11.2 4.7 8.6 4.5 3.7 6.4 2.4None of the Above 4.0 7.1 7.1 8.9 3.8 4.8 2.5 5.0Don’t Know/NA 3.0 9.7 12.2 9.2 6.4 2.7 6.7 4.3

Canada United States Mexico2003 2007 2003 2007 2003

Needs More PowerFederal 14.0% 10.5% 10.9% 8.2% 19.6%Province/State 31.5 27.8 22.7 35.9 42.9Local 45.4 39.6 36.1 38.3 17.1All of the Above 0.8 4.7 1.5 0.9 7.7None of the Above 5.7 10.6 21.1 12.1 6.6Don’t Know/NA 2.6 6.9 7.7 4.5 6.3

Sources: Author Reference Deleted et al. 2003; Author Reference Deleted 2008; and authors’ 2009 survey.

Page 59: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Table 5A Responses to the federalism culture questions and scale of federal culture

Canada Mexico United States 2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009

1. A federal form of government is preferable.Strongly Agree 28.0% 24.7% 18.0% 16.6% 43.3% 27.2%Somewhat Agree 47.0 44.7 40.0 42.0 32.7 46.2Somewhat Disagree 14.0 15.0 25.0 24.8 12.0 14.2Strongly Disagree 7.0 6.1 17.0 12.7 5.8 7.1DK/NA 5.0 9.5 3.8 6.2 5.3 Totals 1500 1000 1200 1216 1000 1000Sig=.000; cc=.275

2. A country in which everyone speaks the same language is preferable.Strongly Agree 11.0 15.8 20.0 18.7 16.9 14.1Somewhat Agree 20.0 21.7 40.0 35.1 20.6 24.6Somewhat Disagree 25.0 18.2 25.0 24.6 20.0 22.0Strongly Disagree 43.0 38.7 15.0 17.2 35.9 34.4DK/NA 2.0 5.7 4.5 6.7 4.8

Totals 1500 1000 1200 1216 1000 1000Sig=.000; cc=.283

3. Having a strong leader in government is preferable.Strongly Agree 23.0 11.0 29.6Somewhat Agree 32.0 58.0 31.6Somewhat Disagree 23.0 22.0 15.5Strongly Disagree 20.0 7.0 `16.8DK/NA 3.0 6.6

Totals 1500 1200 1000Sig=.000; cc=.217

Page 60: American Federalism Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania Seeming Paradoxes? John Kincaid Lafayette College Easton, Pennsylvania

Table 5B Responses to the federalism culture questions and scale of federal culture

Canada Mexico United States

2004 2009 2004 2009 2004 2009

4. When making decisions, government is better off limiting discussion.Strongly Agree 10.0 11.8 10.6Somewhat Agree 25.4 25.9 22.9Somewhat Disagree 19.6 31.0 17.7Strongly Disagree 40.6 26.8 45.5DK/NA 4.4 4.5 3.2

Totals 1000 1216 1000

5. Scale of Federalism Attitudes based on “strong” or “somewhat” pro-federalism responses to the three attitudinal questions asked above each year.0 (least pro-federal) 4.6% 5.1% 10.8% 6.3% 5.1% 6.5%1 27.7 25.2 36.5 37.3 36.2

23.72 40.2 32.8 38.5 42.1 40.5 31.83 (most pro-federal) 27.5 36.9 14.3 14.2 18.2 38.0

Mean Score 1.91 2.02 1.56 1.64 1.72 2.01Sig=.000; cc=.126