american public opinion toward israel dr. amnon cavari idc herzliya
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American Public Opinion Toward Israel
Dr. Amnon CavariIDC Herzliya
American Special Relationship with Israel
• Mutual Strategic Interest• Dominant Jewish population (politically and economically)• Strong Israeli Lobby• Shared values and beliefs – democracy, Judeo-Christian values• Guilt (Holocaust)
• Gilboa (1987) Special relationship would be untenable were it not for highly favorable American public opinion
• Strong public support• Support transcends conventional social and political cleavages
Israel Palestiniansmean of SYMPATHY_2way
EgyptKuwaitJordan
PakistanTurkey
IndonesiaBangladesh
MoroccoLebanonMalaysiaSenegal
MaliChinaSpain
BulgariaItaly
Great BritainNigeria
SwedenPolandFranceRussia
ArgentinaTanzania
MexicoChile
South KoreaCanada
PeruVenezuelaGermany
UkraineKenya
IndiaSouth Africa
EthiopiaGhanaJapan
SlovakiaUganda
BrazilBolivia
Czech RepublicIvory Coast
United States
Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, May 2007
Figure: Global Views about the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Sympathies in the Middle East Conflict
American are Uniquely Favorable of Israel(Cavari 2012)
Israel an Ally
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Figure 5.4: Percent Americans Seeing Israel as an Ally or Friendly Country
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II
19971998
19992000
20012002
20032004
20052006
20072008
20092010
20112012
20130
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Military Grants 1997-2013 (in $ Millions)
FY2000: Wye. FY2003: IraqIn 2012: Israel’s Defense Budget was about $15 Billion. More than 20% comes from the US
… And Americans have been supportive of military aid for Israel
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00
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010Source: Roper iPoll Archive, 1975-2011
Figure 5.5: Percent of Americans Supporting Military Aid to Israel(at existing level or more)
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01
00p
erce
nt
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010YEAR
Israel Arab Nations/Palestinians
Both/Neither
In the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more?
Source: ABC, ADL, CBS, Gallup, La Times, NY Times, Pew, Roper, Time
1967-2009Sympathy toward Sides in the Middle East Dispute
Understanding Support and Change
• Three major points:1. Party polarization2. Polarization lead by elite polarization3. Cohort change (with Shlomo Egoz)
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0
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30D
iffe
ren
ce (
perc
enta
ges)
Rep
ublic
ans
min
us
Dem
ocr
ats
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Source: ABC, CBS, Gallup, NY Times, Pew, Roper, Time
Figure 2: Emerging Gap in Partisan Sympathies with Israel, 1967-2009
Modeling the Relative Effect of Partisanship(Cavari 2013)
• Dependent variable: – Sympathies with Israel
(binary; 1 Israel, 0 otherwise, DK dropped)
• Independent variables:– Party (Republican, Democrat)– Religion (Protestants, Catholics)– Education (4 categorical groups)– Age (4 categorical groups)– Gender (male)– Race (white)
– Controlling for time
01
23
4D
ensi
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Probability of Sympathy with Israel
Republicans Democrats
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0119
1967-2009Probability Distribution of Sympathizing with Israel
02
46
Den
sity
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Probability of Sympathy with Israel
Republicans Democrats
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0106
A. 1967-1985
02
46
8D
ensi
ty
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1Probability of Sympathy with Israel
Republicans Democrats
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0094
B. 1985-2009
Probability Distribution of Sympathizing with Israel
-10
12
para
met
er e
stim
ates
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Democrats
-10
12
para
met
er e
stim
ates
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Republicans
Multivariate analysis. Gray lines represent 95% confidence intervels.
Source: ABC, ADL, CBS, Gallup, LA Times, NY Times, Pew, Roper, Time
Sympathize more with Israel, by partyOver-time Effect of Party Identification
Polarization initiated by Republican Support
02
46
0 .25 .5 .75 1
1967-1988
02
46
0 .25 .5 .75 1
1989-2000
02
46
Den
sity
0 .25 .5 .75 1
Democrats Republicans
2001-2009
Source: Probabilities generated from the base model, Table 2 model 1
Figure 3: Three Periods of Partisan Attitudes toward Israel
Three periods: Cold War, Post Cold War, Post 9/11
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lariza
tion
in C
ong
ress
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el S
ym
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thie
sR
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ious
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ava
ges
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Partisan Gap: Sympathies with IsraelPartisan Gap: Percent of Evangelical Christians
Partisan Gap: Polarization in Congress
All gaps are measured by subtracting annual means of Democrats from Republicans
Figure 4: Three partisan gaps: Religious, Elite Polarization and Israel
Elite Driven Process
Table 3: The Effect of Party Polarization and Religious Cleavages on the Israel Gap, 1980-2009 (1) Israel Gap Polarization (t-1) 0.144^ (0.0789) Religious Cleavages (t-1) 0.211^ (0.122) Democratic Administration -0.0202 (0.0177) Post 2001 0.107** (0.0331) Constant -0.0382 (0.0494) N 29 R2
0.894
Standard errors in parentheses ^ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Note: Series are aggregated annually. Missing data are linearly extrapolated on time.
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09’
Polarization in Congress?(Cavari & Nyer)
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Polarization in Congress?
Oldmixon, Rosenson and Wald (2005)
Trice 1977 Fereurergeson 1979
Data
• Examine all Congressional resolutions referring to Israel
• Criteria for inclusion1. Resolutions specifically referring to the state of Israel 2. Israel is a dominant issue in the resolution. 3. Expressed support—declaratory, monetary or military—
for Israel or condemned its foes
Israel Related Resolutions
101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 1110
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35
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45
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Focus on 109th Congress
Dependent Variable: Israel Score
1. Level of Support (Oldmixon et. al)• No, No Vote, Present, Yes = 0• Cosponsor & Sponsor = 1
2. Intensity Measure• No = -1• No Vote & Present = 0• Yes = 1• Cosponsor & Sponsor = 2
Level of Support0
50
100
150
Num
ber
of R
epre
sent
ativ
es
0 5 10 15 20Israel Score
Score measured by number of resolutions sponsored or co-sponsoredNumber of Resolutions: 36
Figure 2: Support for Israel, Members of the 109th Congress
Intensity Measure0
2040
6080
100
Num
ber
of R
epre
sent
ativ
es
0 10 20 30 40Israel Score
Nay=-1; NV,Present=0; Yea=1; CS,S=1Number of Resolutions: 36
Figure 3: Intensity of Support for Israel, Members of the 109th Congress
Determinants of Support for Israel
Personal
District
Israel Score
Independent Variables Personal Level
• Religion – Jewish, Catholic, and Evangelical or Christian
fundamentalist• Partisanship • Ideology
– DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal)• Race
Independent VariablesDistrict Level
• Religion • Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), 2000 Census
• Race • Percentage of Black population in district based on 2000 Census
• Partisanship• Measured as percent vote given to Republican presidential
candidate in 2004 presidential election
Determinants of Support, 109th Congress
Variables Level of Support Intensity Measure
Jewish + +
Evangelical + +
Catholic +
Republican +
Black -
Ideology + +
% Evangelical -
% Jewish + +
% Catholic -
% Republican
Is support for Israel affected by Events, Life Cycle Attitudes or Cohort Change?
(with Shlomo Egoz)
• Support for Israel is influenced by systematic secular transformations of public support which are based on the experiences each person is exposed to while she is establishing her long-term views of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict
Cohort Analysis
• Birth cohort – An aggregate of the individuals born in a certain years-
span, 17-25 (Evan 1959; Ryder 1965)– Share similar events and environmental effects that shape
how they view the world. • Europeans coming of age during WWI (Fussell 1975)• Algerians, who came of age during Boumedienne's regime
between 1965 and 1978 (Tessler, Konold & Reiff 2004)
• Cohort analysis used for assessment of age, cohort and period effects.
Cohort Analysis: three hypothetical patterns
Age group
+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-
Year of Survey
1969
1979
1989
1998
2009
Cohort Analysis: Age
Age group
+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-
Year of Survey
1969
1979
1989
1998
2009
Cohort Analysis: Period
Age group
+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-
Year of Survey
1969
1979
1989
1998
2009
Cohort Analysis: Cohort
Age group
+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-
Year of Survey
1969
1979
1989
1998
2009
Data
• Survey data from 1967 to 2009 (45 surveys)“In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with Arab nations / Palestinians?”(ABC, CBS, Gallup, LA-Times, NY-Times, Pew, Roper)
– Total of 69,771 respondents• 91% response rate
Sympathies for Israel and Arab Nations / Palestinians by Age and Year of Survey
(note: Percentage difference, Israel – Arab Nations/ Palestinians)
Age group
+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-
Year of Survey
44.9 35.1 31.9 39.6 46.1 45.7 1969
16.9 16.3 19.1 32.6 24.9 33.0 1979
31.8 38.5 41.8 39.7 39.2 34.3 1989
65.8 51.6 69.1 52.2 47.2 41.2 1998
44.3 46.8 40.3 36.2 35.3 30.3 2009
Sympathies for Israel and Arab Nations / Palestinians by Age and Year of Survey
(note: Percentage difference, Israel – Arab Nations/ Palestinians)
Age group
+66 56-65 46-55 36-45 26-35 25-
Year of Survey
44.9 35.1 31.9 39.6 46.1 45.7 1969
16.9 16.3 19.1 32.6 24.9 33.0 1979
31.8 38.5 41.8 39.7 39.2 34.3 1989
65.8 51.6 69.1 52.2 47.2 41.2 1998
44.3 46.8 40.3 36.2 35.3 30.3 2009
Hypothesis
• We expect that two perspectives of Israel have affected people’s attitudes toward the country:
Strategic Partnership
1960-1990; 2001+
Underdog Image1945-1982
Birth cohorts and their environmental experiences at maturation
Underdog image (1945-1982)
Strategic Partnership (1960-1990;
2001+)
Years of Political
Maturation (age 17-25)
Year of birth
Cohort
- - 1917-1934 1900-1909 1
- - 1927-1944 1910-1919 2
-/+ - 1937-1954 1920-1929 3
+ -/+ 1947-1964 1930-1939 4
+ + 1957-1974 1940-1949 5
+ + 1967-1984 1950-1959 6
- +- / 1977-1994 1960-1969 7
- -/+ 1987-2004 1970-1979 8
Cohort groups and their environmental experiences at maturation
Underdog image (1945-1982)
Strategic Partnership (1960-1990;
2001+)
Years of Political
Maturation (age 17-25)
Year of birth
Cohort
- - 1917-1934 1900-1909 1
- - 1927-1944 1910-1919 2
-/+ - 1937-1954 1920-1929 3
+ -/+ 1947-1964 1930-1939 4
+ + 1957-1974 1940-1949 5
+ + 1967-1984 1950-1959 6
- +- / 1977-1994 1960-1969 7
- -/+ 1987-2004 1970-1979 8
Cohort groups and their environmental experiences at maturation
Underdog image (1945-1982)
Strategic Partnership (1960-1990;
2001+)
Years of Political
Maturation (age 17-25)
Year of birth
Cohort
- - 1917-1934 1900-1909 1
- - 1927-1944 1910-1919 2
-/+ - 1937-1954 1920-1929 3
+ -/+ 1947-1964 1930-1939 4
+ + 1957-1974 1940-1949 5
+ + 1967-1984 1950-1959 6
- +- / 1977-1994 1960-1969 7
- -/+ 1987-2004 1970-1979 8
50%
75%
100%
Per
cent
Sym
path
izin
g w
ith Is
rae
l
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990Date of Survey
1910-1919 1920-19291930-1939 1940-1949
Attitudes of Cohorts, 1967-1990
50%
75%
100%
Per
cent
Sym
path
izin
g w
ith Is
rae
l
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005Date of Survey
1930-1939 1940-19491950-1959 1960-1969
Attitudes of Cohorts, 1980-2009
Estimating the Cohort Effect
• Dependent Variable– Sympathies with Israel (1 – Israel; 0 - Arab
Nations/Palestinians, DK)
• Independent Variable– Cohort indicators
(cohorts 1-8. Two models: 1-6, 3-8. 3 is reference)– Demographic variables: religion, education, party
identification, gender, race– Controlling for survey differences
The effect of cohorts on Israel Sympathies 1967-1990 1980-2009
Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds RatioCohort 1: 1900-1909
0.0712
)0.0881(
Cohort 2: 1910-1919
-0.115^ .89
)0.0689(
Cohort 4: 1930-1939
0.331*** 1.39 0.176* 1.19
)0.0687( )0.0757(
Cohort 5: 1940-1949
0.465*** 1.59 0.323*** 1.38
)0.0655( )0.0709(
Cohort 6: 1950-1959
0.267*** 1.31 0.176** 1.19
)0.0636( )0.0672(
Cohort 7: 1960-1969
0.0726
)0.0715(
Cohort 8: 1970-1979
0.0817
)0.0915(
The effect of cohorts on Israel Sympathies 1967-1990 1980-2009
Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds RatioCohort 1: 1900-1909
0.0712
)0.0881(
Cohort 2: 1910-1919
-0.115^ .89
)0.0689(
Cohort 4: 1930-1939
0.331*** 1.39 0.176* 1.19
)0.0687( )0.0757(
Cohort 5: 1940-1949
0.465*** 1.59 0.323*** 1.38
)0.0655( )0.0709(
Cohort 6: 1950-1959
0.267*** 1.31 0.176** 1.19
)0.0636( )0.0672(
Cohort 7: 1960-1969
0.0726
)0.0715(
Cohort 8: 1970-1979
0.0817
)0.0915(
Summary
• American attitudes toward Israel have polarized in the last decade– Mostly due to change in views of Republicans– Lead by elite change
• Attitudes toward Israel are cohort-based– As older cohorts are exiting the electorate,
support for Israel will drop