americans on expanding nato

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PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES

A joint program of the Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes

and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland,

School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland

Americans on

Expanding NATO

A STUDY OF US PUBLIC ATTITUDES

February 13, 1997

Principal Investigator

Steven Kull

The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)is a joint program of the Center for International and Security

Studies at Maryland and the Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes. PIPA undertakes research on American attitudes in

both the public and in the policymaking community toward a variety of international and foreign policy issues. It seeks to

disseminate its findings to members of government, the press, and the public, as well as academia.

The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), at the University of Maryland's School for

Public Affairs, pursues policy-oriented scholarship on major issues facing the United States in the global arena. Using its

research, forums, and publications, CISSM links the University and the policy community to improve communication

between scholars and practitioners.

The Center for the Study of Policy Attitudes (CSPA)is an independent nonprofit organization of social science

researchers devoted to increasing understanding of public and elite attitudes shaping contemporary public policy. Using

innovative research methods, CSPA seeks not only to examine overt policy opinions or positions, but to reveal the

underlying values, assumptions, and feelings that sustain such opinions.

Acknowledgments

This study is part of a larger study called the Project on Attitudes toward the Transatlantic Community, which is a joint

project of PIPA and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Within this project PIPA is focusing on public

attitudes, while the Carnegie Endowment is focusing on Congressional attitudes. The project is funded by the GermanMarshall Fund of the US.

Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Monica Wolford designed the questionnaire, conducted focus groups and wrote the

analysis.

Jeremy Rosner, codirector with Steven Kull of the Project on attitudes To- ward the Transatlantic Community, as well as

I.M. Destler, Fran Burwell, Fred Steeper, and Norman Ornstein contributed to the development of the questionnaire.

The development of the questionnaire benefitted from comments by a group of key Congressional staffers that represented

a broad spectrum of opinion on NATO expansion.

Talmey-Drake Research carried out the telephone interviewing. Scientific Sample supplied the random-digit sample.

Board of Advisors


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I.M. Destler

Director, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland

Gloria Duffy

Visiting Scholar, Stanford University

Alexander George

Professor of International Relations, Stanford University

Alan Kay

Director, Americans Talk Issues Foundation

Catherine M. Kelleher

(on leave)

Daniel Yankelovich

Chairman, DYG Inc.

President, Public Agenda Foundation

The Program on International Policy Attitudes

DC Office:

11 Dupont Circle, NW

Suite 785

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 232-7500

(202) 232-1159 FAX

Campus Office:

CISSM, School of Public Affairs

University of Maryland

College Park, MD 20742-1811

(301) 405-7601

(301) 403-8107 FAX

AMERICANS ON NATO EXPANSION - PAGE 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At their December 1996 meeting, NATO foreign ministers announced that, at a meeting of heads- of-state in July, a number

of countries would be invited to begin the process of joining NATO. While the Clinton administration has been an activeproponent of such a move, it is not clear whether the required two-thirds of the U.S. Senate would ratify such an expansion

of U.S. treaty commitments. An influential factor will be the attitudes of the American public on the issue.

The Program on International Policy Attitudes has recently completed a study of American public attitudes on NATO

expansion. The findings of the study suggest:

1.A strong majority has a favorable attitude toward NATO and U.S. participation in it.

2.A substantial majority supports expanding NATO to include Eastern European countries such as Poland, Hungary, and

the Czech Republic. However, awareness of the issue is low and only a minority feels a sense of urgency about it.

3.Support for NATO expansion is fairly resilient. After respondents evaluate numerous arguments for and against

expansion, support stays constant. However, challenges that introduce the possibility of increased defense costs, or the

nuclear commitment to defend new members, do soften support.


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4. If NATO is expanded, only a minority would be opposed to contributing U.S. troops to a NATO effort to defend a new

NATO member from attack.

5.Support for NATO expansion is derived from a desire to be inclusive and remove the divisions of the Cold War, more

than from a concern about a potential Russian threat. A major reservation about NATO expansion is that it excludes

Russia.

6.A majority would support eventually including Russia in NATO.

7.Support for NATO expansion is not only derived from immediate concerns about U.S. security, but also from more

global and moral concerns for maintaining a norm against aggression, resolving potential conflicts between Eastern European

countries, promoting democracy, and fulfilling a moral obligation of assistance to Eastern European countries.

8.Opposition to NATO expansion arises from a concern that it will impose an excessive burden on the U.S., doubts about

the stability of Eastern European countries, isolationist feelings, and questions about the appropriateness of NATO.

9.A strong majority supports pacing NATO expansion in a way that accommodates Russian concerns. However, the

majority opposes making a commitment not to station troops and nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe to accommodate

Russia.

10.While there is still some cautiousness about Russia as a potential threat in the future, most Americans do not think that it

is inherently aggressive, that its interests necessarily conflict with those of the U.S., or that it should be viewed as the enemy.

11. Broadly, while the majority wants to preserve NATO, most are supportive of NATO expanding beyond its function as

a military alliance oriented to the Russian threat and becoming a more inclusive and diverse security system.

The study included a nationwide poll of 1,214 randomly selected adults conducted September 14-20, 1996 (margin of

error plus or minus 3-4%), focus groups held in Baltimore and Nashville, and a review of existing polling data.

PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES - PAGE 2

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, members of the policymaking community on both sides of the Atlantic have engaged in

extensive discussions on how to address the problem of security in Europe in this new era. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in

1989, there was a debate about whether to preserve NATO or whether to replace it with a security structure that would

be more inclusive of former members of the Warsaw Pact. Gradually a consensus emerged from this debate that NATO

would be preserved, but that it would be imbedded in what was called the new "European Security Architecture," which

included a number of security structures, in addition to NATO, that would make links with former members of the Warsaw

Pact.

At the same time, some within the policymaking community suggested that NATO expand to include new members from

the former Warsaw Pact countries. From the beginning, on both sides of the Atlantic, this idea was controversial. Central

and Eastern European countries were enthusiastic, seeing NATO membership as an assurance that they would never again

be dominated by Russia. Russia was and remains opposed to the idea, saying that it feels threatened by the prospect of

NATO, which it still perceives as being intrinsically anti-Russian, drawing closer to its borders. While some members of the

NATO policymaking community wanted to avoid antagonizing Russia, others stressed that the present situation created an

important window of opportunity that must be acted upon now.

Partly as a result of this controversy, NATO sought to find ways to form new security relations with former members of the

Warsaw Pact that were less threatening to Russia, while still moving in the direction of including these countries in NATO.

To this end, in 1993 the Partnership for Peace initiative was established. This program established relations between NATOand former Warsaw Pact countries, many of the former republics of the Soviet Union, and eventually even Russia, and

sought to promote cooperation on security matters. Implicitly and explicitly the Partnership for Peace was seen as a way of

preparing at least some Eastern countries for membership in NATO.


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As the momentum for expansion continued to grow, NATO foreign ministers announced at their December 1996 meeting

that they would invite one or more countries to begin the process of joining NATO in July 1997. To help reassure Russia,

they also announced that they would negotiate a special charter with Russia and pledged that the alliance had no intention of

placing nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members.

The Clinton administration has been one of the most active proponents of expansion among the NATO member

governments. Congress has signaled support by approving the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act by an overwhelming

margin. However, within Congress (and in the news media and among foreign policy specialists, as well), there are many

voices opposing this step. Since bringing new members into NATO would involve an expansion of U.S. treaty obligations,Senate ratification would be necessary, with a two-thirds vote required. It is not certain that this will be forthcoming.( 1 )

A key factor affecting the Senate's decision will be its perception of public attitudes on the question of NATO expansion.

Currently there is a widespread assumption among many members of Congress that, in the wake of the Cold War, the

public is going through a phase of wanting to withdraw from the world and is loath to commit U.S. troops to foreign

ventures. Thus many doubt that the public would be ready to take on a new treaty obligation, particularly one that could

involve committing U.S. troops to help defend other countries.

1. For a discussion of Congressional attitudes on NATO expansion and the prospects for Senate ratification see Jeremy

Rosner, ''NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle: The Perils of Misjudging Our Political Will" in the July-August 1996 issue

ofForeign Affairsand "The American Public, Congress and NATO Enlargement, Part II: Will Congress Back Admitting

New Members?" in the January 1997 issue ofNATO Review.


Polls have shown that the public is not as averse to international engagement and to the commitment of U.S. troops as is

widely thought. Existing research has shown that the public generally supports continued U.S. involvement in NATO.

However, little research has been done on public attitudes toward NATO expansion, and the little that has been done has

produced what appear to be contradictory results. A January 1994 poll by ABC/Washington Post found majority support

for expansion; a November 1994 poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and a more recent January 1997 pollby the Pew Research Center found plurality support; an April 1996 poll by the Fletcher School found plurality opposition.

The question of public support for NATO expansion is not simply a thumbs up-thumbs down proposition. Numerous

questions are involved. How will members of the public respond when they hear the various pro and con arguments that are

likely to be presented in the debate? Is the public really ready to commit to the defense of new members? How will the cost

issues affect attitudes? What are the attitudes about admitting specific countries? Perhaps most central is the question of

why the public does or does not want to expand - what are the values and perceived interests Americans feel are involved

in the issue?

Another key issue is how to deal with Russian concerns. As mentioned, Russia has opposed NATO expansion, saying that

it is provocative. Some members of the policymaking community have called for moderating the pace at which NATO isexpanded, or making other concessions that will help reassure the Russians, while others say that this would be giving

Russia undue influence over NATO policy. How does the U.S. public feel about this issue?

Closely related is the question of the speed of NATO expansion. This was one of the very few foreign policy issues in the

1996 U.S. presidential election campaign, with Robert Dole criticizing Bill Clinton for not pressing for a faster schedule for

NATO expansion. Does the public feel this sense of urgency?

Another key question is about the future shape of NATO. As mentioned, the present debate about NATO expansion was

preceded by a debate about whether NATO should be replaced by something that would include Russia as well as other

countries - thus becoming a military alliance oriented to an external threat, but more like a collective security system that

would offer security in relation to potential conflicts between members. Some voices presently call for NATO to evolve

gradually in this direction. Others feel that doing so would dilute the meaning of the alliance and thus weaken it. Implicit in

this discussion are questions about the nature of Russia and whether Russian interests are ultimately compatible with those

of the West. How does the public feel about all of these issues?


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Presently within NATO there is much discussion about diversifying the functions of the organization. Some voices are calling

for NATO to move beyond its role as a military alliance to deal with such problems as the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, terrorism, conflicts outside the NATO area, conflicts between NATO members, and to perform peacekeeping

operations, as it is now doing in Bosnia. How do Americans feel about diversifying NATO's functions this way?

To address these various questions PIPA undertook an in-depth study of public attitudes. This included:

a nationwide poll of 1,214 randomly selected adults conducted September 14-20, 1996 (margin of error plus or

minus 3-4%)

focus groups held in Baltimore, MD and Nashville, TN

a review of existing polling data.


The key findings of the study are as follows:

1. A strong majority has a favorable attitude toward NATO and U.S. participation in it.

An overwhelming majority of 75% said that NATO "should be maintained," as compared to just 18% saying that it is not

necessary anymore. This support is slightly higher than other polls that have asked the same question over the last few years:

in January 1993 CNN/USA Today found 70% saying NATO should be maintained, while 60% said so in a December

1994 Times Mirror poll, as did 64% in an April 1995 CNN/USA Today poll and 61 % in a January 1997 Pew poll. The

PIPA number may have been a bit higher because respondents were told that "NATO is a military alliance that consists of

the United States, Canada and Western European countries and has existed since the 1940s." Perhaps as a result of this,

the PIPA poll had fewer "don't know" responses. In a January 1994 ABC/Washington Post poll, 73% said the U.S. should

remain a member of NATO, with just 15% saying it should not.

In the PIPA poll, 67% said that NATO is "still essential to our security." Similarly, 67% said that their view of NATO wasmostly (58%) or very (9%) favorable with 18% saying that their view was mostly (14%) or very (4%) unfavorable. On the

latter question PIPA's numbers were slightly higher than others. On the same question in a June 1995 Times Mirror poll 61

% said that their view was mostly (53%) or very (8%) favorable with 25% saying that their view was mostly (18%) or very

(7%) unfavorable, while in January 1997 Pew found just 53% said their view was very (9%) or mostly (44%) favorable,

with 31 % saying their view was mostly (23%) or very (8%) unfavorable.

Asked whether the U.S. should maintain, increase, or decrease its commitment to NATO, in an


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April 1996 poll by the Fletcher School of Tufts University, 64% wanted to maintain (59%) or increase (5%) the U.S.

commitment, while 33% wanted to decrease. In a November 1994 poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 61

% wanted to maintain (56%) or increase (5%) the U.S. commitment.

However, the public is divided about the optimal level of U.S. troops in Europe. In the PIPA poll, told that the U.S.

presently has 100,000 troops in Europe, 43% found this too many, while 47% found it about right and 3% too few. This

result is very close to a CNN/USA Today poll in April 1995, when 39% found 100,000 troops too many, while 48%found it either about right and 7% too few. In January 1994, an ABC/Washington Post poll question explained that "the

number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe is being cut from more than 300,000 before the breakup of the Soviet Union to

100,000 now," and offered respondents four choices on troop levels. Forty-eight percent said they preferred 100,000

troops or more (about 300,000: 17%; about 100,000: 31 %), while 39% preferred lower levels (less than 100,000: 23%;

none at all: 16%).

2. A substantial majority supports expanding NATO to include Eastern European countries such as Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic. However, awareness of the issue is low and only a minority feels a sense of

urgency about it.

When asked whether they are "inclined to favor or oppose expanding NATO to include some Eastern European countriessuch as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic," 62% said they favored doing so (27% strongly). Twenty-nine percent

were opposed (14% strongly) and 8% said 'don't know.' Among Republicans 60% were in favor, while among

Democrats 64% were in favor. This is approximately the same level of support found in a similarly worded

ABC/Washington Post poll from January 1994, in which 64% said that "Eastern European countries such as Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic should be allowed to join NATO" while 21 % said they should not.

Support for Including

Specific Countries in NATO

Poland.........................68%Hungary ......................63%

Czech Republic............56%

Romania......................55%

Baltic States ................54%

Russia .........................52%

Bulgaria.......................52%

Slovakia .....................50%

Ukraine.......................50%

Slovenia ......................41%

When the PIPA poll asked about including specific countries in NATO only one out of ten countries received less than 50%

support. Poland was the highest with 68% support, while for Hungary it was 63%, the Czech Republic 56%, Romania

55%, Russia 52%, Bulgaria 52%, Slovakia 50%, Ukraine 50% and Slovenia 41 %. (Slovenia may have been particularly

low because it is associated with the instability of the former Yugoslavia.) A January 1993 Gallup question for CNN/USA

Today also asked about admitting specific countries and found responses closely comparable to PIPA: for Poland 66%

support, Hungary 60%, Romania 53%, Czech Republic 52%, Lithuania 51 %, Bulgaria 47%, and Albania 42%.

Some other polls have found somewhat lower levels of support, though in nearly every case a plurality favored expansion.

In every case there were important differences in wording that can help explain these different responses as well as elucidate

some of the nuances of public attitudes.



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In a very recent January 1997 Pew poll respondents were asked, "Should NATO be expanded to include some countries

from Central and Eastern Europe that have not been members in the past, or should NATO stay as it is?" A plurality of

45% said NATO should be expanded while 39% said it should stay as it is, while 14% said "don't know" or re- fused to

answer. The key difference between PIPA's and Pew's questions seems to be that PIPA's question specified the countries

of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while Pew's question referred to "some countries from Central and Eastern

Europe." This interpretation is supported by the abovementioned responses to the questions about including specific

countries. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic all received high levels of support. Interestingly their average level of

support when asked separately was the exact same level 62%as the favorable response to the general PIPA question about

expansion. Thus it appears that while a plurality is supportive of the general principle of NATO expansion a strong majorityemerges only when expansion is associated with the specific countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. (The

Pew number may also have been

lowered by a larger number of "don't know" responses than PIPA's question received; as mentioned, PIPA gave

respondents a one sentence definition of NATO.)

An October 1994 poll conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) and then repeated in April 1996

by the Fletcher School also found a somewhat lower level of support. Here again this can largely be attributed to a key

element in the wording. The question stated that including new countries in NATO meant "committing the United States to

defend them against attack" without any mention of the responsibility of other NATO members. In the CCFR poll only a

plurality of 42% favored including new countries, while 32% were opposed and 26% said 'don't know.' When this question

was repeated by the Fletcher School in April 1996, 44% favored expanding, while a plurality of 47% was opposed, with

9% saying 'don't know.' Other polls have found that, in answering questions about the use of U.S. military force, many

Americans are quite sensitive to whether the action is clearly described as multilateral. Actions that are simply described as

a U.S. effort often elicit opposition. This is consistent with the widely held opposition to the U.S. being the 'world

policeman' or doing more than its 'fair share' in the world.

It does not appear that in the above question respondents were simply reacting to the fact that the responsibility to defend

other countries was highlighted, because this responsibility was also highlighted in other questions that nonetheless elicited

majority support for NATO expansion. In the above-mentioned PIPA questions that asked about admitting specific

countries to NATO, respondents were asked to "keep... in mind that the U.S., together with other NATO members, must

defend any NATO country that comes under attack...." Nonetheless nine out of 10 countries received at least 50%

support. The January 1993 CNN/USA Today poll that asked about admitting specific countries, reported above, also

specified that "NATO is committed to defending its members against a military attack by any other nation, including Russia"


and found majority support for five of the seven countries mentioned.

In summary, it seems that a plurality supports NATO expansion as a general principle, and another 15% or so will join in to


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make it a substantial majority if it is specified that the countries in question are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic,

and that the commitment to defend NATO members is a collective commitment.

Low Saliency and Low Urgency

Although polls consistently find a solid plurality and a conditional majority in support of NATO expansion this does not

mean that the issue is necessarily salient to most Americans. Awareness of the issue is low. Asked how much they have

heard about the issue of NATO expansion, only 7% said "a great deal" and 22% said "some." On the other hand, 33% said

"not very much" and 38% said "nothing at all." (Support for NATO expansion was significantly higher from those who hadgreater awareness of the issue than from those who did not. Similarly the January 1997 Pew poll asked respondents how

closely they followed the news story on NATO expansion. Only 5% said "very closely", 15% "fairly closely", 32% "not too

closely', and 47% "not at all closely.")

There is also very little sense of urgency for NATO expansion. Among those who said they favored NATO expansion, only

29% felt that it should happen quickly, while 67% said that this was "not so important." Thus only 18% of the total sample

felt a sense of urgency (i.e. 29% of the 62% who favored expansion).

A substantial minority is poorly informed about NATO in general. While 85% knew that the U.S. is a member of NATO,

just 58% knew that Russia is not a member, while 23% assumed that Russia is a member. Similarly, a May 1989

CBS/New York Times question found 21% assuming that Russia is a NATO member.

In the focus groups, NATO was not a salient topic when it was first introduced. Initially, a few participants were even

unsure if NATO was still in place, and several commented that they "have not heard much about it lately." NATO's current

peacekeeping activity seemed roughly as salient to participants as did NATO'S traditional mission of deterring Russia. For

example, a Baltimore man said, "The only thing I hear about NATO is...you know, peacekeeping. The Americans go and

the French go and they get together and they try to keep peace between one or two countries." However, once participants

became involved in thinking about the subject, they did become engaged and expressed definite attitudes. Thus, while it

appears that NATO is not a foreground issue, most still see NATO as relevant to their security and to U.S. interests.

NATO expansion is also not very salient as an electoral issue to the general public. In the focus groups, there was little

awareness that either presidential candidate had taken a position on it (the groups took place, however, before President

Clinton's October 1996 pro-expansion speech on the subject).

In the poll, respondents were asked whether they would feel that a candidate who took a position in favor of NATO

expansion was stronger or weaker on national security "or would it make no difference to you?" Half the respondents were

told that the candidate was a Democrat, while the other half heard that the candidate was a Republican. Majorities of 51 %

and 56%, respectively, said the pro-expansion position would make no difference. However, those who said it would make

some difference in their perception of a candidate indicated by a wide margin that support for NATO expansion would

make them feel that a candidate was stronger, not weaker, on national security. For a Democratic candidate 31 % said this

position would make them feel the candidate was stronger, while for a Republican candidate 35% had this response. For a

Democratic candidate only 10% said it would cause them to see the candidate as weaker8% for the Republican.


3. Support for NATO expansion is fairly resilient. After respondents evaluate numerous arguments for and

against expansion, support stays constant. However, challenges that introduce the possibility of increased

defense costs, or the nuclear commitment to defend new members, do soften support.

A key question for policymakers is how resilient is support for NATO expansion - i.e., how much it will be sustained once

Americans are given a greater chance to consider the pros and cons of the issue. This is relevant to the question of how

Americans are likely to respond should the debate about NATO expansion become more public. While it is possible thatthe debate will consolidate support, it is also possible that support will fragment in the face of the dissuasive arguments that

are likely to be presented.

To simulate this deliberative process, we presented respondents with a series of pro and con arguments, asked them to


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evaluate each one and then checked to see what effect this had on their attitudes toward NATO expansion. This list of

arguments was developed in consultation with a group of Congressional staffers that represented the spectrum of attitudes

on the issue. Half the sample was asked whether they favored or opposed NATO expansion both before and after

arguments were presented. To make sure that the responses after hearing the arguments were not simply a result of

respondents' desires to be consistent with their initial responses, another half sample was only asked to take a position after

having heard all the arguments.

The attitudes of those asked after this battery of arguments were almost exactly the same as the attitudes of those asked

before the battery. Among the half who were asked and then re-asked, support actually went up slightly from 62% to 65%.Among those who were only asked after hearing the arguments, 63% favored expansion.

Consistent with the general support for expansion, the pro arguments were found to be more convincing than the con

arguments. Eight of the ten pro arguments were found convincing by the majority, compared with only three of the con

arguments (see chart on pages 10-11).

While the overall balance of attitudes was essentially the same after going through the pro and con arguments, a small

number of respondents did change their position; however, the changes went almost equally in each direction. Six percent

changed from opposing to favoring NATO expansion, and 5% from favoring to opposing it. Among those who swung from

"oppose" to "favor," the most

How Respondents Evaluated Arguments

Contrary to Their Own Positions

The majority of respondents who opposed NATO

expansion proved resistant to arguments in favor of

expanding the Alliance. However, some pro arguments

elicited significant support. The most popular among

this group, rated as convincing by 47% of those who

opposed expansion, was that "It is important for

potential aggressors to know that they cannot get away

with conquering other countries." Close behind, 46% of

opponents found convincing: "It is better to include

Eastern European countries in NATO rather than to

exclude them because peace is more likely if we all

communicate and work together."

The majority of expansion proponents also resisted

most arguments in opposition. However, one exception

received very strong support. A strikingly high 66%

found convincing the argument that "instead ofexpanding NATO, something new should be developed

that includes Russia rather than treating Russia as an

enemy." The second most popular con argument, found

convincing by 48% of expansion proponents, was that

"expanding NATO means increasing the number of

countries the U.S. will have to help defend, thus

increasing the burden on the U.S."


convincing argument in favor was: "If Eastern Europe countries are included in NATO, NATO will be in a better position to

resolve conflicts between those countries." For the 5% who moved from favoring to opposing expansion, the most popular

con argument was: "Eastern European countries are too unstable and have too many unresolved ethnic disputes. If we bring


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them into NATO, it will just get the U.S. bogged down in their conflicts."

Challenges Concerning Financial Costs and Nuclear Commitment

To test the resiliency of support, in addition to presenting pro and con arguments, we challenged respondents by asking

questions about expansion that introduced potentially dissuasive information. Two such challenges did soften support

bringing it down from a majority to a plurality. However, as we shall see, with such questions it is not always clear whether

respondents are actually changing their overall position or whether they are merely reacting to some of the specifics

introduced in the question.

One challenge was related to financial costs. Respondents were told that expanding NATO could cost the U.S. $1 billion

over and above the current defense budget of $260 billion. Given this estimate, only a plurality of 46% said that it would be

worth the cost, while 44% said it would not be and 10% did not know. It is not entirely clear, however, how much

respondents who said it would not be worth the cost were expressing opposition to NATO expansion or how much they

were resisting an increase in the defense budget. Some may have felt that the costs should simply be covered by cutting

back in some other area of the defense budget.

In the focus groups, there was little opposition to NATO expansion based on the estimated costs. As a Baltimore man said,

"You cannot put a price on peace." However, some participants, while still accepting the costs, did bring up the need to

address certain domestic problems, suggesting some tension between the desire to address these needs and to expand

NATO.

Another effective challenge to NATO expansion focused on the nuclear commitment. Respondents were told that "the U.S.

is committed to do whatever is necessary to defend Western European NATO countries, possibly even using nuclear

arms." They were then asked whether they would favor or oppose admitting new members, "assuming we would be giving

(them) the same commitments." In this case, just a plurality of 44% said they would favor doing so, while 43% were

opposed and 13% did not know. (Consistent with this attitude, in another question only 19% felt NATO should "develop a

capacity to base nuclear weapons" in new member states, while 75% were opposed.)


Rating of Arguments in Support of Expansion

Convincing Unconvincing


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There is no need to expand NATO now because Russia does not pose a significant threat

now. If they start to go back to their old ways we will have plenty of time to act. 35% 62%

NATO was set up mostly to deal with the Russian threat. Now that the Cold War is over

NATO is outdated, so expanding it does not make sense. 35% 61%


However, here again it is not clear whether all of those expressing opposition were in fact opposing NATO expansion.

When poll questions on this issue were asked in the 1980s, a majority of Americans showed a preference for moving

toward a "no first use" policy, and at least a plurality believed that it was in fact already the policy of the U.S. Thus the

lower level of support may have been an expression of opposition to the policy of using nuclear weapons to defend NATO

members, not opposition to expansion given the risk of nuclear war. Indeed, when presented with an argument against

NATO expansion that cited the risk of nuclear war, respondents were not highly dissuaded. Only 45% found convincing,

while 54% found unconvincing, the argument that "promising to defend Eastern European countries is too risky, because

one day there could be a conflict with Russia over these countries that could lead to a nuclear war"

Respondents were also inclined to believe that expanding NATO would more likely decrease than increase the risk of

nuclear war. Asked to choose between a pair of statements about this risk, only 28% chose the pessimistic statement: "Byexpanding NATO and committing to defend former Russian allies, there is a chance that NATO may have a conflict with

Russia that could lead to nuclear war. While this chance is low, a nuclear war would be so catastrophic it would not be

worth the risk." On the other hand, 60% preferred the optimistic statement: "The likelihood of Russian aggression against

Eastern Europe is low and would be even lower once we commit to help defend those countries. Therefore, expanding

NATO is more likely to increase peace and security than it is to increase the risk of nuclear war." This suggests that the

public grasps the principle of deterrence, which requires a commitment to take an action that one would prefer not to take

in the hope of dissuading another party (in this case, the Russians) from acting aggressively. While Americans may find

making the commitment somewhat difficult, they tend to be optimistic thatonce the commitment is madethe long-term

outcome will be positive.

In the focus groups, participants were not dissuaded by the prospect that committing to defend new NATO members

would involve nuclear risks, even when the moderator pressed them. A Nashville man responded, "There's always going to

be that risk or that threat as long as there are nuclear weapons. I still think that we should [commit to protect new

members]. If we are part of NATO, part of the alliance, I think we have the responsibility." A woman in the same group,

agreeing, immediately added that once attacks by aggressors start it is unclear where they will stop. When the moderator

pressed her by pointing to the risk of escalation to nuclear conflict, she said, "[The risk is] there as we sit here today. It's

there, so you can't let that scare you from doing what you feel like you need to do." Apparently many Americans have a

certain familiarity with the concept of deterrence and its riskseven if they are sometimes rueful about taking on those risks.

4. If NATO is expanded, only a minority would be opposed to contributing U.S. troops to a NATO effort to

defend a new NATO member from attack.

Naturally, a key question is whether Americans would really be willing to send U.S. troops to defend a new NATO

member from attack. To explore this question, respondents were presented a scenario in which Poland has become a

member of NATO and it comes under attack from Russia. Half the sample was simply asked whether they would or would

not be ready "to support sending U.S. and other NATO troops to defend Poland." A strikingly high number68%said that

they would, with 25% saying that they would not.

However, when the other half sample was asked in a different way, they showed more equivocation. These respondents

were given the same question, but were also offered a third response option: "I don't know if I would be ready to support

sending U.S. and other NATO troops to



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defend Poland. But I favor making preparations to defend Poland, because this will discourage Russia from even thinking

about being aggressive." A plurality of 45% opted for this position, while 37% simply said they "would be ready." However,

when given this third option, the number saying they "would not be ready" to send troops dropped to just 13%. Thus it

seems that opposition to the principle of committing U.S. troops to defend new NATO members is low.

Consistent with this support for defending new members, 57% said they would favor basing troops from current NATO

members on the soil of new NATO members, while just 33% were opposed.

Many policymakers worry that support for NATO expansion will dry up when Americans are presented with the possibility

that it could lead the U.S. to risk the lives of Americans. Clearly this prospect is troubling to many Americans. When

presented the argument against NATO expansion that "this might mean we will have to risk the lives of American soldiers,"

47% found this argument convincing. However a plurality of 49% said they found it unconvincing, suggesting that it will not

be a decisive argument in the coming debate on NATO expansion.

Presumably, this support for committing U.S. troops to defend Eastern European countries is greatly affected by the

question's dual premise that these countries would be part of NATO and that U.S. action would clearly be part of a

multilateral operation. When these two conditions were not specified in an October 1994 poll conducted by the Chicago

Council on Foreign Relations, support was much lower. Respondents were asked about "circumstances that might justify

using U.S. troops in other parts of the world" and then specifically asked whether they would "favor or oppose the use of

U.S. troops...if Russia invaded Poland?" Given this wording, 50% were opposed while 32% were in favor (not sure: 18%).

Even when asked about defending Western Europe against a Russian attack, support for contributing U.S. troops was only

54% when there was no mention of either a commitment to defend Western European NATO countries or of the

multilateral nature of such an effort.

5. Support for NATO expansion is derived from a desire to be inclusive and remove the divisions of the Cold

War, more than from a concern about a potential Russian threat. A major reservation about NATO expansion is

that it excludes Russia.

In the focus groups, support for expanding NATO was quite high. However, when giving reasons for being pro-expansion,participants rarely mentioned



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the potential threat from Russia. The most common rationale was based on a belief in the value of inclusiveness. One

Baltimore woman said, "The more people who are trying to work together as a group for peace, the better off you are,"

while another said, "The more we learn about each other and the more we form personal relationships with each other, the

harder it is to create war and disarray."

In the poll, asked to choose between two arguments in favor of NATO expansion, only 22% selected the one that said:

"NATO should be expanded to make NATO larger and more powerful so that it can more effectively deal with the

possibility of a threat from Russia in the future." Sixty-eight percent chose, instead, the argument that "NATO should be

expanded to remove the outdated divisions of the Cold War and help bring Europe together."

Among the ten arguments in favor of NATO expansion, the most popular argumentrated as convincing by 77%, with 48%

feeling that way strongly was that "it is better to include Eastern European countries rather than to exclude them, because

peace is more likely if we all communicate and work together."

Among the ten arguments against NATO expansion, the most popular was again based on the concept of inclusiveness.

Sixty-two percent found convincing (31% strongly) the argument "instead of expanding NATO, something new should be

developed that includes Russia, rather than treating Russia as an enemy." Interestingly, even among those who said they

generally favored NATO expansion, an extraordinary 66% found this argument convincing even higher than among those

who opposed NATO expansion. This demonstrates how strongly supporters of expansion are oriented to the value of

inclusiveness.

Traditional arguments in favor of NATO expansion that stressed the Russian threat and the geopolitical competition with

Russia were the most unpopular. The least popular argument was that "Russia is very weak and this creates an opportunity

for NATO to expand into Eastern Europe and consolidate our victory in the Cold War." Only 35% found this argument

convincing, with 61% finding it unconvincing (36% strongly). The argument that "promising to protect Eastern Europeancountries will help NATO deter Russia from ever threatening these countries again" was found convincing by just 45% and

unconvincing by 52% (30% strongly).

The only argument about the Russian threat that did do well was based on the hypothetical situation of Russia reverting to

an aggressive posture. Sixty-three percent found convincing the argument: "If Russia goes back to being aggressive, we will

be in a stronger position if the countries that are close to Russia are on our side rather than Russia's." The phrase "if Russia

goes back to being aggressive" implies that Russia is not aggressive now, and does not state whether the odds that Russia

will return to aggressiveness are high or lowperhaps allowing more of a consensus among those who have differing views

about what those odds might be.


6. A majority would support eventually including Russia in NATO.


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In the focus groups, participants spontaneously brought up the possibility of including Russia in NATO. A Nashville man

interrupted a discussion to ask incredulously: "Are we saying that if Russia wanted to get into NATO, we wouldn't let them

in?" A Baltimore man said, "I say let (Russia) in... Russia is not a threat. Russia is now only an enemy to itself." A Baltimore

woman said, "If you included them in they wouldn't feel so defensive... and it might make them see the light and want to be

peaceful." A Nashville man said, "If they are inside you know more of what's happening. I'd much rather have them in than

out." Opposition to including Russia was relatively rare, but one Nashville man said, "I have a big problem with Russia in

NATO. Are (new NATO members) just going to sit and say, 'Now we've got the fox in the henhouse'?"

In the poll as well, the majority favored including Russia in NATO. As mentioned, when Russia was presented on a listtogether with other countries, 52% favored including Russia, with 40% opposed. Other polls have found even higher

support. In an April 1996 poll by the Fletcher School of Tufts University, 62% said that Russia should be allowed to join

NATO, and a January 1994 CNN/USA Today poll found 54% supporting this position.

This attitude becomes more defined when respondents are given the opportunity to respond to varying time horizons.

Apparently, in the short run many Americans still want to take a wait-and-see approach to including Russia. In response to

a pair of statements about timing, a plurality of 49% chose the one that said, "Given the strength of communist and ultra-

national candidates in Russia's recent elections, Russia remains too unstable for the U.S. yet to admit it to NATO," while

43% opted for the statement that called for including Russia, so as to "encourage Russia to be more peaceful."

However, when a longer time horizon was offered, a strong majority expressed potential support for including Russia. Giventwo options sixty-five percent embraced the position that "Once Russia has shown that it can be stable and peaceful for a

significant period, we should try to include it in NATO. This will help assure that Russia will stay stable and peaceful." Only

29% opted for the argument that Russia should not be included because "There are too many ways that our interests might

come into conflict with Russia in the future and there is always the chance that Russia may go back to being aggressive."


7. Support for NATO expansion is not only derived from immediate concerns about U.S. security, but also from

more global and moral concerns for maintaining a norm against aggression, resolving potential conflicts between


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Eastern European countries, promoting democracy, and fulfilling a moral obligation of assistance to Eastern

European countries.

Respondents who said they favored NATO expansion were asked an open-ended question: "Why do you feel that way?"

Responses were then categorized by three judges working independently. Respondents cited global principles (i.e., oriented

to general concerns, not specific to the U.S.) of collective security far more than traditional security concerns. Forty percent

gave an answer that drew on such global principles, as compared to 12% expressing traditional security concerns. For

example, one respondent said, "If we get everybody in...no country would get aggressive." Similarly, another said, "I think in

case of problems that it's better to have a united group of nations that can oppose the offending force." Others advocatedincluding as many nations as possible: "Everyone should be allowed in," said one respondent. And many specified Russia

should be included as did the respondent who said that NATO should be expanded "without exclusion, including Russia."

The January 1997 Pew poll also asked respondents who said they followed the story of NATO expansion very or fairly

closely and who favored NATO expansion why they felt that way. Similarly, there was a very strong emphasis on the value

of inclusiveness as a means of assuring peace. As reported by Pew, 47% gave answers along the lines of, "The more

countries participate, the more likely it will make world peace/The more countries involved the better it will be." Another

40% simply emphasized the value of inclusiveness giving answers along the lines of, "Everyone should participate/have a

right to express their feelings." Only 9% gave answers addressed to traditional security concerns.

In the PIPA poll arguments in support of NATO expansion that drew on more general principles of collective securityreceived very favorable responses. The second strongest of the ten pro arguments was that "it is important for potential

aggressors to know that they cannot get away with conquering countries," with 69% finding this argument convincing. Sixty-

five percent found convincing the argument that through expansion "NATO will be in a better position to resolve conflicts

between (Eastern European) countries."

This robust support for the principle of collective security is consistent with the findings of a November 1995 PIPA poll. A

question in that study began: "The UN was established on the principle of collective security, which says that when a UN

member is attacked by another country, UN members should help defend the attacked nation." Respondents were then

asked about contributing U.S. troops to UN efforts to reverse aggression after hearing the argument that "American troops

may be put at risk in operations that are not directly related to U.S. interests," as well as the argument that such efforts are

valuable "because then potential aggressors will know that aggression will not succeed." Sixty-nine percent favored

contributing U.S. troops to such operations while 23% were opposed.

Open-ended responses that rationalized NATO expansion based on the potential benefits to U.S. security were the second

largest category but included only 12% of the responses. For example, one respondent said, "We should include more

countries to make NATO more powerful, and to have more allies." Others put it in terms of opposing camps, such as, "It

will help the balance of power help some countries lean to the West," or, "Well, it's either that they are going to follow

someone else or follow U.S." The idea that NATO expansion was important to deal with the Russian threat was rarely

mentioned. Only 10% referred to such a threat at all either explicitly, or by implication.


However, among the pros and cons, arguments in favor of NATO expansion based on traditional security concerns fared

very well. Sixty-six percent found convincing the argument that it would "create a larger, stronger alliance that is better able

to keep the U.S. and Europe secure." Sixty-three percent agreed that "if Russia goes back to being aggressive, we will be

in a stronger position if the countries that are close to Russia are on our side rather than Russia's."

Other normative arguments were also quite popular. Fifty-seven percent found convincing the argument that including

Eastern European countries in NATO will "strengthen democracy and help assure that they will not go back to communism

or dictatorship." And the same number found convincing: "We have a moral obligation to include countries that suffered

under Soviet domination and who we encouraged to break free during the Cold War."

Such responses also came up in the open-ended answers to the question: "Why expand NATO?" Six percent of those who

favored expansion cited moral obligation and 4% reasons based on strengthening democracy. Others identified the

following concerns: enhancing NATO as an organization (3%), burden-sharing on defense (2%), potential economic


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benefits (1%), and the respondent's own Eastern European ancestry (1%).

8. Opposition to NATO expansion arises from a concern that it will impose an excessive burden on the U.S.,

doubts about the stability of Eastern European countries , isolationist feelings, and questions about the

appropriateness of NATO.

Respondents who opposed NATO expansion were also asked in an open-ended question to explain why they felt that

way. There was no dominant type of answer from more than a quarter of this group. However, one of the most common

responses, cited by 21%, was the concern that NATO expansion would result in the U.S. shouldering more than its fairshare of the burden. Some in this group worried that other countries "were not able to con- tribute" and that consequently

"most of the burden would be on the U.S." Others predicted, "We'd end up taking care of them instead of them taking care

of themselves." Some complained that for the U.S. in NATO, "We've got enough on our plate, we don't need to take on

any more."

When con arguments that stressed a concern for the burden on the U.S. were presented to the total sample they elicited

fairly strong support. Fifty- seven percent found convincing the argument that "expanding NATO means increasing the

number of countries the U.S. will have to help defend, thus increasing the burden on the U.S." (unconvincing: 41%). The

same number found convincing the argument that "Eastern European countries are too unstable and have too many

unresolved ethnic disputes. If we bring them into NATO, it will just get us bogged down in their conflicts." (unconvincing:

40%).

Interestingly, the argument that NATO expansion would reduce the burden on the U.S. also did well. Sixty-one percent

found convincing the argument: "Expanding NATO will increase the number of countries that can help in NATO missions

and reduce the burden on the U.S." (Unconvincing: 35%) But when they were asked in a later question to come down on

one side or the other, most respondents assumed that the burden would increase. Asked, "In the long run, would you say

that adding Eastern European countries to NATO will increase or decrease the defense burden on the U.S.?", a very strong

majority70% said they thought that NATO expansion would increase America's defense burden. This suggests that while

Americans are hopeful that the burden may be decreased, they think it is more likely that the opposite will occur. It is

striking that even after being exposed to the argument that the burden will increase and apparently finding it more convincing

than the opposite argument, the majority still


favored expansion. Thus it appears that the appeal of expanding NATO is not derived from expectations of a burden -

sharing "dividend" that would follow NATO expansion. Rather, the values that support expansion tend to override a

skepticism about whether effective burden - sharing will take place.

In the open-ended question, another type of reason that respondents gave for opposing NATO expansion, (offered by

21% of those who opposed it), was related to doubts about the countries of Eastern Europe. These doubts centered on the

stability and level of conflict within and between these countries, concern that their democracies were too new, the feelingthat Eastern European countries were too different culturally and issues related to the communist legacies of these countries.

When "con" arguments were presented that stressed that Eastern European countries were not ready for inclusion in

NATO, significant portions of the total sample found them convincing. As mentioned, 57% found convincing (40%

unconvincing) the argument that Eastern European countries "are just too unstable and have too many unresolved ethnic

conflicts." A lesser 44% also found convincing (52% unconvincing) the argument, "Eastern European countries are not

ready to be part of NATO their economies and democracies are not strong enough, and they cannot really add much to the

alliance."

In the open-ended question, only 18% of those who opposed NATO expansion cited reasons related to isolationism and

expressed a desire to reduce U.S. involvement in the world. (Note: In some cases, it was difficult to distinguish whetherrespondents were actually calling for the U.S. to reduce its involvement in the world, or whether they primarily did not want

to increase the burden on the U.S.) Responses in this category included comments like: "We shouldn't get involved in the

actions of other countries." Some emphasized that problems at home should come first, or that domestic problems might

worsen: "We've got too much internal problems, so we're stretched too thin... if you help someone too much, you get


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he would be comfortable with NATO declaring that it would not put troops or nuclear weapons into Eastern Europe "as

long as Russia maintains a non-aggressor state "words that set heads nodding in the group. He went on to say, "If they hold

to that condition, here's a handshake... I don't know so much that it is a promise, as that it says... 'You're not demonstrating

this behavior, so we are not going to do this, but if that behavior changes, we are free to do this."'

Some respondents, though a minority, expressed comfort with making a commitment in order to reassure Russia. A

Baltimore woman said, "If it means us not adding any troops to those countries, and not putting any nuclear weapons in

those countries, I don't think that's a difficult thing to promise because I don't think you need to."

10. While there is still some cautiousness about Russia as a potential threat in the future, most Americans do

not think that it is inherently aggressive, that its interests necessarily conflict with those of the U.S., or that it

should be viewed as an enemy.

Apparently many Americans still feel some cautiousness about Russia as a potential threat in the future. Asked to rate "how

likely it is that some time in the future Russia will again become a threat to European security", on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0

being "very unlikely" and 10 being "very likely," the average response was 4.89. This outcome is consistent with the May

1996 Time/CNN poll, taken when the Russian election campaign between President Yeltsin and his Communist Party

opponent was attracting attention, in which 52% thought that Russia represented a "very serious" (15%) or "moderately

serious" (37%) threat to the U.S.


Attitudes Toward Russia

As a Threat

Please tell me which one of the following

statements comes closer to your point of

view:

A. Russia is aggressive by nature. It will

just be a matter of time before Russia

regains its strength and tries to use its

military aggressively. 30%

B. Russia is not necessarily aggressive by

nature. If democracy succeeds there, it is

likely that Russia will behave peacefully

toward the West. 66%

Consistent with this cautiousness, most Americans are also not receptive to arguments against NATO expansion based on

the absence of a Russian threat. Only 35% in the PIPA poll found convincing the argument that "NATO was set up mostly

to deal with the Russian threat. Now that the Cold War is over, NATO is outdated, so expanding it does not make sense."

The same number found convincing the argument, "There is no need to expand NATO now, because Russia does not pose

a significant threat now. If they go back to their old ways, we will have plenty of time to act."

At the same time, concern about the Russian threat in the present is fairly low and does not seem to be a significant source

of support for NATO expansion. As discussed above, when those who favored NATO expansion were asked why they

felt that way, only 10% mentioned the Russian threat, and arguments in favor of NATO expansion based on the Russian

threat fared poorly.

Overall, it seems that Americans have a fairly sanguine attitude about Russia. Most do not see Russia as inherently

aggressive. Presented with two statements about Russia, only 30% preferred the statement: "Russia is aggressive by nature.

It will just be a matter of time before Russia regains its strength and tries to use its military aggressively." Instead 66% opted


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for the statement that said, "Russia is not necessarily aggressive by nature. If democracy succeeds there, it is likely that

Russia will behave peacefully toward the West." Similarly, in a May 1996 Time/CNN poll only 23% worried "about the

possibility of nuclear war with Russia" while 76% said they did not.

In the present study, the majority also rejected the argument that Russia's interests necessarily conflict with those of the U.S.

In a pair of statements on including Russia in NATO, only 29% percent embraced the argument that "there are too many

ways that our interests might come into conflict with Russia in the future, and there is always the chance that Russia may go

back to being aggressive." Sixty- five percent embraced, instead, the argument that Russia should be included in NATO

once it has shown that it can be stable and peaceful for a significant period.

Few Americans seem to see Russia as an enemy anymore. In January and March 1994, an NBC/ Wall Street Journal poll

asked, "Do you consider Russia to be an ally of the United States, an adversary, or neither an adversary or an ally?" Only

small minorities considered Russia an adversary (10% in January, 15% in March). "Neither" was strongly preferred (56% in

January, 61 % in March), while a substantial minority said they considered Russia an ally (28% in January, 16% in March).

In a September 1995 Louis Harris poll, only 14% saw Russia as an enemy, while 42% saw Russia as "friendly but not a

close ally," and 37% saw it as "not friendly but not an enemy." In a March 1995 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll, pressed to

characterize Russia as either "more of an ally" or "more of an adversary," just 35% said "adversary" while 56% said "ally."

In May 1996, although worries about the outcome of the Russian presidential election in June were at their height, the view

of Russia as an adversary dipped further to 28%, though the view of Russia as an ally also dipped to 48%.


The experience in 1996 of watching the Russians go through their presidential election may have helped to stabilize the

public's view of Russia. Several polls taken in Mayone month before the electionshowed serious trepidations about the

potential for the Communists being elected. In an American Viewpoint poll, while 75% agreed with the statement that "it is

important for Russia to hold free and fair elections even if it means that a Communist is elected to the presidency," 56%

agreed that, "If a Communist is elected, I am concerned that Russia will again become a threat to the U.S." When

Time/CNN posed the issue in May and again in June; 76% and 72%, respectively, said this outcome would be "very" or

"fairly serious" for the U.S. This seemed to generalize to a wider pessimism: a May NBC/ Wall Street Journal poll foundthat 55% said they thought it very (17%) or somewhat (38%) likely that "Russia will return to communism in the next few

years" (somewhat unlikely, 25%; very unlikely, 12%). But after Boris Yeltsin's reelection, the tone changed rather

abruptly. In a July Washington Post poll, when respondents were asked how much they worried about the possibility that

"the Communists will come back to power in Russia and we'll have the same kind of problems we did during the Cold

War," 73% said they worried about this "just a little" (28%) or "not at all" (45%).

This sanguine attitude toward Russia makes it more difficult for opponents of expansion to maintain arguments based on the

idea that NATO expansion might cause Russia to revert to a more hard-line posture. The argument that said, "Russia

opposes NATO expansion and going ahead anyway could revive Cold War tensions, strengthen Russian hard-liners and

lead Russia to withdraw from some arms control treaties, " was found convincing by only 41 % and unconvincing by 54%.

A November 1995 PIPA poll found that the perception of the decline of a Russian threat has also diminished support for

the current level of U.S. defense spending. Asked to choose between two statements, only 39% chose one that said, "In

Russia there are nationalist politicians calling for a renewal of Russian military power. If they ever come to power, they

could pose a threat to the U.S. There- fore, it is important for the U.S. not to reduce its defense spending." However, 58%

preferred this statement: "Russia has sharply reduced its military and even had problems winning a minor civil war in

Chechnya. If they begin to rebuild their military capabilities, then we will see it in time and respond accordingly, but until

then, the U.S. can reduce its defense spending."

11. Broadly, while the majority wants to preserve NATO, most are supportive of NATO expanding beyond its

function as a military alliance oriented to the Russ ian threat and becoming a more inclusive and diverse security

system.

In the focus groups, many participants made emphatic and sweeping statements about the need to transform NATO. Some

echoed the sentiment of a Baltimore man who said: NATO has to change. It's not an organization against Russia anymore."

Others spoke of the need to "change the meaning of NATO," emphasizing the need to include Russia and, as a Baltimore


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woman said, to make it work "for the whole community of Europe." Several said that NATO was important now primarily

to preserve peace between NATO members themselves. At the same time most did not want to abandon NATO, but

wanted rather to use it as a foundation from which to redefine its functions. For example, a Nashville man said, "Well, I've

always had the impression that maybe NATO's grown outdated, because I felt like I was taught it was to help fight against

communism. If there are some strong allegiances or alliances there, maybe the thing is not to dissolve it but give it a new

vision, a new concept of what it is trying to accomplish. If some of the things that it stood against have gone away, it doesn't

mean you need to destroy something or get rid of it... but you do need to change what the vision or the mission of it is."


Poll findings, when viewed in their totality, suggest that this thinking is consistent with that of the majority of Americans. As

mentioned above, a robust majority of 75% wanted to maintain NATO. A majority of 61% rejected the argument that,

"now that the Cold War is over, NATO is outdated, so expanding it does not make sense."

At the same time, most Americans seem to want NATO to move beyond its role as a military alliance. Perhaps most

dramatically, a strong majority favored including Russia in NATO once it has demonstrated that it is a stable democracy.

This would make NATO more like a collective security system than a traditional alliance. This thinking was also suggested

in the most popular argument against NATO expansion (found convincing by 62%): "In- stead of expanding NATO,

something new should be developed that includes Russia rather than treating Russia as an enemy."

Other findings also point to a collective security orientation. As mentioned, when those who said they favored NATO

expansion were asked why they felt that way, by far the most common type of answer, given by 40%, was based on global

principles of collective security. A very strong 69% found convincing the argument that "NATO should commit to defending

Eastern European countries because it is important for potential aggressors to know that they cannot get away with

conquering other countries." There was strong support, discussed below, for having NATO deal with conflicts between

NATO members in addition to threats from outside. Also, 65% found convincing the argument: that "If Eastern Europeancountries are included in NATO, NATO will be in a better position to resolve conflicts between those countries."

Ideas for diversifying the functions of NATO (some of which are already in the process of implementation) drew fairly

strong support. When asked to evaluate a number of possible new missions for NATO respondents gave all of them

positive ratings. Asked to rate these possible missions for NATO on a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 being "not at all the right kind

of thing for NATO to do" and 10 being "very much the right kind," all of the missions received a mean score above 5. They

were:

Dealing with threats to NATO countries such as the threat of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass

destruction (mean score 7.39)

Dealing with aggression and instability outside of Europe, such as in the Gulf War (mean score 6.10)

Intervening in conflicts between NATO members (mean score 5.84)


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Doing peacekeeping to deal with border disputes and ethnic conflicts in the areas surrounding NATO (mean score

5.44).


The January 1997 Pew poll also explored the issue of expanding the functions of NATO, by asking whether "NATO

forces, including U.S. troops" should be used in a variety of new missions. Four of the five mentioned received modest

majority support and one received support from a plurality. Fifty-six percent favored using NATO forces for "peacekeepingin case of conflicts between NATO member countries," 54% for "peacekeeping in countries bordering NATO member

countries, such as Bosnia," 51% "to combat international drugtrafficking," 51% "to combat international terrorism," and

49% "to defend Western interests outside Eu- rope such as in the Persian Gulf." Opposition to these ideas ranged from 34-

39%, with 1-13% saying "don't know."

There is also some evidence that Americans are becoming increasingly comfortable with NATO participation in

peacekeeping operations. The Fletcher School poll in April 1996 asked, "If the U.S. were to become involved in a peace-

keeping mission, would you prefer that the U.S. become a partner with NATO or the United Nations?" Forty-two percent

preferred NATO, 37% preferred the UN, and 20% were undecided. In contrast, back in April 1994when the Bosnia war

was in progress and the UN was the only international force on the ground therePIPA asked about a hypothetical

peacekeeping force, including some U.S. troops, that might be established in Bosnia to police an agreement. At that time,

just 25% preferred that it be under NATO command, 39% preferred that such a force be under UN command, and 29%

said it would not matter much to them.

Conclusion

This study suggests that a majority of Americans is inclined to support expanding NATO to include Eastern European

countries. But will this be sustained in the debate that may ensue leading up to ratification of such a decision? Some

Americans are concerned about the costs that may be incurred in terms of money, risking American lives, and the potential

for a confrontation that could lead to a larger war, possibly even with nuclear weapons. Most Americans think that, on

balance, NATO expansion will increase rather than decrease the burden on the U.S., and numerous polls have shown thatAmericans feel they are already bearing a disproportionate burden in efforts to uphold world order. What is the potential for

these feelings swamping the basic support for NATO expansion?

Various findings of this study suggest that the key variable for the public is likely to be how it perceives the meaning

attached to NATO expansion. If Americans perceive it as consistent with deeply held values, then support for it will likely

continue to hold sway over the doubts and disgruntlements about the U.S. burden. However, if they perceive the push for

NATO expansion as unfolding from values that are not compelling, there is a significant possibility that the bulwark of

support will be eroded or even washed away entirely.

When the public engages with an issue, they often respond to it as a kind of story that plays on particular themes and values.

As in the classic Japanese filmRashomon, in which the same event is portrayed in highly different ways depending on theperspectives of different characters, the prospect of NATO expansion can be portrayed in different


ways - as different stories. Overall, it seems that there are two primary stories - one based on the theme of Western triumph

over communism, the other based on the theme of including new countries in a collective security system.

The triumphalist story portrays NATO expansion in the context of the Cold War. The primary value is the struggle of the

free and democratic West against communist Russia, with Eastern Europe as a key battleground. With the demise of the

Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the West is seen as the victor in the Cold War. NATO expansion is seen as the logical

climax of this victory and as a necessary prophylactic against a potential resurgence of Russia, which is seen as intrinsically

threatening because of its size or its authoritarian culture. This triumphalist perspective was clearly expressed in the 1996

Republican Party platform that called for NATO expansion as part of an effort to "consolidate our Cold War victory in


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Europe."

Another story emphasizes that NATO expansion is one way among several to include countries in a European security

system based on principles of collective security. The Cold War, rather than being the central drama, is seen as an

aberration or detour in an effort to build a collective security system that goes back to the Atlantic Charter and the founding

of the United Nations. With the end of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, it is now seen as possible to include these

countries in such a system. Russia is not seen as intrinsically threatening. The goal is to include more and more countries in a

growing web of cooperative security enhanced by increasing communication and trade.

Much of the official NATO language that is used to describe the new "European Security Architecture" plays on these

themes, which are also the basis for the Partnership for Peace. For example, the communique of the most recent NATO

ministerial meeting states that, "the evolution of the Alliance takes place in the context of our aim to help build a truly

cooperative European security structure," which extends to "countries throughout the whole of Europe without excluding

anyone or creating dividing lines," and to which "Russia has an essential contribution to make."

Between these two stories, the findings of this study suggest unequivocally that Americans respond more warmly to the

latter. Among the arguments in favor of NATO expansion, the most popular ones were based on the value of inclusiveness,

while the least popular one called for "consolidating the victory of the Cold War." A core value sustaining support for

NATO expansion was the principle that nations should help defend each other against aggression from any source. While

the majority felt that NATO should be maintained in part to guard against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, Russia wasseen not as intrinsically threatening but rather as a potential member of a collective security system. Indeed, including Russia

was seen as a way to reduce the potential for Russian aggression. The biggest doubt about NATO expansion was that it

might exclude Russia. There was a willingness to pace NATO expansion in a way that would seek to reassure Russia and a

rejection of the concern that doing so would be a capitulation to Russia.

NATO expansion is politically complex because it lends itself to either a triumphalist or inclusive framework. It will be

tempting for some policymakers to try to drum up support for NATO expansion by playing on collective pride stressing the

expansion of American power and prestige as the climax of a heroic struggle. While some Americans may be stirred by

such themes, more will hear them as code words for imperial over- stretch and an expanded burden for the U.S. In building

political support, it is common practice to try to appeal to various constituencies simultaneously by using the language that

appeals to each.

However, the findings of this study suggest that an effort to play on triumphal themes, while ap- pealing to some, is likely to

backfire with the majority. Rationales, though, based on (in NATO's words) "new forms of cooperative security" are likely

to draw wider and deeper support, particularly as the value of inclusiveness becomes linked to the potential for greater

burden-sharing in the future.

AMERICANS ON NATO EXPANSION - PAGE A-1

APPENDIX ADEMOGRAPHIC VARIATIONS

In analyzing the variations in responses between various demographic groups, what is most striking overall is how little

variation there was between them. Every demographic group favored the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. The

question then is not who supports expansion, but how this support varies in level and nature among groups. People in

different demographic groups were most likely to vary in their views of what NATO'S mission should be in the future, their

perception of Russia, and the amount they had heard about NATO expansion.

Age

There was no difference in support for expansion among the different age groups. However, the older people were, themore information they reported having heard about NATO expanding into Eastern Europe. Only 25% of individuals over

age 65 said they had heard nothing about it, while 54% of individuals between 18 and 29 years of age said they had heard

nothing about it.


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the argument that we should not defend Eastern European countries because it might mean risking the lives of American

soldiers, while just 45% of whites found this same argument convincing.

Education

More educated respondents showed relatively higher levels of support for NATO expansion. While 70% of those with post

graduate degrees favored NATO expansion, only 55% of those with a high school education or less favored expansion,

with those who have intermediate levels of education falling in between. Those with more education also tended to favor

particular countries for admission into NATO more than those with less. The Czech Republic, the Baltic Republics,Slovakia, and Slovenia all had higher support among those with more education.

Not suprisingly, people's awareness of the discussion of NATO expanding to include Eastern European countries also

increases steadily with their educational attainment. For example, 55% of respondents who have some post graduate

education said they have heard "some" or "a great deal" about NATO expansion with only 14% of those who are not high

school graduates saying they have heard "some" or "a great deal".

Those with more education were less likely to see Russia as a threat. Those with a college degree or higher saw Russia as

less likely to threaten Europe (4.1 of ten vs. 5.3 for high school or less). They were also more likely to see Russia as not

inherently aggressive (77% versus 51% for high school or less).

Those with higher levels of education were more positive about NATO expanding its mission. Those with a college or

advanced degree rated the mission of dealing with the threat of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction 7.9 on a scale of zero to ten, compared to 6.6 for those with a high school education or less. They

AMERICANS ON NATO EXPANSION - PAGE A-3

also endorsed expanding NATO'S mission to include intervening in conflicts between NATO members. Respondents with a

college degree or greater education rated the appropriateness of this mission as 6.4, but those without a college degree

rated it as 5.2.

Less educated respondents were significantly more responsive to arguments against NATO expansion based on the risks

involved.

While 55% of those with a high school education or less found convincing the argument that NATO should not expand into

Eastern Europe because it might mean risking the lives of American soldiers, only 34% of respondents with an advanced

degree found it convincing. Other educational groups fell between these two extremes. This was also the case with the

argument that expansion might lead to a nuclear war with Russia. The individuals who had more than a high school

education rated this argument convincing 39% of the time, while those with a high school diploma or lower rated it

convincing 58% of the time.

Less educated respondents were also more responsive to the con argument that expansion would leave countries not

included more vulnerable to Russian pressure. Thirty-nine percent of people with an advanced degree found the argument

convincing, 42% of those with at least some college said it was convincing, while for the lowest educational group 52%

found it convincing.

Income

Different income groups showed few differences that were not due to the association between income and education. The

exception is a difference in attitudes on possible future missions of NATO. Individuals with higher incomes rated dealing

with aggression and instability outside of Europe more positively than those in lower income brackets. Those making

$70,000 or more rated this mission 6.3 of 10.0, while those making less than $45,000 rated its appropriateness as 5.5.Those with higher incomes also rated dealing with threats to NATO countries such as terrorism and the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction as a more desirable mission than those with less income. While those making $45,000 or less

gave this mission an average rating of 6.4, those making $70,000 or more were even more positive, rating it 7.8.


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