america’s electoral future

8/20/2019 America’s Electoral Future

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America’s Electoral FutureHow Changing Demographics Could Impact Presidential

Elections from 2016 to 2032

By William H. Frey, Ruy Teixeira, and Robert Griffin February 2016


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America’s Electoral FutureHow Changing Demographics Could Impact

Presidential Elections from 2016 to 2032

By William H. Frey, Ruy Teixeira, and Robert Griffin February 2016


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1 Introduction and summary

4 Glossary

5 The national popular vote

17 The states and projected electoral college votes

38 Conclusion

39 Methodology

42 Appendix A

60 Appendix B

69 About the authors

71 Endnotes

Contents


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1 Center for American Progress | American Enterprise Institute | Brookings Institution | America’s Electoral Future

Introduction and summary

Resuls rom he pas wo presidenial elecions provide evidence ha he chang-

ing demography o he elecoraewih is increased racial diversiycan affec

elecion oucomes in ways ha could no have been anicipaed even a decade

ago. A solid case can be made ha he naion’s racial minoriy populaions pu

Presiden Barack Obama over he op in boh 2008 and 2012.1 Bu racial diversiy

is no he only demographic change ha may have an effec on uure presiden-

ial elecions. In addiion o greaer diversiywhich is primarily affecing he

younger par o he elecoraehe older par o he voing populaion is growingmore rapidly as he huge Baby Boom generaion ages.

Tese demographic shifsoward boh a more racially diverse younger elecorae

and a larger older elecoraecerainly should change he playing field in erms o

how he Democraic and Republican paries, as well as heir candidaes, appeal o

hese shifing voing blocs, which ofen have differen ineress.2 And he pace o

demographic change varies across geography, wih some as-growing saes such as

Arizona, exas, and Florida seeing he effecs o he naion’s rising diversiy much

more sharply han ohers. Ye even slow growing saes such as Ohio, Pennsylvania,

and Michigan will experience significan rising diversiy in he coming years and,

imporanly, an aging o heir elecoraes driven by large coningens o Baby Boom

residens. Tese sae-level demographic changes will leave srong imprins on he

voing populaions capured by he all-imporan Elecoral College, orcing paries

and candidaes o recalibrae heir sraegies or success.

Tis repor explores how hese demographic changes could shape he elecorae,

as well as poenial oucomes in he nex five presidenial elecions using naional

and sae demographic projecions produced by he Saes o Change projec. In

a 2015 repor and ineracive,3

his projec presened a ime series o long-ermprojecions o race and age profiles or he populaions and eligible elecoraes o

all 50 saes o 2060. Tis repor ocuses on wha hose projecions imply or he

presidenial elecions o 2016, 2020, 2024, 2028, and 2032.


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O course, shaping hese oucomes is no he same as deermining hem. While

he orce o demography is imporan, elecion resuls also depend on economic

condiions, candidaes, and he exen o which hose candidaes are able o

generae enhusiasm ha can be measured in voer urnou and candidae preer-

ence. Te analyses presened here build alernaive scenarios or he elecion years

menioned above. Each scenario assumes he same projeced demography o

eligible voers, or EVs, or ha year bu makes differen assumpions abou voer

urnou and candidae preerence.

Tis repor considers six main scenarios. Scenario A, here called he 2012

Forward scenario, assumes ha or each age, race, and sae group, voer urnou

raes and Democraic/Republican candidae preerences in 2012 will coninue or

EV populaions ha are projeced ino he uure. Scenario B, he 2008 Forward

scenario, assumes ha he even more Democra-avorable urnou and candidae

preerence raes by age, race, and sae group o he 2008 elecion will apply o

uure EV populaions. Scenario C, he 2004 Forward scenario, assumes ha herelaively Republican-avorable 2004 urnou raes and candidae preerences by

age, race, and sae will obain among uure EVs.

The States of Change: Demographics and Democracy project is a collaboration sup-

ported by The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation that brings together the Center

for American Progress, the American Enterprise Institute, and demographer William H.

Frey of the Brookings Institution. The views expressed in this and other States of Change

reports are those of the authors and not the institutions sponsoring the project.

The project’s goals are:

• To document and analyze the challenges to democracy posed by the rapid demo-

graphic evolution from the 1970s to 2060

• To project the race-ethnic composition of every state to 2060, which has not been

done for 20 years

• To promote a wide-ranging and bipartisan discussion of America’s demographic

future and what it portends for the nation’s political parties and public policy


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Scenario D is he Maximum Minoriy urnou scenario. Like scenario A, i

assumes ha he candidae preerences o voers will ollow hose o 2012. Bu

unlike A, i assumes ha he urnou o Hispanics, Asians, and oher races by age

rises o he urnou level o whies by age in every sae. 4 Arican American urn-

ou is no adjused since i was slighly higher han whie urnou in 2012. Tis

simulaion shows he likely oucomes ha would resul i effors o encourage heurnou o newer minoriiesHispanics, Asians, and oher nonblack minori-

iesare exremely successul.

Scenarios E and F adjus scenario A o assume greaer Republican voer preer-

ences or differen groups. Scenario E, he High GOP Hispanic/Asian Suppor

scenario, assumes ha Republican suppor rom voers o each nonblack or new

minoriy groupHispanics, Asians, and hose o oher raceswill increase by

7.5 percenage poins or all age caegories o hose groups in every sae. Noe

ha raising he suppor rae or Republicans by 7.5 poins among new minoriies

reduces he Democras’ suppor rae among hese groups by he same amoun,hereby improving he margin or Republicans by 15 poins in oal.

Scenario F, he More GOP Whie Suppor scenario, changes he voing preer-

ences o he whie elecorae, adjusing scenario A in order o increase he level

o Republican suppor rom whie voers o all age caegories in every sae by 5

poinshereby raising he GOP margin among all caegories o whie voers

by 10 poins.

Noably, hese are simulaionsno predicions. For example, when running he

2016 elecion simulaion as i voer urnou and preerences were he same as in

2012scenario Ahe auhors are no expressing he belie ha his is a likely

even. Te goal o his repor is o display he poenial poliical effecs o demo-

graphic change. As such, he resuls his repor presens offer a range o oucomes

ha can be expeced under differen assumpions as he naion’s demography

changes, bu hey are no predicions abou acual uure evens.


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Glossary

Turnout rate: Tis value is he percen o eligible voers in a group who voed dur-

ing a given presidenial elecion.

Support rate: Among hose who voed, his value is he percen ha voed or a

candidae o a given poliical pary.

Vote margin: Tis value is he difference beween he percenage o Democraic

suppor and Republican suppor in a given group. Posiive values indicae moreDemocraic suppor han Republican, and negaive values indicae he opposie.

I is way o summarizing he advanage or disadvanage paries have relaive o

one anoher.

Turnout rates Support rates

Scenario A 2012 turnout 2012 support

Scenario B 2008 turnout 2008 support

Scenario C 2004 turnout 2004 support

Scenario D

2012 turnout for whites and blacks.

Hispanic, Asian, and other turnout

equal to whites

2012 support

Scenario E 2012 turnout

2012 support for whites and blacks.

15-point pro-Republican swing from

2012 support for Hispanics, Asians, and

others.

Scenario F 2012 turnout

2012 support for minorities.

10-point pro-Republican swing from

2012 support for whites


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The national popular vote

o underpin hese simulaions, we firs look a he naional popular voe in he

pas our presidenial elecions o see how boh high and low urnou and differ-

ing candidae preerences ineraced wih demographic orces o elec Presiden

George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 and Presiden Obama in 2008 and 2012. Te

more racially diverse elecorae clearly helped Presiden Obama, bu srong enhu-

siasm among racial minoriiesin erms o boh urnou and preerencealso

helped his cause.

Overview of the national popular vote in the last four presidential

elections: 2000–2012

Te las our presidenial elecions produced wo Republican winsor Presiden

Bush in 2000 and 2004and wo Democraic winsor Presiden Obama in

2008 and 2012. Te 2000 elecion was so close, however, ha Democraic candi-

dae and ormer Vice Presiden Al Gore acually won he popular voe by a hin

margin, even hough he los he Elecoral College.

able 1 underscores he dominan role ha he combined racial minoriy voe

played in elecing Presiden Obama by comparing his 2008 and 2012 vicories

wih Presiden Bush’s 2004 vicory. In 2004, minoriies regisered a Democraic

ne voe advanage o 12.9 million voes, which was overwhelmed by he whie

Republican ne voe advanage o 16 million. Tis changed in he nex wo elec-

ions. In 2008 minoriies delivered a ne Democraic advanage o 21.2 million

voes o couner he whie ne Republican voe advanage o 11.7 million. Te

minoriy Democraic ne voe advanage increased o 23.5 million in 2012again

besing he whie Republican advanage o 18.6 million.5


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Srong parisan voe advanages among whies and minoriies are no new.6 Whies

have voed Republican in every presidenial elecion since 1968; blacks have voedDemocraic in every presidenial elecion since he second erm o Franklin Delano

Roosevel in 1936and especially srongly afer 1960. Hispanics also are shown

o be srongly Democraic as ar back as daa are available, hough heir level o sup-

por is no as high as ha o blacks. Asians’ leanings have been less consisen, wih

his demographic group only voing Democraic since 2000. Bu overall whie-

minoriy disincions in Republican and Democraic preerences have been clearly

imporan o elecion resuls or quie a while. Tis being he case, i would ollow

ha he aser growh o minoriy populaions compared wih whiesboh in he

general populaion and he eligible voer populaionhas helped Democras win

recen elecions, paricularly hose o Presiden Obama.

As a share o al l EVs, whies sill dominaed in 2012 bu less so han in 2000,

shrinking o 71 percen rom 77 percen. (see Figure 1) Ye changing demo-

graphics are no he whole sory behind Presiden Obama’s winswo oher

acors were criical as well. One o hese was he increased voing urnou o

minoriy EVs. (see Figure 2) Black voer urnou was higher in boh 2008 and

2012 han in any oher presidenial elecion since he U.S. Bureau o he Census

firs colleced saisics in 1968. Black voer urnou also besed voer urnou

among whies or he firs ime ever in 2012.7

And while much lower han blackurnou, Hispanic and Asian voer urnou in hese wo elecions was higher

han in any elecion since 1992. Tis helped drive he minoriy share o acual

voers o 24 percen and 26 percen in 2008 and 2012, respecively, up rom 19

percen in 2000 and 21 percen in 2004.8

TABLE 1

Net popular vote differences

2000 2004 2008 2012

Whites* -10,361 -16,008 -11,676 -18,555

Minorities* 10,908 12,996 21,225 23,540

Democratic vote margin* 547 -3,012 9,549 4,985

(Percent) 0.5 -2.5 7.3 3.9

Winning candidate George W. Bush (R) George W. Bush (R) Barack Obama (D) Barack Obama (D)

Losing candidate Al Gore (D) John Kerry (D) John McCain (R) Mitt Romney (R)

Notes: * Indicates votes for Democratic candidate minus votes for Republican candidate, in 1000s.

Source: William H. Frey, “Diversity Explosion: How New Racial Demographics are Remaking America” (Washington: Brookings I nstitution Press,

2015), based on analysis of national popular votes reported in David Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, “Election Information,” availableat http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (last accessed January 2016), and margins reported by Roper Center at Cornell University, “NationalElelction Day Exit Polls,” available at http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/polls/us-elections/exit-polls/.


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Te second acor ha amplified he influence o minoriy groups on Presiden

Obama’s wo vicories was he voing preerence among minoriies who did voe,9

expressed in Figure 3 as Democraic minus Republican, or D-R, marginsin

oher words, he percen voing Democra minus he percen voing Republican.

Among minoriies, D-R margins were accenuaed in he las wo elecions. Te

2008 and 2012 D-R margins or blacks were he highes in 40 years, according ohisoric exi polls.10 A he same ime, he 2012 whie D-R marginwhich avored

Republicanswas he larges since 1984 when Ronald Reagan ran agains Waler

Mondale. Bu he combinaion o a higher share o eligible minoriy voers, a

greaer voer urnou among hese EVs, and srong D-R voing margins among

minoriies was able o help provide Democraic vicories in boh 2008 and 2012.

FIGURE 1

Racial composition of eligible voters, 2000–2012

Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the AmericanElectorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/pro-

gressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.

2000 2004 2008 2012 2016

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Other

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Total minority

All voters

FIGURE 2

Presidential turnout rate among eligible voters by race, 2000–2012

Source: Estimates based on authors' analysis of the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S.Department of Commerce, 2000–2012), available at https://cps.ipums.org/cps/.

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian

2000 2004 2008 201240%

50%

60%

70%


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While racial shifs and voing dynamics end o ge he mos atenion, he generalaging o he elecorae and he rise o new generaions have also influenced voing

resuls. Figure 4 shows ha as he Baby Boom generaion has aged, he wo older

age caegories combined45 o 64 and 65 and olderincreased heir share o

he elecorae rom 48 percen o 53 percen beween 2000 and 2012. Te ac ha

members o hese groups urn ou o voe a markedly higher raes han younger

members o he elecorae has enhanced heir influence urher. (see Figure 5)

FIGURE 3

Presidential vote margins by race, 2000–2012

Note: Values displayed are the difference between the percent of a group that voted for the democratic candidate and the percent that

voted for the republican candidate in a given year. Positive values indicate that the group voted more democratic than republican whilenegative values indicate the oppisite.

Source: See Appendix B.

2000 2004 2008 2012

White

Black

HispanicAsian

All Voters0%

20%

-20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

65+

45–64

FIGURE 4

Age composition of eligible voters, 2000–2012

Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the AmericanElectorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/pro-gressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change/.

15%

2000 2004 2008 2012

20%

25%

30%

35%


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Age-relaed preerences or Democras and Republicans have shown less consis-

ency over ime as differen generaions move ino new age caegories.11 Ye a clearpatern has emerged over he pas wo presidenial elecions in which younger age

groups are more prone o voe Democraic and older age groupsespecially seniors

age 65 and olderare more prone o voe Republican. For he near erm, here is a

racial dimension o hese wo rends in ha heavily Democraic-voing minoriies

represen a much larger share o he younger populaion han o seniors, whereas

Republican-voing whies represen a much larger share o he senior popula-

ion. However, i should be noed ha younger whies are also less prone o voe

Republican han older whies, a endency hawhile accenuaed by he atracive-

ness o Presiden Obama as a candidaeundamenally reflecs differen genera-

ional views abou social issues and he role o governmen in domesic affairs.12

65+

45–64

30–44

18–29

FIGURE 5

Presidential turnout rate among eligible voters by age, 2000–2012

Source: Estimates based on authors' analysis of the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S.Department of Commerce, 2000–2012), available at https://cps.ipums.org/cps/.

2000 2004 2008 2012

25%

50%

75%

All voters

65+

45–64

30–44

18–29

FIGURE 6

Presidential vote margins by age, 2000–2012


2000 2004 2008 2012

0%

-20%

20%

40%

All voters


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Clearly, he las our presidenial elecions have seen an elecorae ha has

become more diverse, especially among younger age groups, wih he rise o a

new generaion o voers andacing as somewha o a counerorcea rise

in he number o older poenial voers. Bu, o course, Democraic vicories in

2008 and 2012 were no he producs o demographic shifs alone. Voer urn-

ou and candidae preerence among hese demographic groups matered jus asmuch, i no more, in hese elecions.13

Alternative outcomes in the national popular vote: 2016, 2020,

2024, 2028, and 2032

Te long-erm effec o demographic change is imporan, even when urnou

raes and demographic groups’ candidae suppor vary over ime. Te chang-

ing demography o he naional eligible elecorae over he nex five presidenial

elecions by race and age, based on projecions produced by he Saes o Changeprojec, is shown in Figures 7 and 8.

FIGURE 7



gressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change.

2016 2020 2024 2028 2032

White

Black

Hispanic

Asian

Other

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Total minority


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Te racial composiion o he eligible elecorae should shif dramaically over henex five presidenial elecions. Tis is due no only o he rapid growh o newer

minoriies, Hispanics, and Asians compared wih whies bu also he coming o

age o younger members o hese racial groups as hey urn 18 and become eligible

o voe. Tus he combined minoriy populaion should represen 31 percen o

eligible voers in 2016compared wih 23 percen in 2000and rise o 40 per-

cen by 2032. Also noable is he projeced rise in he Hispanic porion o minor-

iy EVs. Hispanic EVs should ounumber black EVs by 2016 and should seadily

widen heir margin hrough 2032, when Hispanics should comprise 18 percen o

EVs compared wih 12.5 percen or blacksnearly a 50 percen advanage. Over

he same period, Asians and oher races should increase heir share o EVs rom 7

percen o 10 percen.

Te age srucure o he elecorae should also change as he Baby Boom genera-

ion grows older. Te mos marked shif is he projeced rise in he age 65 and older

porion o he elecorae as he shares o young and middle-aged aduls become

smaller. Back in 2000, seniors represened 17.5 percen o EVs. Tis should rise o

21 percen by 2016 and o more han 25 percen by 2032, shares ha will likely

be magnified in he populaion ha urns ou o voe. In conras, 18-o-29-year-

oldshe prime age o oday’s Millennialsas well as hose aged 30 o 44 and 45o 64 will hold modesly shrinking shares o he eligible elecorae over ime.

2016 2020 2024 2028 2032

FIGURE 8

Age composition of eligible voters, 2016–2032


gressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change.

20%

25%

30%

35%

65+

45–64


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As hey are now, seniors will coninue o be whier han younger age groups over his

period. However, due o he more diverse naure o he generaions aging ino heir

senior years, whie senior EVs as a share o all EVs will rise by only a single percen-

age poinrom 16 percen o 17 percenover he 2016 o 2032 ime period.

Looking o he uure, a quesion can be raised: How much will hese demographicshifs by hemselves affec naional popular voe oucomes under a variey o differ-

en voer urnou and candidae preerence circumsances? o provide an answer,

he auhors perormed a number o differen simulaions, each o which assume

ha he naion’s underlying EV demography will change according o race and age

projecions in every sae. Te simulaions differ only in wha voer urnou and

Democraic/Republican preerences are assumed or race and age groups in he

various saes. Te resuls, aggregaed o he naional level, are displayed in Figures

9 and 10. We perormed dozens o differen simulaions, bu he repor only covers

six in deail; hese six illusrae paricularly well he possible inerplay beween

ongoing demographic change and shifs in urnou and candidae preerence.

Scenario A, here called he 2012 Forward scenario, assumes ha, or each age, race,

and sae group, voer urnou raes and Democraic/Republican candidae preer-

ences in 2012 will coninue or EV populaions ha are projeced ino he uure.

Scenario B, he 2008 Forward scenario, assumes ha he even more Democra-

avorable urnou and candidae preerence raes by age, race, and sae group o he

2008 elecion will apply o uure EV populaions. Scenario C, he 2004 Forward

scenario, assumes ha he relaively Republican-avorable 2004 urnou raes and

candidae preerences by age, race, and sae will obain among uure EVs.

While he previous hree scenarios projec ahead he race- and age-specific urn-

ou raes and pary/candidae preerences by sae observed in earlier elecions,

hree addiional projecions make new modificaions o scenario A ha change

assumpions abou eiher urnou raes or pary/candidae preerences.

Scenario D is he Maximum Minoriy urnou scenario. Like scenario A, i

assumes ha he candidae preerence o voers will ollow hose o 2012. Bu

unlike A, i assumes ha he urnou o Hispanics, Asians, and oher races by age

rises o he urnou level o whies by age in every sae.14

Black urnou is noadjused since, as discussed above, i was slighly higher han whie urnou in

2012. Tis simulaion shows he likely oucomes ha would resul i effors o

encourage he urnou o newer minoriiesHispanics, Asians, and oher non-

black minoriiesare exremely successul.


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Scenarios E and F adjus scenario A o assume greaer Republican voer preer-

ences or differen groups. Scenario E, he High GOP Hispanic/Asian Suppor

scenario, assumes ha Republican suppor rom voers o each nonblack or new

minoriy groupHispanics, Asians, and hose o oher raceswill increase by

7.5 percenage poins or all age caegories o hose groups in every sae. Noe

ha raising he suppor rae or Republicans by 7.5 poins among new minoriiesreduces he Democras’ suppor rae among hese groups by he same amoun,

hereby improving he margin or Republicans by 15 poins in oal.

Using he naional resuls rom 2012 as a simplified example, scenario E would be

equivalen o assuming ha Lainos, raher han voing 71 percen o 27 percen in

avor o Democras as hey did in 2012a 44-poin marginwould have insead

voed 63.5 percen o 34.5 percen, a margin o jus 29 poins, or 15 poins lower.

Tis scenario, projeced ino he uure, is mean o show how a greaer appeal o

Republicans o minoriies migh affec elecion oucomes.

Scenario F, he More GOP W hie Suppor scenario, changes he voing pre-

erences o he whie elecorae, adjusing scenario A o increase he level o

Republican suppor rom whie voers o all age caegories in every sae by 5

poinshereby raising he GOP margin among all caegories o whie voers by

10 poins. Using he 2012 naional resuls again as a simple example, his is equiva-

len o assuming ha whies, who voed Republican by 18 poins in 20121558

percen o 40 percenwould have voed Republican by 28 poins, or 63 percen

o 35 percen. Noe ha his margin is almos exacly he same as Ronald Reagan’s

advanage among whies in his hisoric landslide vicory in 1984.16

Tis scenario implicily amplifies he influence o older whies as he large

mosly whie Baby Boomers move ino older age groups where Republican sup-

por was already srong in 2012. Alhough his scenario coninues o mainain

he srong urnou and Democraic suppor rom minoriies ha Presiden

Obama obained in 2012, i can be hough o as a bes case Republican scenario

given he greaer Republican suppor i assumes among he sil l very large whie

segmen o he elecorae.

2016 national popular vote scenarios

O mos immediae ineres is how he differen scenarios play ou or he 2016

elecion. As migh be expeced, scenarios A and Bwhich atribue urnou and

candidae-suppor measures rom 2012 and 2008 o an elecorae wih demo-


17/75


graphic atribues ha should be even more avorable o Democrasyields even

higher D-R margins or 2016, 4.8 percenage poins in he 2012 Forward scenario

and 8.6 poins in he 2008 Forward scenario, han seen back in he 2012 and 2008

elecions, 3.9 poins and 7.3 percen poins, respecively.

Resuls rom scenario C, he more Republican-avorable 2004 Forward scenario,

are quie differen. Here, when 2004 urnou and candidae-suppor measures

are applied o 2016 demographics, here is only a very small Democraic win

in he naional popular voea D-R margin o 0.1 percenage poins. Tis is

an even smaller margin o vicory han in 2000, when Democraic presidenial

candidae Al Gore won he naional popular voe bu los in he Elecoral College.

(Ineresingly, here oo he Democras see a sligh Elecoral College loss, despie

heir popular voe win. Tis is discussed in he nex secion.) Tus, he projeced

change in he demography o he elecorae or 2016 would no yield he solid

popular voe Republican win ha Presiden George W. Bush enjoyed in 2004

despie maching his urnou and suppor numbers rom ha year.

Scenario D, he Maximum Minoriy urnou scenario, yields a 2016 D-R mar-

gin6.1 percenage poinsha is predicably larger han he 2012 Forwardscenario. Tis is because, in his scenario, more Hispanics, Asians, and oher

nonblack minoriies urn ou o voe. Ye he 2016 oucome rom his scenario

sill yields a smaller D-R margin han scenario B, essenially he Democraic bes

case, which assumes lower whie Republican candidae suppor, as well as oher

atribues rom 2008.

Democratic

Scenario D Scenario E Scenario FScenario CScenario BScenario A

+6.1 +2.5 -2.4+0.1+8.6+4.8

40%

45%

50%

55%

Note: Values displayed are percent of the national vote each party would be expected to receive under a given scenario.


Republican

FIGURE 9

National support levels by simulation, 2016


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Scenario E, he High GOP Hispanic/Asian Suppor scenario, shaves he 2012

Forward scenario margin subsanially bu sill leaves he Democras wih a

2.5-poin margin in he popular voe. Tus, a considerable rise in new minoriy

Republican suppor does no eliminae a projeced Democraic advanage in he

popular voe under 2012 Forward condiions. Even winning he projeced 7.5-

poin increase in GOP new minoriy suppor wih an equal increase in black GOPsuppor does no produce a GOP win in he naional popular voe, hough he

defici is significanly smaller a 0.5 percenage poins. I should be noed, how-

ever, ha his scenario is no shown.

In scenario F, he More GOP Whie Suppor scenario, he sory is differen. Here,

a srong increase in Republican suppor among whie voers gives Republicans

a projeced popular voe advanage o 2.5 poins or 2016, even i oher 2012

atribues hold. I is he only one o he six scenarios summarized above ha

produces a GOP popular voe vicory or 2016. I is worh noing ha a scenario

where GOP whie suppor increases 4 poins raher han 5 poins also produces aRepublican popular voe advanage, albei a very narrow one.

Noe also ha i he projeced increases in GOP whie suppor and Hispanic/

Asian suppor in he six scenarios are deemed unrealisic, i is possible o combine

more modes increases in Republican suppor among hese groups o produce

hybrid scenarios wih more avorable oucomes or ha pary. For example, i a

projeced increase in GOP whie suppor o 3 poins is combined wih an increase

o 5 poins in Hispanic, Asian, and oher race suppor, he resul is a narrow GOP

win o 1.1 poins in he naional popular voe.

National popular vote scenarios: 2020–2032

Te six basic scenarios also are used o projec our subsequen presidenial elec-

ions2020, 2024, 2028, and 2032. Since Democras regisered popular voe

advanages in he A, B, C, D, and E scenarios in 2016, i should be no surprise ha

hey do so or hese laer years as well. In hese projecions, Democras achieve

even greaer margins in each subsequen elecion as he projeced demographic

makeup o he eligible elecorae coninues o shif in a direcion generally avor-able o Democras.


19/75


I is useul o look more closely a scenario C, which moves orward he urnouand voing preerences ha re-eleced Presiden George W. Bush in 2004. Tis

scenario yields Democraic popular voe wins in each o hese our presidenial

elecions, wih increasing D-R margins ranging rom 1.0 percen in 2020 o 3.4

percen in 2032. Tus, even when assuming he Republican-avorable urnou

and preerence paterns o 2004he relaively high voer urnou or whies and

relaively low voer urnou and Democraic voing preerences or minoriies and

young peoplehe ongoing cumulaive shifs in demographic srucure lead o

Democraic advanages in he popular voe.

Te resuls are differen wih he Republican bes case, scenario F, which assumes

elevaed Republican suppor among an aging whie populaion. Jus as in 2016,

his scenario shows Republican popular voe advanages in 2020 and 2024,

hough by diminishing margins, ollowed by Democraic advanages in 2028 and

2032, wih D-R margins o 1.1 percen and 2.3 percen, respecively. Tus, even

assuming scenario F’s very srong whie Republican voing preerencesa he

level o Reagan in 1984he increased racial diversiy o voers, especially among

he young, should evenually be enough o shif he projeced naional popular

voe o he Democras.

2016 2020 2024 2028 2032

Scenario D

Scenario E

Scenario F

Scenario C

Scenario B

Scenario A

FIGURE 10

National vote margins by simulation, 2016–2032

Note: Values displayed are the difference between the percent of a group that voted for the democratic candidate and the percent thatvoted for the republican candidate in a given year. Positive values indicate that the group voted more democratic than republican whilenegative values indicate the oppisite.


0%

-4%

8%

4%

12%


20/75


The states and projected

electoral college votes

Mos relevan o he oucomes o presidenial elecions are he sae-level resuls

ha deermine which pary achieves a majoriy in he Elecoral College. As he

2000 elecion o Presiden George W. Bush made plain, i is possible o lose he

naional popular voe bu sill win he required 270 or more elecoral voes.

Tis secion provides Elecoral College resuls or he alernaive elecion scenarios

described in he previous secion. In addiion o providing overall Elecoral College

oucomes, our projecions also show wha differen scenarios imply or he ideni-ficaion o swing saes or oher saes ha migh be in in play or 2016 and uure

elecions. Each scenario or a given year suggess a differen se o swing saes, as

well as solid blue and red saes in he Democraic and Republican camps.

Beore presening hese uure Elecoral College projecions, we give an overview

o he eligible voer demographics, urnou paterns, and D-R margins ha led o

Elecoral College oucomes in he our previous presidenial elecions. Special

atenion is paid o he changing demographics across saes, as well as variaions

across saes in whie and minoriy D-R voer margins.

State electorates and Electoral College outcomes in 2000,

2004, 2008, and 2012

Figure 11 displays sae oucomes or he pas our elecions. Tese oucomes

show changes in he geography o poliical suppor beween he wo Republican

wins o Presiden George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 and he wo Democraic wins

o Presiden Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. Te ormer elecions exhibied a

patern o Republican dominance in he Souh, Grea Plains, and Mounain Wes.Democras in hose elecions, by conras, showed greaer srengh in urbanized

coasal saes, New England, and in much o he indusrial Midwes. Te Democra-

held saes also included large saes such as Caliornia, New York, Pennsylvania,


21/75


and Illinois, which helped make hese elecions very close. Bu Republicans seemed

a he ime o have a poenial long-erm demographic advanage, since many o

he saes hey won were as growing saes in he naion’s Sun Bel, poised o gain

greaer elecoral voes as a resul o uure census reapporionmen.

Tis picure changed in 2008 and 2012, as Democras carried a number o Sun

Bel saesnoably, Virginia, Norh Carolina, Florida, Nevada, and Colorado.

Shifing poliical geography also can be seen by noing he saes ha moved rom

srong Republican saus o eiher Democraic or Republican swing sae saus

a margin o 7.5 poins or lesssuch as Georgia, Monana, Norh Carolina, and Virginia, and hose ha moved rom Republican swing sae o Democraic swing

saus, such as Colorado, Nevada, and Florida. In addiion, several Norheas and

Midwes saes made he same Republican o Democraic swing sae shif, includ-

ing Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio.

FIGURE 11

Actual election results, 2000–2012

Source: See Appendix B

Electoral votes: 266 to 271

Vote margin: 0.5

7.5 and higher

0 to 7.4

-7.5 and lower

-0.01 to -7.4

"Solid Democratic"

"Swing Democratic"

2000 2004

2008 2012

"Solid Republican"

"Swing Republican"


Vote margin: 7.3


Vote margin: 3.9


Vote margin: -2.5


22/75


Alhough hese ransiions rom Republican o Democraic wins among affeced

saes reflec a variey o acors, including he appeal and srengh o paricular

candidaes and he naion’s economic circumsances, he shifs in he demograph-

ics o he eligible elecorae are also imporan. Te wo major shifs are: he

dispersal o newer minoriiesHispanics and Asiansino differen pars o he

counry, especially he Souh and Mounain Wes, and a shif o blacks o prosper-ous saes in he Souh.17 Te effec hese shifs have had on he eligible elecorae

are depiced in Figure 12.

In 2000, eigh saes and Washingon, D.C., had minoriy shares o eligible vo-

ers ha exceeded 30 percen, including Hawaii, New Mexico, exas, Caliornia,

Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, and Maryland. By 2012, minoriies comprised a

leas 30 percen o EVs in 17 saes and he Disric o Columbia. New o he lis

were Nevada, New York, Arizona, Florida, New Jersey, Souh Carolina, Alaska,

Norh Carolina, and Virginia. Shifs were especially large in he 2012 swing saes

o Nevada, Florida, Virginia, and Norh Carolina, as well as in he 2012 solid

Republican saes o Arizona, exas, and Georgia. In mos o hese saes, hegrowh o Hispanics, Asians, and oher races has made significan conribuions.

FIGURE 12

Percent minority among eligible voters, 2000 and 2012

Source: Estimates based on Ruy Teixeira, William H. Frey, and Rob Griffin, "States of Change: The Demographic Evolution of the American

Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progres-sive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change.

20 to 29

30 to 39

40 to 49

50 and higher

0 to 9

10 to 19

2000 2012


23/75


A he same ime, he eligible elecoraes o many slow-growing and whier saes

experienced accenuaed aging. Te Midwes swing saes o Iowa, Wisconsin, and

Ohio gained more han 5 percenage poins in heir age 45 and over elecoraes,

wih hose voers now comprising more han 53 percen o oal EVs in hese saes.

However, hese demographic shifs are only par o he sory. As wih he naionalpopular voe, winning individual saes depends imporanly on voer urnou pa-

erns and candidae preerences o he various demographic groups. urnou raes

differ across saes, o course, hough here are some commonaliies. ypically,

older EVs urn ou a greaer raes han younger EVs, and he whie eligible elec-

orae urns ou a higher raes han he combined minoriy elecorae. Ye he

minoriy eligible elecorae is no monolihic. Blacks end o have higher urnou

raes han oher minoriy groupsand in recen presidenial elecions, heir urn-

ou raes have ofen been higher han hose o whies.

Differen sae experiences are shown in Figure 13, which displays voer urn-ou raes or major racial groups in he previous our presidenial elecions. Te

our saes shown are he highly diverse saes o Florida, Norh Carolina, and

Nevada, as well as he mosly whie sae o Ohio. Each are considered swing

saes ha wen or Presiden George W. Bush in boh 2000 and 2004 bu

or Presiden Barack Obama in one or boh o his vicories. In all our saes,

whies had higher voer urnou raes han all minoriy groups in 2004. Ye his

changed in more recen elecions, especially in Nevada, Norh Carolina, and

Ohio, where black urnou rose above whie urnou in one or boh o he las

wo presidenial elecions. Noable Hispanic gains were also shown in hese

elecions or Norh Carolina, Nevada, and Florida. In he later sae, Hispanic

urnou equaled whie urnou and exceeded black urnou in 2012. Overall, he

rise in urnou or blacks and Hispanics magnified he clou o hese voers in

hese saes, as well as in he Elecoral College.


24/75


Te final piece o he Elecoral College equaion is he voing preerences o hose who did urn ou o voe. Here, he long-held racial preerence paterns discussed

earlier generally hold up across saes, wih minoriies avoring Democras and

whies avoring Republicans. In he 2012 elecions, blacks voed Democraic in

all saes, wih D-R margins ranging rom 59 percenage poins o 98 percenage

poins. Te highes Democraic marginso 90 poins or higherwere seen in a

swah o saes in he Norheas and Midwes, including New York, Pennsylvania,

Ohio, Michigan, and Illinois, as well as Caliornia, Colorado, Washingon, Nevada,

and Norh Carolina. Te black D-R margin was lower han 70 poins in only 5

saesNew Mexico, Uah, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and Maine.

Hispanics also avored Democras in mos saes in 2012; hey gave Republicans

a modes advanage in jus Wyoming, Mississippi, and Oklahoma. Sill, here

was wider variaion across saes in erms o Democraic suppor rom Hispanics

han rom blacks, ranging rom D-R margins o 11 poins in Idaho o 78 poins

in Pennsylvania. Te highes marginsabove 50 poinswere ound in he

Disric o Columbia and 14 saes oher han Pennsylvania, including Caliornia,

New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and Norh Carolina. Tere was a wide range in

Democraic suppor among oher saes wih large Hispanic populaions, wih

exas a 17 poins, Florida a 30 poins, and Arizona a 45 poins.

Whi

Blac

HispAsia

All v

FIGURE 13

Turnout rate among eligible voters by race, 2000–2012

Source: Estimates based on authors' analysis of the November supplements of the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000–2012), available ahttps://cps.ipums.org/cps/.

2000 2012 2000 2012 2000 2012 2000 2012

20%

40%

60%

80%

Florida North Carolina Nevada Ohio


25/75


Alhough he Asian populaion is sill a small par o he elecorae in mos saes,

i leaned Democraic in every sae bu Mississippi. In saes wih relaively large

Asian populaions, 2012 D-R margins included 59 poins or Caliornia; 54 poins

or New York; 51 poins or Hawaii; 38 poins or Washingon sae, Nevada, and

Virginia; and 30 poins or exas.

Bu he leanings and pary/candidae voing margins o he whie populaion, sill

he dominan racial group in mos saesespecially among EVsare undeniably

criical or he resuls o uure elecions. Jus as he naional whie populaion has

voed consisenly or Republican candidaes, so oo have whies in mos saes.

Bu more so han wih minoriies, his is no he case across he board. In 2000,

2004, and 2012, whies living in he Disric o Columbia, as well as in 10 o 12

oher saes, avored Democraic candidaes. (see Figure 14 or 2012 daa) Tese

included mos o he New England saes, New York, Washingon sae, Minnesoa

and, in some years, Caliornia, Oregon, New Jersey, Iowa, and Hawaii. In 2008,

when Presiden Barack Obama had his sronges showing, whies in 18 saes andhe Disric o Columbia voed Democraic. Tese included he addiional saes

o Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Delaware, and Colorado.

A he oher exreme is a band o saes where whie populaions have consisenly

voed srongly or Republicans. Tis includes a good par o he Souh and some

saes in boh he Mounain Wes and Grea Plains. Souh Carolina, Alabama,

Mississippi, Louisiana, ennessee, and exas have ypically shown D-R margins

FIGURE 14

White vote margin, 2012

Note: Values displayed are the difference between the percent of Whites that voted for the democratic candidate and the percent thatvoted for the republican candidate. Positive values indicate that they voted more democratic than republican while negative values

indicate the oppisite.


0 and above

0 to -19

-20 to -39

-40 and below


26/75


in he minus 40 poins and below range, wih Louisiana showing minus 71 poins

in 2012. W hies in oher saes, such as Virginia, Wes Virginia, Kenucky, Indiana,

Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska, as well as Norh Dakoa and Souh Dakoa, are in

he minus 20 percenage poin o minus 40 percenage poin ranges. A hird group o

saes include hose in he indusrial Midwes, he Norheas, and pars o he Wes,

where whie Republican margins are airly small or occasionally lean Democraic.

Te wide variaion in whie negaive D-R margins across saes poins o oppor-

uniies or boh paries o make gains in he uure. For Democras, he more

modes Republican leanings o whies in much o he Midwes have helped hem

win saes, including Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, which

have relaively small minoriy populaions. Less severe deficis among whies also

have helped Democras in some Souhern and Wesern saes, such as Virginia,

Norh Carolina, Colorado, and Nevada, which have large, rapidly growing minor-

iy populaions. Republicans, by conras, coninue o exer a srong hold on mos

Deep Souh saes where Republicans compleely dominae he whie voedespie hese saes’ sizable or rapidly growing black and Hispanic populaions.

O course, he ineracion beween changing demographics and whie voing mar-

gins can and does change over ime. Saes such as Georgia, exas, and Arizona

which have coninued o suppor Republican presidenial candidaes due o heir

sizable whie Republican voing marginsare poised o see rapid growh in heir

heavily Democraic-leaning minoriy populaions. I his growh akes placeand

projecions indicae ha i willi is possible ha he minoriy voe could make

hese saes much more compeiive han hey currenly are, despie heir sub-

sanial whie Republican voing margins. A similar argumen could be made or

oher Souhern saes, including ennessee and Souh Carolina, as well as Wesern

saes, including Monana and Idaho.

By he same oken, he somewha slower demographic change in he whier

Norhern saes sreching rom Iowa and eas o Pennsylvania may pu heir

curren Democraic leanings in jeopardy. Teir relaively small whie Republican

marginswhich ypically have been counered by he relaively high urnou

and Democraic voes o minoriiescould rise in he uure as more whie Baby

Boomers age ino heir senior years. Te aging o his generaion should increaseis urnou raes, as well as, possibly, is endency o avor Republican candidaes.

I so, his aging patern could poenially add o Republican whie voing margins

in hese saes, providing a significan counervailing orce o oher Democra-

riendly demographic changes, which end o be relaively modes in hese saes.


27/75


Tis, however, depends crucially on wheher many liberal whie Baby Boomers

in heir senior years replicae he voing behavior o curren whie seniors, who

are primarily drawn rom he noably conservaive Silen Generaion.18 In hese

simulaions, we assume his o be he case and allow age o ouweigh generaion in

projeced poliical behavior. o he exen his is no he case, he pro-Republican

effec o aging whie Baby Boomers could be atenuaed.

For example, i one allows or cohor effecs rom generaional replacemen in he

whie voing pool so ha he whie voe by age becomes somewha more liberal

over ime, he GOP does no gain a sligh popular voe win in 2016 rom a whie

swing o 4 poins. Insead, he GOP suffers a sligh loss. And a whie swing o 5

poins oward he GOP yields a popular voe vicory or he Republicans only in

2016, avoring he Democras hereafer.

Changing state demographics and alternative Electoral Collegeoutcomes in 2016, 2020, 2024, 2028, and 2032

Tis secion presens alernaive projecions o Elecoral College oucomes or

he 2016 presidenial elecion, as well as he our subsequen elecions rom 2020

o 2032, using he various assumpions abou demographic group urnou and

pary/candidae preerences embedded in scenarios A hrough F. Indicaed in

each case is wheher he Democraic or Republican candidae would win under a

given scenario in a given year. In addiion, each simulaion idenifies hose saes

ha can be hough o as swing or compeiive saes in each elecion.

While he race, age, and sae urnou raes and voer preerences remain he same

or all elecions in any given simulaion, he underlying eligible voer demography

o all saes shif in each uure presidenial year using he projecions rom he

Saes o Change projec.

Figure 15 provides an overview o he changes in each sae’s minoriy populaion

beween 2016 and 2032.


28/75


Sharp increases in diversiy can be highlighed by looking a hose saes where more

han 40 percen o he eligible elecorae should be comprised o racial minoriies.

In 2016, here should be six saes over his hreshold: hree saes, in addiion o

he Disric o Columbia, where minoriies are more han hal o EVsHawaii,

New Mexico and, or he firs ime, Caliorniaalong wih exas, Maryland, and

Georgia, where minoriies will be beween 40 percen and 50 percen o EVs. By

2032, 14 saes and he Disric o Columbia should have crossed he 40 percen

hreshold, including: Arizona, Alaska, New Jersey, Nevada, Florida, Mississippi,

New York, and Louisiana. By hen, hree addiional saes should have majoriy-

minoriy eligible elecoraes: exas in 2019, Nevada in 2030, and Maryland in 2031.

A he oher end o he coninuum, he number o saes where whies exceed

80 percen o EVs should be reduced rom 23 saes in 2016 o jus 11 saes in

2032. In 2032, he later sill heavily whie saes should include he hree upper

New England saes o Maine, Vermon, and New Hampshire; he Souhern

saes o Wes Virginia and Kenucky; he Midwesern saes o Norh Dakoa,

Iowa, and Wisconsin; and he Wesern saes o Monana, Idaho, and Wyoming.

I should be noed ha, by 2032, he radiionally very whie sae o Uah

should no longer be par o his group, as racial minoriies will comprise 23 per-cen o is EV populaion due o he projeced dispersion o Hispanics and oher

racial groups hroughou he sae.

FIGURE 15

Percent minority among eligible voters, 2016 and 2032


Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progres-sive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change.

20 to 29.99

30 to 39.99

40 to 49.99

50 and higher

0 to 9.99

10 to 19.99

2016 2032


29/75


Looking more closely a he demographic projecions o seleced Souhern and

Wesern swing saes, i is clear ha he Hispanic presence in paricular should

become quie a bi sronger in several o hese saes, including Nevada and Florida,

where Lainos are projeced o become nearly one-quarer or more o he eligible

elecorae in 2032. (see Figure 16) Due o his and subsanial gains by Asians and

oher races, Nevada’s whie share o EVs should plumme rom 62 percen in 2016o jus 48 percen in 2032. Norh Carolina and Virginia should mainain heir siz-

able black elecoraes and also show significanly increased shares o oher minori-

ies. Tis is also he case or Georgiaa swing sae in waiingwhose 2032

eligible elecorae will be one-hird black and 15 percen oher minoriies. And wo

oher poenial swing saes, exas and Arizona, display sharp drops in heir whie

EV profiles, wih subsanial gains among Hispanics and oher races.

Several Norhern swing saes show smaller gains in diversiy. In 2032, Iowa’s EVs

will sill be 85 percen whie; Wisconsin’s will be 81 percen whie; and Ohio’s will

be 78 percen whie. All hree saes, as well as several o heir Norhern couner-pars, will also be older han heir counerpars in he Souh and Wes. Tis could

make hem more compeiive or Republicans i whie seniors mainain heir vo-

ing preerences despie generaional urnover in his age group.


30/75


FIGURE 16


White Black Hispanic Asian Other

0%

Arizona

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Florida

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Georgia

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2016 2020 2024 2028 2032

North Carolina

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


31/75


2016 electoral college scenarios

Te resuls o our six scenarios a he sae level appear in Figures 17 and 18.

Te firs hing o noe is ha he final Elecoral College oucomes or 2016 dono exacly mach hose projeced or he popular voe shown in Figure 9. Te

difference is ha scenario Che 2004 Forward scenarioyields a Republican

Elecoral College win. However, each o he oher Elecoral College scenarios

yields he same final oucome as he naional popular voe: Democraic wins or

scenarios A, B, D, and E and a Republican win or scenario F.


Electorate, 1974–2060" (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2015), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/pro-gressive-movement/report/2015/02/24/107261/states-of-change.

FIGURE 16 (continued)

White Black Hispanic Asian Other

0%

Nevada

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Texas

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Virginia

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2016 2020 2024 2028 2032


32/75


Perhaps mos inormaive are he swing saes associaed wih each elecion

boh how hey swich across pary lines and how hey move beween swing and

solid saus across paries. I should firs be noed ha, alhough scenario Ahe

2012 Forward scenarioyields he exac same oucome in 2016 as in he 2012

elecion in erms o elecoral voes332 Democra versus 206 Republican

Nevada changes saus rom swing sae o solid Democraic. Georgia also changessaus rom solid Republican o swing sae. Tis reflecs he effec o changing

elecoral demographics beween 2012 and 2016.

Democratic

Scenario D Scenario E Scenario FScenario CScenario BScenario A

0

400

300

200

100

: i .

Republican

FIGURE 17

Electoral college results by simulation, 2016

Electoral votes

270


33/75


F I G U R E 1 8

E l e c t i o n r e s u l t s b y s i m u l a t i o n ,

2 0 1 6

S o u r c e :

S e e A p p e n d i x B .

E l e c t o r a l v o t e s : 3 3 2 t o 2 0 6

V o t e m a r g i n : 4 . 8

7 . 5 a n d h i g h e r

0 t o 7 . 4

- 7 . 5 a n d l o w e r

- 0 . 0

1 t o - 7 . 4

" S o l i d D e m

o c r a t i c "

" S w i n g D e m

o c r a t i c "

S c e n a r i o

A

S c e n a r i o

B

S c e n a r i o C

S c e n a r i o D

S c e n a r i o

E

S c e n a r i o

F

" S o l i d R e p u b l i c a n "

" S w i n g R e p u b

l i c a n "


V o t e m a r g i n : 6 . 1

E l e c t o r a l v o t e s : 3 0 3 t o

2 3 5

V o t e m a r g i n : 2 . 5

E l e c t o r a l v o t e s : 3 6 8 t o

1 7 0

V o t e m a r g i n : 8 . 6


V o t e m a r g i n

: - 2 . 4


V o t e m a r g i n

: 0 . 1


34/75


Sill, even when he same 2016 demographic makeup is assumed, he differen

simulaion scenarios yield a wide array o swing saes. A one exreme is scenario

Bhe 2008 Forward scenario, and he one mos avorable o Democras

which brings 29 saes plus he Disric o Columbia ino he Democraic old,

including 25 ha are solid blue, compared wih 21 saes avoring Republicans,

including 19 ha are solid red. Couned among he solid blue saes are Virginia,New Hampshire, Colorado, Iowa, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Nevada. Missouri

and Indiana are among he Democraic swing saes.

A he oher exreme is scenario F, he More Whie GOP Suppor scenario,

which pus 33 saes ino he Republican columnincluding 23 ha are solid red

saescompared wih jus 18 saes avoring he Democraic candidae, 12 o

which are solid blue. Among he red saes are a subsanial number o Midwes

and Norheas swing saes, including Minnesoa, Iowa, Wisconsin, Ohio, and

Pennsylvania, as well as he Sun Bel saes o Virginia, Norh Carolina, Florida,

and Colorado. Among he blue saes wih swing saus under his scenario areMaine, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, and Oregon. Te shif oward Republican

wins in a hos o Norhern, slower-growing, whier saes indicaes wha could

happen i heir relaively small 2012 whie Republican margins widen.

wo oher 2016 scenarios are o paricular noe. Firs is scenario D, he Maximum

Minoriy urnou scenario, which assumes greaer new minoriy voer urnou

han observed in 2012. Wih his scenario, Democras do no pick up any addi-

ional elecoral voes rom scenario A. However, his scenario does make he

Democraic swing saes o Wisconsin and Colorado shif o solid blue. I also

changes Arizona’s saus rom solid red o a Republican swing sae.

A second noeworhy 2016 simulaion is scenario E, he High GOP Hispanic/

Asian Suppor scenario. I shows ha even wih a subsanial increase in suppor

or Republicans among new minoriy groups, he Democras would sill win he

Elecoral College voe i all else rom 2012 were o remain he same. Te only sae

ha shifs ino he Republican column compared wih scenario A is Florida. Sill,

his scenario does urn Minnesoa and Nevadasolid blue saes under scenario

Aino Democraic swing saes.

In sum, he shifing demographic landscape avors Democras in 2016, paricu-

larly i recen urnou raes and Democraic/Republican voing procliviies hold

or race and age groups in he various saes. Even a rend oward subsanially

greaer Republican voing among Hispanics and Asiansor even all minoriies

does no aler he Elecoral College botom line.


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However, he effec o hese rends can be more successully miigaed or

Republicans i, or example, urnou and voer preerence paterns approximae

hose obained in he 2004 elecion, in which case an Elecoral College vicory

hough no popular voe vicorymigh be he resul. More direcly, he shif ha

would make he mos difference is a subsanial rise in Republican voing among

whies, a group ha is already firmly in he Republican camp in mos saes. Alernaively, a more modes rise in whie suppor or he GOP could be winned

wih a solid increase in Hispanic and Asian suppor o yield a narrow Republican

Elecoral College vicory. Key in hese insances is expanding GOP whie margins

in a number o previously blue Midwesern and Norhern saes, where curren

whie Republican margins are comparaively modes.

Electoral college scenarios: 2020–2032

Like any simulaions, hose shown or he 2016 elecion are based on assump-ions ha can only approximae o a greaer or lesser degree he urnou and voer

preerence paterns we ulimaely see in ha elecion. Tis cauion is even more

appropriae or simulaed elecoral resuls ha are arher in he uure. Probably

he saes par o hese simulaions are he assumpions abou he underlying

race and age makeup o he elecorae. Te assumpions abou voer urnou and

pary/candidae preerences among hese race and age voing groups are more

likely o vary rom real world paterns. Noneheless, given he broad ne we cas

wih he diverse assumpions o scenarios A hrough F, i is useul o see how each

o hese scenarios play ou in ligh o probable demographic changes over he nex

16 years. Tese longer erm Elecoral College projecions under each scenario are

summarized in Figures 19 and 20.


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2020 2032

FIGURE 19

Election results by simulation, 2020 and 2032


Vote margin: 5.7

Scenario A


Vote margin: 8.6

2020 2032


Vote margin: 9.3

Scenario B


Vote margin: 11.5

7.5 and higher

0 to 7.4

-7.5 and lower

-0.01 to -7.4

"Solid Democratic"

"Swing Democratic"

"Solid Republican"

"Swing Republican"

2020 2032


Vote margin: 0.9

Scenario C


Vote margin: 3.4


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7.5 and higher

0.01 to 7.4

-7.5 and lower

-0.01 to -7.4

"Solid Democratic"

"Swing Democratic"

"Solid Republican"

"Swing Republican"

2020 2032

FIGURE 19 (continued)


Vote margin: 7.2

Scenario D


Vote margin: 10.4

2020 2032


Vote margin: 3.1

Scenario E


Vote margin: 5.2

2020 2032


Vote margin: -1.3

Scenario F


Vote margin: 2.3


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Scenario A: 2012 Forward

Te seady sae assumpion ha 2012 urnou and voing preerences or eachrace, age, and sae group hold in he uure yields increasingly large Democraic

gains. A projeced 347 o 191 Elecoral College win in 2020 rises o a 361 o 177

vicory by 2032. Georgia moves ino he Democraic column in 2028. In addiion,

several oher Republican saesincluding Missouri, Indiana, Alaska, Mississippi,

and Souh Carolinaswich rom solid red o Republican swing saes over his

ime period. Colorado and Pennsylvania move rom swing o solid blue saus.

Scenario B: 2008 Forward

Tis scenariohe bes case or Democraspushes ahead he srong minoriy

Democraic and weak whie Republican perormances o he 2008 elecion and

applies hem o projeced demographic changes in he eligible elecorae. An already

srong projeced Democraic 2020 Elecoral College win o 368 o 170 increases o

382 o 156 by 2032 wih he addiion o Georgia in 2024. As shown in Figure 19,

several saes shif rom solid red o swing Republican over his period, mos noably

exas bu also Souh Carolina, Norh Dakoa, Souh Dakoa, and Mississippi. By

2032, Florida moves rom a Democraic swing sae o a solid blue sae.

Scenario C: 2004 Forward

Tis scenario pushes ahead he race, age, and sae urnou and voing preerencesassociaed wih Presiden George W. Bush’s 2004 win. As in he 2016 projecion

discussed above, i yields anoher Republican win in 2020. However, in he 2024,

2028, and 2032 projeced Elecoral College oucomes, he GOP-avorable 2004

urnou and voing preerence paterns are no enough o couner he power o

2016 2020 2024 2028 2032

Scenario D

Scenario E

Scenario F

Scenario C

Scenario B

Scenario A

FIGURE 20

Electoral college results by simulation, 2016–2032

Note: Values diplayed are the difference between the number of electoral college votes captured by the democratic candidate and the

republican candidate in any given simulation and year. Positive values indicate that democrats would receive more electoral collegevotes than republicans and negative values indicate the opposite.


0

-125

125

250


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he underlying demographic shifs in he eligible elecorae. As a consequence,

he Republican Elecoral College win o 275 o 263 in 2020 is reversed o a

Democraic elecoral voe vicory o 275 o 263 in 2024an advanage ha

rises o 285 o 253 in 2032. Te saes shifing o he Democraic column as his

scenario advances include Ohio in 2024 and Colorado in 2032. Sill, several

swing saes coninue o voe Republican hrough 2032 in his scenario, including Virginia, Florida, and Norh Carolina.

Scenario D: Maximum Minority Turnout

Tis scenario makes he same assumpions as scenario A excep ha all nonblack

minoriies urn ou a he same rae as whies or every race, age, and sae group.

As such, much like scenario A, he Democraic Elecoral College wins coninue

or each elecion rom 2020 o 2032 bu wih a bigger elecoral voe oal in 2028

and 2032. In 2020 and 2024, scenario D does no pick up any addiional saes

relaive o scenario A, bu i does bring a ew red saes ino he Republican swing

sae caegory: Indiana and Alaska in 2024. By 2028, scenario D moves Arizonaand Georgia ino he Democraic column, leading o Elecoral College wins o 373

o 165 in boh 2028 and 2032.

Scenario E: High GOP Hispanic/Asian Support

Tis scenario modifies scenario A o look a wheher and o wha exen sub-

sanially greaer suppor or Republicans among new minoriy voersplus 7.5

percenage poinswould lead o Republican wins in he Elecoral College. Te

resul o hese simulaions indicaes ha, compared wih scenario A, here is a

closing o he Democraic/Republican elecoral voe difference or he elecions

in 2020, 2024, and 2028 bu no or 2032. Sill, here is no reversal o Democraic

vicories or each elecion beween 2020 and 2032. In 2020, he Democraic

vicory under his scenario303 o 235is smaller han under scenarios A, B,

or D, as Republicans win Florida and Norh Carolina. However, in subsequen

elecions, he Democraic Elecoral College advanage coninues o grow larger,

so ha by 2032, he Democraic elecoral voe margin361 o 177is exacly

he same as he projecion in scenario A. Over ime, Norh Carolina, Florida,

and Georgia swich rom Republican o Democraic saes, irrespecive o his

increased Republican minoriy suppor.


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Scenario F: More GOP White Support

Tis scenario modifies scenario A o look a wheher and o wha exen

greaer suppor or Republicans among whiesplus 5 poinswould lead o

Republican Elecoral College vicories. As noed in he 2016 projecions above,

his Republican bes case scenario yielded a decisive Republican win in ha

elecion, as a number o saes in he naion’s Midwes, Norheas, and Souh ha voed Democraic in recen elecions became Republican.

Projecing ahead, his scenario indicaes ha Republicans would mainain heir

Elecoral College advanage rom 2016 in 2020, 2024, and 2028.19 Bu in 2032,

even he assumpion o an addiional 5 percenage poins o Republican sup-

por among whieswhich would affec he large coningens o aging whies in

many slow-growing saeswould no be enough o couner he likely elecoral

effecs o growh in Democraic-leaning minoriies. Specifically, he Republican

Elecoral College edge o 325 o 213 in 2020 shrinks o 277 o 261 in 2028 and

finally reverses o a Democraic win o 287 o 251 in 2032. Over he course ohese elecions, several saes reverse rom Republican o Democraic: Colorado,

Minnesoa, and Virginia in 2024; Pennsylvania in 2028; and Wisconsin and Norh

Carolina in 2032. Sill, under his scenario, he swing saes o Ohio, Florida, Iowa,

and New Hampshire remain in he Republican column hrough all o hese elec-

ions, while Nevada and New Mexico remain in he Democraic column.

In sum, hese longer-erm projecions once again show ha shifing demograph-

ics currenly avor Democras i curren race, age, and sae urnou and vo-

ing procliviies coninue. As we have seen, however, when 2004 condiions are

assumedrelaively low minoriy urnou and Democraic suppor along wih

relaively high whie urnou and Republican supporhe simulaions yield

small Republican Elecoral College wins in boh 2016 and 2020. And when a

srong increase in Republican preerence among whies is assumed, even wih

oher 2012 condiions held consan, simulaions indicae ha Republicans could

obain and keep an elecoral voe advanage over a number o cycles, despie

underlying demographic changes ha avor Democras.


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Conclusion

Tis repor has assessed he poenial elecoral effec o shifing race and age

demographics under a variey o differen scenarios. I is clear ha his effec is

likely o be significan bu ha neiher pary can be assured o long-erm domi-

nance simply rom shifing demographics. Indeed, he simulaions in his repor

also show he poenially srong effec o shifs in pary preerence and urnou

among various demographic groups.

As a resul, boh paries will have considerable work o do in order o adjus ohe changing srucure o he eligible elecorae. While shifing demographics

avor Democras when all else is held equal, he pary has significan vulnerabil-

iy among aging whie voers, who will remain quie imporan in slow-growing

Midwesern and Rus Bel swing saes. Democras will hereore have o hink

hard abou how o balance appeals o heir growing and younger minoriy base

wih oureach o older whie voersparicularly in Middle America.

On he oher hand, Republicans ace a clear need o enhance heir appeal o

America’s rapidly growing minoriy populaionespecially he new minoriies o

Hispanics and Asians. I hey do no, Republicans risk puting hemselves ino a

box where hey become ever more dependen on a declining whie populaion

paricularly is older segmen. As he simulaions show, even under generous

assumpions o enhanced whie suppor, GOP elecoral orunes ulimaely could

be undermined by shifing demographics. Te pruden course may very well be o

adap now, raher han laer, o onrushing demographic change.


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Methodology

Eligible voter projections

Te Saes o Change populaion projecions employ a mulisae cohor com-

ponen mehodology ha begins wih he 2010 census and projecs ahead in

five-year inervals or race- and age-specific populaions or each sae o 2060

based on he componens o domesic migraion, inernaional migraion, eril-

iy, and moraliy. Te projecions are based on modeling echniques developed

by demographer Andrei Rogers.20 Tese projecions are perormed separaelyor racial groups, wherein he saes’ domesic migraion flows are projeced

beween he sae and he remainder o he our census regions: he Norheas, he

Midwes, he Souh, and he Wes. Inernaional migraion o he Unied Saes or

each inerval is allocaed o saes and regions. In boh cases, hese migraion flows

and immigraion allocaions are based on paterns recorded in he 2007 o 2012

muliyear American Communiy Survey. Race-specific eriliy and moraliy raes

or each sae assume naional raes specific o age and race.

Using hose projecions as a baseline, we also employ a demographically based

eligibiliy projecion model. Te firs sep in his process was aking daa rom

muliple years o he American Communiy Survey and dividing up he American

populaion ino groups based on sae, race, and ageor example, Hispanics ages

30 o 34 in Colorado. We hen use mulilevel saisical models o esimae he

unique eligibiliy raeshe rae o ciizenship among a given groupand nau-

ralizaion raeshe rae a which hese groups gained ciizenship over imeor

each sae, race, and age group. Tese groups were hen racked orward in ime

and had hose unique nauralizaion raes applied o hem as hey moved ino

older age groups. Addiionally, hese esimaes accoun or he influx o immi-

grans ino each sae, race, and age group, as well as he effec hey have on hosegroups’ overall eligibiliy raes. Te end resul is a procedure ha is sensiive o

he differen raes o nauralizaion each o hese groups experience, as well as he

immigraion each sae is prediced o experience in he uure.


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Determining turnout rates

For scenarios A hrough F, he U.S. EV populaion was broken down ino 1,020

groupsfive racial caegories broken down by our age groups in each o he 51

geographiesand had a unique urnou rae esimaed based on hose char-

acerisics. Below is a summary o how hose urnou raes were esimaed oreach scenario.

Scenarios A, D, E, and F

Te urnou rae or each sae, race, and age group was esimaed using daa rom

he 2012 November Supplemen o he Curren Populaion Survey and mulilevel

modeling echniques. Tis approach provides more accurae esimaes o urnou

or low-sample populaions by parially pooling daa across individuals’ geo-

graphic and demographic characerisics.

Scenario D uses hese same values excep ha he urnou raes or Hispanics,

Asians, and hose o oher race are se equal o he urnou rae or whies o he

same age group in ha sae. For example, he urnou rae o Hispanics ages

18 o 29 in Caliornia was se equal o he urnou rae o Whies ages 18 o 29

in Caliornia. We deermined his o be superior o simply making he urnou

raes or each racial group he same because i pains a more realisic picure o

wha equal urnou would mean in a siuaion where he age disribuions o di-

eren racial groups differ.

Scenarios B and C

Te same procedure described above was implemened using differen sources o

daa. Te urnou raes used in scenarios B and C were esimaed using, respecively,

he 2008 and 2004 November Supplemen o he Curren Populaion Survey.

Determining support rates

Scenarios A, D, E, and F

Saring wih daa rom he 2012 Cooperaive Congressional Elecion Sudy, we

derived Democraic and Republican suppor raes or each race and age group in

all 50 saes and he Disric o Columbia using mulilevel modeling echniques.

Tis approach provides more accurae esimaes o suppor or low-sample popu-


44/75


laions by parially pooling daa across individuals’ geographic and demographic

characerisics. We hen incorporaed daa rom he 2012 November Supplemen

o he Curren Populaion Survey, he Naional Elecion Pool’s 2012 Exi Polls,

and 2012 sae-level elecions resuls o harmonize hese sae-level group esi-

maes wih oher observable eaures o he 2012 elecion and elecorae.

Tis process is imporan because many oher popular esimaes o suppor raes

eiher generae elecion resuls ha deviae rom he rue elecion resuls when com-

bined wih plausible urnou raes or propose implausible urnou raes. For exam-

ple, i we simply combine suppor raes rom he Naional Elecion Pool’s exi polls

wih urnou raes derived rom he Curren Populaion Surveywidely considered

he gold sandard or deermining urnou raes among demographic groupswe

would find ha he resuls varied significanly rom observed elecion oucomes.

Te end resuls o he process employed in his repor are suppor raes ha are

specific down o he sae level and compleely compaible wih he bes esimaes we have or group urnou raes and elecion resuls in he 2012 elecion.

For scenarios E and F, he suppor raes are adjused rom hose 2012 baselines

o simulae shifs among various racial groups. In scenario E, he Democraic sup-

por rae among Hispanics, Asians, and ohers declines 7.5 poins in each sae,

race, and age group, and he Republican suppor rae increases by 7.5 poinsa

15-poin swing. In scenario E, he Democraic suppor rae among whies declines

5 poins in each sae, race, and age group, and he Republican suppor rae

increases by 5 poinsa 10-poin swing.

Scenarios B and C

Te suppor raes or scenarios B and C are esimaed using essenially he same

procedures bu wih differen daa. Te main daa sources or scenarios B and C

are, respecively, he 2008 Cooperaive Congressional Elecion Sudy and he

Naional Elecion Pool’s 2004 Exi Polls.


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Appendix A

TABLE A1

Voting margins and electoral votes for presidential elections by

simulation, 2016–2032

2016 2020 2024 2028 2032

Scenario A "2012 Forward"

Democratic elecotral votes 332 347 345 361 361

Republican elecotral votes 206 191 193 177 177

Vote margin 4.8 5.7 6.7 7.6 8.6

Scenario B "2008 Forward"



Vote margin 8.6 9.3 10.0 10.8 11.5

Scenario C "2004 Forward"



Vote margin 0.1 1.0 1.8 2.6 3.4

Scenario D "MaximumMinority Turnout"



Vote margin 6.1 7.2 8.3 9.3 10.4

Scenario E "High GOP

Hispanic and Asian Support"



Vote margin 2.5 3.1 3.8 4.5 5.2

Scenario F "More GOPWhite Support"



Vote margin -2.4 -1.3 -0.1 1.1 2.3



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