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Social Cognition, Vol. 28, No. 6, 2010, pp. 695716

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The writing o this article was supported in part by an award rom the National ScienceFoundation (BCS 0847350). The author thanks members o the NYU Social Neuroscience Lab, JeSherman, who served as Action Editor, and two reviewers or their thoughtul comments on earlierdrats o this manuscript.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David M. Amodio, Department oPsychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003. E-mail: [email protected].

AMODIO

SocialNeurosciencefortheSOCIALPSYCHOLOGIST

CaN NEurOSCiENCE advaNCE

SOCial PSyChOlOgiCal ThEOry?

SOCial NEurOSCiENCE fOr ThE

bEhaviOral SOCial PSyChOlOgiST

David M. AmdiNew York University

Scia nscinc is a ng and tiving aa sac in psc-g tat intgats divs itats and mtdgis t addss badqstins abt t bain and bavi. Bt dspit t citmnt andactivit gnatd b tis appac, its cntibtin t idas in scia ps-cg is smtims qstind. Tis atic discsss t was in wicscia nscinc sac ma ma nt cntibt t ttica is-ss in scia pscg. Sti a ng fd, mc sac in tis aaas csd n isss bain mapping and mtdgica dvpmnt,wit ss mpasis n gnating and tsting nv scia pscgicaptss. T cangs t ttica advancmnt, incding psc-

mtic and mtdgica isss, a cnsidd, and a st gidins cndcting ttica-inmativ scia nscinc is d. Int fna anasis, it is agd tat nscinc as mc t t sciapscg, bt ttica and mtdgica, bt tat i an nwappac, ts cntibtins wi ta tim t aiz.

The modern eld o social neuroscience represents the culmination o nearly acentury o research on the interplay o mind and body in social situations, withroots that can be traced to ancient Greek physicians and philosophers (Cacioppo,1982). Building on interdisciplinary approaches such as social psychophysiology

(Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Rankin & Campbell, 1955) and clinical neuropsychology(Damasio, 1994; Frith, Morton, & Leslie, 1991), the modern social neuroscience ap-proach integrates ideas rom multiple research areas in psychology and neurosci-ence to address questions about social processes in the mind and brain. The emer-


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gence o Social Neuroscience was recognized in print by Cacioppo and Berntson(1992; see also Cacioppo & Petty, 1983; Carlston, 1994; Leiderman & Shapiro, 1964;Shapiro & Crider, 1969), and later updated to refect the infuences o cognitive

neuroscience and neuropsychology in the intervening years (Klein & Kihlstrom,1998; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). The eld has since been the subject o severaldedicated research conerences, which have grown into the Social and AectiveNeuroscience Society, ounded in 2008 and the Society or Social Neuroscience in2010.

In its most recent emergence, the eld o social neuroscience elicited much ex-citement rom social psychologists. It promised to stimulate important discoveriesabout the social mind while achieving new heights o methodological precision.It also oered the cachet o biological science to a eld too-oten concerned aboutits caricature as a sot science. As the eld o social neuroscience gained its oot-ing, it enjoyed special attention and support rom the academic press, in the ormo special issues in top journals and the launch o two dedicated journals, alongwith targeted support rom unding agencies (at a time when unding or behav-ioral social psychology waned). It also garnered special attention rom the popularpresswith ambivalent approval rom social psychologists who, while appreciat-ing the increased public interest, had received ar less recognition or behavioralstudies o similar phenomena in which the brains involvement was tacitly as-sumed. In this context, social psychologists have begun to wonder whether socialneuroscience is living up to its anarewhat, exactly, has it contributed to theeld o social psychology? Does one really need neuroimaging methods to testsocial psychological ideas? Such questions refect legitimate concerns about boththe research goals and the scientic practices o the eld.

The goal o this article is to discuss how the social neuroscience approach may

or may not contribute to social psychology. To this end, I describe dierent ap-proaches to social neuroscience and discuss some key psychometric and method-ological problems associated with neuroimaging studies o social psychologicalprocesses. I also describe the ways in which social neuroscience may be success-ul in advancing social psychological theory, using examples rom the literature.Finally, I present a set o suggested guidelines or conducting social neuroscienceresearch that can inorm social psychological questions. The ultimate goal o thisarticle is to make the case to behavioral social psychologists that neuroscience hasthe potential to make important novel contributions to social psychological theoryand research, but that care is required to determine what, when, and how socialneuroscience research may serve this purpose.

WhaT iS SOCial NEurOSCiENCE?

Social neuroscience means dierent things to dierent people. To a social psy-chologist, it reers to an interdisciplinary research approach that integrates theo-ries and methods o neuroscience (and other biological elds) to address socialpsychological questions. To a cognitive neuroscientist, it oten reers to researchon the neural substrates o social processes, such as social emotions and personperception, with a ocus on understanding neural unction. To an animal behavior-ist, it may represent research on the neural and hormonal mechanisms associatedwith basic social behaviors, such as dominance and aliation. Broadly speaking,


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SOCial NEurOSCiENCE fOr ThE SOCial PSyChOlOgiST 697

social neuroscience reers to an integrative approach that can be applied to anyscientic question concerning social processes and the brain. For the present pur-poses, it is important to note that much o social neuroscience is not intended to

address a social psychological question and, as such, it is not necessarily expectedto inorm theories o mainstream social psychology. A goal o this article is to assistbehavioral social psychologists in determining when and how neuroscience mightinorm their interests.

Why ShOuld bEhaviOral SOCial PSyChOlOgiSTS

CarE abOuT ThE braiN?

Social psychology seeks to understand the mind and behavior in the context o so-cial and situational actors. Although the approaches and specic questions have

changed over the years, contemporary social psychology is especially interestedin the mechanisms o the individuals mind. Traditional behavioral approachesparticularly those developed in the social-cognitive tradition, such as computer-ized reaction-time tasksare designed to make inerences about the structure andunction o these underlying cognitive mechanisms. Although much has beenlearned to date using behavior-based methods, neuroscience oers new toolsand an anatomical guide or exploring the mind. Inormation about the nature oconnectivity among neural systems serves as a useul complement to behavioralmethods or advancing theories o the mind and behavior.

The neuroscience approach has been especially useul or discerning the under-lying cognitive mechanisms that give rise to observable psychological phenome-na. For example, research on learning and memory has been heavily infuenced by

ndings rom brain lesion patients and animal neuroscience, and more recently byhuman neuroimaging. The classic case o HM, whose temporal lobes were resect-ed as a treatment or epilepsy, revealed an important distinction between declara-tive episodic memory and nondeclarative (implicit) memory processes (Scoville &Milner, 1957). Although other neurological cases have suggested similar dissocia-tions previously, HMs case galvanized a major eort in neuroscience research onlearning and memory, which produced a useul taxonomy o memory systemslinked to dissociable neural substrates (e.g., Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Squire &Zola, 1996). That is, relating specic memory unctions (measured in behavior) tospecic neural structures claried and, in a sense, reied the notion o dissociablemental systems. These advances led to the development and renement o newtheoretical models o memory and behavior, and these in turn infuenced the de-velopment o dual-process theories o social cognition that are dominant in socialpsychology today. It is dicult to know whether researchers would have made thesame advances in socio-cognitive theorizing without inspiration rom early stud-ies o amnesics and other neuropsychological patients. Although similar discover-ies about memory dissociations would likely have been made through behavioralexperimentation, one could argue that the inclusion o brain-based approaches hasprovided a more detailed description o the properties o memory systems thanwould likely have emerged rom behavioral studies alone.

Neuroscience also oers an expanded methodological toolkit or testing psycho-logical theories, complementing the traditional tools o sel-report and behavioralmeasurement. Measures o peripheral psychophysiology served this purpose in


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early social psychology research. In one o the earliest social psychophysiologystudies, Rankin and Campbell (1955) measured participants skin conductance re-sponse as they met with same-race and dierent-race experimenters. Although

participants reported similar liking or both experimenters, the skin conductanceresponsean index o autonomic nervous system activity associated with palmsweating and, presumably, anxietysuggested greater unease toward the dier-ent-race experimenter. This early demonstration o implicit racial bias relied on aphysiological assessment o the psychological process o anxiety. More recently,researchers have used measures o brain activity to record online changes in mo-tivational and aective responses that would otherwise be impossible to assesswithout interrupting a participants engagement in an experimental manipulation(Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). Neuro-science methods have also been used to measure theoretically important psycho-logical processes that occur too rapidly or precise assessment using sel-report orbehavioral methods (e.g., Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003; Amodio et al.,2004; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997).

Finally, neuroscience provides a common denominator or dierent literaturesand research areas in the psychological sciences, given that the ideas proposed indierent areas o psychology must all comport with a single model o the brain.Social neuroscience is well-positioned as a critical hub or the integration o in-ormation rom disparate scientic traditions in psychology. In particular, socialneuroscience links social psychology to this hub, acilitating the exchange o ideasbetween social psychology and the rest o the neuroscientic community.

aPPrOaChES TO SOCial NEurOSCiENCE rESEarCh

As a hybrid eld, social neuroscience uses approaches that serve the goals o bothneuroscience and psychology, with the latter being more directly inormative tosocial psychology. For the present purposes, the two major approaches may be re-erred to as brain mapping andpsychological hypothesis testing . A consideration o thegoals o each approach will help consumers o this research to determine whetherand how social neuroscience can inorm their social psychological questions.

BrAIN MAPPING APProACh

Brain mapping studies ask where in the brain is _____ [insert psychological con-struct here]? Human brain mapping is a cornerstone o modern cognitive neu-roscience. It concerns the exploratory mapping o basic psychological processesto particular regions o the brain. In early brain mapping studies, neurosurgeonsprobed areas o exposed brain tissue while the patient reported his or her experi-ences. Today, relatively noninvasive neuroimaging measures, such as unctionalmagnetic resonance imaging (MRI), are used or a similar purpose, albeit withgreater sophistication. In cognitive neuroscience, this approach may be used tomap relatively low-level psychological processes such as basic orms o sensation,perception, and specic aspects o learning and memory. Because these psycho-logical processes represent relatively low-level mechanisms, they are believed to


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map more directly onto specic physiological responses than more complex high-level psychological processes.

In social psychology, researchers have attempted to map very high-level psy-

chological processes, such as social emotions, the sel-concept, trait impressions,and political attitudes, onto the brain as well. This is where things get trickier.For example, to study the neural basis o romantic love, researchers have scannedparticipants brains while they viewed pictures o strangers versus their signi-cant others (Aron et al., 2005). Similarly, to study the neural basis o the sel, re-searchers have scanned the brain while subjects judged whether trait adjectivesdescribed them vs. another person (Kelley et al., 2002; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae,2005). Thus, such studies apply the same logic to identiying the neural substrateso very high-level processes as neuroscientists have applied in the mapping overy low-level processes, such as edge detection in vision. A problem with thisapproach is that high-level constructs, such as the sel, are very dicult to deneat the psychological level o analysis, and without a clear understanding o onespsychological construct, one cannot begin to make valid inerences about neuralmappings (Gillihan & Farah, 2005).

Pure brain-mapping studies are undertaken with ew prior assumptions aboutthe psychological unction o a brain regionindeed, the point o such studies isto establish ideas about unction through the process o induction, across multiplestudies using a variety o conceptually-similar tasks and manipulations. This ap-proach can be useul or generating new ideas about links between two otherwisedistinct psychological constructs. For example, the observations that social exclu-sion and physical pain both activate the anterior cingulate cortex has led some tohypothesize that social and physical pain share some common neurocognitive ea-tures (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; but see Somerville, Heatherton,

& Kelley, 2006). Although this approach does not tell us exactly how or why theymight be related, simply because the true unction o the neural activity is di-cult to discern, it nevertheless suggests new testable hypotheses about a potentialrelationship. In other MRI research, the observation that two dierent regions othe brain were activated while participants judged animate vs. inanimate objectsmight suggest that social vs. nonsocial inormation is processed via separate cog-nitive mechanisms (Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002). Importantly, however,brain mapping studies are not designed to test hypotheses about the relationshipbetween two psychological variables or the eects o an experimental manipula-tion on a psychological variable.

hyPoTheSIS TeSTING APProACh

The hypothesis testing approach in social neuroscience is used to test hypothesesabout psychological variables. It begins with the assumption that a particular brainregion refects a specic psychological process. In this regard, it does not concernbrain mapping, but instead relies on past brain-mapping studies to have alreadyestablished the validity o neural indicators. For example, a social psychologistwho studies intergroup prejudice might hypothesize that implicit racial bias isrooted in mechanisms o basic classical ear conditioning. To test this hypothesis,one might measure brain activity in the amygdalaa structure implicated in earconditioning in many studieswhile a participant completes a behavioral mea-


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sure o implicit racial bias. In this case, the construct validity o the neural measureo ear conditioning (activity o the amygdalas central nucleus) is already reason-ably established (but see Amodio & Ratner, in press), and the question concerns

not the meaning o brain activations, but experimental eects among psychologi-cal variables. It is the hypothesis testing approach o social neuroscience that iso most interest to social psychologists. Whereas brain-mapping studies typicallyinorm our understanding o the brain, hypothesis-testing studies typically inormpsychological theories o the mind.

The greatest power o the hypothesis testing approach is that it establishes achannel o communication between social psychology and other neuroscience-related elds, ranging rom cognitive neuroscience to neurology, and to geneticsand systems neuroscience, with neuroscience as the common denominator. Forexample, research linking implicit racial bias to amygdala activity (Phelps et al.,2000; using MRI), and more specically, to threat-related activity o the amygda-las central nucleus (Amodio et al., 2003; using startle-eyeblink), suggested thatimplicit racial bias might refect a ear conditioning mechanism. Through this linkto the neuroscience literature on ear conditioning, researchers could begin to ap-ply the vast body o knowledge on this type o learning and memory to orm newhypotheses or how implicit aective racial biases are acquired, expressed in be-havior, and potentially reduced (Amodio, 2008).

Other research has applied neuroscience models o response control to questionso how intergroup responses are regulated. Whereas social psychological modelshad generally ocused on deliberative orms o corrective control (e.g., Gilbert,Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Wilson & Brekke, 1994), more recent neuroscience modelssuggest that control involves at least two separate componentsa preconsciouscomponent that monitors confict between ones intention and an impending re-

sponse error, and a second component representing the top-down correction othe response that is more akin to traditional social psychological models o control(Botvinik, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Applied tothe study o intergroup bias, this neuroscience-based model could address a long-standing question in social psychology: Why do many sel-avowed egalitariansoten respond unintentionally with racial bias despite their nonprejudiced belies?(e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997). Re-search using an event-related potential (ERP) index o confict-related brain ac-tivity suggested that ailures o the preconscious monitoring component, ratherthan more deliberative corrective processes, accounted or unintentionally biasedresponses among low-prejudiced people (Amodio et al., 2004; Amodio, Devine, &Harmon-Jones, 2008). Ideas rom this social neuroscience model have since been

incorporated into recent social-cognitive models o control (e.g., Payne, 2005; Sher-man et al., 2008). In this way, the connection to neuroscience can inspire noveltheoretical perspectives on classic social psychological questions, which in turncontribute to social psychological theory.

A second powerul aspect o the hypothesis-testing approach is the use o newmethods or assessing psychological variables. Once a neural or physiological re-sponse has been reasonably validated as refecting a psychological variable, re-searchers can use physiological assessments o the response to measure that psy-chological variable. An advantage o such measures is that they can be assessedonline during a psychological task without having to interrupt the fow o a taskto have the participant complete a sel-report measure. Some physiological mea-


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sures, such as ERPs are useul or assessing psychological processes that unoldvery rapidly in the course o a task response. For example, researchers have usedERP measures to show that pictures o ingroup and outgroup members are dis-

tinguished in rapid perceptual processes that may occur beore an individual isconsciously aware o the stimulus (Amodio, 2010; Ito & Urland, 2003; Walker,Silvert, Hewstone, & Nobre, 2008). In other research, Harmon-Jones and his col-leagues have used electroencephalography (EEG) measures o rontal cortical ac-tivity to assess online approach-withdrawal orientation, demonstrating that emo-tional responses are organized in terms o their motivational orientation ratherthan in terms o their appraised valence (e.g., good vs. bad), at least in behaviorand physiology (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2003). Other re-searchers have used ERP and MRI methods to assess online changes in confictmonitoring activity while participants attempted to regulate intergroup responses(Amodio et al., 2004; Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006) or reacted to social exclu-sion (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Somerville et al., 2006). These examples illustratehow neuroscience methods can provide unique opportunities to address dicultsocial psychological questions.

PSyChOmETriC aNd mEThOdOlOgiCal

iSSuES iN SOCial NEurOSCiENCE

The promise o the social neuroscience approach is tempered by some seriousmethodological and psychometric issues. Chie among these is the issue o con-struct validity. Construct validity reers to the certainty that a psychological vari-able o interest can be inerred rom an observed response (Cook & Campbell,

1979; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Construct validity issues have been a perennialconcern in psychologya eld that is most interested in mental phenomena thatcannot be observed directly, but must be inerred through indirect measures obehavior, sel-report, and physiology. In social and cognitive neuroscience, con-struct validity is the degree to which a particular psychological process can beinerred rom an observed pattern o neural activity. Hal a century ago, method-ologists raised concerns about the validity o personality questionnaires to trulyassess specic clinical disorders (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). In the social cognitionliterature, similar concerns have been raised regarding inerences o automatic-ity versus control rom reaction-time assessments o intergroup bias (Amodio &Mendoza, 2010; Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Payne,2001). Today, similar concerns are being expressed regarding neural and geneticindices o psychological processes (e.g., Barrett, 2009; Cacioppo et al., 2003; Rischet al., 2009; Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009). Here, I describe what I viewas the most pressing issues rom the perspective o social and personality psychol-ogy.

CoNSTruCT VAlIDITy AND loGICAl INereNCe

As noted above, social neuroscience has a construct validity problem. That is, aproblem with the assumption that a particular pattern o neural activity actuallyrepresents a psychological construct o interest. The issue o construct validity is


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oN MIxING BrAIN-MAPPING AND PSyCholoGICAlhyPoTheSIS TeSTING

In modern psychometric terms, the mixing o brain-mapping and hypothesis test-ing in a single inerential step confates inerences o construct validity and internalvalidity. That is, the process o determining the psychological meaning o a brainactivation is conounded with the process o testing a psychological theory, otenwithin a single analysis. Here, I describe examples o two dierent approaches totesting a social psychological idea with neuroimaging methods: one that estab-lishes construct validity independently and one that does not.

Lets say a researcher wishes to test the hypothesis that generosity in an eco-nomic bargaining situation involves greater engagement o the sel-concept. Theresearcher decides to use an MRI measure o the sel-concept, which in past stud-ies has been associated with activity in the medial prerontal cortex (mPFC; setting

aside or a moment the various problems with trying to map a complex psycho-logical variable onto a single brain region, e.g., Gillian & Farah, 2005, and whetherMRI is the best method or addressing this question).

There are two ways the researcher can test this hypothesis. One way is to rstidentiy the specic region o the mPFC that corresponds to ones notion o thesel-concept using a well-established task manipulation. This rst procedure is de-signed to establish the construct validity o the neural index o the sel-concept.Based on this task, the researcher would identiy the specic cluster o voxels asso-ciated with sel-processes and then use this same cluster to determine the presenceo sel activity in subsequent studies. Next, the researcher might have the partici-pant complete a bargaining task while brain activity is recorded. Behavior rom thetask would yield an index o participants degree o generosity. The degree o Selactivation on the bargaining task would be determined by quantiying the activ-ity within the entire region designated as the Sel area rom the initial sel-concepttask. The degree o average activity in this predened sel region during the bar-gaining task (e.g., or a generous vs. selsh response contrast) would represent thedegree o sel-concept activity in generous bargaining. To test the main hypothesisdirectly, the researcher would then examine the correlation between this neuralindex and generosity behavior on the task. Although this approach is not withoutits problems, it illustrates the preerred way to test a scientic hypothesisthatis, rst establish the construct in an initial step, and then test ones psychologicalhypothesis in a second, independent step.

A dierent way the researcher might test this hypothesis is to rst note that the

sel-concept has been associated with activity in the mPFC in previous studies.However, as with many brain regions linked to social processes, the mPFC in-cludes a large area o cortex, and the specic location o Sel activity varies quite abit rom study to study (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006; Kelley et al., 2002; Mitchell etal., 2005; Ochsner et al., 2005). Thus, one cannot be sure exactly where within thelarge mPFC region that the sel-concept might be representeda rst strike againstgood construct validity. Nevertheless, the researcher conducts a single study inwhich participants complete the bargaining task while their brains are scanned.To test the main hypothesis that generosity involves the sel, the researcher mightrst compare brain activity associated with generous vs. selsh responses. Thiscontrast might reveal brain activity in several parts o the mPFC, as well as in other


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brain regions. Because the mPFC is a large region, how can the researcher knowwhich part o the mPFC really represents the sel? Activations in the mPFC duringsuch tasks oten activate multiple clusters o activity, each composed o hundreds

o voxels. The researcher might simply conclude that because there was greatermPFC activity on trials where generous responses were made, the sel is indeedinvolved in generosity. The problem here is that one cannot know whether theseactivations truly represent sel-concept activation or some other concurrently-ac-tivated process.

To probe the data urther, the researcher might correlate the behavioral mea-sure o generosity with subjects degree o mPFC activity during the task. Some-times, the neural index o the sel is the average brain activity in the mPFC cluster.More oten, however, researchers will use activity rom individual voxels withinthe cluster or correlation analysis. This oten involves hundreds o independentcorrelation testsone or each voxel in the cluster that passed a pre-dened sta-tistical threshold or the generous vs. selsh contrast on the bargaining task. O-ten, researchers ocus on the voxel or cluster that is most strongly correlated withbehavior (in this case, generosity behavior). From this correlation, the researchmight conclude that (a) since these specic voxels were correlated with generositybehavior, they must represent the true Sel area and (b) given the signicant cor-relation, the sel is indeed involved in generosity, supporting the psychologicalhypothesisan example o circular logic. In this case, a single analysis is used orbrain-mapping the sel and or testing the hypothesized relationship between thesel and generosity.

As illustrated in the example above, the use o a single-step analysis to test apsychological hypothesis with neuroimaging data skips the critical step o estab-lishing construct validity. Not only does this seriously threaten the internal valid-

ity o the experimental inerence, it also leads to articially-infated correlationsbecause the brain-based predictor variable (e.g., the sel) becomes dened in termso the criterion variable (generosity behavior), instead o being dened a priori inan independent test. In other words, the construct is dened by the inerential test.When the predictor is dened by the outcome (i.e., arming the consequent), thetest is tautological. This practice is what produces the infated voodoo correlationsdescribed by Vul et al. (2009). It is important to note that this problem is rootedin the conceptual logic o validity and scientic inerence and cannot be ully ad-dressed through statistical corrections or improvements in measurement reliabil-ity (Barrett, 2009). These concerns are o special relevance to the eld o socialneuroscience because in this eld, the psychological constructs tend to be mostabstract and thus most dicult to operationalize in the brain.

Ultimately, social neuroscience relies on the combination o brain mapping andhypothesis testing studies. The initial brain mapping research is needed to estab-lish the unction o neural structures so that they can later be used to inspire andtest theoretical hypotheses, which in turn will raise new questions about brainmapping. Thus, there will always be give and take between these approaches.However, it is critical or scientists to recognize the dierent unctions and limi-tations o these two approaches, along with the challenges involved in bridgingbetween them.


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eeCTS o NeuroIMAGING eNVIroNMeNToN PSyCholoGICAl ProCeSSeS

In addition to the psychometric concerns discussed above, physiological and neu-roimaging measures sometimes introduce important limitations to the scope oexperimental methods normally employed by social psychologists. Beyond issueso cost and training, the recording equipment is sometimes invasive or otherwiseconstraining, and these actors have direct implications or the manipulation andmeasurement o psychological variables involved in hypothesis testing. For exam-ple, MRI recording requires that a participant lie very still on a narrow scannerbed with his or her head and upper body ensconced in the narrow scanner bore(i.e., a plastic tube). A bite bar or other means o immobilizing the participantshead is oten used. During scans, the room is usually darkened, and the participantwears earplugs to attenuate the loud buzzing and whirring noises rom the pulsing

scanner. This environment places important limitations on the type o research thatmay be conducted. Experimenters must contend with the participants anxiety anddistractibility during the study, which may interere with experimental manipula-tions. Experimenters must also design tasks that can be implemented with stimuluspresentation through LCD goggles (or a back-refected LCD monitor) and/or re-sponses made on a button box that is usually held in the subjects right hand.

Beyond these obvious limitations, a recent study ound that immobilization inthe supine position may signicantly reduce the psychological engagement in ap-proach motivation (Harmon-Jones & Peterson, 2009). That is, in line with recent re-search on embodiment and situation cognition (Smith & Semin, 2004), constraintson a participants body (as in the MRI scanner) have important eects on emotionand cognition, especially as they pertain to action. Other common social neurosci-ence methods, such as EEG/ERP, are less constrictive, but still present limitationsthat require special considerations concerning technical and psychological issues.

NoT All BrAIN ACTIVITy IS PSyCholoGICAl

Psychologists, by design, are interested in psychological processes, such as emo-tion and cognition. Cognitive (and social) neuroscientists study the brain as a wayto understand these psychological processes, on the assumption that all mentalactivity arises rom the brain. However, the reverse is not truenot all neural pro-cesses relate to psychological processes. Indeed, much o the brains activity at a

given moment is devoted to nonpsychological (or extremely low-level psycho-logical) processes involved in regulating and maintaining physiological systemsin the body, such as homeostasis, respiration, balance, etc. When a psychologistexamines a brain scan rom an experimental task, some o the activations likelycorrespond to the psychological properties o the task, but other activations thatmay covary with the task may have little to do with psychological processes perse. Nevertheless, there is oten a tendency to interpret all o the brain activations interms o psychological unctions. This practice may lead to misinterpretations oneural activations, which urther threaten the construct validity o neuroimagingmeasures and, at a broader level, may add conusing and conficting inormationto the elds base o knowledge. A consideration o neural anatomy and unction


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rom nonhuman literatures may be inormative when interpreting how particularpatterns o brain activity might relate to a psychological process.

guidEliNES fOr uSiNg SOCial NEurOSCiENCE TO

iNfOrm SOCial PSyChOlOgy

Despite some serious challenges and caveats, social neuroscience remains an excit-ing and generative orce in the eld o social psychology, and in the broader psy-chological and neural sciences. As reviewed in the section on hypothesis-testingapproaches above, theoretically-oriented research has already used neurosciencemodels and methods to gain new ground on classic social psychological questions.In this section, I outline a set o guidelines or conducting social neuroscience re-search that can inorm theoretical issues in social psychology.

1. STArT WITh A SoCIAl PSyCholoGICAl QueSTIoN

This rst guideline seems obvious. But although social neuroscience studies al-most always involve social variables, only a subset ask social psychological ques-tions. As a general rule, a social psychological question is posed in psychologi-cal terms, and ideas and methods rom neuroscience are incorporated to assist inmeasuring and interpreting the evidence or the psychological hypothesis. To theextent that ones question is not couched in psychological terms, it is less likely toinorm social psychological theory.

2. ASk yourSel WheTher you reAlly NeeDA NeuroIMAGING MeASure To TeST your IDeA

Social psychology has come a long way without neuroimaging methods. Indeed,most questions about a social psychological process can be tested using purely behavioral methods, without the need or neural measures. Obviously, simplyshowing that a brain was involved does not constitute a major theoretical advance.The inclusion o unnecessary neuroimaging measures can invite an exploratoryand speculative analysis o brain activations that may blur the line between brainmapping and hypothesis testing. Given the ambiguities o interpreting patterns o

brain activity (especially with MRI), behavioral tests o social psychological ideasoten provide cleaner and more straightorward conclusions.

A powerul but less obvious use o the social neuroscience approach is to gen-erate hypotheses rom neuroscience models and then test them with behavioralmethods. Although this approach to social neuroscience may seem less glamor-ous, it can be more rigorous and have greater potential to inorm social psycholog-ical theory. For example, social psychologists who study prejudice have wonderedwhy reaction-time measures o implicit racial bias are not always good predictorso behavior. To address this issue, my colleagues and I considered how implicitracial associations might be represented in the brain, and how these neural pro-cesses might in turn relate to behavioral expressions o bias. We noted that neuro-


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science models o learning and memory distinguish between implicit associationsbased in aective processes and those based in semantic processes (e.g., Gabrieli,1998; LeDoux, 2000; Squire & Zola, 1996). These models have linked aective and

semantic orms o memory to dierent regions o the brain, which in turn infu-ence dierent aspects o behavior. On the basis o neuroscience research, we oundit useul to think o implicit racial biases in terms o these dierent underlyingmemory systems (e.g., Amodio, 2008; Amodio et al., 2003), and we suggested thati one considers the dierent properties o these underlying systems, one could ob-serve a stronger link between measures o implicit bias and intergroup behavior.We then tested this neuroscience-based hypothesis in a series o behavioral stud-ies and ound that, as expected, a consideration o aective vs. semantic orms oimplicit bias led to better prediction o intergroup responses (Amodio & Devine,2006).

Hence, a consideration o neuroscience models o psychological processes caninorm ones thinking on an issue, which may then inspire new hypotheses thatcan be tested with traditional behavioral methods. By connecting their behavioralresearch to neuroscience on a theoretical level, social psychologists will also maketheir work accessible to a broader audience, inviting urther connections to otherliteratures and theoretical ideas.

3. The BrAIN IS A MeChANISM VArIABle, NoT AN ouTCoMe

Indeed, the brain is a mechanisma key component o the organism in the S-O-Rchain that mediates the eect o a stimulus on behavior. Whereas the goal o brain-mapping studies is to examine brain activations that result rom a manipulation,

the goal o most psychological studies is to understand the psychological mecha-nisms that produce a response. As such, measures o brain activity provide a useuloutcome variable in brain-mapping studies, but are more appropriately treated asa mechanism variable in psychological hypothesis-testing studies in which behav-ior is the outcome. Conceptualizing the brain as a mechanism (or process) variablewill serve two purposes. First, it will encourage the inclusion o behavioral tasksthat provide psychometrically valid measures o a psychological variable, whichin turn will improve ones ability to iner the psychological meaning o observedbrain activity. Second, at a broader level o analysis, it will keep the research ques-tions ramed by a theoretical model in which the outcome is behavior. The practiceo treating neural measures as mechanism variables will aid in the translation osocial psychological theory into hypotheses that can be tested using neuroimagingmethods.

4. oCuS oN NeurAl INDICATorS WIThreASoNABly Well-eSTABlISheD CoNSTruCT VAlIDITy

To inorm social psychological theory, it is important to ocus on neural indica-tors that have already been established as refecting your psychological variableo interest. When selecting a neural indicator, careully decide whether activity ina particular structure can be used as a valid measure o your psychological con-


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struct. The task that a neuroscientist used to manipulate a psychological constructmight not be considered appropriate rom a social psychologists perspective, or itmight just not relate well to your particular theoretical question.

It is important to read widely, within and outside o ones primary literature.The same part o the brain may be described as refecting dierent processes bydierent researchers and in dierent literatures. A case in point is the striatum, aregion o the basal ganglia. Historically, the striatum has been associated with ba-sic motor processes, with its degradation being implicated in Parkinsons disease(Meynert, 1871). Over a century later, the striatum was seen as a key substrateo procedural memory (also, habit learning), with an emphasis on its behavioralimplications (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986; Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire,1996; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). More recently, researchers interested in the cognitiveprocess o economic decision-making have interpreted the striatum activity as re-fecting the computation o value or the appraisal o error signals in reinorcementlearning (Knutson, Taylor, Kauman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005; Montague & Berns,2002). Thus, dierent researchers rom dierent elds may interpret the samepattern o striatum activity in very dierent ways. All may be partially correct.But to the extent that there are multiple plausible psychological interpretations,construct validity or the measure is low, and it is more dicult to iner supportor a particular psychological hypothesis. Furthermore, the way a particular brainactivation is interpreted within a particular eld can become reied over time ithe interpretations receive little input rom other elds, creating an echo chamber.Reading widely across literatures will serve to strengthen ones understanding oneural unction.

Given the construct validity problems associated with neuroimaging measureso high-level psychological variables, it is oten advisable to interpret brain ac-

tivity in terms o lower-level psychological processes that then contribute to thehigher-level processes that are typically o interest to social psychologists. For ex-ample, activity o the amygdala is more accurately described as being involved inautonomic activation or vigilance than the high-level concept o ear. Furthermore,i a researcher interprets a neural activation as i it has a one-to-one mapping witha psychological process, little can be learned about the nature o the process romthe pattern o neural activity. For example, activity in the mPFC has been inter-preted as refecting theory o mind and the process o thinking about other people(Mitchell et al., 2005; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). With this interpretation, the brainactivity is simply used as an indicator o the psychological variable. But i oneconsiders the unction o this same region in lower-level termssuch as an im-portant hub or integrating inormation about ones own actions with ones goals

and expectancies, as a means to regulate behavior (Amodio & Frith, 2006)thenobservations o mPFC activity can enrich ones ideas o how theory o mind relatesto other processes.

5. uSe A CoNSTruCT-VAlID BehAVIorAl TASkThAT yIelDS AN INTerPreTABle DePeNDeNT MeASure

Given the issues o construct validity described above, it is critical to use psycho-logically valid behavioral tasks in conjunction with neuroimaging. That is, whenmeasuring brain activity, a researcher must be sure that the participant is engaged


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in the psychological process o interest. Ideally, the behavioral task will not onlyengage this process, but also yield a clear behavioral index to be used as an out-come variable as well as a means to corroborate ones interpretation o the associ-

ated brain activity.To illustrate this issue, consider research examining the control o intergroup re-

sponses toward Black people by White Americans. Much previous behavioral re-search has shown that stereotypes o Arican Americans (e.g., as dangerous) cometo mind automatically, and that controlled processing is needed to override theinfuence o stereotypes on ones behavior (Devine, 1989; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton,& Williams, 1995; Payne, 2001). For example, in Paynes (2001) weapons identi-cation task, a Black or White ace is presented briefy as a prime, ollowed by apicture o either a handgun or handtool. Because Blacks are oten stereotyped asdangerous, controlled processing is required to respond correctly on certain trials,such as when a Black ace appears beore a tool, but is not required to respond cor-rectly on other trials, such as when a Black ace appears beore a gun. Thereore,this task is designed to engage participants in control on some trials, but not oth-ers. The task also yields clear behavioral assessments o controlled processes, suchas error rate data and mathematically-modeled process estimates (e.g., Jacoby,1991). Thus, the task has construct validity as an elicitor o controlled processing,and it yields valid indicators o the engagement o successul control. Researchersinterested in the neural mechanisms o control can use this task to identiy brainactivity that is specically associated with the engagement o control by compar-ing neural responses rom trials requiring control with trials that do not requirecontrol. Ones interpretation o this brain activity can be urther validated throughits association with behavioral indicators o control. In my own research, I haveused this approach to demonstrate the roles o the PFC and the anterior cingulate

cortex in proactive and corrective orms o control over racial stereotypes, respec-tively (Amodio, 2010; Amodio et al., 2004; Amodio et al., 2007, 2008).

When a scanner task has little construct validity, one cannot be sure that theobserved brain activity is actually related to the process o interest. For example,many social neuroscience studies have used passive ace-viewing tasks to elicitbrain activity in an eort to study prejudice and prejudice control. In such studies,a participant might simply view aces o Black and White people with the goal omaking some arbitrary judgment, such as whether the picture appeared on thelet or right side o the screen. Because such judgments are not known to requireany special control or bear any relation to racial associations, this type o task haslittle i any construct validity, nor does it provide any interpretable behavioraldata. Although such tasks requently elicit brain activity in a variety o brain re-

gions, including areas o the PFC linked to control in past studies, data rom pas-sive viewing tasks cannot be interpreted in terms o psychological concepts suchas control. Further problems arise when researchers explore correlations betweenbrain activity and other measures o racial bias, such as sel-reports or behavioralmeasures o implicit bias, and then choose to interpret only the activations wherecorrelations arise as ad hoc evidence or the brains involvement in control. Thispractice can result in spurious or otherwise uninterpretable ndings. Thereore, iones goal is to draw psychological inerences rom the resulting brain activity, it iscritical to select a task that is psychologically valid.


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6. CoNSIDer NeuroANAToMy WheNDeVeloPING hyPoTheSeS AND INTerPreTING reSulTS

The social neuroscience approach is most powerul when one uses models o neu-roanatomy, as well as the neurochemical systems that interact with neural struc-tures (e.g., Amodio, 2009, 2010), to inorm ones hypotheses about socio-cognitivemechanism. In this way, models o the brain may be used to rene or otherwiseconstrain psychological theory and hypotheses. Problems arise when neurosciencemodels are not considered in the interpretation o neuroimaging data.

For example, early notions o emotion regulation hearken back to the Freudianand Cartesian ideas o inner confict between passion and reason, and the beliethat cognition (i.e., reason) must be invoked to directly down-regulate emotion(i.e., the passions). The idea that cognition directly down-regulates emotion is stillpervasive today (as reviewed by Ochsner & Gross, 2005). On the basis o prior

research linking cognitive control to the prerontal cortex and other studies link-ing negative emotion to the amygdala, some researchers have proposed that emo-tion regulation must involve the inhibition o the amygdala by the PFC. However,anatomical research on these brain regions shows that there are actually very ewconnections between these regions and, o those sparse connections, most runrom the amygdala to the PFC (Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, & Barbas, 2007). Researchon the macaque brain suggests that PFC signals primarily target structures in-volved in sensation, perception, and motor control, but not structures believed tobe emotional, such as the amygdala (Fuster, 2001). Indeed, in a MRI study whereparticipants behavior (i.e., eye gaze) was measured while they attempted to regu-late their negative emotion, the correlation between activity in the PFC and theamygdala was accounted or by participants tendency to look away rom aversivestimuli (Van Reekum et al., 2007). That is, the PFC was involved in regulating onesbehavioral response to the aversive stimulus rather than directly down-regulatingthe amygdala. Hence, neuroscience models can constrain theories about emotionregulation to suggest that the Freudian inner confict model may not be correct.Just as a consideration o neural models can inspire useul new psychological the-ories, ignoring such models may lead to mischaracterized psychological theories.

7. Be PrePAreD To uPDATe INTerPreTATIoNS o BrAIN ACTIVATIoN

Neuroscience is a young and rapidly advancing eld, and changes in our under-

standing o neural unction are inevitable. Researchers will need to keep them-selves apprised o developments and then update interpretations o past workaccordingly. For example, the amygdala was once interpreted as the ear center,and oten as the locus o emotion broadly. However, it is now understood to rep-resent a diverse set o processes involved in attention, vigilance, memory, and thecoordination o both autonomic and instrumental responses (Whalen, 1998; Kill-cross, Robbins, & Everitt, 1997). Thus the notion that the amygdala represents neg-ative emotion is too simplistic and no longer tenable. Furthermore, the amygdalacomprises multiple nuclei associated with dierent unctions, connected withinan inhibitory network (Barbas & Zikopoulos, 2007). These subnuclei cannot bedierentiated with current neuroimaging methods, and thus it is very dicult to


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chology and neuroscience, it is critical or new social psychologists to have basicknowledge o the brain and neuroscience methodology. At the very least, thesestudents will come into contact with social neuroscience research in their uture

careers. At best, they will incorporate neuroscience approaches to complementand enhance their research on social psychological questions. Just as social cogni-tion became ully integrated into mainstream social psychology ater a period oskeptical segregation, social neuroscience is turning the corner toward ull integra-tion as well.

CONCluSiONS

The emergence o social neuroscience is a good thing or social psychology. Thepromise this new eld holds or making substantive contributions to social psy-

chological theory and research ar outweighs the growing pains it is currentlyexperiencing. The goal o this article was to describe how neuroscience modelsand methods can be used constructively to advance social psychological research,while also describing the major limitations o this approach. A consideration othese issues will help the researcher who wishes to apply the neuroscience ap-proach to address social psychological questions. It will also help the consumerwho needs to understand the limitations o neuroimaging research to discern itsvalue or their own work. Although debates about the role o neuroscience in so-cial psychology will surely continue, one thing is certain: neuroscience has arrivedin the eld o social psychology and it is here to stay. It is now up to the socialpsychologist to take advantage o what it has to oer.

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