radvanyi.ciss.msstate.eduradvanyi.ciss.msstate.edu/icwat/sutarji_bin_hj_kasmin_presentation.pdf ·...

��

UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA

��

1. POSSIBLE THREATS OF MARI-TIME TERRORIST IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

2. MALAYSIA’S SECURITY POLICY FOR THE STRAITS OF MALAC-CA

3. MALAYSIA’S CAPABILITIES TO PROTECT THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

4. TOWARD COOPERATIVE APP-ROACHES TO COMBAT INTER-NATIONAL TERRORISM

• CONCLUSION

1. POSSIBLE THREATS OF MARI-TIME TERRORIST IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

2. MALAYSIA’S SECURITY POLICY FOR THE STRAITS OF MALAC-CA

3. MALAYSIA’S CAPABILITIES TO PROTECT THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

4. TOWARD COOPERATIVE APP-ROACHES TO COMBAT INTER-NATIONAL TERRORISM

• CONCLUSION

TERRITORIAL WATERS OFTHE STRAITS OF MALACCA

��

� ��

��

� ��

��

1. PRESENCE OF SEA ROBBERS (HIGH INCIDENTS OF SEA ROBBERIES BUT MUCH REDUCED IN 2005)

2. PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN INDO-NESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGA-PORE (TERRORIST AND SEA ROBBERS ARE NOT LINKED-KMM IS NOT A THREAT ANYMORE)

3. DIFFICULTIES TO TRACK TERRORISTS AND KEEPING PORTS/SEALANES SECURE

1. PRESENCE OF SEA ROBBERS (HIGH INCIDENTS OF SEA ROBBERIES BUT MUCH REDUCED IN 2005)

2. PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN INDO-NESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGA-PORE (TERRORIST AND SEA ROBBERS ARE NOT LINKED-KMM IS NOT A THREAT ANYMORE)

3. DIFFICULTIES TO TRACK TERRORISTS AND KEEPING PORTS/SEALANES SECURE

825SINGAPORE

9514MALAYSIA

382816STRAITS OF MALACCA

94121103INDONESIA

200420032002LOCATION

IMB REPORTS ON PIRACY/SEA ROBBERIES

TERRORIST GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

JIASGKMMJI

JIGROUP

SINGPHILMALINDOCOUNTRY

Cont …

��

�� !�

��

�� !�

4. AVAILABILITY OF MODERN INFRA-STRUCTURES (COMMUNICATION AND FAST BOATS) (USAGE REQUIRE REGISTRATION)

5. GREAT IMPACTS ON MAJOR POWER’S ECONOMY AND INTERESTS (CLOSURE OF SLOC CAUSES OIL SUPPLY AND TRADE ROUTES INTERRUPTED, DAMAGE TO PORT FACILITIES AND ENVIRONMENT)

6. AL-QAEDA THREATS AGAINST UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES

7. AVAILABILITY OF MARITIME SKILLED MAN POWER – CLOSELY UNDER GOVT CONTROLLED

4. AVAILABILITY OF MODERN INFRA-STRUCTURES (COMMUNICATION AND FAST BOATS) (USAGE REQUIRE REGISTRATION)

5. GREAT IMPACTS ON MAJOR POWER’S ECONOMY AND INTERESTS (CLOSURE OF SLOC CAUSES OIL SUPPLY AND TRADE ROUTES INTERRUPTED, DAMAGE TO PORT FACILITIES AND ENVIRONMENT)

6. AL-QAEDA THREATS AGAINST UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES

7. AVAILABILITY OF MARITIME SKILLED MAN POWER – CLOSELY UNDER GOVT CONTROLLED

FAST BOAT

IMPACT OF OIL SPILL ONENVIRONMENT

��

1. HIJACK SHIPS AND DEMAND FOR RANSUM

2. HIJACK SHIP CARRYING DANGEROUS CARGO AND TURN IT INTO A FLOATING BOMB, SINK IT AT CHOKE POINT OR DISCHARGE OIL INTO THE SEA (NEVER HAPPEN YET)

3. BOMB ATTACK ON SHIPS IN PORTS (USS COLE AND MV LIMBURGH IN YEMEN)

1. HIJACK SHIPS AND DEMAND FOR RANSUM

2. HIJACK SHIP CARRYING DANGEROUS CARGO AND TURN IT INTO A FLOATING BOMB, SINK IT AT CHOKE POINT OR DISCHARGE OIL INTO THE SEA (NEVER HAPPEN YET)

3. BOMB ATTACK ON SHIPS IN PORTS (USS COLE AND MV LIMBURGH IN YEMEN)

LNG TANKER VLCC

USS COLE, YEMEN (17 MEN KILLED)

MV LINBURG, YEMEN (I MAN KILLED)

��

1. USE FAST BOAT TO APPROACH THE SHIP AND CLIMB ONBOARD FROM THE STERN. ONCE ONBOARD TAKE OVER CONTROL OF THE SHIP

2. INFILTRATE AS SHIP’S CREWS AND TAKE OVER THE SHIP WHEN OPPORTUNITY ARISE (NEVER HAPPEN YET)

3. STOWAWAY WITH SUPPLIES FOR LONG JOURNEY IN CONTAINERS (GIOIA TAURO, ITALY OCT 2001)

4. SHIP OPERATED BY TERRORIST LADEN WITH EXPLOSIVES/ CHEMICALS/NUCLEAR DEVICE / RADIOLOGICAL BOMB TO STRIKE AT WILL (EXISTENCE NOT KNOWN YET)

1. USE FAST BOAT TO APPROACH THE SHIP AND CLIMB ONBOARD FROM THE STERN. ONCE ONBOARD TAKE OVER CONTROL OF THE SHIP

2. INFILTRATE AS SHIP’S CREWS AND TAKE OVER THE SHIP WHEN OPPORTUNITY ARISE (NEVER HAPPEN YET)

3. STOWAWAY WITH SUPPLIES FOR LONG JOURNEY IN CONTAINERS (GIOIA TAURO, ITALY OCT 2001)

4. SHIP OPERATED BY TERRORIST LADEN WITH EXPLOSIVES/ CHEMICALS/NUCLEAR DEVICE / RADIOLOGICAL BOMB TO STRIKE AT WILL (EXISTENCE NOT KNOWN YET)

� ��

��

� ��

��

� ��

��"��

��

��"��

��

1. MALAYSIA TOGETHER WITH INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

2. THE THREE COUNTRIES ALSO REJECTED FOREIGN POWERS’ INVOLVEMENT TO MAIN-TAIN SECURITY IN THE STRAITS OF MALAC-CA

3. BOTH MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA ALSO REJECTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF PRIVATE COMPANY TO PROVIDE ESCORT FOR SHIPS TRANSITING THE STRAITS

1. MALAYSIA TOGETHER WITH INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

2. THE THREE COUNTRIES ALSO REJECTED FOREIGN POWERS’ INVOLVEMENT TO MAIN-TAIN SECURITY IN THE STRAITS OF MALAC-CA

3. BOTH MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA ALSO REJECTED THE EMPLOYMENT OF PRIVATE COMPANY TO PROVIDE ESCORT FOR SHIPS TRANSITING THE STRAITS

��"��

��

��"��

��

1. NO LEGAL BASIS FOR FOREIGN POWER TO PATROL MALAYSIA’S TERRITORIAL WATERS (UNCLOS III)

2. MALAYSIA HAS THE RESOURCES TO CONDUCT JOINT PATROLLING WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE WATERS

3. MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES, THE MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGENCY AND OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES ARE EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT LEVEL OF THREATS

4. THOSE WHO FEAR THEIR VESSELS WILL COME UNDER ATTACK IN THE STRAITS CAN ALWAYS:

A. USE ALTERNATIVE ROUTES SUCH AS LOMBOK AND SUNDA STRAITSB. REQUEST FOR MALAYSIAN NAVY ESCORTS

1. NO LEGAL BASIS FOR FOREIGN POWER TO PATROL MALAYSIA’S TERRITORIAL WATERS (UNCLOS III)

2. MALAYSIA HAS THE RESOURCES TO CONDUCT JOINT PATROLLING WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE WATERS

3. MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES, THE MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGENCY AND OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES ARE EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT LEVEL OF THREATS

4. THOSE WHO FEAR THEIR VESSELS WILL COME UNDER ATTACK IN THE STRAITS CAN ALWAYS:

A. USE ALTERNATIVE ROUTES SUCH AS LOMBOK AND SUNDA STRAITSB. REQUEST FOR MALAYSIAN NAVY ESCORTS

MALAYSIAN NAVY FLEET

ALTERNATIVE SEA ROUTES

��"��

��

��"��

��

1. MALAYSIA’S LAW DO NOT ALLOW PRIVATE CITIZENS TO CARRY ARMS IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF MALAYSIA

2. ANY PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY ANY PARTIES MUST NOT IMPINGE ON THE TERRITO-RIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF MALAYSIA

3. THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE TO MONITOR SAFETY AT SEA ADVISES SHIPPING COMPANIES NOT TO KEEP WEAPON ONBOARD BECAUSE THEY CAN TRIGGER VIOLENCE

1. MALAYSIA’S LAW DO NOT ALLOW PRIVATE CITIZENS TO CARRY ARMS IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF MALAYSIA

2. ANY PREVENTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY ANY PARTIES MUST NOT IMPINGE ON THE TERRITO-RIAL INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF MALAYSIA

3. THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE TO MONITOR SAFETY AT SEA ADVISES SHIPPING COMPANIES NOT TO KEEP WEAPON ONBOARD BECAUSE THEY CAN TRIGGER VIOLENCE

CONT ….

��"��

��

��"��

��

4. SHOULD THERE BE SHOOTING INCIDENTS BETWEEN PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY VS PIRATES AND LIFE AND/OR PROPERTY IS LOST IN MALAYSIA’S TERRITORIAL WATERS, WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE?

5. WHAT IF THE PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY INTERFERE WITH MALAYSIA’S MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN CARRYING OUT THEIR DUTIES?

4. SHOULD THERE BE SHOOTING INCIDENTS BETWEEN PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY VS PIRATES AND LIFE AND/OR PROPERTY IS LOST IN MALAYSIA’S TERRITORIAL WATERS, WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE?

5. WHAT IF THE PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANY INTERFERE WITH MALAYSIA’S MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN CARRYING OUT THEIR DUTIES?

� ��

��

� ��

��

� ��

��"��

��

��"��

��

��1. VISIBLE DETERRENCE – MAINTAIN

CONTINUOUS PRESENCE2. SWIFT RESPONSE – PLACEMENT OF

ASSETS CLOSE TO THE TROUBLE SPOTS

3. FORWARD REACHING – MAINTAIN GOOD SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY (MARITIME AIRCRAFT AND SEA SURVEILANCE SYSTEM)

4. COOPERATION – SHARING ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATIONS AND ACTIONS WITH LOCAL AND FOREIGN AGENCIES

1. VISIBLE DETERRENCE – MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS PRESENCE

2. SWIFT RESPONSE – PLACEMENT OF ASSETS CLOSE TO THE TROUBLE SPOTS

3. FORWARD REACHING – MAINTAIN GOOD SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY (MARITIME AIRCRAFT AND SEA SURVEILANCE SYSTEM)

4. COOPERATION – SHARING ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATIONS AND ACTIONS WITH LOCAL AND FOREIGN AGENCIES

MALAYSIAN NAVY FLEET

MALAYSIA’S MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

(OPERATIONAL SINCE 1 NOVEMBER 2005)

��"��

��

��"��

��

1. SPECIAL LAW – INTERNAL SECURITY ACT – APPLIED TO KMM

2. DIRECTIVES, DOCTRINES AND PROCEDURES (NATIO-NAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE NO 18, INTERNATIONAL SHIP & PORT FACILITY SECURITY CODE (ISPS) AND MILITARY DOCTRINES

3. TRAINED ARMED FORCES, POLICE AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

4. SUPPORTING MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURES (SEA SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM)

5. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COOPE-RATIONS

6. KNOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TRAINING CENTRES FOR SPECIAL FORCES AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL CENTRE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM, KUALA LUMPUR SINCE 2003)

1. SPECIAL LAW – INTERNAL SECURITY ACT – APPLIED TO KMM

2. DIRECTIVES, DOCTRINES AND PROCEDURES (NATIO-NAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE NO 18, INTERNATIONAL SHIP & PORT FACILITY SECURITY CODE (ISPS) AND MILITARY DOCTRINES

3. TRAINED ARMED FORCES, POLICE AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

4. SUPPORTING MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURES (SEA SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM)

5. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MARITIME COOPE-RATIONS

6. KNOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY BUILDING (TRAINING CENTRES FOR SPECIAL FORCES AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL CENTRE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM, KUALA LUMPUR SINCE 2003)

��"��

��

��"��

�� • LEGISLATED IN 1960• ANY POLICE OFFICER, WITHOUT A WAR-

RANT, MAY ARREST AND DETAIN ANYONE HE HAS "REASON TO BELIEVE" HAS ACTED OR LIKELY TO ACT IN "ANY MANNER PRE-JUDICIAL TO THE SECURITY OF MALAYSIA"

• IT ALLOWS FOR RESTRICTIONS ON FREE-DOM OF ASSEMBLY, ASSOCIATION AND EXPRESSION

• A SUSPECT MAY INITIALLY BE DETAINED FOR 60 DAYS FOR INVESTIGATION

• ON APPROVAL OF THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER, SUSPECTS CAN BE DETAINED FOR UP TO TWO YEARS WITHOUT TRIAL

• LEGISLATED IN 1960• ANY POLICE OFFICER, WITHOUT A WAR-

RANT, MAY ARREST AND DETAIN ANYONE HE HAS "REASON TO BELIEVE" HAS ACTED OR LIKELY TO ACT IN "ANY MANNER PRE-JUDICIAL TO THE SECURITY OF MALAYSIA"

• IT ALLOWS FOR RESTRICTIONS ON FREE-DOM OF ASSEMBLY, ASSOCIATION AND EXPRESSION

• A SUSPECT MAY INITIALLY BE DETAINED FOR 60 DAYS FOR INVESTIGATION

• ON APPROVAL OF THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER, SUSPECTS CAN BE DETAINED FOR UP TO TWO YEARS WITHOUT TRIAL

��

1. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S DIRECTIVE NO 18:A. DESIGNED AS POLICY TO COORDINATE ACTION BY

RELEVANT GOVERNEMNT AGENCIESB. TERRORISM ON LAND AND IN THE AIR IS POLICE RESPON-

SIBILITY WHILE ARMED FORCES IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORISM AT SEA

C. RELEVANT AUTHORITIES ARE EQUIPPED AND TRAIN REGULARLY AT VARIOUS COMMAND LEVEL

2. COUNTER TERRORIST DOCTRINES ARE DEVELOP-ED AND TESTED ANNUALLY

3. PORTS SECURITY CHECK IS CONDUCTED BASED ON THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP & PORT FACILITY SECURITY CODE (ISPS ). ALL MALAYSIAN PORTS ARE ISPS CERTIFIED

1. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S DIRECTIVE NO 18:A. DESIGNED AS POLICY TO COORDINATE ACTION BY

RELEVANT GOVERNEMNT AGENCIESB. TERRORISM ON LAND AND IN THE AIR IS POLICE RESPON-

SIBILITY WHILE ARMED FORCES IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORISM AT SEA

C. RELEVANT AUTHORITIES ARE EQUIPPED AND TRAIN REGULARLY AT VARIOUS COMMAND LEVEL

2. COUNTER TERRORIST DOCTRINES ARE DEVELOP-ED AND TESTED ANNUALLY

3. PORTS SECURITY CHECK IS CONDUCTED BASED ON THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP & PORT FACILITY SECURITY CODE (ISPS ). ALL MALAYSIAN PORTS ARE ISPS CERTIFIED

�#��$��#��$��#��$��#��$��

��

TASK FORCE COMMANDER

SUPPORT SHIPS

NAVALHELICOPTERS

FRIGATES NAVAL SPECIAL FORCES TEAMS

MARITIMEPATROL

AIRCRAFT

442 x KASTURI-Class Corvettes

MULTI PURPOSE SHIP SUPER LYNX

EUROCOPTERFENNEC

FRIGATE

CORVETTE

NAVAL SPECIAL FORCES

MARITIME PATROLAIRCRAFT

KD INDERAPURA

�#��

�� %��

�#��

�� %��

1. OBJECTIVE: TO TEST THE STRAITS OF MALACCA TASK FORCE’S READINESS TO RESCUE A SHIP HIJACKED BY TERRORISTS

2. EXERCISE ACTIVITIES:A. TERRORISTS HIJACKED A SHIP CARRYING DANGEROUS CARGOES IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCAB. ACTIVATE NATIONAL SECU-RITY DIRECTIVE NO 18C. SETTING UP COMMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRES AT VARI-OUS COMMAND LEVELS

1. OBJECTIVE: TO TEST THE STRAITS OF MALACCA TASK FORCE’S READINESS TO RESCUE A SHIP HIJACKED BY TERRORISTS

2. EXERCISE ACTIVITIES:A. TERRORISTS HIJACKED A SHIP CARRYING DANGEROUS CARGOES IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCAB. ACTIVATE NATIONAL SECU-RITY DIRECTIVE NO 18C. SETTING UP COMMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRES AT VARI-OUS COMMAND LEVELS

��$��

��

�#��!!�

�� %��

�#��!!�

�� %��

2. EXERCISE ACTIVITIES:D. CARRIED OUT NEGOTIA-TION WITH THE TERRORISTSE. CONCURRENTLY THE TASK FORCE WAS PREPARED TO SECURE THE SHIPF. NEGOTIATION FAILEDG. RESCUE OPERATIONS LAUNCHED

BOARDING THE SHIP

SEARCHING FOR TERRORIST

AIRBORNE INSERTION

�#��

��

�#��

��

1. GENERAL BORDER COMMITTEES

2. TRILATERAL COORDINA-TED PATROL (JULY 2004)

3. SPECIAL NAVAL JOINT TASK FORCE –”MALSINDO” (JULY 2005)

4. “EYES IN THE SKY” INDONESIA, MALAY-SIA, SINGAPORE AND THAILAND (13 SEPT 2005)

1. GENERAL BORDER COMMITTEES

2. TRILATERAL COORDINA-TED PATROL (JULY 2004)

3. SPECIAL NAVAL JOINT TASK FORCE –”MALSINDO” (JULY 2005)

4. “EYES IN THE SKY” INDONESIA, MALAY-SIA, SINGAPORE AND THAILAND (13 SEPT 2005)

INDONESIA

MALAYSIA

SINGAPORE

“MALSINDO"

��

1. IT PROVIDES SURFACE PIC-TURES AND VESSEL TRAFFIC SAFETY

2. AREA OF COVERAGE IN LANGKAWI AND SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE STRAITS

3. DETECT, TRACK, ANALYSE, RECORD AND INFORM APPROPRIATE MARITIME AGENCIES FOR FURTHER ACTION

4. OPERATIONAL 24 HOURS A DAY

1. IT PROVIDES SURFACE PIC-TURES AND VESSEL TRAFFIC SAFETY

2. AREA OF COVERAGE IN LANGKAWI AND SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE STRAITS

3. DETECT, TRACK, ANALYSE, RECORD AND INFORM APPROPRIATE MARITIME AGENCIES FOR FURTHER ACTION

4. OPERATIONAL 24 HOURS A DAY

TG PIAI

MCC LUMUT

ACC LANGKAWI

TG. KEMARONG

PU ANGSA

CAPE RECHADO

PU UNDAN

SEGENTING

ACC JOHOR

ACC KLANG

BKT PENGERANG

COVERAGE OF SEA SURVEILLANCE

IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

TG PIAI

MCC LUMUT

ACC LANGKAWI

TG. KEMARONG

PU ANGSA

CAPE RECHADO

PU UNDAN

SEGENTING

ACC JOHOR

ACC KLANG

BKT PENGERANG

COVERAGE OF SEA SURVEILLANCE

IN THE STRAITS OF MALACCA

RADAR DISPLAYCONTROL CENTRE

RADAR COVERAGE

RADAR STATIONS

��

�#��

��

�#��

��

1. REGIONAL COOPERATIONSA. JOINT PATROL (MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE)B. EYES IN THE SKY PROGRAMME (MALAYSIA, INDONESIA,

SINGAPORE AND THAILAND)C. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONSA. US – MALAYSIA MILITARY EXERCISES (EX-CARAT FOR NAVY

AND NAVAL SPECIAL FORCES - ONCE A YEAR)B. FIVE POWER DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT (EX-STARFISH ONCE

EVERY TWO YEARS)C. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIESD. MOU WITH AUSTRALIA AND US TO COMBAT TERRORISM

1. REGIONAL COOPERATIONSA. JOINT PATROL (MALAYSIA, INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE)B. EYES IN THE SKY PROGRAMME (MALAYSIA, INDONESIA,

SINGAPORE AND THAILAND)C. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

2. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONSA. US – MALAYSIA MILITARY EXERCISES (EX-CARAT FOR NAVY

AND NAVAL SPECIAL FORCES - ONCE A YEAR)B. FIVE POWER DEFENCE ARRANGEMENT (EX-STARFISH ONCE

EVERY TWO YEARS)C. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIESD. MOU WITH AUSTRALIA AND US TO COMBAT TERRORISM

�#��

��

�#��

��

3. ASSISTANCES FOR KNOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY BUILDING (ONGOING PROGRAMMES):

A. JOINTLY SPONSORED REGIONAL TERRORISM TRAINING AT SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL CENTRE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM, KUALA LUMPUR (SEMINAR, CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS)B. HAND – ON TRAINING ONBOARD ORION MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT OF ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE IN BUTTERWORTH

4. ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCES FOR KNOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY BUILDING ARE WELCOMED

3. ASSISTANCES FOR KNOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY BUILDING (ONGOING PROGRAMMES):

A. JOINTLY SPONSORED REGIONAL TERRORISM TRAINING AT SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL CENTRE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM, KUALA LUMPUR (SEMINAR, CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS)B. HAND – ON TRAINING ONBOARD ORION MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT OF ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE IN BUTTERWORTH

4. ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCES FOR KNOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY BUILDING ARE WELCOMED

��

1. MALAYSIA IS CONTINUOUSLY WORKING HARD WITH OTHER LITTORAL STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ENSURE THE STRAITS OF MALACCA IS SAFE

2. MALAYSIA POSSES SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY AND INFRASTRUC-TURES TO COMBAT THE PRESENT THREAT OF MARITIME TERRORISM

3. THE THREAT OF MARITIME TERRORISM DOES EXIST BUT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE NOT IMMINENT

4. ASSISTANCES FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES ARE WELCOME BUT IN THE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY BUILDING – MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT, UAV, COMMUNI-CATION SYSTEM BUT NOT PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY FORCES

5. MALAYSIA IS ALSO PROMOTING ISLAM HADARI – PROGRESSIVE ISLAMIC APPROACH

1. MALAYSIA IS CONTINUOUSLY WORKING HARD WITH OTHER LITTORAL STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ENSURE THE STRAITS OF MALACCA IS SAFE

2. MALAYSIA POSSES SUFFICIENT CAPABILITY AND INFRASTRUC-TURES TO COMBAT THE PRESENT THREAT OF MARITIME TERRORISM

3. THE THREAT OF MARITIME TERRORISM DOES EXIST BUT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE NOT IMMINENT

4. ASSISTANCES FROM INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITIES ARE WELCOME BUT IN THE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE AND CAPACITY BUILDING – MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT, UAV, COMMUNI-CATION SYSTEM BUT NOT PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY FORCES

5. MALAYSIA IS ALSO PROMOTING ISLAM HADARI – PROGRESSIVE ISLAMIC APPROACH

THANK YOUTHANK YOU

radvanyi.ciss.msstate.eduradvanyi.ciss.msstate.edu/icwat/sutarji_bin_hj_kasmin_presentation.pdf ·...

Documents

yemen development

yemen poster

yemen: childhood under threat · 2020. 4. 28. · child...

vadm cutler dawson ndia presentation 24 october 2002lant esg...

yemen humanitarian pooled fund (hpf) yemen humanitarian...

humanitarian - united nations in yemen · 2019. 12. 15. ·...

yemen: civil war and regional intervention...former...

nscf strategic plan - draft 2018 accomplishments and ......

washington headquarters services room... · uss kennedy,...

published by the uss pyro uss pyro scuttlebutt …

yemen pdf

contralacorrupcion.mx · ] hackingteam[ price uss 50,000.00...

eco- yemen

yemen nutrition cluster bulletin,#42014...

contemporary practice of the united states...

yemen final

yemen crisis

fleeing yemen

the defender - amazon s3 · 2018-08-05 · exposing drone...

yemen conflict