1- abdo, geneive. the arab uprising and the rebirth of the shi'a-sunni divide (2013)
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THE NEW SECTARIANISM:
T A U R S-SD
G A
A N A L Y S I S P A P E R
N u m b e r 2 9 , A p r i l 2 0 1 3
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A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
T A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
I: T N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
R C S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
P O: T C B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A B H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
S D D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
S S R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
S M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B C: R G P F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
P T: T C L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
H S N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
S W S O I L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
S A I W S W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41R D P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
S A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
P T: T I F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
P F: W C U S D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
S B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A S C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
C
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of the research topic from the beginning, nearly
two years ago, and gave initial backing to the proj-
ect. Jean-Francois Seznec offered very useful feed-
back on Bahrain.
Tis monograph benefited from skilled and insight-
ful researchers. Reza H. Akbari, the authors giftedand perceptive research associate, worked hard to
provide material on a tough deadline and was always
willing to go beyond what was required. Nadine
Elali provided vital on-the-ground research in Leba-
non. Fatema Al Hashemi and Teodore Waddelow
were of great help with issues regarding Bahrain.
he author is deeply grateful to the Hen-
ry Luce Foundation for a generous grant
which made this project possible. Te
Earhart Foundation, a long-time supporter of the
authors work over the last decade, extended vital
support. Te Heinrich Boell Stiftung North Amer-
ica, the authors loyal partner on unrelated work,and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, also
contributed.
Te author is also grateful for intellectual support
from Daniel Byman, who was an insightful, knowl-
edgeable, and even-handed adviser, Kenneth Pol-
lack and amara Cofman Wittes. Nathan Brown
provided brilliant feedback during the papers early
drafts. Peter Mandaville recognized the importance
A
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Ms. Abdo is the coauthor ofAnswering Only to God:Faith and Freedom in wenty-First Century Iran(Henry Holt, 2003), a work that explains the theo-
logical struggle in Iran among the Shiite clerics and
how this struggle has caused political stagnation.
Her latest book on Muslims in America,Mecca and
Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11, waspublished in September 2006 by Oxford Universi-
ty Press. Tis book explained the changing identity
among American Muslims as they struggle to keep
true to their faith while deciding to what degree
they will integrate into American society.
From 2001-2002, Ms. Abdo was a Nieman Fellow
at Harvard University. Tat year, she also received
the prestigious John Simon Guggenheim award.
Ms. Abdos commentaries and essays on Islam haveappeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policymagazine,Te New York imes, Te Washington Post, Washing-ton Quarterly, Te New Republic, Newsweek, TeNation, theChristian Science Monitor, CNN, andMiddle East Report. She has been a commentator onCNN, National Public Radio, the BBC, the New-sHour withJim Lehrer, the Oprah Winfrey show,al Jazeera, PBS, and other radio and television ser-
vices.
She is a regular speaker at universities, think tanks,and other institutions in the United States, Europe,
and the Middle East.
G A, a nonresident fellow in the SabanCenter for Middle East Policy, and a fellow in the
Middle East program at the Stimson Center, specializ-
es in issues regarding modern Iran and political Islam.
She also co-chairs a project on Iran in conjunction
with the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, North America.
She was formerly the Liaison Officer for the Alli-
ance of Civilizations, a United Nations initiative es-
tablished by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
which aims to improve relations between Islamic
and western societies.
Before joining the United Nations, Ms. Abdo was a
foreign correspondent. Her 20-year career focused
on coverage of the Middle East and the Muslim
world. From 1998-2001, Ms.Abdo was the Iran
correspondent for the British newspaper theGuard-ianand a regular contributor to Te EconomistandtheInternational Herald ribune. She was the firstAmerican journalist to be based in Iran since the
1979 Islamic Revolution.
Ms. Abdo is the author of No God But God: Egyptand the riumph of Islam(Oxford University Press,2000), a work that documents the social and politi-
cal transformation of Egypt into an Islamic society.
Te book is the first to detail the leading figures and
events responsible for giving moderate Islamists inEgypt enormous social and political power. Oxford
University Press will publish an updated edition lat-
er in 2013.
A
http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_2/Ms.Abdohttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_2/Ms.Abdo -
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I: N S
future of these societies than the actions, policies,
or intentions of external actors. ehran may well
believe it can meddle as it pleases and bend eventsto its purposesand Washington and its western
allies may well agree. However, a close inspection of
facts on the ground in two potential regional flash-
pointsBahrain and Lebanonreveals that this is
simply not the case. ehrans tendency to see the
Arab uprisings in its own terms is more strategic
spin rather than an accurate reading of events, and
it is particularly vulnerable to overestimating its
own influence and the degree to which the Arabs
are prepared to look to Persian Iran for leadership
or guidance.
In fact, the Arab uprisings and their knock-on ef-
fects across the region are the very definition of
local, retail politics and represent a significant
break with a past largely dictated by outside forces,
foreign policy considerations, and proxy contests
between rival regional and global forces. As a re-
sult, the United States must continue to take into
account domestic political players across the Arab
world in order to protect and advance its geopoliti-
cal and economic interests. In other words, it is do-mestic politics that now drives foreign policynot
the other way around.
W
hen the Arab uprisings began in the
winter of 2011, Irans Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei was quick to express hisglee: one of the long-awaited objectives of the 1979
Islamic revolution would now be realized. Khame-
nei praised what he called the Islamic awakening
in the Arab world and claimed vindication for Irans
long-running efforts to overcome the Wests region-
al hegemony.
Te realization of a pan-Islamic Middle East was on
the horizon, in what Khamenei declared was a great
defeat for the United States and Israel. In a speech
on March 2, 2011, to celebrate the Persian NewYear, he expressed strong support for the recent re-
gional uprisings, and insisted that Iran supported
both its fellow Shia and the Sunni who make up
the majority of the worlds Muslims. We do not
distinguish among Gaza, Palestine, unisia, Libya,
Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. We have supported Pal-
estine for thirty-two years, and they are not Shia. It
is not an issue of Shia or Sunni. It is the protest of a
nation against oppression, Khamenei said.1
Yet Khameneis rhetoric fails to take into accountone of the most important facets of the Arab upris-
ings: domestic politics now has more sway over the
11390 Ayatollah Khamenei Nowruz Message, Youube video, posted by IranFree1390, March 20, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=44GvFGLQZw.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=44GvFGTLQZwhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=44GvFGTLQZwhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=44GvFGTLQZwhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=44GvFGTLQZw -
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Te Sunni in Lebanon believe that by confronting
Hizballah they are fighting for all Sunni, especial-
ly their persecuted co-religionists in Syria who are
being slaughtered at the hands of President Bashar
al-Asads Alawite-dominated regime.2Likewise, the
Shia in Bahrain believe their uprising is for the
benefit of all Shia in the region, particularly their
long-oppressed brethren across the border in Saudi
Arabia. In Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, sectarian-
ism has become so pronounced that Sunni clerics
now warn of the Shiitization of the Middle East
and exploit the brutality committed by Asads re-
gime to spur calls for outright Sunni ascendancy.
In this way, the wave of Arab uprisings has deep-
ened ethnic and religious tensions between Sunni
and Shia, which had been largely contained in re-
cent years, and pushed them once again to the fore.
Te U.S. invasion of Iraq and the accompanying
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, which allowed the
Shia to attain power in one of the regions leading
states, has now been eclipsed by a growing Sunni
bid for ascendency in both the religious and polit-
ical realms.
As a result, a strong argument can be made that the
Shia-Sunni divide is well on its way to displacingthe broader conflict between Muslims and the West
as the primary challenge facing the Islamic societ-
ies of the Middle East for the foreseeable future.
Such sectarian conflict is also likely to supplant the
Palestinian occupation as the central mobilizing
factor for Arab political life. As Arab societies be-
come more politically active and aware at home in
the aftermath of the uprisings, fighting Israel is less
of a priority, especially because there are so many
domestic crises. And with this inward perspective
comes an intensification of identities. Religion,gender, and ethnicity play a far more prominent
Although external actors played some role in the
uprisings in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, it is local
figures who instigated the uprisings and who are
likely to play significant roles in the future. As a
result of this shift in the power dynamics in Arab
states, the United States must now also take religion
into account in policy formation. Many local actors
who are influencing events are either sheikhs, cler-
ics, or pious Muslims who believe Islam should play
a central role in their lives.
Te coming of the Arab uprisings has left the Unit-
ed States in a position where it has to deal not only
with Islamist parties, groups, and factions but also
with those more traditional religious figures who
have emerged as political players. Simply put, the
rise of the new sectarianism within the Arab world
has greatly complicated the diplomatic and geo-
political challenges facing the United States by
demanding that serious consideration be given to
religious difference in its own right, and not simply
as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, eco-
nomic, orpolitical contestation.
More than two years after the Arab uprisings began,
the benefits for Iran are clearly more limited, and
the picture is more complicated, than Khameneihad foreseen. Any dream that the uprisings would
spawn a new era of pan-Islamism has been dashed
by the Syrian war, which has revived the central
narrative of Shia-Sunni conflict that has raged off
and on for centuries across the Middle East. Each
new turn in Syria, whether facts on the ground or
merely perceptions of new threats and new align-
ments that may emerge, reverberates throughout
the Levant and the Persian Gulf. In this way, the
Syrian war has provided a mechanism for amplify-
ing traditional sectarian conflict, effectively elevat-ing it to a transnational affair.
2Te place of the Alawites in the Muslim world is a complex and controversial one. A mystical sect with ties to the beliefs and practices of Iransmajority welver Shiism, the Alawites have long been the subject of suspicion within orthodox Sunni Muslim circles, a number of whom do notconsider them true Muslims. Te welver Shia, for their part, accept the Alawites. In order to understand todays religious politics, one mustrecognize that, whatever their doctrinal and practical differences, a natural affinity between the Alawites and the Shia is generally assumed by bothlaymen and religious scholars in the region.
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trying to regain power over the Shia, but the Shia
are not working for Iran, said Ayatollah Ali Fad-
lallah, the son of the recently-deceased Ayatollah
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the former spiritual
guide of millions of Shia who opposed the Iranian
practice of velayat-e-faqih,or rule by a supreme re-ligious figure.4
Other questions the monograph will address in-
clude: Can Iran influence the Arab Shia, many of
whom have an historic Arab identity, not a Persian
one, in order to realize the Islamic republics stated
agenda of pan-Islamism in the Middle East? Or, is
Iran being sidelined by forces outside its control?
o date, Iranian influence has operated mostly in
the background, ever-presentand, to some, even
forebodinglargely as a function of Irans geo-po-
litical weight, its radical vision of Shiite clerical
power, and its revolutionary heritage. As such, the
Iranian role is best viewed within the context of spe-
cific events on the ground, and it is for this reason
that I have generally integrated my discussion of
the policies, actions, and aspirations of the Islamic
republic into the relevant sections on Bahrain and
Lebanon. A brief review of the Iran factor then
concludes the main section of the text.
Te research questions outlined above will be ad-
dressed in light of approximately 200 substantive
interviews with key players, analysts, and policy-
makers in the Middle East, and another two dozen
interviews in the United States and Europe, con-
ducted from March 2012 to January 2013, as well
as current literature and media reports in Persian,
Arabic, and English. I will then conclude with
some analysis and recommendations for U.S. pol-
icymakers struggling with the challenges posed bythe reemergence of sectarian discourse in the poli-
tics of the Muslim Middle East.
role in determining social and political interaction
than in the past.
Te observation of the prominent scholar Michael
Hudson 45 years ago is more apt today than ever:
Te reason that communal identities remain so
strong, reinforced rather than obliterated by the
communication explosion, is the result of historic
doctrinal differences and memories of oppression,
both antique and recent.3
Tis monograph will document how and why sec-
tarianism is on the rise in Arab states, with particu-
lar focus on social, religious, and political upheav-
al in Bahrain and Lebanon. I will also explore the
prospects for greater Iranian influence, as the sectar-
ian conflict escalates and western policy continues
to dismiss or even ignore outright the grievances of
people in the region as they battle one another and
their existing governments.
One caveat is in order at the outset: this monograph
should not be viewed as a generalization of all Shia
views toward Sunni or vice versa. Te extent and
degree to which each sect takes hostile positions to-
ward the other differs greatly from one country to
another.Still, the findings presented below demon-strate the degree to which, in todays Arab world,
all politics is local. While external actors may still
influence events, in the majority of Arab states, it is
local actors that matter most.
Several key questions will be addressed in the course
of this study. In the wake of the Arab uprisings,
how is the conflict between Shia and Sunni reflect-
ed on the ground? How is Iran trying to influence
this conflict? Is there receptivity to Irans overtures,
especially now that the region is undergoing anunprecedented upheaval? As one prominent Shia
cleric remarked, the matter is not as straightfor-
ward as it may appear to many in the West: Iran is
3Hudson,Michael.Te Precarious Republic: Political Mobilization in Lebanon. New York: Random House, 1968. 25.4Fadlallah, Ali. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Beirut, June 25, 2012.
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of the invasion of Iraq and overthrow of its Sun-
ni-dominated Baathist regime, many Shia are now
convinced the United States is behind the Sunni
bid for regional power. Tis view has been strength-
ened in their eyes by Washingtons engagement
with the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and its sup-
port for the Syrian uprising. For the Arab Shia, the
brief period in 2006-2007, which prompted King
Abdullah II of Jordan to warn his fellow Sunni of
a coming Shia Crescent across the region, now
seems a distant memory.5
In the eyes of many Sunni, the Arab uprisings have
provided an opportunity to undercut the Iran-Hiz-
ballah-Syria axis. Yet, they still see Irans skilled and
often mendacious hands behind every twist and
turn, in particular in ehrans deep involvement in
helping Asad cling to power. o listen to many Sun-
ni in Arab states, particularly in the Persian Gulf,
is to perceive all Shia as iron-clad Iranian loyalists.
Tis association serves many purposes. First, it is an
instrument with which to demonize the Shia and
to portray them as being in cahoots with the region-
al culprit, Iran, which is at odds with many Sunni
governments. No matter how much Khamenei has
tried to convince the world of a coming pan-Islam-
ic awakening, many Sunni states are seeking to fur-ther distance themselves from ehran. Meanwhile,
the Muslim street remains conflicted. In religious
terms, the assertion of an Iranian connection is also
an effective Sunni tactic for casting doubt on the
Muslim credentials of the Shia.
Some Arab intellectuals believe that the uprisings
have created the conditions for rising sectarianism
by undermining the authoritarian regimes that once
kept them in check. When states are weak, sectari-
anism rises, the renowned Lebanese religious schol-ar Hani Fahs told the author in June of 2012. Peo-
ple return to their primary identities. And the more
religiosity in a society, the more the state is weak. 6
Te rise of sectarianism is being driven today pri-
marily by three factors. First, a Sunni Islamist as-
cendancy in unisia and, particularly, in Egypt has
reignited the sectarian flame that has historically
hovered over the Middle East. Te Islamist nature
of these two governments is a source of empower-
ment for Sunnis and a thorn in the side of the Shia.
Some Shia see the new Sunni Islamist governments
in both of these countries as a beginning to what
could become a Sunni-dominated region if Asad
falls to a Sunni-led government in Syria and Hiz-
ballah in turn loses power in Lebanon. And with
uprisings and widespread opposition to Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri al Malikis government in Iraq, the
Shia could be in trouble there as well.As the Sun-
nis feel increasingly empowered by the recent chal-
lenges to authoritarian Arab regimes, the Shia feel
all the more threatened.
Second, the civil war in Syria has sparked renewed
conflict over Arab and Islamic identity in neighbor-
ing countriesespecially in Lebanonand even in
those states untouched directly by the war, such as
Bahrain and Kuwait. Not only is Asads likely fall a
blow to a potential Shia ascendance which began
in Iraq with Shia leader Nuri Al Maliki becoming
prime minister, but the atrocities being committedagainst the Sunni in Syria are a glaring blight on all
Shia in the region.
And third, popular perceptions of outside interven-
tion and interference have created a virtual proxy
war with Iran, Syria, and Hizballah on one side and
Saudi Arabia, the United States, and urkey on the
other.
Te Shia had hoped that after al Maliki came to
power a regional alliance could be formed amongtheir co-religionists in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. If at
one time the Shia believed the United States would
not obstruct their rise to prominence, as a result
5Wright, Robin, and Peter Baker, Iraq, Jordan See Treat to Election from Iran. Washington Post, December 8, 2004.6Fahs, Hani. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Beirut, June 26, 2012.
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may provide those Sunni-dominated governments
still standing with powerful justification to retain
authoritarian rule.
Te Shia have long been a reminder to Sunni Mus-
lims of the unresolved differences within Islam
since the death of the Prophet Mohammad more
than 1,400 years ago. Over the centuries, the differ-
ences between these two major sects has crystallized
around the question of the rightful succession to
the Prophet as head of the early religious and polit-
ical community: should the new leader be chosen
from among Mohammads closest companions, or
only from his direct bloodline? Te Shia telling of
this storyencapsulated in the death of Hussein,
the grandson of the Prophet and the champion of
the future Shia, by the Umayyads in a battle near
Karbala in 680 CEhas created the narrative most
Shia have lived by ever since.
It is a narrative of defeat, martyrdom and disposses-
sion and lies at the core of Shia identity, so much
so that the martyrdom of Hussein in the hopelessly
one-sided battle at Karbala is re-enacted each year
by the Shia during the solemn religious commem-
oration of Ashura. Shiism as a distinct doctrine
only emerged in the ninth century. It took on great-er political significance with the rise of Fatamids in
Egypt, and then with the establishment of Shiism
as the state religion of Iran under the Safavid dy-
nasty in the early sixteenth century. Now, the Shia
comprise about 10 to 15 percent of the Muslim
population in the Arab world. Te mere existence
of these and other, smaller sects and factions is a
slap in the face to the proclaimed concept of uni-
ty among the ummah,the collective community ofbelievers which lies at the heart of the Islamic faith.
It is difficult in the cases of Bahrain and Lebanon to
separate doctrinal difference from calculated struggle
While it is common in Washington circles to over-
estimate Irans regional influence and capabilities, it
would be nave not to assume that Iran is seeking
to turn the Shia uprising in Bahrain to its advan-
tage, and strengthen Hizballah in Lebanon, as strife
between Sunni and Shia increases, and meddle in
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, in order to
inspire the minority Shia populations in these two
countries to seize upon the spirit of the uprisings
and assert themselves. If five years from now, Bah-
raini society is extremely polarized and there is still
no resolution to the current crisis, the Iranians will
be the greatest beneficiaries, said one high-ranking
U.S. official.7
R CS
While Shia-Sunni animosity is not new, today it
displays some characteristics that differ from histor-
ical sectarianism in the Middle East. raditionally,
sectarianism can be understood as an institution-
al set of arrangements determining familial, local,
regional, and even broader kinds of loyalty and
affiliation.7oday, however, the increase in sectar-
ian conflict is primarily the result of the collapse of
authoritarian rule and a struggle for political andeconomic power and over which interpretation of
Islam will influence societies and new leaderships.
In states such as Bahrain and Lebanon, where the
Shiite comprise approximately 70 and 40 percent
of the population, respectively, the prospects of
democratic governance alarm the Sunni. As a result,
democracy is viewed as part of a subversive Shia
agenda, rather than as a universal principle which
would advance modernity and development in
those countries.8
Even though the underlying goalof the Arab uprisings was to move toward more of
a democratic-style of governance, the Shia threat
7Anonymous. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Washington, DC, January 3, 2013.8Weiss, Max.In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shiism and the Making of Modern LebanonCambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. 12.9Fuller, Graham, and Rend Rahim Francke.Te Arab Shia: Te Forgotten Muslims. New York: St. Martins Press, 1999. 55.
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Tis anti-Shia sentiment has been exacerbated by
the emergence on the political scene of the so-called
Salafi movement, whose idealized notion of Islam
predates any of the religious and social tensions that
first produced the major sectarian split within Is-
lam and ultimately gave birth to the various Shia
groups. Te origins of Salfism lie in the nineteenth
century, and the Salafi school of thought has been
adopted by Muslims who seek to apply literalist in-
terpretations of scripture based upon the teachings
of the Prophet and his immediate circle. Te Ar-
abic word salaf means predecessors, in this casereferring to the closest companions of the Prophet.
Salafists generally seek a return to their vision of
the seventh century, when they believe Islam was
practiced in direct keeping with the teachings of
Mohammad. Before the Arab uprisings, attention
focused on two primary trends among the Salafists:
those who proselytized through dawa,or the reli-gious call, and were neither violent nor politically
active, and thejihadists, who practiced violence toachieve their aims.
Although Salafi trends are varied across the region
and even within each country, from the 1920s until
the late 1970s the Salafists generally preferred qui-
etism. Tey frowned upon participation in electoralpolitics because they believed that the only law-giv-
er was God, and that man-made government was
by definition illegitimate. In this way, they were
very close to the traditional Shia clerics of Iran,
before Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeinis attempt at
a radical reworking of religious teachings to allow
for direct and on-going intervention into temporal
affairs.13
But in the early 1980s, some Salafists became polit-
ically active and steadily more radical. Some of this
for political and economic power. Although this re-
ligious difference is often the central issue discussed
in the mosques and the media, the Arab uprisings,
which unleashed ethnic, religious and gender con-
flicts, highlighted both sects determination to de-
mand full civic rights and political empowerment.
Where possible, I will attempt to decouple religion
from sectarianism in order to analyze which aspects
of the conflict are due to a struggle for political
power and which stem from religious differences
and how each cause fuels the other.
Over the last three decades, as Sunni Islamist move-
ments gained widespread popular support, the Shia
also began to mobilize, despite restraints imposed
by their respective governments. According to Max
Weiss, as the Shia of Lebanon became better ca-
pable of articulating their political demands, they
transformed themselves from a sect-in-itself to a
sect-for-itself. 10Broadly speaking, the Shia, once
a seemingly weak and alienated sect within Arab
Islam, are now demanding their rights and reaching
for greater political influence, from Saudi Arabia to
Bahrain and Kuwait.
Just how profound are the challenges still facing
the Shia was recently documented in an opinionsurvey conducted by the Pew Forum, a Washing-
ton-based research institute. Te study showed a
widespread belief in most Arab countries that Shia
are not real Muslims.11Tis was true particularly in
countries where Shia represent only a small minori-
ty. According to the survey, at least 40 percent of
Sunni do not accept the Shia as fellow Muslims. In
many cases, even greater percentages do not believe
that some practices common among Shia, such as
visiting holy shrines and praying to dead religious
figures, are legitimate Islamic traditions.12
10Weiss, 187.11In this context it is worth noting that the rhetoric of militant Sunni movements, such as al-Qaida, reserve at least as much venom for the Shia as
they do for America and its allies.12Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Te Worlds Muslims: Unity and Diversity, PewForum.org. (August 9, 2012). http://www.pewforum.
org/Muslim/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary.aspx.13Abdo, Geneive, and Jonathan Lyons.Answering Only to God: Faith & Freedom in wenty-First Century Iran. New York: Henry Holt, 2003.
90-122.
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challenge from a new sense of self-determination
within these same societies. Even if the Arab Shia
religious leadership in Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon
do not directly challenge the clerical establishment
in Iran, it is likely such a challenge will come from
the bottom upfrom the streeta process that is
already taking shape in Lebanon and Bahrain.
It is likely, too, that the Arab Shia street over time
will take issue with Irans theological claim to
Shiism and seek independence through their lo-
cally-based maraji, or religious and moral sourcesof emulation. In Shiism, believers routinely seek
advice from mujtahids (religious scholars who in-terpret the holy text for their followers) regarding
all aspects of their lives. As a result, the Arab Shia
marajimay soon be faced with a difficult choice:subservience to the clerics in Qom or self-assertion
to accommodate their proverbial street.
Tis latter course has been the case in Egypt, where
al Azhar, the seat of learning for Sunni Muslims,
began asserting its independence from official reli-
gious interpretations under former President Hosni
Mubarak and hopes the Islamist government led
by President Mohammad Morsi will aid its desire
for greater independence. However, an Islamist-ledgovernment could prove to be a competitor for al
Azhars religious legitimacy within society.15 Te
role of the clergy among the Shia, however, is more
important than it is for the Sunni. Tis doctrine
(Usuliyya) gave the living mujtahidsa power beyondanything claimed by the Sunni ulemaand gave totheir ruling a sanction beyond anything merely de-
creed.16
Te welver Shia in Lebanon have a long history of
religious classical education. Jabal Amil, an area in
radicalism stems from their assumed roles as the
moral guardians of the ummah, which promote notonly campaigns against immodesty but also decla-
rations over whether minority sects are real Mus-lims. In this way, the modern Salafist movement
has accelerated sectarian tensions because many do
not accept the Shia as Muslims.
While analysts, scholars and decision-makers are
quick to observe that the Shia-Sunni conflict is a
battle within Islam, the broader geo-political im-
plications from the rise in sectarianism should be
of great concern to the United States as it seeks to
preserve its interests in the Middle East. In Bahrain,
for example, the lack of reconciliation between the
Shia-dominated opposition and the U.S.-backed
Sunni government is radicalizing both sides.
Te Shia in Bahrain have made an effort to con-
vince the world that they do not want to be aligned
with Iran. However, attitudes there are beginning
to change as more radial Bahraini Shia turn to
Iran or its proxies for help. In the long-term, the
United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states
which support the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe will un-
dercut their security objectives if they do not take
measures to assist the opposition or penalize the AlKhalifa government for its repressive policies that
have led to well-documented human rights viola-
tions. What the Saudis dont see is that they are
driving the Shia into the arms of Iran, said Pro-
fessor Cherif Bassiouni, a legal scholar who led the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, after
the 2011 uprising began.14
Despite Irans political strategy of seizing upon the
opportunities and exploiting the instability creat-
ed by the Arab uprisings, ehran faces the added
14Bassiouni, Cherif. Interview by Geneive Abdo. Chicago, September 13, 2012.15Abdo,Geneive. No God But God: Egypt and the riumph of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 41-70. For a slightly different
interpretation see: Brown, Nathan. Post-Revolutionary Al-Azhar, Te Carnegie Papers(2011): 1-24. http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/03/post-revolutionary-al-azhar/8kit
16Keddie, Nikki R. Te Roots of the Ulamas Power in Modern Iran, in ed. Nikki R. Keddie, Scholars, Saints, and Sufis. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1972. 223.
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Tis has changed dramatically since the uprising
began in the spring of 2011, when the Shia-dom-
inated opposition challenged the government and
most Sunni intellectuals and activists, who at first
joined the Shia, backed out of the protest move-
ment.18Trough an orchestrated state-media cam-
paign claiming Iran was behind the uprising in or-
der to create a religious state based upon supreme
clerical rule, the government managed to create
deep suspicion among the Sunnis toward the Shia.
Given Bahrains long history of sectarian tension
and a Gulf-wide obsession with Irans potential in-
fluence, the governments strategy had little diffi-
culty succeeding among the Bahraini elite. It also
played well across the Gulf, particularly in the re-
gional power Saudi Arabia, and found sympathetic
ears in the West.
Te Sunnis treat the Shia in the region like sec-
ond-class citizens, said Ayatollah Sayed Ali al
Hakim, a Shiite cleric in Lebanon who comes from
a powerful clerical family whose teachings have left
their footprints on the seminaries of Qom, Najaf
and Beirut. In some Sunni states, they dont treat
us as humans We would never go to a place and
kill people like they [the Sunnis] did on 9/11.19
the south, is home to the oldest and most renowned
welver Shia community in the region. From the
Middle Ages, it has been considered a seat of Shia
learning; many of its mujtahidsmigrated to Iran inorder to institutionalize Irans seminaries during the
sixteenth century, when Shiism became the official
doctrine of the Safavid dynasty.
Yet, despite this illustrious history, the Shia of Leb-
anon historically were considered the forgotten
Muslims. As the Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi
wrote: While the achievements of the Jabal Amil
scholars in the field were held in high esteem for a
long time throughout the Shiite Muslim world, and
most of all in Iran, they naturally had no impact
on the Lebanese scene outside strictly Shiite circles.
No effort of imagination could convincingly depict
them as part of a general Lebanese heritage.17
Across the region, the Arab uprisings have upset
or threatened to do sothe often uneasy accom-
modations reached between Shia and Sunni. Te
case of Bahrain, where the Shia constitute about 70
percent of the population but have been effectively
excluded from power for centuries, illustrates this
phenomenon. Under the Sunni Al Khalifas, who
first took control in the 1700s, a certain level of so-cial integration, including some intermarriage, was
the historical norm.
17Salibi, Kamal.A House of Many Mansions: Te History of Lebanon Reconsidered. Berkley: University of California Press, 1990. 208.18Anonymous sources. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Manama, March 2012.19al Hakim, Sayed Ali. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Beirut, June 25, 2012.
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P O: C B
rich and ancient heritage, along with a long history
of Shiism. Te Shia of Bahrain were strengthened
by Irans adoption of Shiism as the state religion inthe early sixteenth century, and then by Irans direct
control over Bahraini territory beginning in 1602.20
At the time, Bahrain was an important center for
the Arab Shia, along with Jabal Amil in Lebanon
and Kufa and Najaf in Iraq. All of these places be-
came centers of learning for the newly-formed Sa-
favid state in Iran, which needed to educate its Shia
clerics. In fact, the first Safavid Shah cleared his
rulings with clerics in Najaf and Bahrain to ensure
their theological validity.21 It is this history which
the Sunni government and its loyalists use todaywhen they brand the Shia opposition as Safavid
loyalists of Iran.
Te Shia domination of Bahrain came to end with
the conquest by the Al Khalifa tribe in 1782. Te
invasion came from the east from Qatar, and many
Shia living in that part of the island were killed or
expelled; others fled north and west, which remain
Shia strongholds today. In a precursor of things to
come, nearly three-hundred years later, the Al Khal-
ifas in the 1820s called upon the Dawasir tribes inSaudi Arabia to send troops to Bahrain to further
displace the Shia.22Te Bahraini Shia had adopted
E
thnic and religious identity has increasingly
come to define a number of modern Arab
states. Such is the case with Bahrain. Teunderlying causes for the uprising in 2011 have fes-
tered and affected how the Sunni and Shia perceive
one another, not only at home but in other Arab
states as well. Te Shia-dominated uprising in Bah-
rain is now a struggle, not just for the Bahrainis,
but for the standing of the collective Shia in the
Middle East.
For months into the uprising, which began in Feb-
ruary 2011, some Bahrainis, western scholars, and
analysts continued to argue that, unlike a war-torncountry such as Lebanon, Bahrain did not suffer
from deep sectarian divisions. Clearly, this assess-
ment was misguided. Although Bahrain did not
endure a protracted civil war, as was the case in
Lebanon, the country has a long history of dealing
with institutionalized discrimination against the
majority Shia population.
A B H
Among the nation states in the Persian Gulf thatdeveloped in the twentieth century on a foundation
of oil wealth, Bahrain stood out with its particularly
20Fuller and Franke, 121.21Ibid.22Ibid.
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political society, has begun defying government
bans on protests, beginning in September 2012.
Fears of Irans potential for interference are sup-
ported, at least to some degree, by historical prece-
dence. Te 1979 Islamic revolution made a signifi-
cant mark on the Shia in Bahrain and in other Gulf
states. Radical Shia groups emerged in Bahrain,
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Iranian clerics came to
preach in Bahrain and members of a Bahraini Shia
movement, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of
Bahrain (IFLB), visited ehran.
In 1981, the Bahraini government announced it
had uncovered a plot to stage a coup, directed by
the IFLB. Te Bahraini government said the con-
spirators were trained in ehran, and even moder-
ate Shia were suspected by the government as part
of an alleged fifth column.25Te complaint of the
opposition was to address the discriminatory prac-
tices against the Shia, although different groups
had different aims. Te Islamic Freedom Move-
ment, another opposition group based in London,
for example, did not advocate an Islamic state in
Bahrain but rather a more equitable distribution
of wealth. One leader of the group was the cleric
Sheikh Abdel Amir al Jamri, a renowned religiousscholar, whose son by the same name is now a mod-
erate leader in the opposition and the editor of the
newspaper, Al Wasat.
Until the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, the Bah-
raini opposition was dominated by secular-minded
Bahrainisboth Shia and Sunni. But after the revo-
lution, Islamist movements began leading the oppo-
sition.26Contributing to this new religious character
was the fact that slowly more Shia began attending
seminaries in Qom, Irans holy city and home to
Shiism from the early days of the split within Islam
and consider themselves to be the real natives of the
land. Tey called themselves Baharna. A minority
of Shia at the time of Persian descent were known
as Ajam.
Grievances within the Bahraini population are not
new: the modern demand for greater political pow-
er in Bahrain can be traced to 1938, when groups
of Sunnis and Shia presented demands for local
autonomy to the British governor.23 Te British
had sought to bring an end to the prosecution and
killing of the Shia. Te movement, however, was
not successful. During the pan-Arabist period in
the 1950s and 1960s, as in many other Arab states,
Bahrains opposition groups tended to be left-lean-
ing and nationalistic. Teir goals were to end the
British occupation of Bahrain and the Gulf. Com-
pared with today, religion had a far less a role to
play in articulating the grievances of the opposition
to the state.
Te country has undergone rebellions since the
1920s, with significant protests occurring every
ten years or so. However, the current protests are
arguably being taken more seriously by all sides
for a number of reasons. First, the successful up-risings that have occurred in Iraq, Egypt, Yemen,
and unisia have fueled fears within the Al Khalifa
government that they may not be able to control
the opposition much longer. Second, there is an
intensified fear among Gulf monarchies of Irans
attempts to exploit the Arab uprisings, sensitivities
heightened by Iranian state propaganda as well as
its direct intervention in Syria.24 Tird, the Shia
of Bahrain are no longer willing to wait patiently
for reforms that may never be implemented. Even
the moderate al Wefaq, the official Shia opposition
23Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 26.24George, Marcus. Irans Revolutionary Guards commander says its troops in Syria. Reuters,September 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/09/16/us-iran-syria-presence-idUSBRE88F04C20120916.25Fuller and Francke, 126-127.26International Crisis Group. Bahrains Sectarian Challenge, Crisisgroup.org. May 6, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/
media-releases/2005/mena/bahrains-sectarian-challenge.aspx.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/16/us-iran-syria-presence-idUSBRE88F04C20120916http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/16/us-iran-syria-presence-idUSBRE88F04C20120916http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_2/Crisisgroup.orghttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2005/mena/bahrains-sectarian-challenge.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2005/mena/bahrains-sectarian-challenge.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2005/mena/bahrains-sectarian-challenge.aspxhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2005/mena/bahrains-sectarian-challenge.aspxhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_2/Crisisgroup.orghttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/16/us-iran-syria-presence-idUSBRE88F04C20120916http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/16/us-iran-syria-presence-idUSBRE88F04C20120916 -
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a series of clashes and street protests broke out in
Bahrains Shia villages. Te root causes behind the
unrest were said to include state authoritarianism,
the absence of civil and political rights, a stagnant
economy, and extensive anti-Shia discrimination.28
Te Bahraini government was largely viewed by the
Shia community as a corrupt regime that favored
the loyal factions close to it and utterly ignored the
impoverished Shia areas of the country.
While the Shia formed the majority of the protes-
tors, a number of Sunni sought a return to rela-
tively liberal 1973 constitution and helped the
cause by collecting pro-reform petitions, signed by
thousands.29Te uprising also brought about a rare
union among leftist, liberals, and Islamist factions,
who joined forces to demand democratic reforms.
For four years, large demonstrations and street
clashes became the norm. Tis period of unrest in
Bahrain is referred to as the 1994-1998 Intifada.
And as a result of this uprising, religious symbol-
ism as a political tool became one of the character-
istics of the protest movement.30Te governments
response to the street protests was brutal. Tou-
sands of demonstrators and activists were arrested
and some of the opposition leaders were exiled.
31
In 1996, the Bahraini government accused Iran of
funding an organization called the Bahraini Hiz-
ballah, which had allegedly carried out a number
of violent attacks inside the kingdom. In June of
that year, 51 Bahrainis were arrested and charged
with plotting against the government.32Some Shia
have questioned whether this plot ever existed and
accuse the government of greatly exaggerating any
threat.
much of the Shia clerical establishment. For the first
time, Friday prayer sermons in Bahrain were used in
the mosque to discuss the grievances among Bah-
rainis, such as unemployment and social justice.27
Despite the fact that a majority of Shia in Bah-
rain subscribe to the Jafari School of Islamic juris-
prudence, they follow a range of spiritual leaders
which, as explained above, is permitted in Shia
Islam. In political terms, this means their allegianc-
es are divided; some Bahrainis consider Ayatollah
Khamenei their religious guide, others follow Aya-
tollah Sistani in Iraq, while others remain admires
of the late Ayatollah Fadlallah, who spent a great
deal of his life in Lebanon. It is extremely difficult
to determine the exact numbers of Shia who follow
a particular ayatollah, but it is widely believed that
most Shia in Bahrain follow Sistani. Just as these
spiritual guides hold differing views on the issue
of velayat-e faqih, so do their followers. Sistani andFadlallah oppose direct clerical intervention in pol-
itics and are considered quietest clerics. Khamenei,
of course, favors supreme clerical rule.
Much is made of the fact that the Bahraini Shia are
attached to their Arab identity, and thus, less inclined
to be lured into Irans embrace. Tis argument hasmore credibility when assessing whether Bahrainis
would want to be ruled by the Islamic republic or a
similar theocracy, but has less validity when discuss-
ing Irans religious influence over the Shia in Arab
countries. When it comes to choosing a marja, forexample, the teachings of a particular religious schol-
arArab or Persianseem to trump ethnicity.
In the 1990s, the Shia in Bahrain began to unify
more than in the past. Between 1994 and 1998,
27Bahri, Luayy. Te Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain,Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume 11 (Summer 2000): 131.28International Crisis Group, Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): Te Bahrain Revolt,Middle East/North Africa Report
105 (2011): 2.29International Crisis Group (2011): 2.30Bahri (2000): 131.31Human Rights Watch, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain, HRW.org. (1997). http://www.hrw.org/
reports/1997/07/01/routine-abuse-routine-denial32Fuller and Francke, 135.
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Te reworking of laws on naturalization and
citizenship.
Efforts to reduce sectarian divisions.
New mechanisms to provide food subsidies to
the most needy citizens, many of whom areShia.
S D D
When the current uprising began as part of the
wave of revolutions in the Arab world, the majority
of young protestors marching to the Pearl Round-
about, a landmark in downtown Manama that
served as the proverbial square for revolution, were
Shia. It was three days after former President Hosni
Mubarak had been driven from power and the Bah-rainis chose a symbolic day, February 14. On this
day ten years earlier, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khal-
ifa had declared that his National Action Charter,
the major reform project, would be enforced, and
proclaimed Bahrain as a constitutional monarchy
with a bicameral parliament and an elected lower
chamber.
Yet, a decade on, power still remains primarily in
the hands of the king and the appointed prime
minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa,who is the kings uncle and has been in the post for
more than 40 years. Te king has the power to ap-
point and dismiss the prime minister, appoint and
dismiss half of the legislative assembly represented
by a Shura Council, to appoint judges to the Con-
stitutional Court, and the right to impose marshal
law, which he did shortly after the uprising began.
Te protesters were demanding the removal of the
prime minister, who is widely unpopular even with-
in governmental circles, new elections, and a new
constitution.
Te Bahraini government was determined not to
go the way of Egypt and unisia. On March 14,
the government welcomed 1,200 troops from Sau-
di Arabia and 800 from the United Arab Emirates,
Te most recent drive among the Shia for politi-
cal and social reform began when Sheikh Hamad
Al Khalifa, Bahrains current king, took the helm.
He released hundreds of prisoners who had been
put in jail, including Sheikh Jamri. He announced
a pledge in December 1999 to hold municipal
elections, when for the first time women would be
allowed to vote. In 2000, he issued a decree revis-
ing the composition of the Majlis al Shura, a con-
sultative council, increasing the number of Shia
members. Perhaps his most significant reform was
to appoint a committee to create a National Action
Charter that would ring in constitutional, judicial,
and political reform.
Te National Action Charter was approved in a
referendum but trouble followed. In 2002, King
Hamads revision of the constitution unilaterally
without putting the revisions to a popular refer-
endum caused opposition from Shia and Sunni.
Te amendments gave great power to the executive
branch over the legislature. For example, legislation
could not be passed without the approval of the
Majlis al Shura, a special advisory council whose
members were appointed by the king.
Te broad demands of todays mainstream op-position were outlined in a proposed plan which
emerged in July 2011. It is unclear whether the
main stream Shia opposition will continue to make
the demands that it had in the past. Tese include
the following:
An elected parliament with expanded pow-
ers, including the power to confirm or reject a
nominated cabinet.
Direct election of the Prime Minister by the
largest coalition within the elected parliament.
Te monitoring of elections by an independent
electoral commission.
Fairly demarcated electoral boundaries to
prevent the government from gerrymandering
to ensure a Sunni majority in the lower house.
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In staunch defense of the Shia in Bahrain, he ad-
monished in harsh terms the Saudi government for
sending troops to crush the uprising. As the guard-
ians of the two holiest shrines in Islam, he declared,
Saudis owed an explanation of their behavior to the
entire Muslim world.
It is unfortunate that the Muslims revolutions
against American domination and influence caus-
es the ruler of the two holy mosques anger. It
is questionable for every Muslim that the rulers of
the two holy mosques, who should make no a dis-
tinction [between Shia and Sunni] yet in Bahrain
supports subjugation, dictatorship, [and] vice.
No Muslim expects anything like this from of the
rulers of the two holy mosques.36
Factions within the Kuwaiti government, con-
vinced that the Bahraini uprising would provide
an opening for Iran, considered sending forces to
join the troop deployment. But Prime Minister
Sheikh Jaber al Mubarak Al Sabah overruled the
idea, fearing such a move could prompt an uprising
among Kuwaits Shia, who comprise about 20 to
30 percent of the population. In a bid to appease
calls from anti-Iranian forces within his govern-
ment while also attempting not to incite the localShia population, the prime minister instead sent a
naval force to protect the waters around Bahrain.37
Sunni MPs in the Kuwaiti parliament still criticize
the prime minister for not sending ground troops.
King Hamad, welcoming the Peninsula Shield force
and the Kuwaiti naval presence, declared in March
2011 that a foreign plot had been foiled, a direct
reference to Iran.38
operating under the aegis of the Gulf Cooperation
Council. King Hamad wrote that his government
was forced to use the military option and enforce a
crackdown because the legitimate demands of the
opposition were hijacked by extremists with ties to
foreign governments in the region, a clear and di-
rect reference to Iran.33
Te troop deployment, called Peninsular Shield,
was the first time the GCC used collective military
action to suppress a popular revolt.34Irans govern-
ment and even moderate clerics expressed outrage
over the Saudi military presence in Bahrain.
Te uprising was not instigated by Iran. However,
Iranian officials complicated the picture by handing
the Bahraini and Saudi governments the chance to
assert that ehran was behind the revolt. As soon
as the uprising began, Supreme Leader Khamenei
referred to it with elation, and he offered public and
moral support for the Shia against the repressive
Sunni government.
Khamenei has continued to express his enthusiasm.
At a meeting of the Islamic Awakening and Youth
Conference, on January 30, 2012, he told the au-
dience: What you did in Egypt, what you did inunisia, what you did in Libya, what you are do-
ing in Yemen, what you are doing in Bahrain is
part of a battle against this dangerous and harmful
dictatorship that has been pressuring humanity for
two centuries.35
Grand Ayatollah Saafi Gulpaygani, based in Qom,
took up the Bahrain uprising as a personal cause.
33Al Khalifa, King Hamad bin Isa. Stability is a prerequisite for progress. Washington imes, February 8, 2011. http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2011/apr/19/stability-is-prerequisite-for-progress/.34Bronner, Ethan, and Michael Slackman. Saudi roops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest. New York imes, March 14, 2011.35Te Center for the Preserving and Publishing the Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khameni. Supreme Leaders Speech to Participants of
Islamic Awakening and Youth Conference. English.khamenei.ir. January 30, 2012. http://english.khamenei.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1580&Itemid=16
36Gulpaygani, Ayatollah Saafi. A warning letter from Ayatollah Gulpaygani to King Abdullah. Shia Post, March 30, 2012. http://en.Shiapost.com/2012/03/30/a-warning-letter-from-ayatollah-gulpaygani-to-king-abdullah/.
37Anonymous sources. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Kuwait, December 2012.38Kuwait Naval Units Join Bahraini MissionPlot Foiled.Arab imes, March 21, 2011. http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/
tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/167009/reftab/36/Default.aspx.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/19/stability-is-prerequisite-for-progress/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/19/stability-is-prerequisite-for-progress/http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_2/English.khamenei.irhttp://english.khamenei.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1580&Itemid=16http://english.khamenei.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1580&Itemid=16http://en.shiapost.com/2012/03/30/a-warning-letter-from-ayatollah-gulpaygani-to-king-abdullah/http://en.shiapost.com/2012/03/30/a-warning-letter-from-ayatollah-gulpaygani-to-king-abdullah/http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/167009/reftab/36/Default.aspxhttp://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/167009/reftab/36/Default.aspxhttp://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/167009/reftab/36/Default.aspxhttp://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/167009/reftab/36/Default.aspxhttp://en.shiapost.com/2012/03/30/a-warning-letter-from-ayatollah-gulpaygani-to-king-abdullah/http://en.shiapost.com/2012/03/30/a-warning-letter-from-ayatollah-gulpaygani-to-king-abdullah/http://english.khamenei.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1580&Itemid=16http://english.khamenei.ir/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1580&Itemid=16http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_2/English.khamenei.irhttp://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/19/stability-is-prerequisite-for-progress/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/19/stability-is-prerequisite-for-progress/ -
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but we are afraid of their [al Wefaqs] religious
thinking.40
Troughout the early weeks of the uprising, the
government skillfully pushed its own narrative of
the tumultuous events and effectively shaped pub-
lic opinion among the ruling minority Sunni: this
was, it asserted, the long-expected Shia revolt,
backed by Iran. Since 1979, when the Islamic rev-
olution occurred in Iran, the Bahraini intelligence
has always known there is a Shia ideology. After
Saddam went, sectarianism rose in Iraq. Tey [the
Shia] were targeting scientists, religious leaders. ...
Ten, all of a sudden, this happened in Bahrain,
said Saqer Al Khalifa, a former media advisor for
the Bahraini embassy in Washington. Al Khalifa
explains that the government had anticipated the
uprising for years and had developed a well-trained
security apparatus to fight any unrest. If the Shia
opposition had weapons, they would have used
them, he said.41
Soon, the political divide in the street spilled over
into all aspects of everyday life. Ali Fakhro, a former
education minister who tried to form a national
dialogue among groups in the opposition and the
government, noted an upsurge in identity politicswhich continues to this day. People started boy-
cotting restaurants. If a Shia merchant owns one
place, the Sunni wont go there. School children are
not getting along. For the first time, they identi-
fy themselves as Shia or Sunni. With the Saudis
swearing at the Shia all day, I have no doubt the
Saudis are playing a role to fuel propaganda against
the Shia.42
Some Bahrainis have boycotted convenience stores
owned by prominent Bahraini businessman FaisalJawad, who is accused of giving free food to the
At the start of the Bahraini uprising, Sunnis joined
Shia protestors in Manamas Pearl Roundabout.
Moderate Sunnis generally supported the upris-
ing in the interest of all Bahrainis. Protestors wore
badges with the slogan, No Sunni, No Shia, Just
Bahraini. But cross-sectarian cooperation against
the government failed to materialize in the long
term, as the Sunnis became increasingly reluctant
to work with Shia oppositionist factions.
Instead, the uprising soon put the Shia and the
Sunni at loggerheads. Even those Sunni who were
critical of the governments policies, when forced
to choose, sided with the state over the Shia. Tis
gave credence to the governments claims that the
uprising stemmed from a strictly sectarian con-
flict, and it became more visible once the uprising
gained momentum. Tere are some exceptions to
the deepening Shia-Sunni divide: Te National
Democratic Action Society, or Waad, which is the
largest leftist political faction in Bahrain and criti-
cal of the government, claims to include an equal
number of Shia and Sunni in its ranks. Accord-
ing to one Waad leader, 50 percent of the societys
Central Committee is comprised of Shia and the
other half Sunni.39
Te views of one woman rights activist who went
to the Pearl Roundabout reflects the skepticism
of many Bahrainis toward al Wefaq, even among
those who oppose government policies. I was in
the roundabout along with all the protestors. And
when I listened to them [al Wefaq], I felt some
wanted to create an Islamic state, said Maryam, a
middle-aged Sunni womens rights leader who lives
in Manama on the edge of the Shia villages, where
rioting frequently breaks out at night. Many wom-
en came to the roundabout because the maraji toldthem to. We all agree the government is corrupt,
39Anonymous leader. Interviewed by Geneive Abdos researcher. Manama, February, 2013.40Maryam. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Manama, March 2012.41Al Khalifa, Saqer. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Manama, December 15, 2012.42Fakhro, Ali. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Manama, March 2012.
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of Sunnis, set out to fight for political and economic
reforms that would benefit all Bahrainis, the nature
of the revolt was being driven by the Shia majority,
who were optimistic, however fleetingly, about the
potential to address their long-standing grievances
of social, political, and economic inequality.
Iran seized upon the moment and unleashed its
media machine in both Persian and Arabic, loudly
championing the Shia cause. With Iran supporting
the uprising and Saudi-led troops intervening in
support of the Sunni Al Khalifa tribe, the Bahraini
protest movement was swiftly transformed into a
proxy battle between the leading regional powers.
And it provided fertile ground for the notion that
political opposition in Bahrain was tantamount
to a Shia revolt to wrest power from the minority
Sunni. o date, there is no hard evidence to indi-
cate that Iran has given material support to factions
within the Bahraini opposition. However, one U.S.
official, who wished to remain anonymous, stated
in an interview that the U.S. was beginning to see
signs of Iranian connections to opposition groups.
Moreover, the Saudis view the Shia-dominated
uprising as a direct threat to their own domestic
security; a victory for the Shia of Bahrain wouldcertainly inspire Saudi Arabias own disaffected
Shia population in the eastern provinces, home to
much of the kingdoms great oil wealth, to mobilize
behind similar demands for economic, political,
and social equality. In fact, the Bahrain uprising
has sparked protests among the Saudi Shia, who
expressed solidarity with their co-religionists across
the Causeway, a bridge which unites the two coun-
tries. Tese protests continued throughout 2012.45
Te direct involvement of Saudi Arabia, Bahrainspowerful neighbor, ensured that calls for negotiation
protestors during the height of the uprising. Jawad
has denied the allegations. Nonetheless, he has been
forced to close some of his stores and restaurants
due to a Sunni-led boycott.
A young Bahraini whose mother is Sunni and fa-
ther is Shia started a loosely-formed debate forum,
with the specific aim of addressing the rise of sec-
tarianism. My parents never had a problem, and
growing up I was never cognizant of the differences
in the sects. oday, things are very different, the
young man said over coffee in a Manama hotel.43
Ali Al Khalifa, a young Bahraini who worked in
the foreign ministry after graduating from Ameri-
can University in Washington, recalls how the Sun-
ni-Shia relationship has changed since he was a boy.
In the 1990s, I was seven or eight years old. I knew
there was animosity, but not hatred. I attended pub-
lic school and there were some Shia, but not many.
I went to an Islamic school which was Salafist and
there were no Shia. Since last year, we are not on
speaking terms with a lot of Shia. Tey will say it is
my fault, even though I am trying to bridge the gap.
In the 1940s, my grandmother ate with the Shia
until 1979, when the Islamic revolution in Iranbroke out. With Khomeini and the religious revival
in Saudi Arabia at the same time, both sides be-
came more fundamentalist, said Al Khalifa, who is
a member of the royal family.44
As the government capitalized on escalating unease
between Shia and Sunni, its sectarian narrative took
hold: a protest movement which was inspired by
other Arab uprisings and a desire for political and
economic reform for all Bahrainis quickly pitted
Sunni against Shia. Even though the opposition,which in the early days included a sizeable number
43Anonymous. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Manama, April 2012.44Al Khalifa, Ali. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Manama, April 2012.45Saudi Women Rally in support of Bahrain Revolution Leaders.Pakistan oday, September 9 2012. http://www.pakistantoday.com.
pk/2012/09/09/news/foreign/saudi-women-rally-in-support-of-bahrain-revolution-leaders/.
http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/09/09/news/foreign/saudi-women-rally-in-support-of-bahrain-revolution-leaders/http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/09/09/news/foreign/saudi-women-rally-in-support-of-bahrain-revolution-leaders/http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/09/09/news/foreign/saudi-women-rally-in-support-of-bahrain-revolution-leaders/http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/09/09/news/foreign/saudi-women-rally-in-support-of-bahrain-revolution-leaders/ -
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Leader Khamenei emphasized his support for the
revolution in Bahrain.
Such broadcasts have continued. On May 17,
2012, a report on al Manar described a meeting of
the Union of Muslim Ulema in Lebanon, an or-
ganization established by Iran and Lebanese Shia
clerics shortly after the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Te report states that the Union was concerned
about Bahraini people who are victims of the poli-
tics of sectarian conflict and the provocation of hate
as is the case in many countries in the Arab and Is-
lamic world. Te report quotes the Unions leader,
Judge Ahmed Shaikh Ahmed al Zain, as blaming
the United States and Israel for rising sectarianism:
Te Zionist enemy and its American ally have suc-
ceeded in spreading hatred between the sons and
daughters of Islam. Trough its tactics, Iran gave
credence to the Bahraini governments claims that
the Islamic republic was the driving force behind
the uprising.
Just days before the GCC troops entered Bahrain,
former Secretary of Defense Gates and his team
were in Manama trying to find a compromise be-
tween the government and al Wefaq. But the day
after the Gates delegation left, a huge protest oc-curred and the government and the Saudis used
this as a pretext to send in the troops, according to
U.S. officials. Te Saudis discouraged the Bahraini
government from making a deal with the opposi-
tion, according to U.S. and Bahraini sources. Tey
argued that Iran was backing the opposition and,
therefore, it must be crushed. When the talks ended
without resolution, Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
ton expressed her frustration with the Saudis and
said the United States had only limited leverage.49
Te Saudi position was, and still remains, that no
or dialogue with the protesters from moderate voic-
es within the Bahraini government were marginal-
ized. Instead, the Saudis were able to bolster hard-
line elements in Manama to support their harsh
approach to suppressing the uprising. Bahrains
economic dependence on Saudi Arabia certainly
was a factor. A treaty between the two countries
states that Saudi Arabia is the operator of the shared
offshore oil field Abu Safah, which produces nearly
70 percent of Bahrains oil revenue and 80 percent
of its total oil production.46
Te Bahraini hardliners did not have to overreach
to build its case that Iran was behind the uprising.
Iran has stated for years that it considers part of
Bahrain its rightful territory, and ehran is believed
to be behind at least two attempted coups to unseat
the government in Bahrain, in 1981 and 1996. Te
Bahraini government alleged that the 1996 plot was
carried out by Hizballah and masterminded by Isa
Qassem, now the leading cleric in Bahrains Shia
opposition, who spent many years in Qom.47Some
U.S. officials also warned of the Iran factor in the
uprising. Former Defense Secretary Gates said in
an interview with the Arabic network al Arabiya on
March 24, 2011, that while he believed Iran did
not instigate the protest, there was no doubt ehranwas starting to spread its influence.48
Even if Iran were not directly intervening in the
uprising, its extensive Arabic-language media out-
let, al Alam, Hizballahs al Manar V, and the Iraq-
based Ahl al Beit television were hard at work to
convince the Shia, not only in Bahrain, but more
importantly throughout the region, that the con-
flict was about a fight to resolve long-standing po-
litical and religious differences between the sects. In
an al Manar broadcast of March 21, 2011, Supreme
46Galani, Un. Saudis wouldnt gain much from a union with Bahrain. Reuters, May 2, 2012.47Louer, Laurence. ransnational Shia Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 206.48Gates accuses Iran of complicating things in Bahrain.Al ArabiyaEnglish, March 24, 2011. http://english.alarabiya.net/
articles/2011/03/24/142891.html.49Clinton, Hillary. Closed meeting at the U.S. State Department attended by Geneive Abdo. March 2011.
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/24/142891.htmlhttp://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/24/142891.htmlhttp://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/24/142891.htmlhttp://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/03/24/142891.html -
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the Iranian officials, the remarks of the secretary
general of the Lebanese Hizballah, the meddling
in Bahraini affairs by their satellite [V] channels,
the incidents that took place in Pearl Square
expose the training techniques of Hizballah, Staff
Field Marshal Khalifa bin Ahmad Al Khalifa, the
Bahraini commander-in-chief, was quoted as say-
ing inAsharq Alawsat, on June 1, 2011.51
While the running proxy contest between regional
rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran fed sectarian tensions,
political events on the ground in Bahrain further
enhanced the Shia-versus-Sunni narrative. On Feb-
ruary 21, one week after a large Shia mobilization
in the streets, a reported 120,000 Sunni assembled
in the Al Fateh mosque, the largest Sunni mosque
in Bahrain, though this number is disputed as be-
ing inflated.
Tere, a university professor announced the birthofajamma al-Wihdat al Watani,which came to beknown as the National Unity Gathering, GONU,a pan-Sunni bloc supporting the ruling familyat
least initiallyand designed to curb Shia-domi-
nated protest. Sunni Islamist political societies in-
cluding the Muslim Brotherhood, Minbar, and the
Salafist faction, Asala al Islamiya, joined the group.Tis development served to reaffirm the govern-
ments narrative that Iran and its proxies were be-
hind the uprising.52
GONU never succeeded in articulating a clear
agenda for this new coalition. Te central demand
was simply that the government make no conces-
sions to al Wefaq, which they demanded be banned
outright. Interviews carried out in Bahrain reveal
that the central Sunni struggle is not based upon a
desire for religious domination over the Shia. Rath-er, the minority Sunni fear that Shia protests could
steps should be taken to weaken Bahrains Sunni
monarchy.
Stability in Bahrain is of great importance to the
United States. Manama is the home to the U.S. Na-
vys Fifth Fleet, whose presence in the Gulf ensures
the flow of oil and other energy exports through
the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway connecting the
Gulf to the Arabia Sea and the Indian Ocean. Iran
periodically threatens to block the Strait of Hor-
muz, which would severely disrupt oil supplies, al-
though to date it has shown no real sign of making
good on its bellicose rhetoric.
Because of significant U.S. strategic and economic
interests in a stable Bahrain, the Obama admin-
istration has declined to adopt a hard line on the
Bahraini governments human rights abuses and
institutionalized discrimination. Yet, some U.S. of-
ficials believe the administrations criticism is clear
a view Bahraini opposition figures do not share.
Te general feeling among many factions within
the Shia opposition is that the United States is un-
willing to jeopardize its own security interests to try
to extract necessary compromises from the Bahraini
government.50
In mid-March 2011, the protest movement intensi-
fied among the Shia in the Pearl Roundabout. Even
more worrying to the government, protestors be-
gan a strategy of disrupting daily life in Manama by
venturing out from the Pearl to set up barricades in
the financial district, hindering business and traffic.
In response, the government heightened its rhe-
torical denunciation of the protests, in particular
its charges of Iranian meddling. Some within the
government argued that the protestors tactics indi-
cated they had been schooled in Hizballah trainingcamps in Lebanon. Te stands and statements of
50Anonymous U.S. official. Interviewed by Geneive Abdo. Washington, DC, January 3, 2013.51International Crisis Group. Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East: Bahrains Rocky Road to Reform. Middle East/North Report
N 111-28, July, 2001. 3.52International Crisis Group. July, 2001. 9.
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pose of this paper to focus on these issues. Suffice it
to say, that the governments response to the upris-
ing has exacerbated the Shia feeling of persecution
and widened the sectarian divide.
By the spring of 2012, King Hamad, who had
commissioned the Bahrain Independent Commis-
sion of Inquiry and who appeared to be interested
in reform in 2011, decided it was too politically
costly to implement many of the BICIs recom-
mendations. I told the king in March 2012 what
I had previously said in 2011, said Bassiouni in an
interview with the author. You have a choice be-
tween the unity of the country and the unity of the
family. Bassiouni added: Many in the [Bahraini]
cabinet fell back on the Saudis as a justification for
not carrying out the needed social, political and
economic reforms.54
Te Commission, headed by Bassiouni, had issued
its 503-page report on November 23, 2011. Te
report was critical of the governments response to
the unrest and documented in great detail exten-
sive human rights violations committed against the
demonstrators and activists, most of whom were
Shia. At the time, amid great fanfare of the reports
release, the king promised to implement many ofthe recommendations Bassiouni and his team had
drafted. But to date, this has not happened. As a re-
sult, many factions involved in the conflict have be-
come more radicalized. Bassiouni said he had feared
the crisis would produce a hardening of positions
on all sides, and now this concern has been realized.
At the time of this writing, in January 2013, only
three of the BICIs 26 recommendations have been
fully implemented by the government. Tese in-
clude training security forces in human rights reg-ulations during the detention and interrogation of
suspects and a ban on torture. Te government has
topple the existing government and lead to the cre-
ation of an Iranian-style theocracy.
Te Bahraini government gave a stamp of approv-
al to GONU. But what the government failed to
foresee in giving a role to the GONU and its con-
stituents was that the more the national drumbeat
warned of the Shia-Iranian threat, the more pres-
sure came to bear on the government to take harsh-
er action against the opposition, even the peaceful
al Wefaq. Soon, the loyal citizens of Bahrain, as
the government commonly refers to its Sunni sup-
porters, were criticizing the government for not do-
ing enough to protect them and crackdown on the
Shia-dominated opposition.
As the anti-Shiaand anti-Iranrhetoric ramped
up among the Sunni population, the Unity Gath-
ering gave birth to a radical splinter group, al Fa-
tih Youth Union, whose Friday rallies regularly
attracted thousands of supports. Tis development
made it even more difficult for reformist-mind-
ed figures within the government, including the
Crown Prince and even King Hamad, to extend
any significant concessions to the Shia opposition.
Heightened sectarianism both altered the dynamics
of popular mobilization and gave hardliners withinthe
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