1 against ontologically evil misuse of predicate logic barry smith
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Against Ontologically Evil Misuse of Predicate Logic
Barry Smithhttp://ontologist.com
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FantologyThe syntax of first-order predicate logic is
a mirror of reality
‘Fa’ (or ‘Rab’ etc.) is the key to ontological structure
Fantology a special case of linguistic Kantianism: the structure of language is they key to the structure of [knowable] reality
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For the fantologist
“F(a)”, “R(a,b)” … is the language for ontology
This language reflects the structure of reality
Reality is made up of atoms plus abstract (1- and n-place) ‘properties’ or ‘attributes’
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David Armstrong’s
spreadsheet ontology
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F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
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F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
a x x x x x
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
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F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
a x x x x x
b x x x x x
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
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F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
a x x x x x
b x x x x x
c x x x x x
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
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F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V
a x x x x x
b x x x x x
c x x x x x
d x x
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
and so on …
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Fantology
tends to make you believe in some future state of ‚total science‘
when the values of ‘F’ and ‘a’,
all of them,
will be revealed to the elect
(Neokantianism)
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F(a)
All generality belongs to the predicate
‘a’ is a mere name
Contrast this with the way scientists use names:
Yeast DNA-Binding Requirement
Ribosomal Protein Gene Promoter Sequence
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‘a’ leaves no room for ontological complexity
Hence: reality is made of atoms
Fantology cannot do justice to the existence of different levels of granularity on the side of reality
Thus conducive to reductionism in philosophy
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F(a)
‘a’ is a bare namevarious doctrines of bare particulars
including noumenal views as e.g. in the
Tractatus doctrine of simples
(more Kantianism)
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F(a)
To understand properties is to understand predication
(effectively in terms of functional application à la Frege)
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Aristotle distinguished
Predication in the category of substance:
John is a man, Henry is an ox
Predication in the category of accident:
John is hungry, Henry is asleep
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For Fantologyno predication in the category of
substancee.g. [Quine] because there are no
substancesor because the two types of predication
are confusedor because the bareness of ‘a’ yields an
aversion to idea of substances as spatially extended and spatially located
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Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
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Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
19
Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
20
Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
21
Aristotle’s Ontological Square
Substantial Accidental
Second substance
man
cat
ox
Second accident
headache
sun-tan
dread
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
22
Standard Predicate Logic – F(a), R(a,b) ...
Substantial Accidental
Attributes
F, G, R
Individuals
a, b, c
this, that
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
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Bicategorial NominalismSubstantial Accidental
First substance
this man
this cat
this ox
First accident
this headache
this sun-tan
this dread
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
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Process Metaphysics, Trope Bundle Theories
Substantial Accidental
Events
Processes
“Everything is flux”
Uni
vers
alP
artic
ular
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Fantology
(given its roots in mathematics)
has no satisfactory way of dealing with time
hence leads to banishment of time from the ontology
(as in Armstrong’s or Quine’s four-dimensionalism)
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F(a), R(a,b) … adicity
all structures in reality have an adicity
-- tendency to deal inadequately not only with time and change but with continuous phenomena in general
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F(a), R(a,b) … adicity
John has a headache
What is the adicity of John’s headache (a relation [?] between your consciousness and various processes taking place in an around your brain) ?
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The extensionalist limitations of fantology
lead one into the temptations of possible world metaphysics
and other fantasies
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Fantology leads you to talk nonsense about “family
resemblances”
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Fantology
leads to a lazy use of the word ‘property’,
just about any old open sentence will serve to designate a property
-calculus = property ontology as theft rather than honest toil
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Fantology
leads to a lazy use of the word ‘property’,
(in this way, too, fantology is conducive to nominalism)
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Booleanism
if F stands for a property and G stands for a property
then
F&G stands for a property
FvG stands for a property
not-F stands for a property
FG stands for a property
and so on
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Strong Booleanism
There is a complete lattice of properties:
self-identity
FvG
not-F F G not-G
F&G
non-self-identity
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Set theory is Booleanism unremediated
Booleanism without any remediating features whatsoever
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Booleanism
responsible, among other things, for Russell’s paradox
Russell’s solution
Keep Boole
avoid the catastrophe by introducing the machinery of ‘types’
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Booleanism
responsible for Russell’s paradox
and therefore also responsible for the phobia of quantification over properties
and thus in this respect, too, conducive to nominalism
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Lewis and Armstrong
free from Booleanism
with their sparse theory of properties
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That Lewis and Armstrongarrived at their sparse view of properties
against the solid wall of fantological Booleanist orthodoxy
is a miracle of modern intellectual historyanalogous to two 5 stone weakling
climbing up to breathe the free air at the top of Mount Everest with 1000 ton weights attached to their feet
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leading them back, on this point,
to where Aristotelians were from the very beginning
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END
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FOLWUT
First-order logic with universal terms
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Compare the syntax of set theory
(x,y)
one (formal) predicate
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FOLWUT
=(x,y)
Inst(x,u)
Does(x,e)
Part(x,y)
Inst(x,y)
Dep(x,y)
Isa(x,y)
Exemp(x,d)
Loc(x,y)
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Inst(x,u)
no temptation to Booleanism
no temptation to Nominalism
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