1 more upward and also more downward mobility? compulsory schooling in the netherlands during the...

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MORE UPWARD AND ALSO MORE DOWNWARD MOBILITY?

COMPULSORY SCHOOLING IN THE NETHERLANDS DURING THE 20TH CENTURY

Wout Ultee - Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

Presentation in the Department of Sociology,

Tel Aviv University February 24, 2005

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In the 1990s it was found that only in Sweden and the Netherlands inequalities

in education had decreased

Some doubted the quality of the Dutch data leading to this conclusion

New findings indicate that with sufficient statistical power, a trend towards smaller

inequalities in education is present in other (post)industrial countries too

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Previous Research Previous Research on the Netherlandson the Netherlands

Loglinear models with educational distributions for fathers and children (sons and daughters) fitted with

trend constraints on relative chances

Educational inequality decreased according to:uniform association and

diagonal densities

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Present research: dataPresent research: data

Stacked file from 31 surveys21,899 men/20,903 women; age over 25Fifteen 5-year birth cohorts (1900-1974)Father’s education 4 categories (low –

high)Daughter’s/Son’s education 4 categories

(low – high)

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Are questions about diagonal densities and uniform associations, or even questions

about odds ratio’s, pertinent research questions given the theories at issue?

A lower odds ratio may result from a higher odds to climb and

from a higher odds to fall.

What are current theories about?

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Four hypotheses from the field of stratification

One from each generation of stratification studies

Present research: Present research: hypotheseshypotheses

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Zero-generationZero-generation non-hypothesis non-hypothesis

There is a linear downward trend in uniform association and diagonal density

This hypothesis at best is about some unspecified macro force

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First-generation First-generation hypothesishypothesis

A rising standard of living makes for lower uniform association and lower diagonal

density

This hypothesis is about the effect of a country characteristic, that is, about a

macro force or factor

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Second-generation Second-generation hypothesishypothesis

State intervention makes for lower uniform association and diagonal density

This hypothesis is about effects of states

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Third-generation Third-generation hypothesishypothesis

State intervention does not alter the density in the diagonal cell for the highest level of

education

This hypothesis is about the fate of elites in the hands of states

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How to derive macro hypotheses from micro hypotheses?

Embedding the four Embedding the four hypotheses in general hypotheses in general

sociology:sociology:

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Zero generation hypothesis derived

(post)industrialization requires more and more mobility, and this functional

prerequisite is met

Or: the increasing demand of employers for highly educated employees makes it worthwhile for employees to educate themselves and they therefore do so

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First-generation First-generation hypothesis derivedhypothesis derived

Persons differ in financial resources; and the relation between a country’s average

income and its educational inequalities is an aggregate result of a general rise in income

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Second-generation Second-generation hypothesis derivedhypothesis derived

Apart from individual actors there is an all powerful corporate actor: the state

(Coleman about corporate actors)

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Two possible derivations from the

assumption of an intervening state:

The implicit old one and

The explicit new one

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The implicit old one:

States provide stipends etc. for children of low

backgrounds and with outstanding intelligence to

attend university

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My explicit new one:

States gradually raise the age until which schooling is

compulsory for everyone: first only primary school, now also a long period in

secondary school

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Third-generation hypothesis Third-generation hypothesis derivedderived

Highly educated parents deploy strategies compensating for state policies raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends

States are not all-powerful:(Elias about a spiraling process as a

competitive outcome)(Bourdieu about compensatory strategies)

(Hout & Raftery about maximally maintained inequality)

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All in all, the odds to move up for persons at the lower end of the social

scale increase,

While at the time these odds increase, the odds for persons at the upper end of the social scale do not fall, but increase

too.

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Theoretical lesson

Deriving macro hypotheses from micro hypotheses,

makes clear that worthwhile alternatives are around

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The age until which schooling was compulsory in the Netherlands

changed as follows

Since 1900 until the age of 12 years

After 1948 until the age of 14 years

After 1969 until the age of 16 years

After the mid 1970s until the age of 18 years

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12

34

stre

ngth

of

asso

ciat

ion

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

cohort specific association linear trend

GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling

intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974

Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education

Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 1 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Men

23

0.2

.4.6

.81

stre

ngth

of

asso

ciat

ion

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

cohort specific association linear trend

GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling

intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974

Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education

Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 2 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Men

24

0.2

.4.6

.81

stre

ngth

of

asso

ciat

ion

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

cohort specific association linear trend

GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling

intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974

Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education

Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 3 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Men

25

0.2

.4.6

.81

stre

ngth

of

asso

ciat

ion

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

cohort specific association linear trend

GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling

intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974

Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education

Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 4 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Men

26

12

34

stre

ngth

of

asso

ciat

ion

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

cohort specific association linear trend

GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling

intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974

Model includes one general diagonal effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education

Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 5 Changes in Cohort Specific Association-Women

27

0.2

.4.6

.81

stre

ngth

of

asso

ciat

ion

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

cohort specific association linear trend

GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling

intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974

Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education

Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 6 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal Effects-Women

28

0.2

.4.6

.81

stre

ngth

of

asso

ciat

ion

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

cohort specific association linear trend

GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling

intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974

Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education

Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 7 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonals 1 2 3-Women

29

0.2

.4.6

.81

stre

ngth

of

asso

ciat

ion

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

cohort specific association linear trend

GDP per Capita Age Compulsory Schooling

intergenerational educational mobility; the Netherlands 1900-1974

Model includes one uniform associat ion effect for each cohortHomogeneous equal scalings for education

Models for linear trend, GDP and Compulsory SchoolingGraph 8 Changes in Cohort Specific Diagonal 4-Women

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Stipends etc. in the Netherlands

Not only for keen working class boys

Also for upper class girls,

They are for everyone

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How do macro variables influence uniform association and diagonal densities?

Few states ever sought to increase the odds for moving down.

Uniform association and diagonal densities derived from odds ratios

Odds ratios made up from an odds for moving up and an odds for moving down

Testing the third-generation Testing the third-generation hypothesis more severelyhypothesis more severely

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Hypotheses about oddsHypotheses about odds

Raising the age at which compulsory schooling ends, increases the odds

for moving up.But what does it do to the odds for

moving down?

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02

46

810

stre

ngth

of o

dds

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974

dots proportional to sample size

intergenerational educational mobilityObserved Odds: Upward Move from Level 1 to Level 4

upward trend

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0.2

.4.6

.81

stre

ngth

of o

dds

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970birth cohort

Men in the Netherlands 1900-1974

dots proportional to sample size

intergenerational educational mobilityObserved Odds: Downward Move from Level 4 to Level 1

no trend or a downward trend

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Dutch questions, Dutch theories,

Dutch data collection

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Dutch questionsDutch questions

Two large questions about societies;– Various inequalities– Several aspects of cohesion

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Dutch questions: serach for Dutch questions: serach for wrong ones, enrich existing wrong ones, enrich existing

onesones

Questions should not be about odds ratio’sQuestions should be about separate odds

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Dutch theories

Not factor sociology

Versus

Actor sociology

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Dutch theories

Not factor sociology

Versus

Actor sociology:

There is a third alternative

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Dutch theoriesDutch theories

* Actor or individual sociology– Individuals– One goal– One shot

decisions– (all powerful)

state

* ActorS sociology– Egos and their

networks– Several goals– Sequential

decision processes– (intermediate)

collective actors

* Factor or macro forces sociology

- Industrialization

- Technology

- Ideology

- Average income

- General rise in education

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Family Survey Dutch Population– 1993– 1998– 2000– 2003

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Harry GanzeboomNan Dirk de Graaf

Paul de GraafGerbert Kraaykamp

Marcel LubbersAriana NeedWout Ultee

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Multi-Moment dataMulti-Actor data

Multi-Context data

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Multi-Moment dataMulti-Actor data

Multi-Context data

3 MAC data

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Series moments primary respondents– Job history

– Educational history– Income history– Housing history– Religious history– Smoking history

– Sport club history

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Point moments primary respondents– Parental, material, and cultural resources

– Leisure activities at age 18– Weight at age 25 and now

– Relation with boss at every job spell– Relation with co-workers at every job spell

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Past and present attitudes of the primary respondent

– Abortion– Foreigners

– Homosexuals

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Actors– Primary respondent

– Partner– Parent– Child

– Sibling

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Actors– Partner same questionnaire as respondents to

answer questions about the extent to which partner similarity is more than a byproduct of educational homogamy, and whether spouse

effects are present

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Actors– Parental questionnaire as a check upon

retrospective answers of the primary respondent – Additional questions about upbringing of

primary respondent

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Actors– Child

Questionnaire attuned to the issue of first generation upon third generation effects

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Actors– Sibling

Questionnaire in main aspects the same as questionnaire for primary respondents, so that

family effects can be estimated and the statistical power of models can be increased

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Dutch data collectionDutch data collection

Contexts– Municipalities– Neighborhoods

– Schools– Employers

– Economic sectors– Sport clubs

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Dutch data resultsDutch data results

Wim Bernasco Koen van Eijck Tamar Fischer

Maurice Gesthuizen Christiaan Monden Hester Moerbeek

Inge Sieben Wilfred Uunk

Herman van der Werfhorst Maarten Wolbers