1349323703 mayors discussion paper
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AUSTRALIAN MAYORS:
What Can and Should They Do?A Discussion Paper
Graham Sansom
September 2012
Citingthisreport
Sansom,G.AustralianMayors:WhatCanandShouldTheyDo?,UTS:
Centrefor LocalGovernment,UniversityofTechnology,Sydney,
September2012
Forfurtherinformation,pleasecontact:
UTS:Centrefor LocalGovernment
POBOX123
BroadwayNSW2007
Australia
Email:graham.sansom@uts.edu.au
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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Contents
Preface 4
ExecutiveSummary 5
1. Introduction 7
2. Governance,PlanningandLeadership 8
3. Australiancontextandpractice 12
ElectionandRoleofMayors 13
4. DevelopmentsinEnglandandNewZealand 20
England 20
NewZealand
22
5. TowardsamodelforAustralianmayors 24
Themeritsofpopularelection 24
Theneedforstrongercommunityleadership 25
Ensuringeffectivestrategicandcorporateplanning 26
Enhancingpoliticalgovernance 27
Therespectiverolesofmayorsandchiefexecutives 27
Intergovernment
relations
28
6. Conclusion:aframeworkforlegislation 30
References 33
Attachment:ElectionandRolesofAustralianMayors 35
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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Preface
OneofthemostimportantobjectivesoftheAustralianCentreofExcellenceforLocalGovernment
(ACELG)istosupportinformeddebateonkeypolicyissues. Werecognisethatmanycouncilsand
otherlocalgovernmentorganisationsarenotalwaysabletoundertakesufficientbackground
researchto
underpin
develop
sound,
evidence
based
policy.
ACELGs
working
paper
series
seeks
to
addressthisdeficit.
Thispaperonthechangingroleofmayors,andhowthatrolemightbestrengthened,seekstofill
oneofseveralsignificantgapsinresearchanddiscussionofpoliticalgovernanceinAustralianlocal
government. ItreviewsrelevantliteratureandrecentdevelopmentsinAustralia,NewZealandand
theUK,andconcludesthatiflocalgovernmentistoperformeffectivelyandmeetgrowing
communityexpectations,thecapacityofitspoliticalarmneedstobeenhanced.Inthatregard,the
officeofmayorseemsagoodplacetostart.Thefinalsectionofthepaperthussetsoutasuggested
frameworkofmayoralfunctionsandassociatedlegislativeprovisionstosupportanenhancedrole.
ThispapercomplementstherecentACELGpaperPoliticalManagementinAustralianLocal
Government:ExploringRolesandRelationshipsbetweenMayorsandCEOswrittenbyChrisAulich
andJohnMartin,aswellasnewresearchbeingledbytheUTSCentreofLocalGovernment(CLG)
whichcoversdifferentdimensionsofpoliticalgovernance.
Researchforthispaperinvolvedwideranginginterviewsandconsultationswithmayors,chief
executives,governmentofficialsandstakeholderrepresentativesinallthreecountries.The
contributionsofallthoseinvolvedaregratefullyacknowledged.ThanksarealsoduetoSuFeiTanof
theUTSCentreforLocalGovernment,whoundertooksomeofthebackgroundresearch;andto
NancyLy,
also
of
UTS:CLG,
who
formatted
the
final
report.
Specialmentionmustalsobemadeofthetwopartnerorganisationsthatsupportedtheproject:
TheCommonwealthSecretariatwhichprovidedtravelfundsfortwovisitstotheUK
TheVictoriaUniversityofWellington,NewZealand,whichawardedmethe201112DonTrow
FellowshipintheCentreforAccounting,GovernanceandTaxationResearchmuchofthe
researchandwritingofthispaperwascompletedduringvisitstoVUW.
Asalways,ACELGwelcomescommentonthispaper.Wewouldalsoappreciateinputfromlocal
governmentpractitionersandotherstakeholdersregardingpolicyareasthatshouldberesearched
inthe
future.
In
both
cases,
please
contact
our
Research
Program
Manager:
stefanie.pillora@acelg.org.au
GrahamSansom
ProfessorandDirector
AustraliaCentreforExcellenceinLocalGovernment
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Executive Summary
Recentdecadeshaveseensignificantdevelopmentsintheroleofmayorsacrosstheworld.These
developmentshavemirroredthewideninginternationaldiscourseonlocalgovernanceandcivic
leadership,andarepartofbroaderchangessweepingthroughlocalgovernment.
Australianlocalgovernmentshavebeensubjecttowiderangingreformsthathaveaddressed
structureandefficiency,strategicplanning,assetandfinancialmanagement,community
engagementandaccountability,andcorporategovernance.However,littleattentionhasbeengiven
tohowtheintendeddirectionofsuchreformsinteractswithframeworksforpoliticaland
communitygovernance.Thiscontrastsmarkedlywiththeconsistentfocusontrendsinlocalpolitics
evidentintheUnitedStates,UnitedKingdomandEurope.Inthosecountriesparticularattentionhas
beengiventotheimportanceofmayorsascivicleaders,andtherehasbeenextensivedebateabout,
amongstotherthings,howtheroleofmayorsshouldbestructuredandevolve,aswellasthe
relativemeritsofdifferentmodelsofgovernance.
Thispaperseekstofillthatgapatleastinpart.ItbuildsonrecentpracticeanddebateinAustralia,
NewZealandandEnglandtoexploreapossibleAustralianmodelforwhatmightbedescribedasa
semiexecutivemayor:onewithmoreresponsibilitiesandgreaterauthoritythanisgenerallythe
caseatpresent,butwhoremainssubjecttoaseparationofpowersbetweenthepoliticalrealmof
policyandstrategyontheonehand,andthemanagementrealmofadministrationandprogram
implementationontheother.
Whatemergesstronglyfromboththeliteratureandinternationaldiscourseisaperceivedneedfor
whathasbeendescribedaslocalfacilitativeleadershiporplacebasedleadershipgroundedin
localgovernment
and,
in
particular,
the
office
of
mayor.
It
is
argued
that
more
effective
civic
leaders
arerequiredinorderto,amongotherthings:
Engagethecommunityandotherlocalstakeholdersinformulatingastrategicvisionand
supportingplans
Securepoliticalsupportwithinthebodypoliticfortheadoptionandconcerted,consistent
implementationofstrategicplansandassociatedbudgets
Maintainongoingpartnershipswithothersinvolvedinimplementation,especiallysoundinter
governmentrelationsinwhichthelocalvoiceisheardandrespected.
InAustralia,
specification
of
the
responsibilities
and
authority
of
mayors
varies
greatly
both
within
andbetweenthestatesandNorthernTerritory,butapartfromQueensland,attitudestotheroleof
mayorscouldfairlybedescribedasambivalent.Thereisanapparentreluctancetoinstitutionalise
stronglocalleadershipthroughtheofficeofmayor,andonlyinTasmania,WesternAustraliaandthe
CityofAdelaidearemayorsspecificallytaskedwiththatresponsibility.However,recentlegislationto
furtherenhancetheroleandauthorityofQueenslandmayors,andtointroduceadirectly(popularly)
electedmayorfortheCityofGeelonginVictoria,appeartoreflectagrowingbeliefthatmore
effectivecivicleadershipisneeded,andcanbeseenasemblematicofabroadershiftinthat
direction.
Suchdevelopments
echo
moves
in
New
Zealand
and
the
UK,
where
popularly
elected
mayors
with
significantlyincreasedresponsibilitieshavebeenintroducedinAucklandandanumberofEnglish
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cities.TheNewZealandgovernmenthasannouncedplanstoextendtheAucklandmodeltoall
mayorsacrossthecountry,givingthemtheauthoritytoappointdeputymayors,toestablish
committeesandtoapprovecommitteechairpersons,andtoexerciseleadershipoverthe
developmentofplans,policiesandbudgets.
Thefinal
section
of
this
paper
outlines
alegislative
framework
that
might
be
applied
in
Australia
to
enablemayorstoexercisefacilitative,placebasedleadership.Itsuggestsasetofprincipalmayoral
functionsandprerogatives,andlegislativeprovisionsthatwouldgiveeffecttothem.Where
possible,thoseprovisionsdrawonanexistingAustralianlocalgovernmentAct.
Theindicativeframeworkreflectsaconclusionthatthefunctionsofmayorswhoarealready
generallyacknowledgedastheprincipalmemberoftheircouncilsshouldbeupdatedandre
codifiedtomatchotherchangesthathaveoccurredinAustralianlocalgovernment.Exceptin
Queensland,thestructuresandnormsofpoliticalgovernancehavelargelyfailedtokeeppacewith
theexpandedfunctionsoflocalgovernment,andespeciallythegrowingexpectationthatcouncils
willact
more
strategically
to
reflect
and
represent
the
needs
and
aspirations
of
their
communities,
andtoensuresoundmanagementofcommunityassets.Thesegoalscannotbeachievedunlessthe
politicalarmoflocalgovernmenthasthecapacitytodischargeitsresponsibilitieseffectively
alongsidethoseofmanagement.Tobuildthatcapacity,theofficeofmayorseemsagoodplaceto
start.
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1. Introduction
Recentdecadeshaveseensignificantdevelopmentsintheroleofmayorsacrosstheworld.For
example,legislationhasprovidedformayorswithsubstantialexecutivepowersinbothEnglandand
SouthAfrica;inNewZealand,themayorofthenewAucklandsupercityhasbeengiven
considerablyincreased
responsibilities
and
authority
than
his
counterparts
across
the
rest
of
the
country;whilstinAustraliathereissomeevidenceofatrendtowardsstrongermayorsandthere
havebeenspecificlegislativeamendmentsintwostatesthatreflectemergingideasonthisissue.
Thispaperexploresapossiblemodelforwhatmightbedescribedasasemiexecutivemayor:one
withmoreresponsibilitiesandgreaterauthoritythanisgenerallythecaseatpresent,butwho
remainssubjecttoaseparationofpowersbetweenthepoliticalrealmofpolicyandstrategyonthe
onehand,andthemanagementrealmofadministrationandprogramimplementationontheother.
ItfocusesprimarilyontheAustraliancontext,butwithreferencealsotorecentpracticeanddebates
inEnglandandNewZealand.Itdrawsonliterature,casestudiesandinterviewswithmayors1,senior
localgovernment
managers
and
commentators
in
each
of
the
three
countries.
Australianlocalgovernmentshavebeensubjecttowiderangingreforms,mostlyimposedorurged
bystategovernments,butalsoflowingfromfederalinitiativesandinseveralinstances,local
governmentitself.Reformshaveaddressedstructureandefficiency(amalgamations,regional
collaborationandresourcesharing);aspectsoftheNewPublicManagement(separationofpowers
betweenthebodypoliticandmanagement,councillorsasaboardofdirectors);strategicand
corporateplanning(preparationoflongtermstrategicplansanddeliveryprograms,improvedasset
andfinancialmanagement;workforceplans);greatercommunityengagementandaccountability(in
partthroughcommunityfocusedandplacebasedstrategicplanning);andcorporategovernance
(probity,riskmanagement).
However,littleattentionhasbeengiventohowtheintendeddirectionofthesereformsespecially
thepursuitofefficiency,effectivenessandcommunityengagementthroughstrategicandcorporate
planninginteractswithframeworksforpoliticalandcommunitygovernance.Changestolocal
governmentActsoverthepasttwodecadeshavelargelyadopted(andadapted)themanagerialist
provisionsofequivalentNewZealandlegislation.There,too,theissueofpoliticalgovernance
appearstohavereceivedscantattention,atleastuntiltherecentcreationoftheAucklandsuper
city(seebelow).
Thiscontrasts
markedly
with
the
consistent
focus
on
trends
in
local
politics
evident
in
the
United
States,UnitedKingdomandEurope.Inthosecountriesparticularattentionhasbeengiventothe
roleofdirectlyelectedmayors,andtherehasbeenextensivedebateabout,amongstotherthings,
howtheroleofmayorsshouldbestructuredandevolve,aswellastherelativemeritsofdifferent
modelsofgovernance(e.g.Svara2006,BorrazandJohn2004).
1Ninesemistructuredinterviewswereconductedwithmayorsandformermayors,alongwithnumerous
informaldiscussions.
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2. Governance, Planning and Leadership
Recenttrendsintheelectionandroleofmayorshavereflectedthewideninginternationaldiscourse
onlocalgovernanceandcivicleadership,andarepartofbroaderchangessweepingthroughlocal
government.Theseincludetheincreasingemphasisongovernanceasopposedtogovernment;
introductionof
new
forms
of
strategic
and
corporate
planning;
the
growing
importance
of
closer
engagementwithabroadrangeofstakeholdersnotablylocalcommunities,nearbycouncilsand
centralgovernments;andtheperceivedneedforstrongerpoliticalandcommunityleadership.There
isnowanextensiveliteratureontheseissues:whatfollowsisabriefsummaryofsomekeythemes
thataretakenupinthefollowingsectionofthischapter.
InAustralia,anearlydiscussionoflocalandcommunitygovernancewasprovidedbySproats(1997)
inapaperrespondingtoregionalplanningissuesininnerSydney.Sproatsarguedthatthelargely
instrumentalreformagendaofthetimefocusedonlocalgovernmentsroleasaservicedeliverer,
efficiencyandeffectivenessinachievingoutcomes,performanceexcellenceandvalueformoney
neededto
be
balanced
by
engagement
of
an
informed
citizenry
in
collectively
solving
community
problems(ibid:3).Betterlocalmanagementshouldthusbematchedbybetterlocalgovernance,
withgreateremphasisonlocalpeopleandsocialaswellasphysicalandfinancialcapital.Sproats
appliedOsborneandGaeblers(1993:24)definitionofcommunitygovernanceastheprocessby
whichwecollectivelysolveourproblemsandmeetoursocietysneeds.Hisideasaresummarizedin
Figure1.
Figure1:Sproatscomponentsoflocalgovernancereform
BetterLocalManagement
Corporategovernance +Communitygovernance
Customers/clients +Citizens
Management +Leadership
Publicopinion +Publicjudgement
Financialand
physical
capital +
Social
capital
=BetterLocalGovernance
Source:ModifiedfromSproats(1997:5)
Morerecentthinkingaboutgovernancehasfocusedontheincreasingfragmentationofpublicand
democraticinstitutionsthathasoccurredasaresultofmoredispersedandcompetitiveservice
delivery(BorrazandJohn2004:110);andonthefactthatgovernmentsnolongerpossessthe
authority,skillsandresourcesneededtoaddressallthecomplexissuesandproblemsfacingmodern
societies,especiallyinaglobalisedworld.Hambleton(2011:13)thusarguesthatgovernance:
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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.involvesgovernmentplusthelooserprocessesofinfluencingandnegotiatingwitharangeof
publicandprivatesectoragenciestoachievedesiredoutcomes.Agovernanceperspective
encouragescollaborationbetweenthepublic,privateandnonprofitsectorsWhilstthe
hierarchicalpowerofthestatedoesnotvanish,theemphasisingovernanceisonsteering,
influencingandcoordinatingtheactionsofothers.
Thisviewofgovernanceinturnhighlightstheimportanceofpartnerships,planningandleadership.
Collaborationpartnershipsrequiresafoundation,abasisforagreementonwhatneedstobe
doneandhowtogoaboutachievingagreedobjectives:inotherwords,aplan.Atthelocallevel,the
tenetsofurbanandregionalplanning,environmentalconservationandtheNewPublicManagement
werealreadybeingappliedinthelatteryearsofthe20th
Centurytorequirecouncilstopreparea
rangeofstrategicandcorporateplans.Itwasashortsteptoapplysuchplanningconceptstoa
partnershipapproachtogovernance,thusgivingrisetomechanismssuchaslongtermwholeof
communityandwholeofgovernmentstrategicplans,andmultisectorpartnerships(e.g.New
ZealandsLongTermCouncilCommunityPlansandCommunityOutcomesprocess;SouthAfricas
IntegratedDevelopment
Plans;
Community
Strategic
Plans
in
New
South
Wales;
Local
Strategic
PartnershipsintheUK).
Whatemergesstronglyfromallthesemodelsistheneedforwhathasbeendescribedaslocal
facilitativeleadership(Stokeretal2008)inorderto:
Engagethecommunityandotherlocalstakeholdersintheplanningprocess
Negotiatewithcentralgovernmentagenciesandneighbouringlocalgovernments
Securepoliticalsupportwithinthecouncilfortheadoptionandconcerted,consistent
implementationofstrategicplansandassociatedbudgets
Maintainongoing
partnerships
with
others
involved
in
implementation,
especially
sound
inter
governmentrelationsinwhichthelocalvoiceisheardandrespected.
Box1:Indicatorsofgoodpoliticalleadership
Articulatingaclearvisionforthearea
Settingoutanagendaofwhatthefutureoftheareashouldbeanddevelopingstrategicpolicy
direction.Listeningtolocalpeopleandleadinginitiatives.
Promotingthequalitiesofthearea
Buildingcivicpride,promotingthebenefitsofthelocalityandattractinginwardinvestment.
Winningresources
Winningpowerandfundingfromhigherlevelsofgovernmentandmaximisingincomefroma
varietyofsources.
Developingpartnerships
Successfulleadershipischaracterisedbytheexistenceofarangeofpartnerships,bothinternal
andexternal,workingtoasharedviewoftheneedsofthelocalcommunity.
Addressingcomplexsocialissues
Theincreasingly fragmentednatureoflocalgovernmentandthegrowingnumberofservice
providersactiveinagivenlocalitymeansthatcomplexissuesthatcrossboundaries,orareseento
fallbetweenareasofinterest,needtobetakenupbyleadershipsthathaveanoverviewandcan
bringtogethertherightmixofagenciestotackleaparticularproblem.
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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Maintainingsupportandcohesion
Managingdisparateinterestsandkeepingpeopleonboardareessentialiftheleadershipisto
maintainauthority.
AdaptedfromHambleton,R.andBullock,S.(1996),RevitalisingLocalDemocracyTheLeadershipOptions.
London:LocalGovernmentManagementBoard.
Hambleton(2011)hasaddedthenotionofplacebasedleadership.Thisreferstotheimportanceof
concertedactionbyarangeofplayersatthelocalleveltocounterbalancepotentialadverse
impactsofplacelessleadership:globalisedcorporationsandcentralgovernmentsthatmaycare
littleforcommunitywellbeingandthequalitiesoflocalplaces.Hehasalso(Hambleton2009:538)
setoutindicatorsofgoodpoliticalleadershipthatdrawtogetherthevariousconceptsofgovernance
andleadershipoutlinedabove(Box1).
Afurtherconsiderationishowthedifferentplayersinlocalgovernanceeachcontributetocivic
leadership.Hambleton(2009:522523)arguesthatcivicleadershipcomprisesthreeimportant
groups:political
(elected),
managerial,
and
community
(civil
society)
leaders.
Managerialist
approaches,suchasthoseunderlyingtheallocationofresponsibilitiestoelectedcouncillorsand
seniormanagersinmostAustralianlocalgovernmentActs,tendtounderplaytheimportanceof
politicalleadersandcastcivilsocietyastherecipientofservices,ratherthananimportant
contributortolocalleadership.However,asSproats(1997:89)makesclear,whilstmanagement
andleadershipshouldbecomplementary,thecentraltenetsofthetwoarequitedifferent.
Managersmaybegoodleaders,buttheskillsofcommunityleadershipevenwhenexercisedin
partbymanagersareinherentlypolitical(seeFigure2).
Figure2:
Comparing
management
and
leadership
Management Leadership
Plansandbudgets Visionandstrategy
Organisingandstaffing Communicatingandaligning
Controllingandproblemsolving Motivatingandinspiring
Minimisingrisk
Taking
risks
Source:basedonSproats(1997:9)
Thisleadstothequestionofwhetheraseparationofpowersbetweenelectedcouncillorsand
managersismeaningfulandappropriateinthelocalgovernmentcontext.Provisionstoenforcesuch
separationarealsoprevalentinrecentlegislationandagainflowfromNewPublicManagement
thinkingtheideathatelectedmembersshouldsetpolicyandstrategyandmonitorperformance,
whilstmanagementshouldbeotherwiseleftalonetodealwithimplementationofpolicyandplans
andservicedelivery.Itisdebatablewhethersuchanapproachiseitherworkableordesirablein
termsof
asubstantial
number
of
the
functions
of
local
government,
given
the
often
fine
line
betweenpolicyandpractice,thesmallscaleofmanyauthorities,therepresentativeroleofelected
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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members,andthevaluableskillsatleastsomeofthemcanoffer(e.g.Munro2000,Sansom2001,
Svara2006a).Hambleton(2009:532533)providesabriefoverviewofrecentresearchonthisissue
anddescribestheideaofasharpseparationofrolesbetweenpoliticiansandofficersasa
longstandingmyth.FollowingPeters(1995),hesuggeststhatthedichotomyideashields
administratorsfromscrutinyandservestheinterestofpoliticianswhocanpassresponsibilityfor
unpopulardecisionstoadministrators.
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3. Australian context and practice
Australiacurrentlyhasaround560localcouncils:thecountvariesslightlydependingonwhetheror
notsomenonelectedspecialpurposebodiesarealsoincluded.Overtimethetotalnumberof
councilshasfallendramaticallyduetoamalgamationand/orrestructuringoflocalgovernment
areas.
Thistrend
accelerated
over
the
past
two
decades,
as
shown
in
Table
1.
Table1:ChangingnumbersoflocalgovernmentsinAustralia
1910 1967 1982 1990 2000 2008
NewSouthWales
Victoria
Queensland
SouthAustralia
WesternAustralia
Tasmania
NorthernTerritory^
324
206
164
175
147
51
0
224
210
131
142
144
49
1
175
211
134
127
138
49
6
176
210
134
122
138
46
22
174
78
157
68
142
29
69
152
79*
73
68
142
29
16
Total 1,067 901 840 848 717 559
*Therehasbeenonedeamalgamationsince2000.
Queenslandnumbersbefore2000excludeIndigenouscommunitycouncilsestablishedunderseparatelegislation;by
2008thesehadbeenincludedinthemainstreamsystem.
Sincereducedto139throughvoluntaryamalgamations.
^Figuresto2000includeIndigenouscommunitycouncils;in2008mostofthesewereabolishedandreplacedwithlarge
shires,eachincorporatingseveralsmallcommunities.
Sources:Chapman,R(1997);DOTARS(2001);May,P(2003);Statelocalgovernmentdepartmentwebsites.
Untiltheturnofthe21stcentury,movestocreatelargerlocalgovernmentunitsweretypically
associatedwithafocusonefficiencyandasearchforeconomiesofscale.However,duringthepast
decadeincreasingemphasishasbeenplacedonthepotentialforlargerunitstoimprovethecapacity
andviabilityofcouncilsandtostrengthentheirroleinthewidersystemofgovernment.2Thiswas
themainjustificationforthewidespreadrestructuringthattookplaceinQueenslandinearly2008
(LocalGovernmentReformCommission2007).Itreflectsthedevelopmentalchallengesfacingall
governments,andagrowingexpectationthatlocalgovernmentwillcontributetotheachievement
ofnationalandstatelevelpolicygoals,suchasregionaldevelopment,addressingclimatechange,
reducingIndigenousdisadvantageetc.
Sincethelate1970sthefederalgovernmenthasbeenthelargestexternalprovideroffundingfor
localgovernment,andtherehasbeenprogressivelycloserengagementbetweenthetwo. Local
governmentisnowrepresentedonthepeakfederalforum,theCouncilofAustralianGovernments,
alongsidethefederalgovernment,statesandterritories.Italsohasaseatinanumberofinter
governmentministerialcouncilsdealingwithdifferentaspectsofpublicpolicy. Similarhighlevel
policyengagementwithlocalgovernmentcanalsobefoundinsomestates. Thisimpliesaneedfor
morecapablelocalgovernmentsthatcanmakeasubstantialcontributiontotacklingcomplexlocal,
regionalandintergovernmentagendas,andforpoliticalgovernancetounderpinthatcapacity.
2Foranoverviewoftheseissues,seeAulichetal(2011)
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Asnotedearlier,agreatdealofattentionhasbeengiventowhatthesechangingexpectationsof
localgovernmentmightmeanintermsofstructures,strategicplanningandvariousaspectsof
corporatemanagement,buttheneedfornewapproachestopoliticalgovernancehasreceivedlittle
consideration.Inthisrespect,asinmanyaspectsoflocalgovernment,theAustraliansceneis
markedbyenormousdiversity:ratiosofelectorstocouncillorsvarygreatly(andinmorepopulous
localgovernmentareasareoftenamongstthehighestintheworld);councillorsmaybeelectedat
largeorbywards(localelectoraldivisions);thenumberofcouncillorsperwardmaybeone,two,
threeormore;electionsmaybeconductedforthewholecouncileveryfouryears,orforhalfthe
councillorseverytwoyears;votingmaybecompulsoryoroptional,inpersonorbypost;mayorsand
deputymayorsmaybeelecteddirectlybyallvoters,orindirectlybyandfromthecouncillors;the
termofmayorsvariesfromonetofouryears;thelegislatedroleofamayormaybelargely
ceremonialorsemiexecutive;andsoon.
ElectionandRoleofMayors
The
Attachment
to
this
paper
provides
details
on
how
mayors
(and
their
equivalents)
are
elected
in
eachstateandtheNorthernTerritory,aswellastheirdesignatedrolesandresponsibilitiesandhow
theyrelatetothoseoftheothercouncillors.Table2presentsasummaryofkeypoints.
Substantialvariationsareevidentinthewaymayorsareelectedandtherolestheyareexpectedto
playbothbetweenandwithinstates.3 InQueenslandandTasmania,plusurbanareasofthe
NorthernTerritoryandmostofthecentralcapitalcities,mayorsmustbedirectlyelected.InNSW,
SouthAustralia,WesternAustraliaandtherestoftheNorthernTerritorylocalcouncilsortheir
electorscanchoosebetweenpopularandindirectelectionbutonlyinSouthAustraliahasalarge
proportionfavouredpopularelection.InVictorialegislationgenerallyspecifiesindirectelectionand
only
two
councils
the
central
capital
city
of
Melbourne
and
the
large
regional
centre
of
Geelong
havedirectlyelectedmayors.Thuspopularelectioniscompulsoryoravailablebychoiceinallstates
exceptVictoria,butoperatesinlessthan40%ofallAustraliancouncils.
Table2:ElectionandroleofAustralianmayors
Stateor
TerritoryMethodofElectionandTerm DesignatedRole
NewSouth
Wales
Mayorsmaybedirectlyorindirectly
elected(SydneyLordMayormustbe
directlyelected)
Localreferendum
required
to
introducepopularelection
Popularelectionisforthefull4year
termofthecouncil;indirectelection
takesplaceannually
Lessthan20%aredirectlyelected.
Principallythatofchairpersonplus
civic/ceremonialduties
Policyroleifrequiredbetweencouncilmeetings
Councillorscollectively
direct
council
affairs
and
providecivicleadership
Councilmaydelegateadditionalfunctions.
Northern
Territory
Mayorsofmunicipal(urban)councils
aredirectlyelected
Presidentsofruralshiresmaybeeither
directlyorindirectlyelected.
Chairpersonandcivic/ceremonialduties,plus
principalrepresentativeandspokesperson ofthe
council
Councillorscollectivelydirectcouncilaffairsand
providecivicleadership.
3HenceforthstatesshouldbereadtoincludetheNorthernTerritory
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Queens
land
AllMayorsaredirectlyelectedforthe
full4yeartermofthecouncil.
Semiexecutiverolepluscivicandceremonialduties:
leadingandmanagingmeetings.
proposingtheadoptionofthebudget
liaisingwiththechiefexecutiveofficeronbehalf
oftheothercouncillors
leading,
managing,
and
providing
strategic
directionto,thechiefexecutiveofficer
ensuringprovisionofinformationtotheMinister
aboutthelocalgovernmentarea
LordMayorofBrisbanehasadditionalexecutive
responsibilities.
South
Australia
Mayor/Chairperson eitherdirectly
electedforthefull4yeartermofthe
council,orindirectlyelectedforupto
4years
Councildecideswhichmethodto
adopt
Almostthree
quarters
are
directly
elected.
Presideatmeetings,principalspokesperson ofthe
council,civicandceremonialduties
Ifrequested,provideadvicetothechiefexecutive
officerontheimplementation ofcouncildecisions
Councillorscollectivelydirectcouncilaffairsand
providecivicleadership
Councilmay
delegate
additional
functions
LordMayorofAdelaidehasadditionalexecutive
responsibilities.
Tasmania AllMayorsandDeputyMayorsare
directlyelectedfor2yearterms(half
theCouncillorsareelectedevery2
years)
Ifnonomination,theCouncillorselect
oneoftheirnumber.
Substantialleadershiprole:
leaderofthecommunityofthemunicipalarea
chairpersonandspokespersonofthecouncil
liaisewiththegeneralmanagerontheactivitiesof
thecouncilanditsperformance
overseethecouncillorsintheirfunctions.
Victoria NearlyallMayorsareindirectlyelected
foratermofupto2years
Mayorsof
Melbourne
and
Geelong
are
directlyelectedfor4years.
Chairscouncilmeetingsandtakesprecedenceat
allmunicipalproceedingswithinthemunicipal
district
Nootherfunctionsarespecifiedforeitherthe
MayororCouncillors
MelbourneCityCouncilmaydelegatelimited
additionalpowerstotheLordMayor.
Western
Australia
MayororPresidentiseitherdirectlyor
indirectlyelected
Councilmaydecidetomovetopopular
election
Localreferendumrequiredtogoback
toindirectelection
Lord
Mayor
of
Perth
must
be
directly
elected.
Presidesatmeetingsandspeaksonbehalfofthe
localgovernment
LiaiseswiththeCEOonthelocalgovernments
affairsandtheperformanceofitsfunctions
Civicandceremonialduties
Councillorscollectivelyprovideleadershipand
guidance
to
the
community.
TheroleofmayorsasdefinedbylegislationisclearlystrongestinQueensland,whereallmayors
aredirectlyelectedandvotingiscompulsory.TheQueenslandlocalgovernmentActwasamendedin
2009,followingwidespreadamalgamationsoflocalgovernmentareas,toextendtoallmayorsa
modifiedversionoftheestablishedpowersandresponsibilitiesoftheLordMayorofBrisbane
(Australiaslargestcouncilwithapopulationinexcessof1million).TheLordMayorspowersare
trulyexecutiveinnature;theyinclude:
implementing
the
policies
adopted
by
the
council,
and
developing
and
implementing
other
policies
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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leadingandcontrolling(emphasisadded)thebusinessofthecouncil
preparingabudgettopresenttothecouncil
leading,managing,andprovidingstrategicdirectiontothechiefexecutiveofficerinorderto
achievehighqualityadministrationofthecouncil
directingthechiefexecutiveofficerandseniorcontractemployeesofthecouncil.
AnumberofveryhighprofilepoliticianshaveoccupiedthepositionofLordMayor.Thestatureand
significanceoftheofficemaybejudgedbytherecentselectionofthethenincumbenttoleadthe
statesoppositionpartyevenwithoutfirstbecomingamemberofparliament.4Whilstthepowers
giventootherQueenslandmayorsaresignificantlyweaker,theydoprovideaplatformformuch
strongercivicleadershipthanappliesacrosstherestofAustralia.5Thisisreinforcedbythepopular
mandateenjoyedbyQueenslandmayors,andinmanycasestherelativelylargesizeandbudgetsof
thelocalgovernmentstheylead.
Tasmaniaistheonlyotherstatewherelegislationgivesallmayorsanaddeddegreeofauthority
withinthe
body
politic.
Again,
all
mayors
are
directly
elected,
but
voting
is
optional.
Section
27
of
the
LocalGovernmentActrequiresTasmanianmayors,amongstotherthings,to:
actasaleaderofthecommunityofthemunicipalarea
liaisewiththegeneralmanagerontheactivitiesofthecouncilandtheperformanceofits
functionsandexerciseofitspowers
overseethecouncillorsintheperformanceoftheirfunctionsandintheexerciseoftheirpowers.
AsinQueensland,theirpersonalmandateissignificant,althoughrestrictedbythegenerallysmall
scaleandlimitedresourcesoflocalgovernmentinTasmania.
ElsewhereinAustralia,localgovernmentActstypicallyconfinetheprerogativesofthemayorto
presidingatcouncilmeetings,havingtherighttositonanycommittee,andcarryingoutcivicand
ceremonialduties,suchascitizenshipceremonies.Thisapplieswhethermayorsaredirectlyor
indirectlyelected.Moreover,onlyinNSW,SouthAustraliaandtheCityofMelbournedocouncils
haveanexplicitpowertodelegateadditionalfunctionstothemayor.Inpractice,however,mayors
mayplayasignificantlygreaterrolethanthelegislationimplies.
Firstly,themayorsofthesevencapitalcitycouncils6inAustraliasmetropolitanregionsarewell
known,highprofilefiguresandtovaryingdegreesexercisepowerorinfluencesignificantlygreater
thanindicated
by
the
relevant
provisions
of
the
local
government
Act
even
in
the
case
of
Brisbane
wherethemayorslegalpowersarealreadyconsiderable.Thisreflectstheirpersonalmandatesall
aredirectlyelectedaswellastheimportanceoftheircouncilsashometothecountrysmajor
businesscentresandpublicfacilitiesofstateandsometimesnationalimportance.TheLordMayors
ofSydneyandMelbourneareespeciallyprominent,althoughlackingspecificpowersunderthe
relevantActs.TheNSWlocalgovernmentActdoesnotgivetheLordMayorofSydneyanyexecutive
authority,althoughasnotedabovethecouncilmaydelegatespecifiedfunctions.Current
4Subsequentlyheledtheoppositiontovictoryinthe2012Stateelectionandisnowpremier.
5AndtheQueenslandgovernmenthasindicatedthatitwillbringforwardlegislationtofurtherstrengthen
mayoral
powers.
6Brisbane,Sydney,Melbourne,Hobart,Adelaide,Perth,Darwin.ExceptforBrisbane,thesecouncilscoveronly
thecentralbusinessdistrictand,tovaryingdegrees,adjoininginnersuburbs.
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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delegationsarequiteextensiveandconferwhatmightbedescribedassemiexecutivestatus(see
Box2).Inaddition,theLordMayorisexofficiochairoftheCentralSydneyPlanningCommittee(a
jointcommitteeofthecouncilandthestategovernment).
Box2:Examplesofcouncildelegationstothe LordMayorofSydney
(tobe
exercised
in
amanner
consistent
with
Councils
policies
and
decisions
as
applicable
from
time
to
time)
Exercise,duringrecessesofcouncil,thepowers,authorities,dutiesandfunctionsofcouncilother
thanthosereservedtothecouncilitselfundertheLocalGovernmentActordelegatedtotheChief
ExecutiveOfficerbycouncilresolution
DirecttheChiefExecutiveOfficer,exceptasotherwiseprovidedbytheLocalGovernmentAct
NegotiateandsettletermsofacontractofemploymentwiththeChiefExecutiveOfficer
Review,approveandimplementgovernanceandaccountabilitystructuresandprocessesforthe
performanceoftheorganisation,andoverseetheperformanceoftheChiefExecutiveOfficer
Suspend
the
Chief
Executive
Officer
at
short
notice
and,
only
after
prior
consultation
with
councillors,terminatetheChiefExecutiveOfficersemployment
Makechangestotheorganisational structurewhichtheLordMayorreasonablyconsiderstobe
minorchanges
Approveallexpenditurefromcontingencyfunds(excludingtheChiefExecutiveOfficers
contingencyfund)provideditiswithinthetermsofthebudgetadoptedbycouncil,andafter
consultationwiththeChiefExecutiveOfficer
Callandschedulemeetingsofcouncilandcommittees
Approveallpressstatementsandpublicationsissuedonbehalfofcouncil,unlesscouncil
determinesotherwise
Determinewho
should
represent
council
on
external
organisations
and
committees
and
inter
agencyworkingparties,andatcivicceremonialandsocialfunctions
Determinetowhomcivicawardsandhonourssuchaskeystothecityandhonorarycitizenship
shouldbepresented
Directthatcouncilsinternalauditorcarryoutarevieworaudit
Obtaindirectandindependentadvice(includinglegaladvice)relevanttocouncilfunctions
InrespectoftheOfficeoftheLordMayor,determinethestructure,allocateexpenditure,and
directstaffandallocatetasksinconsultationwiththeChiefExecutiveOfficer.
Source:City
of
Sydney
Delegations
to
the
Lord
Mayor,
current
at
August
2012
InthecaseofMelbourne,thecouncilspowertodelegateadditionalresponsibilitiestotheLord
MayorislimitedbytheCityofMelbourneActto:
theappointmentofcouncillorstochaircommittees
theappointmentofcouncillorstorepresentthecouncilonexternalorganisations,committees
andworkingparties
councillorstravellingarrangementsandexpenses.
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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However,onerecentissuethatdidgenerateconsiderabledebatewasthemovebythestate
governmentofVictoriatolegislateforpopularelectionofthemayorofGeelong,Victoriaslargest
regionalcitywithapopulationofaround220,000.Thegovernmentissuedadiscussionpaperin
March2011proposingadirectlyelectedmayoronthegroundsthat(DPCD2011a:2):
Allowingthe
voters
of
Greater
Geelong
to
directly
elect
their
mayor
will
recognise
the
state
and
regionalsignificanceofthecity
Adirectlyelectedmayorwillhaveahighpublicprofileandclearpublicendorsement,andthis
allowshimorhertoprovidestrongleadershipforthecouncilandthecommunity
Amayorelectedforthefullfouryeartermofthecouncilcanalsocontributetoproviding
stabilityofgovernmentforthecity.
Theproposalattractedconsiderablepublicandmediainterest,and65writtensubmissionswere
madeinresponsetothediscussionpaper55fromindividualsand10fromorganisations.According
tothestategovernmentssummaryofsubmissions,45favouredadirectlyelectedmayorinsome
form,18
were
opposed
and
2did
not
express
aclear
view
(DPCD
2011b:
2).
However,
aclear
majorityopposeddirectelectionofthedeputymayor.
Businessgroupsstronglysupportedadirectlyelectedmayor.Initssubmission,theGeelong
ChamberofCommerce(2011:45)alsosetoutwhatitregardedasthekeyexpectationsofthe
mayorinoffice.Theseincluded:
settingupaneffectivegovernancestructureandpresidingoverdecisionmaking
managingthecouncillorsandbuildingacohesiveteam
providingmotivationandleadershiptotheadministrationtoconveyastrongsenseofwhatis
important(but
not
managing
the
staff
which
is
the
chief
executive
officers
role)
effectivelypositioningthecouncilinitsstrategicrelationshipswithfederalandstate
governments,keyagenciesandinstitutions,communityorganisationsandstakeholders
bringingpeopletogetheraroundaspecificvisionforthefutureandactingasacatalystfor
findingthebestsolutionstoissues
aidingcoordinationandcohesion
beingthespokespersonforthecouncil,thetalkinghead,makingpublicstatementswhich
projectapositiveimageofthecouncil(andhis/herownimage),whetherinthemediaor
speakingonpublicplatformsathomeorabroad.
TheCommittee
for
Geelong,
also
strongly
business
based,
argued
that
the
mayor
should
be
given
additionalpowers,atleastcommensuratewiththoseoftheLordMayorofMelbourne,but
preferablyalsoincludingthepowertoestablishasmalldecisionmakingexecutive,perhaps
comprisingthechairsofmajorcommittees.TheCommitteeforGeelongassertedthatthiswould
freeupothercouncillorstobecommunityrepresentatives,ratherthanbeingexpectedtofunction
asaboardofdirectors(CommitteeforGeelong2011:9).
Bycontrast,thetwomainrepresentativebodiesforlocalgovernment,theMunicipalAssociationof
Victoria(MAV)andtheVictorianLocalGovernanceAssociation(VLGA)adoptedaverycautious
approach,arguingthatthecaseforchangehadnotbeenmadeandthatfurtherresearchand/oran
inquirywas
required.
The
MAV
sought
a
clear
and
detailed
discussion
of
the
benefits
and
any
disbenefitsondemocracyandgovernance,andtheadditionalcosttothecommunityandcouncil...
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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(MAV2011:1).However,thestategovernmentannouncedinNovember2011thatitwouldbegoing
aheadwiththechange(DPCD2011c).
Insummary,andapartfromQueensland,approachestotheroleofmayorsacrossAustraliacould
bestbedescribedasambivalent.Thereisanevidentreluctancetoinstitutionalisestronglocal
leadershipthrough
the
office
of
mayor.
Only
in
Tasmania,
Western
Australia
and
the
City
of
Adelaide
aremayorsspecificallytaskedwithcommunityleadership.InNSW,Queensland,theNorthern
TerritoryandtherestofSouthAustralia,thatroleisgiventoallthecouncillorsindividuallyand
collectively.InVictoriaitisnotmentionedatall. Yetcallsformoreeffectivelocalleadership
abound.Latersectionsofthispaperconsiderhowtheymightbeanswered.
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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4. Developments in England and New Zealand
UnliketheAustralianstates(exceptQueensland)governmentsinbothEnglandandNewZealand
haverecentlyaddressedtherolethatmayorsshouldplayandamendedlegislationaccordingly.A
movetointroducedirectlyelectedmayorswithsemiexecutivepowerswaspartofbroaderreforms
ofEnglish
local
government
undertaken
by
the
Blair
Labour
government
around
the
turn
of
the
century.ThepromptforsimilaractioninNewZealandwasadecisionin2007bytheformerLabour
ledgovernmenttoholdaRoyalCommissionintothefuturegovernanceofAuckland.
England
InEngland,thedecisivesteptowardsnewformsofmayoralleadershipwastheestablishmentin
2000oftheGreaterLondonAuthority(GLA),headedbyadirectlyelectedMayorofLondon.TheGLA
isaregionalauthoritythatoperatesatastrategiclevelinconjunctionwiththe32Londonborough
councilsandtheCityofLondon.Themayorisanswerabletoanassemblyof25electedmembers
whichscrutinisestheAuthoritysactivities,spendingandperformance,andcanbyatwothirds
majorityamendthemayorsproposedbudget.
ThemayorisabletoexercisetheexecutivefunctionsoftheGLA.His/herroleencompasses:
Promotingavisionforeconomic,socialandenvironmentalimprovement
Formulatingplansandpoliciescoveringtransport,planninganddevelopment,housing,
economicdevelopmentandregeneration,culture,healthinequalities,andarangeof
environmentalissuesincludingclimatechange,biodiversityandenvironmentalquality
Ensuringthoseplansandpoliciescontributetosustainabledevelopmentandthehealthof
Londoners
Responsibilitiesfor
culture
and
tourism,
including
managing
Trafalgar
Square
and
Parliament
Square
SettingtheannualbudgetfortheGreaterLondonAuthorityandthewiderGLAgroup,which
includestheMetropolitanPolice,TransportforLondon,andtheLondonFireBrigade
AppointmentstotheboardsoftheMetropolitanPoliceAuthority,TransportforLondon,andthe
LondonFireandEmergencyPlanningAuthority,andchairingthoseboardsifs/hesochooses.8
Inexercisinghis/herpowersthemayorisrequiredtoconsultregularlywithLondoners.
Subsequently,theLocalGovernmentAct2000introducednewgovernanceoptionsforalllocal
authorities,including
one
of
adirectly
elected,
semi
executive
mayor
as
opposed
to
the
previously
universalmodelofaleaderelectedbyandfromthecouncillors,withdecisionmakinginthehands
ofaseriesofcommittees.Thepositionofmayorhadpreviouslybeenessentiallyceremonialand
subservienttothatoftheleader.Localauthoritieswererequiredtoholdalocalreferendum9ifthey
wishedtoadoptthenewmayoralmodel:only37outof353didso,andonly12succeeded.The
overwhelmingmajorityofauthoritiesselectedagovernanceoptionthatretained10
orwassimilarto
theestablishedapproach(Stevens2010).
8Seehttp://www.london.gov.uk/who runslondon/mayor/role
9
A
successful
referendum
had
been
held
to
endorse
the
establishment
of
the
GLA
and
Mayor
of
London
10Smallercouncilswith1999populationsoflessthan85,000weregiventheoptionofretainingthecommittee
system.
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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The2000Actdidnotdetailtheroleandpowersofelectedmayors,beyondthoseofappointinga
deputyandmembersofanexecutivegroupofcouncillorsthatwouldmanagethelocalauthorityin
conjunctionwiththemayor,chiefexecutiveandseniorofficers.Theunderlyingconceptherewas
thatofaministerialandcabinetsystem,withotherbackbenchcouncillorsactingascommunity
representativesandscrutinisingtheworkoftheexecutive(cabinet)amajordeparturefrom
previouspracticeandoneaimedatmoredecisive,innovativeandresponsivelocalleadership.
Thespecificfunctionsanddecisionmakingpowersofthemayorandexecutivearethesubjectof
ministerialregulationsand/orindividualcouncilconstitutions.Thustheycananddovary
considerablyfromoneauthoritytoanother.IntheLondonBoroughofLewisham,forexample,the
councilconstitutionsetsouttheroleofthemayorasfollows(LondonBoroughofLewisham2011:
47):
tobethecouncilsprincipalspokesperson
togiveoverallpoliticaldirectiontothecouncil
toappoint
(and
dismiss)
the
executive
todecideonascheduleofdelegationofexecutivefunctions
tochairmeetingsoftheexecutive
torepresentthecouncilonexternalbodiesthatdealwithexecutivefunctions
tobethecouncil'sleadmemberforchildren'sservices.
Thekeypointhereisthemayorspowertoallocateanddelegateexecutivefunctionsi.e.thewide
rangeofdecisionmakingpowersvestedinhimselfandtheexecutive.InLewisham,hemaydelegate
anyofthosepowersto:
theexecutive
as
awhole
or
acommittee
of
the
executive
anindividualmemberoftheexecutive
anofficer
anareacommittee
ajointcommittee
anindividualwardcouncillor,totheextentthefunctionisexercisablewithintheward
anotherlocalauthority.
Themayorisalsoresponsibleforleadingthepreparationofanumberofkeystrategicandcorporate
plans,andoftheannualbudget.Thecouncilasawholemayamendthebudgetsubmittedbythe
mayorand
executive,
but
requires
atwo
thirds
majority
to
do
so.
DebatecontinuesinEnglandoverthemeritsorotherwiseofelectedmayors:Stevens(2010)
providesapithysummary:
Dependingonyourpreferenceoraffiliation,electedmayorsare,likereformoflocalfinance,
destinedtoremaineitheradesirablepanaceafordecliningratesofparticipationand
underperformancebylocalcouncils,oranaspirininsearchofaheadache.Whathasbeenshownis
thatmayors,likecouncilleaderspossibly,havemostlybeencapableofputtingtheirlocalauthority
onanimprovementjourney,whichinsomecaseshasshowndramaticturnarounds(Hackney,
NorthTyneside)andinothercasessimplysteadyprogress(Lewisham).Whereassomemayorshave
providedstabilityafterconsiderablechaos(Hackney)orunderperformance(Torbay),othershave
simplygotonwiththejobandbeenrecognisedforit(Hartlepool,Middlesbrough).Andwherethey
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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havent,theelectoratehavehadtheirsay(Doncaster,StokeonTrent).Eitherway,theyvegot
peopletalkingaboutlocalgovernment,whichremainsinmostpeopleseyesamunicipaltheme
parkofmayorschainsofoffice,dullcommitteemeetingsbehindcloseddoorsandpossiblyeven
irrelevance.
Furtherfuel
was
added
to
the
debate
by
the
policy
of
the
Conservative
Liberal
Democrat
governmentelectedinMay2010toextendthesystemtoanother12majorcitycouncilsacrossthe
country.11
Attentionthusremainedfocusednotonthequiteradicalconceptofreplacingtheold
committeesystemwithastrongcouncilexecutive(cabinet),butratherwhethertheheadofthat
executiveshouldbeadirectlyelectedmayororanindirectlyelectedleader.Amendmentstothe
localgovernmentActsince2000havegivenleadersverysimilarrolesandpowerstothoseof
mayors,andthisisusedbysometoarguethatthereisnoneedforpopularelection.Thecentral
issuethusbecomesoneofwhetherthepresidingmemberofacouncilshouldenjoyapopular
mandate,andthevaluetoalocalityofhavingaclearlyidentifiedfirstcitizenwithsignificant
politicalandexecutiveauthority.
NewZealand
AllmayorsinNewZealandhavebeendirectlyelectedformanyyears,buttheyhavenospecific
powersbeyondchairingcouncilmeetings.EvenwhenthelocalgovernmentActwas
comprehensivelyreviewedandrewrittenin2002itseemsthatlittleornothoughtwasgivento
movingawayfromtheprevailingweakmayormodel.The2002Actdoescontainaprovision(s40)
forgovernancestatementsthat,togetherwiththeuseofdelegations,couldbeusedtocodifyand
extendthemayorsrole,buttheprovisiondoesnotappeartohavebeenusedinthatway(Local
GovernmentNewZealandundated:5152).AsinAustralia,lackofformalpowersdoesnot
necessarilyprecludetheemergenceofstrongmayors,andNewZealandprovidesmanyexamples
offorceful
and
effective
civic
leadership
based
on
the
mayors
popular
mandate
and
personal
qualities(RoyalCommissiononAucklandGovernance:423)
However,theRoyalCommissionestablishedinOctober2007toreviewthegovernanceofthe
Aucklandmetropolitanregionsawaneedforamuchmorestructuredapproach.Inrecommending
establishmentofasupercitycouncilcoveringtheentiremetropolitanareaandwithapopulation
ofaround1.4million,anddrawingtoasignificantextentontheEnglishmodelofelectedmayors,it
arguedasfollows(ibid:8):
Aucklandneedsaninspirational leader,inclusiveinapproachanddecisiveinaction.Auckland
needsaperson
who
is
able
to
articulate
and
deliver
on
ashared
vision,
and
who
can
speak
for
the
region,anddeliverregionalprioritiesdecisively.
TheAucklandCouncilwillbeledbyamayorwhoiselectedbyallAucklanders.TheMayorof
AucklandwillhavegreaterexecutivepowersthancurrentlyprovidedundertheLocalGovernment
Act2002,althoughtheseadditionalpowerswillstillbemoremodestthaninmanyinternational
modelsofmayoralty.Theadditionalpowerswillbelimitedtothreekeyabilities:
11Referendahavesincebeenheldinthosecities(exceptLiverpoolwhichmovedvoluntarilytoadirectly
elected
mayor)
but
only
one
(Bristol)
was
successful.
It
appears
that
the
principal
reasons
for
this
outcome
wereinstitutionalandpoliticalinertia,andthelackofasimple,readilyunderstoodandcompellingcasefor
change.
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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appointmentofthedeputymayorandcommitteechairpersons
proposaloftheAucklandCouncilbudgetandinitiationofpolicy
establishmentandmaintenanceofanappropriately staffedMayoralOffice.
TheMayorwillbeexpectedtochartandleadanagendaforAuckland.ToensuretheMayor
remainsfullyaccountable,allpolicywillneedtobeapprovedbythefullAucklandCouncil.
Therewill
also
be
additional
obligations
on
the
Mayor
to
engage
with
the
people
of
Auckland
throughregularMayorsDaysandanannualStateoftheRegionaddress.
Thefunctionsofthemayorweresubsequentlyarticulatedinsection9oftheLocalGovernment
(AucklandCouncil)Act2009asfollows:
articulateandpromoteavisionforAuckland
provideleadershipforthepurposeofachievingobjectivesthatwillcontributetothatvision
leadthedevelopmentofcouncilplans(includingtheLTCCP12
andtheannualplan),policies,and
budgetsforconsiderationbythegoverningbody
establishprocessesandmechanismstoengagewiththepeopleofAuckland
appointthedeputymayor,establishcommitteesofthegoverningbodyandappointthe
chairpersonofeachcommittee
establishandmaintainanappropriatelystaffedofficeofthemayor,withanannualbudgetnot
lessthan0.2%ofthecouncil'stotalbudgetedoperatingexpenditureforthatyear.
Whilstthissetofpowersandfunctionsfallsshortofcreatinganexecutivemayor(McKinlay2011),it
clearlyestablishesanewbenchmarkforNewZealandlocalgovernment,inthesamewaythatthe
powersoftheLordMayorofBrisbanewereseenasapointofreferenceforotherQueensland
mayors.InMarch2012theNewZealandGovernmentlaunchedanewwaveoflocalgovernment
reformproposalsunderthebannerBetterLocalGovernment(NewZealandGovernment2012).
Thoseproposalsincludethefollowingstatementonmayoralpowers(ibid:8):
Mayorsarethepublicfaceofcouncilsandpubliclycarrytheresponsibility fortheirdecisions.The
problemisthatthereisamismatchinthecurrentlocalgovernmentframeworkbetweenthehigh
levelofpublicinterest,scrutinyandengagementinmayoralelections,wheretheyareelectedfor
anentirecityordistrict,andtheirlimitedformalpowersoverthegoverningbodyofacouncil.
Mayorsneedthecapacitytoprovideclearerandstrongerleadership.
ThiswasrecognisedwiththeAucklandCouncilreform.TheLocalGovernment(AucklandCouncil)
Act2009providesAucklandsmayorwithgovernancepowersnotavailabletoothermayors,
although
substantial
decision
making
remains
with
the
full
council.
It
makes
good
sense
for
mayors
acrossNewZealandtohavesimilargovernancepowers.
Allmayorswillbeempowered,fromthe2013localelections,toappointdeputymayors,to
establishcommitteesandtoapprovecommitteechairpersons.Theroleofthemayorwillexplicitly
includeleadershipoverthedevelopmentofplans,policiesandbudgets.
AsinQueensland,itappearsthattheperceivedsuccessofthebigcitymodelhaspersuadedcentral
governmentthatasimilarapproachcandeliverthebenefitsofstrongerpoliticalleadershipacross
thewholeoflocalgovernment.
12LongTermCouncilCommunityPlanawiderangingstrategicandfinancialplan
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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5. Towards a model for Australian mayors
Wenowreturntothecentralquestionoftherolethatmayorscouldandshouldplayinthe
Australiancontext.Basedontheliteratureoverviewandothermaterialpresentedabove,sixkey
dimensionshavebeenidentifiedforfurtherconsideration.Thesecomprise:
themeritsofpopularelection
theneedforstrongercommunityleadership
ensuringeffectivestrategicandcorporateplanning
enhancingpoliticalgovernance
therespectiverolesofmayorsandchiefexecutives
intergovernmentrelations.
Themeritsofpopularelection
InNewZealand,QueenslandandTasmaniathereisnoevidentdebateaboutwhethermayorsshould
bedirectly
elected,
and
all
the
mayors
interviewed
in
those
jurisdictions
affirmed
the
value
and
importanceofhavingapersonalmandate.Eventhoughmayorsmaynotenjoyspecificadditional
powers,andmaysometimesfindthemselvesinaminoritywithintheelectedcouncil,apersonal
mandatewasseentoenablethemtoappealdirectlytoconstituents,torepresentadiverserangeof
communityinterests,toworkmoreeffectivelywithcentralgovernments,businessandotherkey
partners,andtoexercisemoreinfluencewithinthecouncilorganisation,bothinnegotiationswith
othercouncillorsandwithseniormanagement.Similarargumentswereadvancedbyalltheother
directlyelectedmayorsinterviewed.
InEnglanddebatestillragesonthemeritsofpopularelection.Someclaimthatelectedmayorshave
providedmore
visible
and
accountable
facilitative
leadership,
improved
the
performance
of
their
councils,andestablishedaplatformfordevolutionofauthorityfromcentralgovernment(Kennyand
Lodge2008).Thecontraryviewisthatindirectlyelectedcouncilleaderscananddoachievesimilar
results,thatindirectelectionavoidspersonalitypoliticsandensuresleadershavesoundlocal
governmentexperience,andthateffectivedevolutionrequiresbroadersystemicchange(Kemp
2006).
SomeofthoseopposedtothepopularelectionoftheMayorofGeelongalsopointedtothedangers
ofpersonalitypoliticsandthepotentialforcandidateswithgreaterresourcestobuythemayoralty.
Therewerealsoconcernsthatthemayormightveeroutofcontrol,runningapurelypersonal
agenda,or
conversely
that
there
could
be
gridlock
between
the
mayor
and
an
opposing
majority
of
councillors. Concernsofthatnaturereflecttheneedtoensurethatthemayorspowersand
responsibilitiesarearticulatedinsufficientdetailtoestablishclearrulesofthegameeitherby
statuteorthroughamechanismsuchasacouncilconstitutionorspecificdelegationofdecision
makingauthority.ThisisrecognisedmostclearlyinBrisbane(andtoalesserextenttherestof
Queensland),Sydney(intermsofthedelegationfromthecouncil),andEngland(throughcouncil
constitutions).Also,inTasmaniasection27(1A)oftheLocalGovernmentActrequiresthemayorto
representaccuratelythepoliciesanddecisionsofthecouncilinperforminghisorherfunctions.
Whereapopularlyelectedmayorexercisesconsiderableexecutiveauthority,regularandeffective
scrutinyof
his
or
her
performance
is
also
essential:
this
is
normally
inherent
in
the
way
Australian
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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councilsoperate,butmorestructuredandrigorousprocessesmayneedtobeintroducedifthereisa
riskthattherepresentativeroleofothercouncillorscouldbeundulyimpaired.Opportunitiesfor
councillorstoscrutiniseandquestionmayoralstatementsanddecisionscouldbeincreased,and
theremightbeapowertovetosomeorallmayoraldecisionsbyatwothirdsmajority.Also,since
stategovernmentsalreadyexercisecloseoversightandsupervisionofcouncils,thoseprocesses
couldbeextendedtomonitoringtheperformanceofdirectlyelectedmayorsandinterveningwhen
necessary.Anotheroptionwouldbetointroducerecallprovisions,empoweringtheelectorsand/or
thecouncillorstoremovethemayorbyreferendumor,say,atwothirdsmajority,butsuch
provisionsmayintroduceunwarranteddisruptionandinstability.
Analternativeapproachfavouredbysomeisforthemayortobeindirectlyelectedbutwitha
guaranteedtermofnotlessthantwoyears,orpossiblythewholeofthecouncilsterm.Thiswould
amelioratetheproblemsinherentinmayorshavingtobereelectedevery12months,notably
inactionorinstabilityintheleaduptoeachannualelection,anddealsbeingdonetosharetherole
ofmayoramongstthreeorfourcouncillorsoverthelifeofthecouncil,diminishingtheauthorityand
effectivenessoftheposition.However,unlessthemayoristheunqualifiedleaderofadominant
politicalgroupingwithinthecouncil(asituationwhichoftenappliestocouncilleadersintheUK,
wherelocalgovernmentispartypolitical,butismuchlesscommoninAustralia),itisdifficulttosee
howindirectelectionforextendedperiodswouldbedemocraticallyjustifiedorhowitwouldmakea
significantdifferenceinpractice,sincethemayorwouldstilllackapersonalmandate.
Theneedforstrongercommunityleadership
Entwinedwiththeissueofpopularelectionisthecommonlyperceivedneedforstrongercommunity
leadership.Thereappearstobewidespreadagreementonthispoint:itwasanexplicitobjectiveof
government
moves
to
introduce
elected
mayors
in
England,
Auckland
and
Geelong,
and
is
supported
bytheliteratureonfacilitativeandplacebasedleadership.Thequestionthatarises,however,is
howbesttoconstructsuchleadership:towhatextentshouldthepowertoleadbevestedinthe
mayorasopposedtoabroadercollectiveofcouncillorsandindeedothernonelectedcommunity
representatives.ThiswasakeyissueraisedintheGeelongdebate.Certainly,theprovisionsof
AustralianlocalgovernmentActs,apartfromQueensland,suggestareluctancetomoveawayfrom
thecollectivecouncildecisionmakingmodel,eventhoughcouncilsarefrequentlycriticizedfor
indecisionandlackofstrategy.
Allthemayorsinterviewedforthisstudyemphasisedtheneedtobuildconsensusandnonesawany
valuein
operating
as
aone
man
band.
But
they
also
agreed
that
someone
had
to
be
responsible
for
takingthelead,bothinproposingactionandseekingconsensus.Allsawthemselvesasplayinga
leadershiproleinliaisingwithabroadrangeofgovernmentandnongovernmentstakeholdersto
promotetheinterestsoftheirlocalityanditscommunities.Again,fewAustralianlocalgovernment
Actsexplicitlyconfersuchresponsibilitiesonthemayor.
Ofparticularrelevancehereistheincreasingemphasisplacedoncommunityconsultationand
engagement.Thismaybelinkedspecificallytopreparationofplansandpolicies(discussedbelow)or
expressedmorebroadly.ThewordingoftheLocalGovernment(AucklandCouncil)Actisparticularly
interesting,requiringthemayorto:establishprocessesandmechanismstoengagewiththepeople
ofAuckland,
whether
generally
or
particularly.
The
Mayor
of
London
is
similarly
charged
with
consultingLondoners.Bycontrast,noAustralianlocalgovernmentActgivesmayorsanyspecialrole
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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incommunityengagement:wherecommunicationorconsultationwiththelocalcommunityis
mentioned,itislistedasoneoftheresponsibilitiesofallcouncillors.Theinherentriskofthisloose
approachisthatengagementbecomeslargelyadhoc,andthatwhatshouldbeseenasanongoing
politicalfunctionisinsteadtreatedasamatterofcompliancewhenspecifiedplansandpoliciesare
beingprepared,andconductedprincipallybymanagers.
Afurtherissueiswhethercentralgovernmentsareseriousaboutenablinglocalleadership.Oneof
theargumentsputforwardbythoseopposedtoelectedmayorsinEnglandisthattheycannotmake
anyrealdifferenceunlessthereisgenuinedevolutionofauthorityfromcentraltolocalgovernment
(Kemp2006).Toasignificantextent,thatmaybeachickenandeggissue:devolution(legislativeor
defacto)maybemorelikelyiflocalleadershipismoreeffectiveandbetterabletoexercisegreater
authority.TheexperienceofBrisbaneCityCouncilandmorerecentlytheGreaterLondonAuthority
andMayorofLondonappearstosupportsuchanargument.
Interestingly,theheadoftheUKsNewLocalGovernmentNetworkrecentlylinkedtheneedfor
devolutionto
acall
for
compulsory
voting
in
local
elections
(Parker
2012).
He
argued
that:
Thisisawaytosolvethelocalist'sdilemma:councilscomplainthatnobodyvotesforthembecause
theyhavenopower,butWhitehallrefusestopassdownmorepowerbecausecouncilsarenotfully
accountable.Compulsoryvotingwouldtransformthepracticeoflocalpolitics,forcingpartiesto
appealtoamuchwiderrangeofvoters.
InAustralia,votinginlocalelectionsisalreadycompulsoryinthethreelargeststates,andthereis
littledoubtthatthisaddssignificantlytotheauthorityofdirectlyelectedmayors.Arecentreviewof
localgovernmentinmetropolitanPerthproposedbothcompulsoryvotinganddirectelectionof
mayors(MetropolitanLocalGovernmentReview2012).
Ensuringeffectivestrategicandcorporateplanning
RecentamendmentstomostAustralianlocalgovernmentActshaveplacedconsiderableemphasis
ontheimportanceoflongtermstrategicplans,typicallylinkedtogoalsofwellbeingand
sustainability,andpreparedinconsultationwithabroadrangeofstakeholders.Thesestrategiesare
thentobetranslatedintoaseriesofshortertermcorporateplans:inNSWthetermdelivery
programisusedtomakethepurposeclear.Thepurposeofallthisistomakecouncilsmorepolicy
andfuturefocused,committedtotheongoingpursuitofagreedcommunityobjectivesandtosound
managementofassets,financesandhumanresources.
However,only
in
NSW
and
Tasmania
does
the
legislation
indicate
explicitly
that
one
of
the
functions
ofcouncillorsistoinvolvethemselvesinthepreparationofstrategicplans,andnoneoftheActs
suggestsleadershipbythemayorinthisregard.OnlytheQueenslandActgivesmayorsassociated
functions:togivestrategicdirectiontotheCEOandtopresentthebudget.InthecaseofBrisbane,
thesefunctionsareextendedtodevelopingpoliciesandpreparingthebudget.
ThissituationcontrastsmarkedlywithAucklandandEngland,wheremayors(andnowalsoindirectly
electedcouncilleaders)arechargedwithformulatingandpromotingavisionfortheircityorarea,
andwithleadingthepreparationofplansandbudgetsinparttogiveeffecttothatvision.Like
communityengagement,strategicplanningisfundamentallypoliticalratherthantechnical:itis
aboutcommunity
preferences
and
expectations,
setting
objectives,
and
balancing
competing
claims
onresources.Iflegislationrequiressuchplanningbutdoesnotrequireandenableelected
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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representativestoleadtheprocess,thenitisnotdifficulttounderstandwhyplanspreparedlargely
byofficialsareadoptedbycouncillorswithoutsufficientconsiderationoftheirimplicationsandwith
littlesolidcommitmenttotheirimplementation.Thesameappliestoannualormultiyearbudgets.
Enhancingpoliticalgovernance
Anunderlying
theme
in
the
evolving
role
of
mayors
is
the
need
for
enhanced
political
governance.
Thisrelatestothegoalofeffectiveleadershipdiscussedearlierandinvolvesissuesofgood
governancethewaythebodypoliticofthecouncilorganisesandconductsitselftoensuresound
decisionmaking.
Anumberofinterestingdevelopmentsareapparent.First,mayorsinEngland,Aucklandand(subject
tothenecessarydelegation)Melbournearevariouslyresponsibleforappointingtheirdeputy,the
cabinet(inEngland),delegatingdecisionmaking,determiningthecommitteestructure,and
appointingcouncillorstointernalcommittees(includingaschair)orasrepresentativesofthecouncil
onoutsidebodies.Inotherwords,themayorisempoweredtosetupthestructureofpolitical
governancein
such
away
as
to
reflect
his
or
her
vision
and
priorities
(and
potentially,
of
course,
to
rewardhisorhersupporters).
Frominterviewswithmayors,theselectionandroleofdeputiesemergedasparticularlyimportant.
Allemphasisedtheneedforacloseandtrustfulworkingrelationship:havingadeputytheycould
relyontofillinwherenecessaryand,importantly,toliaisewithothercouncillorsandhelpsecure
votesinthecouncilonkeyissues.Whilstsomethoughtremovingtherightofcouncillorstoelectthe
deputycouldprovecounterproductive,themajorityfeltthatthebenefitsofbeingabletoappointa
trustedcolleagueorstrategicallyoutweighedtherisk.InthecaseofMelbourne,therequirement
forcandidatesformayoranddeputytostandforelectiontogetherisdesignedtoensureaneffective
leadershipteam,althoughrelationshipsmaynotalwayslastthedistance.
Secondly,themayormaybeexpectedtotaketheleadinensuringprobityandappropriate
behaviouronthepartofallcouncillors.InTasmania,forexample,thelocalgovernmentActrequires
themayortooverseethecouncillorsintheirfunctions,andthemayorplaysakeyrolewhen
complaintsaremadeagainstcouncillors.Thiscanbeseenasanimportantelementofcivic
leadership:initssubmissionsupportingadirectlyelectedmayortheGeelongChamberofCommerce
identifiedaneedforthemayortomanagethecouncillorsandbuildacohesiveteam.
Therespectiverolesofmayorsandchiefexecutives
Therelationship
between
mayors
and
chief
executives
is
acomplex
and
often
vexed
issue:
it
lies
at
theheartofthedebateaboutwhetherandtowhatextentmayorsshouldexerciseexecutive
powers.ThisisaparticularlysensitivequestioninAustralia,wherethegeneraltrendoflocal
governmentlegislationoverthepasttwodecadeshasbeentoapplytheconceptofseparationof
powers.Theresponsibilitiesandprerogativesofchiefexecutivesaredescribedinasmuchormore
detailasthoseofmayorsandcouncillors,typicallysuchthattheyare(officiallyatleast)thesole
pointofcontactbetweenthebodypoliticandtheadministration,entrustedwithallaspectsofthe
daytodaymanagementoftheorganisation,includingappointmentofallstaff,andallowed
considerablediscretionintheimplementationofcouncilpolicies.
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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Inlegalterms,theonlysignificantdeparturesfromthismodelinAustraliaarethecitycouncilsof
Brisbane,wheretheActempowersthelordmayorunequivocallytodirectthechiefexecutive,and
Sydney,wherethatfunctionhasbeendelegatedtothelordmayorbythecouncil,togetherwiththe
powertomakeminoradjustmentstotheorganisationstructure.Elsewhere,legislationlimits
mayorstoprovidingstrategicdirectiontotheirchiefexecutives,oradvisingorliaisingwiththem.
However,thisdoesnotnecessarilypreventapoliticallypowerfulmayorfromexercisinga
considerablemeasureofdefactoexecutiveauthority,especiallywhenseniormanagersare
employedunderfixedterm,performancebasedcontracts.
ThesituationinNewZealandisgenerallysimilartothatinAustralia:eventhenewmayorof
Aucklandhasnotbeengivenexplicitexecutivepowers.However,asnotedearliers/hedoeslead
thedevelopmentofstrategicandcorporateplansand,perhapsmostimportantly,thebudget.
Moreover,themayorhasdedicatedsupportstaffandaguaranteedminimumbudgettomaintain
thatoffice.
InEngland,
elected
mayors
(and
indirectly
elected
council
leaders)
may
have
much
more
explicit
and
extensiveexecutiveauthority,dependingontheircouncilsconstitutionandschemeofdelegations.
TheLondonmayorisalsoabletoexercisepowerfulinfluence,ifnotexecutiveauthorityassuch,by
appointingandchairingtheboardsofkeyservicedeliveryorganisations,suchasTransportfor
London.
Noneofthemayorsinterviewedforthisstudyexpressedadesiretoadministerthedaytoday
operationsoftheircouncilorganisation:allsawtheirprimaryfocusasontheonehandoutward
looking:formulatingstrategy,engagingthecommunityandstakeholdersandworkingwithpartner
organisations;andontheotherpoliticalmanagement,creatinganenablingenvironmentwithinthe
councilso
that
agreed
objectives
are
achieved.
However,
in
most
cases
it
was
evident
that
this
handsoffapproachtoadministrationwasconditionalonhavingachiefexecutivewhoappreciated
themayoralroleandmandate,anddidnotseektoapplyseparationofpowersinaliteralandrigid
manner.Inthisregard,thereappearstobeconsiderablemeritintheEnglishconceptofacouncil
constitutionthatcanbenegotiatedandupdatedaftereachelection,andthatsetsouttheimportant
rulesgoverningoperationsandkeyrelationships.Thiswouldapplyequallytoissuesofpolitical
governancediscussedpreviously.
Whilsthavingaseparatechiefexecutiveremainsthenorm,someEnglishcouncilsarenow
experimentingwiththemayor(orleader)asCEOmodel(Stevens2011),anddowngradingthe
positionofchiefexecutivetochiefoperatingofficerorheadofpaidservice.Insomeinstancesthis
followstheadventofamayororcouncilleaderwhowishestobethedominantauthority,but
elsewhereitmayreflectaviewthattheheadofthebodypoliticoughttodealdirectlyasrequired
withalltheseniorofficers(asinthecaseofBrisbaneslordmayor)andthatgrantingthetitlechief
executiveofficertoanappointedofficialisinappropriate.Theneedtoreduceexpenditureisalsoa
significantfactor:eliminatingtheseparatepositionofCEOandmakingoneoftheseniorofficers
headofpaidservicemaybeseenasaworthwhilesaving.
Intergovernmentrelations
Anecessarycorollaryofcommunityleadershipandstrategicplanningisinvolvementininter
governmentrelations.Allthemayorsinterviewedspokeabouttheirroleindealingwithand
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
29
advocatingtocentralgovernmentsonbehalfoftheirlocalarea.Asnotedearlier,theAucklandRoyal
Commissionhighlightedtheneedforsomeonetospeakfortheregion.
OnlytwoAustralianlocalgovernmentActsspecificallymentionintergovernmentrelations.TheCity
ofAdelaideincludesthestrongestreference,makingitadutyofthemayortoparticipateinthe
maintenanceof
inter
governmental
relationships
at
regional,
state
and
national
levels.
The
QueenslandActincludesasomewhatoddrequirementforthemayortoprovideinformationtothe
ministeraboutthelocalgovernmentarea.Inaddition,theNorthernTerritoryActmakesthemayor
theprincipalrepresentativeofthecouncil,whileasnotedearlierSydneyslordmayorchairsthe
jointstatecouncilCentralSydneyPlanningCommittee,animportantintergovernmentmechanism.
Regardlessoflegislation,itisevidentthatAustralianmayorsaregenerallyexpectedtoplaya
significantroleinintergovernmentrelations.WhentheRuddfederalgovernmentestablishedthe
AustralianCouncilofLocalGovernmentin2008,itsnominalmembership(andannualplenary
gathering)consistedofallthecountrysmayors(orequivalents).ArecentmovebytheNSW
governmentto
launch
ongoing
reform
and
revitalization
of
local
government
(Destination
2036)
beganwithameetingofallthestatesmayorsandcouncilgeneralmanagers(chiefexecutives).This
suggeststhatsomecodificationofthemayorsintergovernmentrole,alongthelinesoftheAdelaide
Act,wouldbeappropriate.
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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6. Conclusion: a framework for legislation
Thisconcludingsectionbuildsonthelessonsdrawnearlieraboutkeyelementsoftheevolvingrole
ofmayors,tosuggestaframeworkoflegislativeprovisionsthatmightbeappliedinAustralia.Its
startingpointisthattheevidencereviewedpointsclearlytothevalueofmayorswhoareenabledto
exercisestrong,
facilitative
and
place
based
leadership.
Based
on
that
approach,
Table
3proposes
a
setofprincipalmayoralfunctionsandprerogatives,andlegislativeprovisionsthatwouldgiveeffect
tothem.Wherepossible,thesuggestedprovisionsdrawonanexistingAustralianlocalgovernment
Act.
Table3:Possiblemayoralrolesandlegislation
Functionorprerogative Legislativeprovision (andorigin)
Principalmemberofthe
council
Leadandcontrolthebusinessofthecouncil(Brisbane)
Chairandmanagemeetings(All/Qld)
Speakon
behalf
of
the
council
as
the
council's
principal
representative(NT)
Conductcivicandceremonialfunctions(All)
Communityleadershipand
engagement
Articulateandpromoteavisionforthearea(Auckland)
Provideleadershipandguidancetothecommunity(Adelaide)
Establishprocessesandmechanismstoengagewiththecommunity
(Auckland)
Selectionofdeputymayor Appointthedeputymayor(Auckland)OR
Mayoranddeputytostandforelectionasateam(Melbourne)
Effectivepolitical
governance
Establish
committees
of
the
governing
body
and
appoint
the
chairpersonofeachcommittee(Auckland)
Overseethecouncillorsintheperformanceoftheirfunctionsandin
theexerciseoftheirpowers(Tas)
Representaccuratelythepoliciesanddecisionsofthecouncil(Tas)
Strategicandcorporate
planning
Leadthedevelopmentandimplementationofcouncilplans,policies,
andbudgets(Auckland/Qld)
Proposetheadoptionofthebudget(Qld)
Guidingthechiefexecutive
Lead,manage,andprovideadviceandstrategicdirectiontothechief
executiveofficerontheimplementationofcouncilpolicies(Qld/SA)
Exercise,in
cases
of
necessity,
the
policy
making
functions
of
the
governingbodyofthecouncilbetweenmeetings(NSW)
Liaisewiththechiefexecutiveofficeronbehalfoftheother
councillors(Qld/Tas)
Directthechiefexecutiveofficerinaccordancewiththecouncils
policies(Qld)
Conductperformanceappraisalsofthechiefexecutiveofficer(Qld)
Intergovernmentrelations Participateinintergovernmentalrelationshipsatregional,Stateand
nationallevels(Adelaide)
Exercisedelegatedauthority Exercisesuchotherfunctionsasthecouncildetermines(NSW/SA).
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
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WhilstthelegislativeprovisionssuggestedinTable3wouldconsiderablystrengthentheroleof
Australianmayors,theyarebynomeansradicalintheinternationalcontextandstopshortof
conferringexecutivepowersinthecommonlyacceptedsenseoftheterm.Indeed,itmaywellbe
thatgreaterexecutiveauthorityisseenasdesirableinsomecases,suchascurrentlyappliesin
BrisbaneandSydney(thelatterunderdelegation).Ontheotherhand,theremaybelittleneedfor
changeinmanyofAustraliasthinlypopulatedruralandremotelocalgovernmentsthatdischarge
onlylimitedfunctions.
Nevertheless,packagingexistingprovisionsofvariousAustralianlocalgovernmentActsandthe
AucklandCouncilActinthemannersuggestedwouldundoubtedlybeconsideredriskyordownright
dangerousinsomequarters,particularlypowerstoappointthedeputymayor,toestablish
committeesandappointchairs,andtodirectthechiefexecutivetogiveeffecttocouncilpolicies.As
discussedearlier,suchchangeswouldneedtobeaccompaniedbyarrangementstoensureeffective
scrutinyofthemayorsactionsbythecouncilasawhole,plusifnecessarystategovernment
oversight(perhapsviaanindependentlocalgovernmentboardorcommission).Thismightalso
involveintroducingaquestiontimeformayorsaspartofcouncilmeetings,andenablingcouncillors
tooverturnmayoralproposalsordecisionsbyatwothirdsmajority.
Ifmayorsaretodomore,theywillneedincreasedresourcesandsupport.TheAucklandmodel,
underwhichthereisalegislativeguaranteethatthemayorwillhaveanadequatelyresourced
personaloffice,appearsdesirableinthecaseoflargerurbancouncils.
Thisleavesthequestionofwhetherstrongermayorsshouldbedirectly(popularly)orindirectly
elected.AsinEngland,firmviewsareheldonbothsidesofthatdebate,althoughapartfromthe
recentdebateinGeelongthereisnoevidenceofwidespreaddissentinthosestatesorcitieswhere
mayorsare
required
to
be
directly
elected,
and
the
author
is
not
aware
of
any
instances
in
which
councilsorcommunitiesthatoptedfordirectelectionhavelaterreversedthatdecision.Atthesame
time,theredoesappeartobeanemergingconsensusthatevenindirectlymayorsshouldholdoffice
foratleasttwoyearssothattheycansettleintothepositionandmakeagreatercontributionto
strategicdirection,policyandprogramdevelopment,andascivicleaders.
Asdiscussedearlier,thereareofcourserisksassociatedwithdirectelectionofmayorspersonality
politicsmaythrowupunsuitableorinexperiencedcandidates,orperhapsenableacandidatewith
personalwealthorfinancialbackerstobuyelection.Themajorpartiesmaybecomemoreinvolved
inlocalgovernmentthantheyareatpresent,seekingtocapturefurtherglitteringprizes.However,
theresearchandinterviewsconductedinpreparingthispaperindicatedthatdirectelectionisno
morelikelytoproduceanincompetentoregotisticalmayorthanisindirectelectionbythe
councillors:itseemsthateithertheelectorateisabletodiscernthestrengthsandweaknessesof
candidates,orthatonceelectedandwiththerightsupport,thegreatmajorityofsuccessful
candidatesquicklycometotermswiththeroletheymustplayandrisetotheoccasion.Indeed,it
canreasonablybearguedthatindirectelection,involvingpoliticaldealsamongstcouncillorssothat
severalcantaketheirturnasmayorforayearortwo,carriesequalorgreaterrisks.
Onbalance,thecaseforpopularelectionandhenceasolidmandatetoexercisecivicleadership
seemsmorecompelling.Asnotedearlier,thiswasalsotheconclusionreachedbytherecentreview
ofmetropolitanlocalgovernmentinPerth,whichalsohighlightedtheimportanceofenhanced
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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?
32
strategicthinkingandleadership(MetropolitanLocalGovernmentReview2012:6,22).Whatthen
followsistheneedtoensurethattheresponsibilitiesandauthorityofmayorsaredefinedinsome
detailsothattheyarecleartoallandsuitablybalanced,andinorderformayorstobeheldto
accountbytheirfellowcouncillorsandconstituents.
Toconclude,
this
paper
has
argued
that
the
functions
of
mayors
who
are
already
generally
acknowledgedastheprincipalmemberoftheircouncilsshouldbeupdatedandrecodifiedto
matchotherchangesthathaveoccurredinAustralianlocalgovernment.ExceptinQueensland,the
structuresandnormsofpoliticalgovernancehavelargelyfailedtokeeppacewiththeexpanded
functionsoflocalgovernment,andespeciallythegrowingexpectationthatcouncilswillactmore
strategicallytoreflectandrepresenttheneedsandaspirationsoftheircommunities,andtoensure
soundmanagementofcommunityassets.Thesegoalscannotbeachievedunlessthepoliticalarmof
localgovernmenthasthecapacitytodischargeitsresponsibilitieseffectivelyalongsidethoseof
management.Tobuildthatcapacity,theofficeofmayorseemsagoodplacetostart.
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