2 nd gnss vulnerabilities and solutions conference baska, krk island, croatia september 3, 2009 ...

22ndnd GNSS Vulnerabilities and Solutions Conference GNSS Vulnerabilities and Solutions Conference

Baska, KrK Island, CroatiaBaska, KrK Island, CroatiaSeptember 3, 2009September 3, 2009

Hank SkalskiHank Skalski

U.S. Department of TransportationU.S. Department of Transportation

2

Overview

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

3

GNSS enabled applications and services are woven into the fabric of our daily lives

The Challenge

4

Overview

• All radio signals are vulnerable to man-made and natural sources of interference

• Global Navigation Satellite Systems are not immune from disruptions

• Intentional / Unintentional In-band transmission

• Out-of band / Harmonics

• Solar activity / Scintillation

• Satellite anomalies

• All radio signals are vulnerable to man-made and natural sources of interference

• Global Navigation Satellite Systems are not immune from disruptions

• Intentional / Unintentional In-band transmission

• Out-of band / Harmonics

• Solar activity / Scintillation

• Satellite anomalies

5

AFSPCGPSOCAFSPCGPSOC

USCGNAVCEN

USCGNAVCEN

FAANOCCFAA

NOCC

OtherSources

OtherSources

NANU

SystemPerformanceNOTAM

InterferenceReports

Notice toMariners

Testing

SpaceWx

UserFeedback

AugmentationReports

The Challenge

There is a substantial amount ofinformation that must be verified,

analyzed, and coordinated

There is a substantial amount ofinformation that must be verified,

analyzed, and coordinated

6

Overview

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

8

User Support

USCGUSCG

NAVCENNAVCEN

Notice to MarinersNotice to Mariners NANU’sNANU’s

List Server DistributionList Server Distribution

DGPS & NDGPSDGPS & NDGPS

General User InformationGeneral User Information

9

USCGUSCG

NAVCENNAVCEN

User Support

Notice to AirmenNotice to Airmen

Aviation AdvisoriesAviation Advisories

WAAS & LAASWAAS & LAAS

RAIM PredictionsRAIM PredictionsFAAFAA

NOCCNOCC

10

USCGUSCG

NAVCENNAVCEN

User Support

FAAFAA

NOCCNOCC

Constellation

Performance Predictions

Constellation

Performance Predictions

Constellation

Health & Status

Constellation

Health & Status

Space WeatherSpace Weather

Anomaly AnalysisAnomaly Analysis

JSpOC and

Theater Support

JSpOC and

Theater Support

AFSPCAFSPC

GPSOCGPSOC

11

USCGUSCG

NAVCENNAVCEN

User Support

AFSPCAFSPC

GPSOCGPSOC

National Space-BasedPositioning, Navigation, & Timing

Policy

National Space-BasedPositioning, Navigation, & Timing

Policy

Tri-Lateral Memorandum of AgreementTri-Lateral Memorandum of Agreement

Interference

Detection & Mitigation

CONOPS

Interference

Detection & Mitigation

CONOPS

Standard Operating

Procedures

Standard Operating

ProceduresFAAFAA

NOCCNOCC

12

Overview

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

13

FAAFAA

NOCCNOCC

USCGUSCG

NAVCENNAVCEN

Civil Detection & Reports

Detection / Reporting

14

USCGUSCG

NAVCENNAVCEN

FAAFAA

NOCCNOCCAFSPCAFSPC

GPSOCGPSOC

Space Event Tracking System (SETS)

Detection / Reporting

15

AFSPCAFSPC

GPSOCGPSOC

Information & Data Analysis

Performance

Analysis

Performance

Analysis

Constellation

Health & Status

Constellation

Health & Status

Space WeatherSpace Weather

Engineering

Data Analysis

Engineering

Data Analysis

16

USCGUSCG

NAVCENNAVCEN

FAAFAA

NOCCNOCC

Interference Detection & Mitigation

DHSDHS

Integrated Common Analytical Viewer

(iCAV)(iCAV)

DHSDHS

Integrated Common Analytical Viewer

(iCAV)(iCAV)

SETS

Data Fields

SETS

Data Fields

AFSPCAFSPC

GPSOCGPSOC

Purposeful Interference Resolution Team

(PIRT)

Purposeful Interference Resolution Team

(PIRT)

Information & Data Analysis

17

FAAFAA

NOCCNOCC

Interference Location

Identification / Location

Nine RFI

Detection Vans

Nine RFI

Detection Vans

200+ hand held

devices

200+ hand held

devices

26 Flight Inspection Aircraft

are Fitted with RFI Detection equipment

26 Flight Inspection Aircraft

are Fitted with RFI Detection equipment

Fixed Base

RFI Detection Systems

Fixed Base

RFI Detection Systems

18

FAAFAA

NOCCNOCC

Interference Location

Identification / Location

Nine RFI

Detection Vans

Nine RFI

Detection Vans

200+ hand held

devices

200+ hand held

devices

26 Flight Inspection Aircraft

are Fitted with RFI Detection equipment

26 Flight Inspection Aircraft

are Fitted with RFI Detection equipment

Fixed Base

RFI Detection Systems

Fixed Base

RFI Detection Systems

FederalFederal

CommunicationCommunication

CommissionCommission

19

FederalFederal

CommunicationCommunication

CommissionCommission

FederalFederal

Bureau ofBureau of

InvestigationInvestigation

Mitigation

Mitigation of Disruption Source

20

Overview

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

21

Way Ahead

• Continue improvements• Training & exercise• Maximize use of automation• Employ interference detection systems

• Cultivate international cooperation • Interoperability & Compatibility • ITU Spectrum protection • Communications

• Continue improvements• Training & exercise• Maximize use of automation• Employ interference detection systems

• Cultivate international cooperation • Interoperability & Compatibility • ITU Spectrum protection • Communications

22

Overview

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

• The Challenge

• User Support

• GNSS Service Disruptions• Detection / Reporting• Information & Data Analysis • Identification / Location• Mitigation

• Way Ahead

• Summary

23

Summary

• Major strides have been made in the dissemination and coordination of GPS operational information to serve all users throughout the world

• We need to cultivate the communications, cooperation, and coordination between all providers of GNSS services

• Major strides have been made in the dissemination and coordination of GPS operational information to serve all users throughout the world

• We need to cultivate the communications, cooperation, and coordination between all providers of GNSS services

24

Contact Information

Hank SkalskiDOT Liaison to Air Force Space Command

Air Force Space Command HeadquartersAFSPC/OST

150 Vandenberg St., Suite 1105Peterson AFB, CO 80914

Phone: +01.719.554.2570Fax: +01.719.554.6719

Email: Hank.Skalski@peterson.af.mil

Hank SkalskiDOT Liaison to Air Force Space Command

Air Force Space Command HeadquartersAFSPC/OST

150 Vandenberg St., Suite 1105Peterson AFB, CO 80914

Phone: +01.719.554.2570Fax: +01.719.554.6719

Email: Hank.Skalski@peterson.af.mil