7 additional studies · 2018-12-01 · chemplast sanmar limited expansion of pvc plant at...
Post on 29-Mar-2020
10 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 240
7 ADDITIONAL STUDIES
7.1 Public Consultation
The site is located in Notified Industrial Estate set up prior to EIA Notification dated 14th September 2006, hence
Public consultation will not be required. Gazettee notification is attached as Annexure 17.
7.2 Consequance Analysis & Risk Assessment
7.2.1 Background
Key issues in Risk Assessment (RA) of the Petro chemical based processing unit (M/s Chemplast Sanmar) i.e.
Category 5 (e) of the Schedule to the EIA Notification dated Sept. 14, 2006 (amended till date), for proposed
increased capacity ( 6,00,000 TPA) are discussed in this chapter. The risk assessment process is intended to
identify existing and probable hazards in the work environment and all operations, to quantify the hazards and to
assess the risk levels of those hazards in order to prioritize those that need an immediate attention.
In the unlikely event that an abnormal consequence has occurred, the disaster management kicks in. This includes
prescribing the procedures pertaining to a number of issues such as communication, encounter, rescue,
rehabilitation and further steps to prevent recurrence of such consequence in future. These issues are addressed in
the disaster management plan.
Both, the RA and DMP are living documents and need to be updated whenever there are changes in operations,
equipment or procedures.
7.2.2 Key Definitions
The terminologies used in this Risk Assessment (RA) study are defined below.
Consequence: Magnitude or size of the damage or loss. In terms of health and safety, it is the degree of harm
that could be caused to the people exposed to hazard, the potential severity of injuries or ill health, and/or the
number of people who could be potentially affected. Consequence of hazard need not only be in terms of human
safety criteria, but could also be in terms of a financial loss due to production and incurred costs due to
repairs/replacement, environmental impacts as well as public outrage.
Disaster: A catastrophic consequence of a major emergency/accident that leads to not only extensive damage to
life and property, but also disrupts all normal human activity for a significant period of time and requires a major
national and/or international effort for rescue and rehabilitation of those affected.
Emergency: A situation of process deviation that, if uncontrolled, may lead to a major accident/disaster with
potential short term and/or long term risk damage consequence to life and property in and/or around the
workplace.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines1 (EPRG1): The maximum airborne concentration below which it is
believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour (without a respirator) without experiencing
other than mild transient adverse health effects or without perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odour.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines2 (ERPG2): The maximum airborne concentration below which it is
believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible
or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines3 (ERPG3): The maximum airborne concentration below which it is
believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening
health effects.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 241
Hazard: Source of potential harm, injury or loss to man and machines.
Immediately Dangerous to life and health (IDLH): It represents the maximum concentration of a chemical
from which, in the event of respiratory failure, one could escape within 30 minutes without a respirator and without
experiencing any escape/impairing (e.g. severe irritation) or irreversible health effects.
Lethal Concentration Low (LCLo): It is the lowest concentration of a material in air, other than LC50, which has
been reported to cause death in human or animals.
Risk: Combination of the likelihood of a specific unwanted event and the potential consequences, if it occurs.
Risk Assessment: A process that involves estimation and measurement of risk to determine priorities and to
enable identification of appropriate level of risk treatment (used also to describe the overall process of risk
management).
Risk Control: Implementation of strategies to prevent, control and minimize hazards.
Risk Management: Overall description of the steps taken to manage risk, by identifying hazards and
implementing controls in the workplace.
Risk Rating: The category, level, or risk assigned following risk assessment (e.g. High, Medium, or Low).
Threshold Limit Value (TLV): It is the permitted level of exposure for a given period on a weighted average
basis (usually 8 hrs for 5 days in a week)
Short Time Exposure Limit (STEL): It is the permitted short-term exposure limit usually for a 15 minutes
exposure.
Toxic Concentration Low (TCLo): It is the lowest concentration of a material in air, to which humans or animals
have been exposed for any given period of time that has produced a toxic effects in humans or produced
carcinogenic, neoplastigenic or tetratogenic effect in humans or animals.
7.2.3 Methodology for Risk Assessment
The scope of work includes site inspection, hazard identification, selection of potential loss scenarios, and
simulation of release source model on DNV’s PHAST Professional 7.1, consequence analysis and plotting of Damage
contour on site map in order to take strategic decision to mitigate/minimize the level of risk to the facility and to the
community. The steps undertaken to carry out Risk Assessment for the proposed increased capacity are described
in subsequent sections.
7.2.4 Hazard Identification
The Hazop for this plant for the production capacity of 3,00,000 TPA was carried out by “Kadam Environmenal
Consultants” September 2011. And all recommendations were closed. Consequence analysis for 6,00,000 TPA
capacity has been done and detailed Hazop will be carried out during engineering phase.
7.2.5 MCLS Development Techniques
As a first step towards risk assessment is to identify the possible release scenarios based on available information
about scenario development for Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLS).
Basis for Selecting the Material to be studied for Consequence Assessment
Following points are considered while selecting the release scenarios:
Flammability and the flash point of the material
Phase of the material i.e. liquid or gas
Threshold quantity of the chemical as prescribed in MSIHC Rules
Operating Temperature and Pressure of the material
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 242
Total inventory of the material
M/s. Chemplast Sanmar is using Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM) as a major raw material which is a highly
flammable liquid having flash point in the range of -75°C to -78°C in production of Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC). The
flow of VCM in the facility is shown below:
Table 7-1: Flow of VCM in the Chemplast Sanmar PVC manufacturing facility at Cuddalore
The other flammable liquid being used in the facility is High Speed Diesel (HSD). The physical condition of the
containment carrying VCM as shown above is given below;
Table 7-2: Containment Operating Condition
S. No. Containment (Vessel) Temperature
(°C)
Pressure
(bar)
Height
(m)
Diameter
(m)
Volume
(m3)
Existing
1 VCM Storage Tank -13.6 ambient 21 24.8 7500
2 VCM Day Tank 30 5 - - 190
3 Reactor 56 8.5 - - 100
4 HSD Tank Amb. Amb. 3.6 2.4 20
Proposed
1 VCM Storage Tank -13.6 ambient 21 24.8 10000
2 HSD Tank Amb. Amb. 3.6 2.4 30
PVC to packing and to Supply
Sections of the facility where
containment / equipment failure
will lead to release of VCM into
the environment and can lead to
disastrous situation
VCM transfer from Jetty through
a pipe-in-pipe out pipeline
facility
VCM storage in high integrity
double walled Storage Tank at
Atmospheric Pressure and at
–13.60 C Temp
VCM from tank farm to Heat
Exchanger 1003
VCM from HE 1003 to
Intermediate Storage VCM Day
Tank
VCM from Day Tank to Reactor
Slurry from the reactor to Blow
down Vessel, then to Stripper
feed vessel, and then to FBD
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 243
Table 7-3: Pipeline Operating Conditions
S. No.
Containment (Pipe) Temp.
(°C)
Pressure
(bar)
~Pipe Length (m)
Pipeline Size
(Inch)
~Volume (m3)
1 Pipeline transferring VCM from Jetty to Tank Farm in pipe-in-
pipe out pipeline -13.6 5 - 6 3500
OD of inner pipeline
12.75
- OD of outer
pipeline 16.00
2 Pre Cooling Line -13.6 10 - 11 3500
OD of inner pipeline
4.00
- OD of outer
pipeline 8.63
3 Pipeline connecting VCM Tank
Farm to HE 1003 -13.6 16 40 8 1.25
4 Pipeline connecting HE 1003
to VCM Day Tank 30 5 20 4 0.157
5 Pipeline connecting VCM Day
Tank to Reactor 30 14 50 8 1.6
Hazard and Damage Assessment
Toxic, flammable and explosive substances released from sources of storage as a result of failures or catastrophes,
can cause losses in the surrounding area in the form of:
Toxic gas dispersion, resulting in toxic levels in ambient air,
Fires, fireballs, and flash back fires, resulting in a heat wave (radiation), or
Explosions (Vapours Cloud Explosions) resulting in blast waves (overpressure).
Consequences of Fire/ Heat Wave
The effect of thermal radiation on people is mainly a function of intensity of radiation and exposure time. The effect
is expressed in term of the probability of death and different degree of burn. The consequence effects studied to
assess the impact of the events on the receptors are provided in Table 7-4.
Table 7-4 : Damage due to Radiation Intensity
Radiation (kW/m2) Damage to Equipment Damage to People
4.0 - Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 sec. But
blistering is unlikely.
12.5 Minimum energy to ignite wood with a
flame; melts plastic tubing. 1% lethality in one minute. First degree burns in 10
sec.
37.5 Severe damage to plant
100% lethality in 1 min.
50% lethality in 20 sec.
1% lethality in 10 sec.
Consequences of Overpressure
The effects of the shock wave vary depending on the characteristics of the material, the quantity involved and the
degree of confinement of the vapor cloud. The peak pressures in an explosion therefore vary between a slight over-
pressure and a few hundred kilopascals (kPa). Whereas dwelling are demolished and windows and doors broken at
overpressures as low as 0.03- 0.1 bar. Direct injury to people occurs at greater pressures. The pressure of the
shock wave decreases rapidly with the increase in distance from the source of the explosion. The overpressure
damage is shown in Table 7-5.
Table 7-5: Overpressure Damage
Overpressure bar Damage
1 Fatality
0.41 Ear Drum Rupture to humans
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 244
Overpressure bar Damage
0.2 Structural Damage to buildings
0.02 Glass Damage
Source: CCPS Consequence Analysis of Chemical Release
Consequences of Toxic Release
The effect of exposure to toxic substance depends upon the duration of exposure and the concentration of the toxic
substance.
Short-term exposures to high concentration give Acute Effects while long term exposures to low concentrations
result in Chronic Effects.
Only acute effects are considered under hazard analysis, since they are likely credible scenarios. These effects are:
Irritation (respiratory system, skin, eyes)
Narcosis (nervous system)
Asphyxiation (oxygen deficiency)
System damage (blood organs)
7.2.6 Selection of Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLs’)
Following important points should be considered for the selection of release scenarios.
Flammability and the flash point of the material
Phase of material i.e. liquid or gas
Threshold quantity of the chemicals as prescribed in MSIHC Rules
Operating temperature and pressure of the material
Total inventory of the material
On the basis of study of chemical properties (MSDS) of the chemicals those are selected for simulation are
presented Table 7-2 & Table 7-3.
On the basis of the information provided in Table 7-2 & Table 7-3, and as discussed over failures sceneries given
in publications like World Bank Technical Paper 55 and TNO Purple Book and the experience of the consultant,
MCLs’ which may take place are presented in Table 7-6 & Table 7-7.
Table 7-6: Scenario Selected for Simulation from vessel Source
S. No.
Containment (Vessel)
Types of Failure Possible Consequences Studied
1 VCM Storage Tank 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 50 mm dia hole leak in tank and
Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Pool Fire,
Explosion
2 VCM Day Tank 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 50 mm dia hole leak in tank and
Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Pool Fire,
Explosion
3 VCM Reactor 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 50 mm dia hole leak in tank and
Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Pool Fire,
Explosion
4 HSD Storage Tank 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 50 mm dia hole leak in tank and
Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Pool Fire,
Explosion
Table 7-7: Scenario Selected for Simulation from Pipe Source
S. No.
Containment (Vessel) Types of Failure Possible Consequences Studied
1 Pipeline transferring VCM
from Jetty to Tank Farm in pipe-in-pipe out pipeline
Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Fireball, Explosion
2 Pre Cooling Line Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Fireball, Explosion
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 245
S. No.
Containment (Vessel) Types of Failure Possible Consequences Studied
3 Pipeline connecting VCM Tank Farm to HE 1003
10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 25 mm dia hole leak in tank and Catastrophic Rupture
Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Explosion
4 Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM Day Tank
10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 25 mm dia hole leak in tank and Catastrophic Rupture
Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Explosion
5 Pipeline connecting VCM
Day Tank to Reactor 10 mm dia hole leak in tank, 25 mm dia hole leak
in tank and Catastrophic Rupture Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Explosion
Failure Rates
A leak or rupture of a tank, release some or all of its content, can be caused by brittle failure of the tank wall, welds
or connected pipework due to use of inadequate materials, combined with loading such as wind, earthquake or
impact. Failure rates for selected MCLS’ are provided in Table 7-8.
Table 7-8: Failure Frequency for Storage Tanks
Categories Catastrophic Rupture
Frequency (per tank per year) Leak Frequency (per year)
Refrigerated Storage Tank (Single Wall) 2.3 × 10-5 1.0 × 10-5
Refrigerated Storage Tank
(Double Walled) 2.5 × 10-8
1.0 × 10-5
(for primary containment)
Atmospheric Storage Tank 3.0 × 10-6 2.8× 10-3
Pressure Vessels 4.7 × 10-7 1.2 × 10-5 (for Hole Size 3 to 10 mm)
7.1 × 10-6 (for Hole Size 10 to 50 mm)
Reference: International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP); Report No. 434-3, March 2010
Also, the risk assessment is considered using certain internationally recognized yardsticks for measuring risk. These
first need to be explained, and this is done as Table 7-9.
Table 7-9: Broadly Accepted Frequency
Annual Fatality risk level per year
Conclusion
10-3 Unacceptable to everyone. Immediate action shall be taken to reduce the hazards
10-4 Willing to spend public money to control hazards, such as traffic signs, fire departments etc.
10-5 People still recognize. Safety slogans have precautionary rings. Such as never swim alone,
never point a gun
10-6 Not of great concern to everyone. People are aware of these hazards but feel that they
cannot happen to them. Such as Lightning Never Strikes twice an Act of God.
7.2.7 Simulation of Release and Development of Contours
As the MCLS’ were developed for the selected set of chemicals, the next step is to carry out the consequence
analysis. The consequence analysis results along with their contours are presented in the following sections.
VCM Storage Tank (Existing)
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-10, whereas the Overpressure Effect distance are
presented in Table 7-11.
Table 7-10: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
VCM Tank (7500 m3 Existing)
10 mm leak Jet Fire
1.5/B 23.6 19.2 NR
2.0/E 22.8 18.4 NR
4/D 20.6 16.4 NR
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 246
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 26.5 16.6 9.5
2.0/E 27.0 17.5 9.4
4/D 26.9 17.0 9.4
50 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 88.6 71.5 58.7
2.0/E 85.7 68.6 56.4
4/D 78.6 61.8 51.0
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 155.2 95.9 49.5
2.0/E 155.8 98.5 51.5
4/D 150.0 99.4 54.3
Catastrophic Rupture
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 1844.0 1175.1 733.5
2.0/E 1855.2 1190.6 752.0
4/D 1845.6 1208.7 794.9
Table 7-11: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
VCM Tank (7500 m3 Existing)
10 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 55 35 32
2.0/E 39 24 22
4/D 25 13 11
50 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 311 166 144
2.0/E 322 160 136
4/D 208 105 90
Catastrophic Rupture
Overpressure
1.5/B 4966 3125 2916
2.0/E 4957 3034 2810
4/D 2518 1435 1401
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-1 to Figure 7-3.
Figure 7-1: Jet Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 247
Figure 7-2: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E
Figure 7-3: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E
VCM Storage Tank (Proposed)
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-12, whereas the overpressure effect distance are
presented Table 7-13.
Table 7-12: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data
Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
VCM Tank (10000 m3 Proposed)
10 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 23.6 19.2 NR
2.0/E 22.8 18.4 NR
4/D 20.6 16.4 13.4
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 26.5 16.6 9.5
2.0/E 27.0 17.5 9.4
4/D 26.9 19.0 9.4
50 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 88.6 71.5 58.7
2.0/E 85.7 68.6 56.4
4/D 78.6 61.8 51.0
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 155.2 95.9 49.5
2.0/E 155.8 98.5 51.5
4/D 150.1 99.4 54.3
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 248
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data
Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
Catastrophic Rupture
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 2058.2 1316.0 827.9
2.0/E 2070.3 1332.5 847.6
4/D 2058.2 1350.9 892.5
Table 7-13: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
VCM Tank (10000 m3 Existing)
10 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 55 35 32
2.0/E 39 24 22
4/D 25 13 11
50 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 311 166 144
2.0/E 322 160 136
4/D 208 105 90
Catastrophic Rupture
Overpressure
1.5/B 5547 3544 3301
2.0/E 5544 3448 3189
4/D 2798 1596 1521
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-4 to Figure 7-6.
Figure 7-4: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to 10 mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E
Figure 7-5: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 249
Figure 7-6: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E
VCM Day Tank
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-14, whereas the Overpressure Effect distance are
given in Table 7-15.
Table 7-14: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
VCM day Tank
10 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 27.9 22.9 19.7
2.0/E 26.9 21.9 18.7
4/D 24.6 19.4 16.2
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 24.1 18.0 15.1
2.0/E 23.9 18.1 14.9
4/D 23.6 18.8 15.6
50 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 118.9 96.6 82.7
2.0/E 115.3 92.7 78.6
4/D 106.4 82.9 68.7
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 125.0 85.0 52.7
2.0/E 123.3 85.7 52.9
4/D 119.8 87.3 54.7
Catastrophic Rupture
Fireball Ellipse
1.5/B 450.3 169.7 NR
2.0/E 450.3 169.7 NR
4/D 450.3 169.7 NR
Table 7-15: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
VCM Day Tank
10 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 25 13 11
2.0/E 25 13 11
4/D 24 13 11
50 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 197 127 117
2.0/E 202 128 117
4/D 209 138 127
Catastrophic Rupture
Overpressure 1.5/B 1350 311 197
2.0/E 1368 323 252
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 250
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
4/D 1373 342 297
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-7 to Figure 7-9.
Figure 7-7: Jet Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B
Figure 7-8: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B
Figure 7-9: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 50mm Leak at Weather Condition 4.0/D
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 251
VCM Reactor
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-16, whereas the Overpressure Effect distance are
given in Table 7-17.
Table 7-16: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
VCM reactor
10 mm leak Jet Fire
1.5/B 29.1 24.0 20.7
2.0/E 28.1 22.9 19.6
4/D 25.7 20.3 17.0
50 mm leak Jet Fire
1.5/B 124.8 101.6 87.4
2.0/E 120.9 97.4 83.1
4/D 111.4 87.2 72.5
Catastrophic Rupture
Fireball Ellipse
1.5/B 451.7 186.4 NR
2.0/E 451.7 186.4 NR
4/D 451.7 186.4 NR
Table 7-17: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
VCM Reactor
10 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 24 13 11
2.0/E 24 13 11
4/D 24 13 11
50 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 182.9 116.4 106.6
2.0/E 186.2 117.1 106.8
4/D 192.6 126.4 116.5
Catastrophic Rupture
Overpressure
1.5/B 1065.5 243.9 131.3
2.0/E 1080.2 249.9 140.5
4/D 1086.4 257.1 157.6
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-10 & Figure 7-11.
Figure 7-10: Jet Fire Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 252
Figure 7-11: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 50 mm leak at Weather Condition 4.0/D
HSD Tank (Existing)
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-18, whereas the Flash Fire effect distance are given in
Table 7-19.
Table 7-18: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario Consequence Met Data
Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
HSD Tank (20 KL - Existing)
10 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 1.4 NR NR
2.0/E 1.3 NR NR
4/D 1.3 NR NR
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0
2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3
4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7
50 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 8.0 6.1 5.8
2.0/E 7.7 5.8 4.5
4/D 7.3 5.4 3.9
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0
2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3
4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7
Catastrophic Rupture
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0
2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3
4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7
Table 7-19: Flash Fire Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter
0.5 LFL LFL
HSD Tank (20 KL - Existing)
10 mm leak Flash Fire
1.5/B 3.01 2.98
2.0/E 3.00 2.98
4/D 2.97 2.97
50 mm leak Flash Fire
1.5/B 3.8 3.8
2.0/E 3.8 3.8
4/D 3.8 3.8
Flash Fire 1.5/B 5.5 5.5
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 253
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter
0.5 LFL LFL
Catastrophic Rupture
2.0/E 5.5 5.5
4/D 5.3 5.3
HSD Tank (Proposed)
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-20, whereas the Flash Fire effect distance is given in
Table 7-21.
Table 7-20: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data
Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
HSD Tank (30 KL - Proposed)
10 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 1.5 NR NR
2.0/E 1.4 NR NR
4/D 1.3 NR NR
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0
2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3
4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7
50 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 8.0 6.1 5.8
2.0/E 7.7 5.8 4.5
4/D 7.3 5.4 3.9
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0
2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3
4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7
Catastrophic Rupture
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 25.2 14.4 5.0
2.0/E 25.6 15.4 5.3
4/D 26.8 17.4 5.7
Table 7-21: Flash Fire Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter
0.5 LFL LFL
HSD Tank (30 KL - Proposed)
10 mm leak Flash Fire
1.5/B 3.01 2.98
2.0/E 3.00 2.98
4/D 2.97 2.97
50 mm leak Flash Fire
1.5/B 3.8 3.8
2.0/E 3.8 3.8
4/D 3.8 3.8
Catastrophic Rupture
Flash Fire
1.5/B 6.1 6.1
2.0/E 6.1 6.1
4/D 5.9 5.9
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-12.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 254
Figure 7-12: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 4.0/D
Pipeline transferring VCM from jetty to Tank farm in pipe-in-pipe out pipeline
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-22, whereas the Overpressure Effect distance are
given in Table 7-23.
Table 7-22: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data
Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
Pipeline transferring VCM from jetty to Tank farm in pipe-in-pipe out pipeline
Catastrophic Rupture
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 488.3 301.9 170.0
2.0/E 497.8 314.1 183.1
4/D 504.5 329.9 208.4
Fireball Ellipse
1.5/B 80.2 20.2 NR
2.0/E 80.2 20.2 NR
4/D 80.2 20.2 NR
Table 7-23: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
Pipeline transferring VCM from jetty to Tank farm in pipe-in-pipe out pipeline
Catastrophic Rupture
Overpressure
1.5/B 1130.2 661.4 616.9
2.0/E 1143.0 643.7 591.8
4/D 971.9 453.6 399.0
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-13 & Figure 7-14.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 255
Figure 7-13: Fireball Ellipse Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 2.0/E
Figure 7-14: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to 10mm leak at Weather Condition 2.0/E
Pre cooling Line
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-24, whereas the overpressure effect distance are
given in Table 7-25.
Table 7-24: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario Consequence Met Data
Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
Pre cooling Line Catastrophic
Rupture
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 181.2 109.7 54.8
2.0/E 185.1 115.4 59.7
4/D 190.4 124.8 70.2
Fireball Ellipse
1.5/B 12.8 NR NR
2.0/E 12.8 NR NR
4/D 12.8 NR NR
Table 7-25: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
Pre cooling Line Catastrophic
Rupture Overpressure
1.5/B 487.8 254.9 229.8
2.0/E 494.7 251.2 222.3
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 256
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
4/D 450.2 194.6 168.3
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-15.
Figure 7-15: Late Pool Fire Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 4.0/D
Pipeline connecting VCM Tank farm to HE 1003
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-26, whereas the overpressure effect distance are
given in Table 7-27.
Table 7-26: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data
Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
Pipeline connecting VCM Tank farm to HE
1003
10 mm leak Jet Fire
1.5/B 39.7 32.4 27.5
2.0/E 38.4 31.1 26.1
4/D 35.1 27.5 22.7
25 mm leak Jet Fire
1.5/B 90.1 73.2 62.1
2.0/E 87.3 70.2 59.1
4/D 80.2 62.5 51.5
Catastrophic Rupture
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 46.6 27.2 10.9
2.0/E 47.7 29.0 11.5
4/D 50.2 33.1 13.3
Table 7-27: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
Pipeline connecting VCM Tank farm to
HE 1003
10 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 58 35 32
2.0/E 59 36 32
4/D 44 25 22
25 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 191.6 126.1 116.5
2.0/E 208.9 137.6 127.1
4/D 169.3 105.7 96.3
Catastrophic Rupture
Overpressure 1.5/B 174.4 81.6 68.6
2.0/E 176.1 80.6 68.2
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 257
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
4/D 162.7 68.7 57.5
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-16.
Figure 7-16: Jet Fire Consequence Contour due to 25 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B
Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM Day tank
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-28, whereas the overpressure effect distance are
given in Table 7-29.
Table 7-28: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data
Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM Day
tank
10 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 27.9 22.9 19.7
2.0/E 26.9 21.9 18.7
4/D 24.6 19.4 16.2
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 20.1 15.7 14.5
2.0/E 20.1 15.7 14.3
4/D 20.6 16.7 15.2
25 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 63.8 52.2 44.8
2.0/E 61.8 50.0 42.5
4/D 56.8 44.6 37.1
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 29.1 23.9 22.0
2.0/E 29.0 24.0 21.8
4/D 30.1 25.5 22.6
Fireball Ellipse
1.5/B 34.6 NR NR
2.0/E 34.6 NR NR
4/D 34.6 NR NR
Catastrophic Rupture
Fireball Ellipse
1.5/B 34.6 NR NR
2.0/E 34.6 NR NR
4/D 34.6 NR NR
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 258
Table 7-29: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 0.21 1.00
Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM
Day tank
10 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 25 13 11
2.0/E 25 13 11
4/D 24 13 11
25 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 69.6 37.8 33.2
2.0/E 70.9 38.1 33.3
4/D 68.4 37.6 33.1
Catastrophic Rupture
Overpressure
1.5/B 79.6 23.8 15.5
2.0/E 84.4 24.7 15.9
4/D 107.6 29.4 23.5
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-17 to Figure 7-19.
Figure 7-17: Jet Fire Consequence Contour due to 25 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B
Figure 7-18: Fireball Ellipse Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 2.0/E
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 259
Figure 7-19: Overpressure Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 4.0/D
Pipeline connecting VCM Day Tank to Reactor
Radiation level and effect distance are presented in Table 7-30, whereas the overpressure effect distance are
given in Table 7-31.
Table 7-30: Radiation Level and Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
Pipeline connecting VCM Day Tank to
Reactor
10 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 34.8 28.6 24.6
2.0/E 33.6 27.4 23.3
4/D 30.8 24.3 20.3
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 27.5 21.2 18.1
2.0/E 27.1 21.1 17.8
4/D 26.3 21.7 18.7
25 mm leak
Jet Fire
1.5/B 79.6 64.9 55.7
2.0/E 77.1 62.2 53.0
4/D 70.9 55.6 46.2
Late Pool Fire
1.5/B 45.9 35.9 28.6
2.0/E 45.4 36.2 28.3
4/D 46.3 38.6 29.3
Catastrophic Rupture
Fireball Elipse
1.5/B 97.8 36.9 NR
2.0/E 97.8 36.9 NR
4/D 97.8 36.9 NR
Table 7-31: Overpressure Effect Distance
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
Pipeline connecting VCM Day Tank to
Reactor
10 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 28 14 11
2.0/E 29 14 12
4/D 27 13 11
25 mm leak Overpressure
1.5/B 100.5 60.0 54.0
2.0/E 112.6 70.4 64.2
4/D 110.5 70.0 64.0
Overpressure 1.5/B 275.3 62.5 40.5
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 260
Chemical (Storage Tank)
Failure Scenario
Consequence Met Data Overpressure Distances in Meters
0.02 bar 0.21 bar 1.00 bar
Catastrophic Rupture
2.0/E 277.9 63.2 44.3
4/D 279.2 66.2 55.8
The contours for effect distance generated are presented in Figure 7-20 & Figure 7-21.
Figure 7-20: Jet Fire Consequence Contour due to 25 mm leak at Weather Condition 1.5/B
Figure 7-21: Fireball Ellipse Consequence Contour due to Catastrophic Rupture at Weather Condition 2.0/E
Conclusion
Table 7-32: Conclusion from Consequance Analysis
Chemical Scenario
Effect Distance in Meters Consequence
Zone At Radiation level 4 Kw/m2
At Flash Fire 0.5 LFL
At Overpressure 0.02 bar
VCM Tank (7500 m3 Existing)
Normal Condition (50 mm Leak)
155.8 at 2.0/E 133.4 at 1.5/B 322 at 2.0/E Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
1855.2 at 2.0/E 2808.9 at 1.5/B 4966 at 1.5/B Outside Plant
boundry*
VCM Tank (10000 m3 Proposed)
Normal Condition (50 mm Leak)
155.8 at 2.0/E 133.4 at 1.5/B 322 at 2.0/E Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
2070.3 at 2.0/E 3187.7 at 1.5/B 5547 at 1.5/B Outside Plant
boundry*
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 261
Chemical Scenario
Effect Distance in Meters Consequence
Zone At Radiation level 4 Kw/m2
At Flash Fire 0.5 LFL
At Overpressure 0.02 bar
VCM day Tank
Normal Condition (50 mm Leak)
125 at 1.5/B 129.3 at 4.0/D 209 at 4.0/D Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
450.3 at 1.5/B 477.9 at 4.0/D 1373 at 4.0/D Within the site
VCM reactor
Normal Condition (50 mm Leak)
124.8 at 1.5/B 113.1 at 4.0/D 192.6 at 4.0/D Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
451.7 at 1.5/B 176.8 at 4.0/D 1086.4 at 4.0/D Within the site
HSD Tank (20 KL - Existing)
Normal Condition (50 mm Leak)
26.8 at 4.0/D 3.8 at 4.0/D - Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
26.8 at 4.0/D 5.5 at 1.5/B - Within the site
HSD Tank (30 KL - Proposed)
Normal Condition (50 mm Leak)
26.8 at 4.0/D 3.8 at 4.0/D - Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
26.8 at 4.0/D 6.1 at 1.5/B - Within the site
Pipeline transferring
VCM from jetty to Tank farm in
pipe-in-pipe out pipeline
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
504.5 at 4.0/D 602.7 at 1.5/B 1143 at 2.0/E Within the site
Pre cooling Line
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
190.4 at 4.0/D 223.1 at 1.5/B 497.4 at 2.0/E Within the site
Pipeline connecting
VCM Tank farm to HE 1003
Normal Condition (25 mm Leak)
90.1 at 1.5/B 125.7 at 2.0/E 208.9 at 2.0/E Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
50.2 at 4.0/D 69.2 at 1.5/B 176.1 at 2.0/E Within the site
Pipeline connecting HE 1003 to VCM
Day tank
Normal Condition (25 mm Leak)
63.8 at 1.5/B 37.7 at 4.0/D 70.9 at 2.0/E Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
34.6 at 2.0/E 37.1 at 4.0/D 107.6 at 4.0/D Within the site
Pipeline connecting
VCM Day Tank to Reactor
Normal Condition (25 mm Leak)
79.6 at 1.5/B 61.9 at 2.0/E 112.6 at 2.0/E Within the site
Worst case (Catastrophic Rupture)
97.8 at 2.0/E 84.8 at 4.0/D 279.2 at 4.0/D Within the site
*Worst case scenario i.e. catastrophic rupture of existing and proposed VCM tanks are considered to comply ToR
point. However catastrophic rupture is not possible due to;
Double walled VCM storage tanks
VCM boil-off recovery system
Multi level pressure and vacuum protection devices are provided to avoid tank failure due to excess pressure or
vacuum
Dedicated power supply and standby compressor & utility system
Pressure and vacuum relieving devices for VCM storage tanks
Apart from standard monitors and hydrant points the tanks are provided with an automatic medium velocity
water deluge system for fire protection
In case of emergency material from one tank can be pumped to other at any time
With all the above safety system, any catastrophic release of VCM is remote
All the above safety system will ensure that any major release of VCM is avoided at any point of time
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 262
7.2.8 Treatment and Control
After examining the high priority risks, a prime consideration is given to the potential to reduce or eliminate the risk
by using the hierarchy of controls. This assists in establishing methods to reduce risk. The desirability of control
plans (with reducing effectiveness) is as follows;
Elimination: Take step to eliminate the hazard completely,
Substitution: Replace with less hazardous material, substance or process,
Separation: Isolate hazard from person by guarding, space,
Administrative: Adjusting the time or conditions of risk exposures
Engineering Control: includes designs or modifications to plants, equipment, ventilation systems, and processes
that reduce the source of exposure.
Training: Increasing awareness, improving skills and making tasks less hazardous to persons involved,
Personal protective equipment: Use appropriately designed and properly fitted PPE.
Control measures can reduce either the likelihood or consequence of the event or both. Depending on the level of
reduction of the hazard, there could still be a residual risk that needs to be monitored so that a secondary
prevention process can be initiated when trigger points are reached.
The control measures and action will be adopted by M/s Chemplast to minimize the risk present in the facility for
the hazardous event are summarized in Table 7-33.
Table 7-33: Event Consequences, Treatment and Control
Hazardous Event Possible Consequences Treatment and Control
Loss of containment
Rupture / leak in storage tanks
Fire, explosion and toxic hazards
Gas detectors, Dyke wall provision, Level indicator, Earthing, flame arrestor &
visual observation, Ready availability of fire extinguishers and fire hydrant system
7.2.9 Precautions to be taken during Transportation
Following are some precautions will be taken during the loading and unloading of material in plant premises.
Before the tanker enters the industry premises, the tanker is to be inspected for authorized entry and safe &
sound condition of the tanker, its contents and that of the prime mover. Flammable material carrying tankers
entering plant are to be fitted with spark arresters on their exhaust.
Static charge neutralizing
The quality of the chemical in the tanker should be ascertained before unloading to avoid contamination of
chemical already at storage.
Coupling used for connecting hose to tanker must be leak proof.
For flammable chemicals, the tanker and the hose are to be properly earthed before starting unloading
operation.
Unloading should be done under personal supervision of responsible staff authorized by the management.
Provision of sample quantity of water / neutralizing medium to take care of leakage / spillage must be made.
Also steam and inert gas hose stations must be available at unloading point.
Fire alarm and firefighting facility commensurate with the chemical should be provided at the unloading point.
7.3 Disaster Management Plan
7.3.1 Objectives of Onsite Emergency Plan
The objective of “On-Site Emergency Plan” is to prepare well in advance to contain effectively any emergency in the
shortest time possible with minimum loss. The plan aims to make the maximum use of the combined resources of
the plant and the outside services to take fast and effective actions in any emergency in order to:
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 263
Protect the personnel, plant and the environment
Effect rescue and treatment of casualties, if any
Safeguard other personnel and sections in the premises
Minimize damage to property and environment
Initially contain and ultimately bring the incident under control
Provide authoritative information to the media
Preserve the relevant records and equipment for subsequent enquiry
7.3.2 Definition of Terms
Table 7-34: Definition of Terms
Hazard The size and nature of the event unforeseen.
Risk The probability that the event could occur.
Consequences The effect on people, plant and environment, both on-site and off-site due to emergency.
Major Emergency
An industrial emergency could be defined as an “occurrence of such magnitude so as to create a situation in which normal pattern of life within an industry/plant is suddenly
disrupted, adversely affecting not only the personnel and property within such an industrial area, but also in the vicinity”. It will require the assistance from outside agencies and use of
outside resources to handle it effectively.
Key Personnel
The essential actions during an emergency depend upon the prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the required actions are promptly and effectively organised
by nominated people, each having specified responsibilities as part of coordinated plan. Such nominated personnel are known as KEY PERSONNEL.
Site Controller Site Controller is the person who assumes absolute control of the works and determines the
actions necessary to control the emergency.
Incident Controller Incident Controller is the person who goes to the scene of emergency and directs the actions
at the location of incident to overcome the emergency.
Teams A number of special actions may have to be carried out by specified works personnel to
control as well as minimise the damage and loss. For this purpose, designated teams should be available. Each Team will be headed by a Leader.
Emergency Control Centre The Emergency Control Centre is the place from where the operations to handle the
emergency are directed and co-ordinated.
Incident Control Centre Incident Controller (IC) means Incident Control Centre during emergency. It should be
located at minimum risk area.
Safe Assembly Points
In an emergency, it will almost certainly be necessary to evacuate personnel from affected areas and, as a precautionary measure, to further evacuate non-essential workers from
areas likely to be affected, should the emergency escalate. The evacuation will be effected on getting necessary message from Site Controller (SC). On evacuation, employees should be directed to pre determined safe places called safe Assembly Points. The safe Assembly
Points are to be located well away from plant and equipment and near exits from plants and conspicuously identified.
Escape Routes The roads leading to the safe Assembly Points are the designated escape routes. The
escape routes would be clearly marked with arrow marks for easy identification and escape.
Essential Personnel Essential Personnel are those to whom specific responsibilities are assigned in the
management of the On-site Emergency.
Non-Essential Personnel Non-Essential Personnel are those to whom specific responsibility is not assigned in the
management of emergency.
Recovery It means that all those short term and long term activities undertaken by the management
to normalize the operations after an emergency.
7.3.3 Declaration of Emergency
Declaring Fire Emergency
Any one discovering a fire shall attempt to put out the fire by using the first aid fire fighting appliances
Simultaneously, he would shout FIRE, FIRE, FIRE/ THEE, THEE, THEE (in local language) till the assistance
arrives
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 264
Any one or his colleagues who hears, shall immediately inform the Shift In-charge and Control Room over
phone or in person giving the exact location of the emergency
The Incident Controller on hearing the incident of emergency would proceed to the scene of emergency and
assess the situation and decide whether a major emergency exists or is likely to escalate into major one
If a major one, he would activate the on-site emergency plan by sounding the siren to code and informs the
Site Controller
The key personnel would report to the emergency control centre and take respective charge
Declaring VCM Leakage Emergency
Any person discovering VCM leakage would immediately inform the control room giving the exact location of
the leakage
He shall not approach the leakage without suitable personal protective equipment. Approach would be from
upward wind direction
The Incident Controller would proceed to the site with protective equipment from upward wind direction and
assess the situation
He will take a decision whether it would be possible to attend the leakage safely. If it is YES, he would call the
maintenance and operational personnel and get it attended taking all safety precautions
If he feels the leakage could not be attended so, if required, he would take a decision to close down the
system concerned and also inform the Site Controller about the same
He shall not allow people to crowd in that area but directs them to safe areas and if warranted to assembly
points
If gas is escaping into the atmosphere and surrounding, Incident controller would activate the on-site
emergency plan by hooting the siren to code
Declaring HSD Leakage and Fire Emergency
Any person discovering HSD leakage or fire would immediately inform the control room giving the exact
location of leakage or fire
The Incident Controller would proceed to the site to assess the situation. Meanwhile, the person discovering
HSD fire shall try to extinguish it, if it is safe to do so, using suitable fire extinguishers
If the leakage could be attended safely, he would call the maintenance and get it attended
HSD leakage shall be collected and not allowed to spread
If the leakage is very heavy and warrants plant shutdown, the Site Controller shall be informed and on his
confirmation, he would take suitable action
If the leakage has caught fire, the Incident Controller would initiate the On-site Emergency Plan by operating
the siren to emergency code. The Site Controller would be informed.
Declaring Hydrochloric Acid Emergency
Any person discovering Hydrochloric acid leakage would immediately inform the Shift-in –charge/control room
giving the exact location of the leak
He shall not approach the leakage without suitable personal protective equipment
The incident controller would proceed to the site to assess the situation
He will take a decision whether it would be possible to attend the leakage safely. If it is YES, he would call the
maintenance and operational personnel and get it attended taking all safety precautions
If he feels the leakage could not be attended so, and warrants storage tank isolation he would make suitable
arrangements. If required he make arrangements for neutralizing the leaked acid lime or soda ash
He would inform the Site Controller about the same
He shall not allow people to crowd in that area but directs them to safe areas and if warranted to assembly
points
If required he shall initiate the On-Site Emergency Plan by sounding the siren to code
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 265
Figure 7-22: Onsite Emergency Plan
Legend: Admn – Administration; CSR – Corporate Social Responsibilities; PR: Public Relations
7.3.4 Key Personnel and Responsibilities
Table 7-35: Key Personnel and Responsibilities
S. No Designation Designation during Emergency
1 Location - Head Site Controller
2 Manufacturing head Alternate site controller
3 Head – Instrumentation Alternate site controller
4 Head- Production Incident Controller
5 Head - Mechanical Leader Emergency task Force
6 Mechanical Alternate Emergency task Force
7 Head - Security Logistic Controller
8 Support services Alternate logistic controller
9 Head- Electrical AlternateCommunication Coordinator
10 Head - HR Head count Team
11 Head- Safety Safety & fire Fighting Coordinator
12 Head- Safety & Environment Alternate Safety & fire Fighting Coordinator
7.3.5 Emergency Team
There will be 7 Emergency Teams. Each Team will be headed by a Leader assisted by number of personnel,
Allotment of Personnel for Each Team
The personnel for each team are allotted based on the minimum strength, which would be available on any day and
beyond the general shift hours.
The extra personnel available in the plant at the time of accident will be commissioned for augmenting the teams
engaged in control of the emergency.
Site Controller
Location: Head
Alternate: Head (Production)
Incident Controller Location: Head (Production) Alternate: Shift In charge.
Emergency Task Force Team Leader: Head (Mechanical) Altertnate: Senior Manager (Mechanical)
Logistic controller
Leader: Head - Security
Alternate: Support Services
Communication Team Leader: Head (Instrument) Alternate: Head: (Electrical)
Safety & Fire Fighting Team Leader: Head (safety) Alternate: Joint Manager (Safety & Environment)
Incident control Team Respective shift-in-charge. Area officer
Security Team Leader: AGM -Security Alternate: Shift Security Officer
Medical Team Leader: Medical Officer - OHC Alternate: Shift First aider
Manpower Accounting Team Leader: Head (HR) Alternate: Officer (HR)
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 266
The minimum allotment is done so that there are no extra persons overcrowding at the location and also to avoid
confusion.
The responsibilities of each Team and its Leader are specifically delineated, so that the responsibilities do not over
lap and confusion does not develop in executing the duties.
Incident Control Team-Production Team
Emergency Task Force
Communication Team
Security and Transport Team
Manpower Accounting Team
Medical Team
Safety and Fire fighting Team
7.3.6 Emergency Action Procedure
Responsibilities of Any Person Noticing Emergency
Raise alarm by shouting, "FIRE OR GAS/LIQUID LEAK, HELP" as the case may be.
Break the nearest Manual call Point.
Inform other employees in the vicinity by shouting.
If possible, attempt to extinguish the fire or take suitable action to contain the incident
Immediately inform the Shift in Charge/ Control Room. Pass on the following information to them :
Location and brief description of the incident
Approximate severity of the situation.
Wind direction
Action immediately taken
Continue control of the emergency at location.
Shift-in-Charge of the affected plant
Rush to the spot of emergency
Assess the severity
If required inform Main Control Room to declare emergency
Mobilise men and material for control of emergency
Responsibilities of Main Control Room during Emergency
On getting information regarding any emergency from the Shift-in-Charge of the concerned plant the Main Control
Room In-Charge/supervisor should do the following:
Immediately start the "wailing siren"
Announce the emergency on "Public Address System" (PAS) (In English and Tamil).
Handle all communication till take over by the communication team.
Immediately arrange to inform Shift in-Charge of the Main Plant.
Inform Security at Main Gate.
If the incident comes under control activate "all clear siren" on the advice of the Site controller.
7.3.7 Roles and Actions of Key Personnel, Teams and Other Essential Personnel of the Company on
Hearing Wailing Siren or on Coming to Know of Emergency
Site Controller
On hearing the Emergency Siren, rush to Emergency Control Centre 1 or 2 and take charge of the incident.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 267
Take overall responsibility for directing emergency operations and asking outside help.
Assess the situation quickly and find out the level of emergency from Incident Controller and decide and
declare major emergency, if needed inform occupier.
Ensure that other key personnel are called-in.
Direct emergency control and rescue operations with the following priorities
Personnel safety (Arrange to provide necessary safety equipment to all the personnel in the plant, if
required.)
Plant, property and environment safety.
Minimum loss of production.
Continuously review and assess possible developments to determine most probable course of events.
Direct safe shut down of plants in consultation with Incident Controller and key personnel, if necessary.
Call Emergency Task Force for arranging immediate repairs and maintenance of equipment, if necessary.
Arrange to check that all non-essential workers, visitors, contract labor are evacuated to Assembly Points
and later on to safe places, if required.
If necessary, arrange for evacuation of neighboring population
Ensure that search for affected personnel within the affected area have been carried out.
Arrange for hospitalization of victims and additional help, if required, and ensure that relatives are apprised
of.
Ensure liaison with outside agencies such as District Emergency Authorities, District Magistrate, Police
Services and Chief Inspector of Factories, Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories and Inspector of Factories.
Provide advice on possible effects on areas outside the factory.
Ensure that a chronological record of the emergency is being maintained.
Direct sounding of all clear sirens, when the situation comes under control.
Control rehabilitation of affected areas on cessation of the emergency.
Arrange to flash information to public on radio and TV.
Issue authorized statement to the news media.
Ensure that evidence is preserved for enquiries to be conducted by statutory authorities.
Incident Controller
The Shift In-charge of the affected plant would act as Site Controller till the Site Controller arrives. Thereafter he
would be “Incident Controller”. He would execute the following responsibilities:
Take action to control the incident either by isolating the equipment or by stopping the plant and
simultaneously inform the Site Controller.
He would assess the emergency situation and if a major emergency exists or is likely to develop, he would
activate the On-Site Emergency Plan.
He would depute an operator to remain near the telephone to give and receive messages.
Ensure through the Site Controller that the required key personnel and outside help are called-in.
Direct all emergency operations, within the affected area, with the help of operation staff available at site,
with the following priorities.
Secure the safety of personnel
Minimise damage to plant, property and environment
He would ensure that all non essential staff and contract workmen are evacuated to the safe assembly points
He would ensure that the affected area is searched for causalities or trapped personnel
Brief the Site Controller and keep him informed of the developments. Provide guidance to the fire and security
teams
Preserve evidence so as to facilitate any enquiry into the causes and the circumstances or escalation of
emergency
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 268
Logistic Controller
Take charge of all logistic activities at site
Arrange to render first-aid and medical-aid to casualties.
Arrange for additional ambulance.
Arrange for head counting of all employees like regular workers, contract workmen and truck drivers at the
assembly point and in plant, by the time keeper and get it counter checked with the entry records.
Help Site controller by mobilising men, material and other services.
Co-ordinate with Site Controller in all activities as per his directions.
Arrange to record the names of casualties, head count of persons in assembly points and for rescue of those
trapped inside.
In case persons are missing, send persons equipped with PPE for search in co-ordination with Incident
Controller.
Ensure that the relatives of the casualties are informed.
If emergency is prolonged, arrange for relievers, catering facility etc.
Shift-in-Charge of the Affected Plant
Rush to the spot and assume the role of Incident Controller. Act as Site Controller also if the designated Site
Controller is not immediately available at the site.
Initiate appropriate actions to contain the situation.
Arrange for the "Wailing Siren", if not already given, through the Main Control Room.
On the Site Controller reaching site the Shift in Charge will function only as Incident Controller.
The Main Control Room Personnel will communicate the following information to the Site Controller:
Brief description of incident
Status and seriousness of the situation
Action immediately taken
Team Leaders
Mobilise the team members and required equipment.
He should activate and direct his team to take up activities assigned to the team by the Incident Controller.
Incident Control Team
The team should rush and report to the Incident Controller.
Take all prompt actions to contain and control the situation at the earliest, with minimum loss/damage.
Help coordinate with other emergency team members.
Emergency Task Force
Rush to the incident spot.
Report to Incident Controller and carry out emergency maintenance activities as required/instructed by Incident
Controller.
Co-operate and coordinate with the Incident Control Team.
Arrange to isolate electrical lines as required/advised by Incident Controller.
Attend to urgent repairs, if any, which are needed from emergency point of view.
Arrange required temporary connections.
Bring to the spot the required additional equipment and materials.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 269
Security and Transport Team
Manning of gates. Arrange for closing of all gates and stop movement of traffic.
In case of fire arrange to post sufficient guards to incident site for augmenting firefighting force.
Inform guards at the gate to allow movement of emergency vehicles.
Depute adequate security personnel to cordon off the incident area.
Maintain law and order in the plant and Assembly Points.
Allow the emergency services like ambulance, fire tender etc to go through the gates without normal checks.
Direct external emergency services to the site of emergency.
Communication Team
On hearing the emergency alarm /or coming to know of the emergency he would proceed to Emergency
Control Center and report to the Incident Controller, Site Controller and maintain the communication system.
From the information received, brief the Site Controller of the situation, recommending, if necessary,
evacuation of staff from assembly points, to outside the plant in co-ordination with Transport and Welfare
Teams.
Deploy suitable staff to act as runners or messengers who are listed in the essential workers list between him
and the incident controller if the telephone and other system of communication fail due to any reason.
Maintain inventory of items in the emergency control center.
Maintain a log of incidents.
Keep in constant touch with happenings at the emergency site and offer suggestions to the incident
controller. He shall ensure that the board is kept free to the extent possible for incoming calls.
He shall ensure that the telephone system is in good working condition.
Medical Team
Keep the ambulance and Occupational Health Center ready to receive the injured.
Direct the first-aiders and arrange for immediate first-aid and medical attention to casualties.
Arrange additional emergency equipment and medicines.
Liaise with local hospitals and give detailed treatments required.
Liaise with Security and Transport Team for transportation of casualties to local hospitals.
Be in constant touch with Incident Controller.
Look after the welfare of the affected persons.
Arrange to keep record of casualties.
Fire Fighting Team
On hearing the emergency siren/ coming to know of the emergency he would rush to the spot of incident.
He would make sure that all required safety equipment are made available. If required he would arrange from
other sources.
Advising on safety to Incident Controller, if required be in continuous touch with Incident Controller and carry
out his instructions.
He would arrange for issue of Safety Work Permits for jobs to be taken up arising out of the emergency in co-
ordination with the task force.
Ensure that safety of personnel, plant and environment are properly taken care of.
Arrange for the prompt replacement/replenishment of used fire and safety equipment.
Take guidance of the Incident Controller for assessing the requirement of mutual aid.
Based on the instructions from the Incident Controller, he would guide the fire group to control the emergency
and rescue operations.
Arrange to position the fire tender at the proper place depending on wind direction and availability of fire
hydrant.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 270
Decide his line of action in consultation with the Incident Controller and take appropriate measures to
extinguish the fire / control gas leak.
Ensure the crewmembers are provided with proper safety equipment.
Man Power Accounting Team
Conduct "headcount" of all employees like regular workers, contract workmen and truck drivers at the
assembly point and in plant, and get it counter checked with the entry records.
Keep control of the persons assembled in assembly point/s.
Do not permit non-essential personnel and visitors to move out of assembly point/s till the termination of
emergency or on instructions from Site Controller.
Report the list of missing person/s to Logistic Controller.
Search and find out missing person/s, if any under instructions of Site Controller.
Record all happenings and report to Logistic Controller, and Incident Controller.
Report to Logistic Controller and carry out his instructions
Key Personnel beyond General Shift Hours and for Holidays
The executives and officers will not be available during non- general shift hours and factory holidays. So shift
Personnel available in the respective team has to shoulder the emergency responsibilities till the above mentioned
key personnel arrive at the site and relieve them.
Table 7-36: Details of Team Leaders
S. No. Team Team Leader Designation
1 Incident Control Team Shift in Charge of the plant where
emergency occurred Shift in Charge
2 Emergency Task Force Maintenance Engineer - Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
3 Communication Team Foreman- Electrical Foreman
4 Security &Transport Shift Security in charge D.S.O
5 Manpower Accounting Team Shift Security In charge D.S.O
6 Medical Team Compounder, (Health Center) Medical attendant
7 Safety &Fire Fighting Fireman Fireman
Each team leader may select and train 2 to 3 members working under him to act as its team members during an
emergency.
7.3.8 Role of Key Personnel and Key in Brief
Table 7-37: Role of Key Personnel
S. No. Key Personnel/Team Brief Description of the Role
1 Site Controller Overall in-charge
2 Incident Controller In-charge of all site actions
3 Logistics Controller Head of Support team. Mobilization of Finance, Material, Security, Medical
Transport and rendering all non technical/logistics support to Site Controller.
4 Other Senior Personnel of the
company As required, depending upon the situation.
5 Incident Control Team, To bring the incident under control.
6 Emergency Task Force Team To carry out emergency maintenance activities.
7 Security and Transport Team To look after security and transport requirements.
8 Communication Team To maintain communication facilities during emergency.
9 Medical Team To look after medical requirements including first aid, transport of injured
to hospitals and procurement of medicines on emergency basis.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 271
S. No. Key Personnel/Team Brief Description of the Role
10 Fire Fighting To fight the fires; to control toxic release by spraying water; issue of PPE; to mobilize PPE and fire fighting equipment; to direct external fire fighting
agencies .
11 Man Power Accounting To head count the personnel assembled at Safe Assembly Points and plant
areas including contract labour.
If an emergency occurs beyond general shift hours or during holidays, the Shift in-Charge of the plant in which it
occurs would act as the Incident Controller. The Shift – In – Charge of one of the other plants, would assume the
responsibilities of the site Controller. They will continue to shoulder this responsibility till the regular site Controller /
Incident Controller or their alternatives arrive at the site.
Table 7-38: Emergency in PVC Plant
Emergency in Incident Controller Site Controller
PVC Plant Field officer of respective section Shift-in Charge PVC Plant
Table 7-39: Emergency Control Centre
Main Intercom: 3384 Admin Block
Alternate Intercom : 3372 Material Gate
7.3.9 Safe Assembly Points
Safe assembly points are listed below;
Main Gate/ Security Office
Adjacent to fire water storage tank
Material Gate
7.3.10 Escape Routes
Route no. 1: From VCM Tank Storage to Material Gate (Road N 7 to N 8 via Road E 7)
Route no 2: From Reactor area to Admin Building (Road E3 to N 3 and/or E3 to E 1 via N 6)
Route no 3: Road to Ware House via open area (Road E6 to N 8)
Route no. 4: From Dryer Area to Main Gate via Work shop (from E3 to E1 via N6 and/or E3 to N 3)
Route no. 5: From Nitrogen Plant / Compressor to fire water pump house. ( N 3 to E 9 and/or N2 to E 8)
7.3.11 Help from External Agencies during Emergencies
Types of Accident
Fire in VCM, or HSD storage tanks or lines conveying these materials due to leakage
Toxic release of hydrochloric acid vapours due to leakage from joints or from tank
Bomb threat, terrorism, act of war, earth quake
Responsibilities Assigned
Table 7-40: Responsibilities Assigned
Incident External Agency Assistance
Fire / explosion spillage, natural disasters.
State fire brigade. Fire fighting and rescue augmentation.
Injury/illness Hospitals and ambulance services. Medical help augmentation.
Theft / sabotage /bomb threat /terrorism /war.
Police department Law and order, safety and security augmentation.
All incidents Neighbourhood organization Consumables, manpower, technical help
augmentation.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 272
Other Organizations in the Locality
Following are the factories in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex, in which Chemplast Sanmar factory is situated:
SPIC Pharmaceuticals
Shasun Chemicals
Tamil Nadu Fluorides and Allied Chemicals (TANFAC)
AsianPaints – Penta division
Pandian chemicals
Clariant Chemicals
Bayer Material Science India Ltd
Tagros chemicals India Limited
Arkema Peroxides India Private Limited
Contact No. of External Organizations
Table 7-41: Contact Information of External Organizations
S. No. Name Telephone No.
OFFICE* RESIDENCE*
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION
a. The District Collector, Cuddalore 04142-230999 04142-230777
b. Special Deputy Collector, Cuddalore 04142-226600 9444452166
c. The District Revenue Officer 04142-230651 04142-230185
d. The Tahsildar 04142-295189
e. Panchayat Officer 04142-320286 9443335831
POLICE
a. Superintendent of Police, Cuddalore 04142-230060 04142-295161
9443879888
b. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Cuddalore 04142-284355
c. Inspector of Police (OT) 04142-297681
d. Inspector of Police (Port) 04142-297680
e Inspector of Police Kullanchavady 04142-279233
f. Inspector of police - Kurinjipadi 04142-258350
FACTORIES INSPECTORATE
a. Director Industrial safety and Health 044-28112144
b. Senior Additional Director of Industrial safety and
Health, Chennai 044-28291534 044-26152244
c. Additional Director of Industrial safety and health, Trichy 044-242122
d. Joint Director of Industrial safety and Heath Cuddalore 04142 - 222826
DEPARTMENT OF EXPLOSIVES
a. Joint Chief Controller Of Explosives, Chennai 044-28419529
b. Chief Controller Of Explosives, Nagpur 0712-2510248
FIRE DEPARTMENT
a. Divisional Fire Officer, Cuddalore 04142 - 294603
b. Asst. Divisional Fire Officer 04142 - 295733
c. Fire Station, SIPCOT 04142 - 239242
d. Fire Station ,Kurinjipadi 04142 - 258370
POLLUTION CONTROL DEPARTMENT
a. Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board, Chennai 044-22353134 to
22353141
b. Chairperson, TNPCB, Chennai 044-22353076 044-26261144
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 273
S. No. Name Telephone No.
OFFICE* RESIDENCE*
c. Member Secretary, TNPCB, Chennai 044-22355145 044-23662870
d Additional Chief Environmental Engineer 044-22353146 044-24615007
e. The District Environment Engineer, Cuddalore 04142-221867
HEALTH AND MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OFFICE RESIDENCE
a. District Medical Officer, Cuddalore 04142-230052
b. District Health Officer, Cuddalore 04142-295134
c. General Hospital, Casualty, Cuddalore 04142-231590
d. ESI Dispensary – Medical Officer Cuddalore - OT 04142-297148
TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT
a. The Manager, TSTC, Cuddalore 04142-224795
b. Regional Transport Officer, Cuddalore 04142-290035
ELECTRICAL DEPARTMENT
a. Chief Engineer 04142-222035/
04142-222036
b. Superintending Engineer 04142-223793
04142-230969 9443330664
WATER SUPPLY
a. SIPCOT 04142-239236
SANITARY
a. Sanitary Inspectors, Cuddalore (Municipality) 04142-230021
SERVICE CLUBS
a. Cosmopoliton Club 04142-221723
NEWS MEDIA
a. Dinathanthi, Cuddalore 04142-293289
b. Dina Malar, Cuddalore 04142-295830
* Telephone nos. valid at the time of EIA report writing
Key Personnel of Neighboring Industries
Table 7-42: Name of Contact Person in Neighboring Industries
S. No NAME OF THE INDUSTRY CONTACT PERSON* Phone*
1 The Covestro (India) Pvt. Ltd. Senthil Kumar 04142-239913
2 Pioneer Jellice India Pvt.Ltd Mr.T.Arumugam 04142-239355
98946 39386
3 Arkema Peroxides Private Ltd Mr.M.Ananda jothi 04142-239901
90032 12868
* Contact Person & Telephone nos. valid at the time of EIA report writing
7.3.12 Safety Related Components
Chemplast Sanmar, after assessing the available technologies have selected the technology of INOVYN U. K. Ltd.,
was formerly known as INEOS Vinyls Ltd., for this project. INOVYN is the largest producer of PVC in Europe.
The technology used is a clean and closed reactor technology, which minimizes reactor opening thereby
reducing the potential exposure to the operator and release of VCM to the environment.
The expected opening frequency is once in 500 batches.
The VCM recovery system does not use a gas holder thereby reducing the fugitive emissions of VCM.
Ex –situ (outside the reactor) preparation of catalyst using commonly available chemicals.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 274
Water contaminated with VCM is stripped and treated to levels < 0. 5 ppm before discharge. Plant design
meets applicable standards of safety and environmental performance.
The reactor protection systems against major hazard releases are of very high integrity and include a reaction
short stop system of extremely high reliability and effectiveness.
The technology used is a clean one and the plant is well designed with utmost care on safety (ie, protection of
personnel, plant and surrounding environment). Adequate built-in safety devices, preventive/mitigation
measures are incorporated in the plants.
The pipeline is buried in a concrete trench
The line runs through the land exclusively owned by Chemplast Sanmar
The corridor is under strict surveillance by security staff 24 hrs x 7 days.
7.3.13 Safety Features in VCM Unloading Line
Chemplast Sanmar imports VCM (liquid) through tankers at Cuddalore Port. VCM liquid from tankers will be pumped
through VCM pipeline. The system for unloading VCM from the tanker to the storage tank at plant site consists of
the following elements:
Island jetty including unloading arm
Offshore pipeline including pipeline end manifold (PLEM)
Onshore pipeline (corridor line) including crossing of the Uppanar River and PLEM at the plant end
An important safety feature of VCM unloading is that the line will be in service only during Ship unloading time
and during all other times it will be depressurized and kept at a positive pressure of 0.5 KG/CM2 through
complete recovery of VCM. This ensures that during this period, no fire, explosion or toxic vapor release can
take place. It is expected that to a maximum extent of 3 times in a month (each time three days) the line will
be under pressure
The off- shore portion of the unloading line is coated with concrete for anti buoyancy and buried 1.5 meters
below the sea bed
VCM pipe line is made of special low carbon steel to withstand low temperature
Polypropylene coating is given to prevent corrosion
To avoid Electro Chemical Corrosion, cathodic protection is provided
VCM pipeline is of pipe in pipe configuration-i.e.; inner pipe and outer pipe with annular space between them
Both the inner and outer pipes are independently capable of withstanding 7 times the operating pressure
envisaged
Pipeline from jetty to plant is a single welded string with flanges only at valve locations to minimize the risk of
leak
All pipe weld joints are 100% radiographed
Pipeline designed by Impac Germany, design proof checked by OGE Singapore and finally certified for design
performance by DNV
Emergency Shut down Valves (ESD) are provided at three strategic locations
Pressure sensors are provided in the annular space of the VCM pipeline at 6 locations for immediate detection
of VCM
Any leakage detected will immediately activate and close all the three ESDs
7.3.14 Risk due to Natural Calamities
Earthquake
Cuddalore is situated in Seismic Zone II which means Low Risk Damage Zone. Also, there are no high rise
buildings or structures or trees that can cause damage to the VCM pipe line.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 275
However high intensity earthquake or explosion of high explosive bomb may cause twisting of the pipeline leading
to leak of VCM. However, since the pipeline is buried underground with sand filling, free flow of the escaping liquid
will get hampered.
Emergency Action During Earthquake
In case of an earthquake being felt all concerned to stop the operations in consultation with site controller or
incident controller considered if it is safe to do so and evacuate the plant and assemble at the assembly point.
Shift Engineer to inform the site controller and main gate security.
Electrical in charge along with shift engineer to isolate the power supplies and shut down the whole plant.
Ensure that non-essential loads are cut - off from the UPS power supply so that it is available for lighting and
emergency systems.
In case of any eventuality arising due to earthquake like fire execute related emergency actions.
Try to avoid staying below structures, be in open place.
Sections can be restarted after getting clearance from the plant.
Action After Earth Quake
Immediately take head count to ensure that all are safe.
Ensure that all available communication facilities are in good condition.
Inspect the VCM storage facility and Boiler area and other critical areas of the plant.
Check the gas cylinders for any leak.
Look for and extinguish fire, if any, to eliminate fire hazard.
Watch out for fallen power lines, broken gas lines and stay away from danger zone.
Emergency team shall carry out leak arresting, fire fighting and rescue operations as per onsite plan.
If leakage could not be controlled isolate the valves with due safety precautions
Medical and first aid team shall render medical help to the injured.
Inform District crisis group and local fire brigade for assistance.
Ensure availability of food, water and medicine in adequate quantity
Tsunami
After the occurrence of Tsunami that hit the Indian coast in 2004, it has also been identified as a potential hazard.
Tsunami results from Earthquake in the seabed. This creates high waves. The lashing of these waves on the
structures would cause damage. Also there will be inundation of huge areas inland.
Tsunami effects on the pipeline and the plant are due to wave propagation and inundation. However the VCM
pipeline from the marine terminal to the PLEM at the plant is buried underground and so protected from mechanical
damage.
The plant is constructed 3km from the sea and 7-8 km along the Uppanar river from Bay of Bengal. The wave
propagation from Tsunami will subside to a large extent and there may not be any significant rise in Uppanar River
level above the normal high tide level. In addition the bund wall and the green belt will serve to dissipate the force
of Tsunami waves, if any.
Review of the Preliminary Impact assessment of Tsunami that occurred in 2006 compiled by ICMAM (Integrated
Coastal and Marin Area Management, a body under Department of Ocean Development), especially for the
Cuddalore Coast, indicated that no wave propagation and subsequent inundation was observed in the Uppanar
Backwaters. Also there were no damages observed to any industrial structures located in SIPCOT Phase.
Response Action
On receipt of tsunami warning from district authorities indicating a threat to the area.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 276
1. Any vessel discharging or loading at the jetty shall immediately suspend all cargo operations and be removed
to the anchorage or sea.
2. The non-critical operations in the plant shall be stopped in consultation with site controller and be ready for
safe shut down of whole plant if required.
3. Protecting the life will be the highest priority.
4. Restrict the access to the Marine Terminal site and Uppanar river.
5. Instruct all to move to high-rise structures and buildings at least 10 meters above sea level and stay there until
advised that it is safe to return.
Flood
Emergency Action Procedure During Flood
The person first noticing the incidence should shout the nature of emergency.
Inform to the shift engineer through phone.
Inform the site controller and main gate. The main gate guard shall inform all key personnel.
Security at Uppanar river end should keep watch on the river high tide condition and inform the situation time
to time to main gate.
Crossing of the river should be avoided during high flood situation in Uppanar river.
Security shall make frequent walk around of the Uppanar periphery to assess the situation.
Life saving appliances like, life buoy with life line and life jackets shall be kept ready.
Main gate guard shall immediately close the gate to prevent any person or vehicle entry.
Incase section is going to be affected by flood; /Shift in charge in consultation with site controller immediately
stop all the operations.
Inform Electrical people to isolate the power.
Try to remove all the voluble materials to safe area.
The Electrical Incharge Emergency Action Procedure During Flood
Go round the plant and check whether water has entered in any of the cable trenches/MCC panel room in the
ground floor inside the factory and if any cables are short – circuited.
Immediately arrange to isolate the power supply in that particular line.
Arrange to pump out the water from cable trenches.
Incase of any abnormal smell/sound isolate the power
Stp/Civil Department
Ensure that no sewage water is allowed to mix with the floodwater.
Ensure that all the storm water drains are free from choking and other debris particles periodically.
General steps during emergency
If incidence is in control, normalcy is restored after getting clearance from the site controller.
If the incidence is not in control, site controller will declare emergency.
Based on the situation stopping of the plant and evacuation will be carried out by the team.
The rescue team along with security will go with PPE to rescue any people in danger.
Ensure that no valuable material taken away by the flood.(Eg.pallets,barrels,bags etc.)
Keep in ready all-medical and transport facilities for tackling the emergency.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 277
Inundation
As the corridor line is buried underground enclosed in a concrete trench impervious to water, the water inundation
due to cyclone or storm or Tsunami would at the most affect the topsoil only and not the pipeline along the pipeline
corridor.
Since the damage to the corridor pipeline can take place only during Ship unloading, immediate action will be taken
to shut down the system and to control the release of VCM.
Cyclone
The plant along with the MTF is designed to handle Cyclone of Gale up to 200 Km/hr.
The Plant is situated about 2.5 Km from the seafront and the risk of Tsunami impacting the plant is very low.
The plant has an established system of communication even during cyclones / Tsunami that helps in aids in
implementation of the management plan for the disaster.
Even during the recent “THANE” cyclone that had gale in excess of 160 km/hr at the plant and the Marine terminal
facility, the loading arm, instrumentation and all the safety systems that were installed in the MTF was intact.
The main plant had no damage because of the cyclone, but had some peripheral damage to the roof top in the
utility area.
The plant after a detailed safety integrity check and on availability of power was started immediately.
The plant was among the first to start operations post Cyclone and this is a testimony of the robust design of the
plant.
In Marine Terminal
1. The first priority shall be of a vessel on the jetty and its timely removal to a place of safety away from the port
area.
2. The terminal support craft shall be similarly considered and arrangements made for placing them offshore in a
position to safely ride out the storm.
3. The jetty facilities shall be made ready for the winds and VCM arm locked securely in position.
In PVC Plant
1. No class A permit shall be issued for height work such as scaffolding erection, removal etc during cyclone.
2. No temporary power connection shall be given if it rains and Electrical Engineer to ensure that all temporary
power connections already given is isolated and removed.
3. Ensure that all the storm water drains are free from choking and other debris particles periodically.
4. Ensure valuable materials, which are kept out side like chemical barrels, bags etc, are covered and secured
properly.
5. Ensure all the glass windows and doors are securely closed.
6. Where personnel are required to stay onsite, adequate stocks of food and other essential items should be made
available during the period.
7. Ensure the availability adequate first aid and emergency medicines.
Post Cyclone monitoring
1. Inspect plant area for damage: being aware of dangerous situations power lines, weakened structures, debris,
submerged hazards etc, identify situations requiring high priority attention, initiate action as required.
2. Reset electrical connections so long as power outlets/cabling appears undamaged; otherwise have system
checked by qualified electrician.
3. Record and photograph any damage.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 278
7.3.15 Emergency Procedure
The care taken in design and standard spreading procedure operation of the PVC plant are intended to make a
major release highly improbable. Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that such an incident, or a lesser incident,
which involves people outside the works, will not occur.
Full instructions are provided for prompt recognition of escapes, which can affect those outside the works, prompt
action to stop the escapes and mitigate their effects, make safe other plants, and protect works personnel within
the affected area.
The local emergency services (Ambulance Service, Fire Service, Hospital Service and Police) are informed of the
potential hazards in the factory and given all information necessary for them to deal with any situation which may
arise.
The emergency services will warn the local population in case of emergency.
Emergency equipment has been provided at suitable points in areas, where significant escapes could occur. There
is an adequate training and practice in use.
Personal Protective Equipment
Safety Helmets, Safety Shoes and appropriate Hand Gloves are issued to all plant personnel. Other need-based PPE
are also are available for use where and when needed basis.
Emergency Safety Equipment
Emergency equipments are available at vulnerable points. In case of emergency, the emergency equipment can be
used.
It is ensured that the emergency equipments are readily available for any emergency.
Safety Showers
Adequate safety showers are provided, wherever required. They are also well maintained.
Communication Facilities
For internal communications, "Intercom" phones are provided in all sections. For external communications, P & T
Telephones are provided. "Public Address System" (PAS) is installed in the main control room. In case of failure of
phones, runners/messengers will be used.
First Aid
No. of first-aid boxes in the factory premises: 10
No. of personnel trained in first aid by St. John's Ambulance Association, Cuddalore: 29
The first aid boxes are distributed in all sections. It is ensured that the boxes are fully equipped at all times.
Occupational Health Centre
Occupational Health Centre is in place in the factory premises. A visiting Doctor with diploma in industrial health has
been arranged to visit the plant thrice a week. For emergencies, he is available on call. Medical records of workmen
and contract workmen have been made available to the doctor. Medicines are also made available in the OHC.
An ambulance with stretcher and first aid medicines is made available in the plant round the clock.
Facilities available in OHC:
Bed , Pillow & Bed spread
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 279
Table of required size
Toilet with wash arrangement
Oxygen cylinder with required arrangements
One Blood pressure apparatus
Stethoscope
Stretcher
One suction equipment
Lung function measurement instrument
All prescribed/required medicines
Other equipments like Drip stand, tray etc
Anti venom and required medicines
Information of Other Hospitals
Table 7-43: Contact Telephone No. of Hospitals
S. No Place Phone No*
1 Government Hospital 04142230052
2 Mahatma Gandhi Medical college and research Institute 0413-2615449 to 458
3 Surendra Hospital, Cuddalore O.T 04142237333
4 Hindu Mission Hospital, SIPCOT Through a messenger
5 Krishna Hospital, Manjakuppam 04142-231711
6 Kannan Hospital O4142230370
* Contact Person & Telephone nos. valid at the time of EIA report writing
Provision of Emergency Power Supply
Emergency power supply is available from the diesel generator (DG sets). There are three DG sets with a capacity
of 2000 KVA each for supply of emergency power. Apart from critical equipments, some of the important lights are
connected with emergency power supply.
Portable Meters
Oxygen meter and explosion meter are available.
Detectors
VCM detectors are provided at following places:
Near Fire Water Tank
Near VCM Storage tank
VCM Recovery – North Side
VCM Recovery near grid
Reactor pipe rack
Reactor area
Additive area
Dryer area
VCM Tank emergency vent
Vent Gas absorption
Alarm and Warning System
Electrically operated siren, with 5 Km range and UPS arrangement is provided to give warning during an
emergency.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 280
Siren Code
Table 7-44: Siren Code
Type of Siren Duration Sign
Wailing Siren 30 seconds each Total 2 minutes Emergency (fire/release of toxic gas/liquid)
Continuous Siren 90 seconds Termination of emergency
Locations of Sirens
Table 7-45: Location of Sirens
S. No. Locations of Sirens Location of ON/OFF Switch of the Sirens
1 Silo Building Control Room
"No break power" is supplied to the On/Off switches of the sirens
Speakers of the "Public Address Systems" (PAS) are distributed in almost all areas/sections to have full coverage
throughout the factory. The mike and amplifier of the system is installed in the main control room. Back up power
is supplied to the system.
Windsocks
24 no. of windsocks are provided. Regular trainings are conducted to all employees so that all are well acquainted
with the locations of the windsocks.
Periodic maintenance and changing of windsock clothes is being followed to have them always in working condition.
Safety Promotional Activities
All appropriate and effective safety promotional activities as detailed below are adopted in the company to arouse
and maintain the safety awareness amongst all employees.
Safety Organisation
CHEMPLAST SANMAR has set up a separate Safety, Health & Environment Department to take care of all aspects of
safety including the environment. The safety department comprises of a Manager (Safety) and a Executive Manager
(Safety & Environment). All matters connected with safety and environment is effectively handled by the Safety
Department.
Safety and Health Policy
CHEMPLAST SANMAR has declared their well-defined "Safety and Health Policy" which is distributed to all
employees. The same has been displayed in prominent locations in the company premises.
Safety Committee
A properly constituted safety committee is functioning as per statutes.
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 281
Figure 7-23: Environment, Health, Safety and Responsible Care Policy of Chemplast Sanmar
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 282
Safety Slogans and Posters
Catchy safety slogans and posters are displayed wherever required in the company. The safety slogans and posters
are circulated/ displayed in appropriate locations in the company.
Safety /Fire Fighting Training
Regular training on safety and fire fighting is given to all employees in the company, including the Security
Personnel. Refresher courses will also be conducted.
National Safety Day and Safety Week Celebration
"National Safety Day" and "Safety Week" are celebrated every year in the month of March. Competitions are held
on such items as safety essays, speeches, slogans and posters during the safety day celebration. Attractive prizes
are given to the winners of the competitions. External faculties are also invited to give effective speeches on safety
during such occasions.
7.3.16 Reporting and Investigations of Accidents and Fire
All fires and accidents are reported through the prescribed formats and investigated. Remedial steps are evolved
and implemented. Reportable accidents are reported to the Factories Inspectorate through the prescribed forms.
Records are also maintained. Accident statistics are maintained and circulated to all concerned.
7.3.17 Statutory Obligations
All statutory obligations as applicable are always complied with.
7.3.18 Work Permit System
Work permit system is strictly followed for any maintenance job in the plant.
7.3.19 Material Safety Data Sheet
MSDS of all hazardous chemicals stored and handled in the company are available. It is circulated to all concerned.
7.3.20 Smoking
Smoking is strictly prohibited inside the company premises. "No Smoking" caution boards are displayed wherever
required. A very strict vigil is kept in this regard.
7.3.21 Housekeeping
Efforts are made by all concerned to maintain good housekeeping in the entire company. Waste disposal is
regularly done.
7.3.22 Earthing and Lightening Arresters
Tanks and equipment, all electrical equipment and pneumatic conveying systems etc are properly earthed.
Adequate lightening arresters are provided in the plant
7.3.23 External Technical Support
CHEMPLAST SANMAR maintains a list of consultants to obtain technical consultancy in case of need such as:
National Safety Council (NSC) India
Indian Chemical Manufacturers Association (ICMA)
SIPCOT Employers' Association
CHEMPLAST SANMAR LIMITED EXPANSION OF PVC PLANT AT CUDDALORE, TAMIL
NADU FROM 300000 TPA TO 600000 TPA ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | NOVEMBER 2018 283
7.4 Social Impact Assessment. R&R Action Plans
R& R is not applicable as project is expansion within existing premises.
top related