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Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy:
Middle East and Africa
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
August 11, 2016
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R43756
Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa
Congressional Research Service
Summary After nearly a decade and a half of combating Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
United States faces an increasingly diverse threat from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and
Africa. While senior Al Qaeda figures reportedly remain based in Pakistan, the network maintains
a number of affiliates across the Middle East and Africa including Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Shabaab. Al Qaeda also
retains a small but growing presence in Afghanistan. U.S. officials have stated that Al Qaeda still
maintains a foothold in Syria through its ties to Jabhat Fatah al Sham (formerly known as the
Nusra Front). This report examines the threat posed by Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and
Africa as described by U.S. officials and outside observers, as well as the U.S. approach to date in
responding to the threat posed by individual groups.
The rise of the Islamic State and its rapid territorial expansion across Syria and Iraq has at times
eclipsed the attention directed towards Al Qaeda, at least in the public debate. However, U.S.
officials have warned that Al Qaeda remains focused on attacking the United States, and that
some of its affiliates in the Middle East have the capability to do so. AQ affiliates that have
primarily targeted local governments in the region have also turned their efforts to Western
interests abroad, aiming at soft targets—such as hotels—frequented by Americans or Europeans.
U.S. officials have cautioned that some Al Qaeda affiliates may increasingly turn to this type of
high-profile attack as a way of remaining “competitive” for funds and recruits, in light of the
wide publicity garnered by the Islamic State.
Congressional concerns regarding these issues might shape ongoing reevaluations of the laws that
underpin current U.S. counterterrorism policy, including the 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40). In addition to the AUMF, Congress has addressed the
emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates through a number of channels, including oversight of executive
branch counterterrorism policies and practices; authorization and appropriations of U.S. funds for
counterterrorism operations; and oversight of assistance for partner nations engaged in such
operations.
Note: This report does not cover Al Qaeda affiliates outside of the Middle East, Afghanistan, and
Africa. See also CRS Report R44563, Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, by Lauren
Ploch Blanchard and Alexis Arieff, and CRS Report R44501, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Ben
Dolven et al.
Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa
Congressional Research Service
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Al Qaeda’s Emergence and Organizational Development .............................................................. 1
Roots in Afghanistan ................................................................................................................. 1 Rise of Affiliate Groups ............................................................................................................ 3 Al Qaeda – Islamic State Split .................................................................................................. 3 Al Qaeda – Nusra Front Split .................................................................................................... 5
Posture and U.S. Threat Assessments .............................................................................................. 6
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan ........................................................................................................... 6 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ........................................................................................... 7 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ............................................................................................. 8 The Nusra Front / Levant Conquest Front ................................................................................ 8 Al Shabaab .............................................................................................................................. 10
Ideology ......................................................................................................................................... 10
Al Qaeda Messaging on the Islamic State ............................................................................... 10
Selected Policy Responses ............................................................................................................ 12
Military Operations ................................................................................................................. 13 Efforts to Build Regional Partners’ Military Capability .......................................................... 14 Targeted Sanctions .................................................................................................................. 15 Countering Violent Extremism ................................................................................................ 17
Legislation and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 18
Authorization for the Use of Military Force ........................................................................... 18 FY2016-FY2017 Appropriations for Foreign Operations and Defense .................................. 19
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 20
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 22
Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa
Congressional Research Service 1
Introduction Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, groups espousing Al Qaeda’s ideology have proliferated
in the Middle East and Africa. Some of these groups have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda (AQ)
leader Ayman al Zawahiri, and others have not. Even among the groups that have formal alliances
with Al Qaeda, there is significant variation over the extent to which they are operationally
integrated with Al Qaeda’s senior leadership in practice. Some of these groups, despite the formal
alliances, emerged in the context of local conflicts and are self-sustaining. In a speech at West
Point in May 2014, President Obama stated, “Today’s principal threat no longer comes from a
centralized Al Qaeda leadership. Instead, it comes from decentralized Al Qaeda affiliates and
extremists, many with agendas focused in the countries where they operate.” While the groups
discussed in this report focus the majority of their attacks on local targets, they have been
identified by U.S. officials as posing a credible threat to the United States or its allies, or to U.S.
interests in the Middle East and Africa.
The rise and rapid expansion of the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym
Da’esh) in Iraq and Syria since 2013 has unsettled Al Qaeda’s leadership. The State Department’s
2015 Country Reports on Terrorism states that, “the tensions between AQ and ISIL escalated in a
number of regions during 2015 and likely resulted in increased violence in several parts of the
world as AQ tried to reassert its dominance.” The Islamic State’s expansion has also reignited a
debate over the type and scope of policies and legislation needed to provide the tools to fully
address the threats posed by such groups. In addition, the ongoing debates within Al Qaeda
itself—over leadership and tactics—may prompt a reexamination of U.S. understanding of the
group, and the ways in which it may have evolved since the September 11, 2001 attacks. For
additional information on the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S.
Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud.
Al Qaeda’s Emergence and Organizational
Development
Roots in Afghanistan
In 1988, Osama bin Laden formally established Al Qaeda from a network of veterans of the
Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union. The group conducted a series of terrorist attacks
against U.S. and allied targets, including the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole docked in Aden, Yemen. After the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the United States redoubled its counterterrorism (CT) efforts, forcing the
group's leadership to flee Afghanistan—where they had been hosted by the Taliban—and seek
refuge in Pakistan. U.S. forces located and killed Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, and Bin Laden's
deputy Ayman al Zawahiri assumed leadership of the group. U.S. intelligence officials have
argued in testimony to Congress that persistent CT operations against Al Qaeda since 2001 have
significantly degraded the group's leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that Al Qaeda’s
affiliates have proven resilient.1
1 Testimony of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, before the Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing on the “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” February 9, 2016.
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Profile: Al Qaeda Leader Ayman al Zawahiri
Ayman al Zawahiri was born in 1951 to a prominent Egyptian family. He studied medicine at Cairo University
alongside his twin sister, obtaining a degree in general surgery in 1974. He then served three years as a surgeon in the
Egyptian army, before marrying the daughter of a wealthy family in 1978. In 1980 he traveled to Peshawar, near
Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, where he volunteered as a medic treating Afghan refugees of the Soviet-Afghan
conflict. Six years later he would return to Peshawar and join forces with Bin Laden. However, Zawahiri’s Salafist
views developed in Egypt, shaped by the political context of the time. Muslim Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb, who
called for an Islamic revival to replace secular government with divine law, was executed by the Egyptian government
in 1966. Zawahiri, whose maternal uncle had served as Qutb’s lawyer, became active in one of many underground
Islamist organizations. Zawahiri’s activism continued during his university years. Banned from participating in politics,
the Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian Islamist organizations were highly active in student and professional
unions. Inspired by Qutb’s ideology and galvanized by the 1967 defeat of Egypt by Israel, they aimed to replace Egypt’s
secular government with a system of Islamic rule. The Iranian revolution of 1979 showed that it was possible for a
popular movement to replace secular rulers with an Islamic government.
By the late 1970s, several underground Islamist groups, including Zawahiri’s, merged to form what would be known
as Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made peace with Israel, a decision approved by
a popular referendum widely seen as fixed (the Egyptian government reported that 99 percent voted “yes”).2 In 1981,
a small group of military officers loyal to EIJ assassinated Sadat during a military parade. Zawahiri was among the
hundreds of Egyptians imprisoned under suspicion of involvement in the assassination. Although he was released after
three years, some analysts argue that Zawahiri’s time in prison—where he and others were reportedly subject to
torture—further radicalized him.
Zawahiri and his wife permanently left Egypt in 1985 and arrived in Pakistan in 1986 after an intervening period in
Saudi Arabia. In Pakistan, he continued his medical work while also reconstituting EIJ with Egyptian foreign fighters
who had traveled to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In his book Bitter Harvest, Zawahiri denounced the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood for pursuing electoral politics at the expense of armed struggle.
Following years of informal cooperation between Al Qaeda and EIJ, the two groups merged in 2001 to form Qaeda al
Jihad. While the merger may have been driven in part by EIJ’s strained financial situation, it was also controversial
within the group, whose members reportedly mostly wished to focus on Egypt. Nevertheless, EIJ fighters retained a
prominent role in Al Qaeda’s leadership. Zawahiri served as Bin Laden’s deputy, providing experienced fighters and
strategists from EIJ to craft the group’s operations. While Zawahiri’s primary target remained the Egyptian
government, he apparently came to believe that the only way to bring Islamic regimes to power was to oust from the
region the perceived backer of secular regional regimes, the United States—the so-called “Far Enemy.” When Bin
Laden was killed in a 2013 U.S. raid in Pakistan, Zawahiri assumed leadership of the group. He has spent recent years
restating his views on strategy and tactics for the global jihadist movement and has clashed publicly with Islamic State
leaders.
Sources: Lawrence Wright, “The man behind Bin Laden,” New Yorker, September 16, 2002; Lawrence Wright,
The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11; Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist
Movement, New York: 2015.
2 “Egyptian Vote Results,” Washington Post, April 21, 1979.
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Rise of Affiliate Groups
Starting in the mid-2000s, groups operating in the Middle East and Africa began to formally
pledge allegiance to Al Qaeda leaders. With the exception of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
and the Nusra Front, AQ affiliate groups developed around local conflicts and only later forged
ties with Al Qaeda. Prior to the 2013 creation of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda affiliates in the
Middle East and Africa included the following groups:
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2004. Previously
known as Tawhid wal Jihad, the group emerged in 2002. It expanded following
the U.S. invasion of Iraq under the leadership of the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi,
and was rebranded as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in 2006. Zarqawi’s
successors now lead the Islamic State organization and have been disavowed by
AQ leadership.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in
2006. Previously known as the Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the
group originated from an Islamist insurgent faction in Algeria’s 1990s civil
conflict.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) formed in 2009 following a
merger between Al Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia—established in 2003 and
known by the acronym QAP—and Yemen, established in the early 1990s by
fighters returning from Afghanistan.
Al Shabaab formally joined Al Qaeda in 2012 after several unreciprocated
pledges of support. The group emerged in the mid-2000s as an offshoot of a
militant wing of Somalia’s Council of Islamic Courts.
The Nusra Front emerged in Syria in late 2011 as an offshoot of the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI). The Nusra Front was designated by the State Department as an
alias of AQI in December 2012, although it did not publicly declare its allegiance
to Al Qaeda until 2013. In July 2016, the Nusra Front renamed itself Jabhat
Fatah al Sham (Levant Conquest Front) and stated that the group would no
longer be affiliated with external entities.
Despite these alliances, most affiliates continued to focus primarily on local grievances and did
not adopt Al Qaeda’s call for global jihad against the West as an immediate priority. However,
former NCTC Director Matthew Olsen in late 2015 stated, “the core leadership of al-Qaida
continues to wield substantial influence over affiliated and allied groups such as the Yemen-based
al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.”3
Al Qaeda – Islamic State Split4
In 2013, new divisions emerged between Al Qaeda’s central leadership and leaders of the AQI
successor group—known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). This would lead, a year later, to the
emergence of ISI as Al Qaeda’s primary rival. What began as a disagreement over operations in
Syria would grow into a public rift as ISI leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi ultimately rejected the
authority of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
3 Testimony of former NCTC Director Matthew Olsen before the House Homeland Security Committee and House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Joint Hearing on Terrorism Outlook, November 18, 2015. 4 Prepared by Carla Humud and Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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According to both U.S. officials5 and ISI leaders,6 Baghdadi (also known as Abu Du’a), tasked
ISI member Muhammad al Jawlani in 2011 to begin operations in Syria under the banner of a
new group known as the Nusra Front. In accordance with directives from AQ leadership, Jawlani
and other Nusra members operated as a local Syrian opposition group, without initially
acknowledging their ties to ISI or Al Qaeda.7
The Nusra Front soon became one of the most effective opposition groups in Syria—claiming
nearly 600 attacks in major city centers between November 2011 and December 2012.8 In April
2013, Baghdadi publicly revealed the link between ISI and the Nusra Front. In an audio
statement, he declared,
the Al-Nusrah Front is nothing but an extension and a part of the Islamic State of Iraq.
[...] We announce the abolition of both names, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Al-
Nusrah Front, and we merge them under one name, the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant [ISIL].9
While acknowledging Nusra’s affiliation with Al Qaeda, Jawlani rejected the merger, stating that
he had not been consulted and that his fighters would continue to operate under the banner of the
Nusra Front. Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri also denounced the merger, and decreed that ISI should
confine its operations to Iraq.10 Despite Zawahiri’s efforts, Baghdadi’s forces—then known as
ISIL or ISIS—ramped up activities in Syria. Fighters from the two groups clashed frequently,
leading Zawahiri to issue appeals for unity and a halt to intra-jihadist violence.
On February 3, 2014, Zawahiri formally severed Al Qaeda’s ties with ISIL, stating,
The Al-Qa’ida of Jihad group announces that it has no connection with the group called
the ISIL, as it was not informed or consulted about its establishment. It was not pleased
with it and thus ordered its suspension. Therefore, it is not an affiliate with the Al-Qa’ida
group and has no organizational relationship with it. Al-Qa’ida is not responsible for the
ISIL’s actions.11
In May 2014, ISIL spokesperson Abu Muhammad al Adnani stated that their group “is not and
has never been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,” and said that, given that ISIL was a sovereign political
entity, its leaders had given leaders of Al Qaeda deference rather than pledges of obedience. In
June 2014, Adnani announced the establishment of a caliphate, declaring that ISIL would now be
5 “Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” Press Statement by State Department
Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, December 11, 2012. 6 Baghdadi states, “[w]e deputized Al-Jawlani, who is one of our soldiers, along with a group of our people. We sent
them from Iraq to the Levant so that they could meet up with our cells there. We put plans in place for them, we drew
up an operational policy for them, and we funded them with half of the monthly amount of money that we collected.”
Open Source Enterprise (OSE) Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant,’ April 9, 2013. 7 Zawahiri later stated, “The declaration of the ISIL was in clear violation of the orders by Al-Qa’ida’s command to its
soldiers in Iraq and the Levant, not to declare any official presence of Al-Qa’ida in the Levant.” OSE Report
TRN2014050238064112, “Al-Fajr Releases Al-Zawahiri Statement Urging ISIL to Return to Iraq, Al-Nusrah to Stop
Infighting,” May 2, 2014. 8 “Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” Press Statement by State Department
Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, December 11, 2012. 9 OSE Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,’
April 9, 2013. 10 OSE Report PLN2013061030660134 Doha Al-Jazirah.net in Arabic 09 Jun 13 11 OSE Report TRR2014020311346316, “Al-Qa'ida General Command Text Statement Claims Group Has 'No
Connection' to ISIL,” February 3, 2014.
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known simply as the Islamic State.12
In summer 2014, Islamic State forces began a wide
territorial expansion, capturing large areas of northern and eastern Syria, and northern and
western Iraq.
In Syria, many foreign jihadists defected from the Nusra Front to the Islamic State, leaving Nusra
to regroup as a primarily Syrian organization. While the Islamic State focused on gaining
territory—frequently at the expense of other opposition groups—the Nusra Front continued to
form alliances with other Syrian armed groups and focused its attacks on the Asad government.
This approach accorded with Zawahiri’s call for AQ-affiliated groups to blend into the local
population and build support by adopting local struggles. Given its largely Syrian membership—
up to 70% by some estimates13
—and its integration into the struggle against the Syrian
government, some observers suggest that Nusra’s roots in Syria run deeper than those established
by the Islamic State, which continues to rely on foreign fighters and sustains itself largely through
force.14
Al Qaeda – Nusra Front Split
In July 2016, the Nusra Front announced that it was reconstituting itself as an independent group.
Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al Jawlani stated that his group would hereafter be known as
Jabhat Fatah al Sham (“Levant Conquest Front”), and would have “no affiliation to any external
entity.” U.S. officials have downplayed the announcement as a rebranding effort, noting the
continuing role and presence of Al Qaeda operatives within the Front.
Reports that the United States and Russia have considered coordinating efforts against the group15
may have encouraged the Nusra Front to seek protection in alliances with other fighters. The
announcement could also be seen as part of a broader effort to win the support of key armed
groups. The Front may calculate that by renouncing its ties to Al Qaeda and continuing to focus
its attacks on the Syrian government, it could eventually win the support of most Syrian
opposition groups—particularly if these groups conclude that their primary goal of removing
Syrian President Asad is best served through an alliance with the Nusra Front rather than with the
United States.
The Front’s public severance of external affiliations may result in greater cooperation and
integration with other elements of the Syrian opposition. Some of these groups have described the
Nusra Front’s ties to Al Qaeda as detrimental to the Syrian revolution, and have called upon the
group to renounce those ties as a prerequisite for closer coordination.16
Since the announcement,
powerful groups such as Ahrar al Sham (“Free Men of the Levant”) have welcomed the move and
called for greater unity among rebel groups.17
Increased battlefield integration between the Nusra Front and other Syrian opposition groups
could complicate efforts to strike the Nusra Front without impacting other groups with which the
United States may prefer to maintain a relationship. The United States has worked to build
partnerships with Syrian groups on the ground as part of efforts to counter the Islamic State, and
12 OSE Report TRR2014062966139093, “ISIL Spokesman's Statement Declares 'Islamic Caliphate,' Abu-Bakr Al-
Baghdadi Appointed 'Caliph,'” June 29, 2014. 13 Charles Lister, “Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra,” Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, July 2016. 14 “Exploiting Disorder: al Qaeda and the Islamic State,” International Crisis Group, March 14, 2016. 15 “Obama proposes new military partnership with Russia in Syria,” Washington Post, June 30, 2016. 16 Charles Lister, “Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra,” Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, July 2016. 17 OSE IML2016072945916442, July 29, 2016.
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U.S. leaders have stated that it is only local Syrian partners, not U.S. forces, that can ultimately
bring long-term stability to Syria. However, expanded cooperation between the Front and other
armed groups could limit the range of actors eligible to receive U.S. weapons and equipment in
support of the campaign against the Islamic State.
Finally, the Nusra Front’s decision to rebrand itself as an independent group does not appear
intended as a slight to Al Qaeda. Rather, the language of Jawlani’s statement was deferential to
AQ leadership. Jawlani described the step as a consensus decision between the two groups,
undertaken for the purpose of unifying Syrian opposition fighters.
Posture and U.S. Threat Assessments U.S. officials have warned that the rise of the Islamic State has not lessened the threat posed to
the United States by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. In October 2015, National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) Director Nicholas Rasmussen stated,
The tremendous efforts being made to counter the ISIL threat are absolutely warranted,
but I want to stress that we still view al-Qa’ida and the various al-Qa’ida affiliates and
nodes as being a principal counterterrorism priority. We would not tier our priorities in
such a way that downgrades al-Qa’ida in favor of greater focus on ISIL. When we are
looking at the set of threats that we face as a nation, al-Qa’ida threats still figure
prominently in that analysis.18
In his annual public presentation to Congress on the Intelligence Community’s assessment of
worldwide threats, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated in early 2016 that Al
Qaeda affiliates “have proven resilient and are positioned to make gains in 2016, despite
counterterrorism pressure that has largely degraded the network’s leadership in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.”19
The Administration has defined Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Syria as the
organization’s “most capable” branches.20
Administration officials continue to monitor and assess
the posture and capabilities of Al Qaeda and affiliate groups, described below.
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan21
From “core” Al Qaeda’s expulsion from its Afghanistan base in 2001 until 2015, U.S. officials
asserted that the group had only a minimal presence (defined as fewer than 100) in Afghanistan
itself, operating there mostly as a facilitator for insurgent groups and confined mainly to
northeastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in late 2015, U.S. Special Operations forces and their
Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) partners discovered and destroyed a
large AQ training camp in Qandahar Province—a discovery that indicated that Al Qaeda had
expanded its presence in Afghanistan. In October 2015, the then-top U.S. and NATO commander
in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, stated that, “Al Qaeda has attempted to rebuild its
18 NCTC Director Rasmussen, Statement for the Record, “Worldwide Threats and Homeland Security Challenges,”
House Homeland Security Committee, October 21, 2015. 19 James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, prepared statement for a hearing on the “Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016. 20 Testimony of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, before the Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing on the “Worldwide Threat Assessment,” February 9, 2016. 21 Prepared by Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
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support networks and planning capabilities with the intention of reconstituting its strike
capabilities against the U.S. homeland and Western interests.”22
In April 2016, U.S. commanders publicly raised their estimates of AQ fighters in Afghanistan to
100 – 300, and reported an increasingly close relationship between Al Qaeda and the Afghan
Taliban.23
A key AQ operative, Faruq al Qahtani al Qatari, reportedly has been working with
Afghan militants to train a new generation of AQ members in Afghanistan.24
Until the killing of Al Qaeda’s founder Osama Bin Laden by U.S. Special Operations Forces in
Pakistan on May 1, 2011, there had been reported frustration within the U.S. government over the
pace of the search for Al Qaeda’s top leaders. U.S. efforts to find remaining senior AQ leaders
reportedly focus on his close ally and successor as AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is
presumed to be in Pakistan. In 2014, Zawahiri announced formation of Al Qaeda in the Indian
Subcontinent (AQIS), an affiliate likely born in response to the ascendance of a major new rival
jihadist group in the Middle East. Since then, AQIS has sought—with some apparent successes—
to recruit among disaffected Muslims in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, and it may be realizing
a recent resurgence in the Pakistani megacity of Karachi.25
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula26
The Administration has described Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as “the most active
and dangerous affiliate of al-Qa’ida today,”27
with “several thousand adherents and fighters”
inside of Yemen.28
The group has operated in Yemen since 2009, and has been the most active in
the southern provinces that were formerly part of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen,
which reunited with northern Yemen in 1990. Despite unification, political and economic power
remains in the hands of northern leaders and tribes, and AQAP has benefitted from southern
resentment directed against the government. According to the State Department’s 2015 Country
Reports on Terrorism, AQAP has continued to take advantage of the political and security
vacuum created by the ongoing fighting between the Yemeni government and its supporters and
the rebel Houthi-led opposition. The conflict between these forces has contributed to AQAP’s
expansion in the southern and eastern parts of Yemen since 2015.
Perhaps more than any other AQ affiliate, AQAP has attempted to carry out attacks in the United
States and Europe. Between 2009 and 2012, AQAP was behind three attempts to down U.S.-
bound commercial airliners, and officials note that the group likely “still harbors this intent and
22 Statement of General Campbell before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Situation in Afghanistan,”
October 6, 2015. 23 Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Cleveland via teleconference from Afghanistan, April 14, 2016. 24 Kimberly Dozier, “Officials: Al-Qaida Plots Comeback in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, February 28, 2014. 25 “An Offshoot of Al Qaeda is Regrouping in Pakistan,” Washington Post, June 3, 2016. 26 For background on the Houthi conflict in Yemen, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional
Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 27 The White House, Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Resolution, June 13, 2016. 28 Transcript, CIA Director John Brennan before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, June 16, 2016.
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substantial capability to carry out such a plot.”29
In early 2015, AQAP claimed to have directed
and funded the attack against the Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine in Paris.30
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb31
In June 2016, incoming AFRICOM Commander Gen. Thomas Waldhauser stated that Al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates “have the capability and intent to conduct
attacks on western targets and post a significant threat to U.S./western interests and regional
stability.”32
An Algerian-led regional network, AQIM has long exhibited internal tensions and has
spawned a number of offshoots and splinter movements in recent years. These include: Al
Murabitoun (formed in 2013), which the State Department described in 2015 as “one of the
greatest near-term threats to U.S. and international interests in the Sahel”; the Movement for
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (also known as MUJAO after its French acronym); Ansar al Dine
and the Macina Liberation Front in Mali; and the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade in Tunisia.33
These
groups have conducted bombings against local state targets and security forces; kidnappings for
ransom, often of Westerners; and, since 2013, deadly large-scale hostage-taking attacks targeting
foreigners in Algeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire. AQIM has also reportedly provided
support to other extremist groups.
U.S. officials including Waldhauser have publicly assessed these groups to be primarily focused
on local and Western targets within North and West Africa, including U.S. interests and
personnel. (At least six U.S. citizens have been killed in AQIM-linked attacks.) As Algerian
security forces increased pressure on AQIM in the wake of large attacks in 2007-2008, the
group’s activities moved south into the poorer states of West Africa’s Sahel region. In 2012,
AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar al Dine claimed control over parts of northern Mali amid a domestic
political crisis and civil conflict. French military operations have since driven group leaders
underground and killed or captured several key commanders. Nevertheless, militants continue to
commit asymmetric attacks, and they have recently expanded their areas of operation into
central/southern Mali and neighboring countries to the south. AQIM and linked groups are also
reportedly active in Tunisia and Libya.
The Nusra Front / Levant Conquest Front
The Nusra Front (aka Jabhat al Nusra) emerged early in the Syrian conflict as one of the most
effective armed opposition groups, and initially concealed its ties to Al Qaeda. In early 2016, U.S.
military officials estimated that the group numbered approximately 6,000 to 9,000 fighters,
spread across Syria.34
The group has established a stronghold in the Syrian province of Idlib, and
Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL stated,
29 Testimony of former NCTC Director Matthew Olsen before the House Homeland Security Committee and House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Joint Hearing on Terrorism Outlook, November 18, 2015. 30 “Al Qaeda in Yemen Claims Responsibility for Charlie Hebdo Attack,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2015. 31 Prepared by Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs. 32 Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps Nominee for
Commander, U. S. Africa Command, June 21, 2016. 33 State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, June 30, 2015, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 34 Dr. Michael G. Vickers, former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, before the House Armed Services
Committee, January 12, 2016.
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Nusra is establishing schools and training camps, recruiting from abroad, launching
major military operations, and enjoying a sophisticated on-line presence, all the while
providing safe haven for some of al Qaida’s most experienced terrorists. With direct ties
to Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s successor, Nusra is now al Qaida’s largest
formal affiliate in history.35
Nusra also has targeted groups receiving U.S. assistance. After a Nusra attack in July 2015
targeted U.S.-backed fighters, U.S. military officials in September 2015 reported that only “four
or five” trainees remained “in the fight” against the Islamic State.36
In response to these and other
pressures, the Administration subsequently reconfigured its Syria train-and-equip program.37
In July 2016, Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al Jawlani announced that the Nusra Front was
reconstituting itself as an independent group under the name Jabhat Fatah al Sham (the Levant
Conquest Front), potentially in a bid to reassure opposition groups wary of its Al Qaeda ties, or to
attract support from groups or nations that oppose Al Qaeda.
The Nusra Front presents a unique challenge to the United States, given that the group has both
threatened and coordinated with other Syrian opposition groups—some of which may receive
U.S. support. U.S. officials have acknowledged that the Nusra Front in some places is
“geographically close or intermixed” with civilian or other opposition groups.38
Administration
officials have also noted, “we have seen even to some degree some troubling cooperation
between certain opposition groups and al-Nusrah.”39
The Khorasan Group
In 2015, a former senior intelligence official described the Khorasan Group as a group of operatives dispatched by Al
Qaeda leader Zawahiri from Pakistan to Syria in order to assist the Nusra Front in its battle against Syrian President
Bashar al Asad. Khorasan also reportedly intended to use Syria as a base of operations for attacks against the West. 40
The official asserted that, like Al Qaeda senior leadership and AQAP, the Khorasan Group has the capability to
conduct successful attacks in the United States. Military officials have stated that Al Qaeda and Khorasan operatives
“have one main goal, and this is to plan attacks in the west. That is what they do.”41 National Counterterrorism
Center Director Nicholas Rasmussen stated, “In many cases we believe these individuals that we are identifying as the
Khorasan group play a role alongside or as part of Jabhat al Nusra in carrying out action inside Syria to advance the
goals of the opposition.” Rasmussen also noted that, “memberships in these particular organizations is not always a
clean, distinct, or definable proposition.”42 However, some outside observers argue that by early 2015 Khorasan had
largely ceased external operations planning in response to directives from AQ leadership to prioritize opposition
activities inside Syria.43
35 Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, Testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, June 28, 2016. 36 General Lloyd James Austin, Commander U.S. CENTCOM, before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
September 16, 2015. 37 For additional information on the Syria train-and-equip program, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and
U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud, and CRS Report R43727, Train and Equip Program
for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco. 38 Department of State Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson John Kirby, May 6, 2016. 39 Department of State Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson John Kirby, May 13, 2016. 40 Michael Morell, “Fourteen Years and Counting: The Evolving Terrorist Threat,” CTC Sentinel, September 2015. 41 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Col. Warren via Teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq, April 7, 2016. 42 Paul Cruickshank, “A View from the CT Foxhole: An Interview with Nick Rasmussen, Director, NCTC,” CTC
Sentinel, September 2015. 43 Charles Lister, “Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra,” Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, July 2016.
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Al Shabaab44
The Somalia-based Al Shabaab group remains a key terrorist threat in East Africa. In addition to
assassinations and suicide bombings inside Somalia, it has also conducted attacks in countries
contributing to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is mandated with
countering the group and helping to stabilize the country. Al Shabaab’s 2013 attack against the
Westgate mall in Nairobi killed at least 67, and the group has continued to attack Kenyan towns
along the border—including a 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University that killed 148. Al
Shabaab has also conducted suicide attacks in Djibouti. While AMISOM-led forces have
succeeded in pushing the group out of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, and other major southern
cities, Al Shabaab has proven resilient and adaptable, and by some accounts acts as a “shadow
government’ in Somalia.45
Al Shabaab leaders have threatened attacks in the United States and against U.S. citizens and
targets in the region. At least five U.S. citizens have been killed in Al Shabaab attacks in East
Africa since 2010. In February 2016, Al Shabaab demonstrated its ability to conceal a bomb in a
laptop computer that was detonated by a suicide bomber onboard a Somali airliner. (It detonated
before the plane reached cruising altitude and thus did not destroy the aircraft.) Al Shabaab’s
ability to recruit abroad and the presence of foreign fighters, among them U.S. citizens, in
Somalia have been of significant concern to U.S. policymakers.
Ideology
Al Qaeda Messaging on the Islamic State
Since the rise of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda’s public messaging has refocused on clarifying the
rules for jihad and on discrediting the Islamic State’s leadership and tactics. In September 2013
Zawahiri issued General Guidelines for Jihad. In this document he lays out the group’s priorities,
beginning with the United States:
The purpose of targeting America is to exhaust her and bleed her to death, so that it meets
the fate of the former Soviet Union and collapses under its own weight as a result of its
military, human, and financial losses. Consequently, its grip on our lands will weaken
and its allies will begin to fall one after another.46
Nevertheless, the majority of the document is spent outlining a code of conduct for jihadist
fighters operating locally. Zawahiri states that fighters should avoid clashing with local
governments. Emphasizing that jihad is a long-term struggle, Zawahiri urges groups to, when
possible, “pacify” any conflict with local rulers so as to create “safe bases” and a permissive
operating environment.
Zawahiri also orders fighters to “avoid fighting the deviant sects” (Shi’a, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and
Sufis) unless attacked, and even then, “we must make it clear that we are only defending
ourselves. Those from amongst them who do not participate in the fight against us and their
families, should not be targeted.” Zawahiri also instructs followers to “avoid meddling” with
Christian, Sikh, and Hindu communities in Muslim lands. He states that followers should make
44 Prepared by Lauren Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs. 45 Remarks by Matt Bryden at the Center for Strategic and International Studies event, “The Race Against Time in
Somalia,” March 24, 2016. 46 Ayman al Zawahiri, “General Guidelines for Jihad,” Al Sahab Media, September 2013.
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clear to these communities that, “we do not seek to initiate a fight against them, since we are
engaged in fighting the head of disbelief (America); and that we are keen to live with them in a
peaceful manner after an Islamic state is established.”
Finally, Zawahiri states that fighters must not harm other Muslims, and should refrain from
killing non-combatants—even if they are families of those who fight Al Qaeda. He instructs
fighters to avoid targeting their enemies in public spaces such as mosques and markets, where an
attack could harm other Muslims or noncombatants.
In September 2015, Zawahiri issued the first of a series of audio statements entitled “The Islamic
Spring.” In these audio statements, Zawahiri draws on historical and Koranic sources to attack the
legitimacy of the Islamic State. Zawahiri’s objections to the Islamic State include:
Declaring a caliphate by force without consultation with other jihadist
authorities. Zawahiri argues that a caliphate can only be established through
consultation and consensus, not through the unilateral actions of a small group. In
Episode 4, he declares that “taking power by force without consultation violates
sharia.”47
He adds that while Al Qaeda fully intends to establish an Islamic
caliphate, “it will be a caliphate that follows the prophet’s path and not some
wrongful kingdom taken by force through car bombs and blasts.”
Declaring a caliphate prematurely. Zawahiri states that conditions are not yet
right for the declaration of a caliphate. He argues that a true caliphate does not
come into existence merely by declaring it as such. In Episode 3, he states that
before establishing a caliphate, there are “truths that must exist in reality and on
the ground,” not just “hopes and desires.”48
Killing other Muslims. Throughout the series, Zawahiri repeatedly condemns
the shedding of blood among different jihadist factions. In Episode 2, he calls on
fighters to avoid infighting, “for the sin of killing a Muslim is great.”49
He adds
that it is not permissible to seize money or equipment from rival jihadist groups.
Sowing discord within jihadist ranks, benefiting the enemy. Zawahiri’s
repeated calls for an end to infighting stems from his concern that such conduct
ultimately benefits the United States. In Episode 1, he rhetorically asks:
As we face this campaign now, is this dispute pleasing or displeasing to the Americans?
Does it please or displease the enemies when Al-Baghdadi and those with him rebel
against Al-Qa'ida, break their confirmed pledge of allegiance, openly rebel against their
amir, attack the governance of Mullah Omar, whose name they used to shout, declare a
caliphate based on a pledge from unknown individuals, and call on the mujahideen to
dissent and break their pledges, resulting in all kinds of disputes and tumult?50
Despite Zawahiri’s animosity for the group, many of the differences he describes between Al
Qaeda and the Islamic State appear to be tactical rather than strategic. In recognition of this,
Zawahiri throughout his “Islamic Spring” series repeatedly calls on all jihadist fighters, including
those of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, to cooperate on the battlefield for the sake of their
common enemy. In Episode 2, Zawahiri states,
47 OSE Report TRR2015100561575345, October 5, 2015. 48 OSE Report TRL2015092183805913, September 21, 2015. 49 OSE Report TRR2015091311667655, September 12, 2015. 50 OSE Report TRN2015091004392901, September 9, 2015.
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Despite these grievous errors, I call upon all of the mujahideen in the Levant and Iraq to
cooperate and coordinate their efforts to stand as one in confronting the Crusaders,
secularists, Nusayris [derogatory reference to Alawites], and Safavids, even if they do not
recognize the legitimacy of Al-Baghdadi's state and his group, not to mention his
caliphate. The matter is bigger than not recognizing the legitimacy of their state or their
claim to establishing a caliphate, for the ummah is being subjected to a savage Crusader
campaign and we must set out to push back its assailants.51
This ideological affinity raises the possibility, and the expectation among terrorism analysts, that
extremist operations in the region will continue regardless of the fate of the Islamic State
organization. Al Qaeda’s willingness to cooperate with Islamic State fighters may leave the group
in a position to absorb some of these fighters if the Islamic State’s leadership is ultimately
defeated in Syria and Iraq. And while the majority of Zawahiri’s focus in this series is on
discrediting the group, he does not neglect the ultimate goal of attacks against the United States.
In Episode 2, Zawahiri states,
I call upon all Muslims who can inflict harm in countries of the Crusader coalition to not
hesitate [...] I believe that we should focus now on bringing the war to the backyard,
cities, and facilities of the Crusader West, and most importantly, America. They must
learn that as they bomb, they shall be bombed; as they kill, they shall be killed; as they
harm, they shall be harmed; and as they destroy, burn, and exterminate, they shall be
destroyed, burned, and exterminated. They must know that war is a shared fate, and that
retribution is part of the nature of this work.52
Selected Policy Responses U.S. strategy to combat Al Qaeda in the Middle East and Africa combines limited troop
deployments, training and equipping of local forces, financial sanctions, and programs on
countering violent extremism (CVE). The U.S. approach to particular affiliates has varied
depending on factors such as the operating environment, the capabilities of local forces, and legal
considerations, as discussed below.
U.S. Government Terminology: Affiliated v. Associated Forces
The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) enacted by Congress in September 2001 is the
primary law authorizing U.S. operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.53 U.S. administrations later established
categories of Al Qaeda-linked groups, each of which carries potentially distinct legal and policy implications. The
terms below do not appear in the original AUMF text; rather, they have been delineated in a series of subsequent
legal rulings and executive branch strategy papers.
Associated Forces: organized, armed groups that have entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and are
co-belligerents with Al Qaeda or the Taliban in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.54 Once
established as co-belligerents, associated forces are considered legal targets of U.S. military force per the laws of
armed conflict—which are commonly interpreted to permit a country at war to use force against those fighting
alongside its enemy.
Affiliates: groups that have aligned with Al Qaeda. This includes associated forces as well as groups and individuals
51 OSE Report TRR2015091311667655, September 12, 2015. 52 Ibid. 53 For additional background on the AUMF, see CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force:
Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by Matthew C. Weed. 54 Testimony of Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, May 21, 2014.
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against whom the Obama Administration considers the United States is not authorized to use force based on the
authorities granted by the AUMF.55 The United States may use force against affiliates that have been further classified
as associated forces.
Adherents: individuals who form collaborative relationships with Al Qaeda or act on its behalf or in furtherance of
its goals—including by engaging in violence—regardless of whether such violence is directed at the United States.56
Al Qaeda “Inspired”: Groups or individuals not affiliated with identified terror organizations but inspired by the Al
Qaeda narrative.57
The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism includes the following footnote: “Affiliates is not a legal term of art.
Although it includes Associated Forces, it additionally includes groups and individuals against whom the United States
is not authorized to use force based on the authorities granted by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force,
P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The use of Affiliates in this strategy is intended to reflect a broader category of
entities against whom the United States must bring various elements of national power, as appropriate and consistent
with the law, to counter the threat they pose. Associated Forces is a legal term of art that refers to cobelligerents of
al-Qa‘ida or the Taliban against whom the President is authorized to use force (including the authority to detain)
based on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
Military Operations
Defense Department officials in 2015 stated that the United States has used military force under
the 2001 AUMF against the following Al Qaeda groups: Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, AQAP in
Yemen, individuals who are part of Al Qaeda in Libya and Somalia, the Nusra Front, and the
Khorasan Group. 58
In some cases U.S. forces have relied on unmanned aerial vehicles to target Al
Qaeda militants, particularly outside areas of active hostilities.59
Afghanistan. Approximately 2,000 out of the remaining 9,800 U.S. troops are
performing counterterrorism combat missions, primarily against Al Qaeda and its
associated forces in Afghanistan. U.S. forces continue to try to find and to
target—primarily using manned and unmanned aircraft—senior Al Qaeda
operatives in Afghanistan.
Yemen. Defense Department recently reported that U.S. strikes had killed
approximately 81 AQAP members in Yemen in the first half of 2016.60
In June
2015, a U.S. strike killed AQAP leader Nasser al Wuhayshi.
Libya. A U.S. strike in Libya in June 2015 sought (reportedly unsuccessfully) to
kill AQIM splinter-faction leader Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar.61
Somalia. Officials confirmed several successful strikes against Al Shabaab
targets in Somalia in 2016.62
This includes a March strike on an Al Shabaab
55 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Note: previous versions of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism
were issued in 2003 and 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. 56 Ibid. 57 See for example, “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” Department of
Defense, February 2013. http://www.defense.gov/news/Homelanddefensestrategy.pdf. 58 Remarks by Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, as delivered to the annual meeting
of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC, April 10, 2015. 59 See White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of
Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” May 23, 2013. See
also, U.N. General Assembly Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson,” March 11, 2014. 60 U.S. Defense Department, “Centcom Announces Yemen Counterterrorism Strikes,” June 3, 2016. 61 Source: Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Airstrike in Libya Targets Planner of 2013 Algeria Attack,” June 14, 2015.
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training camp that killed an estimated 150 militants, whom U.S. officials
described as posing a “direct threat” both to AMISOM forces and to U.S. forces
in the region working with AMISOM.63
In September 2014, a U.S. strike killed
Al Shabaab’s leader, Ahmed Godane.64
Syria. Coalition strikes in July 2015 killed Khorasan member and French
national David Drugeon, described by U.S. military officials as an Al Qaeda
operative and explosives expert.65
In October 2015, U.S. strikes killed Sanafi al
Nasr, a Saudi national whom military officials described as a leading financial
figure in the Khorasan Group. In April 2016, U.S. military officials stated that
U.S. strikes had targeted a “senior Al Qaida operational meeting in northwest
Syria,” killing several Al Qaeda operatives. 66
Efforts to Build Regional Partners’ Military Capability67
The Administration has described its efforts to train local partners as a necessary complement to
U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. In 2015, President Obama stated,
... it is not enough for us to simply send in American troops to temporarily set back
organizations like ISIL, but to then, as soon as we leave, see that void filled once again
with extremists. It is going to be vital for us to make sure that we are preparing the kinds
of local ground forces and security forces with our partners that can not only succeed
against ISIL, but then sustain in terms of security and in terms of governance.68
To counter Al Qaeda and its affiliates, the United States works with local military and security
forces in countries such as Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Building capable partner forces in
these countries may be seen to further a range of objectives that, taken together, help partners to
better manage their regional security challenges. These include: sustaining gains made by U.S.
forces, minimizing the need for a large U.S. presence, and preventing the establishment of AQ
safe havens that could be used as a launch pad for attacks against the United States.
Capacity-building efforts have at times involved direct military strikes in what U.S. officials have
termed “self-defense” of U.S. personnel accompanying partner forces. And in some cases, the
Administration has expanded its threshold for the use of direct force beyond the specific targeting
of Al Qaeda. For example, the Administration broadened its justification for direct U.S. military
action in Somalia in 2015, indicating in a notification to Congress consistent with the War Powers
Resolution that its operations in Somalia were carried out not only “to counter Al Qaeda and
(...continued) 62 See, for example, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon
Briefing Room, April 4, 2016. 63 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
March 8, 2016. 64 White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Death of Ahmed Godane, September 5, 2014. 65 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
September 22, 2015. 66 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room, April
4, 2016. 67 For additional information, see CRS Report R44313, What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis. 68 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on Progress in the Fight Against ISIL,” July 6,
2015.
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associated elements of Al Shabaab” (as previously reported), but also “in support of Somali
forces, AMISOM forces, and U.S. forces in Somalia.”69
Afghanistan. In December 2014, the United States and its international partners
transferred the lead domestic security role in Afghanistan from NATO forces to
the ANDSF. About 9,800 U.S. troops and about 5,000 international partner forces
remain in Afghanistan, tasked primarily with training, advising, and assisting the
ANDSF. In June 2016, President Obama announced that 8,400 troops will
remain in Afghanistan until the end of his term in 2017.70
Yemen. In April 2016, “small numbers” of U.S. military personnel were
authorized to deploy to Yemen to support operations against AQAP.71
U.S.
military officials confirmed in May 2016 that some U.S. military personnel had
returned to Yemen and were operating in a liaison capacity out of the port city of
Al Mukalla.72
North Africa and the Sahel. The U.S. approach to AQIM and affiliated groups
relies largely on bolstering the domestic counterterrorism capabilities of the
North African and Sahel countries where these groups operate. The Trans-Sahara
Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in North-West Africa includes military
and police train-and-equip programs, counter-radicalization programs, and public
diplomacy efforts. Additional assistance is provided bilaterally to countries in the
region.
Somalia. U.S. efforts against Al Shabaab include a limited U.S. military “train,
advise, and accompany” mission inside Somalia, and help to train, equip, and
supply AMISOM forces. U.S. officials in March 2016 stated that a “small
number” of U.S. forces were involved in a separate ground raid against Al
Shabaab militants in Somalia, reiterating that U.S forces operated in a “train,
advise, and accompany mode, as they have been in the past in Somalia.”73
AFRICOM in early 2014 confirmed the presence of U.S. military advisors in
Mogadishu, who formed part of a military coordination cell with Somali security
forces and AMISOM.74
Targeted Sanctions
Another aspect of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy against Al Qaeda involves limiting the
group’s ability to finance its operations, in part by ensuring that the group and its supporters are
unable to access the U.S. financial system. According to the 9/11 Commission, some $300,000 of
69 The White House, Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Resolution, December 11, 2015. 70 “Obama Says He Will Keep More Troops in Afghanistan Than Planned,” New York Times, July 6, 2016. 71 The White House, Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Resolution, June 13, 2016. 72 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room, May
9, 2016. 73 Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
March 10, 2016. 74 “U.S. has deployed military advisors to Somalia, officials say,” Washington Post, January 10, 2014.
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the overall $400,000-$500,000 cost of the September 11, 2011, attacks passed through U.S. bank
accounts.75
A 2015 assessment by the Department of the Treasury stated,
[t]he central role of the U.S. financial system within the international financial system
and the sheer volume and diversity of international financial transactions that in some
way pass through U.S. financial institutions expose the U.S. financial system to TF
[terrorist financing] risks that other financial systems may not face.76
Targeted financial sanctions administered and enforced by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC), are used to identify, disrupt, and prevent terrorists—including those linked to Al
Qaeda—from accessing the U.S. financial system.
In 1998, Treasury designated Al Qaeda as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) following Al
Qaeda’s bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The designation banned U.S.
financial transactions with the group and allowed U.S. law enforcement to freeze any U.S.-held
assets. Osama bin Laden was also added to the Treasury Department’s list of Specially
Designated Nationals (SDN). After the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda was listed as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which
authorizes the U.S. government to block the assets (within U.S. jurisdiction) of individuals and
entities that commit or pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism, as well as the assets
of individuals or entities that provide support, services, or assistance to designated terrorist
groups. In its 2015 Terrorist Assets Report, the Treasury Department stated that $13 million in Al
Qaeda-linked funds in the United States had been blocked as of 2015 under SDGT, SDT, and
FTO programs.77
Given that many Al Qaeda financiers are based outside of the United States, U.S. agencies have
also sought to build ties with partner countries to broaden the reach of financial sanctions and
bolster enforcement. In 1999, the United Nations Security Council established the Al Qaeda
Sanctions Committee pursuant to resolution 1267 (UNSCR 1267). The resolution requires all
U.N. member states to freeze the assets of, prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories by, and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, and transfer of arms and military
equipment to any individual or entity associated with Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. The
committee maintains a list of individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda, toward which
member states must apply an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. In December 2015,
UNSCR 2253 expanded the list to include the Islamic State, and the list is now known as the ISIL
(Da’esh) & Al Qaida Sanctions List. As of June 2016, the sanctions list included 258 individuals
and 75 entities.
In addition to imposing financial sanctions, the above designations also include restrictions on
travel designed to limit terrorist mobility. Through the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) the
State Department provides funding and technical training for countries to screen passengers at
ports of entry. As part of TIP, the State Department has provided high-counterterrorism-priority
countries with the PISCES screening system (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and
Evaluation System) to facilitate immigration processing and to exchange information with State
Department officials on suspected terrorist transit.78
75 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The
9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 76 U.S. Department of the Treasury, National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, June 12, 2015. 77 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Terrorist Assets Report 2015, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar2015.pdf. 78 Written testimony of Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Justin Siberell before the House Foreign Affairs
(continued...)
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Countering Violent Extremism
The Obama Administration has emphasized countering violent extremism (CVE) programs to
attempt to counter the reach of groups like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. In a July 2015 speech,
President Obama stated, “ultimately, in order for us to defeat terrorist groups like ISIL and al
Qaeda it’s going to also require us to discredit their ideology [...] Ideologies are not defeated with
guns; they’re defeated by better ideas—a more attractive and more compelling vision.”79
Obama
added that the United States would work with international partners and Muslim communities to
counter terrorist propaganda.
In May 2016, the State Department and USAID released a joint strategy on countering violent
extremism, which defined CVE as
proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and
mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent
extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence. This includes both disrupting the
tactics used by violent extremists to attract new recruits to violence and building specific
alternatives, narratives, capabilities, and resiliencies in targeted communities and
populations to reduce the risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence.80
USAID oversees CVE programs in the Middle East and Africa alongside the State Department’s
Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, while the Department of
Homeland Security focuses on outreach to domestic, particularly Muslim, communities. Some
CVE components fall within broader regional programs, and some are designed to counter a
range of violent extremists—including, but not limited to, Al Qaeda. Examples of CVE programs
in the Middle East and Africa include:
Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS-Somalia), managed by USAID. The
program has supported more than 650 infrastructure, education, training, and
cultural programs in 16 of Somalia’s 18 regions, focusing on areas liberated from
Al Shabaab by the Somali National Army and AMISOM.81
Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East and North Africa (CoVE-
MENA), managed by USAID. The program’s first pilot project, the Maghreb-
Sahel CSO, brings together representatives from civil society organizations
(CSOs) from six regional countries to facilitate cross-border CVE exchanges and
to bolster CSO networking and capacity building.82
(...continued)
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation & Trade, May 17, 2016. 79 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on Progress in the Fight Against ISIL,” July 6,
2015. 80 Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violence Extremism, May 2016. 81 Fact Sheet: Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS-Somalia), USAID. 82 USAID, Quarterly Performance Report No.4, Countering Violent Extremism in the Middle East & North Africa
(CoVE-MENA) Maghreb-Sahel Pilot, October 29, 2015.
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Legislation and Issues for Congress
Authorization for the Use of Military Force83
U.S. military action against Al Qaeda and its affiliates has continued for almost 15 years in
multiple countries located in several regions of the world. The authority for such continuing and
expanding action against Al Qaeda, the proper interpretation of such authority, and the role of
Congress in overseeing and updating such authority, however, have been points of contention
between Congress and the executive branch for most of that 15-year period. Such debate
continues regarding the use of force against Al Qaeda, associated groups, and its affiliates,
although much of the attention on issues related to presidential use of military force has in recent
years shifted to the military campaign against the Islamic State.
Many observers, including some Members of Congress, have identified several concerns about
continued use of force under existing authorities and what some see as expansive concepts of
inherent presidential authority to use military force:
No termination date for existing authorizations. Neither the 2001 AUMF nor
the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243), both of which have been relied upon as authority to
combat Al Qaeda, certain associated groups, and its “successor” the Islamic
State, include language sunsetting their respective authorities on a certain date or
laying out conditions under which the authorities would terminate. Some argue
that this could lead to these authorities being relied upon permanently by
successive Administrations to use force against Al Qaeda and many other related
terrorist groups.
Geographic scope of military action. Although the original theater of military
action against Al Qaeda was Afghanistan, Al Qaeda members cross national
borders or recruit new members in other countries. In addition, the network of Al
Qaeda affiliates operates in multiple countries in the Middle East, South Asia,
and North, West, Central, and East Africa. Because of terror networks’ ability to
operate transnationally, the use of force against Al Qaeda and certain linked
groups has led to a massive increase in the geographic scope of military
operations without additional authorization from Congress.
Timeliness of language in existing authorizations. The 2001 AUMF authorizes
the use of military force against those who perpetrated the September 11, 2001,
terror attacks and those who cooperated or aided them, while the 2002 AUMF
authorizes force to defend against the “continuing threat posed by Iraq,”
originally a reference to the Saddam Hussein regime. While the language of both
authorizations can be and has been interpreted to provide authority for the
continuing use of military force, some argue that these existing authorizations
must be amended or replaced to reflect current realities and future developments
concerning U.S. military counterterrorism efforts.84
83 Prepared by Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation. For additional information, see CRS Report
R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by Matthew C.
Weed. 84 See, e.g., Letter from Rosa Brooks et al. to President Barack Obama, February 10, 2015, https://www.
justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/AUMF-Sunset-Letter.pdf.
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Presidential authority under Article II of the Constitution. Some argue that
the 2001 AUMF has been stretched to include military action that was not
originally contemplated by Congress. Both the Bush and Obama Administrations,
however, have argued that the President’s authority as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the Constitution authorizes action
against Al Qaeda and other related terror groups in many cases even if an existing
legislative authorization does not extend to such action.85
If there is an imminent
threat to the United States, its citizens, military or civilian personnel, or interests,
the President has argued he has stand-alone constitutional authority to use
military force as Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, both Administrations
have argued the President can also use military force as part of conducting the
foreign policy of the United States. In some instances of U.S. strikes against Al
Qaeda-linked groups, it is unclear from Administration statements which legal
justification the Administration relied upon to conduct the strike. Some in
Congress have disagreed with this interpretation of inherent presidential power,
and have called on Congress to define and place limits on the President’s
authority to use military force against terror groups such as Al Qaeda and its
affiliates.
Constitutional role of Congress. Many Members of Congress have proposed
legislation to amend, replace, and/or repeal the 2001 AUMF and 2002 AUMF,
and have called on Congress to fulfill its constitutional role afforded it through
the power to declare war and other related war powers. These Members have
argued that perceived problems with presidential overreach concerning the use of
military force against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as other uses of military
force, in part stem from Congress’s unwillingness to conduct effective oversight
and revisit existing legislation to ensure the President is using military force in
accordance with the Constitution and the will of Congress, insofar as Congress
has authority in those areas.
FY2016-FY2017 Appropriations for Foreign Operations and Defense
In December 2015, Congress appropriated FY2016 funds for foreign operations and defense in
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113, H.R. 2029). There were no specific
appropriations limited to Al Qaeda, although the act did permit funds not to exceed $1.16 billion
to be used to provide training or equipment to coalition forces supporting the U.S. military and
stability operations in Afghanistan, as well as to counter the Islamic State.
The Administration’s FY2016 budget request had included a request for $42.5 billion in Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan
(formerly known as Operation Enduring Freedom) to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces and
to conduct counterterrorism operations against the remnants of Al Qaeda.
In February 2016, the Obama Administration released its preliminary FY2017 budget requests for
foreign operations and defense. Select specific requests related to Al Qaeda include:
85 See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearing on authorization for use of military force, 113th
Cong., 2nd sess., May 21, 2014 (testimony of Mary McLeod, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, and
Stephen Preston, General Counsel, Department of Defense).
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$2.5 billion for programs in Afghanistan, including military training and
assistance and countering extremism.
$45 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF-OCO) for Tunisia to counter
threats from terrorist organizations, including those affiliated with Al Qaeda,
notably AQIM.
$5.8 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
(NADR)-OCO funds for Yemen to counter terrorist threats including those from
AQAP.
$66.5 million in State Department- and USAID-administered funds for TSCTP
activities to build the capacity of participant countries in North-West Africa to
counter the threat posed by terrorist groups in the region, including AQIM and its
splinter and offshoot factions.
$24.2 million in State Department- and USAID-administered funds for the
Partnership for East Africa Counter-Terrorism (PREACT).
$277 million in State Department-administered funds for AMISOM and Somali
security forces fighting Al Shabaab.86
$450 million in Defense Department Counter-Terrorism Partnership Fund
(CTPF) for programs to build the counterterrorism capacity of countries in Africa
to counter AQIM, Al Shabaab, and other terrorist groups (including Boko Haram,
which has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State).
$250 million in defense funding for the Syria train and equip program. The
overarching authority for the program provided in the FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-
291) authorizes U.S. assistance for the purpose of defending the United States
from the Islamic State as well as from threats posed by terrorists in Syria.
Outlook Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups continue to evolve, reflecting internal debates as well as
reactions to competitors such as the Islamic State. Possible future trends include:
Increase in small-scale attacks. Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell in
2015 described an altered threat landscape since the attacks of September 11. He
stated that, “the change is defined by a reduction of the threat from the original al
Qa’ida organization but a significant expansion of the threat from the emerging
groups, a reduction in the threat of large, spectacular attacks but a skyrocketing
rise in the threat of small-scale attacks.”87
Other U.S. officials have warned that
Al Qaeda affiliates, seeking to compete with the attention garnered by the Islamic
State, are countering with high-publicity attacks on soft targets such as hotels.88
AQIM in 2015-2016 claimed attacks against hotels in Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso,
86 $167 million in CIPA for UNSOS, $110 million for AMISOM TCCs and Somali security forces under the Somalia
bilateral request. 87 Michael Morell, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism—From al Qa’ida to ISIS, pp304-
305. 88 Brian Dodwell, “A view from the CT foxhole: Brigadier General Donald C. Bolduc, Commander, Special Operations
Command Africa,” CTC Sentinel, May 25, 2016.
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and Mali. The group and its offshoots also continue to conduct attacks against
members of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA.
Potential for AQ leadership resurgence in Afghanistan. Despite the reportedly
reduced capabilities of Al Qaeda leadership, there is concern that AQ leaders
could once again find sanctuary with the Taliban in Afghanistan, particularly
following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country. Once safely
established, AQ leadership could reconstitute its capabilities and eventually
regain the capacity to conduct large-scale attacks. Zawahiri had previously
pledged allegiance to Afghan Taliban leader Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, and in
June 2016 pledged allegiance to Mansur’s successor, Haibatullah Akhunzada.89
In his Islamic Spring series, Zawahiri offers a general plan for establishing a
caliphate, stating that the first step is strengthening the Islamic Emirate in
Afghanistan [the Taliban].90
Stretching of U.S. resources. Morell also noted that the Arab Spring has
bolstered Al Qaeda by challenging governance at the local level. In some cases,
this has created safe havens from which the group can operate, and which supply
recruits, money, and weapons. The geographic dispersal of Al Qaeda-linked
groups, he argued, has stretched the diplomatic, intelligence, and military
resources of the United States. Unlike the Islamic State, which is geographically
tethered to specific territory it seeks to defend, Al Qaeda groups are fluid and
move across a wide expanse of terrain—arguably increasing their resilience
under attack. To counter them effectively may require the development of U.S.
relationships with a range of regional partners.
Competition and adaptation. Al Qaeda’s attempt to reassert leadership within
the jihadist community could place pressure on the group to accelerate the
implementation of what it had previously described as long-term goals. Although
Zawahiri has declared that conditions are not ready for the establishment of a
caliphate, some observers point to indications that the Nusra Front (now known
as the Levant Conquest Front) is preparing to establish an Islamic emirate in
parts of northern Syria under its control. 91
Others argue that, despite competition
and conflict between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, their shared objectives
overshadow their differences, suggesting that in the next five years the two
groups could merge or establish some degree of tactical cooperation.92
Despite the heightened focus on the Islamic State since its territorial expansion in 2014, U.S.
military and intelligence officials remain concerned about the threat posed by Al Qaeda and its
affiliated groups, some of which have already attempted attacks inside the United States—notably
the multiple foiled airliner attacks attempted by AQAP. As policymakers examine the broad
landscape of terrorist threats, they may wish to consider whether and how the risks posed to the
United States and U.S. interests from the Islamic State and Al Qaeda differ, and how U.S.
counterterrorism policy can be best positioned to address and balance both threats.
89 OSE TRR2016061112755024, “Ayman Al Zawahiri Pledges Allegiance to New Taliban Leader, Vows to ‘Establish
a Caliphate,’” June 11, 2016. 90 OSE TRO2015100644888543, “Al-Qa'ida Leader Declares Conditions 'Not Ready' for Caliphate, ISIL Leaders
'Fanatics,'” October 6, 2015. 91 Charles Lister, “Al Qaeda is about to establish an emirate in northern Syria,” Foreign Policy, May 4, 2016. 92 Bruce Hoffman, “The Coming ISIS- al Qaeda Merger,” Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2016.
Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa
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Author Contact Information
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314
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