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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ))
Plaintiff and Respondent ) Court of Appeal) No. G234578
v. ) )
MICHAEL NORTH, ) San Diego County) No. SDC567034
Defendant and Appellant. )_________________________________________________ )
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY
Honorable Jonathan R. Proud1
____________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF____________________________
Student 1114
Attorney for Appellant
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Under the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, did the trial court err by
using the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule of evidence when law
enforcement searched the incorrect residence with an insufficient warrant?
APPELLANT’S BRIEF ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW……………………..…………...……………ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………..……………………iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..………………………………………..……………………iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE...……………………………………..……………………1
STANDARD OF REVIEW...……….………………………………..……………………4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.………………………………..……………………5
ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………………………6
I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE 4TH AMENDMENT BY PERMITTING
EVIDENCE SEIZED VIA AN INVALID WARRANT AND INCORRECTLY EVALUATED
WHERE THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIES.…………………..………………7
A. The Officer’s Reliance, Before the Search, on the Warrant Lacking Particularity
Did Not Conform to the Standards of the Good Faith.Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule………………………...…….………………………………………………….8
B. The Unreasonable Actions of the Police Officers Should Be Deterred by
Prohibiting Seized Evidence During the Search.………………………………….11
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………15
APPELLANT’S BRIEF iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) ………………………………...…………1, 2, 3, 5
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) ……………………...…………………3, 5
Higgason v. Sup. Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1985)…………………………………2, 8
Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2000)…………………….……6, 7, 9
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) ……………………………..……2, 4, 7, 8
People v. Ramirez, 194 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. 1983)……………………………….2, 3, 4, 5
People v. MacAvoy, 162 Cal. App. 3d 746, 758 (1984) 1………..……………………..7, 8
United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976)……………………………………7
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) ……………….……………….……1, 2, 6, 7
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971)………………………………. ………....4
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ………………….…………….………1
Constitutional Provisions or Statutes
U.S. Const. Amend IV……………………………………………………….……1, 2, 7, 8
California Penal Code 1538.5 ………………………………….……………………......18
1 The California Reporter for People v. MacAvoy began at page 34, with the opinion beginning at 37, however no further page numbers were provided for that particular reporter, so all cites are listed as one continuous page: 37.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged, in count one, with possession of methamphetamine for
purposes of sale in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11378; in count two, with
possession of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377,
subdivision (a); in count three, with possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in
violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364; and in count four, with being under
the influence of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor, in violation of Health and Safety
Code section 11550, subdivision (a). (C.T. 57-58.)
The defense filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section
1538.5. (C.T. 63-98.) The court denied the motion after hearing. (C.T. 107.)
Appellant pled nolo contendere to count one and the remaining charges were
dismissed by the prosecution. (C.T. 110-111.) The court sentenced appellant to the
midterm of two years on the single count. (C.T. 127, 201.)
A notice of appeal was filed on February 4, 2016. (C.T. 131.)
This case before the California Court of Appeal involves Mr. North, the Defendant
and Appellant, and the People of the State of California, the Respondent. Mr. North made
a motion to suppress evidence used against him in a drug conviction. It was denied after
determining that although the warrant was invalid for lack of particularity, the
exclusionary did not apply because the officers acted in good faith when they searched
Mr. North’s home. R. at 79:8-15. This was then a case of a warranted search, as opposed
to warrantless. R. at 2:23-24. Mr. North requests a review of the trial court’s decision.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 1
The facts are undisputed that Officer Blant obtained a warrant to search “400
Washington Ave., No. A”. R. at 4:16-17. The warrant was signed by the judge for both
the warrant and affidavit. R. at 5: 15-16 When Mr. North’s brother, Ronald, arrived to the
residence, the officers were already there, and apparently already searching through the
property. R. at 55:1-5. They then asked Ronald if they could make a protective sweep of
the residence only of things in their line of sight, to which Ronald consented. R. 55:16-
21. Detective Brown informed Officer Brian that Ronald had consented to search the
upstairs unit. R. at 69:8. The location has two separate units, each with its own approach,
lock, and doorway. R. at 9 1-17, 10:1-7. Ronald told the officers at that time that he lived
“upstairs” (R. at 46:25-26; R. at 12:1-12), and Mr. North told the officers he lived in the
“downstairs” unit. R. at 67:16. Mr. North’s unit had two entryways, one from outside,
and one from a common hallway. R. at 9 10-12. There is however, no way to go from Mr.
North’s apartment to Ronald’s. R. at 11:20-22. Although two units are billed together
under “400 Washington Ave.,” they are billed as two units for water, gas, and electric
services. R. at 57:5-13. Ron’s is marked “A”, while Mr. North’s is marked “B”. R. at
14:27, 15:1-8. Mr. North’s address on official identification does not include the “B”. R.
at 48:16-23. Ronald’s apartment also has the letter “A” painted on the glass. R. at 12:12.
Each unit independently has its own set of amenities that distinguish it as its own place of
residence, such as a bedroom, bathroom, living, and kitchen. R. at 11:1-19. Officers were
aware of this at the time they conducted the search. R. at 63:5-21. It is settled that the
warrant did not cover Mr. North’s apartment, but the discrepancy arose because the
exterior door, before climbing the stairs to “A” or going around the hall to “B”, was
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 2
marked with an “A.” R. at 19:24-27, 20:1-17. Exterior to that door however is are two
doorbells, one labeled “A” and one labeled “B”. R. at 13:7-12; 14:23-26. Once you pass
the front door and enter the common hallway, there are two separate doors marked “B” to
get to Mr. North’s apartment. R. at 19:12-14; 43:5-6. There are no common areas other
than a laundry room for the two units. R. at 13-14. Mr. North has his own entrance into
this area with a locked door marked “B.” R. at 25:2-4, 39:10-11. Both were in use. R. at
23: 18-20. He also has a separate, back-door entrance apart from the exterior “A” door.
R. at 43:1-19.
Mr. North is requesting review of the trial court decision denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained with an invalid warrant. According to these facts, the officers
would have reasonably been aware they were searching beyond the scope of the warrant.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the California Constitution, the federal exclusionary rule governs claims
regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f), para. (2); People v. Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 950, 979, n.5
(1993)(noting that a “defendant’s state and federal claims are reviewed under the same
standard” in post-Proposition 8 cases); In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873 (1985) (discussing
the effect of Prop. 8 on state exclusionary rules).
In ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court must: (1) find the
historical facts; (2) select the applicable rule of law; and (3) apply the law to the facts to
determine whether the rule of law was violated under the particular facts of the case.
People v. Ayala, 24 Cal. 4th 243, 279 (2000).
On appeal, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s rulings involving questions
of fact under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. Id. The appellate court
independently reviews rulings concerning pure questions of law. Id. Finally, rulings that
concern mixed questions of fact and law, such as the reasonableness of any challenged
search or seizure, are also subject to independent review. Id.; see People v. Camacho, 23
Cal. 4th 824, 830 (2000). All issues in the present appeal are subject to independent
review.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The 4th Amendment guarantees every person safety from invasion of privacy, by
insuring that unreasonable searches and seizures do not occur. Any protection however, is
worthless if it is not enforced. As a remedy, a person may not be prosecuted with
evidence that originated from an unwarranted search. By excluding any fruit from
unwarranted invasions of privacy, police misconduct can effectively be deterred. One
exception to the rule however, is if the officers rely in good faith on a flawed warrant,
considering no misconduct has occurred on the part of the officers. United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Reasonableness of the search separates into two parts. The first is the officer’s
reliance on the warrant itself, and the effort made to insure the warrant would be
sufficient. Officers have a duty to do preliminary investigations to ensure a warrant is
adequate, and cannot execute a warrant they discover is deficient. Maryland v. Garrison,
480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). The officers had reason to believe the warrant was for only a part
of the building, and failed to fulfill their duty to make reasonable efforts to discover that.
Secondly, the officers must discontinue any ongoing search if it becomes clear
they have gone beyond the scope of the warrant. In order to preserve the right to privacy,
any police misconduct voids incriminating evidence taken into possession. Jacobs v. City
of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2000). From the outset, Mr. North’s residence
contained ample indications indicated to any reasonable officer that it was a separate and
private unit.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 5
The good faith reliance of police officers is not applicable where the officers
should have reasonably known the warrant was insufficient for the search they were
conducting. The exclusionary rule deters unreasonable behavior and ensures law
enforcement follows the Fourth Amendment right regarding warrants. Ultimately, the
reckless investigation of the facility, acquisition of the warrant, invasion of privacy,
search of the wrong residence, and misconduct from law enforcement outweigh any
benefit that could come from permitting the seized evidence.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 6
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE 4TH AMENDMENT BY PERMITTING EVIDENCE SEIZED VIA AN INVALID WARRANT AND INCORRECTLY APPLICATED THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION.
The State of California violated Mr. North’s rights of protection against
warrantless searches and seizures when they used evidence against him obtained under an
invalid warrant. The police officer’s unreasonable behavior both before and during the
search preclude them from acting in good faith on a bad warrant. The evidence obtained
against him should be excluded in order to deter police misconduct.
The 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. If that right is violated, this
Court adheres to the exclusionary rule as a remedy in search and seizure violations,
where any “fruits from that poisonous tree” must be set aside. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). The Court allowed for a narrow exception to
exclude unwarranted evidence when the good faith of an officer reasonably carries out a
facially valid warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 912 (1984). The good faith
exception operates under two key doctrines: (A) The officers must reasonably believe the
warrant they are operating under is complete before conducting the search, and nothing in
the search reveals to them otherwise. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004). (B)
The aim of the exclusionary rule must still be accomplished, which is to deter police
misconduct during a search Higgason v. Sup. Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 817, 827 (1985)
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 7
A. The Officer’s Reliance, Before the Search, on the Warrant Lacking Particularity Did Not Conform to the Standards of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule.
The right outlined in the Fourth Amendment is the unlawful search and seizure
itself. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. The remedy for evidence from an unlawful search is
outlined by case law in the exclusionary rule. Id. An officer can only execute a warrant if
he has a reasonable belief that the warrant does not violate the 4th Amendment. Maryland
v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). Police officers may not simply rely on an invalid
warrant and seize evidence. People v. Ramirez, 194 Cal. Rptr. 454, 457 (Cal. 1983). They
carry the burden to ensure it authorizes them to search a specific place for specific things.
Groh, 540 U.S. at 564. Only then, is his reliance in good faith. Id. at 909.
A warrant’s validity is not assessed on the facts of the search, but on the basis of
the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover. Garrison, 480 U.S.
at 85. In Garrison, the officer who obtained the warrant conducted an investigation,
verifying the information obtained by a reliable informant, examining the exterior of the
building, and questioning the utility company. Id. at 81. The officers received a warrant
to search “the premises known as “2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” Id. at 80.
The Court held that an overly broad warrant does not invalidate evidence, as long as the
search is not reckless. Id. at 85. It reasoned that the officers had done all due diligence to
and reasonable steps to understand what needed to be in the warrant. Id. It was not
reckless to then rely on the warrant indicating there was only one residence on the third
floor. Id.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 8
It is the responsibility of the officer executing a search to ensure that it
conforms to constitutional requirements. Groh, 540 U.S. at 563. In Groh, Agent Groh
searched Mr. Ramirez’s home after a tip that he had a stockpile of high powered
weaponry. Id. at 563. After the failed search, the warrant was found to lack particularity
for what and where they were to search. Id. The Court held it unreasonable for the
officers to believe the warrant they were using was specific enough, and the search could
not be in good faith. Id. at 563. The officers leading the search must make sure their
warrant authorizes the search they are to conduct. Id. Additionally, they determined that
the rule against warrantless searches had equal force in cases where the warrant lacked
particularity, and that the particularity requirement does not just prevent general searches,
it also established the lawful authority of the officer, his need to search, and the limits of
his power to do so. Id. at 561.
It is not reasonable for officers to rely on any errors made by prior authorities.
Ramirez, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 456. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 143. In Ramirez, an officer
detained two suspicious men and had their records ran. Id. at 455. Ramirez had an
outstanding warrant for possession of PCP. Id. The officer searched his belongings and
found PCP. Id. at 456. The officer believed the warrant was valid, but it was revealed that
it was revoked 6 months earlier. Id. The Court held that good faith reliance on
information provided through “official channels” does not validate the arrest and search.
Id. See also, Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971). The Court reasoned “an
otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.” Id. In other words, it
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 9
would be unjust to allow negligent officers to create invalid warrants, relying on other
officers to carry them out in good faith. Id.
The officers had reason to believe there were multiple units before ever searching
the building. In Garrison, the officers were sure to exercise due diligence when
identifying the “third floor apartment”. With corroboration from third parties, such as
utilities, it was reasonable for officers to believe there was one apartment on the third
floor. When the officers obtained the warrant for Ronald’s apartment, it said “400
Washington Ave., No. A.” The warrant itself distinguished, as every multi-unit building
must, No. A form other subsequent units. “A” suggests that it is, at least, followed by a
400 Washington Ave., No. B, yet the officers did not investigate the matter. The officers
in Garrison also spoke with the utilities to see how many units were on the third floor.
Had the officers done the same here, they would have discovered that water, gas, and
electric were all billing two units at that address.
The officers did not fulfill their duties to confirm the constitutionality of the
warrant. The warrant was for 400 Washington Ave #A. This means that the warrant was
not incorrect or overly vague in some way, for example if it had only said 400
Washington Ave. In fact, what it lacked in particularity was that it did not include what
not to search. In Groh, the executing officers were looking for things left out of the
warrant, and it was not sensible to rely on vagueness as grounds for good faith. To say
that the warrant was relied on in good faith is to say “The officers could search apartment
B in good faith, because the warrant did not tell them they could not.” For this same
reason no inference can be made from Mr. North’s driver’s license not including the “B”.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 10
As is made clear by Groh, the policy implication of allowing good faith exceptions by
being able to blame the warrant writer would create a devastating loophole to the entire
requirement of a warrant.
Officer Blant’s warrant was not a clerical error, thus he could not rely on it in good
faith. In both Herring and Ramirez, the officers took the necessary steps to discover if the
warrant was sufficient, and they would have been but for clerical mistakes other
authorities made. The substance of the warrant was sufficient, so it was reasonable for the
officers to carry out the particularities of the warrant. Officer Blant’s warrant lacked
particularity, meaning the search limits needed to be corrected by the executing officer.
The warrant was correct by saying to search No. A, but it required the reasonability of the
officers to ensure that it was sufficiently particular, not some computer database error.
The failure to proactively confirm the search parameters are undesired behaviors of law
enforcement. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can not infringe on an
officer’s duty to discover any problems with the warrant.
The good faith exception requires that preliminary research be complete and
thorough to ensure the warrant is sufficient, and that reliance on the warrant must be
reasonable when presented with the facts of Mr. North’s residence. It was not reasonable
to ignore the indications of multiple units and simply rely on a vague warrant.
B. The Unreasonable Actions of the Police Officers During the Search Should Be Deterred by Prohibiting Seized Evidence.
The officers who searched Mr. North’s apartment recklessly ignored all of the
physical evidence that told them they were beyond the scope of the warrant while
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 11
searching. This misconduct needs to be discouraged by excluding any evidence gained
outside of the warrant.
The exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter police misconduct. Jacobs v. City of
Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 783 (7th Cir. 2000). Additionally, a balancing test of the good
coming from suppressing the evidence must outweigh the damage that would come from
the same. Id. at 909. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909.The standard of reasonability is during the
search is recklessness. Id. at 914. A good faith search still must not infringe on a person’s
expectation of privacy. People v. MacAvoy, 209 Cal. Rptr. 34, 37 (1984). See United
States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 1976).
Where the harm from seizing invalid evidence outweighs the good coming from it,
it must be excluded. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 897. In Garrison, the
officers correctly executed the warrant according to its parameters, but discovered there
were two units after entering both. Id. Because there was a common atrium, and both
units were open to that area, the officers entered the opposing doors. Id. at 81. It was not
until after they had seized drug paraphernalia that they noticed the error and discontinued
searching Garrison’s apartment. Id. at 81, 88. The majority opinion determined that the
conduct of the officers followed protocol and they ceased the search as soon as the error
was identified. Id. Excluding the evidence would not bring about any additional good,
and for this reason, the Court determined to allow the evidence they possessed. Id.
The good faith exception does not extend as far as the expectation of privacy
MacAvoy, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 37. In MacAvoy, a college student ordered a drug shipment,
and in transit, a drug dog picked up on the scent. Id. at 37. The officer coordinated a
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 12
controlled delivery and produced an affidavit for a warrant to search the addressee’s
fraternity house at the college. Id. The student had been assigned his own room, but the
rest of the amenities were used in common. Id. at 37. The officers searched the apartment
the next day, where they found various drug paraphernalia. Id. The court held that there is
no expectation of privacy in a public housing setting, and therefore no violation of the 4th
Amendment. Id. at 769. The fraternity house remained open to the public, and there was
no check in desk at the front. Id. at 768. Considering the layout, the tenant had little
expectation of privacy until the officers arrived at his door. Id.
Where the exclusionary rule exists to deter police misconduct, evidence should
always be suppressed if it comes from such behavior. Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d
at 783. In Jacobs officers searched a first floor apartment for a drug dealer, but when he
wasn’t found, they continued searching an upstairs unit where the residents were detained
during a search. The court held that the officer lacked good faith immunity during the
search. Id. Under the 4th Amendment, the officers knew it was unreasonable to search
multiple units of an apartment building. Id. See Higgason, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 827 (Crosby,
J., concurring).
There is no benefit coming from Mr. North’s drug conviction that outweighs the
4th Amendment violation. In Garrison, the officers stopped the search as soon as they
recognized that the two spaces were individual units. They then only focused on the
residence the named party possessed. Even after seeing all repeating amenities, the
officers never stopped their search of No. B. Also the officers communicated to the party
searching the opposing apartment in Garrison. Officer Morris and Officer Blant discussed
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 13
that one would search the upstairs unit, and the other the downstairs unit, without
somehow realizing they were searching separate units. In Garrison it would be unjust to
dismiss the evidence that would shut down the operation based on a technicality, but here
the only benefit that came from the search was the precise evidence that was the fruit of
these grievous violations.
The officers met the standards of recklessness needed suppress any evidence they
obtained. In Garrison, the officers entered through a preliminary door to an indoor
common area open to both units. The officers, reasonably assumed it was one location.
Mr. North’s and his brother’s apartments are entirely separated. They have no common
atrium. You must go to the second floor to get to Ronald’s apartment. Mr. North’s door is
down a hall and around a corner, created no line of sight, and they were locked, meaning
there was no interrupted line of travel either.
Mr. North’s unimpeded expectation of privacy prevents the good faith exception
from allowing the evidence. In MacAvoy, the tenant lived in the dorm room of a frat
house. Nearly all elements of the living quarters were in common. Mr. North had entirely
the opposite. Every aspect of his home was separated and independent. There was no
reason for Mr. North to believe that anyone could enter his apartment without his prior
consent. Every door entering his home was locked, and one would have to ring a distant
doorbell for him to come open it. The complete absence of access shows Mr. North
expected privacy within the confines of his home.
Police misconduct would be better deterred by excluding the drug evidence against
Mr. North. In Jacobs, the officers recklessly expanded the scope of their warrant and
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 14
began searching another unit, upstairs from the one they were searching. Identically, Mr.
North’s unit was never a part of the warrant, and the officer ignored that the units were
not only on different floors, but had no connections other than an outside gate. Just like
the units in Jacobs, the units were individually marked, each having their own doorbell at
the gate, their own locks, entryways, and their own rights. The law cannot tolerate
misconduct by law enforcement.
When balanced, suppressing the evidence will further law enforcement policies
and guarantee more reasonable searches, thereby preserving a citizen’s right to privacy.
CONCLUSION
In order to maintain the integrity of the 4th Amendment, the good faith exception
must not extend to the level of recklessness this search and seizure demonstrated. For the
foregoing reasons, the decision of the Superior Court of the State of California denying
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence filed pursuant to California Penal Code § 1538.5
should be reversed.
Dated: 2/26/16 Respectfully submitted,
1114
Student ID 1114Counsel for Appellant
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 15
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d), I certify that the Argument section
of Appellant’s Final Appellate Brief complies with the word count requirement and
contains 2500 words total (including its headers) according to the word count feature of
Microsoft Word, the computer program used to prepare the brief.
Respectfully submitted,
1114
Student ID 1114Counsel for Appellant
APPELLANT’S BRIEF 16
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