brokering peace in sudan - special warfare quarterly article
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8/9/2019 Brokering Peace in Sudan - Special Warfare Quarterly Article
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8/9/2019 Brokering Peace in Sudan - Special Warfare Quarterly Article
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BROKERING PEACE IN THE SUDAN
Brokering Peace inSpecial Forces ofcers tackle unique advisory role in Darfur.Story by Major Patrick J. Christian
As the world and regional security environments call increasingly for action under coalitionand intergovernmental auspices, an emerging advisory role is forming for the Army special-operations community. In these roles, perhaps more than in any others, ARSOF Soldiers willbe called on to put all of their skills to the test. In these advisory roles, Soldiers will operate inisolation, with few or no support personnel. They will have to work side by side with coalitionsoldiers who do not speak their language and have no experience with their technology.Often times, they will be called on not only to keep the peace, but to broker it.
ADVISORY DUTY The author and an Egyptian military observer withmembers of the Sudans Justice and Equality Movement Army.
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Sudan
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In August 2004, the author found
himself in just such a role when he de-
ployed to the Darfur region of Sudan as
part of a small joint-special-operations
advisory team dispatched there by the
commander of the Joint Special Opera-
tions Task Force Horn of Africa. The
team, deployed from Camp Lemonier,
Djibouti, consisted of a Navy SEAL
lieutenant commander, a Marine recon
major, and the author, an Army Spe-
cial Forces major. The team was tasked
to work as advisers to the African
Unions 12 military-observer teams,
or MILOBS, which were attempting
to negotiate a cease- re with multiple
parties in the Sudans civil war.
The mission was simple: to keep
the MILOBS collecting intelligence
on the con ict, as well as to gather
information relevant to the Global War
on Terrorism, or GWOT. The team had
to strike a balance between those two
missions while staying positioned be-
tween the warring parties as advisers
without getting killed in the process.
The mission originated when the
United States partnered with the
European Union, or EU, in an effort to
avoid a full-scale civil war in Sudan.
The coalition focus is on funding and
supporting the newly formed African
Union, or AU, in a role designed to
mediate between the Government of
Sudan, or GoS (which is primarily in
the control of the Northern Arab Su-
danese), and the armed rebel groups
in the Darfur region. The government-
supported militias were created when
the GoS armed a large number of
Arab nomadic civilians, known as the
Janjaweed, and encouraged them to
clear out the African Muslim tribes of
Darfur in a form of political/culturalcleansing.
It is this cleansing that former Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell called the
genocide in Darfur. The AUs rst step
in dealing with the issue was to medi-
ate a temporary cease- re on April 8,
2004, to form and deploy MILOBS to
patrol Darfur, and to encourage the
warring parties to abide by the cease- re and to stay at the negotiating
table.
Initially, there were 12 AU MILOBS
teams, of ve or six of cers each,
spread out among the six largest pop-
ulation centers in western and south-
ern Darfur. Because of the warring
parties enduring distrust of both the
Arab League and the African Union,
the teams were mandated to have ei-
ther an EU or a U.S. adviser to ensure
impartiality and improve the reliability
of the observing and reporting.
The other members of the MILOBS
teams consisted of EU of cers from
Italy, Hungary, Ireland, France, Eng-
land, Denmark and Norway. The Afri-
can Union of cers hailed from South
Africa, Mozambique, Namibia, Congo,
Chad, Algeria, Nigeria, Kenya and
Ghana, and collectively they spoke a
dozen or so languages. Each team was
also staffed with an interpreter and
a military-of
cer representative fromeach of the three parties involved in
the con ict: the GoS; the Justice and
Equality Movement Army, or JEM; and
the Sudan Liberation Movement Army,
or SLA. The of cers of the JEM and
SLA are majors or lieutenant colonels.
While the teams primary mission
was to support the AUs MILOBS, a
secondary mission, gathering informa-
tion for the GWOT, was also vitally
important. Sudan was, and in many
A line of Arab militia came over a steep rise on theircamels and horses. A fierce battle erupted. Apparently, wewould not be staving off any attack today, so we returnedto our camp.
Editors note: To further illustrate
Major Christians article, we have
included excerpts from his diary ac-
counts. Shown as comments on note
paper, they are not intended to provide
complete accounts of incidents, but
rather to convey the atmosphere of the
situation.
FORMING-UP Members of the Janjaweed mili-
tia mass for an attack on a village in Darfur.
BROKERING PEACE IN SUDAN
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8/9/2019 Brokering Peace in Sudan - Special Warfare Quarterly Article
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respects still is, one of the most im-
portant safe havens for al-Qaeda and
Osama bin Laden.
The Muslim Brotherhood helped
organize Sudans government as an
Islamic fundamentalist state. The calls
to prayer from the minarets in Khar-toum are different from those in Saudi
Arabia, in that they mix the traditional
Allah Aqbar call with angry denun-
ciations of U.S. foreign policy.
The current president, Lieuten-
ant General Omar Hassan Ahmad
al-Bashir, is a moderate (by Sudanese
standards) who occasionally cooper-
ates with the U.S. and the internation-
al community in countering terror-
ism. On the other hand, the current
vice-president, Ali Asman Mohamded
Taha, leads factions that advocate
the spread of fundamentalist Islam
through all parts of the country and
region.
It is in this complex and hostile
environment that the MILOBS oper-
ate. They nd that in order to get
information on the GWOT, they must
be successful in brokering the peace
that the AU is seeking.
The AU holds a charter to collect
information and intelligence under
the cease- re accords, but without
training and guidance, its teams were
unable to do much more than wander
around in the desert. Contributing
to the chaotic movements of the AU
teams is the lack of communica-
tion and technology available to its
members. There are some important
lessons to be learned here, most im-
portantly, the dif culties that the mul-
tinational unions (United Nations, EU,
AU, Organization of American States
and NATO) face in operating, given the
vast differences in culture, language,
doctrine and training among their
member states.For example, on one MILOB team
there were seven majors hailing from
various countries. The major from
Mozambique spoke Portuguese
and Spanish. The
major from the
Congo spoke
French, while
the Namib-
ian major spoke
English. The major
from Chad spoke
Arabic and French,
while the Egyptian
major spoke Arabic
and English, as did
the lieutenant colonels
from the JEM and the
SLA. The Sudanese major
spoke only Arabic, and the
author spoke English and
Spanish.
The lack of a common
language was a major source
of problems, as most inter-
views were conducted in Arabic
and English. Of cers who do not
speak either language must rely
on other of cers for interpretation.
At any given time during planning
and operations there were four- or ve-way conversations going on as the
MILOB team members translated for
each other.
In addition to the language dif cul-
ties, there are also problems caused by
the lack of common military training.On one team, the Egyptian
of cer attended
In-
Just as we lan
ded near the
village of Kas
ara (in the
J u s t a s w e l a n d
e d n e a r t h e v i
l l a g e o f K a s a r a
( i n t h e
Jebel Mara
Mountains),
however, a l
ine of Arab m
ilitia
J e b e l M a r a M
o u n t a i n s ), h o w
e v e r, a l i n e o f
A r a b m i l i t i a
(known as the Ja
njaweed) ca
me over a ste
ep rise on
( k n o w n a s t h e J a n j a w e e
d ) c a m e o v e r
a s t e e p r i s e o n
their camels
and horses. Som
e 300 African
Arabs in
t h e i r c a m e l s a n
d h o r s e s. S o m e 3 0 0 A
f r i c a n A r a b s i n
mixed dress
of civilian an
d military, sporting we
apo
m i x e d d r e s s o
f c i v i l i a n a n d m
i l i t a r y, s p o r t i n g w e a
p o
of various co
untries, and
dubious age t
rotted past
o f v a r i o u s c o u n
t r i e s, a n d d u b i o
u s a g e t r o t t e d p a s t
enroute to th
e battle. A fe
w of them gla
nced at us
e n r o u t e t o t h e
b a t t l e. A f e w o
f t h e m g l a n c e
d a t u s
curiosity but
continued in
their assault
on the tow
c u r i o s i t y b u t c o
n t i n u e d i n t h e i
r a s s a u l t o n t h
e t o w
Moony, 2 kilo
meters away
. The lead reb
el picket
M o o n y, 2 k i l o m
e t e r s a w a y. T h e
l e a d r e b e l p i c k
e t
opened up, a
nd a erce b
attle of assau
lt ries a
o p e n e d u p, a n d
a e r c e b a t t l e
o f a s s a u l t r i e
s a
erupted. At t
his point, the
pilots of the
MI-8 we
e r u p t e d. A t t h
i s p o i n t, t h e p i
l o t s o f t h e M I -
8 w e
practically in
panicked con
vulsions as th
ey wa
p r a c t i c a l l y i n p
a n i c k e d c o n v u l
s i o n s a s t h e y w
a
back to the helic
opter to get
out of the lin
e o
b a c k t o t h e h e l i c o p
t e r t o g e t o u t o
f t h e l i n e o
Apparently,
we would not be
staving off a
ny
A p p a r e n t l y, w e w o u l d
n o t b e s t a v i n g
o ff a n y
today, and w
e returned to our cam
p.
t o d a y, a n d w e r
e t u r n e d t o o u r c a m
p.
1 Nov 1 N o v
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Department personnel at the the U.S.
base in Djibouti had to craft a support
plan. This was dif cult, as the U.S.
Embassy in Khartoum was anked by
a local Hamas headquarters and an
of ce of the Survivors of the Martyrs
reimbursement of ce that provides
money to families of suicide bombers
in Palestine and Iraq.
The U.S. Embassy is actually a
mission that has only recently opened,
and it operates on minimal staf ng
without an accredited ambassador.
The mission staff continually works on
developing an aggressive evacuation
plan to be used if the country defaults
to the harder line Islamic radicals who
advocate increased fundamentalist
involvement in the government.
Just as the embassy staff planned
for evacuation, so, too, did the military
advisers. The advisers to the MILOBS
operated as isolated personnel in a
region crawling with armed factions,
as is often the case in advisory assign-
ments. The team carried all its survival
equipment on every mission and was
always prepared to enter into the es-
cape-and-evade mode, which basically
meant running for the Chad border.
Illustrating the requirement for
solid mission planning was the inci-
dent in which the AU received intel-
ligence that a non-Sudanese third
party was operating in Darfur with the
intent of abducting U.S. or EU of cers
to sell to al-Qaeda operatives. It is
common knowledge among the AU and
rebel forces that al-Qaeda has robust
networks in Darfur. Al-Qaeda has
been very active there, and the team
received a continuous ow of informa-
tion on its activities.
Abductions, threats and hostile ac-
tion toward AU, U.S. and EU person-
nel were not limited to al-Qaeda. The
authors initial assignment in Darfur
was in Tine, Sudan, in the southern
Libyan Desert. Shortly after the author
left that rst team, it was abducted by
one of the warring parties.
Besides the threat from outside
forces, the teams also faced the
uncertainty of the cease- re and the
daily risk of cross re. The cease- re
was tenuous, as there was steady ghting around Al Fashir, Kebka-
bia and Nyala, and sporadic ghting
around El Geniena, Ambarou and Bir
Furniwayah.
The GoS reinforced its military
and police battalions daily, but the
governments intent was not always
clear. The rebel groups claimed that
the GoS was preparing for an offensive
that would shatter the cease- re and
could cause the MILOBS team mem-
bers to execute their escape-and-eva-
sion plans.
The JEM and SLA representatives
on the MILOBS teams constantly
pulled the U.S. and EU representa-
tives aside to show them documents
that they claimed were taken from
government of ces. The documents
outlined the GoSs nal solution to
the Darfur problem: the employment
of chemical weapons.
TAKING NOTES Members of the AUs military-observer teams meet with the secretary general and military leaders of the JEM in Darfur, Sudan.
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BROKERING PEACE IN SUDAN
The military advisers were lightly
armed, carrying only a sidearm for
protection, as anything else makes
the warring factions uneasy. Rwan-
dan and Nigerian soldiers were on the
ground to keep the peace and provide
security for the MILOBS and otherparties within the country. These
soldiers, however, were excitable and
impulsive and proved dangerous when
the teams confronted the edgy war-
ring parties. More times than not, the
Rwandans and Nigerians were left to
guard the MILOBS sector base camp.
The authors teams patrol vehicle
came under re by edgy participants
in the ghting, with at least one of cer
receiving wounds.
The epidemiology of the region is
even more of a security factor than
the danger from civil war. When the
author arrived for his second Darfur
assignment, he found the teams living
in rented mud brick huts in an area
over owing with desperate refugees.
Because of the rampant disease
within the refugee population, both
teams in that sector were nearly non-
mission capable. Of the 18 military
observers on those two teams, nine
tested positive for malaria and were
bedridden. Three of the soldiers were
medially evacuated to either Khar-
toum or Addis Ababa.
A signi cant number of MILOBS
(including the author) eventually con-
tracted malaria during the mission.
The potential for large-scale epidemics
is high, as the High Commission for
Refugees, the International Red Cross,
Doctors Without Borders and other
nongovernmental agencies are not up
to the task of dealing with so many
people.
The sheer number of war casual-
ties on both sides of the con ict has
overburdened the medical support.
The GoS did not support the efforts
of the NGOs or the MILOBS teams
to provide medical care to the rebel
forces.
The authors team spent several
days in the Jebel Mara Mountains
with the SLA rebels western brigade,
investigating Janjaweed attacks on vil-
lages. Before the team went out, rebel
of cers assigned to the team helped
load several rucksacks with medical
supplies. The GoS of cer assigned to
the team had previously objected to
providing medical assistance to the
rebels, so caution had to be exercised.
Upon its arrival in a village, the team
would split up, ostensibly to cover
more ground. In reality, the other
team members would ensure that the
GoS of cer was separated from the
author so that the medical supplies
could be delivered.
The hut the rebels were using as a
hospital was almost medieval: Ampu-
tation was the solution for a com-
pound fracture when the bone was
exposed; surgery was done without
anesthesia, and IV bags were being re-
used. The acting doctors credentials
were that he had once been a medi-
cal technician before the war. While
providing the medical assistance had
the potential of causing problems
within the team, it garnered important
goodwill and often brought a wealth of
information pertinent to the mission.
U.S. Special Forces Soldiers will
increasingly be tapped for these new
and emerging missions. Their exper-
tise in operating in complex, sensitive
and dangerous environments holds
strategic national implications. As-
signments of this nature provide valu-
able experience in working intimately
SPECIAL DELIVERY Severely overloaded trucks carry supplies and humanitarian aid for refugees in Darfur
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