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Marco Cepikhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/3923697331385475
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do SulDepartamento de Economia e Relações Internacionais
USA and China in Latin America:An International Security Assessment
How the strategic balance between United States of America (USA) and
People’s Republic of China (PRC) works as a predictor variable explaining the consequences of an increased
role of PRC in Latin America?
1) The current and projected nuclear andconventional forces of both powers will becompared in order to assess the relative materialand symbolic importance of Latin Americafor each of them.2) The institutional and discursive setting ofboth USA and PRC current policies to theregion will be compared.3) The collective and singular capacity of four LatinAmerican countries (Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, andArgentina) to act strategically will be reassessedafter years of severe crisis.
It is generally accepted that Latin America is notas decisive to global security affairs as East Asia or
the Middle East (IISS, 2018).
Similarly, it is common sense to observe thatChina’s role in Latin America is mainly restricted to the commercial, financial, and the diplomatic fields.
Therefore, China’s present and future involvementin Latin America should not upset the strategic
balance in the region, characterized byMearsheimer (2001) as a US regional hegemony.
However, due to three main reasons, I think that USA – PRC relations in Latin America will be an important test bed for what Graham Allison (2017) has
called the “Thucydides’ trap” between the two great powers.
First, if security relations between United States and China deteriorate in global terms, Latin America will
matter dearly in logistical and geopolitical terms due its abundant natural resources and its bioceanic routes
(Bagley; Horwitz; 2016).
In this sense, the strategic balance between United States and China can be conceptualized as a predictor variable explaining the potential consequences for Latin
America (Tillerson, 2018).
Henceforth, how US and China manage their relations with Latin America will be an indicator of the level of global polarization between the two great powers
(Keersmaeker, 2017).
It is particularly relevant for Latin American security concerns the criteria to assess (and act upon)
capabilities and intentions in contexts of secrecy, asymmetric and incomplete information (Li;Hongyi,
2008; Long; Green, 2015; Lieber; Press, 2017).
Beijing increasingly perceives United States as a revisionist great power trying to encircle the PRC by
provoking a new Cold War (Chase; Garafola; Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2017; Cimbala;
McDermott, 2015).
Second, capabilities help to shape intentions, mutual perceptions, and regional institutions.
Various observers have acknowledged that will be difficult for China to refrain from upgrade its
diplomatic and military ties with the region once the economic exchanges reach a certain level of
density (Cui, 2016; Ellis, 2009; Ellis, 2014; Fornes; Philip, 2012; Jenkins; Peter, 2009;). In the most recent Latin America policy paper issued by the
PRC, Latin America and the Caribbean is called a land “full of vitality and hope” (2016).
“China will actively carry out military exchanges and cooperation with Latin American and
Caribbean countries, increase friendly exchanges between defense and military leaders from the two
sides, strengthen policy dialogue and set up working meeting mechanisms, conduct exchanges of visits between delegations and vessels, deepen professional exchanges in such fields as military
training, personnel training and UN peacekeeping, expand pragmatic cooperation in humanitarian
relief, counter-terrorism and other non-traditional security fields, and enhance cooperation in military
trade and military technology.” CHINA (2016, page 06).
Improving defense and security cooperation with China may be perceived as natural and harmless from a Chinese or even Latin American point of
view (Poh; 2017; Roett; Paz, 2008; Wei, 2015; Xu, 2017). In contrast, it is most certainly viewed with
less favorable lenses in the United States. For instance, in his appearance before the Senate
Armed Forces Committee, Admiral Kurt W. Kidd (Commander, SOUTHCOMM) has spoken
unequivocally about his concerns:
“Mr. Chairman, I’ll speak plainly: if we care about what’s going on in the South China Sea, Eastern Europe, and the
Middle East, it’s worth keeping an eye on Chinese, Russian, and Iranian activity in this part of the world, too. For Russia, China, and Iran, Latin America is not an afterthought. These global actors view the Latin American economic, political,
and security arena as an opportunity to achieve their respective long-term objectives and advance interests that may be incompatible with ours and those of our partners. Their vision for an alternative international order poses a
challenge to every nation that values non-aggression, rule of law, and respect for human rights—the very same principles
that underlie the Inter-American system of peace and cooperation. Some of what they’re doing—while not a direct military threat—does warrant examination. Even seemingly benign activities can be used to build malign influence...
… Now the region’s number two trading partner, China has courted Latin America through economic diplomacy, importing
more and more raw materials, offering loans, and pledging billions in investments in infrastructure development. It sees its own development as contingent on the development of other countries,
including those in Latin America and the Caribbean. Beijing cooperates with Latin America on space, potential nuclear power
projects, and telecommunications networks, which could pose security concerns to the United States. China’s military soft power
lies in its ability to engage through offers of all-expenses-paid training, no-strings-attached defense sales and financing to
regional militaries, and donations of equipment and humanitarian aid. China prioritizes engagement with regional organizations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC) that exclude the United States, and seeks to leverage regional relationships to reshape international economic and financial institutions to its advantage.” USA (2017, page 09).
The Trump presidency has taken a confrontational stance against most of Latin America’s recent past. Issues as diverse as immigration, commerce, drug
policy, environment, diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Venezuelan crisis, or even the peace process in Colombia have been turned around by the current
U.S. government. In this context, the SOUTHCOMM alert against the “malign influence
of China” is also very telling about the fears of relative declining power (USA,2017; Tulchin, 2016;
Tulchin, 2017; Cui; Garcia, 2016; Ellis, 2015).
Third, in order to explain what Barbara Stallings (2008) and Kevin Gallagher (2016) have called a
triangular relationship, one also needs to evaluate the agency of Latin American countries,
both individually and collectively. In terms of collective action, I shall analyze the regional
organizations postures towards China and the U.S. Especially in the case of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America (ALBA) governance experiences (Ziccardi, 2015; Villa, 2017; Herz; Siman; Telles, 2017;
Bagley; Defort, 2015).
As for the Latin American countries, I will concentrate on Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and
Argentina (Mares, 2001; Franco; Migon; Jimenez, 2017; Mares, 2015; Donadio; Tibiletti,
2016; Mares; Kacowitz, 2016; Mares, 2017; Suarez; Villa; Weiffen, 2017). Basically, evidence needs to be compiled regarding both institutions and specific behaviors, like diplomatic events,
military exchanges, and acquisitions processes.
Field Work
This research is to be completed in 12 months.
Field work is to be conducted in United States,China, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil.
Three research protocols will be developed toaccomplish the goals of this project.
Literature Review
First, it will be necessary to review the literature on explanations by mechanisms and their general use for the study of international security (TILLY, 2001; ELIAS, 1990; FALLETI; LYNCH, 2009; GERRING,
2010; JACKSON, 2010; GUZZINI, 2011; GUZZINI, 2012; BENNETT, 2013). Literature reviews will also
precede all substantive inquiries (China - United States comparison, collective action and institutions
in Latin America, as well as foreign and defense policies of Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and
Argentina).
CAQDAS Analysis
Second, I must select specialist software to explore, auditand interpret the revised texts (articles, documents, books,etc.).There are different solutions within the category calledCAQDAS (Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis),both free software (e.g. CATMA 4, CAT, FreeQDA, TAMSAnalyzer) and proprietary solutions (e.g. MAXQDA,NVivo, QDA Miner, Saturate). The choice will be madebased on the research protocols of the CAQDAS project ofthe University of Surrey (http://www.surrey.ac.uk).The focus will be on content analysis, which depends oncoding, recursive abstraction, and mapping.
Descriptive Statistical Analysis
Third, it will be necessary to compile the databaseconcerning the contextual, structural andinteractional variables. Currently, the database ofthe research program already has information(including missing data) on 105 variables for allcountries for the year 2014. The focus here is toselect relevant variables and obtain a historicalseries for the four countries. From there I shall testthe parameters of the model (strategic stability andregional contest).
THREE PROJECTS
1. United States and China in Latin America: An International Security Assessment (UFRGS e FAPERGS)
2. Segurança Internacional: Contexto, Estrutura e Interações (PQ e UNIVERSAL)
3. Inteligência Estratégica e Segurança Internacional: estruturas militares permanentes em temas críticos (CNPq e PANDIA-MD)
CEGOV
Segurança Internacional:Contexto, Estrutura e Interações
Por que uma teoria estrutural da segurança internacional precisaincorporar variáveis contextuais e interacionais para explicarmacroprocessos de mudança?
Por meio de quais mecanismos causais certas variações contextuais(climática, demográfica, energética e tecnológica) e algumasinterações críticas (dissuasão nuclear, contraterrorismo e operaçõesde paz), mesmo quando restritas a um número restrito de agentesmais poderosos (Estados Unidos, China, Rússia e Índia), tendem amodificar a polaridade do sistema (uma dimensão estrutural definidaem termos de capacidades nucleares de segundo ataque, comando doespaço e inexpugnabilidade à conquista militar)?
Transformação do Sistema InternacionalBuzan e Little (2000); Buzan e Lawson (2015)
Escala: global na primeira metade século XXI; mas oceanos e espaço?Capacidade de Interação: transporte hipersônico e digitalizaçãoProcessos (dinheiro): asianização, concentração, sixfold GDP (2050) Processos (poder): estados regionais, terrorismo, risco guerra centralProcessos (conhecimento): difusão, crescimento exponencial, AIUnidades: estados regionais, corporações transnacionais, ONU verdeEstrutura: multipolar desequilibrada, caos sistêmico e fim da anarquia?
Inteligência Estratégica e Segurança Internacional:estruturas militares permanentes em temas críticos
Os tomadores de decisões na área de segurança nacional lidam comseveras incertezas e assimetrias informacionais que envolvem ameaçasexistenciais, vulnerabilidades, bem como suas consequências em escalastemporais variadas (meso processos). Dados constrangimentos diversos, ainteligência estratégica visa a reduzir incerteza por meio (micro processos)do tratamento probabilístico (estimativas) ou estruturadamenteespeculativo (cenários) de problemas analíticos complexos.
O problema informacional é decisivo para a cooperação, o fator decisivoem dinâmicas evolucionárias. Trata-se, neste caso, de analisar ainteligência estratégica em três processos nos quais a cooperaçãointernacional é decisiva e difícil: 1) Inteligência sobre as capacidadesmútuas de segundo ataque nuclear nas interações entre as GrandesPotências. 2) Inteligência sobre terrorismo internacional em operações decontraterrorismo. 3) inteligência multidimensional para as missões de pazdas Nações Unidas.
REALITY MOVES FASTERTogether, the National Security Strategy (December 2017), the National Defense Strategy (January 2018), and the Nuclear Posture Review (February 2018) signal a much more explicitly
confrontation with China and Russia.
The hidden assumption (problematic and seldom seriously questioned by international authorities and analysts) is that
Washington acts in defense of the post-World War II world order, while Russia and China seek to overhaul or overthrow the status
quo.
In the first Trump’s State of the Union address, the strategic choice for confrontation was the backdrop of a rhetoric based upon the
notion that the United States and its allies are threatened by "communist dictatorships and socialists "like Cuba, Venezuela, Iran
and North Korea.
Threatened by Trump to be fired last November for being too diplomatic with North Korea, before even starting his trip to
Latin America (Mexico, Jamaica, Colombia, Peru and Argentina) on February 1st, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
was "alerting" the countries of the region against Russia's "arms sales" and the "hidden costs of trade" with China.
As the Financial Times also noted in the same address given at the University of Texas, Tillerson extolled the Monroe Doctrine (1823) as a model for relations between the two Americas. In
fact, indicating that he was even closer to the Roosevelt corollary (1904), in Mexico the secretary suggested that President Nicolás Maduro could be overthrown by the Venezuelan armed forces "to ensure a peaceful regime
transition."
HOW TO ASSESS CHINA?
Latin America as a whole begins to emerge from recession and expects GDP growth to be in the range of 2.4% by 2018.
In this sense, could not be greater the contrast between the declarations of the current Washington government and the recent results of the second ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum, concluded on January 22, 2018 in Santiago,
Chile.
Wang Yi, China's foreign minister, conveyed the message of President Xi Jinping, which included support for the peace
process in Colombia, the invitation to Latin American countries to join the Belt and Route Initiative (BIR) and the strengthening of common aspirations for peace, development and happiness.
China and LA Security
• Principle of non-interference• Changes: port and transportation infrastructure• Expanding transpacific criminal activity• Taiwan diplomatic ties (Paraguay)?• Chinese companies as local actors• Crime and violence against Chinese communities
Ellis (2016: 291-301)
• Extended life of “populist” regimes• Changing relations between LA and PRC • Expanded arms market options• PLA military education and training activities• Expanded PLA military presence • The disposition of Chinese-US relations
Ellis (2016: 291-301)
To a certain extent, China's competitive pressure in Latin America may favor the bargaining conditions of the countries of the region with the United States, the
European Union and Japan. This seems to be the case of the trade agreement between the European Union and MERCOSUR. However, the strategic choices that the
United States and China make at the global level could have a negative impact on the region. Latin America is
not interested in an even greater deterioration of international security in the coming years, much less a
war between the United States and China. In the nuclear age, more than ever, world peace is necessary for sustainable development and
regional integration.
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