classical indian metaphysics. idealism classical indian metaphysics centers on the contrast between...
Post on 21-Dec-2015
217 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
Classical Indian Metaphysics
Idealism
• Classical Indian metaphysics centers on the contrast between realism and idealism
• Buddhism and the most popular school of Hinduism, Advaita Vedanta, are thoroughly idealist
• They insist that everything is mind-dependent
Idealism
• What appear to be independent objects are mental constructions
• Objects do not really endure over time; they exist for no more than a moment
• What we take to be objects are really bundles of momentary entities that we group together for our own purposes
Realism
• Hindu philosophers of the Logic and Particularist schools, in contrast, are realists
• They hold that objects such as rocks, stones, and trees are truly “out there” in the world
• These objects in no sense depend on our minds
• They endure over time
Vaisesika (Particularism)
• Kanada (c. 100): “I will enumerate everything that has the character of being.”
• Fundamental question of ontology: What is there?
• Everyday speech and behavior is the touchstone
• Categories (padartha, types of things to which words refer)
Basic Categories
• Substance: pot, cloth, fire, soul• Quality: square, blue• Motion (action): move, eat, throw
• These correspond to items in Aristotle's categories, and to
• Nouns, adjectives, and verbs• They are existent (sat)
Additional Categories
• Universality: triangularity• Inherence: the pot's being blue• Individualizer: differentiates atoms (‘this’)• Absence: the elephant in here• The first three are present (bhava); the last,
absent (abhava)• But they can all be talked about and named
Inherence
• Quality
• Inherence
• Substance
Individualizer
• Black’s two iron spheres• They are qualitatively identical• But they are different• What distinguishes them?
Absences
Kanada’s Beard?
• How do we know anything about– Universals– Inherence– Particularizers– Absences?
Another Trilemma?
• We must either– Reinterpret sentences that lead us to
introduce these entities (the semantic strategy)
– Reinterpret the entities as concepts (the metaphysical strategy)
– Postulate some way of knowing these entities (the epistemological strategy)
Substance
• All the other categories depend on substance
• Qualities, quantities, relations, etc., are always of substances
• There are many senses in which a thing may be said to be
• But all depend on a focal meaning of ‘being’, substance
Vaisesika: Kinds of Noncomposite Substance
• Earth• Air• Fire• Water• Ether
• Composite substances are the causal result of combinations of these
• Space• Time• Self• Mind
Two Concepts of Substances
• Realist (Aristotle/Vaisesika) Idealist (Buddhist)• The world is divided into We divide the world
into• Substances— bearers of Objects— bundles of• Qualities Qualities• We carve the world at joints There are no joints
Hinduism
• Hinduism is the primary religion of India.
• It regards the Upanishads (900-200 BCE) as sacred.
Henotheism
• There are many gods,• But all are forms of one being, Brahman.
Rg Veda
• “They have styled Him Indra (the Chief of the Gods), Mitra (the Friend), Varuna (the Venerable), Agni (Fire), also the celestial, great-winged Garutma; for although one, poets speak of Him diversely; they say Agni, Yama (Death), and Matarisvan (Lord of breath).”
• All these gods exist, but as diverse appearances of one God, “the divine architect, the impeller of all, the multiform.”
Bhagavad Gita
• “Even those who are devotees of other gods,And worship them permeated with faith, It is only me, son of Kunti, that even theyWorship, (tho’) not in the enjoined fashion. For I of all acts of worshipAm both the recipient and the Lord. . . .”
• “I see the gods in Thy body, O God. . . .”
Concepts of Brahman
• Nirguna brahman: God without attributes; neti . . . neti (not this)
• Saguna brahman: God with attributes
Attributes of God
• Abstract: – Sat: being – Chit: awareness– Ananda: bliss
• Concrete– Creator (Brahma)– Preserver (Vishnu)– Destroyer (Shiva)
Six Orthodox Schools (darshanas)
• Vedanta (end of Veda, or sacred knowledge)
• Samkhya (nature)• Yoga (discipline) • Purva Mimamsa (exegesis,
interpretation) • Vaisesika (realism) • Nyaya (logic)
Vedanta
• Brahman: the Absolute, ground of all being, reality as it is in itself
• Atman: the soul
Advaita• Nondualism: soul (atman) = Brahman• Monism: Everything is ultimately one• Everything is Brahman• Brahman is the child and the elephant,
you and me• We are one with everything• Everything is holy
Advaita• Idealism: The world as it appears is not
real• Distinctions are illusory• The world is maya (play, illusion)
Theism
• Dualism: soul (atman) ≠ Brahman• Not everything is identical with
everything else• Realism: Some aspects of the world are
independent of us• At least some distinctions are real
Buddhaghosa (-400)
• There are 89 kinds of consciousness• Nothing unifies them• There are only streams of consciousness• Nothing unites past, present, and future
Buddhaghosa
• A living being lasts only as long as one thought
• People, minds, objects are only ways of speaking
People and Passengers
• Jane flies from Austin to Houston and back <———————————>
• She is one person• She is two passengers• ‘Passenger’ is just a way of counting• Buddhaghosa: every noun is like
‘passenger’
Questions to King Milinda
• “there is no ego here to be found”• “there is no chariot here to be
found”• No one element is the whole• The combination isn’t the whole;
parts could change while object remains the same
Consciousness-Only
• Vasubandhu’s idealism —> Dharmapala —> Xuanzong (596-664)
• Idealism: Everything depends on mind
• No-self: There is no mind
The Atomic Theory of Matter
• The atomic theory poses a challenge to this conception of substances
• Atomic theory: things are composed of atoms; properties of things depend on nature and motion of atoms
Dignaga (c. 450), Buddhist
• “Though atoms serve as causes of the consciousness of the sense-organs, they are not its actual objects like the sense organs; because the consciousness does not represent the image of the atoms. The consciousness does not arise from what is represented in it. Because they do not exist in substance just like the double moon. Thus both the external things are unfit to be the real objects of consciousness.”
Plato’s Philosophy of Mind
•
Form
Object
This is a triangle
Participation
Perception
Recollection
The Good
Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy of Mind
•
Universal
Object
This is a triangle
Instantiation
Perception
Quality
Inherence
Making Universals Mind-Dependent
•
Concept
Object
This is a triangle
Application
Perception
Quality
Inherence
Buddhist Philosophy of Mind
•
Concept
Internal Object
This is a triangle
Application
Perception
Dharma
Actual Object
Nyaya-Vaisesika Conception• There are continuing substances• Qualities inhere in substances• Our talk of substances is a good guide
to metaphysics• Substances are the basic constituents of
the world• They have essences— properties
necessary to them• Their essences give them identity
through change
The Buddhist Conception
• There are no continuing substances• Everything is momentary• “Substances” are just bundles of
qualities (dharmas)• Our talk of substances is a convenient
fiction• “Substances” are conceptual
constructions• Nothing gives them unity• They have essences only as constructed
Yogi Berra
• “Here’s your pizza, Mr. Berra. Would you like me to cut it into four pieces or eight?”
• Yogi: “Better make it four. I don’t think I can eat eight.”
Actual and Internal Objects
• Aristotle: objects cause perceptions, and are represented in them
• Causes of perception = objects of perception
• Dignaga: No— – causes are the atoms— actual objects
[alambana] – objects are appearances— internal objects
[artha]
Causes and Effects
• Causes of perception are the atoms• We don’t see atoms, but their
effects• What we see doesn’t exist in reality;
it is “like the double moon”• How could we distinguish aspects of
the effects (appearances) that do match the causes?
Buddhist Arguments
Yogacara (Buddhist idealism): Vasubandhu, Asanga,
Samghabhadra (4th century)
Argument from Change
• Distinctness of discernibles: The same thing can’t have contrary properties
• Any difference in properties implies numerical difference
• Change implies a difference in properties• So, change implies numerical distinctness• Change occurs at every moment• So, things persist only for a moment
Nyaya-Vaisesika Response
• Substances can endure through change
• Substances can have contrary properties
• Change does not occur at every moment
• These relations are different:– Substance/properties– Whole/parts– Properties/parts
• Things have essences
• Qualities
• Substance
• Atoms
Argument from Destruction
• Everything is destroyed by its own nature, with no external cause
• Everything destroyed by its own nature is destroyed immediately
• So, everything is destroyed immediately
• So, nothing persists for more than a moment
Against External Destruction 1
• A cause can’t have contradictory effects• External causes of destruction would
also be causes of production (e.g., fire causing ash)
• Destruction and production are contradictory
• So, there are no external causes of destruction
Against External Destruction 2
• Nonexistence can’t have a cause• Destruction is nonexistence• So, destruction can’t have a cause
• Nyaya-Vaisesika response: absences can be causes and effects
Immediate Destruction
• Say an object is destroyed, not at t, but at a later t’
• Some contributing factor must have absent at t but present at t’
• But no external factor can contribute to the thing’s destruction
• So, the factor must be part of the thing’s nature
• But the thing has the same nature at t and t’; contradiction
Argument from Causality
• Everything that exists is causally efficient
• Everything causally efficient is momentary
• So, everything that exists is momentary
Capacities
• There are no unrealized capacities• So, anything that can cause something
causes it immediately• So, things have different capacities at
different times• Difference in capacities implies numerical
distinctness• So, nothing persists for more than a
moment
Argument from Momentariness
• Mental states are momentary• Anything that depends on something
momentary is momentary• The body depends on mental states• So, the body is momentary
Argument from Momentariness
• Mental states are momentary• Anything that causes something momentary
is momentary• Physical objects cause mental states• So, physical objects are momentary
Argument from consciousness
• Dignaga: We know world only through sense organs
• So, we know objects only insofar as they become internal objects
• They are objects of consciousness, constituted by consciousness
• We know objects only as conditioned by consciousness
Jainist Perspectivism
• Jainism, a religion and philosophy tracing from Mahavira (599-527 BCE), is best known for its emphasis on nonviolence
• Jainism also advances a version of perspectivism
Jain Ethics
• Jains base their ethical views on five great vows: – 1. noninjury – 2. truthfulness – 3. respect for property – 4. chastity – 5. nonattachment
Jain Metaphysics
• They believe that these vows can be fulfilled only from a certain metaphysical standpoint
• A conviction that one has the absolute truth, for example, is likely to lead one to be willing – to injure others for its sake, and – to become attached to it
Nonabsolutism
• Nonabsolutism (anekantavada, non-one-sidedness): no statement captures the truth absolutely
• Everything we say is true, at best, in some respect
• Nothing is true simpliciter
Nonabsolutism
• The same is true of falsehood
• Every statement approaches its topic from one point of view
• To understand any topic, however, we must see it from many points of view
Respect
• We should respect people no matter what they believe or say, therefore, because every statement contains some element of truth
• Everything is true in some respect, or from some point of view
Multifaceted Reality
• Reality is many-sided
• Indeed, it has infinitely many facets, some of which are opposites
• Whatever we say is true syat, maybe, perhaps, in some respect
• It is also false in some respect
• We never capture the whole truth
Language
• Accompanying nonabsolutism is a view of language
• Maybeism, or relativism (syadvada): language can express the truth only from some point of view
Law of Sevenfold Predication• Vadi Devasuri (twelfth century) develops this
into a theory of language based on the Law of Sevenfold Predication:– 1. It is – 2. It is not – 3. It is and is not – 4. It is indeterminate– 5. It is and is indeterminate – 6. It is not and is indeterminate– 7. It is and is not and is indeterminate
Pluralism
• Nonabsolutism implies a positive pluralism of perspectives
• Reality is so rich that it makes true, with qualifications, every intellectual stance
• Reality is so incredibly rich that it can underlie and give rise to opposed pictures
Skepticism
• Nonabsolutism ≠ skepticism
• It promises reconciliation of apparently opposed points of view
• It targets only the absolutism that partisans propose for their preferred positions, blind to the truth in their opponents’ theories
Intellectual Nonviolence
• The point is not to deny but to affirm seemingly incompatible perspectives
• The special sevenfold logic, the maybeism, was developed to facilitate the disarming of controversy
• Here are the tools of intellectual nonviolence (ahimsa)
Self-Defeating?
• Is the Jain position self-defeating? • Jainists say no. It is not meant to be an
absolute claim • That would be like practicing ahimsa
toward everyone except oneself• Nonharmfulness requires humility • So, the Jainist offers it merely as one
perspective alongside others
top related