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AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937]Saturday, February 07, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic WritesLabels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts fromissuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public fundsshall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a resultof the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein thestate will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contendsthat such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondentfor the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It ishowever not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in humanaffairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator isrecognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence isdeeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does

not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling tofavor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the RomanCatholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned,contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII InternationalEucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” theofficials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although suchissuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit andpropaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATIONFacts of the CaseA New Jersey law allowed reimbursements of money to parents who sent their children to school on

buses operated by the public transportation system. Children who attended Catholic schools alsoqualified for this transportation subsidy.

QuestionDid the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as made applicableto the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?

ConclusionNo. A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. After detailing the history andimportance of the Establishment Clause, Justice Black argued that services like bussing and police andfire protection for parochial schools are "separate and so indisputably marked off from the religiousfunction" that for the state to provide them would not violate the First Amendment. The law did not paymoney to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was simply a law enacted as a

"general program" to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.

Engel v. Vitale (1962)Historical BackgroundAfter World War II, the United States experienced another period of intense concern about the spread of communism abroad and fear of subversion at home. The Federal Government enacted a programrequiring all employees to take loyalty oaths, while U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy claimed there werecommunist agents in government. Alleged “communist spies” were called forth to give testimony before aSenate subcommittee chaired by McCarthy. These hearings had the impact of sensational court dramasthat filled the media, while the deployment of U.S. soldiers to fight communist aggression in Korea made

the threat of communism at home all the more palpable. In this context, some States enacted a variety of programs to encourage patriotism, moral character, and other values of good citizenship. They alsobegan challenging separation of church and state issues in hopes of providing students with strong moraland spiritual stamina. In this case, the Warren Court once again was to take up a controversial issue.

Circumstances of the CaseIn 1951 the New York State Board of Regents (the State board of education) approved a 22-word“nondenominational prayer” for recitation each morning in the public schools of New York. It read:“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.” The Regents believed that the prayer could be a useful tool for the development of character and good citizenship among the students of the State of New York. Theprayer was offered to the school boards in the State for their use, and participation in the “prayer-exercise” was voluntary. In New Hyde Park, New York, the Union Free School District No. 9 directed thelocal principal to have the prayer “said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginningof the school day.”

The parents of ten pupils in the New Hyde Park schools objected to the prayer. They filed suit in a NewYork State court seeking a ban on the prayer, insisting that the use of this official prayer in the publicschools was contrary to their own and their children's beliefs, religions, or religious practices. The Stateappeals court upheld the use of the prayer, “so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join in the

prayer over his or his parents' objection.”

Constitutional IssuesThe question before the Court involved the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment. Did the Regentsof New York violate the religious freedom of students by providing time during the school day for thisparticular prayer? Did the prayer itself represent an unconstitutional action—in effect, the establishment of a religious code—by a public agency? Did the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment preventschools from engaging in “religious activity”? Was the “wall of separation” between church and statebreached in this case?

ArgumentsFor Engel (the parents): The separation of church and state requires that government stay out of thebusiness of prescribing religious activities of any kind. The Regents' prayer quite simply and clearly

violated the 1st Amendment and should, therefore, be barred from the schools.

For the Regents of the State of New York: The New York Regents did not establish a religion by providinga prayer for those who wanted to say it. Countless religious elements are associated with governmentsand officials, reflecting the religious heritage of the nation. New York acted properly and constitutionally inproviding an optional, nonsectarian prayer. It would be an intrusion into State matters for the SupremeCourt to strike down the right of the Regents to compose the prayer and encourage its recitation.

Decision and RationaleThe Court found the New York Regents' prayer to be unconstitutional. Justice Hugo Black wrote theopinion for the 6-1 majority: “We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of theRegents' Prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the EstablishmentClause. There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's program of daily classroom invocation of

God's blessings…in the Regents' Prayer is a religious activity…”

Black further explained that “When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placedbehind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform tothe prevailing officially approved religion is plain…. The Establishment Clause thus stands as anexpression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, toosacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate.”

To support the Court's finding, Black referred to the following ideas of the Framers: “To those who maysubscribe to the view that because the Regents' official prayer is so brief and general [it] can be no

danger to religious freedom…, it may be appropriate to say in the words of James Madison, the author of the First Amendment:… 'Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, inexclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, inexclusion of all other Sects?'”

The Court's decision was not, Black pointed out, antireligious. It sought, rather, only to affirm theseparation between church and state. “It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separategovernment in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers…”Thereafter, State governments could not “prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to beused as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity.”

LEMON v. KURTZMANFacts of the CaseThis case was heard concurrently with two others, Earley v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso(1971). The cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania,a statute provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental salary payments toteachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-relatededucational institutions."

QuestionDid the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause bymaking state financial aid available to "church- related educational institutions"?

ConclusionDecision: 8 votes for Lemon, 0 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Establishment of ReligionYes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a three-part test for laws dealing withreligious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it musthave principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster "an excessivegovernment entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization of parochial schoolsfurthered a process of religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary toenforce the specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The

Court also noted the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legislation whichappropriates support to religious schools.

ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SCHEMPPFacts of the CaseThe Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At the beginning of the schoolday, students who attended public schools in the state of Pennsylvania were required to read at least tenverses from the Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all Abington Townshipstudents to recite the Lord's Prayer. Students could be excluded from these exercises by a written notefrom their parents to the school. In a related case -- Murray v. Curlett -- a Baltimore statute required Bible-reading or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at open exercises in public schools. Murray and his mother,professed atheists -- challenged the prayer requirement.

QuestionDid the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate inclassroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First andFourteenth Amendments?

ConclusionDecision: 8 votes for Schempp, 1 vote(s) againstLegal provision: Establishment of ReligionThe Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both the Free Exercise Clauseand the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially

religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore, argued Justice Clark, theability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it did notprevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause.

ZORACH v. CLAUSONFacts of the CaseIn the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in McCollum v. Board of Education, New York Citybegan a program in which students in public schools could be dismissed from classroom activities for certain periods to participate in religious instruction elsewhere. In McCollum, the Court disallowed anIllinois program in which representatives of religious groups came to public schools and taught classesduring the school day. New York's "released time" program was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals.

QuestionDid the New York program violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

ConclusionIn a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "released time" program neither constituted the establishmentof religion nor interfered with the free exercise of religion. The Court noted that public facilities were notbeing used for the purpose of religious instruction and that "no student was forced to go to the religious

classroom." Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas argued that there was "no constitutional requirementwhich makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts towiden the effective scope of religious influence."

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette319 U.S. 624 (1943)

Facts of the Case:As part of instituting a required curriculum teaching American values, the state of West Virginia forcedstudents and teachers to participate in saluting the flag. Failure to comply with this resulted in expulsionand the student was considered illegally absent until readmitted. A group of Jehovah's Witnesses refusedto salute the flag because it represented a graven image that was not to be recognized.

Decision:In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled that the school district violated the rights of students by forcing them tosalute the American flag.

Majority Opinion: (Justice Jackson)The refusal of the students to say the pledge did not infringe on the rights of other students. The flagsalute required students to declare a belief that was contrary to their faiths. The state did not claim that aclear and present danger would be created if the students remained passive during the pledge. Unlike thedecision in Gobitis, this Court does not believe that allowing an individual's rights to be supported over government authority is a sign of a weak government. "Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimedat the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which

contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities." Finally, compulsion is not a legitimate means for creating national unity.

Significance:This decision directly reversed the Court's earlier decision in Gobitis. In this case, the Court saw theforced salute as compelling the students to assert a belief contrary to their faiths. The minimal harmcreated by lack of compliance is not great enough to dismiss the rights of the students to exercise their religions

Board of Education v. Allen

392 U.S. 236 (1968)Facts of the Case:A group of New York school boards sued the state's Commissioner of Education claiming that theEducation Law violated both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Law required the state to providetextbooks to all school children in grades seven through twelve regardless of whether they attendedpublic or private schools.

Decision:The Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York Education Law because it furthered a secular end.

Majority Opinion: (Justice White)In Everson, the Court decided that "the Establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extendingthe benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard for religious affiliation." The New York law has thesecular purpose of increasing the educational opportunities available to students. Books are only loanedto the students, so the parochial school never has ownership of them. Also, the law does not allow for theloaning of religious textbooks. Parochial schools offer religious and secular educations to students, thislaw only furthers their efforts in the latter area.

Dissenting Opinion: (Justice Douglas:)"Whatever may be said of the Everson decision, 330 U.S. 1, there is nothing ideological about a bus." Aidto religious schools may not violate the Establishment Clause when the aid does not promote anideological end. However, textbooks are paramount to the teaching in a parochial school, and are the"chief instrumentality for propagating a particular religious creed or faith."Significance:

This decision interpreted parochial schools' missions as two-fold and separate. The secular and religiouseducation aspects could be partitioned and one could be helped without the other also benefiting.

CANTWELL v. STATE OF CONNECTICUTFacts of the Case

Jesse Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's Witnesses; they were proselytizing a predominantly Catholicneighborhood in Connecticut. The Cantwells distributed religious materials by travelling door-to-door andby approaching people on the street. After voluntarily hearing an anti-Roman Catholic message on theCantwells' portable phonograph, two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells were subsequentlyarrested for violating a local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach of thepeace.

QuestionDid the solicitation statute or the "breach of the peace" ordinance violate the Cantwells' First Amendmentfree speech or free exercise rights?

ConclusionYes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate,

restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determinewhich causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not beused to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensiveto many, did not entail any threat of "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.

Marsh v. AlabamaBrief Fact Summary. Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness, was arrested for trespassing after attempting todistribute religious literature in a privately owned Alabama town.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A private entity that acts like a governmental body and performs a publicfunction is subject to the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Facts. A Corporation owned a town called Chickasaw in Alabama. The town was accessible and usedfreely by the public except for the fact that the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned title to the town andpaid the police. Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness was told she needed a permit to distribute her flyers.However, Marsh declined to obtain a permit and refused to leave the sidewalk. Marsh was arrested andcharged with violating Alabama’s anti-trespassing statute.Marsh claimed that applying the statute to her violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of theConstitution.

Issue. Is the Constitution applicable to privately owned towns?

Held. Yes, it applies, because the town acts like a government body. The Supreme Court of the UnitedStates (Supreme Court) first recognizes that if Chickasaw had been a municipality the anti-trespassingstatute would not be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court specifically states that a private town is not the

same as a private homeowner. Meaning, it is not appropriate to suppress unwanted religious expressionin the town like it would be in a private home.

Discussion. The more an owner opens up his property to the public, the more the Constitution isapplicable. Here, the town was treated like a town, where the public was free to do as they pleased. Thefact that the property (the town) is privately owned, does not justify restricting fundamental liberties.Therefore, Alabama’s attempt to convict Marsh cannot stand.

IN RE SUMMERS, 325 U.S. 561 (1945)325 U.S. 561

Mr. Justice REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from this Court under Section 237(b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A.344(b), to review the action of the Supreme Court of Illinois in denying petitioner's prayer for admission tothe practice of law in that state. It was alleged that the denial was 'on the sole ground that he is aconscientious objector to war' or to phrase petitioner's contention slightly differen ly 'because of hisconscientious scruples against participation in war.' Petitioner challenges here the right of the SupremeCourt to exclude him from the bar under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to theConstitution of the United States which secured to him protection against state action in violation of theprinciples of the First Amendment. 1 Because of the importance of the tendered issue in the domain of civil rights, we granted certiorari. 2 323 U.S. 705 , 65 S.Ct. 274. [325 U.S. 561, 563] Since theproceedings were not treated as judicial by the Supreme Court of Illinois, the record is not in thecustomary form. It shows accurately, however, the steps by which the issue was developed and theaction of the Supreme Court on the prayer for admission to the practice of law in the State of Illinois. From

the record it appears that Clyde Wilson Summers has complied with all prerequisites for admission to thebar of Illinois except that he has not obtained the certificate of the Committee on Character and Fitness.Cf. Illinois Revised Statutes 1943, c. 110, 259.58. No report appears in the record from the Committee.An unofficial letter from the Secretary gives his personal views. 3 A petition was filed in the [325 U.S. 561,564] Supreme Court on August 2, 1943, which alleged that petitioner was informed in January, 1943,that the Committee declined to sign a favorable certificate. The petition set out that the sole reason for theCommittee's refusal was that petitioner was a conscientious objector to war, and averred that suchreason did not justify his exclusion because of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thedenial of the petition for admission is informal. It consists of a letter of September 20, 1943, to theSecretary of the Committee which is set out Below, 4 a letter of the same date toMr. Summers and a third

letter of March 22, 1944, to Mr. Summers' attorney on petition for rehearing. These latter two letters areset out in note 8.

The answer of the Justices to these allegations does not appear in the record which was transmitted fromthe Supreme Court of Illinois to this Court but in their return to the rule to show cause why certiorarishould not be granted. The answer is two-fold: First, that the proceedings were not a matter of judicialcognizance in Illinois and that no case or controversy exists in this Court [325 U.S. 561, 565] under Article III of the Federal Constitution; second, that assuming the sole ground for refusing to petitioner admission to practice was his profession of conscientious objection to military service, such refusal didnot violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the requirement for applicants for admission to the bar totake an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois could not be met. In view of his religious affirmations,petitioner could not agree, freely, to serve in the Illinois militia. Therefore petitioner was not barredbecause of his religion but because he could not in good faith take the prescribed oath, even though hemight be willing to do so. We turn to consideration of the Justices' contentions.

Case or Controversy. The return of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices states that thecorrespondence and communications of petitioner with the Justices were not spread upon the records of the Supreme Court of Illinois and that under the law of Illinois this petition for admission to the bar doesnot constitute a case or controversy or a judicial proceeding but is a mere application for appointment asan officer of the court. 5 We of course accept this authoritative commentary upon the law of Illinois as

establishing for that state the non-judicial character of an application for admission to the bar. 6 We take itthat the law of Illinois treats the action of the Su- [325 U.S. 561, 566] preme Court on this petition as aministerial act which is performed by virtue of the judicial power, such as the appointment of a clerk or bailiff or the specification of the requirements of eligibility or the course of study for applicants for admission to the bar, rather than a judicial proceeding.

For the purpose of determining whether the action of the Supreme Court of Illinois in denying Summers'petition for an order for admission to practice law in Illinois is a judgment in a judicial proceeding whichinvolves a case or controversy reviewable in this Court under Article III, Sec. 2, Cl. 1, of the Constitutionof the United States,7 we must for ourselves appraise the circumstances of the refusal. Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 259 , 53 S.Ct. 345, 346, 87 A.L. R. 1191. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314U.S. 252, 259 , 260 S., 62 S.Ct. 190, 192; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 , 52 S.Ct. 484, 487, 88A.L.R. 458; First National Bank of Hartford, Wis. v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 552 , 47 S.Ct. 462, 463, 59

A.L.R. 1; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 324 , 42 S.Ct. 124, 126, 27 A.L.R. 375.

A case arises, within the meaning of the Constitution, when any question respecting the Constitution,treatise [325 U.S. 561, 567] or laws of the United States has assumed 'such a form that the judicialpower is capable of acting on it.' Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 819. The Court was then considering thepower of the bank to sue in the federal courts. A declaration on rights as they stand must be sought, noton rights which may arise in the future, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 , 29 S.Ct. 67,69, and there must be an actual controversy over an issue, not a desire for an abstract declaration of thelaw. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 , 31 S. Ct. 250, 255; Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126,129 , 42 S. Ct. 274, 275. The form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which iscontrolling. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 259 , 53 S.Ct. 345, 346, 87 A.L. R. 1191.

The brief for the Justices raises the question as to who are the adversary parties. The petition in the state

court was entitled, 'Clyde Wilson, Summers, Petitioner, v. Committee on Character and Fitness for ThirdAppellate District, Respondent.' The prayer sought relief against those named as respondents. Therecord does not show that any process issued or that any appearance was made. Our rule on the petitionfor certiorari required the Supreme Court of Illinois to show cause why a record should not be certifiedand the writ of certiorari granted. The return was by the Justices, not by t e Court. The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, concluded that the 'report of the Committee on Character and Fitness should besustained.' Thus it considered the petition on its merits. While no entry was placed by the Clerk in the file,on a docket, or on a judgment roll, the Court took cognizance of the petition and passed an order which isvalidated by the signature of the presiding officer. 8 Where relief is thus sought in a state court against theaction of a com- [325 U.S. 561, 568] mittee, appointed to advise the court, and the court takes

cognizance of the complaint without requiring the appearance of the committee or its members, we thinkthe consideration of the petition by the Supreme Court, the body which has authority itself by its own actto give the relief sought, makes the proceeding adversary in the sense of a true case or controversy.

A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state and a denial of that right is a controversy.When the claim is made in a state court and a denial of the right is [325 U.S. 561, 569] made by judicialorder, it is a case which may be reviewed under Article III of the Constitution when federal questions areraised and proper steps taken to that end, in this Court. 9

Disqualification Under Illinois Constitution. The Justices justify their refusal to admit petitioner to practicebefore the courts of Illinois on th ground of petitioner's inability to take in good faith the required oath tosupport the Constitution of Illinois. His inability to take such an oath, the justices submit, shows that theCommittee on Character and Fitness properly refused to certify to his moral character and moral fitness tobe an officer of the Court, charged with the administration of justice under the Illinois law. His goodcitizenship, they think, judged by the standards required for practicing law in Illinois, is not satisfactorilyshown. 10 A conscientious belief in non- [325 U.S. 561, 570] violence to the extent that the believer willnot use force to prevent wrong, no matter how aggravated, and so cannot swear in good faith to supportthe Illinois Constitution, the Justices contend, must disqualify such a believer for admission.

Petitioner appraises the denial of admission from the viewpoint of a religionist. He said in his petition:

'The so-called 'misconduct' for which petitioner could be reproached for is his taking the New Testamenttoo seriously. Instead of merely reading or preaching the Sermon on the Mount, he tries to practice it. Theonly fault of the petitioner consists in his attempt to act as a good Christian in accordance with hisinterpretation of the Bible, and according to the dictates of his conscience. We respectfully submit that theprofession of law does not shut its gates to persons who have qualified in all other respects, even whenthey follow in the footsteps of that Great Teacher of mankind who delivered the Sermon on the Mount. Werespectfully submit that under out Constitutional guarantees even good Christians who have met all therequirements for the admission to the bar may be admitted to practice law.'Thus a court created to administer the laws of Illinois, as it understands them and charged particularlywith the protection of justice in the courts of Illinois through supervision of admissions to the bar founditself faced with the dilemma of excluding an applicant whom it deemed disqualified for the responsibilitiesof the profession of law or of admitting the applicant because of its deeply rooted tradition in freedom of

belief. The responsibility for choice as to the personnel of its bar rests [325 U.S. 561, 571] with Illinois.Only a decision which violated a federal right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment would authorize our intervention. It is said that the action of the Supreme Court of Illinois is contrary to the principles of thatportion of the First Amendment which guarantees the free exercise of religion. Of course, under our Constitutional system, men could not be excluded from the practice of law, or indeed from following anyother calling, simply because they belong to any of our religious groups, whether Protestant, Catholic,Quaker or Jewish, assuming it conceivable that any state of the Union would draw such a religious line.We cannot say that any such purpose to discriminate motivated the action of the Illinois Supreme Court.

The sincerity of petitioner's beliefs re not questioned. He has been classified as a conscientious objector under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix301 et seq. Without detailing petitioner's testimony before the Committee or his subsequent statements inthe record, his position may be compendiously stated as one of non-violence. Petitioner will not serve in

the armed forces. While he recognizes a difference between the military and police forces, he would notact in the latter to coerce threatened violations. Petitioner would not use force to meet aggressionsagainst himself or his family, no matter how aggravated or whether or not carrying a danger of bodilyharm to himself or others. He is a believer in passive resistance. We need to consider only his attitudetoward service in the armed forces.

Illinois has constitutional provisions which require service in the militia in time of war of men of petitioner'sage group. 11 The return of the Justices alleges that petitioner has not made any showing that he wouldserve not- [325 U.S. 561, 572] withstanding his conscientious objections. This allegation is undenied inthe record and unchallenged by brief. We accept the allegation as to unwillingness to serve in the militia

as established. While under Section 5(g) of the Selective Training and Service Act, supra, conscientiousobjectors to participation in war in any form now are permitted to do non- war work of national importance,this is by grace of Congressional recognition of their beliefs. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 , 261-265, 55 S.Ct. 197, 203-205, and cases cited. The Act may be repealed. No similar exemption during war exists under Illinois law. The Hamilton decision was made in 1934, in time of peace. 12 This decision asto the powers of the state government over military training is applicable to the power of Illinois to requiremilitary service from her citizens.

The United States does not admit to citizenship the alien who refuses to pledge military service. UnitedStates v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 , 49 S. Ct. 448; United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 , 51 S.Ct.570. Even the powerful dissents which emphasized the deep cleavage in this Court on the issue of ad-[325 U.S. 561, 573] mission to citizenship did not challenge the right of Congress to require militaryservice from every able-bodied man. 279 U.S. at page 653, 49 S.Ct. at page 451; 283 .S. at page 632, 51S.Ct. at page 577. It is impossible for us to conclude that the insistence of Illinois that an officer who ischarged with the administration of justice must take an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois andIllinois' interpretation of that oath to require a willingness to perform military service violates the principlesof religious freedom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state action, when a likeinterpretation of a similar oath as to the Federal Constitution bars an alien from national citizenship. 13

AFFIRMED.

GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This providedfor the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of thesaint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was

temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’sproperty since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against thepriest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as arepresentative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 andSec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was

purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring anyreligion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended tofacilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image wasplaced in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow theimage in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image,therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided togive it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not everygovernment activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint isviolative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship andbanning the use of public money or property.

FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS [96 PHIL 417; G.R. L-5917; 28 JAN 1955]Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI), represented by its supreme bishop GerardoBayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of all the temporalproperties and to recover the same on the ground that he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. IsabeloDe los Reyes Jr. had been elected as the Supreme Bishop.

Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was JuanJamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his administration and was turned over to bishopJamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and formally joined theProstestant Episcopal Church of America.

CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to render an accounting of his admistration

CA affirmed the decision of the CFI

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.

Held: Supreme Court affirmed CA’s decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De losReyes, Jr. The Supreme Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes as the Supreme

Bishop based on their internal lawsTo finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the rule inproperty controversies within religious congregations strictly independent of any other superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules for resolving suchcontroversies should be those of any voluntary association. If the congregation adopts the majority rulethen the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to duly constituted authorities within thecongregation, then that should be followed.

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA [101PHIL 386; G.R. NO. 9637; 30 APR 1957]

Facts: New York’s Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of chargeto all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education contended thatsaid statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order barring the

Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant’s members from office for failure to complywith the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to belent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The AppellateDivision reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. TheNew York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the freeexercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or

preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or politicalrights.

The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religiousprofession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was insome instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant wasengaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Courtbelieve that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to

appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession andworship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge uponthe enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.

WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties aswell as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VATsystem and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There arevarious suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as requiredby Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills,H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings asrequired by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives asrequired by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law butthe revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislativeprocess culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill wouldbe to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, billsauthorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from theHouse of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of theHouse can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, solong as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days asrequired by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But thiswas because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensedwith the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon thecertification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing anddistribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Genaro Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al.106 Phil 2

FACTS: RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing ruleDep Order 8 says that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone mustsalute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is torecite the patriotic pledge. Gerona’s children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson,Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They consider the flag to be an image in the context of

what is prohibited in their religion and because of this they were expelled from the school. Gerona wroteto Sec of Ed that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand atattention. Sec of Ed denied the petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued.

ISSUE: Is Dep Order 8 unconstitutional?

RULING: Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-

Discriminatory therefore it is constitutional. The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but itsexercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former must yield. Petitioners salute the flag duringboy scout activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. Thepledge is judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or to theRepublic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force,military service, or duty to defend the country. There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey thesalute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education.

GERMAN VS. BARANGAN

135 SCRA 514

Facts: Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which adjoinedMalacañang. Respondent barred them for security reasons. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom.

Held: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an anti-government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti-government slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be done ingood faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the Presidentand his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business withMalacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacananggrounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for aprior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and

imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate publicinterest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminentdanger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and had thecapability to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to publicsafety or the security of Malacanang.

EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU [219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR1993]Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their

jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS studentsof Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities expelledthese students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the “Panatang

Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religiousworship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcendsconstitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondentsrelied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we area system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and itdoesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitutiondoes not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing nationalanthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousnessand duties of citizenship.

Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.

Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religiousworship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.) Freedom to acton one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is theexistence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has rightto prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified.

The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who refuseto obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and worship.Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not givethem the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standingquietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesn’t present any danger so evil andimminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s request is exemption from flag ceremonies andnot exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is alsoa violation of a citizen’s right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totallyconstitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for nationalheroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsiondue to religious beliefs is unjustified.

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED.

RAUL GONZALEZ v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA.

Facts: Gonzalez brought the suit against the archbishop in the CFI of Manila and prayed for judgmentdeclaring that he, the lawful heir to the chaplaincy and its income; establishing the right of the petitioner and his successors to be appointed to and receive the income of the chaplaincy during their infancywhenever it may be vacant and, pending such appointment, to receive the income for their maintenanceand support. The trial court directed the archbishop to appoint Gonzalez as chaplain; and orderedpayment to him the sum being the aggregate net income of the chaplaincy during the vacancy, less theexpense of having the prescribed masses celebrated in each year. It reserved to the petitioner any legalright he may have to proceed in the proper court for cancellation of the certificate of registration of theproperty in the name of the archbishop.

Issue: Is the Gonzalez legally entitled to be appointed the chaplain?

Ruling: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands reversed the judgment and absolved the archbishopfrom the complaint, 'without prejudice to the right of proper persons in interest to proceed for independentrelief,' in respect to the income accrued during the vacancy, or in respect to the reformation of thecertificate of registration so as to show the fiduciary character of the title. Without deciding whether suchdisposition of the surplus was proper or what should be its disposition in the future, that a son of the lastincumbent, who was properly refused appointment as chaplain because he had not the qualificationsprescribed by the Canon Law, was not entitled, as the nearest relative, to the accrued surplus.

PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN & ZOSA, 38 O.G. 1676Avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not allowed in the Philippines because of Section 4,

Article II—The state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the people to defend theState and in the fulfillment of this duty, the State may call all citizens to render military or civil service.

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