criminal law and morality at war

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PhilosophicalFoundationsofCriminalLawR.A.DuffandStuartGreen

Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199559152PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:May2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

CriminalLawandMoralityatWarAdilAhmadHaque

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0021

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapteridentifiesthemoralnormsapplicabletokillinginarmedconflictanddeterminewhetherandtowhatextentthelawofarmedconflict(LOAC)andinternationalcriminallaw(ICL)trackthesemoralnorms,andjustifiablyorunjustifiablydepartfromthem.Section1exploresthemoralandlegalnormsgoverningthekillingofciviliansnotdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities,bothasanintendedmeansandasaforeseensideeffect.ItdefendsoneaccountofthesenormsagainstimportantphilosophicalchallengesbyThomasScanlon,VictorTadros,FrancesKamm,andJeffMcMahan.Itarguesthatthesemoralnormsarebestunderstoodanddefendedusingthedistinctionsdrawnincriminallawtheorybetweenwrongdoing,justifiability,andjustification.Theremainderofthechapterexaminesthemoralandlegalnormsgoverningthekillingofciviliansdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesaswellasofmembersofarmedforcesandorganizedarmedgroups.Section2identifiestheconditionsunderwhichindividualslosetheirmoralimmunityfromdirectattack,partlybycriticallyexaminingananalogydrawnbyJeff

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McMahanbetweentheseconditionsandthelegaldoctrineofcriminalcomplicity.

Keywords:armedconflicts,killing,lawofarmedconflict,internationalcriminallaw,moralnorms

Criminallawtheoryisconcerned,inpart,withunderstandingthepropernormativerelationshipbetweenmoralwrongs,legalwrongs,andcrimes.Liberalretributivists,forexample,tendtobelievethatmostmoralwrongsshouldnotconstitutelegalwrongs,andthatmostlegalwrongsshouldnotconstitutecrimes.Asliberals,theytendtobelievethatconductshouldbemadeunlawfulonlyifdoingsowillpreventsubstantiallymoreharmtoothersthanitwillbringabout,andthatunlawfulconductshouldbemadecriminalonlyifdoingsowillpreventsubstantiallymoreoverallharmtoothersthanwouldlessintrusiveorcoerciveformsoflegalregulation.Inaddition,asretributivists,theytendtobelievethatlegalwrongsshouldbemadeintocrimesonlyiftheyarealsoseriousmoralwrongs.Ofcourse,liberalretributivistsarenotexclusivelyconcernedwithcreatingorpreservinggapsbetweenmoralwrongs,legalwrongs,andcrimes;theyarealsoconcernedwithclosingsuchgapswherenosuchgapsshouldexist.Ingeneral,allseriousmoralwrongsthecriminalizationofwhichwouldpreventsubstantialoverallharmtoothersshouldbemadeintocrimes.

Forcriminallawtheoristsinterestedininternationalcrimes,similarissuesariseregardingtherelationshipbetweenmoralwrongscommittedinthecontextofarmed(p.482)conflict,violationsofthelawofarmedconflict,andwarcrimes.Indeed,warcrimesjustareseriousviolationsofthelawofarmedconflictwhicharepunishableunderinternationalcriminallaw.Althoughwarcrimesareoftenperpetratedandseldompunished,itisalmostcertainlythecasethattheirillegalitypreventsmoreharmtoothersthanitbringsaboutandthattheircriminalitypreventsstillmoreoverallharm.Moreover,whileallegationsthataparticularpartytoanarmedconflicthascommittedwarcrimesarealmostalwaysdisputedbytheaccusedpartyanditsallies,itisalmostcertainlythecasethateverywarcrimecurrentlyrecognizedunderinternationallawconstitutesaseriousmoralwrong.Indeed,itistheseriousmoralwrongfulnessofwarcrimes,nottheirtechnicalillegality,whichislikelytoexplainthevigourwithwhichtheircommissionisdenied.Whatislessclear,andthereforemoreinteresting,iswhetherotherseriousmoralwrongscommittedinarmedconflict,someofwhicharealreadylegalwrongsunderthelawofarmedconflict,shouldberecognizedaswarcrimesaswell.

Ofcourse,wecannotknowwhichmoralwrongscommittedinarmedconflictshouldberecognizedaswarcrimesuntilweknowwhatactsofwarconstitutemoralwrongsandunderstandwhereintheirwrongfulnessconsists.Thepurposeofthischapteristoidentifythemoralnormsapplicabletokillinginarmedconflictanddeterminewhetherandtowhatextentthelawofarmedconflict(LOAC)andinternationalcriminallaw(ICL)trackthesemoralnorms,justifiablydepartfromthem,orunjustifiablydepartfromthem.Section1exploresthemoralandlegalnormsgoverningthekillingofciviliansnotdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities,bothasanintendedmeansandasaforeseensideeffect,anddefendsoneaccountofthesenormsagainstimportantphilosophicalchallengesbyThomasScanlon,VictorTadros,FrancesKamm,andJeffMcMahan.Iarguethatthesemoralnormsarebestunderstoodanddefendedusingthedistinctionsdrawnincriminallaw

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theorybetweenwrongdoing,justifiability,andjustification.TheLOACtracksthesemoralnormsquiteclosely.Bycontrast,ICLdepartsfromthesemoralnormsinwaysthataredifficulttodefend,inpartbecauseICLseemstomistakenlyassignintentionawrong-makingratherthanawrong-justifyingfunction.

Thebalanceofthechapterexaminesthemoralandlegalnormsgoverningthekillingofciviliansdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesaswellasofmembersofarmedforcesandorganizedarmedgroups.Section2attemptstoidentifytheconditionsunderwhichindividualslosetheirmoralimmunityfromdirectattack,partlybycriticallyexaminingananalogydrawnbyJeffMcMahanbetweentheseconditionsandthelegaldoctrineofcriminalcomplicity.BoththeLOACandICLgenerallytracktheseconditionsfairlyclosely,butbothshouldberevisedtoprohibitdirectattacksonmembersofarmedforceswhomtheattackerknowsarenotdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesandhavenotassumedacontinuouscombatfunction.Finally,section3arguesthatmoralconstraintsofnecessityandproportionalitylimittheuseofforceevenagainstindividualswhoaremorallyliabletodirectattack.Severalarguments(p.483) totheeffectthattheLOACandICLmayjustifiablyfailtoenforcethesemoralconstraintsareexaminedandfoundunpersuasive.1

1IMMUNITYFROMDIRECTATTACKUnderinternationallaw,civiliansareallindividualswhoarenotcombatants.Combatants,inturn,includemembersofthearmedforcesofapartytoanarmedconflict(exceptforreligiousandmedicalpersonnel)aswellasparticipantsinaspontaneousarmeduprisingknownasaleveenmasse.ItisbothaviolationoftheLOACandawarcrimetoattackciviliansdirectlyduringarmedconflict,unlessandforsuchtimeastheydirectlyparticipateinhostilities.Thecircumstancesunderwhichciviliansmaylosetheirimmunityfromdirectattackwillbediscussedinsection2.Thetaskofthissectionistoexaminetheconceptualstructureandmoraljustificationofthelegalimmunityfromdirectattackwhichciviliansordinarilyenjoy.ThissectionwilldefendaversionoftheDoctrineofDoubleEffect(DDE),whichistypicallycharacterizedastheviewthatissometimesmorallypermissibletokillciviliansasaforeseeablesideeffectofachievinganintendedmilitaryadvantagebutimpermissibletokillthesamenumberofciviliansasanintendedmeansofachievingasimilarmilitaryadvantage.ThenewinterpretationoftheDDEofferedbelowbeginsbysupplementingtheconceptofpermissibilitywhichdominatesmoralphilosophywiththemorepreciseconceptsofwrongdoing,justifiability,andjustificationderivedfromcriminallawtheory.IarguethatbothdefendersandcriticsoftheDDEmistakenlyassumethatintentionisawrong-makingratherthanawrong-justifyingfeatureofharmingcivilians.

1.1IntentionandjustificationThomasScanlonhasrecentlyarguedthatacombatant'sintentioninkillingciviliansisirrelevanttowhetherthekillingofthoseciviliansismorallypermissible.2(p.484)Permissibility,Scanlonargues,isafunctionofthereasonsforandagainstperforminganaction,andtheintentionwithwhichanactionwouldbeperformeddoesnotcountamongthereasonsfororagainstperformingthataction.Scanlonconcludesthatthepermissibilityofagivenmilitaryoperationdependsonitsanticipatedoutcomes,

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specificallyontheharmitwillcausetociviliansaswellasonthemilitaryadvantageitwillachieve.Ifthemilitaryadvantageoutweighsthecivilianharmthenitispermissibleforthecombatantstoachievetheformerattheexpenseofthelatter,irrespectiveofwhethertheirintentionindoingsoistoachievethemilitaryadvantageortoharmcivilians.

ThefirstproblemwithScanlon'sviewisthathisuseofpermissibilityisinsensitivetothedifferencesbetweennon-wrongfulconduct,wrongfulconductthatisjustifiable,andwrongfulconductthatisbothjustifiableandjustified.Now,thekillingofciviliansisapresumptivemoralwrong(thatis,aninfringementofamoralrightorduty)whethercommittedintentionally,knowingly,recklessly,ornegligently.Tothatextent,Scanloniscorrect:acombatant'sintentiondoesnotdeterminewhetherthekillingofciviliansiswrongfulornon-wrongful.Moreover,thewrongofkillingciviliansisjustifiable(thatis,supportedbyundefeatedreasons)onlyifitiscausedbyoralongsidetheachievementofasufficientlyimportantmilitaryobjective.Tothisextentaswell,Scanloniscorrect:thejustifiabilityofkillingciviliansturnsontheobjectivemoralreasonsforandagainstkillingthem,notontheintentionsofthecombatant.However,thewrongofkillingciviliansisonlyjustified(thatis,performedforundefeatedreasons)whentheachievementofthemilitaryadvantageisamongthecombatant'sreasonsforaction.3Itisinthissensethatintentionisnotawrong-makingfeatureofkillingcivilians(withaculpablementalstate)butratherawrong-justifyingfeature.Thekillingofciviliansmaybejustifiable(forexample,asanecessarysideeffectofaproportionatemilitaryadvantage)andyetthecombatantwhokillsthemmaybeunjustifiedindoingso(forexample,ifhersolereasonforactionistospreadterrorbykillingthecivilians).Itfollowsthatanactmaybepermissible(thatis,ajustifiablewrong)yetanindividualmayactimpermissibly(thatis,withoutjustification)inperformingitforthewrongreasons.

Certainly,actingjustifiablyenjoysakindoflogicalpriorityoveractingwithajustification:thelatterisimpossiblewithouttheformer,whiletheformerispossiblewithoutthelatter.ButactingwithajustificationiscentraltoourmorallivesinawaythatScanlonofallpeopleshouldrecognize.ForatthecoreofScanlon'scontractualismisthedesiretojustifyourselvestoothers,orratherthedesirabilityofbeingabletodoso,andwecannotjustifyourselvestoothersbyalludingtoreasonsforwhichwecouldhaveactedbutdidnot.Instead,wemustsharewiththemourreasonsforactingaswedid.Whenwearecalledtoaccountforouractions,andinparticularto(p.485) accountforthewrongswecommit,wearecallednotmerelytogiveananswerbuttogiveouranswer.

Scanloncomesclosertothetruthwhenheobservesthatmoralprinciplescanserveeitherasguidestodeliberation(theirdeliberativefunction)orasstandardsofevaluation(theircriticalfunction).4Hesaysthatthedeliberativefunctionofmoralprinciplesistodeterminewhichactionapersonhasdecisivereasonstoperform,whilethecriticalfunctionistodeterminewhetherornotthepersonperformedthatactionforthosereasons.However,Scanlon'sterminologyisquitemisleading,foritisstrangetosaythatamoralprinciplehasfulfilleditsdeliberativefunctionevenifitplaysnoroleinanindividual'sdeliberations.Inotherwords,ifanindividualisunawareofthereasonsidentifiedbyamoralprinciple,oradvertstothemonlytodisregardthemandacton

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entirelydifferentreasons,thenitisquiteoddtosaythattheprinciplehasdischargedadeliberativefunction.Perhapsitisbettertospeakofagovernancefunctionconcernedwiththejustifiabilityofaction,aguidancefunctionconcernedwithactingwithjustification,andacriticalperspectivefromwhichbothcanbeevaluated.

1.2MeansandendsThekillingofciviliansisapresumptivemoralwrongthatisonlyjustifiedwhenperformedforundefeatedreasons,thatis,forreasonsthatareneitheroutweighednorexcluded.Thislastpointiscrucialbecauseoneclassofpotentialreasonsforkillingciviliansisnotmerelyoutweighedbythevalueoftheirlivesbutexcludedfrombeingweighedagainsttheirlivesinthefirstplace.Inparticular,thekillingofcivilianscannotbejustifiedbythecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsoftheirdeaths.Forexample,thekillingofcivilianscannotbejustifiedasameansofspreadingterror(acausalconsequence)orofexpressinggenocidalhatred(anon-causalresult).Civiliandeathsdonotmerelyoutweightheirconsequencesandresultsbutinsteadexcludethemfromjustificatoryconsideration.

Bycontrast,thekillingofcivilianscanbejustifiedbythecausalantecedentsoraccompanimentsoftheirdeaths.Forexample,thekillingofcivilianscanbejustifiedwhenthedeathsarecausedbytheachievementofamilitaryadvantage(forexample,whenthedeathsresultdirectlyfromthedestructionofamilitaryobjective),orbyanattackwhichbothachievesamilitaryadvantageandkillscivilians(forexample,whenthedeathsresultdirectlyfromanattackwhichalsodirectlyresultsinthedestructionofamilitaryobjective,butneitherthedeathsnorthedestructionofthemilitaryobjectiveresultsfromtheother).Inaddition,thekillingofcivilianscannotbejustifiedwhenasimilarmilitaryadvantagecouldhavebeenachievedbyusing(p.486) morediscriminatingweaponsorselectingmoreremotetargetsandtherebyavoidingorreducingharmtocivilians.

Thisaccountofthewrongfulnessofkillingcanbeconceptualizedintermsofamandatorynormconsistingofaprimaryreasonnottokillciviliansaswellasanexclusionaryreasonwhichprecludesthecausalconsequencesandnon-causalresultsofkillingciviliansfromcountinginitsfavour.5Mostpeoplewouldagreethatsomeincentivestoharmotherscannotcountinfavourofdoingso(forexample,thefactthatharmingsomeonewouldgiveonesadisticorvindictivepleasure).WhatIamproposinghereisthatincentivestoharmotherscanberenderednormativelyinertbytheircausalhistory.Bycontrast,actswhichcauseciviliandeathsmayalsohavecausalconsequenceswhicharenotthemselvescausedbythoseciviliandeaths(namelythecausalantecedentsandaccompanimentsofthosedeaths).Theselatterconsequencesfalloutsidethescopeoftheexclusionaryreasonandmaybebalanceddirectlyagainsttheprimaryreasonnottokillcivilians.Thisaccountpreservestheinsightattheheartofthemeans/sideeffectdistinction.6

Inaseparatechapterinthisvolume,VictorTadrosarguesthatcausalrelationshipsbetweenharmsandbenefitsdonotpossesintrinsicmoralsignificance.Instead,Tadrosarguesthatwhatmattersmorallyiswhetheronepersontreatsanotherasameans,

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whichTadrosarguesisafunctionofthefirstperson'smotivations.7Infactthisistheoppositeofthetruth.Treatingsomeoneasameans,causallyspeaking,iswrongfulifandonlyiftheyarenotameans,morallyspeaking.PtreatsVasameanswhenPharmsVinordertoachievethecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsofharmingV.Visameansinsofarasmoralitypermitsthecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsofharmingVtobeweigheddirectlyagainsttheprimaryreasonsnottoharmVinthefirstplace.Ifmoralitypermitssuchdirectweighing,thenVisameansandthereisnothingwrongwithtreatingVassuch.Bycontrast,ifmoralityforbidssuchdirectweighing,thenVisnotameansanditisindeedwrongfultotreatVassuch.

Thefundamentalissue,then,isnotoneoftreatmentbutoneofstatus.Ifthekillingofcivilianscouldbejustifiedbyreferencetothecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsoftheirdeathsthenmoralityitselfwouldtherebyregardciviliansasmeanstobeusedopportunisticallyoreliminatedentirelytoservetheendsofothers.Bycontrast,ifthekillingofcivilianscanbejustifiedbyreferencetothecausalantecedentsoraccompanimentsoftheirdeathsthenmoralityonlyconcedesthat(p.487) legitimateendsmaysometimesbepursuedeventhoughtheirpursuitincidentallycausesciviliandeaths.

Tadrosiscorrectthatmotivationsarerelevanttomoralpermissibility,thoughnotinthewayhethinks.Tadrosthinksthatintentionplaysawrong-makingrolebecauseintentionisanecessaryelementofthewrongofkillingorharmingsomeoneasameans.Infact,killingorharmingsomeonealmostalwaysconstitutesafree-standingmoralwrong;killingorharmingsomeoneasameansismerelyonewayofcommittingsuchabasicwrongwithoutjustification.Moreover,thekillingofciviliansisamoralwrongthatcanbecommittedintentionally,knowingly,recklessly,ornegligently.Thatwrongisjustifiableiftheciviliandeathsweretheunavoidableandproportionatecausalconsequencesoftheachievementofamilitaryadvantageoroftheactthatachievesthatmilitaryadvantage.Thatwrongisjustifiediftheachievementofthatmilitaryadvantagewasthereasonforitscommission.8

WealsoarenowinabetterpositiontoidentifyasecondproblemwithScanlon'sapproach.Scanlonstipulatesthattheconceptofmilitaryadvantageincludesdestroyingenemycombatantsorwar-makingmaterialsbutexcludeshasten[ing]theendofthewarbyunderminingpublicmorale.9Sincekillingorinjuringcivilianshardlyevercausallycontributestothedestructionofopposingcombatantsorwar-makingmaterials,Scanlon'sviewentailsthatciviliansmayalmostneverbekilledorharmedasameansofachievingmilitaryadvantagebutmayoftenbekilledasasideeffectofachievingmilitaryadvantage.However,Scanlondoesnothavetoendorsethemeans/sideeffectdistinctiontoreachthisresult,sinceitfollowsfromhisstipulation.

Despitereachingtherightresultregardingliabilitytodirectattack,Scanlon'srestrictiveunderstandingofmilitaryadvantageisnotultimatelyplausible.Forexample,itisundeniablymilitarilyadvantageoustopreventnon-uniformedcombatantsfrominterminglingwithacivilianpopulationandusingciviliansashumanshields.However,itis

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notjustifiabletopursuethismilitaryadvantagebyforciblyandpermanentlydisplacingthecivilianpopulationinwhichtheopposingcombatantsseektohide.Similarly,itisperfectlylegitimateforapartytoarmedconflicttocreatepoliticalpressureontheopposingpartytostopfightingandacceptthetermsofajustpeace,forexample,throughpropaganda.Whatisillegitimateistokillorinjureciviliansasameansofcreatingsuchpoliticalpressure.Thus,civilianimmunityfromdirectattackcannotbedefendedsolelybyrestrictivelydefiningmilitaryadvantagebutonlybyexplainingwhyitisimpermissibletokillciviliansasameansofachievinganymilitaryadvantage.(p.488)

1.3SideeffectsandindirectmeansThereisonelastissuethathasbeenraisedinthephilosophicalliteraturethatneedstobeaddressed.Iarguedabovethatdeathorinjurytocivilianscannotbejustifiedbyitscausalconsequencesornon-causalresults.Thisclearlyrulesoutdirectattacksoncivilians.Theremainingquestioniswhetheranattackthatisdirectedatcombatantsormilitaryobjectivesbutthatcausesdeathorinjurytociviliansasasideeffectcannonethelesstakethefurthercausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsofthedeathorinjurytociviliansintoaccountwhendeterminingtheoverallproportionalityoftheattack.Forexample,JeffMcMahanhaswrittenthat,althoughingeneral,civiliansmaynotbeharmedorkilledasanintendedmeansofdeterringfuturewarsthedeterrenteffectthatcasualtiesamongcivilianscanhavedoescountasagoodeffectincalculationsofwideproportionality.10Morenarrowly,FrancesKammhasarguedthatciviliandeathscausedbythedestructionofamilitaryobjectivemaybejustifiableifthesurvivingcivilianswillbetoogrief-strickentorebuildtheobjective,thussustainingthemilitaryadvantageproducedbytheinitialattack.11Inthesecases,civiliansareharmedbothasacausalconsequenceofachievingonemilitaryadvantageandasacausalantecedentofachievinganothermilitaryadvantage(orsustainingthefirstmilitaryadvantage).Doesthismorecomplexcausalstructuremakeamoraldifferencetothepossibilityofjustifyingdeathandinjurytocivilians?

Infact,thereisnodifferenceinmoralpermissibilitybetweencaseslikethoseconstructedbyMcMahanandKammandcasesinwhichadirectattackonamilitaryobjectivekillstoofewcivilianstosufficientlydeterordemoralizethesurvivorsandisthereforefollowedupwithadirectattackonsurvivingcivilians.Aswehaveseen,thecausalconsequencesandnon-causalresultsofciviliandeathsareexcludedfromcountinginfavourofkillingthem.Itismorallyirrelevantwhethercombatantsintendtobringaboutsuchexcludedoutcomesormerelyforeseesuchexcludedoutcomesandactontheconditionthattheywilloccur.Suchoutcomesshouldnotbesubjectivelyintendedbecausetheyareobjectivelyexcluded;combatantsarenotjustifiedinpursuingsuchoutcomesbecausesuchoutcomescannotrenderciviliandeathsjustifiable.Similarly,thereisnodifferenceinmoralpermissibilitybetweenthescenariosenvisionedbyMcMahanandKammandascenarioinwhichacombatantrealizesthatdirectingoneweaponssystematamilitaryobjectivewillcausetoofewciviliansdeathsassideeffectstosufficientlydeterordemoralizethesurvivorsandthereforeselectsamoredestructiveweaponssysteminstead.Thisisbecausecombatantscanonlyapplytherequirementofminimalforceaftertheyfirstidentify(p.489) thenon-excludedoutcomesofanattack;onlythencanthey

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determinehowtobringthoseoutcomesaboutwhilecausingtheleastpossibleharmtocivilians.

Neitherdirectattacksonciviliansnordirectattacksonmilitaryobjectivesthatkillciviliansasasideeffectcanbejustifiedbythecausalconsequencesornon-casualresultsoftheciviliandeathstheycause.Ifthecausalantecedentsofciviliandeathsareinsufficienttojustifythosedeathsthenthemerepresenceofthoseantecedentscannottransformthecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsofthosedeathsfromexcludedtonon-excludedbasesforjustifyingthosedeaths.Suchcausalantecedentsareredherrings,sourcesofmisdirectionratherthanjustification,andtheoperationscontemplatedbyMcMahanandKammaresimplyindirectformsoftheunjustifiablewrongthatinitsdirectformisknownasterrorism.

1.4LawandmoralityHowwelldotheLOACandICLreflectthemoralnormsdiscussedabove?TheLOACsucceedsadmirably.Theintentionalandknowingkillingofciviliansisprohibitedbytheprincipleofcivilianimmunity,whichforbidscombatantsfrommakingcivilianstheobjectofattack.12Therecklessornegligentkillingofciviliansisprohibitedbytheprincipleofdistinction,whichrequirescombatantstodoeverythingfeasibletodistinguishbetweenciviliansandopposingcombatantsbeforelaunchinganattack;13andbytheprincipleofdiscrimination,whichforbidsattackswhicharenotaimedtostrikeopposingcombatantsandmilitaryobjectiveswhileavoidingciviliansandcivilianobjects.14Theprincipleofdistinctionforbidsrecklessnessornegligencewithrespecttocircumstances(namelywhethertheindividualsattackedareciviliansorcombatants),whiletheprincipleofdiscriminationforbidsrecklessnessornegligencewithrespecttoresults(namelywhichindividualsareattackedinthefirstplace).Finally,theprinciplesofnecessityandproportionalitystatethatincidental(sideeffect)harmtociviliansisjustifiableifandonlyifthereisnolessharmfulwayofachievingasimilarmilitaryadvantageandtheharmtociviliansisnotexcessiveinrelationtothemilitaryadvantageanticipated.15

Bycontrast,ICLcapturesneithertheLOACnortheunderlyingmoralnormsgoverningthekillingofcivilians.Forexample,itisawarcrimeintentionallytodirectanattackatindividualswhomoneknowstobecivilians.16However,itisnotawarcrimetodirectanattackatcivilianswhomoneshouldknowareciviliansbut(p.490) whomoneunreasonablybelievestobeopposingcombatants.Norisitawarcrimetolaunchanindiscriminateattackthatisnotdirectedataspecificmilitarytargetbutratheratanentireareaorthatusesweaponsthatbytheirnaturecannotbedirectedatmilitarytargetsandawayfromcivilians.Similarly,itisawarcrimetolaunchanattackintheknowledgethatitwouldcauseincidentalharmtociviliansthatisclearlyexcessiveinrelationtotheconcreteanddirectoverallmilitaryadvantageanticipated.17However,itisnotawarcrimetocausegreaterharmtociviliansthannecessarytoachieveagivenmilitaryadvantage,ortocauseincidentalharmtociviliansthatisdemonstrablydisproportionatebutnotclearlyexcessiveinrelationtothatmilitaryadvantage.18

ThesegapsbetweentheLOACandICLaremorallyindefensible.Inparticular,thesegaps

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arenotwarrantedbythesupposeddifficultyofprovingthatacombatantactedrecklesslyornegligentlyduringarmedconflict,orthatlessharmfulmeansofachievingasimilarmilitaryadvantagewereavailable,orthatincidentalharmtocivilianswasexcessivebutnotclearlyexcessive.Concernsthatcombatantswillbefalselyconvictedarebestaddressedbydemandingstrictadherencetothestandardofproofbeyondareasonabledoubt,notbyadoptingweaksubstantivenorms.Itisnotcredibletomaintainthatforensicevidence,eyewitnesstestimony,and(increasingly)videorecordingsofmilitaryoperations,combinedwhenappropriatewiththeexpertanalysisofcurrentandformermilitaryofficers,cannevermeetthisstandard.Thefactisthatcombatantsdosometimesfireblindlyintocars,crowds,androomsinsteadofpositivelyidentifyingandpreciselytargetingopposingforces;theydosometimesuseprimitiverocketsandimprovisedexplosivedevicesthatarebytheirverynatureindiscriminate;andtheydosometimescausegreaterincidentalharmtociviliansthannecessarytoachieveagivenmilitaryadvantage.Unfortunately,evenclearcasesofunjustifiedwrongdoinginarmedconflictwillrarelybepresentedtointernationalcriminaltribunalsorcourtsmartial.Butwhentheyarepresentedtosuchcourtstheyshouldbeprosecutedandpunished,andwhenevertheyoccurtheyshouldbecondemnedaswarcrimes.

2LIABILITYTODIRECTATTACKIarguedabovethatthekillingorharmingofanindividualispresumptivelyamoralwrongwhichcannotbejustifiedbythecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsof(p.491)herdeathorinjury.Thisiswhatitmeansforanindividualtoenjoyimmunityfromdirectattack.Itseemstofollowthatforcertainindividualstolosetheirimmunityfromdirectattackisforthekillingofsuchindividualstobejustifiableeitherbyreferencetothecausalantecedentsoraccompanimentsoftheirdeathsorbyreferenceto(atleastsomeof)thecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsoftheirdeaths.Thepurposeofthissectionistoidentifyandcomparethecircumstancesunderwhichindividualslosetheirmoralandlegalimmunityfromdirectattack.

2.1LiabilitytodefensiveforceThemostfamiliarwaytoloseone'smoralimmunityfromdirectattackistobecomeliabletodefensiveforceor,puttheotherwayaround,tobecometheappropriateobjectofsomeoneelse'srightofself-defence.Forexample,ifsomeoneisliabletodefensiveforcethentheymaybeharmedasameansofeliminatingthethreattheythemselvespose(anon-causalresult)ortopreventordeterathreatposedbyothers(acausalconsequence).Inaseriesofimportantbooksandarticles,JeffMcMahanhasarguedthatindividualsbecomeliabletodefensiveforcewhentheyaremorallyresponsibleforanunjustifiablethreattoanotherperson.19AccordingtoMcMahan,moralresponsibilityforathreatrequires(i)thatonecausallycontributetothethreat,and(ii)thattheriskthatone'sconductwouldcausallycontributetothethreatwasforeseeableeveniftheriskwastoosmalltorenderonerecklessornegligentintakingtherisk.20McMahanarguesthatmuch(though,asweshallsee,notall)ofthemoralityofkillinginwarcanbeexplainedintermsofthemoralityofdefensiveforce.Ifsuchacontinuityofmoralprinciplesdidexist,itwouldsupportasimilarcontinuityoflegalprinciplesbetweenICLandordinarycriminallaw.

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ThereareatleasttwoproblemswithMcMahan'sviewofliabilitytodefensiveforce.First,responsibilityforanunjustifiablethreatisnotnecessarytobecomeliabletodefensiveforce.AsIhavearguedelsewhere,onecanbecomeliabletodefensiveforcebyposingajustifiedthreattosomeonewhohasnotforfeitedorwaivedherownrightofself-defence.21Forexample,supposethataTacticalBomberisabouttostrikealegitimatemilitaryobjectivethedestructionofwhichwillkillanecessaryandproportionatenumberofnearbycivilians.Ifthosecivilianshavedonenothingtolosetheirrighttoself-defencethentheyarejustifiedinkillingtheTacticalBomber.TheciviliansarenotmorallyrequiredtoallowthemselvestobekilledeveniftheTacticalBomberfightsforajustcause.Atthesametime,theTactical(p.492) Bomberhasdonenothingtoloseherrighttoself-defenceandisthereforejustifiedinusingdefensiveforceagainstthoseciviliansiftheyusedefensiveforceagainsther.22Indeed,McMahannowagreesthattheposingofajustifiedthreatcangiverisetoasymmetricalself-defensesituation.23

IsubmitthatMcMahan'sproposedcriterionforliabilitytodefensiveforceismoreplausibleasacriterionforforfeitureoftherightofself-defence.24Inotherwords,responsibilityforanunjustifiablethreatmightbewhatcausesonetoloseone'srighttodefendoneselfagainstthoseonethreatens.Itisforthisreasonthatunjustifiedaggressorshavenorighttodefendthemselvesagainstthenecessaryandproportionatedefensiveforceoftheirvictims.Bycontrast,ifthethreatoneposesisjustifiedthenoneretainsone'srighttodefendoneselfagainstthosewhoseektodefendthemselvesagainstthatthreat.Itisforthisreasonthatthosewhoposethreatstoinnocentothersthatarejustifiedasthelesserevilmaydefendthemselvesagainstthedefensiveforceofthoseinnocentothers.Finally,ifoneposesnothreatatallthenoneretainsone'srighttousedefensiveforceevenagainstthreatsthatarejustifiedasthelesserevil.25

Second,whilecausalcontributionandforeseeableriskseemsufficienttomakeoneresponsibleforthethreatsoneposesandliabletodefensiveforceonthatbasis(whatwemayrefertoasprimaryresponsibilityandprimaryliability)theydonotseemsufficienttomakeoneresponsibleforthethreatsposedbyothersorliabletodefensiveforceonthatbasis(whatwemayrefertoasderivativeresponsibilityandderivativeliability).Atseveralpoints,McMahandrawsparallelsbetweenderivativeliabilitytodefensiveforceandderivativeliabilitytopunishment,invokingthedoctrineofcriminalcomplicitytosupporthispositiononkillinginwar.Forexample,McMahanwritesthatcivilianscanbeinstigatorsofunjustwars,oraidersandabettorswhoshareresponsibilityforunjustactsofwarperpetratedbyunjustcombatants.26McMahanconcludesthatcivilianscanbecomemorallyliabletodirect(p.493) attackthroughparticipationinthegeneralwareffortandwar-sustainingactivities,forexample,byadvocatingwar,lobbyingpoliticianstosupportwar,votingforcandidatesthatsupportwar,payingtaxesthatfundthewareffort,workinginthedefenceindustry,andwrongfullyfailingtoopposethewar.27

However,acloseexaminationofcriminalcomplicityunderminesratherthansupportsMcMahan'sposition.First,observethatcomplicityinthecrimeofanotherpersongenerallyrequiresthespecificintention(notmereforeseeability)tocontributecausallytotheperpetrator'sconduct,inadditiontothementalstateregardingtheresultsofthat

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conductthatisrequiredfortheperpetrator'scommissionofthecrime.Furthermore,anaccomplicemustcausallycontributetotheperpetrator'scommissionofthecrime,andnotmerelytotheperpetrator'sgeneralcapacitytocommitsuchcrimes.Generally,thismeansthatanaccomplicemustaid,assist,enable,facilitate,orwrongfully(thatis,inbreachofaduty)failtopreventthecommissionofacrimetheperpetratoralreadyintendstocommitormustabet,procure,instigate,solicit,encourage,ororderthecommissionofacrimetheaccompliceintendsfortheperpetratortocommit.Bycontrast,onedoesnotbecomeanaccomplicetoacrimebyassistingtheperpetratorinordinaryaspectsoflife(forexample,bycookingfood,washingclothes,orprovidingreligiousormedicalservices)evenifthisassistanceindirectlycontributestotheperpetrator'sabilitytocommitcrimes.Ifcomplicityisnecessaryforliabilitytodirectattackthenitwouldseemthatmedicalandreligiouspersonnelinthearmedforces,aswellasmilitarycontractorsandcivilianemployeesofarmedforceswhoperformnon-combat-relatedfunctions,generallyretaintheirimmunityfromdirectattack.

Thesecondproblemwithviewingderivativeliabilitytodirectattackthroughthelensofcriminalcomplicityisthatthelensisitselfdistorted.Criminallawtheoristshavecogentlyarguedthatderivativeliabilitytopunishmentshouldrequirethatanaccomplicemakeanecessarycausalcontributiontotheconductoftheperpetrator.28Encouragingthecommissionofacrimetheperpetratoralreadyintendstocommit,orfacilitatingthecommissionofacrimeforwhichtheperpetratoralreadyhasthenecessarymeansandopportunity,shouldnotbeenough.29Moreover,itwouldbestrangeindeedifderivativeliabilitytodirectattackcouldrestonsuchabasis.Cheeringdepartingtroopsorsendingsupportiveletterstothefrontlines,evenifspecificallyintendedtoencouragesoldierstofight,doesnotseemsufficienttoexposeonetodirectattackevenifnecessarytoavoidthethreatposedbythosesoldiers.Indeed,itishardtobelievethatlocalswhoencouragearmedgroupsoperatingontheirterritorytherebymakethemselvesliabletodirectattackbyopposingforces.McMahancorrectlynotesthatitisseldomnecessaryoreffectivetoattackcivilian(p.494) supportersasameansofavertingathreat,butthepointhereisthatciviliansupportersareseldomnecessarytogeneratethethreatinthefirstplace.30Crucially,ifderivativeliabilitytodirectattackrequiresintentionallymakinganecessarycausalcontributiontoathreatposedbyanotherperson,thenmostciviliansparticipatinginthegeneralwar-effortorwar-sustainingactivitiesretaintheirimmunityfromdirectattack.

ItshouldbenotedthatMcMahanconceivesofdefensiveforceasameansofredistributingtheriskofwrongfulharmsawayfromthoseatriskandtowardthosemostresponsibleforcreatingtherisk.31ItisforthisreasonthatMcMahanthinksthatifonepersonisevenslightlyresponsibleforariskofharmandanotherpersonisnotresponsibleatall,andiftheharmcannotbedividedamongthemoravoidedbybothofthem,thenthenon-responsiblepersonmayshifttheriskentirelytotheslightlyresponsibleperson.However,toasignificantextent,McMahan'sreferencestoriskanddistributionaremisleading.WhatisreallyatissueiswhetherIcanharmyouasameansofavoidingharmtomyselfifIamnotresponsibleforthepossibilitythatImaybeharmedandyouareatleastslightlyresponsibleforthepossibilitythatImaybeharmed.Putthat

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way,McMahan'spositionseemslessplausible.AsMcMahanconcedes,sinceitissubstantiallyworsetodoharmtoothersthantoallowharmtoothersortooneself,itseemshardtoacceptthataslightdifferenceinprimaryresponsibilitywouldjustifydoingharmtoanotherpersonasameansofavoidingharmtooneself.32Indeed,itisevenhardertoacceptthataslightdegreeofderivativeresponsibilitycanjustifydoingharmtoanotherpersonwhoposesnothreatasameansofavoidingharmtooneself.Sincemostcivilianswhoparticipateinthegeneralwareffortorwar-sustainingactivitiesbearonlyslightandderivativeresponsibilityforspecificmilitaryoperations,theydonotseemliabletodirectattacktopreventthoseoperations.

2.2JustcauseandliabilitytodirectattackInhismorerecentwork,McMahanhasstatedthatliabilitytodirectattackisnotentirelycoextensivewithliabilitytodefensiveforce.Instead,McMahanbelievesthatthereareatleasttwobasesofliabilitytodirectattackinarmedconflict.Thefirstisresponsibilityforanunjustifiedthreat.Thesecondisresponsibilityforaninjustice(p.495) thepreventionorrectificationofwhichprovidestheopposingpartytoarmedconflictwithajustcauseforwar.33Forexample,civiliansparticipatinginthegeneralwareffortorwar-sustainingactivitiesmayshareresponsibilityforanunjustinvasionormilitaryoccupationasawholeeveniftheyarenotcomplicitinthespecificmilitaryoperationswhichconstituteitsparts.Similarly,prisonersofwarwhofoughtforanunjustcauseshareresponsibilityforthecreationorperpetuationofanunjustthreatorotherseriousinjustice.34AccordingtoMcMahan'ssecondcriterion,suchciviliansandprisonersofwararepotentiallyliabletobeharmedasameansofachievingajustcause.

McMahan'sconclusionrestsonthepremisethatajustcauseisacausethatmaypermissiblybepursuedbymeansofwar.35Thispremiseisnotobviouslytrue.Onemightinsteadsupposethatajustcauseisacausethatmaypermissiblybepursuedinthefaceofarmedopposition.Onthisview,combatantsdonothaveaspecialrighttokillthoseresponsibleforaninjusticeasameansofpreventingorcorrectingthatinjustice.Instead,combatantsretaintheirgeneralrighttousedefensiveforcetoprotectthemselvesorothersfromwrongfulharm.Themoralsignificanceofjustcauseisthatcombatantspursuingajustcausearerelievedofthegeneraldutytoretreat,surrender,oravoidconflictratherthanusedefensiveforce.36Thisconceptualpointisobscuredwhenastateactsinnationalself-defenceagainstanimminentorongoingarmedattack.Insuchcases,thelinebetweenpursuingajustcause(compellingtheopposingpartytoceaseitsattack)anddefendingagainstarmedresistance(fromopposingforcesthatrefusetoretreatorsurrender)iseasytooverlook.Asaresult,itiscommonlybutmistakenlyassumedthatthekillingofopposingcombatantsisaninherentmilitaryadvantagetowhichtheconstraintsofnecessityandproportionalitydonotapply.

Bycontrast,ifweallow,forthesakeofargument,thatarrestingterroristsordestroyingweaponsofmassdestructionmayprovideajustcauseforresortingtoarmedforcethenitbecomesclearthatcombatantsareonlyjustifiedinengagingopposingforcestotheextentnecessarytoachievetheirjustcause.Suchcombatantsmayengageindefensiveoperationsagainstthosewhoattackthem,oroffensiveoperationsagainstthosewho

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wouldotherwiseattackthem.37However,individualswhodonotandwouldnototherwiseengageinarmedresistancetothepursuitofthejustcauseormakenecessarycausalcontributionstothearmedresistanceofothers(p.496) arenotliabletobekilledmerelyasameansofachievingthejustcause.Inshort,liabilitytodirectattackderivesfromprimaryorderivativeresponsibilityforattacksoncombatantspursuingajustcause,notresponsibilityfortheinjusticethatgivesrisetothatjustcause.

Oneimportantimplicationoftheviewdescribedaboveisthatindividualsbecomeliabletodirectattackbyengaginginorcommittingthemselvestoarmedresistance,andceasetobeliabletodirectattackwhentheydisengagefromarmedresistanceeithervoluntarily(forexample,throughsurrenderordesertionorbytakingreservestatus)orinvoluntarily(forexample,throughillness,injury,orcapture).Bycontrast,pastengagementinarmedresistanceisnotabasisforliabilitytodirectattack.Theissueisnotmerelythat,asMcMahanobserves,itisseldomnecessaryoreffectivetousedefensiveforceagainstindividualswhosecausalcontributionstopresentorfuturethreats(or,forMcMahan,injustices)lieinthepast.38Theissueisthatoncetheircausalcontributionstopresentorfuturethreatshavecometoanendso,too,doestheirliabilitytodirectattack.So,contrarytoMcMahan'sposition,ontheviewproposedaboveprisonersofwarmaynotbeharmedevenasanecessarymeansofachievingthejustcausetheypreviouslyopposed.

2.3Directparticipationinhostilities,continuouscombatfunctions,andmeremembershipIngeneral,itisneitheraviolationoftheLOACnorawarcrimetodirectlyattackciviliansifandforsuchtimeasthosecivilianstakeadirectpartinhostilities.AccordingtoanimportantreportrecentlyissuedbytheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),civilianstakeadirectpartinhostilitieswhentheycommitaspecificactwhichmeetsthefollowingcumulativecriteria:

1.Theactmustbelikelytoadverselyaffectthemilitaryoperationsormilitarycapacityofapartytoanarmedconflictor,alternatively,toinflictdeath,injury,ordestructiononpersonsorobjectsprotectedagainstdirectattack(thresholdofharm),and2.theremustbeadirectcausallinkbetweentheactandtheharmlikelytoresulteitherfromthatact,orfromacoordinatedmilitaryoperationofwhichthatactconstitutesanintegralpart(directcausation),and3.theactmustbespecificallydesignedtodirectlycausetherequiredthresholdofharminsupportofapartytotheconflictandtothedetrimentofanother(belligerentnexus).39(p.497)

Inaddition,theICRCwritesthat[c]iviliansloseprotectionagainstdirectattackforthedurationofeachspecificactamountingtodirectparticipationinhostilities40butafterwardsregainthatprotection[u]ntilthecivilianinquestionagainengagesinaspecificactofdirectparticipationinhostilities.41

Thefirstcriterioncertainlyencompassesavarietyofactswhichwouldtriggermoral

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liabilitytodirectattack,suchasactslikelytoinflictdeathorinjuryonindividualswhoretaintheirrighttoself-defence.However,thefirstcriterionalsoencompassesactslikelytoadverselyaffectmilitaryoperationsormilitarycapacitywithoutnecessarilykillingorinjuringcombatantsorcivilians.TheICRCgivesanumberofexamples,includingsabotagingmilitaryequipmentandinterferingwithmilitarycomputernetworks.42Ordinarily,itwouldbedisproportionatetousedeadlyforceindefenceofproperty,eveniflessforcewouldbeinadequatetothetask.However,ifcertainpropertyisessentialtoone'ssurvivalthenonemaydefendone'slifebydefendingone'sproperty.Similarly,actswhichadverselyaffectmilitaryoperationsormilitarycapacitywillgenerallyeitherleavecombatantsvulnerabletoattackbyopposingforcesorcompelcombatantstochoosebetweenabandoningtheirpursuitoftheirjustcauseandpursuingtheirjustcauseatgreaterrisktothemselves.Givensufficientlyhighstakes,theuseoflethalforceagainstcivilianswhoseactionsadverselyaffectmilitaryoperationsorcapacitymaybeproportionate.

Thesecondcriterionrequiresadirectcausallinkeitherbetweentheactandtheharmlikelytoresultfromthatactorbetweenacoordinatedmilitaryoperationofwhichthatactconstitutesanintegralpartandtheharmlikelytoresultfromthatoperation.43AccordingtotheICRC,directcausationshouldbeunderstoodasmeaningthattheharminquestionmustbebroughtaboutinonecausalstep.44Itfollowsthataspecificactmakesoneliabletodirectattackifitiseitherlikelytocausecognizableharmwithouttheinterveningactsofothersorifitisanintegralpartofacoordinatedmilitaryoperationthatislikelytocausecognizableharmwithouttheinterveningactsofothers.Forexample:

[t]hedeliverybyaciviliantruckdriverofammunitiontoanactivefiringpositionatthefrontlinewouldalmostcertainlyhavetoberegardedasanintegralpartofongoingcombatoperationsand,therefore,asdirectparticipationinhostilities.Transportingammunitionfromafactorytoaportforfurthershippingtoastorehouseinaconflictzone,ontheotherhand,istooremotefromtheuseofthatammunitioninspecificmilitaryoperationstocausetheensuingharmdirectly.45

Thiscriterionseemslargelyinkeepingwiththeviewdefendedintheprevioussection,namelythatliabilitytodirectattackrequiresthatthethreatenedharm(p.498) wouldbeproximatelycausedbyone'sownvoluntaryconductorbytheconductofanotherpersontowhichoneintentionallymakesanecessarycausalcontribution.Intriguingly,theICRC'suseofthephraseintegralpartmightsuggestthatacivilianmustbeaco-principalandnotmerelyanaccessorybeforethefactinordertobecomederivativelyliabletodirectattack.However,theICRCelsewhereindicatesthatacivilianmaybecomederivativelyliabletodirectattackbytransportingweaponstothesiteofaspecificmilitaryoperationtobeperformedlater.46

Thethirdcriterion,requiringaspecificdesigntoopposeonepartyorsupporttheother,createsthemostinterestingcontrastbetweentheLOACandordinarycriminallawprinciplesofself-defence.Forexample,starvingorimpoverishedciviliansmayattemptforciblytotakefoodorsuppliesfrommembersofanarmedforcewithouttherebyintendingtoopposetheachievementofthatforce'smilitaryorpoliticalobjectivesorto

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supportanyopposingparty.SuchciviliansretaintheirimmunityfromdirectattackundertheLOAC,whilecombatantswhodirectlyattackthemcommitawarcrimewhichtheymayjustifyintermsofself-defenceordefenceofothers.Whilemoralliabilitytodefensiveforceturnsonresponsibilityforathreat,moralliabilitytodirectattackinarmedconflictadditionallyrequiresarmedresistancetotheachievementofajustcause.TheLOACadoptsthelattercriterionofliability,withtheimportantmodificationthatcivilianslosetheirlegalimmunityfromdirectattackbyresistingtheachievementofanymilitaryadvantage,evenbyanarmedforcefightingforanunjustcause.Onlyifthelattercriterionisnotsatisfiedwillrecoursebemadetocriminallawprinciplesofliabilitytodefensiveforce.

Aswehaveseen,civilianslosetheirlegalimmunityfromdirectattackbydirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesandregaintheirimmunityassoonastheirdirectparticipationcomestoanend.Bycontrast,membersofanorganizedarmedgroupactingasthearmedforcesofanon-statepartytoanarmedconflictlosetheirlegalimmunityfromdirectattackforaslongastheyassumeacontinuouscombatfunction.AccordingtotheICRC,individualswhosecontinuousfunctioninvolvesthepreparation,execution,orcommandofactsoroperationsamountingtodirectparticipationinhostilitiesareassumingacontinuouscombatfunction.47Suchindividualsareliabletodirectattackbefore,during,orafterdirectparticipationinspecificmilitaryoperationsandtheyregaintheirimmunityfromdirectattackonlyupondisengagingfromtheircontinuouscombatfunction.

TheICRCofferstwoargumentsinfavourofbasingliabilitytodirectattackontheassumptionofacontinuouscombatfunction.First,theICRCstatesthatitwouldgiveorganizedarmedgroupsanunfairadvantageoverStatearmedforcestoallow(p.499)theformerbutnotthelattertoenjoyimmunityfromdirectattackinbetweenspecificmilitaryoperations.48Thisargumentdoesnotseemparticularlystrong,sincetheunfairadvantageitidentifiescouldjustaseasilybecuredbygrantingStatearmedforcesimmunityfromdirectattackonthesameterms.Second,theICRCsuggeststhat,unlikecivilianswhosefuturedirectparticipationinhostilitiesisverydifficulttoanticipate,thosewhoassumeacontinuouscombatfunctioncanbereliabl[y]predict[ed]todirectlyparticipateinfuturehostilities.49Thisargumentseemssound,assumingofcoursethatitisjustifiabletodirectdefensiveforceatthosewhowouldotherwisecarryoutorparticipateinimminentorfutureattacks,eveniftheyarenotcurrentlycarryingoutorparticipatinginincipientorongoingattacks.Boththecommonlaw,bypermittingdefensiveforceagainstimminentattacks,andmoderncriminallaw,bypermittingdefensiveforcethatisimmediatelynecessarytopreventafutureattack,seemcommittedtothisassumption.

Onthisassumption,directattacksonthosewhoassumeacontinuouscombatfunctionwillalmostalwaysbeeitherjustified(bythefactthattheywouldotherwisedirectlyparticipateinfuturehostilities)orexcused(byareasonablebeliefthattheywouldotherwisedirectlyparticipateinfuturehostilities).Bycontrast,directattacksoncivilianswhohavedirectlyparticipatedinpasthostilitiesonaspontaneous,unorganizedor

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sporadicbasiswilloftenbeneitherjustifiednorexcusedsince[e]venthefactthatacivilianhasrepeatedlytakenadirectpartinhostilities,eithervoluntarilyorunderpressure,doesnotallowareliablepredictionastofutureconduct.50Indeed,itseemsplausiblethatcombatantswillbettercomplywiththemoralnormsgoverningtheirconductiftheydirectlyattackonlythoseindividualswhoareeitherdirectlyparticipatingincurrenthostilitiesorassumingacontinuouscombatfunctionthanifcombatantstrytoidentifyonacase-by-casebasisandthendirectlyattackthoseindividualswhowouldotherwisedirectlyparticipateinfuturehostilities.

Thisfinallybringsustomembersofthearmedforcesofastatepartytoanarmedconflict,wholosetheirlegalimmunitytodirectattacksimplybyenteringtheirstate'sarmedforces.Membersofstatearmedforcesmaybedirectlyattackedeveniftheyarenotdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesandeveniftheydonotassumeacontinuouscombatfunctionwithintheirarmedforces.Thisisespeciallystrikingbecauseprivatemilitarycontractorsandcivilianemployeesofthearmedforcesperformingnon-combatfunctionsarenotlegallyliabletodirectattack,unlessandforsuchtimeastheydirectlyparticipateinhostilitiesorassumeacontinuouscombatfunction.51Butmembersofarmedforcesperformingnon-combatfunctionsenjoynosuchlegalprotection.(p.500)

Nodoubtitisoftenextremelydifficulttodistinguishbetweenmembersofarmedforceswhoassumeacontinuouscombatfunctionandmemberswhodonot,perhapsevenmoredifficultthandistinguishingbetweencivilianswhoaredirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesandcivilianswhoarenot.Itthereforemaybeunfairtodemandthatcombatantsrefrainfromdirectattacksonopposingarmedforcesunlessoruntiltheyhavemadesuchdifficultdistinctions.Moreover,itwouldbeunjusttopunishcombatantswhoreasonablybelievethatthemembersofthestatearmedforceswhomtheyattackhaveassumedacontinuouscombatfunction.Nevertheless,theseconsiderationsdonotsupportasubstantivelegalliabilitytodirectattack,onlyaninversionoftheusualprecautionscombatantsarerequiredtotakeundertheLOAC.Forexample,theLOACrequiresthat,incasesofdoubt,combatantsmustpresumethatindividualsare(i)civilians,(ii)notdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities,and(iii)notassumingacontinuouscombatfunction.Bycontrast,itseemsreasonabletoholdthat,incasesofdoubt,individualsidentifiedasmembersofstatearmedforcesmaybepresumedtoassumeacontinuouscombatfunction.Thisseemsafairriskforthelawtoimposeonindividualswhovolunteertojointhearmedforcesoftheirstateorwhoareconscriptedbutneverthelesshaveanopportunitytochoosebetweentherisksofmembershipandthepunishmentforrefusal.

However,ifacombatantcomestoknowthatamemberofthearmedforcesofanopposingstateisneitherdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesnorassumingacontinuouscombatfunctionthenthecombatantisneitherjustifiednorexcusedindirectlyattackingthatindividual.Inotherwords,whilecombatantsmaynotdirectlyattackanindividualwhoisnotamemberofopposingstatearmedforcesunlesstheyreasonablybelievetheindividualisdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesorassumingacontinuouscombatfunction,combatantsmayattackamemberofopposingstatearmedforcesunlesstheyreasonablybelievethememberisnotdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesorassumingacontinuous

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combatfunction.Accordingly,itshouldbeaviolationoftheLOACaswellasawarcrimetodirectlyattackamemberofanopposingarmedforcewhomoneknowsisneitherdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesnorassumingacontinuouscombatfunction.52

Itmightbearguedthatmembersofstatearmedforces(exceptmedicalandreligiouspersonnel)havecommittedthemselvestofightiforderedtodosoandmaythereforebedirectlyattackedtopre-emptorpreventthemfromparticipatinginfuturemilitaryoperations.Thisisnotanimplausibleargument.However,theonly(p.501) membersofanarmedforcethataremorallyliabletodirectattacktopre-emptorpreventfuturemilitaryoperationsarethosememberswhowouldotherwisedirectlyparticipateinthosefuturemilitaryoperations.Ifamemberofastatearmedforcehasnotassumedacontinuouscombatfunctionthenitisunwarrantedtoactonthepresumption(thatis,unlessconfrontedbyevidencetothecontrary)thatshewilldirectlyparticipateinfuturemilitaryoperations.Theriskthatadirectattackonsuchanindividualwouldbeunjustifiableistoohighfortakingsucharisktobeexcusable.

3CONSTRAINTSONDIRECTATTACKInordinarylife,thekillingofanotherhumanbeingisbothapresumptivemoralwrongaswellasacrimewhichcallsforanexculpatoryexplanationintheformofajustification,anexcuse,oradenialofresponsibility.Inarmedconflict,bycontrast,theintentionalkillingofcombatantswhoarenothorsdecombatisneitheraviolationoftheLOACnorawarcrimeunlesscommittedtreacherouslyorperfidiously,suchasbypretendingtobesickorinjured,tosurrenderorcallatruce,ortobeamemberoftheUnitedNationsortheRedCross.Inotherwords,whilekillinganotherhumanbeingiscriminalexceptundercarefullyspecifiedcircumstances,killinganopposingcombatantiscriminalonlyundercarefullyspecifiedcircumstances.Putanotherway,ICLdoesnotconsiderthekillingofcombatantstobeajustifiableorexcusableoffence;rather,ICLdoesnotgenerallyconsiderthekillingofcombatantsanoffenceatall.Thus,questionsofjustificationorexcuseneverarise.Thekillingofcombatantsisgenerallyanon-eventunderICL.

OnemightconcludethatthisstructuraldifferencebetweenordinarycriminallawandICLreflectsopposingviewsofthevalueofhumanlife.Infact,thisstructuraldifferencemayreflectinsteadanattempttoincorporatejustificatoryelementsintotheoffencedefinitionsofvariouswarcrimes.Inotherwords,sinceonedoesnotwrongindividualswhohavemadethemselvesliabletodirectattack,combatantspursuingajustcausecommitnowrongbyattackingopposingforceswhoundertakeacontinuouscombatfunctionorcivilianswhotakedirectpartinhostilities.53However,evenindividualswhoareliabletodirectattackcanbewrongedifattacksagainstthemviolateothermoralconstraints,includingthoseagainstperfidyand(p.502) treachery.Accordingly,IwillarguebelowthattheunnecessaryordisproportionatekillingofopposingcombatantsshouldbeprohibitedbytheLOACandpunishedasawarcrime.

3.1NecessityandproportionalityIarguedabovethatthefirst-order,primaryreasonsnottokillorinjureotherhumanbeingsareordinarilyprotectedbysecond-order,exclusionaryreasonsthatprecludethe

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justificationofkillingorinjuringhumanbeingsbyreferencetothecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsofdoingso.Ialsoarguedthatatleastsomeoftheseexclusionaryreasonsceasetoapplytoindividualswhoposeorarecomplicitinthreatstootherswhoretaintheirrighttoself-defence,andthatsuchindividualsmaythereforebekilledorinjuredasameansofovercomingthethreattheyposeorinwhichtheyarecomplicit.Bycontrast,theprimaryreasonsagainstkillingorinjuringsuchindividualsareleftstanding.Itfollowsthattheuseofdefensiveforceisjustifiableonlyifthethreatcouldnotbeavoidedwithoutusingforceatallorbyusinglessforceandifthemostseriousharmthreatenedtoanyvictimiscomparabletothemostseriousharminflictedonanyattacker.Otherwise,theprimaryreasonsagainstkillingorinjuringindividualswhoareliabletodefensiveforcewoulddefeatthereasonsinfavourofdoingso.

Itisalsonoteworthythattheharminflictedonindividualswhoareliabletodefensiveforceneednotoutweightheharmthreatened.Theuseofdefensiveforceneednotbethelesserevil,impartiallyconsidered,inordertobejustifiable.Thisistruedespitethefactthatordinarilyitisnotjustifiabletodoharmtoanotherpersoninordertoavoidacomparableharmtooneselforaninnocentthirdparty.Itseemsthatliabilitytodefensiveforcecancelsorannulsthemoralasymmetrybetweendoingandallowingharm.Sinceindividualsmayactjustifiablyonthebasisofanyundefeatedreason,includingeitheroftwoopposingreasonsofcomparableweight,itisjustifiabletoinflictharmonindividualsliabletodefensiveforceeitherasameansorasasideeffectofpreventingcomparableharmtooneselforothers.54Bycontrast,itisonlyjustifiabletoinflictharmonindividualsnotliabletodefensiveforceasasideeffect(butnotasameans)ofpreventingsubstantiallygreaterharmtooneselforothers.(p.503)

Therequirementofminimumforceentailsthatcombatantsmustofferopposingforcesanopportunitytosurrenderandbetakenprisonerwheneverdoingsowillnotinvolvesignificantlygreaterriskthanusingdeadlyforce.Inaddition,partiestoarmedconflictmayhaveanobligationtodevelopnon-lethalweaponsandusethemwheretheyarelikelytobeeffective.However,giventhenear-universaluseoflethalweaponsinarmedconflict,therequirementofcomparableharmwillalmostalwaysbesatisfiedorreasonablybelievedtobesatisfied.Moreover,theunusualcircumstancesofarmedconflictgenerallypermitcombatantstokillopposingcombatantsinordertopreventinjurytothemselves.First,aninjurymayrenderacombatantmorevulnerabletolaterlethalattackandshemaythereforedefendherlifebydefendingagainstsuchaninjury.Second,aninjurymayrenderacombatantunableorlessabletodefendothers(particularlyhercomradesorcivilians)fromlaterlethalattackandshemaythereforedefendtheirlivesbydefendingagainstsuchaninjury.Finally,aninjurymayforceacombatanttochoosebetweengivingupherpursuitofajustcauseandpursuingthatjustcauseatgreaterrisktoherself.Givensufficientlyhighstakes,deadlyforcemaybeaproportionatemeansofpreventingsuchaninjury.

Themostdifficultquestionssurroundingnecessityandproportionalityinarmedconflictdonotrelatetothreatsfacedbycombatantsindiscretetacticalsituations,butrathertothemilitaryadvantageswhichcombatantspursueaspartofanoverallstrategytoachieve

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militaryvictory.Asproposedearlier,itisthepursuitofmilitaryvictoryinajustcausethatmakesitjustifiableforcombatantstousedefensiveforce,bothreactivelyandpre-emptively,ratherthanretreating,surrendering,orotherwiseavoidingengagementwithopposingforces.Onthisview,combatantsfightingforajustcausearejustifiedinengagingopposingforces(whentheycouldsafelyavoiddoingso)onlywhennecessarytosecureamilitaryadvantagethatisinturnanecessarypartofajuststrategyforattainingmilitaryvictory.Forpresentpurposes,amilitaryadvantageisanyeventthatcontributestomilitaryvictory;militaryvictoryisachievedwhenopposingforcesarerenderedunwillingorunabletoengageinarmedresistance;andajuststrategyisonethatwouldachieveajustcauseatnecessaryandproportionatecosttoothers.55

Ontheviewproposed,thekillingofcombatantsisunnecessaryifthecombatantdeathsdonotcausallycontributetotheachievementofamilitaryadvantage(forexample,iftheyarekilledinthefinalhoursbeforeapeacetreatygoesintoeffect)orifasimilarmilitaryadvantagecouldbeachievedwithoutkillingthem(forexample,bytakingthemprisoner).Similarly,ifsecuringamilitaryadvantagewouldnotmakeanecessarycontributiontoajuststrategythencombatantsmaynotengageopposingforcesinordertosecurethatadvantage.Ofcourse,iftheachievementofamilitaryadvantageisanecessarypartofajuststrategythentheexpectedharmtoopposing(p.504) forcescannotbedisproportionateinastrictsense.Thisisbecausethetotalharmtoopposingforcescalledforbyajuststrategyisbydefinitionoutweighedbythevalueofthejustcause.However,sincemilitarystrategiesarecraftedandimplementedunderconditionsofpredictiveuncertainty,onecouldconsideritdisproportionatetoengagewithopposingforcesinpursuitofamilitaryadvantagethatwillonlyslightlyincreasethelikelihoodofmilitaryvictory(forexample,ifalargenumberofopposingforcesaredefendingaremote,fixedpositionthecaptureofwhichwouldjustbarelyincreasethelikelihoodofmilitaryvictory).

3.2Anewwarcrime?AlthoughthereisnospecificruleoftheLOACexpresslyprohibitingtheunnecessaryordisproportionatekillingofcombatantsorciviliansdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities,theICRChasrecentlyassertedthatsuchkillingsviolategeneralprinciplesoftheLOAC.Specifically,[i]ntheabsenceofexpressregulation,thekindanddegreeofforcepermissibleinattacksagainstlegitimatemilitarytargetsshouldbedetermined,firstofall,basedonthefundamentalprinciplesofmilitarynecessityandhumanity56

Today,theprincipleofmilitarynecessityisgenerallyrecognizedtopermitonlythatdegreeandkindofforce,nototherwiseprohibitedbythelawofarmedconflict,thatisrequiredinordertoachievethelegitimatepurposeoftheconflict,namelythecompleteorpartialsubmissionoftheenemyattheearliestpossiblemomentwiththeminimumexpenditureoflifeandresources.Complementingandimplicitintheprincipleofmilitarynecessityistheprincipleofhumanity,whichforbidstheinflictionofsuffering,injuryordestructionnotactuallynecessaryfortheaccomplishmentoflegitimatemilitarypurposes.57

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TheICRCconcludesthat:[i]nconjunction,theprinciplesofmilitarynecessityandofhumanityreducethesumtotalofpermissiblemilitaryactionfromthatwhichIHLdoesnotexpresslyprohibittothatwhichisactuallynecessaryfortheaccomplishmentofalegitimatemilitarypurposeintheprevailingcircumstances.58Forexample,theICRCstatesthatitwoulddefybasicnotionsofhumanitytokillanadversaryortorefrainfromgivinghimorheranopportunitytosurrenderwheretheremanifestlyisnonecessityfortheuseoflethalforce.59

Unfortunately,aswehaveseen,thekillingofcombatantsorciviliansdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities,evenifunnecessaryordisproportionate,isnotawarcrimethatrequiresjustificationorexcuse.Sincethereisordinarilydecisivereasontocriminalizeandpunishseriousmoralwrongdoingwhendoingsowouldpreventsubstantialoverallharmtoothers,thereisatleaststrongreasontomake(p.505) theunnecessaryordisproportionatekillingofcombatantsaninternationalcrime.Nevertheless,thereareatleasttwosignificantargumentsagainstcriminalizingtheunnecessaryordisproportionatekillingofcombatants.

First,provingthatkillingcertaincombatantswasunnecessarytoachieveagivenmilitaryadvantagerequiresacounterfactualanalysisofthestrategicandtacticaloptionsavailablebutnottakenatthetimethedecisionwasmadetoattack.Itisindeedimportantforcourtsnottoconvictdefendantsbasedonmerespeculationthattheycouldhaveachievedasimilarmilitaryadvantagewithoutkillingsomanyopposingcombatants.Buttherequirementofproofbeyondareasonabledoubtexistspreciselytoensurethatcourtsconvictonlyonthebasisofsufficientevidenceofanactualviolation.Thefactthatunnecessarycombatantkillingsaresometimesdifficulttoprovedoesnotentailthatthosewhichcanbeprovedshouldnotbepunished.Moreover,wheneverintentionallyharmingcombatantswillresultinincidentallyharmingciviliansthenecessityandproportionalityofharmingthelatterwilldependonthenecessityandproportionalityofharmingtheformer.SinceboththeLOACandICLalreadycallforthelatterinquiryitcannotavoidtheformer.

Inadditiontoproblemsofproof,determiningnecessityandproportionalitycanrequireresolvingdifficultnormativeissues.Forexample,giventhechoicebetweentwoormoremeansofachievingasimilarmilitaryadvantage,isitpermissibletochooseameansthatwillkillmoreopposingcombatantsbutresultinfewerlossestoone'sownforces,orfewerlossestocivilians,orthatissubstantiallymorelikelytoachievethemilitaryadvantagesought?Thesethreeissuesforceprotection,civilianprotection,andlikelihoodofsuccessareindeedcomplex.Theyimplicatethedistinctionbetweenkillingandlettingdie,dutiesofloyaltyandotherassociativeobligations,andmoralchoiceunderconditionsofpredictiveuncertainty.However,theICRChasalreadysuggestedhowtheissuesofforceprotectionandcivilianprotectionshouldberesolvedasamatterofpositivelaw,statingthatoperatingforcescanhardlyberequiredtotakeadditionalrisksforthemselvesorthecivilianpopulationinordertocaptureanarmedadversaryalive.60Moreover,allthreeissuesmustberesolvedinordertomakesimilarjudgmentsregardingthenecessityandproportionalityofincidentalciviliandeaths.Thereisnoobviousreasonnottoconfronttheseissuesinthecontextofcombatantdeathsaswell.

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4CONCLUSIONInordertoevaluatethecurrentcontentandfuturedirectionofinternationalcriminallaw,wemustfirstimproveourunderstandingofthemoralnormsgoverning(p.506) armedconflict.Ihavearguedthatmoralimmunityfromdirectattackisbestunderstoodasexcludingthecausalconsequencesornon-causalresultsofkillingorinjuringindividualsfromcountingtowardthejustificationoftheirdeathorinjury;thatmoralliabilitytodirectattackrequireseitherposingathreattoindividualswhoretaintheirrighttoself-defenceorcomplicityinthethreatsposedbyotherstosuchindividuals;andthatmoralliabilitytodirectattackisconstrainedbymoralnormsofnecessityandproportionality.Onthesegrounds,Ihavearguedthatinternationalcriminallawshouldcondemnandpunishaswarcrimesthereckless,negligent,andunnecessarykillingofciviliansnotdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities;directattacksonmembersofstatearmedforceswhomtheattackerknowsareneitherdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesnorassumingacontinuouscombatfunction;aswellastheunnecessaryordisproportionatekillingorinjuringofcombatantsorofciviliansdirectlyparticipatinginhostilities.Implementingtheserecommendationswouldgoalongwaytowardbringinginternationalcriminallawintoalignmentwithitsphilosophicalfoundations.

Notes:(1)Itshouldbenotedattheoutsetthatthechapterexaminesonlythemoralnormsapplicabletotheconductofarmedconflictbycombatantsfightingforajustcause.Inpartthisisbecausemostcombatantsclaimtofightforajustcauseandsuchclaimsareoftendifficulttodecisivelyrefute.Often,themostthelawcanhopetoachievewillbetoholdcombatantstothemoralnormsthatwouldapplytothemiftheirclaimstofightforajustcauseweretrue.

(2)TMScanlon,MoralDimensions:Permissibility,Meaning,Blame(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2008),289.

(3)ThisdiscussiondrawsonJGardner,JustificationandReasons,inASimesterandATHSmith(eds),HarmandCulpability(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1996),103.

(4)Scanlon,MoralDimensions,238.

(5)Theconceptsofmandatorynorms,primaryreasons,andexclusionaryreasonswereintroducedinJRaz,PracticalReasonandNorms(revedn;Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).

(6)ThisaccountwasoriginallypresentedinAAHaque,Torture,Terror,andtheInversionofMoralPrinciple(2007)10NewCriminalLawReview613.Inotethere(at640)that,forthresholddeontologists,thecausalconsequencesandnon-causalresultsofkillingciviliansareexcludedonlybelowaquantitativeorqualitativethreshold.

(7)VTadros,WrongdoingandMotivation(thisvolume).

(8)Moreprecisely,acombatantmustacteitherwiththeintentionofachievingthemilitary

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advantageorontheconditionthatthemilitaryadvantagewillbeachievedandforanotherpermissiblepurpose.Haque,Torture,Terror,andtheInversionofMoralPrinciple,648.

(9)Scanlon,MoralDimensions,289.

(10)JMcMahan,KillinginWar(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),211.

(11)FMKamm,FailuresofJustWarTheory:Terror,Harm,andJustice(2004)114Ethics650,6689,nn267;FMKamm,TerrorismandSeveralMoralDistinctions(2006)12LegalTheory19,412,41,n21.

(12)ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andRelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofInternationalArmedConflicts(ProtocolI),art51(2),8June1977,1125UNTS3.

(13)Ibidart48.

(14)Ibidart51(4).

(15)Ibidarts57(3)(necessity)and51(5)(b)(proportionality).

(16)RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,art8(2)(b)(i),17July1998,UNDocA/CONF183/9.

(17)Ibidart8(2)(b)(iv).

(18)IdiscusssomeoftheseissuesatgreaterlengthinAAHaque,ProtectingandRespectingCivilians:SubstantiveandStructuralDefectsoftheRomeStatute(2011)14NewCriminalLawReview(forthcoming).

(19)McMahan,KillinginWar,35.

(20)Ibid177.McMahanreferstoobjectivejustificationratherthanjustifiabilitybutIbelievethatforthepurposesofthissectionthetwoconceptsareequivalent.

(21)AAHaque,RightsandLiabilitiesatWar,inPHRobinson,SGarveyandKFerzan(eds),CriminalLawConversations(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),395.

(22)Interestingly,becausethecivilianstakeuparmsinself-defenceratherthantotakesidesintheconflict,theyarenottakingdirectpartinhostilitiesandthereforedonotlosetheirlegalimmunityfromdirectattack.TheTacticalBombersdirectattackontheciviliansthereforeviolatestheLOACandconstitutesawarcrime,althoughtheTacticalBombermayclaimself-defenceifchargedwithawarcrime.

(23)McMahan,KillinginWar,412and238,n3(MyanalysisofthemistakeisslightlydifferentfromHaques).

(24)Haque,RightsandLiabilitiesatWar.DRMapel,MoralLiabilitytoDefensiveKilling

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andSymmetricalSelf-defense(2009)18JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy198.

(25)AsimilardynamicisvividlycapturedbyVeraBergelsonscaseofJackandJill:AssumethatcriminalsconditionedthereleaseoftheircaptivesonJacksrapeofJill.Realizingthatthisistheonlywaytosaveseverallives,includingJillsown,Jackreluctantlyagrees.Jill,ontheotherhand,vehementlyproteststhatshewouldratherdiethanbeviolated.WhenJackattemptstooverpowerher,JillfightsbackandseriouslyinjuresJack.VBergelson,Rights,Wrongs,andComparativeJustifications(2007)28CardozoLawReview101,113.If,asBergelsonbelieves,rapecanbejustifiedasameansofpreventingagreaterevilthenBergelsoniscorrectthatbothJackandJillactjustifiably.

(26)McMahan,KillinginWar,208.

(27)Ibid21415.

(28)JDressler,ReassessingtheTheoreticalUnderpinningsofAccompliceLiability:NewSolutionstoanOldProblem(1985)37HastingsLawJournal91.

(29)ButseeWilcoxvJeffery[1951]1AllER464,KB(findingaccompliceliabilityonthebasisoftrivialandunnecessarycausalcontribution).

(30)Itmustbeadmittedthatscholarswhoassertthatderivativeliabilitytodirectattackrequiresanecessarycausalcontributiontoathreatposedbyanotherpersonhavenotproducedadetailedargumentinsupportofthatprinciple.LAAlexander,Self-DefenseandtheKillingofNoncombatants:AReplytoFullinwider(1976)5Philosophy&PublicAffairs40815.Nonetheless,somelimitationofthiskindseemsunavoidable.

(31)JMcMahan,TheBasisofMoralLiabilitytoDefensiveKilling(2005)15PhilosophicalIssues386,3945.

(32)McMahan,KillinginWar,178.

(33)JMcMahan,TheMoralityofWarandtheLawofWar,inDRodinandHShue(eds),JustandUnjustWarriors:TheMoralandLegalStatusofSoldiers(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),19,22.

(34)Ibid.

(35)Ibid5.

(36)Moreprecisely,combatantsarerelievedofthedutytoretreatorsurrenderonlyifthejustcauseforwhichtheyfightisproportionatetothetotalharmtheyexpecttoinflictinpursuitofthatjustcause.Asimilarviewissuggested,thoughnotpursued,inDRodin,WarandSelf-Defense(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2003),1328.

(37)Asdiscussedfurtherinthefollowingsection,offensiveoperationsarebestunderstoodintermsofthepre-emptiveuseofdefensiveforcebycombatantspursuinga

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justcause.

(38)McMahan,KillinginWar,226.

(39)NMelzer,InterpretiveGuidanceontheNotionofDirectParticipationinHostilitiesUnderInternationalHumanitarianLaw(ICRC,2009),46(availableathttp://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0990/$File/ICRC_002_0990.PDF).

(40)Ibid70.

(41)Ibid71.

(42)Ibid48.

(43)Ibid46.

(44)Ibid53.

(45)Ibid56.

(46)Ibid66.

(47)Ibid34(statingthatrecruiters,trainers,financiersandpropagandistsretaintheirimmunityfromdirectattack,asdoindividualswhosefunctionislimitedtothepurchasing,smuggling,manufacturingandmaintainingofweaponsandotherequipmentoutsidespecificmilitaryoperationsortothecollectionofintelligenceotherthanofatacticalnature).

(48)Ibid72.

(49)Ibid71.

(50)Ibid71.

(51)Ibid37.

(52)Inaforthcomingarticle,GabriellaBlumarguesthatmembersofarmedforcesmaybepresumedtoposeanimmediatethreatbutindividualmembersmaynotbetargetedifthereisreasontobelievetheyposenoimmediatethreat.GBlum,TheDispensableLivesofSoldiers(2010)2JournalofLegalAnalysis69.Bycontrast,thischapterproposesthatmembersofarmedforcesmaybepresumedtoassumeacontinuouscombatfunctionbutindividualmembersmaynotbetargetedifitisreasonabletobelievetheyareneitherassumingacontinuouscombatfunctionnordirectlyparticipatinginhostilities.Inaddition,directattacksonindividualsassumingacontinuouscombatfunctionarelimitedbytheconstraintsofnecessityandproportionalitydescribedbelow.

(53)Importantly,sinceliabilityisawrong-obliteratingjustificationratherthanawrong-overridingjustification,theconditionsofliabilitytodirectattackmaybeincorporatedinto

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anoffencedefinitionratherthanadefencedefinitionwithoutglossingoveranymoralremainderleftbehindbytheharmfulact.

(54)Asindomesticcriminallaw,defensiveforceneednotbestrictlyproportionate.Egdeadlyforcemaybeusedtopreventseriousbodilyinjury.Notealsothattheharmthreatenedtoanyvictimmustbecomparabletotheharminflictedoneachattackerindividually,ratherthanallattackerscumulatively.Itisnotdisproportionatetokillmultipleattackerswhoaretryingtokillyou.Bycontrast,itwouldbedisproportionatetokillmultipleinnocentsasasideeffectofsavingoneself.Whyaggregateharmtotheinnocentaffectsproportionalitywhileaggregateharmtoattackersdoesnotisanimportantquestionthatcannotbeaddressedhere.

(55)Ajuststrategymustalsojustlydistributeharmsamongthepartiestotheconflictaswellascivilians.Thejustdistributionofharmsisacomplextopicwhichcannotbeadequatelydiscussedhere.

(56)NMelzer,InterpretiveGuidanceontheNotionofDirectParticipationinHostilitiesUnderInternationalHumanitarianLaw(ICRC,2009),79.

(57)Ibid79.

(58)Ibid79.

(59)Ibid82.

(60)Ibid82.

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