deleuze, gilles. bergsonism
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T r a n s l a t e d b y H u g h T o m l i n s o n
a n d B a r b a r a H a b b e r j a m
Bergsonism
G i l l e s D e l e u z e
Z O N E B O O K S • N E W Y O R K
1 9 9 1
© 1988 Ur/one, Inc.
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No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a
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permission from the Publisher.
Printed in the United States of America
Originally published as Lc Bergsonisme
© 1966 Presses Univcrsitaircs de France
Distributed by The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Deleuze, Gilles.
[Bergsonisme. English]
Bergsonism / Gilles Deleu/.e; translated by
Hugh Tomlinson.
p. cm.
Translation of: Bergsonisme.
Bibliography: p.
ISBN 0-942299-06-x ISBN 0-942299-07-8 (pbk.)
1 . Bergson, Henri, 1859-1941. [.Title.
B24 )0 .B4JDJ{13 1988 87-34051
194—<lc i9 C IP
9 412 7 5 4 4
C o n t e n t s
Translator's Introduction 7
References to Rerason's Works 11
I Intuition as Method 13
II Duration as Immediate Datum 3 7
III Memory as Virtual Coexistence 51
IV One or Many Durations? 7 3
V HIan Vital as Movement of Differentiation 9 l
.1 Return to Rerc/son 11 5
Sous l l 9
Index 13 7
T r a n s l a t o r s ' I n t r o d u c t i o n
Thi s book was originally published in 1966 as part ol a series
ol short studies known as " In i t ia t ion Phi Iosophk |ue ." On lirst
impression, the subject matter appears unpromising. Although
I lenri Bergson was one of the most important and widely read
ph i lo sophe r s o l the lirst decades o l t h e t w e n t i e t h century ,
nowadays his work seems to be almost forgotten. As Kolakowski
says, 'Today 's philosophers, both in thei r research and in their
teaching are almost ent i re ly indifferent to his legacy." 1 Berg
son i sm is r educed to t h e s ta tus of a f o o t n o t e in h i s to r i e s of
philosophy, making a brief appearance in studies of "v i t a l i sm"
or " i r ra t ional ism."
But this first impression is misleading, I or Deleuze, Bergson
forms part of a "coun te r history" of philosophy. I le was a writer
like Lucre t ius , Spinoza, Hume or Nie tzsche " w h o seemed to
be part of the history of philosophy, but who escaped from it
in one respect or a l toge ther . " 2 In the 1950s and 1960s , it was
writing about philosophers of this kind that enabled Deleuze
to make his escape from the scholas t ic ism of post-war French
academic philosophy. He has descr ibed this task of escaping
the history of philosophy as follows:
B E R G S O N I S M
My way of get t ing out ol it at that t ime , was, I really think,
to conce ive of the history ol philosophy as a kind ol bug
gery or, what c o m e s to the same thing, immacula te con
c e p t i o n . I imagined m y s e l f ge t t i ng o n t o the back of an
author, and giving him a ch i ld , which would be his and
which would at the same t ime be a monster. It is very impor
tant that it should be his ch i ld , because the author actu-
allv had to say everything that I made him say. But it also
had to be a monster because it was necessary to go through
all kinds of decenter ings, slips, break ins, secret emissions,
which 1 really enjoyed. My book on Bergson seems to me
a classic case of t h i s . '
But Bergson is not just an exemplary target lor the philo
sophical perversion of the early Deleuze . Bergson's work has
provided Deleuze with materials lor his own tool box , lor the
manufacture of his own c o n c e p t s and his own war mach ines .
As he said to Claire Parnet,
Bergson, of course , was also caught up in French-style his
tory of philosophy, and yet in him there is something which
cannot be ass imi la ted , wh ich enab led him to provide a
shock, to be a rallying point for all the opposition, the objec t
of so many hatreds: and this is not so much because of the
t heme of duration, as ol the theory and pract ice of b e c o m
ings ol all kinds, of coex i s t en t mu l t i p l i c i t i e s . 4
Deleuze has himself taken up and transformed these Bergsonian
no t ions in his own errant campaigns lor cons t ruc t ive plural
ism, recent ly describing himself as an empir ic i s t engaged in
tracing the becomings of which mul t ip l ic i t ies are made up . '
8
T R A N S L A T O R ' S I N T R O D U C T I O N
T h e allinities between Deleuze and Bergson led Ciillian Rose
to speak of his work as " t h e new Bergsonism." 6 But this may
lead to a misunderstanding as Deleuze 's work is character ized
not by a f idel i ty to any master , but by a ser ies of transfor
mat ions of c o n c e p t s borrowed from a range of wri ters from
many discipl ines . Nevertheless , Deleuze and Bergson do have
a number of important " p r o b l e m s " in c o m m o n . In particular,
Deleuze 's work has been increasingly p reoccup ied with the
p rob lems o f " m o v e m e n t " and " t i m e " wh ich s o c o n c e r n e d
Bergson. His recent isolation of the c inematographic concep t s
of the " m o v e m e n t - i m a g e " and the " t i m e - i m a g e " grows out of
four "commentar ies" on Bergson's notions of movement, image,
recogni t ion and t i m e . 7
T h e t rans la t ion o f the Bergsonian t e rms in t h e b o o k pre
sents a special difficulty. Bergson's m o t h e r was from the north
of Ing land and he spoke the language from ch i ldhood . Many
of his major works were translated during his l ifetime and per
sonally revised by h i m . 8 We have not followed the t e rmino l
ogy adopted in these translations in three respects .
First, in the authorized translations, the key term "elan Vitaf
is rendered as "vital impetus ." Th i s version is not an entirely
happy one and has of ten been c r i t i c i z e d . T h e F rench word
"clan" has a m u c h b roade r range of sense than t h e F.nglish
" impetus ," from " m o m e n t u m " through "surge" to "vigor." We
have thus followed the pract ice of recent writers on Bergson
and have left "elan vital" in the French. Second , the authorized
t ransla t ions do not make a sys t ema t i c d i s t inc t ion b e t w e e n
" r e c o l l e c t i o n " and " m e m o r y " in the English. We have invari
ably rendered "souvenir" as " r e c o l l e c t i o n " and "me'moire" as
" m e m o r y " and have al tered ext rac ts from the Bergson transla
t ions accordingly. Third , the authorized translations have used
9
B E R G S O N I S M
an English neo log i sm " d e t e n s i o n , " as the i r rendering of the
word "detente." However, this only suggests one ol the range
of senses in which Bergson uses the word, that is " re laxa t ion ,"
in contras t to " c o n t r a c t i o n " (in o ther words, "de- tens ion") -
the N ixon-Brezhnev sense . I t does not , however, convey the
more act ive senses of the word: meaning "spring" or "expan
s ion . " Bergson often draws on this last sense w h i c h is used
technical ly in thermodynamics to mean the expansion ol a gas
that has been previously sub jec t to pressure. We have there
fore rendered "detente" by e i the r " r e l axa t ion" or "expans ion"
depending on the c o n t e x t , with the original in parentheses.
We have followed the authorized translations in translating
"duree" as "duration" and adopting "ex tens i ty" and "extension"
to translate Bergson's terms "e'tendue" and "extension." We have
translated bo th "e'eart" and "intervalle" as " in t e rva l " wi th the
F rench word in pa ren theses . D e l e u z e of ten uses Kant ' s dis
t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e "quaestio quid juris" and the "quaestio
quid facti" be tween the "question de droit" and the "question de
fait:** We have translated "en fait" and "en droit" by "in fact"
and "in pr inc ip le ."
We are grateful to l l rzone , Inc. and particularly to Ramona
Naddaff for suggesting that we translate this book . A number
of friends and colleagues have made suggestions and commen t s
and tried to remind us how English is supposed to read. In par
t i cu la r we would l ike to thank: Caro l ine Davidson, R o b e r t
Cialeta, Martin Joughin and Richard Wi l l i ams .
I lugh Tomlinson
Barbara I labberjam
London,
D e c e m b e r 1987
1 0
R e f e r e n c e s t o B e r g s o n ' s W o r k s
T F Time and Free Will, t rans la ted by F .L . Pogson, L o n d o n :
George Allen & Unvvin Ltd. New York: Macmillan & Co. , 1919.
Essai sur les donnees imme'diatcs de la conscience, 1889 .
MM Matter and Memon, translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and
W. Sco t t Palmer, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd . , 1911.
Mattered Memoire, 1 8 9 6 .
CE Creative Evolution, translated by Arthur Mitchel l , New York:
Henry Holt & C o . , 1911 (New York: Macmi l lan & C o . , 1 9 4 4 ) .
l.'Evolution creatrice, 1 9 0 7 .
ME Mind-Eneryv, t ranslated by I I . W i l d o n Carr, New York:
Henry Holt & C o . , 1 9 2 0 . L'Eneryicspiritucllc, 1919.
DS Duration and Simultaneity, translated by Leon J acobson ,
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merr i l l , 1 9 6 5 . Duree ct Simultaneity, 1922 .
MR The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, translated by R.
Ashley Audra and Cloudeslev Brc rc ton with the assistance ol
VY. 1 lorslall Carter. New York: Henry Holt & C o . , 1 9 3 5 . Les deux
sources de la morale et de la religion, 1 9 3 2 .
CM The Creative Mind, t r ans la ted by M a b e l l e L. And i son ,
Westport, C o n n e c t i c u t : Greenwood Press, 1 9 4 6 . La Pensc'e ct
lcMouvant, 1941.
11
B E R G S O N I S M
References to the original French are in parentheses. The 1)S
references are to the 4th Edi t ion . For all the o the r works, the
French references are, first, to the Centenary Edit ion (Presses
LIniversitaires de France) , and then to the 19 39 -1941 reprints.
12
C H A P T E R I
I n t u i t i o n a s M e t h o d
Duration, Memory, lllan Vital mark the major stages of Bergson's
philosophy. T h i s b o o k sets ou t to d e t e r m i n e , first, the rela
tionship between these three notions and, second, the progress
they involve.
Intuition is the m e t h o d of Bergsonism. Intui t ion is ne i ther
a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but a fully
developed me thod , one ol the most lullv developed methods
in philosophy. It has its s t r ic t rules, cons t i tu t ing that which
Bergson calls "precision" in philosophy. Bergson emphasizes this
point: Intuition, as he understands it methodologically, already
presupposes duration. "These conclusions on the subject ol dura
t ion were, as it seemed to m e , decisive. S tep by step they led
me to raise intui t ion to the level of a phi losophical me thod .
I he use of the word intuition, however, caused me some degree
of hesitation." 1 And to llotfding, he writes: " T h e theory of intu
ition which you stress more than that of duration only became
clear to me long afterwards." 2
But first and second have many meanings. Intuition certainly
is second in relation to duration or to memory. But while these
not ions by themselves deno t e lived reali t ies and expe r i ences .
• J
B E R G S O N I S M
they do not give us any means ol knowing (connaitrc) them with
a precision analogous to that ol science. We might say, strangely
enough, that duration would remain purely intuit ive, in the
ordinary sense of the word , i f i n tu i t ion — in t h e proper ly
Bergsonian sense — were not there as me thod . T h e lact is that
Bergson relied on the intuit ive me thod to establish philoso
phy as an absolutely "p rec i se" discipl ine, as precise in its field,
as capable ol being prolonged and transmitted as sc ience itself
is. And wi thou t the methodica l thread ol intui t ion, the rela
t ionsh ips b e t w e e n Dura t ion , M e m o r y and Ulan Vital would
themselves remain inde te rmina te from the point ol view ol
knowledge. In all of these respects , we must bring intui t ion
as rigorous or precise method to the forefront of Our discussion. 5
T h e most general methodolog ica l quest ion is this: How is
intuition — which primarily denotes an immediate know ledge
(connaissance) — capable of forming a method, once it is accepted
that the method essentially involves one or several mediations?
Bergson often presents intuition as a simple act. But, in his view,
s impl ic i ty does not e x c l u d e a qual i ta t ive and virtual mul t i
plicity, various d i rec t ions in which it c o m e s to be actual ized.
It is in this sense, then, that intui t ion involves a plurality of
meanings and i r r educ ib le mu l t i p l e a s p e c t s . 4 Bergson dis t in
guishes essentially three distinct sorts of acts that in turn deter
mine the rules of the me thod : T h e lirst conce rns the stating
and creat ing ol problems; the second , the discovery ol genu
ine differences in kind; the third, the apprehension ol real t ime.
It is by showing how we move from one meaning to another
and what the "fundamental meaning" is, that we are able to
red iscover the s imp l i c i ty ol in tu i t ion as l ived ac t , and thus
answer the general methodolog ica l ques t ion .
* • *
' 4
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
FIRST R U L E : Apply the test of true and false to problems themselves.
Condemn false problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level
of problems.
We are wrong to bel ieve that the true and the false can only
be brought to bear on solutions, that they only begin with solu
tions. This prejudice is social (lor society, and the language that
t ransmi t s i ts o rder -words [mots d'ordre], " s e t u p " [donnent]
ready-made problems, as if they were drawn out of " t h e city's
administrative filing c a b i n e t s , " and force us to " so lve" t hem,
leaving us only a thin margin of freedom). Moreover, this preju- '
dice goes back to ch i ldhood, to the classroom: It is the school
teacher who "poses" the problems; the pupil's task is to dis
cover the solut ions . In this way we are kept in a kind of slav
ery. True f reedom l ies in a power to d e c i d e , to c o n s t i t u t e
problems themselves. And this "semi-divine" power entails the
disappearance of false problems as much as the creative upsurge
of true ones . " T h e truth is that in philosophy and even else
where it is a question of finding the problem and consequent ly
of positing it, even more than of solving it . For a speculat ive
problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated. By that 1 mean
that its solut ion exists then, although it may remain hidden
and, so to speak, covered up: The only thing left to do is to
uncover it. But stating the problem is no t s imply uncovering,
it is inventing. Discovery, or uncovering, has to do with what
already exis ts , actually or virtually; it was therefore cer tain to
happen sooner or later. Invention gives being to what did not
exist ; it might never have happened. Already in ma themat ics ,
and still more in metaphysics , the effort of invention consis ts
most often in raising the p rob lem, in creat ing the t e rms in
which i t will be stated. T h e stating and solving of the prob-
' 5
B E R G S O N I S M
I cm are here very c l o se to be ing equivalent : T h e truly great
problems are set forth only when they are so lved ." 5
It is not just the whole history of ma themat i c s that sup
ports Bergson. We might c o m p a r e the last s en t ence of this
ex t rac t from Bergson with Marx 's formulation, which is valid
for pract ice itself: "Humani tv only sets itself problems that it
is capable of solving." In ne i the r example is it a case of saying
that problems are like the shadow of pre-existing solutions ( the
whole con tex t suggests the contrary) . Nor is it a case of*saying
that only the problems coun t . On the contrary, it is the solu
t ion that coun t s , but the problem always has the solut ion it
deserves, in t e rms of" the way in which it is stated ( i . e . , the
condi t ions under which it is de te rmined as p r o b l e m ) , and of
the means and terms at our disposal for stating it. In this sense,
the history ol man, from the theore t ica l as much as from the
practical point of view is that of the const ruct ion of problems.
It is here that humanity makes its own history, and the b e c o m
ing consc ious of that act ivi ty is like the conques t of freedom.
( I t is true that, in Bergson, the very not ion of the problem has
its roots beyond history, in life itself or in the elan vital: Life is
essentially de te rmined in the act of avoiding obs tac les , stat
ing and solving a problem. T h e cons t ruc t ion ol the organism
is bo th the stating of a p roblem and a s o l u t i o n . ) 6
But how can this cons t i tu t ive power which resides in the
problem be r econc i l ed with a norm ol the true? W h i l e it is
relatively easy to de l ine the true and the false in relation to
solut ions whose problems have already been stated, i t seems
much more difficult to say in what the true and the false con
sist when applied to the process of stating problems. Th i s is
how many philosophers fall into circular arguments: Conscious
ol the need to take the test of true and false beyond solut ions
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
into problems themselves, they are conten t to define the truth
or falsity of a problem by the possibility or impossibility of its
being solved. Bergson's great vir tue, on the o ther hand, is to
have a t tempted an intrinsic de te rmina t ion of the false in the
expression "false p rob lem." This is the source of a rule that is
complemen ta ry to the preceding general rule.
COMPLEMENTARY RULE: Take problems arc of two sorts, "nonexistent
problems," defined as problems whose very terms contain a confusion
of the "more" and the "less"; and "badh stated" questions, so defined
because their terms represent badlv analv/ed composites.
Ib il lustrate the first kind of problem Bergson c i t e s the prob
lems of 'non being, of disorder or of the possible ( the problems
of knowledge and being); as examples of the second type, there
are the problems of freedom or of intensi ty . 7 His analyses of
these are famous. In the first case, they consist in showing that
there is not less, but more in the idea of nonbeing than that of
being, in disorder than in order, in the possible than in the real.
In the idea of nonbeing there is in fact the idea of being, plus
a logical operat ion ol generalized negat ion, plus the particu
lar psychological mot ive for that opera t ion (such as when a
being does not correspond to our expec ta t ion and we grasp it
purely as the lack , the absence ol what in teres ts us) . In the
idea ol disorder there is already the idea ol order, plus its nega
t ion, plus the mot ive lor that negat ion (when we e n c o u n t e r
an order that is not the one we e x p e c t e d ) . And there is more
in the idea ol the possible than there is in the idea of the real:
' T o r the possible is only the real with the addition ol an act
ol mind that throws its image back into the past o n c e it has
been e n a c t e d , " and the mot ive of that act (when we confuse
' 7
B E R G S O N I S M
the upsurge of a reality in the universe wi th a success ion ol
states in a c losed s y s t e m ) . 8
W h e n we ask " W h y is there something rather than noth
ing?" or " W h y is there order rather than disorder?" or " W h y
is there this rather than that (when that was equally possible)?"
we fall in to the same error: We mistake the more lor the less,
we behave as though nonbeing existed before being, disorder
before order and the |*>ssible before exis tence. As though being
c a m e to lill in a void, order to organize a preceding disorder,
the real to realize a primary possibility. Being, order or the exis
ten t are truth itself; but in the false problem there is a funda
mental illusion, a "retrograde movement ol the true," according
to which being, order and the existent are supposed to pre
cede themselves, or to precede the creative act that const i tutes
t hem, by pro jec t ing an image of themselves back into a possi
bility, a disorder, a nonbeing which are supposed to be primor
dial. This t h e m e is a central o n e in Bergson's philosophy: It
sums up his c r i t ique of the negative and of negat ion, in all its
forms as sources of false p rob lems .
Badly stated problems, the second type of false p rob lem,
introduce a different mechanism: This t ime it is a case of badly
analyzed compos i t e s that arbitrarily group things that differ in
kind. Take for example , the quest ion ol whe ther happiness is
reducible to pleasure or not : Perhaps the te rm pleasure sub
sumes very varied i rreducible states, just like the idea of hap
piness. II the terms do not correspond to "natural articulations"
then the problem is lalse, lor it does not affect " the very nature
ol things.'"' I lere again, Bergson's analyses are famous: for exam
ple, the one in which he c o n d e m n s intensi ty as such a c o m
posi te . W h e t h e r the quality ol the sensation is confused with
the muscular space that corresponds to it, or with the quan-
18
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
tity ol the physical cause that produces it, the not ion of inten
sity involves an impure mix tu re be tween de terminat ions that
differ in kind, so that the question "by how much does the sen
sation g row?" always goes back to a badly stated p r o b l e m . 1 0
l ikewise the problem of freedom, in which two types ol "multi
p l i c i ty" are contused: that ol terms juxtaposed in space and
that of states which merge together in duration.
Let us return to the lirst type of false problem. I lere, Berg
son says, the more is mistaken for the less. But there are also
t imes when Bergson says that the less here is mistaken lor the
more : just as doubt about an act ion only apparently adds to
the act ion, when in reality it indicates a half-willing; negation
is not added to what it denies, but only indicates a weakness in
the person who denies. " F o r we feel that a divinely crea ted will
or thought is t o o full of itself, in the immensi ty of its reality,
to have the slightest idea of a lack of order or a lack of being.
To imagine the possibili ty of absolute disorder, all the more
the possibili ty of nothingness , would be tor i t to say to itself
that it might not have existed at all, and that would be a weak
ness incompat ib le with its nature, which is force It is not
something more but something less; it is a deticit ol the wil l ." 1 1
Is there a contradiction between these two formulations, where
nonbeing is somet imes presented as a more in relation to being
and some t imes as a less? T h e r e is no cont rad ic t ion if we bear
in mind that what Bergson is condemning in nonexistent prob
lems is the obsession in all its aspects wi th thinking in terms of
more and less. T h e idea of disorder appears when, instead of
seeing that there are two or more irreducible orders (for exam
ple, that of life and that of mechanism, each present when the
other is absent ) , we retain only a general idea of order that we
conf ine ourselves to opposing to disorder and to thinking in
"9
B E R G S O N I S M
cor re la t ion wi th the idea of disorder. T h e idea of nonbe ing
appears when, instead of grasping the different reali t ies that
are indefinitely substi tuted lor one another, we muddle them
toge ther in the homogene i ty of a Being in general , which can
only IK- opposed to nothingness, be related to nothingness. T h e
idea of the possible appears when, instead of grasping each exis
ten t in its novelty, the whole of e x i s t e n c e is related to a pre
formed e lement , from which everything is supposed to emerge
by s imple "real izat ion."
In short, each t i m e that we think in terms of more or less,
we have already disregarded the differences in kind between the
t w o orders, or be tween beings, be tween exis tents . In this way
we can see how the first type of false problem rests, in the final analy
sis, on the second: T h e idea ol disorder emerges from a general
idea of order as badly analyzed composi te , e t c . And conceiving
everything in terms of more and less, seeing nothing but dif
ferences in degree or differences in intensity where , more pro
foundly, there are differences in kind is perhaps the most general
error of thought, the error c o m m o n to sc ience and metaphysics.
We are therefore vict ims of a fundamental illusion that cor
responds to the t w o aspects of the false p rob lem. T h e very
no t ion of the false problem indeed impl ies that we have to
struggle not against simple mistakes (false solutions), but against
something more profound: an illusion that carries us along, or
in which we are immersed , inseparable from our cond i t ion .
A mirage, as Bergson describes the project ion backward of the
possible. Bergson borrows an idea from Kant although he com
pletely transforms it: It was Kant who showed that reason deep
within i tself engenders not mistakes but inevitable illusions, only
the effect of wh ich cou ld be warded off. Although Bergson
de te rmines the nature of false problems in a comple t e ly dil-
2 0
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
lerent way and although the Kantian cr i t ique i t se l f seems to
him to be a co l l e c t i on of badly stated problems, he treats the
illusion in a way similar to Kant. T h e illusion is based in the
deepest part of the intel l igence: It is not , strictly speaking, dis
pelled or dispel lable , rather it can only be repressed.^2 We tend
to think in terms of more and less, that is, to see d i l l e rcnccs
in degree where there are differences in kind. We can only react
against this intel lectual tendency by bringing to life, again in
the intelligence, another tendency, which is critical. But where,
precisely, does this s econd tendency c o m e from? Onlv intu
ition can produce and act ivate it, because it rediscovers dil
terences in kind beneath the differences in degree, and conveys
to the in te l l igence the cr i ter ia that enable i t to dist inguish
be tween true and false p rob lems . Bergson shows clearly that
the in te l l igence is the faculty that states problems in general
( the instinct is rather a faculty for finding s o l u t i o n s ) . " But only
intuition decides be tween the true and the false in the prob
lems that are stated, even if this means driving the intel l igence
to turn back against itself.
* * *
S E C O N D R U L E : Struggle against illusion, rediscover the true differ
ences in kind or articulations of the real.14
I he Bergsonian dual i sms are famous: d u r a t i o n - s p a c e , qual
ity-quantity, heterogeneous-homogeneous, continuous-discon
tinuous, the two mult ipl ici t ies, memory-mat ter , r eco l l ec t ion-
pe rcep t ion , c o n t r a c t i o n - r e l a x a t i o n * (detente), i n s t i n c t - i n t e l
l igence , the t w o sou rces , e t c . Even the running heads that
KTor a discussion of the problem of translating detente, see Preface (Trans.).
21
B E R G S O N I S M
Bergson puts at the top ol each page ol his hooks indicate his
taste lor dualisms - which do not , however, have the last word
in his philosophy. W h a t , there-lore, do they mean? According
to Bergson, a c o m p o s i t e must always he divided accord ing to
its natural ar t iculat ions, that is, in to e l e m e n t s which differ in
kind. Intui t ion as method is a method ol division, P la tonic in
inspiration. Bergson is aware that things are mixed together in
reality; in (act, exper i ence itsell oilers us nothing but compos
i tes . But that is not where the difficulty l ies. For example , we
make t ime into a representation imbued with space. I he awk
ward thing is that we no longer know how to distinguish in
that representation the two c o m p o n e n t e l emen t s which differ
in kind, the t w o pure presences ol duration and extensi ty. W e
mix extensity and duration so thoroughly that we can now only
oppose their mix tu re to a principle that is assumed to be both
nonspatial and nontemporal , and in relation to which space and
t ime , duration and extensity, are now only de te r io ra t ions . 1 5 To
take yet another example , we mix recol lect ion and perception;
but we do not know how to recognize what goes back to per
cept ion and what goes back to reco l lec t ion . We no longer dis
t inguish the t w o pure p r e sences ol m a t t e r and m e m o r y in
representat ion, and we no longer see anything but differences
in degree between percept ion-recol lec t ions and reco l l ec t ion-
perceptions. In short, we measure the mixtures with a unit that
is itsell impure and already mixed . We have lost the ground
of composi tes . T h e obsession with the pure in Bergson goes back
to this restoration ol differences in kind. Only that which dif
fers in kind can be said to be pure, but only tendencies differ in
kind." ' T h e compos i t e must therefore be divided according to
quali tat ive and qualified tendenc ies , that is, according to the
way in which it c o m b i n e s duration and ex tens i ty as they are
2 2
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
2 3
defined as movements, d i rec t ions of movements ( h e n c e dura
t ion-con t rac t ion and mat ter-expansion [detente]). Again, there
is some resemblance be tween intui t ion as method of division
and transcendental analysis: If the composi te represents the fact,
it must be divided into tendencies or into pure presences that
only exis t in principle (en droit).17 W e go beyond e x p e r i e n c e ,
toward the condi t ions of expe r i ence (but these are not , in the
Kantian manner, the condit ions of all possible experience: They
are the condi t ions of real e x p e r i e n c e ) .
This is the Bergsonian le i tmotif : People have seen only dif-
ferences in degree where there are differences in k ind . And
Bergson groups his major c r i t iques , which take many differ
ent forms, under this heading. His fundamental c r i t i c i sm of
metaphys ics is that it sees d i f ferences in degree be tween a
spatialized t ime and an eternity which it assumes to be primary
( t ime as de ter iora t ion , re laxat ion [detente] or d iminut ion of
b e i n g . . . ) : All beings are defined on a scale of intensity, between
the two ex t remes of perfection and nothingness. But he directs
a similar cri t icism at sc ience; there is no definition of mechanism
other than that which invokes a spatialized t ime, according to
which beings no longer present anything but differences of
degree, of position, of dimension, of proportion. There is even
" m e c h a n i s m " in evolut ionism, to the ex ten t that it postulates
a unilinear evolution and takes us from one living organization
to another by simple intermediaries, transitions and variations
ol degree . T h e w h o l e sou rce of the false p rob lems and the
illusions that overwhelm us lies in this disregard for true dif
ferences in k ind: As early as the first chap te r oi Matter and
Memory, Bergson shows how the forgett ing of differences in
kind — on the one hand be tween percept ion and affection, on
the o the r hand be tween percept ion and r eco l l ec t ion — gives
B E R G S O N I S M
rise to all kinds ol falsi- problems by making us think that our
percept ion is inextensive in charac ter : ' T h e r e are, in the idea
that we project outside ourselves states which are purely inter
nal, so many misconcep t ions , so many lame answers to badly
stated quest ions " I K
No text shows more clearly than this lirst chap te r oi Matter
and Memory how c o m p l e x the manipulat ion of intui t ion is as a
me thod of division. T h e representat ion has to be divided into
the e l emen t s that condi t ion it, in to pure presences or tend
encies that differ in kind. I low does Bergson proceed? He asks,
first, be tween what two things there may be (o r may not b e )
a difference in kind. His lirst response is that, s ince the brain
is an " i m a g e " among o ther images, or ensures certain move
ments among o the r movements , there cannot he a difference in
kind between the faculty of the brain which is said to be per
cep t ive and the reflex functions of the c o r e . Thus, the brain
does not manufacture representat ions, but only compl i ca t e s
the relationship between a received movement (exc i ta t ion) and
an executed movement ( response) . Between the two, it estab
l ishes an interval (ecart)., w h e t h e r it divides up the r ece ived
movemen t infinitely or prolongs it in a plurality of possible
react ions . Hven if r eco l l ec t ions take advantage- ol this interval
or, strictly speaking, "interpolate themselves," nothing changes.
We can, lor the m o m e n t , d i scount them as being involved in
another " l i ne . " On the line that we are tracing, we only have,
we can only have mat ter and movemen t , movemen t which is
more or less c o m p l i c a t e d , more or less delayed. T h e whole-
quest ion is knowing whether, in this way, we also alre-ady have-
perception. By virtue ol the cerebral interval, in effect, a being
can retain Irom a material o b j e c t and the ac t ions issuing from
it only those e l e m e n t s that interest h im. 1 ' ' So that percep t ion
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
is not the o b j e c t plus someth ing , hut the o b j e c t minus some
thing, minus everything that does not interest us. It could be
said that the o b j e c t itsell merges with a pure virtual percep
tion, at the same t i m e as our real percept ion merges with the
o b j e c t from which it has abstracted only that which did not
in teres t us. H e n c e Bergson 's famous thes is ( the lull c o n s e
quences ol which we will have to analyze): We perceive things
where they are, perception puts us at once into matter, is imper
sonal, and co inc ides with the perceived ob j ec t . Cont inuing on
this same l ine , the whole ol Bergson's me thod consis ts , lirst
of all, in seeking the terms between which there could not be a
difference in kind: T h e r e cannot be a difference in kind, but
only a difference in degree be tween the faculty of the brain
and the function of the c o r e , be tween the percept ion of mat •
ter and mat te r itself.
We are now in a position to trace out the second line, which
differs in kind from the first. In order to establish the first we
needed fictions: We assumed that the body was l ike a pure
mathemat ica l point in space, a pure instant, or a succession
ol instants in t ime . But these fictions were not simply hypoth
eses: They consisted in pushing beyond exper ience a direct ion
drawn from exper ience itself, ft is only in this way that we can
extract a whole aspect of the condit ions of exper ience . All that
is left now is to ask ourselves what fills up the cerebra l inter
val, what takes advantage of it to b e c o m e embod ied . Bergson's
response is three-told, f i rs t , there is allectivitv, which assumes
that the body is some th ing o the r than a mathemat ica l point
and which gives it vo lume in space. Nex t , it is the r eco l l ec
tions ol memory that link the instants to each o ther and inter
polate the past in the present, finally, it is memory again in
a n o t h e r form, in the form Of a c o n t r a c t i o n ol m a t t e r that
B E R G S O N I S M
makes the quality appear. (It is therefore memory that makes
the body s o m e t h i n g o t h e r than ins tan taneous and gives i t a
duration in t i m e ) . We are consequen t ly in the presence ol a
new l ine , that ol subjec t iv i ty , on which affcctivity, r e c o l l e c
t i o n - m e m o r y , and c o n t r a c t i o n - m e m o r y are ranged: T h e s e
terms mav be said to differ in kind from those of the preced
ing line ( p e r c e p t i o n - o b j e c t - m a t t e r ) . 2 0 In short, representation
in general is divided into two d i rec t ions that differ in kind,
into two pure presences that do not al low themselves to be
represented: that o f perception which puts us at once in to mat
te r and that o f memory which puts us at once in to the mind .
O n c e again, the quest ion is no t whe the r the t w o lines mee t
and mix together . Th i s m ix tu re is our e x p e r i e n c e i tsel l , our
representat ion. But all our false problems derive from the fact
that we do not know how to go beyond exper ience toward the
condi t ions o f expe r i ence , toward the ar t iculat ions o f the real,
and rediscover what differs in kind in the compos i t e s that arc-
given to us and on which we live. T h e s e two acts , percept ion
and reco l l ec t ion , "always interpenetrate each other , are always
exchanging something of their substance as by a process of end-
osmosis . T h e proper office of psychologists would be to dis
socia te t hem, to give back to each its natural purity; in this
way many d i f f icu l t ies raised by psychology and perhaps also
by metaphysics might be lessened. But they will have it that
these mixed states, c o m p o u n d e d , in unequal proport ions, of
pure pe rcep t ion and pure r e c o l l e c t i o n , are s imp le . And so
we are c o n d e m n e d to an ignorance alike of pure r eco l l ec t i on
and of pure percep t ion , to knowing only a single kind of phe
nomenon that will be cal led now reco l l ec t ion and now per
cep t ion , accord ing to the predominance in i t ol one or o the r
o l the t w o a s p e c t s ; and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , to finding b e t w e e n
2 6
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
p e r c e p t i o n and r e c o l l e c t i o n on ly a d i f ference in degree and
not in k ind . " 2 1
In tu i t ion leads us to go beyond the s tate of e x p e r i e n c e
toward the condi t ions of exper ience . But these condi t ions are
ne i ther general nor abstract . They are no broader than the con-
di t ioned: they are the condi t ions of real expe r i ence . Bergson
speaks ol going "to seek experience at its source, or rather above
that decis ive turn, where , taking a bias in the d i rec t ion of our
utility, i t b e c o m e s properly human e x p e r i e n c e . " 2 2 Above the
turn is precisely the point at which we finally discover differ
ences in kind. But there are so many difficulties in trying to
reach this focal point that the acts of intuition, which are appar
ently contradictory, have to be multiplied. Bergson, thus, some
t imes speaks of a m o v e m e n t that is exact ly appropriate to the
expe r i ence , some t imes a broadening out , s o m e t i m e s a tight
ening and narrowing. For, in the first place, the determinat ion
of each " l i n e " involves a sort of con t rad ic t ion in which appar
ently diverse facts are grouped according to their natural affini
t ies , drawn toge ther accord ing to the i r ar t icula t ion. But , on
the other hand, we push each line beyond the turn, to the point
where i t g o e s beyond our own e x p e r i e n c e : an extraordinary
broadening out that forces us to think a pure percept ion iden
tical to the whole of matter , a pure memor y identical to the
total i ty of the past. It is in this sense that Bergson on several
occas ions compares the approach of philosophy to the proce
dure of infini tesimal ca lcu lus : W h e n we have benef i t t ed in
expe r i ence from a l i t t le light which shows us a l ine of articu
lation, all that remains is to extend it beyond exper ience — just
as mathemat ic ians recons t i tu te , with the infinitely small ele
ments that they perce ive of the real curve, " t h e curve itsell
s t re tching out into the darkness behind t h e m . " 2 3 In anv case,
2 7
B E R G S O N I S M
Bergson is not o n e of those philosophers who ascribes a prop
erly human wisdom and equi l ib r ium to philosophy. To open
us up to the inhuman and the superhuman (durations which are
inferior or superior to our o w n ) , to go beyond the human con
dit ion: This is the meaning of philosophy, in so far as our condi
t ion condemns us to live among badly analyzed c o m p o s i t e s ,
and to be badly analyzed compos i t e s ou r se lves . 2 4
But this broadening out , or even this going-beyond does not
consis t in going beyond exper ience toward concep t s . For con
cep t s only define, in the Kantian manner, the condi t ions of all
possible e x p e r i e n c e in general . Here , on the o the r hand, i t is
a case of real exper ience in all its peculiari t ies. And if we must
broaden it, or even go beyond it, this is only in order to find
the ar t iculat ions on which these peculiar i t ies depend. So that
the condi t ions of expe r i ence are less de te rmined in c o n c e p t s
than in pure p e r c e p t s . 2 5 And, while these percepts themselves
are uni ted in a c o n c e p t , it is a c o n c e p t mode led on the thing
itself, which only suits that thing, and which , in this sense, is
no broader than what it must accoun t for. For when we have
followed each of the " l i n e s " beyond the turn in e x p e r i e n c e ,
we must also rediscover the point at which they intersect again,
where the d i rec t ions cross and where the t endenc ies that dif
fer in kind link toge ther again to give rise to the thing as we
know it. ft might be thought that noth ing is easier, and that
expe r i ence i t s e l f has already given us this point . But it is not
as simple as that. After we have followed the lines of d ivergence
beyond the turn, these lines must intersect again, not at the point
from which we started, but rather at a virtual point, at a virtual
image of the point of departure, which is itself located beyond
the turn in exper ience; and which finally gives us the sufficient
reason of the thing, the sufficient reason of the compos i t e , the
2 8
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
sufficient reason of the point of departure. So that the expres
sion "beyond the dec is ive turn" has two meanings: First , i t
denotes the moment when the lines, setting out from an uncer
tain c o m m o n point given in expe r i ence , diverge increasingly
according to the differences in kind. T h e n , it denotes another
m o m e n t when these l ines converge again to give us this t i m e
the virtual image or the dist inct reason of the c o m m o n point .
Turn and return. Dualism is therefore only a m o m e n t , which
must lead to the re-formation of a m o n i s m . Th i s is why, after
the broadening out , a final narrowing follows, just as integra
t ion follows dif ferent ia t ion. " W e have alluded e l sewhere to
those ' l ines of fact," each one indicating but the d i rec t ion of
truth, because it does not go far enough: Truth itself, however,
will be reached if two of them can be prolonged to the point ( ,
where they in tersec t In our opinion this me thod of inter
sect ion is the only one that can bring about a decisive advance
in me taphys ic s . " 2 6 T h e r e are, therefore , t w o successive turns
in exper i ence as it were, both in a reverse di rect ion: They con
st i tute what Bergson calls precision in philosophy.
Hence, a C O M P L E M E N T A R Y R U L E to the second rule: The real is
not only that which is cut out fse decoupe ) according to natural articu
lations or differences in kind; it is also that which intersects again Ise
recoupe) along paths converging toward the same ideal or virtual point.
T h e particular function of this rule is to show how a prob lem,
when it is properly stated, tends to be solved of its own accord.
For example , still in the lirst chapter of Matter and Memory, the
problem of memory is correct ly stated, s ince, starting from the
pe rcep t ion- reco l lec t ion compos i t e , we divide this compos i t e
into two divergent and expanded di rec t ions which correspond
2 9
B E R G S O N I S M
to a true difference in kind be tween soul and body, spirit and
mat ter . But we can only reach the solut ion to the problem by
narrowing: W h e n we attain the original point at which the two
divergent directions converge again, the precise point at which
recol lec t ion inserts i tself into perception, the virtual point that
is like the reflection and the reason of the departure point. Thus
the problem of soul and body, of matter and spirit, is only solved
by an ex t reme narrowing in which Bergson shows how the lines
of ob jec t iv i ty and of subject ivi ty, the lines of external obser
vation and of internal expe r i ence , must converge at the end
ol the i r different processes, all the way to the case of aphasia . 2 7
Bergson shows, similarly, that the problem of the immor
tality of the soul tends to be solved by the convergence of two
very different l ines: that of an expe r i ence of m e m or y and that
of a qui te different, myst ical , e x p e r i e n c e . 2 8 T h e problems that
are unraveled at the point at which three lines of facts converge
are even m o r e c o m p l e x : Such is the nature of consc iousness
in the first chapter of Mind-Energy. It should be noted that this
method of in tersect ion forms a genuine probabil ism: bach line
defines a probabi l i ty . 2 9 But it is a qualitative probabil ism, lines
of fact being quali tat ively d i s t inc t . In thei r divergence, in the
disart iculat ion of the real that they brought about according
to the differences in kind, they already cons t i tu ted a superior
empi r i c i sm, capable of stating p rob lems and of going beyond
exper ience toward conc re t e condi t ions . In their convergence ,
in the intersection of the real to which they proceed, they now
define a superior probabilism, one capable of solving problems
and of bringing the condi t ion back to the cond i t ioned so that
no dis tance remains be tween t h e m .
3 0
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
I HIRD R U L E : State problems and solve them in terms of time rather
than of space.50
This rule gives the "fundamental meaning" of intuit ion: Intui
t ion presupposes duration, it consists in thinking in t e rms of
duration. 1 1 We can only understand it by returning to the move
ment of the division de termining the differences in kind. At
lirst sight it would seem that a difference in kind is established
be tween t w o things, o r rather be tween t w o t endenc ies . This
is t rue, but only superficially. Let us cons ide r the principal
Bergsonian division: that be tween duration and space . All the
o the r divisions, all the o t h e r dualisms involve it, derive from
it, or result in it. Now, we cannot s imply conf ine ourselves to
affirming a difference in kind between duration and space. The
division occurs between ( I ) duration, which "tends" for its part
to take on or bear all the d i f ferences in kind ( b e c a u s e i t is
endowed with the power of qualitatively varying with i tself) ,
and ( 2 ) space, which never presents anything but differences
of degree ( s ince i t is quantitative homogene i ty ) . T h e r e is thus
not a difference in kind be tween the two halves of the divi
sion; the quali tat ive difference is ent i re ly on one side. W h e n
we divide someth ing up accord ing to its natural ar t iculat ions
(as with proport ions and figures that vary greatly from case to
case) , we have: on the one hand, the aspect of space, by which
the thing can only ever dilfer in degree from o ther things and
from itself (augmenta t ion , d iminu t ion) ; and on the o the r hand,
the aspect of duration, by which the thing differs in kind from
all o thers and from itself ( a l t e ra t ion) .
lake a lump of sugar: It has a spatial configurat ion. But il
we approach it from that angle, all we will ever grasp are dif
ferences in degree between that sugar and any o ther thing. But
B E R G S O N I S M
it also has a duration, a rhythm of duration, a way of being in
t ime that is at least partially revealed in the process of its dis
solving, and that shows how this sugar differs in kind not only
from other things, but lirst and foremost from itself. Th i s alter
ation, which is one with the essence or the substance of a thing,
is what we grasp when we conce ive of it in terms of Duration.
In this respect, Bergson's famous formulation, "I must wait until
the sugar dissolves" has a still broader meaning than is given
to it by its c o n t e x t . 3 2 It signilies that my own duration, such
as I live it in the impa t ience of waiting, for example , serves to
reveal o the r durations that beat to o the r rhythms, that differ
in kind from m i n e . Dura t ion is always the l o c a t i o n and the
environment of differences in kind; it is even their totality and
mult ipl ic i ty . T h e r e are no differences in kind e x c e p t in dura
t ion — whi l e space is no th ing o t h e r than the l o c a t i o n , the
env i ronment , the total i ty of differences in degree .
Perhaps we now have the means to resolve the mos t gen
eral of methodolog ica l ques t ions . W h e n Pla to formulated his
method of division, he t o o intended to divide a compos i te into
two halves, or along several lines. But the whole problem lay
in knowing how to c h o o s e the right half: W h y was what we
were looking for on one side rather than on the o ther? Divi
s ion c o u l d t he re fo re be c r i t i c i z e d for no t be ing a g e n u i n e
method s ince it lacked a "middle t e r m " and still depended on
an inspiration. In Bergsonism, the difficulty seems to disappear.
For bv dividing the c o m p o s i t e accord ing to two t endenc ies ,
with only o n e showing the way in which a thing varies quali
tatively in t i m e , Bergson effectively gives h imse l f the means
of choos ing the "right s ide" in each case; that of the essence .
In short , in tui t ion has b e c o m e m e t h o d , or rather me thod has
been reconc i led with the immedia te . Intuit ion is not duration
3 2
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
itself. Intui t ion is rather the movemen t by which we emerge •••
from our own duration, by which we make use of our own dura
t ion to affirm and immedia te ly to recognize the ex i s t ence of
other durations, above or below us. "Only the method of which
we are speaking allows one to pass beyond idealism as well as
realism, to affirm the e x i s t e n c e of o b j e c t s both inferior and
superior to us, though nevertheless , in a cer tain sense, inte
rior to us O n e perceives any number of durations, all very
dilfercnt from one another" (in fact the words inferior and superior
should not mislead us, they denote differences in k i n d ) . 5 3 With
out intui t ion as me thod , duration would remain a s imple psy
chologica l expe r i ence . Conversely, if it did not co inc ide with
duration, intui t ion would not be capable of carrying out the
program that corresponds to the preceding rules: the determi
nation of true problems or of genuine differences in kind
Let us return, therefore, to the illusion of false p rob lems .
W h e r e does it c o m e from and in what sense is it inevitable?
Bergson calls into quest ion the order of needs, of ac t ion , and
of socie ty that predisposes us to retain only what interests us
in things; the order of in te l l igence , in its natural affinity with
space; and the order of general ideas that tends to obscure dif
ferences in kind. Or rather there are very varied general ideas
that t h e m s e l v e s differ in k ind , s o m e referr ing to o b j e c t i v e
resemblances in living bodies, o thers to ob jec t ive ident i t ies
in inanimate bodies , and others again to subject ive demands
in manufactured o b j e c t s . But we are qu i ck to form a general
idea of all general ideas and to dissolve differences in kind in
this e lement of general i ty. 3 4 " W e make differences in kind melt
into the homogene i ty of the space which subtends t h e m . " 3 5
It is true that this c o l l e c t i o n of reasons is still psychological
and inseparable from our own condi t ion . We must take into
33
B E R G S O N I S M
considerat ion more profound reasons. For while the idea of a
homogeneous space impl ies a sort of art if ice or symbol sepa
rating us from reality, it is nevertheless the case that mat te r
and extensi ty are realities, themselves prefiguring the order of
space. Although it is i l lusion, space is not merely grounded in
our nature, but in the nature of things. Mat te r is effectively
the " a s p e c t " by which things tend to present to each other ,
and to us, only differences in degree. Exper ience gives us com
posites. Now the state of the c o m p o s i t e does not cons is t onlv
in unit ing e l e m e n t s that differ in kind, but in uni t ing them in
condi t ions such that these const i tuent differences in kind can
not be grasped in it . In short , there is a point ol view, or rather
a state ol things, in which differences in kind can no longer
appear. T h e retrograde movement of the true is not merely an illu
sion about the true, but belongs to the true itsell. Bergson adds
(dividing the compos i te "rel igion" into two directions — static
and dynamic r e l ig ion ) that in placing ourselves at a ce r ta in
standpoint "we should perceive a series of transit ions and, as
it were, differences of degree , whereas really there is a radical
difference in k i n d . " 1 6
The illusion, therefore, does not result onlv from our nature,
but from the world in which we live, from the side of being
that manifests i t se l f to us in the lirst p lace . Bergson evolved,
in a cer tain sense, from the beginning to the end ol his work.
T h e two major aspects ol his evolution are the following: Dura
t ion seemed to him to be less and less reducib le to a psycho
logical expe r i ence and b e c a m e instead the variable essence of
things, providing the t heme of a complex ontology. But, simul
taneously, space seemed to him to be less and less reducible
to a fiction separating us from this psychological reality, rather,
it was itself grounded in being and expressed one of its two
M
I N T U I T I O N A S M E T H O D
slopes, one of its two d i rec t ions . T h e absolute , said Bergson,
has two sides (aspects): spirit imbued with metaphysics and mat
ter known by s c i e n c e . 5 7 But the point is that s c i ence is not a
relative knowledge, a symbol ic discipline that c o m m e n d s itsell
only by its successes or its e f fec t iveness ; s c i e n c e is part of
ontology, it is one ol ontology's two halves. T h e Absolute is
di lference, but difference has two facets, differences in degree
and differences in kind. It can, therefore , be seen that when
we grasp s imple differences in degree be tween things, when
sc i ence itself invites us to see the world in this way, we are
again in an absolute ( " W i t h modern physics more and more
clearly revealing to us differences in number behind our dis
t inc t ions of quality " ) . 5 8 I t is, however, an il lusion. But i t
is only an illusion to the ex ten t that we project the real land
scape of the first slope o n t o the other . If the illusion can be
repressed it is because of that o the r s lope , that ol durat ion,
which gives us differences in kind corresponding in the final instance
to differences of proportion as they appear in space, and already
in mat ter and ex tens ion .
Thus intuition does form a method with its three (or five) rules.
This is an essentially problemati/.ing me thod (a c r i t ique of false
p rob lems and the invent ion of genu ine o n e s ) , differentiating
(carvings out and intersections), temporali/ing (thinking in terms
of durat ion) . But how does intuition presuppose duration, and
how, on the o the r hand, does it give duration a new ex tens ion
Irom the point of view of being and knowledge? Th i s is what
remains to be de te rmined .
IS
C H A P T E R I I
D u r a t i o n a s I m m e d i a t e D a t u m
Wo shall assume that the reader is familiar with the descrip
t ion of duration as psychological expe r i ence as it appears in
lime and Iree Will and in the first pages of Creative Evolution: It
is a case of" a " t rans i t ion ," of a " c h a n g e , " a becoming, but it is a
becoming that endures, a change that is substance itself. T h e
reader will no t e that Bergson has no difficulty in reconc i l ing
the two fundamental characteristics of duration; continuity and
heterogenei ty . 1 However, defined in this way, duration is not
merely lived exper i ence ; it is also exper ience enlarged or even
gone beyond; it is already a condi t ion of exper ience . For expe
r ience always gives us a c o m p o s i t e of space and duration. Pure
duration offers us a succession that is purely internal, wi thout
exter ior i ty; space, an exter ior i ty wi thout succession (in effect,
this is the memory of the past; the r eco l l ec t ion of what has
happened in space would already imply a mind that endures) .
I he two c o m b i n e , and into this combina t ion space introduces
the lorms ol its ext r ins ic dis t inct ions or ol its homogeneous
"iid d iscont inuous " s e c t i o n s , " while duration con t r ibu tes an
internal succession that is both heterogeneous and continuous.
We are thus able to "preserve" the instantaneous states of space
37
B E R G S O N I S M
and to juxtapose them in a sort of "auxil iary space" : But we
also i n t roduce ex t r i n s i c d i s t i nc t ions in to our dura t ion; we
decompose it into external parts and align it in a sort of homo
geneous t i m e . A c o m p o s i t e of this kind (whe re homogeneous
t ime merges with auxiliary space) must be divided up. Even
before Bergson had b e c o m e consc ious of intuition as method ,
he had to face the task of dividing up the c o m p o s i t e . Should
it be divided along two pure d i rec t ions? So long as Bergson
does not expl ic i t ly pose the problem of an ontologica l origin
ol space, it is rather a case of dividing the c o m p o s i t e in t w o
d i rec t ions , only one of which (dura t ion) is pure, the o the r
( space ) is the impuri ty that denatures i t . 2 Durat ion will be
attained as " i m m e d i a t e da tum" because it is associated with
the right s ide, the good side of the c o m p o s i t e .
T h e important thing here is that the decompos i t ion of the
c o m p o s i t e reveals to us t w o types of mult ipl ici ty . O n e is rep
resented by space (o r rather, if all the nuances are taken into
accoun t , by the impure combina t ion o f homogeneous t i m e ) :
I t i s a mul t ip l ic i ty of exter ior i ty , of simultaneity, of juxtapo
si t ion, of order, of quant i ta t ive differentiation, oi difference in
degree; it is a numer ica l mul t ip l ic i ty , discontinuous and actual.
T h e o the r type of mul t ip l ic i ty appears in pure duration: I t is
an internal mul t ip l ic i ty of success ion, of fusion, of organiza
t ion, of heterogenei ty , of quali tat ive d iscr iminat ion , or of dif
ference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous m u l t i p l i c i t y that
cannot be reduced to n u m b e r s . 5
* * w
Too little importance has been attached to the use of this word
"multiplicity." It is not part of the traditional vocabulary at all -
this is particularly not the case when denoting a continuum. We
3«
D U R A T I O N A S I M M E D I A T E D A T U M
shall see not only that it is fundamental in terms of the con
struction ol the method , but also that, even at this early stage,
it tel ls us about the p rob lems that appear in Time and Tree Will.
(These will be developed later) . T h e word "mu l t i p l i c i t y " is
not there as a vague noun corresponding to the well-known
phi losophica l no t ion ol the Mul t ip l e in genera l . In fact for
Bergson it is not a question of opposing the Multiple to the One hut,
on the contrary, oj distinguishing two types of multiplicity. Now, this ^
problem goes back to a scholar of genius , G . B . R . R iemann , a
physicist and mathemat ic ian . Riemann defined as "mul t ip l i
c i t i e s " those things that could be de te rmined in terms ol their
d imensions or their independent variables. He dist inguished
discrete multiplicities and continuous multiplicities. T h e former con
tain the pr inciple of the i r own met r ics ( the measure of one of
their parts being given by the number of e l emen t s they con
tain) . T h e lat ter found a metr ica l pr inciple in someth ing e lse ,
even if only in phenomena unfolding in them or in the forces
acting in t h e m . 4 It is c lear that Bergson, as a philosopher, was
well aware of Riemann 's general p rob lems . Not only his inter
est in ma themat i c s points toward this, but, more specifically,
Duration and Simultaneity is a book in which Bergson opposes
his own doc t r ine to the theory of Relativity, which is direct ly
dependent on Riemann. If our hypothesis is co r rec t , this book
loses its doubly strange character. In the lirst place, it does not
appear abruptly and without explanation. Rather, it brings into
the open a conf ron ta t ion that until then , had been impl i c i t
be tween Riemannian and Bergsonian interpretat ions of con
tinuous mult ipl ici t ies . Second, Bergson's renunciation and con
demnat ion of this book is perhaps due to the fact that he did
not feel able to pursue the mathematical implicat ions of a the
ory of mul t ip l i c i t i es . He had, in fact, profoundly changed the
3 9
B E R G S O N I S M
direction ol the Riemannian distinction. Continuous multiplici
ties seemed to him to be long essentially to the sphere of dura
t ion . In this way, lor Bergson , durat ion was not s imply the
indivisible, nor was it the nonmeasurable . Rather , it was that
which divided only by changing in kind, that which was sus
cep t ib le to measurement onlv by varying its metr ical princi
ple at each stage ol the division. Bergson did not confine himsell
to opposing a philosophical vision of duration to a sc ient i f ic
c o n c e p t i o n ol space but t o o k the problem into the sphere of
the two kinds of multiplicity. I le thought that the mult ipl ic i ty
proper to duration had, lor its part, a "p rec i s ion" as great as
that of s c i ence ; moreover, that i t should react upon sc i ence
and open up a path lor it that was not necessarily the same as
that of R iemann and Einste in . Th i s is why we must at tach so
much importance to the way in which Bergson, borrowing the
notion of multiplici ty, gives it renewed range and distribution.
I low is the qualitative and cont inuous mult ipl ic i ty ol dura
t ion del ined, in opposi t ion to quant i ta t ive or numerical mul
tiplicity? A difficult passage from Time and Tree Will is particularly
significant in this respect as it foreshadows the deve lopments
in Matter and Memory. It distinguishes the subjec t ive and the
ob jec t ive : " W e apply the te rm subject ive to what seems to In
comple te ly and adequately known; and the term objec t ive , to
what is known in such a way that a constant ly increasing num
ber ol new impressions could be substituted lor the idea which
we actually have ol i t . " ' II we confine ourselves to these for
mulations, we run the risk ol misunderstandings, which are for
tunately dispelled by the con tex t . Bergson in fact specifies that
an object can be divided up in an infinity of ways. Now, even
before these divisions are made, they are grasped by thought
as possible, without anything changing in the total aspect ol the
4 0
D U R A T I O N A S I M M E D I A T E D A T U M
o b j e c t . I hey are t he re fo re already v i s ib l e in t h e image of
the ob jec t : I von when not realized (but simply possible) , they
are actually perceived, or at least perceptible in principle. "This
actual, not merely virtual, apperception of subdivisions in the
undivided is precisely what we call object ivi ty." Bergson means
that the ob jec t ive is that which has no virtualitv — whe the r real
ized or not , whe the r possible or real, everything is actual in
the o b j e c t i v e . The first chapter ol Matter and Memory develops
this t heme more clearly: Mat te r has ne i ther virtualitv nor hid
den power, and that is why we can assimilate it to " the image."
No doubt there can be more in mat te r than in the image we
have of it, but there cannot be anything else in it, of a differ
ent k i n d . 6 And in a n o t h e r passage Bergson praises Berke ley
lor having assimilated body and idea, precisely because mat ter
"has no in ter ior , no u n d e r n e a t h , . . . h ides no th ing , con ta ins
no th ing . . . possesses nei ther power nor virtualitv ol any k i n d . . .
is spread out as mere surface a n d . . . i s no more than what it
presents to us at any given m o m e n t . " 7
In short , " o b j e c t " and " o b j e c t i v e " deno te not only what is
divided, but what, in dividing, does not change in kind. It is
thus what divides by differences in degree . 8 T h e ob jec t is char
acterized by the perfect equivalence of the divided and the divi
sions, of n u m b e r and uni t . In this sense, the o b j e c t wil l be
called a "numer ica l mul t ip l ic i ty ." f o r number, and primarily
(In- ari thmetical unit i tsell , is the model ol that which divides
without changing in kind. Th i s is the same as saying that num
ber has only d i f fe rences in d e g r e e , or tha t its d i f f e rences ,
whe ther realized or not, are always actual in it. " T h e units by
means of which a r i t hme t i c forms numbers are provisional units
which can be subdivided without l imi t , a n d . . . e a c h ol them
is the sum ol fractional quant i t ies , as small and as numerous
1 1
B E R G S O N I S M
as we like to imagine While- all mul t ipl icat ion implies the
possibility ol treating any number whatever as a provisional unit
that can be added to i tsel l , conversely the units in thei r turn
are true numbers which are as big as we l ike, but are regarded
as provisionally indivisible lor the purpose of c o m p o u n d i n g
them with one another. Now, the very admission that it is pos
sible to divide the unit into as many parts as we l ike , shows
that we regard it as ex tended. ' " '
On the o ther hand, what is a qualitative multiplici ty? Wha t
is the sub jec t or the subjec t ive? Bergson gives the following
example : "A c o m p l e x feeling will con ta in a fairly large num
ber of s imple e l emen t s ; but as long as these e l emen t s do not
stand out with perfect clearness, we cannot say that they were
c o m p l e t e l y rea l ized , and as soon as consc iousnes s has a dis
t inc t percept ion of them, the psychic state which results from
their synthesis will have changed lor this very r ea son . " 1 0 (For
example , a c o m p l e x of love and hatred is actualized in con
sciousness, but hatred and love b e c o m e consc ious under such
condi t ions that they differ in kind from one another and also
differ in kind from the unconsc ious c o m p l e x ) . It would there
fore be a serious mistake to think that duration was simply the
indivisible, although for conven ience , Bergson often expresses
himself in this way. In reality, duration divides up and does so
constantly: That is why it is a multiplicity. But it does not divide-
up without changing in kind, it changes in kind in the pro
cess of d i v i d i n g up: Th i s is why it is a nonnumcr i ca l mult i
plicity, where we can speak ol " ind iv i s ib les" at each stage of
the division. T h e r e is other wi thout there being several; num
ber exists only po ten t ia l ly . " In o ther words, the sub jec t ive ,
or duration, is the virtual. To be more precise , it is the virtual
insofar as it is actualized, in the course of being actual ized, it
4 2
D U R A T I O N A S I M M E D I A T E D A T U M
is inseparable from the movement of its actualization. For actu
alization c o m e s about through differentiation, through diver
gent l ines, and crea tes so many differences in kind by virtue
of its own movement . Everything is actual in a numerical mul
t ip l ic i ty; everything is not " rea l ized ," but everything there is
actual . T h e r e are no relat ionships o the r than those be tween
actuals, and no differences o the r than those in degree. On the
o ther hand, a nonnumerical mult ipl ic i ty by which duration or
subjectivity is defined, plunges into another dimension, which
is no longer spatial and is purely temporal : It moves from the
virtual to its actual izat ion, it actualizes itself by creat ing lines
of differentiation that correspond to its differences in kind. A
mul t ip l ic i ty of this kind has, essentially, the three propert ies
ol cont inu i ty , he terogenei ty , and s impl ic i ty . In this ins tance
Bergson does not have any real difficulty in r econc i l ing het
erogenei ty and cont inui ty .
The aforementioned passage from Time and Free Will, wherein
Bergson distinguishes the subjective and the objec t ive , appears
to be all the more important insofar as it is the first to intro
duce indirect ly the no t ion o f the virtual. Th i s not ion o f the
virtual wil l c o m e to play an increasingly impor tan t ro le in
Bergsonian phi losophy. 1 2 For, as we shall see, the same author
who re jec ts the c o n c e p t oi possibility — reserving a use for it
only in relation to mat te r and to c losed systems, but always
seeing it as the source of all kinds of false problems — is also
he who develops the no t ion of the virtual to its highest degree
and bases a whole philosophy of memory and life on it .
A very important aspect of the not ion of mult ipl ic i ty is the
way in which it is dist inguished from a theory of the O n e and
the Mul t ip le . T h e not ion of mul t ip l ic i ty saves us from think
ing in terms of " O n e and Mul t ip l e . " T h e r e are many theor ies
43
B E R G S O N I S M
in philosophy that c o m b i n e the one and the mul t ip le . They
share the characteristic of claiming to reconstruct the real with
general ideas. We are told that the S e l f is one ( thes i s ) and it is
mul t ip le (ant i thes is ) , then i t is the unity of the mul t ip le (syn
thesis) . Or e lse we are to ld that the O n e is already mul t ip le ,
that Being passes into nonbeing and produces becoming . T h e
passages where Bergson condemns this movemen t ol abstract
thought are among the finest in his oeuvre. To Bergson, it seems
that in this type of dialectical method , one begins with concepts
that, like baggy c lo thes , are much too b i g . " T h e O n e in gen
eral, the mul t ip le in general , nonbeing in general In such
cases the real is r e c o m p o s e d with abstracts ; but ol what use
is a d ia lec t ic that believes i t se l f to be reunited with the real
when it compensa tes lor the inadequacy of a c o n c e p t that is
t o o broad or t o o general by invoking the oppos i te c o n c e p t ,
which is no less broad and general? T h e c o n c r e t e will never
be attained by combin ing the inadequacy of one c o n c e p t with
the inadequacy o l its o p p o s i t e . T h e s ingular wil l never be
attained by co r rec t ing a general i ty with another generality. In
all this, Bergson clearly has in mind l l ame l in whose Essai sur
les elements principaux de la representation dates from 1 9 0 7 . Berg-
sonism's incompat ib i l i ty with I legelianism, indeed with any
dialect ical m e t h o d , is also evident in these passages. Bergson
criticizes the dialectic lor being a false movement, that is, a move
ment ol the abstract c o n c e p t , which goes from one opposi te
to the o ther only by means of i m p r e c i s i o n . 1 4
O n c e again there is a P la ton ic tone in Bergson. P la to was
the lirst to deride those who said " the O n e is mul t ip le and the
mul t ip le one — Being is nonbe ing , " e t c . In each case he asked
how, how main, when and where. " W h a t " unity of the mul t ip le
and "wha t " mul t ip le o l the o n e ? " T h e combina t ion o l oppo-
4-1
D U R A T I O N A S I M M E D I A T E D A T U M
si lcs tells us nothing; it forms a net so slack that everything
slips through. Those me taphor s ol P la to about carving and
the good c o o k (which Bergson likes so m u c h ) correspond to
Bergson's invocation ol the good tailor and the well-fitted out-
lit. This is what the precise concept must be like. " W h a t really
matters to philosophy is to know what unity, what mult iplici ty,
what reality superior to the abstract one and the abstract mul
tiple is the mul t ip le unity ol the person C o n c e p t s . . . o r d i
narily go by pairs and represent the t w o opposi tes . T h e r e is
scarcely any conc re t e reality upon which one cannot take two
opposing views at the same t i m e and that is consequen t ly not
subsumed under the two antagonistic concep t s . I l ence a thesis
and an ant i thesis which it would be vain for us to try logically
to r econc i l e , lor the s imple reason that never, with c o n c e p t s
or points ol view, will you make a thing If I try to analyze
duration, that is, to resolve it in to ready-made c o n c e p t s , I am
obliged by the very nature of the c o n c e p t and the analysis to
take two opposing views of Juration in general, with which I shall
then claim to recompose it. This combinat ion can present nei
ther a diversity ol degrees nor a variety of forms: It is, or it is
no t . I shall say, for e x a m p l e , that the re is, on the one hand,
a multiplicity of successive states ol consciousness and, on the
o ther hand, a unity which binds t hem together . Duration will
be the synthesis of this unity and multiplicity, but how this mys
terious operat ion can admit of shades or degrees, 1 repeat , is
not qu i t e c l e a r . " 1 6
What Bergson calls lor — against the dialect ic , against a gen
eral c o n c e p t i o n ol opposi tes ( the O n e and the Mul t ip l e ) — is
an acute perception of the "what" and the "how many," ol what
he cal ls the " n u a n c e " or the potent ia l number . Dura t ion is
opposed to b e c o m i n g precisely because it is a mult ipl ic i ty , a
4 5
B E R G S O N I S M
type ol mul t ip l i c i ty that is not r educ ib le to an overly broad
combina t ion in which the opposi tes , the O n e and the Mult i
ple in general, only co inc ide on condi t ion that they are grasped
a t the e x t r e m e point o l t h e i r gene ra l i za t i on , e m p t y ol all
"measu re" and of all real substance. Th i s mul t ip l ic i ty that is
duration is not at all the same thing as the mul t ip le , any more
than its s impl ic i ty is the same as the O n e .
Two forms of the negative are often distinguished: The nega
tive of s imple l imitat ion and the negative of oppos i t ion . We
are assured that the substitution of the second lorm tor the first
by Kant and the post-Kantians was a revolut ion in philosophy.
It is all the more remarkable that Bergson, in his c r i t ique of
t h e nega t ive , c o n d e m n s b o t h forms. Bo th s e e m to h im to
involve and to demonstrate the same inadequacy. For if we con
sider negative not ions l ike disorder or nonbeing, their very con
cept ion (from the starting-point of being and order as the limit
of a "deterioration" in whose interval all things are [analytically]
included) amounts to the same thing as our conceiving of them
in opposit ion to being and order, as forces that exercise power
and c o m b i n e with thei r opposi tes to produce ( synthe t ica l ly)
all things. Bergson's c r i t ique is thus a doub le one insofar as it
c o n d e m n s , in bo th forms of the negative, the same ignorance
of differences in kind, which are some t imes treated as "deter ior
a t i o n s , " s o m e t i m e s as o p p o s i t i o n s . T h e heart o f Bergson 's
p r o j e c t is to th ink d i f ferences in kind independen t ly of all
lorms ol negation: The re are differences in being and vet noth
ing negative. Negation always involves abstract c o n c e p t s that
are much t o o general . W h a t is, in fact, the c o m m o n root of
all negat ion? We have already seen it. Instead of starting out
from a difference in kind be tween two orders , from a differ
e n c e in kind be tween two beings, a general idea of order or
4 6
D U R A T I O N A S I M M E D I A T E D A T U M
being is c rea ted , which can no longer be thought e x c e p t in
opposi t ion to a nonbeing in general , a disorder in general , or
else which can only be posited as the starting point ol a deter i
oration that leads us to disorder in general or to nonbeing in
general. In any case, the question of difference in kind - "what"
order? "wha t " being? — has been neg lec ted , l i k e w i s e the dif
ference in kind between the two types ol multiplicity has been
n e g l e c t e d : T h u s a general idea ol the O n e is c rea ted and is
combined with its opposi te , the Mul t ip le in general, to recon
struct all things from the standpoint ol the lorce opposed to
the m u l t i p l e or to the de te r io ra t ion of the O n e . In fact, i t
i s the ca tegory of mul t ip l ic i ty , wi th the d i f ference in kind
be tween t w o types that i t involves, which enables us to con
demn the myst if icat ion of a thought that operates in terms of
the O n e and the Mul t ip le . We see, therefore, how all the cri t i
cal aspects of Bergsonian philosophy are part of a single theme:
a cri t ique of the negative of l imitation, of the negative of oppo
sit ion, of general ideas.
" I f we analyze in the same way the c o n c e p t o f m o t i o n " l 7
In fact, movement as physical exper i ence is itself a compos i t e :
on the one hand, the space traversed by the moving o b j e c t ,
which forms an indefinitely divisible numerical mult ipl ic i ty ,
all of whose parts - real or possible - are actual and differ only
in degree; on the other hand, pure movement , which is alter
ation, a virtual quali tat ive mult ipl ici ty, like the run of Achil
les that is divisible into steps, but which changes qualitatively
each t ime that it d iv ides . 1 8 Bergson discovers that beneath the
local transfer there is always a conveyance of another nature.
And what seemed from outside to be a numerical part, a com-
4 7
B E R G S O N I S M
portent of the run, turns out to he, expe r i enced from inside,
an obs tac le avoided.
But in doubling the psychological expe r i ence of duration
with the physical expe r i ence of movemen t , one problem be
c o m e s pressing. The ques t ion " D o externa l things endure?"
remained indeterminate from the standpoint of psychological
expe r i ence . Moreover , in Time and Free Will, Bergson invoked
on two occas ions an " inexpres s ib l e , " an " i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e "
reason — " W h a t duration is there exist ing outside us? The pre
sent only, or, if we prefer the expression, simultaneity. No doubt
external things change, but the i r m o m e n t s do not succeed (in
the ordinary sense of the word) one another, e x c e p t for a con
sciousness that keeps t hem in mind H e n c e we must not
say that external things endure, but rather that there is s o m e
inexpressible reason in t hem which accoun ts for our inability
to examine them at successive m o m e n t s of our own duration
without observing that they have changed." - "Although things
do not endure as we do ourselves, nevertheless , there must be
s o m e incomprehens ib l e reason why phenomena are seen to
succeed one another instead of being set out all at o n c e . " ' 1 '
However, Time and Free Will already had an analysis of move
m e n t . But movemen t had been primarily posited as a "fact of
consciousness" implying a conscious and enduring subject con
fused with duration as psychological e x p e r i e n c e . It is only to
the ex tent that movement is grasped as belonging to things as
much as to consciousness that i t ceases to be confused with
psychological duration, whose point of application it will dis
place , thereby necessi ta t ing that things part icipate direct ly in
duration itself. II quali t ies exis t in things no less than they do
in consc iousness , if there is a movemen t ol qualit ies outside
myself, things must, of necessity, endure in their own way. I'sy-
4 8
D U R A T I O N A S I M M E D I A T E D A T U M
etiological duration should be only a clearly de te rmined case,
an opening on to an on to log ica l duration. On to logy should, of
necessity, be possible, f o r duration was delined from the start
as a mult ipl ici ty . Wi l l this mul t ip l ic i ty not — thanks to move
ment — b e c o m e contused with be ing i tsell? And, s ince it is
endowed with very special propert ies , in what sense can it be
said that there are several durations; in what sense can there be
said to be a single one; in what sense can one get beyond the
ontological alternative of one several? A related problem now
b e c o m e s more urgent. If things endure, or i f there is duration
in things, the ques t ion ol space will need to be reassessed on
new loundations. For space will no longer simply be a form
ol exteriority, a sort of screen that denatures duration, an impu
rity that c o m e s to disturb the pure, a relative that is opposed
to the absolu te : Space itsell will need to be based in things,
in relat ions be tween things and be tween durations, to be long
i t se l f to the absolute , to have its own "purity." This was to be
the double progression of the Bergsonian philosophy.
4 9
C H A P T E R 111
M e m o r y a s V i r t u a l C o e x i s t e n c e
Duration is essentially memory , consciousness and freedom.
It is consciousness and freedom because it is primarily memory.
Now, Bergson always presents this iden t i ty ol m e m o r y and
duration in t w o ways: " t h e conservat ion and preservation of
the past in the present." Or else "whether the present dist inctly
con ta ins t h e ever-growing image of t h e past, or w h e t h e r by-
its cont inual changing ol quali ty attests rather to the increas
ingly heavy burden dragged along behind one the o lder one
grows." Or again: " m e m o r y in these two forms, covering as it
does wi th a c loak of r e c o l l e c t i o n s a c o r e of immed ia t e per
cept ion, and also contract ing a number ol external moments . " 1
In fact we should express in two ways the manner in which
duration is distinguished Irom a discontinuous series of instants
repeated identically: On the one hand, " the following m o m e n t
always conta ins , over and above the preceding one , the mem
ory the latter has left i t" ; 2 on the other hand, the two moments
c o n t r a c t o r c o n d e n s e in to each o t h e r s ince one has no t yet
disappeared when another appears. T h e r e are, therefore , t w o
memor ies — or two indissolubly linked aspects ol m e m o r y -
s i
B E R G S O N I S M
r e c o l l e c t i o n - m e - m o r v and c o n t r a c t i o n - m e m o r y (II we ask
what, in the linal analysis, is the basis ol this duality in dura
t ion , doubt less we find ourselves in a movement — which we
shall e x a m i n e la ter — by wh ich the " p r e s e n t " that endures
divides at each " ins tant" into two direct ions , one or iented and
d i la ted toward the past, the o t h e r c o n t r a c t e d , c o n t r a c t i n g
toward the future) .
But pure duration is i tself the result ol a division that is only
opera t ive " in p r i n c i p l e " (en droit). It is c l e a r that m e m o r y
is identical to duration, that it is coex tens ive with duration,
but this pro|X)sition is valid in principle more than in lact. I he
special problem ol memory is: I low, by what mechanism, does
duration b e c o m e memory in lact? I low does that which exists
in principle actual ize itsell? In the same way, Bergson shows
that consciousness is, in pr inciple , coex tens ive with lile; but
how, and unde r what c o n d i t i o n s , does l ife in fact b e c o m e
se l l -consc iousness? 3
* * *
Le t us resume the analysis of the lirst chap te r of Matter and
Memory. We are led to distinguish live senses or aspects ol sub-
j ec t iv i ty : ( I ) need-subjectivity, the moment ol negation (need
makes a hole in the cont inu i ty of things and holds back every
thing that interests i t about the o b j e c t , let t ing the rest go by);
( 2 ) brain-subjectivity, the m o m e n t ol interval or ol indetermi-
nat ion ( the brain gives us the means ol " c h o o s i n g " that which
corresponds to our needs in the o b j e c t ; int roducing an inter
val be tween received and execu ted movement , it is i tse l f the
cho ice between two ways because, in itsell, by virtue of its net
work of nerves , i t divides up e x c i t a t i o n infini tely and also
because , in relat ion to the mo to r ce l l s ol the core it leaves us
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
to c h o o s e be tween several possible r eac t ions ) ; (I) affection-
subjectivity, the m o m e n t ol pain (because affection is the price
paid by the brain or by conscious percept ion; perception does
not reflect possible ac t ion , nor does the brain bring about the
interval wi thout the assurance that ce r ta in organic parts are
c o m m i t t e d to the immobi l i ty of a purely recept ive role that
surrenders t h e m to pa in) ; ( 4 ) recollection-subjectivity, the pri
mary aspect ol memory ( reco l l ec t ion being what c o m e s to till
the interval , be ing e m b o d i e d or ac tual ized in the properly
cerebral interval [intcrvallc]); ( 5 ) contraction-subjectivity, the sec
ond aspect of memory ( the body being no more a punct i lbrm
instant in t i m e than a mathemat ica l point in space, and bring
ing about a con t rac t ion ol the exper ienced exc i ta t ions from
which quality is bo rn ) .
Now, these live aspects are not mere ly organized in order
ol increasing depth, but are distributed on two very different lines
of facts. The lirst chapter ol Matter and Memory sets out to decom
pose a compos i te (Representa t ion) in two divergent direct ions:
matter and memory, perception and recol lect ion, object ive and
subject ive ( c f . the t w o mul t ip l i c i t i e s of Time and Tree Will). Of
the live aspects ol subject ivi ty, the lirst t w o obviously be long
to the ob jec t ive l ine, s ince the lirst conf ines itsell to abstract
ing Irom the o b j e c t , and the second conf ines i t se l f to estab
lishing a zone of indeterminat ion . T h e case of affect ion, the
third sense, is more c o m p l e x ; it undoubtedly depends on the
in tersect ion of the two l ines. But the positivity of affection,
in its turn, is not yet the presence of a pure subject iv i ty that
would be opposed to pure objectivity, it is rather the "impurity"
that disturbs the la t te r . 4 T h e province of the pure line of sub
jec t iv i ty is thus the fourth, and then the fifth sense. Only the
two aspects of memory str ict ly signify subjectivi ty, the o ther
5 i
8 E R G S O M S M
meanings conf ine themselves to making way for or bringing
about the insertion ol one line into the other , the intersect ion
ol one line with the other .
T h e quest ion " W h e r e are r eco l l ec t ions preserved?" involves
a false p rob lem, that is to sav, a badly analyzed c o m p o s i t e . It
is as though r eco l l ec t ions had to be preserved somewhere , as
though, lor example, the brain were capable of preserving them.
But the brain is wholly on the line of ob j ec t i v i t y : T h e r e can
not be any difference in kind be tween the o the r states of mat
te r and the brain. For in the lat ter everything is movemen t , as
in the pure percept ion that it de te rmines . (And yet the te rm
movement obviously must not be understood in the sense of
enduring movemen t , but on the contrary as an " instantaneous
s e c t i o n . " ) 5 R e c o l l e c t i o n , on the contrary, is part of the line of
subject ivi ty. It is absurd to mix the two lines by conce iv ing
ol the brain as the reservoir or the substratum of reco l lec t ions .
Moreover , an examinat ion of the second l ine would be suffi
c i en t to show that r eco l l ec t ions do not have to be preserved
anywhere o the r than " i n " durat ion. Recollection therefore is pre
served in itself. Only then "did I b e c o m e aware of the fact that
inward expe r i ence in the pure state, in giving us a ' subs tance '
whose very essence is to endure and consequent ly to prolong
continually into the present an indestructible past, would have
relieved me from seeking and would even have forbidden me
to seek, where recollection is preserved. It preserves itself " < >
Moreover, we have no interest in presupposing a preservation
ol the past e lsewhere than in itself, for e x a m p l e , in the brain.
T h e brain, in its turn, would need to have the power to pre
serve itself; we would need to i onfer this power ol preserva-
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
tion that we have denied to duration on a state of matter, or
even on the whole of ma t t e r . 7
We are touching on one of the most profound, hut perhaps
also one of the least unders tood, aspects of Bergsonism: the
theory of memory. The re must be a difference in kind between
mat ter and memory, be tween pure percept ion and pure rec
ollect ion, between the present and the past, as there is between
the two lines previously distinguished. We have great difficulty
in unders tanding a survival of the past in i tself because we
bel ieve that the past is no longer, that it has ceased to be . We
have thus confused Being with being-present. Nevertheless, the
present Is not; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself.
It is no t , but it ac ts . Its proper e l e m e n t is not being but the
.11 five or the useful. The past, on the o ther hand, has ceased
to act or to be useful. But i t has not ceased to be . Useless and
inact ive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is
ident ica l wi th be ing in i tself . It should not be said that it
"was , " s ince it is the in-itself of being, and the form under
which being is preserved in itself ( in opposi t ion to the pre
sent, the form under which being is consummated and places
itsell O u t s i d e of i tself) . At the l imi t , the ordinary determina
tions are reversed: of the present , we must say at every instant
that it "was , " and of the past, that it " i s , " that it is eternally,
lor all t ime . Th i s is the difference in kind between the past
and the present ." But this first aspect of the Bergsonian the
ory woidd lose all sense if its extra-psychological range were
not emphasized. W h a t Bergson calls "pure r e c o l l e c t i o n " has
no psycho log ica l e x i s t e n c e . T h i s is why it is ca l l ed virtual,
inactive, and unconsc ious . All these words are dangerous, in
particular, the word " u n c o n s c i o u s " which , s ince Freud, has
b e c o m e inseparable from an especially effective and active psy-
B E H G S O N I S M
chologic.i l ex i s t ence . We will have occas ion to compare the
Freudian unconscious with the Bergson ian, s ince Bergson him-
sell made the compar i son . 4 We must nevertheless be c lear at
this point that Bergson does not use the word " u n c o n s c i o u s "
to deno t e a psychological reality outside consc iousness , but
to deno te a nonpsychological reality — being as it is in itself.
S t r ic t ly speaking, the psychological is the present. Only the
present is "psychological" ; but the past is pure ontology; pure
r eco l l ec t ion has only on to log ica l s i g n i f i c a n c e . 1 0
Let us now quote the admirable passage where Bergson sum
marizes the whole of his theory. W h e n we look for a r eco l l ec
t ion that escapes us, " W e b e c o m e conscious of an act sui aeneris
by wh ich we detach ourselves from the present in order to
replace ourselves, first in the past in general , then in a cer tain
reg ion of the past — a work of a d j u s t m e n t , s o m e t h i n g l ike
the focusing of a camera. But our reco l lec t ion still remains vir
tual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the
appropriate a t t i tude. Li t t le by l i t t le it c o m e s into view like a
condens ing c l o u d ; from the virtual s ta te i t passes in to the
actual "" Here again, one must avoid an overly psychologi
cal interpretat ion of the t e x t . Bergson does indeed speak of a
psychological ac t ; but if this ac t is "sui generis," this is because
it has made a genuine leap. We place ourselves at once in the
past; we leap into the past as into a proper e l e m e n t . 1 2 In the
same way that we do not perceive things in ourselves, but at
the place where they are, we only grasp the past at the place
where it is in itself, and not in ourselves, in our present. I here
is therefore a "past in genera l" that is not the particular past
of a particular present but that is like an onto logica l e l e m e n t ,
a past that is e ternal and for all t i m e , the c o n d i t i o n ol the
"passage" ol every particular present. It is the past in general
$6
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
that makes possible all pasts. According to Bergson, we first
put ourselves back into the past in general: He describes in this
way the leap into ontology. We really leap into being, into being-
in-itself, into the being in itsell ol the past. It is a case ol leaving
psychology al together . It is a case ol an immemor ia l or on to l
ogical Memory. It is only then , o n c e the leap has been made,
that r e c o l l e c t i o n will gradually take on a psychological ex i s
t ence : "from the virtual it passes into the actual state " We
have had to search at the place where it is, in impassive Being,
and gradually we give it an embodiment , a "psychologi/at ion."
T h e parallels be tween this text and s o m e others must be
emphasized. For Bergson analyzes language in the same way as
memory. T h e way in which we understand what is said to us
is identical to the way in which we find a recol lect ion. Far from
recompos ing sense on the basis ol sounds that are heard and
associated images, we place ourselves at once in the e l e m e n t of
sense, then in a region ol this e l ement . A true leap into Being.
It is only then that sense is actualized in the psychologically
perceived sounds, and in the images that are psychologically
associated wi th the sounds. Here there is a kind ol transcen-
dance of sense and an ontological foundation ol language that,
as we shall see , are particularly important in the work of an
author whose c r i t ique ol language is considered to have been
overly has ty . ' 3
We must place ourselves at o n c e in the past — in a leap, in
a jump. I lere again, this a lmost Kirkegaardian idea ol a " l e ap"
is strange in the work ol a phi losopher who is considered to
be so at tached to continuity. What does it mean? Bergson con
stantly says: You will never r ecompose the past with presents,
no matter what they may be : " T h e image pure and s imple will
not take me back to the past unless, indeed, it was in the past
B E R G S O N I S M
that I sought i t . " 1 4 T h e past, i t is t rue, s e e m s to be caught
b e t w e e n t w o presents : t h e old present that i t o n c e was and
the actual present in relation to which it is now past. Two lalse
beliefs are derived from this: On the one hand, we believe that
the past as such is only cons t i tu ted after having been present;
on the o ther hand, that it is in s o m e way recons t i tu ted In the
new present whose past it now is. Th i s double illusion is at
the heart ol all physiological and psychologica l t heo r i e s of
m e m o r y . W h e n o n e i s i n f luenced by such an i l lus ion , o n e
assumes that there is only a difference in degree be tween rec
o l lec t ion and perception. We are thus entangled in a badly ana
lyzed compos i t e . Th i s c o m p o s i t e is the image as psychological
reality. T h e image in effect retains someth ing of the regions
where we have had to look for the r eco l l ec t i on that it actual
izes or e m b o d i e s . But i t does not actualize this r eco l l ec t i on
without adapting it to the requirements of the present; it makes
i t in to someth ing of the present. Thus , we subst i tute the sim
ple d i f ferences in degree b e t w e e n r e c o l l e c t i o n - i m a g e s and
perception-images for the difference in kind between the pres
ent and the past, be tween pure percep t ion and pure memory.
We are t o o accus tomed to th inking in terms of the "pres
ent ." We bel ieve that a present is only past when it is replaced
by another present . Nevertheless , let us s top and reflect for a
momen t : I low would a new present c o m e about if the old pres
ent did not pass at the same t ime that it is present? How would
any present whatsoever pass, if it were not past at the same time
as present? T h e past would never be cons t i tu ted if it had not
been cons t i tu ted first of all, at the same t ime that it was pres
en t . T h e r e is he re , as it were , a fundamental posit ion ol t i m e
and also the most profound paradox ol m e m o r y : T h e past is
"con temporaneous" with the present that it has been. I I the past
5 8
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
had to wait in order to be no longer, if it was not immediately
and now that it had passed, "past in genera l , " it could never
b e c o m e what it is, it would never be that past. II it were not
cons t i tu ted immediately, nei ther could it be reconst i tuted on
the basis of an ul ter ior present . T h e past would never be con
s t i tu ted if it did not c o e x i s t with the present whose past it
i s . 1 5 T h e past and the present do not deno t e t w o successive
moments , but two e lements which coexis t : One is the present,
which does not cease to pass, and the o the r is the past, which
does not cease to be but through which all presents pass. It is
in this sense that there is a pure past, a kind of "past in gen
eral": T h e past does not follow the present , but on the con
trary, is presupposed by it as the pure condi t ion without which
it would not pass. In o the r words, each present goes back to
itsell as past. T h e only equiva lent thesis is Plato 's no t ion of
R e m i n i s c e n c e . T h e r emin i s cence also aflirms a pure being of
the past, a being in itsell ol the past, an on to log ica l Memory
that is capable of serving as the foundation for the unfolding
of t ime . Yet again, a Platonic inspiration makes itsell profoundly
felt in B e r g s o n . 1 6
I he idea of a con temporane i ty of the present and the past
has one final consequence : Not only does the past coexis t with
the present that has been , but , as it preserves i t s e l f in i tself
(whi le the present passes), it is the who le , integral past; it is
all ou r past, which c o e x i s t s wi th each present . T h e famous
metaphor of the c o n e represents this c o m p l e t e state of c o e x
i s tence . But such a state implies , finally, that in the past itsell
there appear all kinds ol levels ol profundity, marking all the
possible intervals in this c o e x i s t e n c e . 1 7 T h e past AB coex i s t s
with the present S, but by including in itself all the sec t ions
A ' B ' , A " B " , e t c . , that measure the degrees o l a purely ideal
J 9
B E R G S O N I S M
A '
A"\
proximity or d is tance in relat ion to S. Each ol these sec t ions
is itself virtual, belonging to the being in itsell ol the pas t . 1 8
Each of these sect ions or each ol these levels includes not par
t icular e lements of the past, but always the total i ty of the past.
It includes this totality at a more or less expanded or contracted
level. Th i s is the precise point at which con t r ac t i on -Memory
tits in with r e c o l l e c t i o n - M e m o r y and, in a way, takes over from
it. I lence this consequence : Bergsonian duration is, in the final
analysis, defined less by succession than by c o e x i s t e n c e .
In Time and tree Will duration is really defined by succession,
coex i s t ences referring back to space, and by the power of nov
elty, repetition referring back to Matter. But, more profoundly,
duration is only success ion relatively speaking (we have seen
in the same way that it is only indivisible relatively). Duration
is indeed real success ion, but it is so only because , more pro
foundly, it is virtual coexistence: the c o e x i s t e n c e with itsell ol
all the levels, all the tensions, all the degrees of con t rac t ion
and relaxation (detente). Thus, with coexis tence , repetition must
be reintroduced into duration — a "psychic" repetition of a com
pletely dilferent type than the "physical" repet i t ion of mat-
60
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
tor; a repet i t ion ol "planes" rather than ol e lements on a single
plane; virtual instead ol actual repe t i t ion . T h e whole of our
past is played, restarts, repeats itself, at the same time, on all the
levels that i t ske tches o u t . 1 9 Let us return to the " l eap" that
we make when, looking for a r e co l l e c t i on , we place ourselves
at o n c e in the past. Bergson gives the following clar i f icat ion:
We place ourselves "firstly into the past in general , then into
a certain region of the past." It is not a case ol one region con
taining particular e lements ol the past, particular recol lec t ions ,
in opposi t ion to another region which conta ins o the r reco l
l ec t ions . It is a case ol there being dis t inct levels, each one of
which conta ins the whole of our past, but in a more or less
con t rac ted s tate . It is in this sense that one can speak of the
regions of Being itself, the on to log ica l regions of the past "in
genera l , " all coexis t ing , all " repea t ing" one another.
Later we shall see how this doc t r ine revives all the prob
lems of Bergsonism. I fowever, at this point it is enough to sum
marize the four main propositions that form as many paradoxes:
( I ) we place ourselves at o n c e , in a leap, in the ontological ele
ment of the past (paradox of the leap); ( 2 ) there is a difference
in kind be tween the present and the past (paradox of B e i n g ) ;
( 3 ) the past does not follow the present that it has been , but
coexists with it (paradox of coexis tence) ; ( 4 ) what coexists with
each present is the whole of the past, integrally, on various lev
els of con t rac t ion and relaxation (detente) (paradox of psychic
repe t i t ion) . T h e s e paradoxes are i n t e r connec t ed ; each one is
dependent on the others. Conversely, the propositions that they
attack also form a group, insolar as these proposit ions are char
acter ized by thei r being ordinary theories ol memory, l o r it is
a single illusion about the essence of T i m e , a single badly ana
lyzed c o m p o s i t e that makes us bel ieve that: ( I ) we can recon-
B E R G S O N I S M
st i tute the past with the present; ( 2 ) we pass gradually from
o n e to the o ther ; ( 3 ) that they are dist inguished by a before
and an alter; and ( 4 ) that the work ol the mind is carried out
by the addition ol e l emen t s (rather than by changes of level,
genuine jumps , the reworking o l s y s t e m s ) . 2 0
* • *
O u r problem is: I low can pure r eco l l ec t i on take on a psycho
logical existence? I low will this pure virtual be actualized? Thus
the present makes an appeal, accord ing to the requi rements
or needs ol the present situation. We make the "leap": We place
ourselves not simply in the e l e m e n t of the past in general , but
in a particular region, that is, on a particular level which , in a
kind ol R e m i n i s c e n c e , we assume corresponds to our actual
needs. Each level in effect contains the totality of our past, but
in a more or less con t rac ted s tate . And Bergson adds: T h e r e
are also dominant r eco l l ec t i ons , like remarkable points, which
vary from one level to the o t h e r . 2 1 A foreign word is spoken
in my presence : Given the situation this is not the same thing
as wondering what the language in general, of which this word
is a part, could be or what person o n c e said this word, or a
similar one , to me . Depending on the case , I do not leap into
the same region of the past; I do not place myself on the same
level; 1 do not appeal to the same essential character is t ics . Per
haps I fail: Look ing for a r e co l l e c t i on , I may place myself on a
level that is too contracted, t o o narrow, or on the contrary, t o o
broad and expanded for it . I would then have to start from the
beginning again in order to find the c o r r e c t leap. We must
emphasize that this analysis, which seems to have so much psy
chologica l finesse, really has a qu i te di l lerent meaning. It is
related to our affinity with being, our relationship with Being,
6 2
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
. I I K I to the variety ol this relationship. Psychological conscious
ness has no t yet been born . I t wil l be born , but p rec i se ly
because it has found its proper on to log ica l condi t ions here.
Faced with these ex t r eme ly difficult t ex t s , the task of the
c o m m e n t a t o r is to mult iply the d is t inc t ions , even and above
all when these tex ts confine themselves to suggesting the dis
t inc t ions , rather than to establ ishing them strictly. First , we
must not confuse the appeal to r eco l l ec t ion and the "recal l of
the image" (or its evocat ion) . T h e appeal to recol lect ion is this
j ump by which I place myself in the virtual, in the past, in a
particular region of the past, at a particular level of con t rac
t ion. It appears that this appeal expresses the properly on to
logica l d i m e n s i o n of man or, rather , o f m e m o r y : " B u t our
recol lec t ion still remains vi r tual ." 2 2 W h e n , on the o ther hand,
we speak of evoca t ion , or o l this recall of the image, some
thing c o m p l e t e l y different is involved: O n c e we have put our
selves on a particular level where r eco l l e c t i ons l ie, then , and
only then, do they tend to be actual ized. T h e appeal of the
present is such that they no longer have the ineffectiveness,
the impassivity that character ized them as pure r eco l l ec t ions ;
they b e c o m e recol lect ion- images , capable of being " reca l led ."
They are actualized or embodied . This actualization has all kinds
of d is t inc t aspects , stages, and d e g r e e s . 2 3 But through these
stages and these degrees it is the actual izat ion (and it a l o n e )
that cons t i tu tes psychological consc iousness . In any case , the
Bergsonian revolution is c lear : We do not move from the pre
sent to the past, from percept ion to reco l l ec t ion , but from the
past to the present , from reco l l ec t ion to percept ion .
"Memory, laden with the whole ol the past, responds to the
appeal ol the present state by two s imul taneous movements ,
one ol translation, by which it moves in its entirety to meet expe-
B E R G S O N I S M
r i cnce , thus contracting more or less, though without dividing,
with a view to action; the other ol rotation upon itself, by which
it turns toward the situation of the moment , presenting to it that
side ol itsell which may prove to be the most usefu l . " 2 ' Thus
we already have two aspects of actualization here: t ranslat ion-
contract ion and rotat ion-orientat ion. Our question is: Can this
t ransla t ion-contract ion be identical with the variable cont rac
t ion of regions and levels of the past that we were discussing
earlier? Bergson's c o n t e x t seems to suggest that i t is, s ince he
constantly invokes t ransla t ion-contract ion with regard to sec
t ions of the c o n e , that is, levels ol the pas t . 2 5 Many considera
t ions , however, lead us to the conc lus ion that whi le there is
obviously a relat ionship be tween the two con t rac t ions , they
are by no means ident ical . W h e n Bergson speaks of levels or
regions of the past, these levels are no less virtual than the past
in general; moreover , each o n e of them con ta ins the whole of
the past, but in a more or less con t rac ted state, around ce r
tain variable dominant r eco l l ec t i ons . T h e ex ten t o f the con
traction, therefore, expresses the difference between one level
and another. On the other hand, when Bergson speaks of trans
lat ion, it involves a movement that is necessary in the actual
ization of a r e c o l l e c t i o n taken from a part icular level. Here
c o n t r a c t i o n no longer expresses trie o n t o l o g i c a l d i f ference
between two virtual levels, but the movement by which a rec
o l l ec t ion is (psychological ly) actualized, at the same time as the
level that belongs to i t . 2 6
It would , in fact , be a mi s t ake to th ink tha t , in o r d e r to
be ac tua l i zed , a r e c o l l e c t i o n must pass th rough m o r e and
more cont rac ted levels in order to approach the present as the
supreme point of cont rac t ion or the summit of the c o n e . Th i s
would be an untenable interpretat ion lor several reasons. In
64
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
the metaphor of the t o n e , even a level that is very cont rac ted ,
very c lose to the summit — so long as it is not actualized —
displays a genuine difference in kind from this summit , that
is, from the present, fu r the rmore , in order to actual ize a rec
ol lec t ion , we do not have to change levels; if we had to do this,
the operat ion of memory would he imposs ib le . I or each rec
o l l ec t ion has its own proper level; i t is t o o d i smembered or
dispersed in broader regions, too confined and muddled in nar
rower regions. If we had to pass from one level to another in
order to actual ize each r eco l l e c t i on , each r eco l l ec t ion would
thus lose its individuality. Th i s is why the movement of trans
lation is a movemen t by which the r eco l l ec t i on is actualized
at t h e same t i m e as its level : T h e r e is c o n t r a c t i o n because
recol lect ion-becoming-image enters into a "coa l e scence" with
the present. It therefore passes through "planes of consc ious
ness" that put it in to e f lec t . But it does not pass through the
in termediate levels (which would prevent it from being put
into e f l e c t ) . Hence the need t o avoid confusing the planes of
consciousness, through which r eco l l ec t i on is actual ized, and the
regions, the sections or the levels of the past, according to which the
always virtual s ta te of r eco l l ec t i on varies. H e n c e the need to
distinguish intensive, on to log ica l con t rac t ion — where all the
levels coex i s t virtually, con t rac ted or relaxed (detendus) — and
translative, psychological con t rac t ion through which each rec
ol lect ion on its own level (however relaxed [de'tendu] it is) must
pass in order to be actualized and thereby b e c o m e image.
But , on the o the r hand, Bergson says, there is rota t ion. In
its process of actualization, recol lec t ion does not confine itself
to carrying out this translation that unites it to the present; i t
also carries out this rotat ion on itsell in order to present its
"useful facet" in this union. Bergson does not clarify the nature
65
B E R G S O N I S M
of this rotation. We must make hypotheses on the basis of other
tex ts . In the movement of translat ion, it is therefore a whole
level of the past that is actual ized at the same t i m e as a par
t icular r e c o l l e c t i o n . Each level thus linds itsell con t rac ted in
an undivided representat ion that is no longer a pure r eco l l ec
t ion, but is not yet , s tr ict ly speaking, an image. This is why
Bergson specifies that, from this point of view, there is no divi
sion at this p o i n t . 2 7 R e c o l l e c t i o n undoubtedly has its individ
uality. But how do we b e c o m e c o n s c i o u s ol it, how do we
distinguish it in the region that is actualized with it? We begin
From this undivided r ep re sen t a t i on ( tha t Bergson wil l cal l
"dynamic s c h e m e " ) , where all the reco l lec t ions in the process
of actualization are in a relationship ol reciprocal penetration;
and we develop it in dis t inct images that are external to one
another, that correspond to a particular r e c o l l e c t i o n . 2 8 Here
again, Bergson speaks of a success ion of "planes of consc ious
ness." But the movement is no longer that of an undivided con
t r a c t i o n . I t is, on the cont rary , that of a d iv i s ion , a deve lop
men t , an expansion. R e c o l l e c t i o n can only be said to be actu
alized when it has b e c o m e image. It is then , in lact , that it
enters not only into " c o a l e s c e n c e , " but in to a kind of circuit
with the p resen t , the r e c o l l e c t i o n - 7 m a g e referring back to
the percept ion- image and v ice versa. 2 1* H e n c e the preceding
m e t a p h o r o l " r o t a t i o n " wh ich prepares the ground lor this
launch into the c i rcu i t .
Thus , we have here t w o movements o f actual izat ion: one
of con t rac t ion , one ol expansion. We can see clearly that they
correspond c losely to the mul t ip le levels of the c o n e , some-
expanded (dc'tcnilus), some con t r ac t ed . For what happens in a
creature that conf ines i tsel f to dreaming? S ince sleep is l ike a
present s i tuat ion requiring noth ing but rest , with no interest
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
Other than "dis in teres t , " it is as if the con t rac t ion were miss
ing, as if the ex t remely expanded (de'tendu) relat ionship of the
r eco l l ec t ion with the present reproduced the most expanded
(de'tendu) level of the past itself. Conversely, what would hap
pen in an au tomaton? It would he as though dispersion were
imposs ible , as though the d is t inct ion be tween images was no
longer carried into ef lect and onlv the most con t rac ted level
ol the past r e m a i n e d . 5 0 T h e r e is thus a c l o s e analogy be tween
the different levels of the c o n e and the aspects of actualization
for each level. It is inevitable that the latter will come to include the
former (hence the ambiguity that has already been pointed ou t ) .
Neve r the l e s s , we must no t confuse t h e m b e c a u s e t h e first
t heme conce rns the virtual variations of r eco l l ec t i on in itself;
the o ther , r e co l l ec t i on for us, the actualization of the recol
lec t ion in the r eco l l ec t ion - image .
Wha t is the framework c o m m o n to recol lec t ion in the pro
cess of actualization (the recol lect ion-becoming-image) and the
p e r c e p t i o n - i m a g e ? T h i s c o m m o n f ramework i s m o v e m e n t .
Thus , it is in the relat ionship be tween the image and move
ment , in the image's way of extending itself in movement , that
we must find the final m o m e n t s of actual izat ion: " the recol
lections need, for their actualization, a motor ally." 5 1 I lere again,
the ally is double . Some t imes percept ion is ex tended naturally
in movement ; a m o t o r tendency, a motor scheme, carries ou t a
d e c o m p o s i t i o n o f the pe rce ived i n t e r m s o f u t i l i t y . 5 2 I b i s
movement -percep t ion relationship would, on its own, be sul-
l ic ient to de l ine a recogni t ion that is purely au tomat ic , with
out the i n t e rven t ion of r e c o l l e c t i o n s (o r , i f you prefer, an
instantaneous m e m o r y cons i s t ing ent i re ly in m o t o r m e c h a
n i s m s ) . However, r e c o l l e c t i o n s do i n te rvene . For, insofar as
recol lec t ion- images resemble actual percept ion, they are nec -
<>7
B E R G S O N I S M
cssarily ex tended into the movements that correspond to per
cep t ion and they b e c o m e "adop ted" by i t . 5 '
Let us assume for a moment that a disturbance arises in this
movement -percep t ion-a r t i cu la t ion , a mechanical disturbance o f
the m o t o r s c h e m e : R e c o g n i t i o n has b e c o m e imposs ib l e (a l
though another type of recogni t ion subsists, as we see in those
patients who clearly describe an o b j e c t that is named to them,
but who do not know how to "make use" of it; or who cor
rect ly repeat what is said to t h e m , but no longer know how
to speak spontaneously) . T h e patient no longer knows how to
o r i en t himself , how to draw, that is, how to d e c o m p o s e an
o b j e c t according to the mo to r tendencies: His perception only
provokes diHuse movement s . Nevertheless, the r eco l l ec t ions
are there. Moreover, they cont inue to be evoked, to be embod
ied in dis t inct images, that is, to undergo the translation and
rotat ion that character ize the first m o m e n t s ol actualizat ion.
W h a t is lacking therefore is the final m o m e n t , the final phase:
that of ac t ion . Just as the concomi t an t movements of percep
t ion are disorganized, the reco l l ec t ion- image also remains as
useless, as ineffective as a pure reco l l ec t ion , and can no longer
ex tend itself into ac t ion . Th i s is the lirst important (act: T h e r e
are cases where r eco l l ec t ions survive despi te psychic or ver
bal blindness or deafness . 5 4 ,
Let us move on to the second type ol movement-percept ion
re la t ionsh ip that de l ines the c o n d i t i o n s o f an a t t en t ive r ec
ogni t ion . It is no longer a mat te r of movements that " ex t end
our perception in order to draw useful el lects from it" and that
d e c o m p o s e the o b j e c t according to our needs , but of move
men t s that abandon the effect , that bring us back to the o b j e c t
in order to restore its detail and completeness . Then the recol
lect ion-images — which are analogous to present perception —
6 8
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
take on a role that is "p reponderan t and no longer mere ly
accessory," regular and no longer acc iden t a l . 5 5 Let us assume
that this second kind of movement is disturbed (dis turbance
of the sensory m o t o r (unctions that is dynamic, and no longer
mechanical).* It is possible for automatic recognition to remain,
but what does appear to have disappeared is recollection itself.
Because such cases are the most frequent they have inspired
the traditional concept ion of aphasia as the disappearance of
recol lec t ions stored in the brain. Bergson's whole problem is:
W h a t has really disappeared?
First hypothesis: Is it pure recollection? Obviously not, since
pure recol lec t ion is not psychological in nature and is imper
ishable. Second hypothesis: Is it the capacity to evoke reco l
lection, that is, to actualize it in a recollection-image? At times,
Bergson does express h imse l f in this way. 3 7 Nevertheless, it is
more compl ica ted than this. For the first two aspects of actu
alization ( translat ion and ro ta t ion) depend on a psychic atti
tude; the last t w o ( the t w o types of m o v e m e n t ) depend on
sensory-motrici ty and the attitudes of bodies . Whatever the
solidarity and complementar i ty of these two dimensions, the
one cannot comple te ly cance l out the other. W h e n only the
automatic movements of recognit ion are affected (mechanical
disturbances of sensory-motr ic i ty) , recol lec t ion nevertheless
comple t e ly retains its psychic actual iza t ion; i t preserves its
"normal a s p e c t , " but can no longer e x t e n d i tself in move
ment , the corporeal stage of its actualization having b e c o m e
impossible. W h e n the movements of attentive recognition are
alfectcd (dynamic disturbances of sensory-motr ic i ty) , psychi
cal actualization is undoubtedly more endangered than in the
preceding case for here the corporeal attitude really is a con
dition of the mental attitude. Bergson nevertheless maintains
69
B E R G S O N I S M
that , o n c e again, no r eco l l ec t i on is " i n a t t e n t i v e . " T h e r e is
merely a "disturbance of the equ i l ib r ium." 5 8 We must perhaps
understand that the t w o psychic aspects of actualization sub
sist but are, as it were, dissociated lor want ol a corporeal atti
tude in which they could be inserted and combined. Sometimes
then, translation-contraction would occur, but would lack the
complementary movement of rotation, so that there woidd be
no distinct recol lec t ion- image (or, at least, a whole category
of recol lect ion- images would seem to have been abol ished) .
Some t imes , on the contrary, rotation would occu r , d is t inct
images would form, but they would be detached from memory
and abandon their solidarity with the others . In any case , it is
not sufficient to say that, according to Bergson, pure reco l l ec
t ion always preserves itself; we must add that i l lness never
abolishes the recol lec t ion- image as such, but merely impairs
a particular aspect of its actualization.
These , therefore, are the four aspects of actualization: transla
tion and rotation, which form the properly psychic moments ;
dynamic movement , the attitude of the body that is necessary
to the stable equilibrium of the two preceding determinations;
and finally, mechanical movement , the motor scheme that rep
resents the final stage of actualization. All this involves the adap
tation of the past to the present, the utilization of the past in
terms of the present - what Bergson calls "at tent ion to l i fe ."
T h e first moment ensures a point of con tac t be tween the past
and the present: T h e past literally moves toward the present
in order to find a point of con tac t (o r of con t rac t ion) with it.
T h e second m o m e n t ensures a transposition, a translation, an
expans ion of the past in t h e present : R e c o l l e c t i o n - i m a g e s
restore the distinctions of the past in the present - at least those
that are useful. T h e third moment , the dynamic attitude of the
70
M E M O R Y A S V I R T U A L C O E X I S T E N C E
body, ensures the harmony of the two preceding moments , cor
rect ing the one by the o the r and pushing them to thei r l imit .
The fourth m o m e n t , the mechanica l movemen t of the body,
ensures the proper uti l i ty of the whole and its performance in
the present. But this utility, this performance, would be noth
ing if the lour m o m e n t s were not c o n n e c t e d with a cond i t ion
that is valid lor them all . We have seen that pure r eco l l ec t ion
was con temporaneous with the present that it had been. R e c
o l l ec t i on , in the course of actualizing itself, thus tends to be
actualized in an image that is itself con temporaneous to this
present. Now it is obvious that such a recol lect ion-image, such
a " r e c o l l e c t i o n of the present ," would be comple t e ly useless
since it would simply result in doubling the perception-image.
R e c o l l e c t i o n must be e m b o d i e d , not in terms of its own pre
sent (with which it is contemporaneous) , but in terms of a new
present, in relation to which it is now past. Th i s condi t ion is
normally realized by the very nature of the present, which con
stantly passes by, moving forward and hol lowing out an inter
val. Th i s is therefore the fifth aspect of actual izat ion: a kind
ol d isplacement by which the past is e m b o d i e d only in terms
of a present that is different from that which it has been. ( T h e
dis turbance corresponding to this last aspect would be param
nesia, in wh ich the " r e c o l l e c t i o n of the p r e s e n t " would be
actualized as s u c h . ) 5 9
* * *
In this way a psychological unconscious, distinct from the onto
logical unconscious, is defined. T h e latter corresponds to a rec
o l lec t ion that is pure, virtual, impassive, inactive, in itself. T h e
former represents the movement of recol lec t ion in the course
ol actualizing itself: Like Leibnizian possibles, recol lect ions try
B E R G S O N I S M
to b e c o m e e m b o d i e d , they exert pressure to be admit ted so
that a lull-scale repression originat ing in the present and an
"a t ten t ion to l i fe" are necessary to ward oi l useless or danger
ous r e c o l l e c t i o n s . 4 0 T h e r e i s no con t rad ic t ion be tween these
two descriptions of two distinct unconsciousnesses. Moreover,
the whole of Matter and Memory plays be tween the two , with
c o n s e q u e n c e s that we shall analyze later.
C H A P T E R I V
O n e o r M a n y D u r a t i o n s ?
Thus far, the Bergsonian method has shown two main aspects,
the one dualist, the o the r monis t . First, the diverging lines or
the differences in kind had to be followed beyond the "turn
in e x p e r i e n c e " ; then, still further beyond, the point of con
vergence of these l ines had to be rediscovered, and the rights
of a new monism res tored . 1 T h i s program is in fact realized in
Matter and Memory. First , we bring out the difference in kind
between the t w o lines of o b j e c t and subject : between percep
t ion and r eco l l e c t i on , mat te r and memory, present and past.
W h a t happens then? I t certainly seems that when the reco l
l ec t ion is ac tual ized, its di f ference in kind from percep t ion
tends to be o b l i t e r a t e d : T h e r e are no longer , the re can no
longer be , anything but differences in degree be tween recol
l ec t ion - images and p e r c e p t i o n - i m a g e s . 2 It is for this reason
that, wi thout the method of intui t ion, we inevitably remain
prisoners of a badly analyzed psychological c o m p o s i t e whose
original differences in kind we are unable to discern.
But it is c lear that, at this level, a genuine point of unity is
not yet available. T h e point of unity must account for a c o m
posi te from the other side of the turn in expe r i ence ; it must not
7 ?
B E R G S O N I S M
be contused with the one in expe r i ence . And in l a d , Bergson
is not c o n t e n t to say that t h e r e are now only dif ferences in
degree b e t w e e n the r e c o l l e c t i o n - i m a g e and the percep t ion-
image. He also presents a much more important on to log ica l
proposi t ion: While the past coexists with its own present, and while
it coexists with itself on various levels of contraction, we must recog
nise that the present itself is only the most contracted level of the past.
This t ime it is pure present and pure past, pure perception and
pure r eco l l ec t i on as such, pure mat ter and pure memory that
now have only differences of expansion (detente) and con t rac
t ion and thus rediscover an onto logica l unity. But discovering
a deepe r c o n t r a c t i o n - m e m o r y at the heart of r e c o l l e c t i o n -
memory we have thus laid the foundations for the possibili ty
ol a new monism. At each instant, our percept ion cont rac ts "an
inca lcu lab le m u l t i t u d e of r e m e m o r i / e d e l e m e n t s " ; a t each
instant, our present infini tely con t r ac t s our past: " T h e two
terms which had been separated to begin with cohere c losely
t o g e t h e r . . . . " 5 W h a t , in fact, is a sensation? It is the opera t ion
of con t rac t ing t r i l l ions ol vibrations o n t o a recept ive surface.
Qual i ty emerges from this, quality that is nothing o ther than
cont rac ted quantity. Th i s is how the not ion of cont rac t ion (o r
of tension) allows us to go beyond the duality ol homogeneous
quanti ty and he terogeneous quality, and to pass from one to
the o the r in a con t inuous movemen t . But , conversely, if our
present, through which we place ourselves inside matter, is the
most con t rac ted degree of our past, ma t t e r itsell will be like
an infinitely dilated or relaxed (detendu) past ( so relaxed that
the preceding m o m e n t has disappeared when the following
appears). Th i s is how the idea of relaxat ion (detente) — or of
extens ion — will ove rcome the duality of the unextended and
the extended and i»ive us the means of passim; from one to the
7-1
O N E O R M A N Y D U R A T I O N S ?
other , l o r percept ion itsell is extensi tv, sensation is extens ive
insofar as what i t c o n t r a c t s is p rec i se ly the e x t e n d e d , tin-
expanded (detendu). (It makes space available to us "in the exact
propor t ion" in which we have t i m e avai lable) . 4
Hence , the impor tance of Matter and Memory: Movement is
attr ibuted to things themselves so that material things partake
directly of duration, and thereby form a l imit case of duration.
The immediate data (les donees imme'diates) are surpassed: Move
ment is no less outside me than in m e ; and the Sell itsell in
turn is only o n e case among others in durat ion. 5 But then all
kinds ol problems arise. Let us single out two important ones .
( I ) Is there not a cont rad ic t ion be tween the two m o m e n t s
of the me thod , be tween the dualism of di l lerences in kind and
the m o n i s m of c o n t r a c t i o n - r e l a x a t i o n (detente)? Lor, in the
name of the first, philosophies that confine themselves to dif
ferences oi'degree, oi'intensity were condemned . Moreover, what
were c o n d e m n e d were the false not ions of degree, of inten
sity, as no t ions of cont rar ie ty or negation, sources of all false
problems. Isn't Bergson now in the process of restoring all that ^
he o n c e dismissed? W h a t differences can the re be b e t w e e n
relaxation (detente) and con t rac t ion e x c e p t for the differences
of d e g r e e , of intensity? T h e present is only the most contracted
degree of the past, mat te r the most relaxed (de'tendu) degree
ol the present (mens momentanca).1' And if we seek to co r r ec t
what is too "gradual" here , we can only do so by re int roduc
ing into durat ion all the contrar ie ty , all the oppos i t ion that
Bergson had previously c o n d e m n e d as so many abst ract and
inadequate c o n c e p t i o n s . We will only escape from mat te r as
deter iorat ion ol duration by embrac ing a c o n c e p t i o n ol mat
ter that is a "reversal" of durat ion. 7 What then becomes of the
Bergsonian pro jec t of showing that Difference, as difference
7S
B E R G S O N I S M
in kind, could and should be understood independently ol the
negative ( t he negative ol de ter iora t ion as well as the negative
ol opposi t ion)? T h e worst cont rad ic t ion of all seems to be set
up at the heart of" the s y s t e m . Every th ing is r e i n t r o d u c e d :
degrees , intensity, oppos i t ion .
( 2 ) Even suppos ing that th i s p r o b l e m is so lved , can we
speak of a rediscovered moni sm? In one sense, yes, insofar as
everything is durat ion. But , s ince duration is dissipated in all
these differences in degree, intensity, re laxat ion (detente), and
con t rac t ion that affect it, we tend instead to fall in to a kind
of quanti tat ive pluralism. H e n c e , the impor tance of the fol
lowing ques t ion: Is duration one or many, and in what sense?
Have we really ove rcome dualism, or have we been engulfed
in pluralism? We must begin wi th this ques t ion .
* * *
Bergson's t ex t s seem to vary considerably on this point . Matter
and Memory goes furthest in the affirmation of a radical plurality
of durations: T h e universe is made up of modif icat ions , dis
turbances , changes of tension and ol energy, and nothing e lse .
Bergson does indeed speak of a plurality of rhvthms of duration;
but in this c o n t e x t he makes it clear — in relation to durations
that are more or less slow or fast — that each duration is an
absolute , and that each rhythm is i tsel f a dura t ion . 8 In a key
text from 1903 , he insists on the progress made since Time and
Tree Will: Psychological duration, our duration, is now only one
case among o the rs , among an infinity of O t h e r s , "a ce r t a in
wel l -de l ined tension, whose very def in i t iveness s e e m s l ike a
c h o i c e between an infinity of possible durations."*' We can see
that, as in Matter and Memory, psychology is now only an open
ing on to ontology, a springboard lor an "instal lat ion" in Being.
76
O N E O R M A N Y D U R A T I O N S ?
But no sooner are we installed, than we perceive that Being
is m u l t i p l e , the very n u m e r o u s dura t ion , our o w n , caught
b e t w e e n m o r e dispersed dura t ions and m o r e taut (tendue),
more intense durations: "Th i s being so one perceives any num
ber of durations, all very different from one another " T h e
idea of a virtual c o e x i s t e n c e of all the levels of the past, of all
the levels of tension, is thus extended to the whole of the uni
verse: This idea no longer simply signifies my relationship with
being, but the relationship of all things with being. Everything
happens as if the universe were a t remendous Memory. And
Bergson is pleased with the power of the me thod of intuit ion: xf
It a lone enables us " t o go beyond idealism as well as real ism,
to affirm the ex i s tence of ob jec t s which are inferior and superior
to ourselves, although st i l l , in a cer tain sense, internal to us,
to make them coexist together without difficulty." This extension
of virtual coex i s t ence to an infinity of specific durations stands
out clearly in Creative Evolution, where life i tsel f is compared to
a memory, the genera or spec ies corresponding to coex i s t ing
degrees of this vital m e m o r y . 1 0 Thus we have an on to log ica l
vision that seems to imply a general ized pluralism. But it is
precisely in Creative Evolution that a major l imitat ion is under
l ined: If things are said to endure, it is less in themselves or
absolute ly than in re la t ion to the W h o l e of the universe in
which they part icipate insofar as their d is t inc t ions are artifi
c ia l . Thus , the p iece of sugar only makes us wait because , in
spite of its arbitrary c a n i n g out, it opens out on to the universe
as a whole . In this sense, each thing no longer has its own dura
t ion. T h e only ones that do are the beings similar to us ( p s y - ^
etiological duration), then the living beings that naturally form
relative c losed systems, and finally, the W h o l e of the uni
v e r s e . " It is thus a l imi ted , not a generalized, pluralism.
77
B E R G S O N I S M
Finally, Duration and Simultaneity recapitulates all the pos
s ib le hypotheses : genera l ized plural ism, l imi t ed plural ism,
m o n i s m . 1 2 Acco rd ing to the lirst , there i s a c o e x i s t e n c e of
comple t e ly different rhythms, ol durations that are really dis
t inc t , hence a radical mul t ip l ic i ty ol T i m e . Bergson adds that
he o n c e advanced this hypothesis , but considered that apart
from ourselves it was valid only lor living species : " W e did not
see then , we still see today, no reason to ex t end this hypothe
sis ol a m u l t i p l i c i t y ol dura t ions to the mater ia l un iverse . "
Hence , a second hypothesis: Material things outs ide us would
not be distinguished by absolutely different durations but by
a cer tain relative way of participating in our duration and of
giving it emphasis, f fere it seems that Bergson is condensing the
provisional doc t r ine of Time and Tree Will ( t he re is, as it were,
a myster ious part icipat ion of things in our duration, an " i n e x
pressible ground") and the more developed doctr ine oi Creative
Evolution (this participation in our duration would be explained
by things belonging to the W h o l e of the universe) . But even
in this second case, the mystery about the nature ol the W h o l e
and our relationship with it remains. Hence , the third hypoth
esis: T h e r e is only a single t i m e , a single duration, in which
everything would part icipate, including our consc iousnesses ,
including living beings, including the whole material world.
Now, to the reader's surprise, it is this hypothesis that Bergson
puts forward as the most satisfactory: a single Time, one, univer
sal, impersonal.^ In short, a monism o f T i m e Nothing could
be m o r e surprising; one of the o the r two hypotheses would
s e e m to be a b e t t e r express ion of the s tate of Be rgson i sm,
whether alter Matter and Mcmon or alter Creative Evolution. What
is m o r e : l ias Bergson forgotten that in Time and Tree Will he
defined duration, that is real t i m e , as a "mul t ip l i c i ty"?
7 8
O N E O R M A N Y D U R A T I O N S ?
W h a t has happened? Undoubted ly the confrontat ion with
the theory of Re la t iv i ty . T h i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n was forced on
Bergson because Relativity, for its part, invoked concep t s such
as expansion, con t rac t ion , tension and dilat ion in relation to
space and t ime . But this confrontation did not c o m e about sud
denly: It was prepared by the fundamental no t ion of Mul t i
plicity, which Hinstein drew from Riemann, and which Bergson
lor his part had used in Time and Free Will. Let us recall , briefly,
the principal characteristics of Einstein's theory, as Bergson sum
marizes t hem: Everything begins from a cer tain idea of move
ment that entails a contract ion of bodies and a dilation of their
t ime . From this we conc lude that there has been a dislocation
of s imultaneity: W h a t is s imultaneous in a fixed system ceases
to be s imul taneous in a m o b i l e system. Moreover , by virtue
of the relativity of rest and m o v e m e n t , by virtue of the rela
t ivity even o f a c c e l e r a t e d m o v e m e n t , t he se c o n t r a c t i o n s o f
extensi ty, these di lat ions o f t ime , these ruptures o f s imulta
neity b e c o m e absolutely rec iproca l . In this sense there would
be a mul t ip l ic i ty of t imes , a plurality of t imes , with different
speeds of flow, all real, each one peculiar to a system of refer
e n c e . And as it b e c o m e s necessary, in order to situate a point ,
to indicate its posit ion in t i m e as well as in space, the only
unity of t ime is in a fourth d imens ion of space . It is precisely
this S p a c e - T i m e b l o c that actually divides up into space and
into t ime in an infinity of ways, each one peculiar to a system.
To what does the discussion relate? Cont rac t ion , di la t ion,
relat ivi ty of m o v e m e n t , mul t ip l i c i ty — all these no t ions are
familiar to Bergson. He uses them lor his own purposes. Bergson
never gives up the idea that durat ion, that is to say t i m e , is
essent ia l ly m u l t i p l i c i t y . But the p r o b l e m is: W h a t type of
mul t ip l ic i ty? R e m e m b e r that Bergson opposed two types of
7 9
B E R G S O N I S M
mult ipl ici ty — actual mul t ipl ic i t ies that are numerical and dis
cont inuous and virtual mul t ip l ic i t ies that are cont inuous and
quali tat ive. It is c lea r that in Bergson's terminology, Einstein 's
l i m e belongs to the first category. Bergson cr i t i c izes Einstein
lor having confused the t w o types ol mul t ip l ic i ty and lor hav
ing, as a result , revived the confusion of t i m e with space . T h e
discussion only apparently deals with the quest ion: Is t ime one
or mul t ip le? T h e true p rob lem is " W h a t is the mul t ip l i c i ty
peculiar to t i m e ? " Th i s clearly surfaces in Bergson's uphold
ing of the exis tence of a single, universal and impersonal T i m e .
" W h e n we are si t t ing on the bank of a river, the flowing of
the water, the gliding of a boat or the flight of a bird, the unin
terrupted murmur of our deep life, are for us three different
things or a single one , at will " 1 4 Here Bergson endows atten
t ion with the power of "appor t ioning wi thout dividing," " o f
being one and.several"; but more profoundly, he endows dura
tion with the power to encompass itself. T h e flowing of the
water, the flight of the bird, the murmur of my life form three
l luxes; but only because my duration is one of t hem, and also
the e l emen t that contains the two others . W h y not make do
with t w o fluxes, my durat ion and the flight of the bird, for
example? Because the two fluxes could never be said to be coex
istent or simultaneous if they were not contained in a third one .
T h e flight of the bird and my own duration are only simulta
neous insofar as my own duration divides in two and is reflected
in another that conta ins it at the same t i m e as it conta ins the
flight of the bird: T h e r e is therefore a fundamental t r ipl ici ty
of l l u x e s . 1 5 It is in this sense that my duration essentially has
the power to disclose other durations, to encompass the others,
and to encompass itsell ad infinitum. But we see that this infin
ity of ref lect ion or a t tent ion gives duration back its true char-
8 0
O N E O R M A N Y D U R A T I O N S '
actcr is t ics , which must be constantly recalled: It is not simply
the indivisible, but that which has a very special style ol divi
sion; it is not simply succession but a very special coex i s t ence ,
a s imultanei ty ol l luxes. "Such is our first idea of s imul tane
ity. We call simultaneous, then, two external lluxes that occupy
the same duration because they hold each o the r in the dura
t ion ol a third, our own [ I t is this] s imultanei ty of fluxes
that brings us back to internal duration, to real dura t ion . " 1 6
l e t us return to the characteristics by which Bergson defines
durat ion as virtual or c o n t i n u o u s mul t ip l i c i ty . On the o n e
hand, it divides into e lements that diller in kind; on the other ,
these e l emen t s or these parts only actually exist insofar as the
division itself is effectively carried out (II our consciousness
" terminates the division at a given point, there also terminates
d ivis ib i l i ty .") . 1 7 If we take up a position where the division has
not yet been carried out , that is, in the virtual, it is obvious
that there is only a single t ime . T h e n , let us take up another
position at a m o m e n t where the division has been carried out :
two l luxes, lor e x a m p l e , that of Achi l les ' race and that of the
tor toise 's race. We say that they difler in kind (as do each step
of Achil les and each step of the tor to ise , i f we take the divi
sion still further). T h e fact that the division is sub jec t to the
condi t ion ol actually being carried out means that the parts
( l luxes) must be lived or at least posited and thought of as capa
ble ol being lived. Now Bergson's w hole thesis consists in dem
onstrating that they can only be livable or lived in the perspective of a
single time. T h e principle o f the demonst ra t ion is as follows:
W h e n we admit the exis tence of several t imes, we are not con
tent to cons ider flux A and flux B or even the image that the
sub jec t of A has of B (Achi l les as he conce ives or imagines the
to r to i se ' s race as capab le of be ing lived by the t o r t o i s e ) . In
81
B E R G S O N I S M
order to posit the e x i s t e n c e o l t w o t i m e s , we are lo rced to
int roduce a strange factor: the image that A has of B, whi le
nevertheless knowing that B cannot live in this way. Th i s lac-
tor is comple t e ly " s y m b o l i c " ; in o the r words, i t opposes and
. r exc ludes the lived expe r i ence and through it (and only i t ) is
the so-called second time realized, f rom this Bergson concludes
that there exis ts o n e T i m e and one T i m e onlv, as much on the
level of the actual parts as on the level ol the virtual W h o l e .
(But what is the significance ol this obscure demonst ra t ion?
We shall soon s e e . )
It we lollow the division in the o ther d i rec t ion , if we go
back , we see the lluxes each t i m e with their differences in kind,
with their differences of contraction and expansion (detente), c o m m u
nicat ing in a single and identical l i m e , which is, as it were ,
the i r condi t ion: "A single duration will pick up along its route
the events ol the total i ty ol the material world; and we will
then be able to el iminate the human consciousness that we had
initially had available, every now and then, as so many relays
lor the movement of our thought: there will now only be imper
sonal t ime in which all things will How." 1 8 H e n c e the t r ipl ic-
ity ol lluxes, our duration ( the duration ol a spec ta to r ) be ing
necessary both as Mux and as representative ol l i m e in which
all l luxes are engulfed. It is in this sense that Bergson's various
tex ts are perfectly r econc i l ab le and conta in no cont rad ic t ion :
There is only one t ime ( m o n i s m ) , although there is an infin
ity ol actual lluxes (generalized pluralism) that necessarily par
ticipate in the same virtual whole ( l imited pluralism). Bergson
in no way gives up the idea of a difference in kind be tween
actual fluxes; any more than he gives up the idea ol differences
ot r e l axa t ion (detente) or c o n t r a c t i o n in the vir tual i tv that
encompasses them and is actualized in them. But he considers
8 2
O N E O R M A N Y D U R A T I O N S '
that these two certaint ies do not exc lude , but on the contrary
imply, a single t i m e . In short: Not only do virtual mul t ip l ic i
ties imply a single t i m e , but duration as virtual mul t ip l ic i ty is
this single and same Time.
It is nonetheless true that the Bergsonian demonstrat ion of
the con t r ad i c to ry cha rac t e r o f the plurali lv o f t imes s e e m s
obscure . Let us clarify it at the level of the theory of Relat iv
ity. For, paradoxically, only this theory makes it appear c lea r
and convincing. Insofar as we are dealing with qualitatively dis
t inct fluxes, it may in fact be difficult to know whether or not
the t w o subjec ts live and perceive the same t i m e : We support
unity, but only as the most "plausible" idea. On the other hand,
the theory ol Relat ivi ty is based on the following hypothesis:
T h e r e are no longer quali tat ive fluxes, but systems, "in a s tate
of reciprocal and uniform r ep l acemen t " where the observers
are in terchangeable , s ince there is no longer a privileged sys
t e m . 1 9 Let us accept this hypothesis. Einstein says that the t ime
of the two systems, S and S ' , is not the same. But what is this
other t ime? It is no t that of Peter in S, nor that of Paul in S ' ,
s ince, by hypothesis, these two t imes only differ quantitatively,
and this difference is cancel led out when one takes S and S' as
systems of reference in turn. Could it at least be said that this
o the r t i m e is the one that Peter conce ives as lived or capable
ol being lived by Paul? Not at all — and this is the essential point
of the Bergsonian argument. "Undoubtedly Peter s t icks a label on
this T i m e in the name of Paul; but if he imagined Paul con
scious, living his own duration and measuring it, lor this very
reason he would see Paul take his own system as a system of
reference , and then place himself in this single T i m e , internal
to each system, which we have just been speaking of: more
over, also for this very reason, Peter would provisionally sur-
8 ?
B E R G S O N I S M
render his system ol reference and in consequence his exis tence
as physicist, and in c o n s e q u e n c e also his consc iousness ; Pe te r
would now only see himself as a vision of Paul."- 0 In short, the
other t ime is someth ing that can nei ther he lived by Peter nor
by Paul, nor by Paul as Pe te r imagines h im. It is a pure sym
bol excluding the lived and indicating simply that such a sys
t em, and not the other , is taken as a reference point . " P e t e r
no longer envisages Paul as a physicist , nor even a consc ious
being, nor even a being: he empt i e s from his consc ious and
living interior the visual image of Paul, onlv retaining the exter
nal envelope ol the character ."
Thus , in the Relativity hypothesis, it b e c o m e s obvious that
the re can only be a single livable and lived t ime . (Th is dem
onstrat ion goes beyond the relativist hypothesis, s ince quali
tative differences, in their turn, cannot cons t i tu t e numerical
dist inct ions.) This is why^Bergson claims that Relativity in fact
demonstrates the opposite of what it asserts about the plurality
of t i m e . 2 1 All Bergson's o ther c r i t ic i sms derive from this, f o r
what s imultanei ty does Einstein have in mind when he states
that i t varies from one system to the o ther? A s imul tanei ty
defined l>\ the readings ol two distant I locks . And it is true
that this s imu l t ane i t y is var iable or re la t ive . But p rec i se ly
because its relativity expresses, not something lived or livable,
but the symbolic factor of which we have just been speaking. 2 2
In this sense, this s imultanei ty presupposes t w o others l inked
in the instant, simultaneit ies that are not variable but absolute:
the s imul tanei ty be tween t w o instants, taken from external
movements (a nearby phenomenon and a moment of the c l o c k ) ,
and the s imul tanei ty of these instants with the instants taken
by them from our duration. And these two simultaneit ies pre
suppose yet ano the r , that ol the l luxes , w h i c h is even less
8 4
O N E O R M A N Y D U R A T I O N S '
var iab le . 2 ' T h e Bergsonian theory o f simultaneity thus tends to
confirm the c o n c e p t i o n o f duration as the virtual coexistence o f
all the degrees of a single and identical t ime .
In short , from the first page o f Duration and Simultaneity to
the last, Bergson crit icizes Einstein tor having confused the vir
tual and the actual ( the in t roduct ion of the symbol ic factor,
that is, ol a f ic t ion, expresses this confus ion) . I Ie is c r i t i c ized ,
therefore, for having confused the two types of mult ipl ici ty,
virtual and actual. At the heart of the question "Is duration one
or mul t ip le?" we find a comple t e ly different p rob lem: Dura
t ion is a mult ipl ic i ty , but of what type? Only the hypothesis o f
a single T ime can, according to Bergson, account for the nature
of virtual mul t ip l ic i t ies . By confusing the two types — actual
spatial mult ipl ici ty and virtual temporal multiplicity - Einstein
has mere ly invented a new way of spatializing t ime . And we
cannot deny the originality of his s p a c e - t i m e and the stupen
dous achievement it represents for s c i ence . (Spatialization has
never been pushed so far or in such a way . ) 2 4 But this achieve
men t is that of a symbol for expressing compos i t e s , not that
of something exper ienced that is capable , as Proust would say,
of expressing "a l i t t le t i m e in the pure s ta te ." Being, or T i m e ,
is a multiplicity. But it is precisely not "mul t ip l e" ; it is O n e , in
conformi ty with to type of mult ipl ici ty .
* * *
W h e n Bergson defends the uniqueness of t i m e , he does not
retract anything he has said previously about the virtual c o e x
istence of various degrees ol relaxation (detente) and contract ion
and the difference in kind be tween lluxes or actual rhvthms.
W h e n he says that space and t i m e never over lap nor " i n t e r
twine , " when he maintains that only their dis t inct ion is r e a l , 2 5
85
B E R G S O N I S M
he does not retract any of the ambiguity ofMatter and Memory,
which consisted in integrating something of space into dura
t ion , in o rder to find in durat ion a suff icient reason (raison
wffhante) of ex tens ion . Wha t he condemns from the start is
the whole combination of space and t ime into a badly analyzed
composite, where space is considered as ready made, and t ime,
in c o n s e q u e n c e , as a fourth d imens ion of s p a c e . 2 h And this
spatialization of t i m e is undoubtedly inseparable from sc ience .
But Relativity is characterized by its having pushed this spatiali
zation forward, welding the composi te together in a completely
new way: For, in prerelat ivist s c i e n c e , t i m e assimilated to a
fourth d imension ol space is nevertheless an independent and
really dist inct variable. In Relativity, on the o the r hand, the
assimilation ol space to t ime is necessary in order to express
the invariance ol dis tance, so that it is expl ic i t ly introduced
into the ca lcula t ions and does not allow any real d is t inct ion
to subsist . In short . Relat ivi ty has formed an especially c lose -
knit mix tu re , but a mix tu re that is part of the Bergsonian cri
t ique of the " c o m p o s i t e " in general .
On the o the r hand, from Bergson's point of view we can
(in fact we mus t ) conce ive of combina t ions that depend on a
comple t e ly different pr inciple , l e t us consider the degrees of
expansion (detente) and of contract ion, all ol which coexist with
one another : At the l imit of expansion (detente), we have mat
t e r . 2 7 W h i l e undoubtedly, mat ter is not yet space, it is already
extensi ty. A duration that is infinitely slackened and relaxed
places its m o m e n t s outs ide one another ; one must have dis
appeared when the o ther appears. W h a t these m o m e n t s lose
in rec iprocal penet ra t ion they gain in respect ive spreading.
W h a t they lose in tension they gain in ex tens ion . So that, at
each moment , everything tends to be spread out into an instan-
86
O N E O R M A N Y D U R A T I O N S ?
t .meous, indefinitely divisible continuum, which will not pro
long itsell in to the nex t instant, but will pass away, only to be
reborn in the following instant, in a flicker or shiver that con
stantly begins again . 2 8 It would be sufficient to push this move
ment of expansion (detente) to its limit in order to obtain space
(but space would then be found at the end of the line of dif
ferentiation as the e x t r e m e ending that is no longer c o m b i n e d
with durat ion) . Space , in effect , is not mat te r or ex tens ion ,
but the " s c h e m a " of matter, that is, the representat ion of the
l imit where the movement of expansion (detente) would c o m e
to an end as the external envelope of all possible ex tens ions .
In this sense, it is not matter, it is not extensity, that is in space,
but the very o p p o s i t e . 2 9 And if we think that mat ter has a thou
sand ways of b e c o m i n g expanded (detendu) or ex t ended , we
must also say that there are all kinds of dis t inct ex tens i t ies ,
all related, but still qualified, and which will finish by inter
mingl ing only in our own schema of space.
T h e essential point is to see how expansion (detente) and con
t r ac t i on are r e l a t ive , and re la t ive to o n e ano the r . W h a t i s
expanded (detendu) if not the con t rac ted — and what is con
tracted i f not the ex tended , the expanded (detente)'! This is why
there is always extensity in our duration, and always duration in matter.
W h e n we perce ive , we con t r ac t mi l l ions o f vibrations o r e le
mentary shocks into a felt quality; but what we cont rac t , what
we " t e n s e " in this way, is matter, ex tens ion . In this sense there
is no point in wondering if there are spatial sensations, which
ones are or are not : All our sensat ions are ex tens ive , all are
"vo luminous" and ex tended , although to varying degrees and
in different styles, depending on the type of con t rac t ion that
they carry out . And qual i t ies be long to mat te r as much as to
ourselves: They belong to matter, they are in matter, by virtue
8 7
B E R G S O N I S M
of the vibrations and numbers that punctuate them internally.
I xtensi t ies arc- thus --till qualified, since ihe\ arc inseparable
from the contractions that become expanded (detendu) in them;
and matter is never expanded (detendu) enough to IK- pure space,
to stop having this min imum ol con t rac t ion through which i t
participates in duration, through which it is part of durat ion.
Conversely, duration is never contracted enough to be inde
pendent ol the internal mat ter where it operates , and ol the
extension that it c o m e s to con t rac t . Let us return to the image
ol the inverted cone: Its point (our present) represents the most
con t r ac t ed point ol our durat ion; but i t also represents our
insertion in the least contracted, that is, in an infinitely relaxed
(detendu) matter. This is why, according to bergson, intelligence
has two correlative aspects, forming an ambiguity that is essen
tial to it: It is acquaintance wi th matter, it marks our*adapta
t ion to matter , i t molds itsell on mat ter ; but it only does so
by means of mind or duration, by placing itsell in mat te r in a
point of tension that allows it to master matter. In intel l igence,
one must therefore distinguish between form and sense: It has
its form in matter , it finds its form with matter , that is, in the
most expanded (detendu), but it has and finds its sense in the
most contracted, through which it dominates and utilizes mat
ter. Tt might therefore be said that its form separates intel l i
g e n c e from its meaning, but that this meaning always remains
present in it, and must be rediscovered by intui t ionTjThis is
why, in the final analysis, Bergson refuses all s imple genesis ,
which would account for intel l igence on the basis ol an already
presupposed order ol matter, or which would account lor the
phenomena ol mat te r on the basis ol the supposed categories
ol in te l l igence . T h e r e can only be a s imul taneous genesis of
mat te r and in te l l igence . O n e s tep for one , o n e s tep lor the
88
O N E O B H A N V D U R A T I O N S ?
other : In te l l igence is con t rac ted in mat te r at the same t ime
as m a t t e r is expanded (detendu) in dura t ion ; bo th l ind the
form that is c o m m o n to them, their equi l ibr ium, in extensity,
even if in te l l igence in its turn pushes this form to a degree of
expansion (detente) that mat ter and extensi tv would never have
attained by themselves — that ol a pure s p a c e . 5 0
C H A P T E R V
Elan Vital a s M o v e m e n t o f
D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
Our problem is now this: By moving from dualism to monism,
Irom the idea of differences in kind to that of levels of expan
sion (detente) and contrac t ion, is Bergson not reintroducing into
his philosophy everything that he had condemned — the dif
ferences in degree and intensity that he so strongly cr i t ic ized
in Time and Free Will?1 Bergson says in turn that the past and
the present differ in kind and that the present is only the most
c o n t r a c t e d level or deg ree of the past: How can these t w o
proposi t ions be r econc i l ed? T h e problem is no longer that of
monism; we have seen how the coex i s t ing degrees of expan
sion (detente) and cont rac t ion effectively implied a single t ime
in which even the " f luxes" were s imul taneous . T h e problem
is that of the harmony be tween the dualism of differences in
kind and the monism of degrees of expansion (detente), between
the two moments of the method or the two "beyonds" the turn
in e x p e r i e n c e — recognizing that the m o m e n t of dualism has
not been suppressed at a l l , - but comple t e ly retains its sense .
T h e c r i t i q u e of in tens i ty in Time and Tree Will is highly
ambiguous, Is it d i rec ted against the very not ion of intensive
quantity, or mere ly against the idea of an intensity of psychic
9 1
B E R G S O N I S M
states? It it is t rue that intensity is never given in a pure expe
r ience , is it not then intensity that gives all the quali t ies with
which we make exper ience? I l ence , Matter and Memory recog
nizes intensit ies, degrees or vibrations in the quali t ies that we
live as such ou t s ide ourse lves and tha t , as such , be long to
mat ter . T h e r e are numbers e n c l o s e d in qua l i t ies , in tens i t ies
included in durat ion. Here again, must we speak of a contra
d ic t ion in Bergson? Or are there , rather, different m o m e n t s ol
the me thod , with the emphasis somet imes on one , somet imes
on another , but all coex i s t ing in a dimension of depth?
(1 ) Bergson begins by c r i t i c i z ing any vision of the world
based on differences in degree or intensity. T h e s e in tact lose
sight ol the essential point; that is, the articulations of the real
or the quali tat ive differences, the differences in kind. T h e r e
is a difference in kind between space and duration, mat ter and
memory , present and past, e t c . We only discover this differ
ence by dint ol decompos ing the compos i t e s given in exper i
ence and going beyond the "turn." We discover the differences
in kind be tween t w o actual t endenc ie s , be tween two actual
d i rec t ions toward the pure state into which each c o m p o s i t e
divides. This is the m o m e n t ol pure dualism, or of the divi
sion ol compos i t e s .
( 2 ) But we can already see that it is not enough to say that
the difference in kind is between t w o tendenc ies , be tween two
d i rec t ions , be tween space and duration For one ol these
two d i rec t ions takes all the differences in kind on itsell and
all the differences in degree tail away into the o the r d i rect ion,
the o t h e r tendency. It is duration that includes all the qualita
tive differences, to the point where it is defined as alteration in
relation to i tsell . It is space that only presents differences in
degree, to the point where it appears as the schema ol an indel-
92
£LAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
inite divisibility. Similarly, Memory is essentially difference and
mat te r essentially repet i t ion . T h e r e is therefore no longer any
difference in kind be tween two tendenc ies , but a difference
between the differences in kind that correspond to one tendency
and the differences in degree that refer back to the o the r ten
dency. Th i s i s the m o m e n t of neutralized, balanced dualism.
( 3) Duration, memory or spirit is difference in kind in i tself
and for itself; and space or ma t t e r is difference in degree out
side itsell and for us. There fo re , be tween the two there are all
the degrees of difference or, in o the r words, the whole nature of
difference. Duration is only the most cont rac ted degree o f mat
ter, mat ter the most expanded (detendu) degree o f duration. But
duration is l ike a naturing nature (nature naturante), and mat
ter a natured nature (nature nature'e). Differences in degree are
the lowest degree ol Difference; differences in kind (nature) are
the highest nature of Dif ference . T h e r e is no longer any dual
ism be tween nature and degrees . All the degrees c o e x i s t in a
single Nature that is expressed, on the one hand, in differences
in kind, and on the other , in differences in degree. Th i s is the
m o m e n t of mon i sm: All the degrees coex i s t in a single T i m e ,
which is nature in i t se l f . 2 T h e r e is no cont rad ic t ion be tween
this monism and dualism, as m o m e n t s of the me thod . For the
duality was valid be tween actual t endenc ies , be tween actual
d i r ec t ions leading beyond the first turn in e x p e r i e n c e . But
the unity occurs at a second turn: T h e c o e x i s t e n c e of all the
degrees , of all the levels is virtual, only virtual. T h e point of
unification is i t se l f virtual. This point is not wi thout similar
ity to the O n e - W h o l e of the Platonists. All the levels of expan
sion (detente) and contract ion coexis t in a single T ime and form
a total i ty; but this W h o l e , this O n e , are pure virtuality. Th i s
W h o l e has parts, this One has a number - but only potentially. 5
93
B E R G S O N I S M
This is why Bergson is not contradicting himself when he s|x-aks
ol different intensi t ies or degrees in a virtual c o e x i s t e n c e , in
a single T i m e , in a s imple Totality.
• * *
A philosophy like this assumes that the not ion of the virtual
stops being vague and indeterminate . In itself, it needs to have
the highest degree ol precision. Th i s condi t ion is only fulfilled
if, starting from monism, we are able to rediscover dualism and
account for it on a new plane. A fourth m o m e n t must be added
to the three preceding ones — that of dualism recovered, mas
tered and in a sense, generated.
W h a t does Bergson mean when he talks about elan vital? It
is always a case of a virtualitv in the process of being actual
ized, a s impl ic i ty in the process of differentiating, a total i ty
in the process of dividing up: Proceeding "by dissociation and
divis ion," by "d i cho tomy ," is the essence of l i f e . 4 In the most
familiar examples, life is divided into plant and animal; the ani
mal is divided into instinct and intel l igence; an instinct in turn
divides into several d i rec t ions that are actualized in different
species ; in te l l igence itself has its particular modes or actual
izations. It is as if Life were merged into the very movemen t
of differentiation, in ramified series. Movement is undoubtedly-
explained by the insertion ol duration into mat te r : Durat ion
is differentiated according to the obstacles it mee t s in matter,
according to the materiality through which it passes, according
to the kind ol ex tens ion that i t con t r ac t s . But differentiation
does not mere ly have an external cause. Durat ion is differen
tiated within itsell through an internal explosive force; it is
only affirmed and prolonged, it only advances, in branching
or ramified ser ies . 5 Durat ion, to be precise, is called life when
9 4
ELAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
it appears in this movement . W h y is differentiation an "actual
ization"? Because it presupposes a unity, a virtual primordial
total i ty that is dissociated accord ing to the lines ot differen
t ia t ion , but that st i l l shows its subsis t ing unity and to ta l i ty
in each l ine. Thus , when life is divided into plant and animal,
when the animal is divided into instinct and inte l l igence, each
side of the division, each ramificat ion, carries the whole with
it. From a certain perspective it is like an accompanying nebu
losity, testifying to its undivided origin. And there is a halo of
inst inct in in te l l igence , a nebula of in te l l igence in ins t inct , a
hint of the animate in plants, and of the vegetable in animals . 6
Differentiat ion is always the actual izat ion of a virtuality that
persists across its actual divergent l ines.
We then encounter a problem that is peculiar to Bergsonism:
T h e r e are t w o types of division that must not be confused.
According to the first type, we begin with a c o m p o s i t e , for
e x a m p l e the s p a c e - t i m e m i x t u r e o r t h e p e r c e p t i o n - i m a g e
and recol lect ion-image mixture . We divide this composi te into
two actual divergent lines that are different in kind and that
we e x t e n d beyond the turn in e x p e r i e n c e (pure ma t t e r and
pure duration, or e lse pure present and pure past) . But now
we are speaking of a c o m p l e t e l y dif ferent type of d iv is ion:
Our starting point is a unity, a simplicity, a virtual totality. This
unity is ac tua l ized a c c o r d i n g to d ivergent l ines differing in
kind; it "exp la ins , " it develops what it had kept enc losed in a
virtual manner . Fo r e x a m p l e , a t each instant pure durat ion
divides in two di rec t ions , one ol which is the past, the o the r
the p resen t ; or e l se the elan vital at every ins tant separa tes
into two movements , one of relaxation (detente) that descends
into matter , the o the r of tension that ascends into durat ion.
I t can be seen that the d ivergent l ines p roduced in the t w o
95
B E R G S O N I S M
types of division co inc ide and are superimposed, or at least cor
respond c losely to each other . In the second type of division
we r ed i scove r d i f fe rences in k ind iden t ica l o r ana logous to
those that had been determined in the lirst type. In both cases
a vision of the world is c r i t ic ized for only taking account of
differences in degree where , more profoundly, there are dif
ferences in kind. 7 In both cases a dualism is established between
t e n d e n c i e s that d i l l e r in k ind . But this is not the same s ta te
of dualism, and not the same division. In the lirst type, it is *
a ref lexive dual ism, wh ich results from the decomposition of an
impure composite: It const i tutes the first moment of the method.
In the second type it is a gene t i c dualism, the result of the dif
ferentiation of a Simple or a Pure: It forms the linal m o m e n t of
the me thod that u l t imate ly rediscovers the starting point on
this new plane.
O n e quest ion b e c o m e s pressing: Wha t is the nature of this
one and simple Virtual? I low is it that, as early as Time and Tree
Will, then in Matter and Memon, Bergson's philosophy should
have attributed such importance to the idea of virtualitv at the
very m o m e n t when it was chal lenging the category of possi
bili ty? It is because the "virtual" can be distinguished from the
" p o s s i b l e " from at least two points ol view. I r o m a cer tain
point ol view, in lact , the possible is the oppos i te of the real,
it is opposed to the real; but, in qu i te a different opposi t ion,
the virtual is opposed to the actual . We must take this termi
nology seriously: T h e possible has no reality (al though it may
have an actual i ty) ; conversely, the virtual is not actual , but as
such possesses a reality. Mere again Proust 's formula best defines
the states ol virtualitv: "real wi thout being actual , ideal with
out being abstract." On the o ther hand, or Irom another point
of view, the possible is that which is " rea l ized" (o r is not real-
96
ELAH VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
ized). Now the process of realization is subjec t to two essen
tial rules, one o l resemblance and another of l imita t ion. l o r
the real is supposed to be in the image of the possible that it
realizes. ( I t simply has e x i s t e n c e or reality added to it, which
is translated by saying that, from the point of view of the con
cep t , there is no di l lerence be tween the possible and the real.)
And, every possible is not realized, realization involves a l imi
tation by which s o m e possibles are supposed to be repulsed
or thwarted, while o thers "pass" into the real. T h e virtual, on
the o the r hand, does not have to be realized, but rather actu
alized; and the rules of actualization are not those of resem
blance and l imi ta t ion , but those of difference or divergence
and of c rea t ion . W h e n cer ta in biologis ts invoke a not ion of
organic virtualitv or potentialitv and nonetheless maintain that
this potentiali ty is actualized by s imple l imitation of its global
capacity, they clearly tall in to a confusion of the virtual and
the poss ib le . 8 For, in order to be actualized, the virtual can
not proceed by e l imina t ion or l imi ta t ion, but must create its
own lines of actual izat ion in positive acts . T h e reason for this
is s imple : W h i l e the real is in the image and likeness of the
possible that it realizes, the actual , on the o the r hand does not
resemble the virtualitv that it embod ie s . It is difference that
is pr imary in the process of ac tua l i za t ion — the d i f fe rence
be tween the virtual from which we begin and the actuals at
which we arrive, and also the d i l le rence be tween the c o m p l e
mentary lines according to which actualization takes place. In
short , the charac te r i s t ic of virtualitv is to exis t in such a way
that it is actualized by being differentiated and is forced to dif
ferentiate i tsell , to crea te its l ines of differentiation in order
to be actual ized.
W h y does Bergson chal lenge the not ion of the possible in
97
B E R G S O N I S M
favor of that of the virtual? It is precisely because - by virtue
ol these p reced ing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s — the poss ib le is a false
not ion , the source of false p rob lems . T h e real is supposed to
resemble it. That is to say, we give ourselves a real that is ready-
made, preformed, pre-existent to itsell , and that will pass into
e x i s t e n c e a c c o r d i n g t o a n o r d e r o f succes s ive l i m i t a t i o n s .
Every th ing is already complete!} given: all o f t h e real in t h e
image, in the pseudo-actuality of the possible. Then the sleight
of hand b e c o m e s obvious: If the real is said to resemble the »
possible, is this not in fact because the real was expec t ed to
c o m e about by its own means, to "p ro j ec t backward" a ficti
tious image of it, and to claim that it was possible at any t ime ,
before it happened? In (act, it is not the real that resembles
the possible, it is the possible that resembles the real, because
i t has been abs t rac ted from the real o n c e made , arbitrari ly
ex t rac ted Irom the real like a s ter i le d o u b l e . 9 H e n c e , we no
longer understand anything e i t he r of the mechanism of differ
e n c e o r o f the mechanism of c rea t ion .
Evolution takes place from the virtual to actuals. Evolution
is actual izat ion, actual izat ion is c rea t ion . W h e n we speak of
biological or living evolution we must therefore avoid two mis
c o n c e p t i o n s : that of interpret ing it in terms of the "pos s ib l e "
that is realized, or e lse interpret ing it in t e rms ol pure actu
als. T h e first misconcept ion obviously appears in prcformism.
And, contrary to preformism, evolut ionism will always have
the meri t ol reminding us that life is product ion, creat ion of
differences. T h e whole problem is that of the nature and the
causes of these differences. T h e vital differences or variations
can certainly be conce ived ol as purely acc identa l . But three
o b j e c t i o n s to an interpretat ion ol this kind arise:
(1 ) s ince they are due to c h a n c e , these variat ions, how-
98
ELAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
99
ever small they are, would remain external , " indifferent" to
each other ;
( 2 ) s ince they are external , they could not logically en t e r
in to anything but re la t ions ol assoc ia t ion and addi t ion wi th
one another ;
( 3 ) s ince they are indifferent, they could not even have the
means to really en t e r into such relat ions (tor there would be
no reason why the small successive variations should link up
and add t o g e t h e r in the same d i r e c t i o n ; no r any reason for
sudden and s imul taneous variations to be coordinated into a
livable w h o l e ) . ' "
I f we invoke the ac t ion of the envi ronment and the influ
e n c e of external cond i t i ons , the three o b j e c t i o n s persist in
another form: For the differences are still interpreted from the
perspect ive of a purely external causality. In thei r nature they
would only be passive effects, e lements that could be abstractly
combined or added together. In their relationships they would,
however, be incapable of functioning "as a b l o c , " so as to con
trol or utilize their c a u s e s . "
T h e mistake of evolut ionism is, thus, to c o n c e i v e of vital
variations as so many actual de terminat ions that should then
c o m b i n e on a single l ine. T h e three requirements of a philoso
phy of life are as follows:
(1) the vital difference can only be experienced and thought
of as internal difference; it is only in this sense that the " ten
dency to c h a n g e " is no t a c c i d e n t a l , and that the variat ions
themselves find an internal cause in that t endency ;
( 2 ) these variations do not en t e r into relationships of asso
ciat ion and addition, but on the contrary, they en te r into rela
t ionships o f dissociat ion o r division;
( 3 ) they the re fo re involve a vi r tual i tv that is ac tua l i zed
B E R G S O N I S M
according to the lines oi d ivergence ; so that evolution does not
move irom one actual term to another actual te rm in a h o m o
geneous unil inear series, hut Irom a virtual t e rm to the het
erogeneous terms that actualize it along a ramified s e r i e s . 1 2
But this leads to the ques t ion of how the S imp le or the
O n e , " the original identity," has the power to be differentiated.
T h e answer is already contained in Matter and Memon. And the
linkage between Creative Evolution and Matter and Memory is per
fectly r igorous. We know that the virtual as virtual has a reality;
this reality, extended to the whole universe, consists in all the
c o e x i s t i n g degrees of expansion (detente) and c o n t r a c t i o n . A
gigant ic memory, a universal c o n e in which everything c o e x
ists wi th itself, e x c e p t for the differences of level. On each of
these levels there are s o m e "outs tanding poin ts , " which are
like remarkable points peculiar to it. All these levels or degrees
and all these points are themselves virtual. They be long to a
single T i m e ; they coexis t in a Unity; they are enclosed in a Sim
plici ty; they form the potent ial parts of a W h o l e that is itself
virtual. T h e y are the reality of this virtual. Th i s was the sense of
the theory of virtual mul t ip l ic i t ies that inspired Bergsonism
from the start. W h e n the virtualitv is actualized, is differenti
ated, is "deve loped ," when it actualizes and develops its parts,
i t does so accord ing to l ines that are divergent , but each of
which corresponds to a particular degree in the virtual total
ity. T h e r e is here no longer any c o e x i s t i n g w h o l e ; there are
merely l ines of actual izat ion, some successive, others simultaneous,
but each represent ing an ac tua l iza t ion of the w h o l e in o n e
d i rec t ion and not c o m b i n i n g with o the r lines or o ther d i rec
t ions. Nevertheless , each of these l ines corresponds to one of
these degrees that all c o e x i s t in the virtual; it ac tua l izes its
l eve l , w h i l e separa t ing i t from t h e o t h e r s ; i t e m b o d i e s its
100
£LAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
prominent points, while being unaware of everything that hap
pens on o the r l e v e l s . 1 5 We must think of i t as follows: W h e n
duration is divided into mat te r and life, then life into plant
and animal , different levels of con t rac t ion , which only c o e x
ist insofar as they remain virtual, are actualized. And when the
animal instinct is i t se l f divided into various instincts, or when
a particular inst inct is i t s e l f divided according to species , lev
els are again separated, or arc actually cu t out in the region of
the animal or of the genus. And however s t r ic t ly the lines of
actualization correspond to the levels or the virtual degrees of
expansion (detente) or c o n t r a c t i o n , i t should no t be thought
that the l ines o f ac tual izat ion conf ine themse lves to t racing
these levels or degrees, to reproducing them by s imple resem
blance . For what coex i s t ed in the virtual ceases to coex i s t in
the actual and is dis t r ibuted in lines or parts that cannot be
summed up, each one retaining the whole , e x c e p t from a cer
tain p e r s p e c t i v e , from a ce r t a in po in t of view. T h e s e l ines
ol differentiation are therefore truly creat ive: T h e y only actu
alize by inventing, they c rea te in these condi t ions the phvsi-
cal , vital or psychical representat ive of the on to log ica l level
that they embody.
I f we c o n c e n t r a t e only on the actuals that c o n c l u d e each
l ine, we establish relationships be tween them — whe the r of
gradation or oppos i t ion . Be tween plant and animal , for exam
ple, be tween animal and man, we now only see differences in
degree. Or we will situate a fundamental opposi t ion in each
one of t hem: We will see in one the negative of the other , the
inversion of the o ther , or the obs tac le that is opposed to the
other. Bergson often expresses h imse l f in this way, in terms of
cont rar ie tv : Mat te r is presented as the obs tac le that the elan
vital must get around, and materiality, as the inversion of the
101
Summary Diagram of Differentiation (CE, Ch. 2)
MATTERRELAXATION/EXPANSION
[detente] I THE DIFFERENT WORLDS, AND IN EACH WORLD, THE TYPES OF MATTER
THAT APPEAR AS THE MANY EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL OBSTACLESTHAT LIFE MUST AVOID.
LIFE(CONTRACTION)
PLANT: CHLOROPHYLLOUS FUNCTION(ACCUMULATION OF ENERGYIN A CONTINUOUS FASHION,STORING UP EXPLOSIVES).
/ \
ANIMAL: NERVOUS SYSTEM (EXPENDITURE OF ENERGY INA DISCONTINUOUS WAY,DETONATION OF THEEXPLOSIVE).
FIXATION OF CARBON.
FIXATION OF NITROGEN.
DECENTRALIZED NERVOUS SYSTEM; INSTINCT.
CENTRALIZED NERVOUS SYSTEM: INTELLIGENCE.
\
EXTERIORIZATION AND DOMINATION OF MATTER
CONVERSION AND UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE (INTUITION).
ELAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
movemen t of l i f e . ' 4 I t should not , however, he thought that
Bergson is going back to a c o n c e p t i o n of the negative that he
had previously c o n d e m n e d , any more than he returns to a the
ory of de ter iora t ions . For one only has to replace the actual
terms in the movement that produces them to bring them back
to the virtualitv actualized in t hem, in order to see that dif
ferentiation is never a negation but a c rea t ion , and that differ
e n c e is never negative but essentially positive and creat ive.
» * *
We always rediscover the laws c o m m o n to these lines ol actu
alization or ol differentiat ion. T h e r e is a corre la t ion be tween
life and matter , be tween expansion (detente) and con t rac t ion ,
which shows the c o e x i s t e n c e of the i r respect ive degrees in the
virtual W h o l e , and their essential relativity in the process of
actualizat ion. Fach line of life is related to a type of ma t t e r
that is not mere ly an external env i ronment , but in terms of
which the living being manufactures a body, a form, for itself.
This is why the living being, in relation to matter, appears pri
marily as the stating of a p rob lem, and the capaci ty to solve
problems: T h e construct ion of an eye, for example , is primarily
the solut ion to a problem posed in terms of l i gh t . 1 5 And each
t ime , we will say that the solution was as good as it could have
been, given the way in which the problem was stated, and the
means that the living being had at its disposal to solve it . ( I t
is in this wav that, if we compare a similar inst inct in various
species , we ought not to say that it is more or less c o m p l e t e ,
more or less perfected, but that it is as perfect as it can be in
varying d e g r e e s . ) 1 6 It is nevertheless c lear that each vital solu
t ion is not in itself a success : By dividing the animal in two ,
Arthropods and Vertebrates , we have not taken into account
103
B E R G S O N I S M
the- two o ther d i rec t ions , I c h inodcrms and Mollnsks, which
are a setback lor the clan vital.1"1 Everything takes place as though
living beings themselves also stated false problems lor them
selves in which they risk losing thei r way. Moreover , if every
solut ion is a relative success in relation to the condi t ions of
the problem or the envi ronment , it is still a relative se tback,
in relat ion to the movement that invents it: l.ile as movement
alienates itsell in the material form that it c rea tes ; by actualiz
ing i tsel l , by di l lerent ia t ing i tsel l , it loses " c o n t a c t with the
rest ol i tsel l ." Every species is thus an arrest ol movement ; it
could be said that the living be ing turns on i t s e l f and closes
itse//. 1 8 It cannot be otherwise , s ince the W h o l e is only virtual,
dividing itsell by being acted out . It cannot assemble its actual
parts that remain external to each o ther : I he W h o l e is never
"given." And, in the actual, an i r reducible pluralism reigns —
as many worlds as living beings, all " c l o s e d " on themselves .
But we must , in another osc i l la t ion , be del ighted that the
Whole is not given. Th i s is the cons tant t h e m e of Bergsonism
Irom the outset : T h e confusion of space and t i m e , the assimi
lation of t ime into space, make us think that the whole is given,
even if only in pr inciple , even if only in the eyes of God. And
this is the mistake that is c o m m o n to mechanism and to final-
ism. I he lormer assumes that everything is calculable in terms
of a state; the latter, that everything is de te rminab le in terms
of a program: In any event , t ime is only there now as a screen
that hides the eternal Irom us, or that shows us successively
what a ( i od or a superhuman in te l l igence would see in a sin
g le g l a n c e . ' 1 ' Now this i l lusion is i nev i t ab l e as soon as we
spatialize t ime. Indeed, in space it is sufficient to have a dimen
sion supplementary to those where a phenomenon happens lor
the movement in the course ol happening to appear to us as a
104
ELAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
ready-made form. II we consider t i m e as a fourth d imension
of space , this fourth d imension will thus be assumed to con
tain all the possible forms of the universe as a whole ; and move
ment in space, as well as (lowing in t i m e , will now only be
appearances linked to the three d i m e n s i o n s . ' 0 But the lact that
real space has only three dimensions, that T ime is not a dimen
sion ol space, really means this: T h e r e is an e l l icaci ty , a posi-
tivity ol t ime , that is identical to a "hes i ta t ion" of things and,
in this way, to crea t ion in the wor ld . 2 1
It is c lear that there is a W h o l e of duration. But this whole
is virtual. It is actualized according to divergent lines; but these
lines do not form a whole on thei r own accoun t , and do not
resemble what they actualize. If the c h o i c e is be tween mecha
nism and finalism, tinalism is preferable; providing that it is cor
rected in two ways. O n the one hand, it is right to compare the
living be ing to the whole of the universe, but i t is wrong to
interpret this compar ison as if it expressed a kind of analogy
be tween two c losed to ta l i t ies ( m a c r o c o s m and m i c r o c o s m ) .
The finality of the living being exists only insofar as it is essen
tially open on to a total i ty that is i t se l f open: "finality is ex te r
nal , or i t is no th ing at a l l . " 2 2 I t is thus the w h o l e classical
comparison that takes on another meaning; it is not the whole
that c loses like an organism, it is the organism that opens on to
a who le , like this virtual who le .
On the o ther hand, there is a proof of finality to the ex tent
that we discover similar actualizations, identical s tructures or
apparatuses on divergent lines (for example , the eye in the Mol-
lusk and in the Ver tebra te ) . T h e example wil l be all the more
significant the further apart the lines are, and the more the organ
that is s imilar is obta ined by dissimilar m e a n s . 2 ' We see here
how, in the process of actualization, the very category of resem-
105
B E R G S O N I S M
Nance finds itsell subordinated to that ol divergence, difference
or differentiation. W h i l e actual forms or products can resem
ble each other, the movements of production do not resemble
each other , nor do the products r e semble the virtualitv that
they embody. Th i s is why actual izat ion, differentiat ion, are a
genuine creat ion. T h e W h o l e must create the divergent lines
accord ing to wh ich it is actual ized and the dissimilar means
that it uti l izes on each l ine. T h e r e is finality because life does
not operate without directions; but there is no "goal ," because
these d i rec t ions do not pre-exist ready-made, and are them
selves crea ted "along wi th" the act that runs through t h e m . 2 4
Each l ine of actual izat ion corresponds to a virtual level; but
each t ime , it must invent the figure of this correspondence and
crea te the means for the deve lopment of that which was only
enveloped in order to distinguish that which was confused.
* * *
Duration, Life, is in principle (en droit) memory, in principle con
sciousness, in pr inciple f reedom. " In pr inc ip le" means virtu
ally. T h e whole quest ion (quid facti?) is knowing under what
c o n d i t i o n s dura t ion b e c o m e s in fact c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f se l l ,
how life actually accedes to a mem or y and freedom of f a c t . 2 5
Bergson's answer is that it is only on the line of Man that the
elan vital successfully "ge ts through"; man in this sense fa " t h e
purpose of the en t i re process of e v o l u t i o n . " 2 6 I t could be said
that in man, and only in man, the actual b e c o m e s adequate to
the virtual. It could be said that man is capable of rediscover
ing ail t h e levels , all t h e degrees of expans ion (detente) and
con t rac t ion that coexis t in the virtual W h o l e . As if he were
capable of all the frenzies and brought about in h i m s e l f suc
cess ively everything that , e l s ewhe re , can only be e m b o d i e d
106
ELAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
in di f ferent s p e c i e s . Even in his d reams he red i scovers or
prepares mat ter . And durations that arc inferior or superior to
him are still internal to him. Man therefore crea tes a differen
t iat ion that is valid for the W h o l e , and he alone traces out an
open d i r e c t i o n tha t is ab l e to express a w h o l e tha t is i t s e l f
open. W h e r e a s the o ther d i rec t ions are c losed and go round
in c i r c l e s , whereas a dis t inct " p l a n e " of nature corresponds to
each o n e , man is capable of scrambling the planes, of going
beyond his own plane as his own cond i t ion , in order finally to
express naturing N a t u r e . 2 7
f low does this privilege of man c o m e about? At first sight,
its origin is a humble o n e . Every con t rac t ion of duration still
be ing relat ive to an expans ion (detente), and every life to a
ma t t e r , t h e po in t of depar ture is in a ce r t a in s ta te of c e r e
bral mat ter . We recall that this la t ter "analyzed" the received
e x c i t a t i o n , s e l e c t e d t h e r eac t ion , made poss ib le an interval
b e t w e e n e x c i t a t i o n and r eac t ion ; noth ing here goes beyond
the physico-chemical propert ies of a particularly c o m p l i c a t e d
type of matter. But, as we have seen, it is the whole of memory
that descends in to this interval, and that b e c o m e s actual. It is
the whole of freedom that is actual ized. On man's l ine of dif
ferent iat ion, the elan vital was able to use ma t t e r to crea te an
ins t rument of f r eedom, " t o make a m a c h i n e wh ich should
tr iumph over m e c h a n i s m , " " t o use the de te rmin ism of nature
to pass through the meshes of the ne t which this very deter
m i n i s m had s p r e a d . " 2 8 F r e e d o m has p rec i se ly this physical
sense: " t o de tona te" an explosive, to use it for more and more
powerful m o v e m e n t s . 2 9
But where does this starting point seem to lead? To percep
t ion; and also to a utilitarian memory , s ince useful r eco l l ec
tions are actualized in the cerebral interval; and to intell igence
107
B E R G S O N I S M
as the organ of domina t ion and util ization of mat te r . We even
understand that men form societies. It is not that society is solely
or essent ia l ly in te l l igent . From the outse t , human soc i e t i e s
undoubtedly imply a certain intelligent comprehension ol needs
and a cer ta in rational organization of ac t iv i t ies . But they are
also formed, and only subsist through irrational or even absurd
factors, 'fake, lor example , obligation: It has no rational ground.
F.ach particular obl igat ion is convent ional and can border on
the absurd; the only thing that is grounded is the obl igat ion
to have obl igat ions , " t h e whole of obl igat ion"; and it is not
grounded in reason, but in a r equ i rement of nature, in a kind
of "virtual ins t inc t , " that is, on a counterpar t that nature pro
duces in the reasonable being in order to compensa t e lor the
partiality ol his intel l igence. F.ach line ol differentiation, being
exclusive, seeks to recapture, by its own means, the advantages
of the o the r l ine. T h u s , in thei r separation, inst inct and intel
l igence are such that the one produces an ersatz of intel l igence,
the other , an equivalent ol ins t inct . Th i s is the "story-tel l ing
func t ion" : virtual i n s t inc t , c r ea to r o l gods, inven to r o f reli
g ions , that is, ol f ic t i t ious representat ions "wh ich will stand
up to the representat ion ol the real and which will succeed ,
by the intermediary ol in te l l igence i tsel l , in thwarting intel
lectual work." And as in the case ol obligation, each god is con
t ingen t , or even absurd, but what is natural, necessary and
grounded is having gods; it is the pantheon ol gods.*" In short,
sociabi l i ty (in the human sense) can only exis t in intel l igent
beings, but it is not grounded on the i r in te l l igence : Social life
is immanen t to in t e l l i gence , it begins with it but does not
derive from it. H e n c e our problem appears to have b e c o m e
more c o m p l i c a t e d instead ol being solved, f o r if we cons ider
intell igence and sociability, both in their complementar i ty and
108
ELAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
in their difference, nothing yet justifies man's privilege. T h e
soc ie t i e s that he forms are no less c losed than animal species;
they form part of a plan (plan) of nature, as much as animal
species and societ ies; and man goes round in c i rc les in his soci
e ty jus t as much as the species do in theirs or ants in thei r
d o m a i n . " Nothing here seems to be capable of giving man the
previously m e n t i o n e d excep t iona l opening , as the power of
going beyond his " p l a n e " (plan) and his cond i t ion .
Unless this kind of play of in te l l igence and of society, this
small interval be tween the two , is i t s e l f a decisive factor. T h e
small intracerebral interval has already made in te l l igence pos
s ib le , and the ac tua l iza t ion of a m e m o r y useful. Moreover ,
thanks to it, the body imitates the whole life of the mind, and
we were able with a leap to place ourselves in the pure past.
We now find ourselves before another intercerebral inten'al between
in te l l igence itself and soc ie ty : Is it not this "hes i ta t ion" of the
intelligence that will be able to imitate the superior "hesitation"
of things in duration, and that will al low man, wi th a leap, to
break the c i r c l e of c losed soc ie t ies? At first sight, the answer
is no. For, if in te l l igence hesi tates and some t imes rebels , it is
primarily in the name ol an egoism that it seeks to preserve
against social r e q u i r e m e n t s . ' 2 And whi le soc ie ty makes itself
obeyed it is thanks to the story-tell ing function, which per
suades the in te l l igence that it is in its interest to confirm the
social obligation. We therefore seem to be constantly sent back
from one term to another. But everything changes when some
thing appears in the interval.
W h a t is it that appears in the interval be tween intel l igence
and society (in the same way as the recollection-image appeared
in the cerebral interval appropriate to in te l l igence)? We can
not reply: It is intuition. In fact, we must on the contrary carry
109
B E R G S O N I S M
out a genesis ot in tui t ion, that is, de te rmine the way in which
intel l igence itsell was converted or is converted into intuition.
And i f we recal l , accord ing to the laws of di l lerent ia t ion, that
i n t e l l i g e n c e , in separat ing i t s e l f from ins t inc t , never the less
keeps an equivalent of inst inct that would be like the nucleus
of intuition. We are not saying anything of importance, tor this
equivalent ol inst inct tinds i t se l f comple t e ly mobi l ized in the
c losed soc ie ty as such, through the s tory-tel l ing f u n c t i o n . 5 5
Bergson's real answer is comple te ly different: Wha t appears in
the interval is emotion. In this answer, " W e have no c h o i c e . " 5 4
O n l y e m o t i o n differs in nature from bo th i n t e l l i g e n c e and
ins t inc t , from both in te l l igent individual egoism and quasi-
ins t inct ive social pressure. Obviously no one denies that ego
ism produces emot ions ; and even more so social pressure, with
all the fantasies of the story-telling function. But in both these
cases, emot ion is always connected to a representation on which
it is supposed to depend . We are then placed in a c o m p o s i t e
ol e m o t i o n and ol representat ion, wi thout no t ic ing that it is
potential (en puissance), the nature ol emot ion as pure e lement .
T h e latter in tact precedes all representat ion, itself generating
new ideas. It does not have, s t r ic t ly speaking, an o b j e c t , but
mere ly an essence that spreads itself over various o b j e c t s , ani
mals, plants and the whole of nature. "Imagine a piece ol music
which expresses love. It is not love lor a particular person
T h e quality of love will depend upon its essence and not upon
its o b j e c t . " 5 1 Although personal, it is not individual; transcen
dent , it is like the God in us. " W h e n music c r i es , it is human
ity, it is the whole of nature which cries with it. Truly speaking,
it does not introduce these feelings in us; it introduces us rather
into them, like the passers-by that might l>e nudged in a dance."
In short , e m o t i o n is crea t ive (first , because it expresses the
110
ELAN VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
whole of c rea t ion , then because i t creates the work in which
it is expressed; and finally, because it c o m m u n i c a t e s a l i t t le
ol this creat ivi ty to specta tors or hearers) .
T h e l i t t le interval "be tween the pressure ol society and the
resis tance ol i n t e l l i gence" defines a variability appropriate to
human s o c i e t i e s . Now, by means of this interval , some th ing
extraordinary is produced or embodied: creative emot ion . This
no longer has anything to do with the pressures of society, nor
with the disputes of the individual. I t no longer has anything
to do with an individual who contests or even invents, nor with
a socie ty that constrains, that persuades or even tells s t o r i e s . 5 6
It has only made use of the i r c i rcular play in order to break
the c i r c l e , just as Memory uses the c i rcular play of exc i ta t ion
and react ion to embody r eco l l ec t ions in images. And what is
this crea t ive e m o t i o n , il not precisely a c o s m i c Memory, that
actualizes all the levels at the same t ime , that l iberates man
Irom the plane (plan) or the level that is proper to him, in order
to make him a creator , adequate to the whole movemen t ol
c rea t ion? 5 7 This liberation, this embodiment ol cosmic memory
in crea t ive e m o t i o n s , undoubtedly only takes place in privi
leged souls. It leaps Irom one soul to another , "every now and
then ," crossing closed deserts. But to each m e m b e r of a c losed
society", if he opens h imse l f to it, i t c o m m u n i c a t e s a kind ol
r emin i scence , an e x c i t e m e n t that allows him to lollow. And
from soul t o soul, it traces the design o f an open society, a soci
ety of c rea tors , where we pass from one genius to another ,
through the intermediary of disciples or spectators or hearers.
It is the genesis of intuition in in te l l igence. II man accedes
to the open creative totality, it is therefore by act ing, by cre
ating rather than by contempla t ing . In philosophy itself, there
is still t o o much alleged con templa t ion : Everything happens
111
B E R G S O N I S M
as if intel l igence were already imbued with emot ion , thus with
in tui t ion, but not sufficiently so lor creat ing in conformi ty to
this e m o t i o n . ' 8 Thus the great souls — to a greater ex tent than
philosophers — are those ol artists and myst ics (at least those
of a Christian myst ic ism that Bergson descr ibes as being c o m
pletely superabundant activity, act ion, c rea t ion) . ' 1 ' At the l imit ,
i t i s the myst ic w h o plays wi th the whole of c rea t ion , w h o
invents an expression of i t whose adequacy increases with its
dynamism. Servant ol an open and finite God (such are the char
acterist ics o f the Elan Vital), the mystical soul actively plays the
whole ol the universe, and reproduces the opening ol a W h o l e
in which there is noth ing to see or to c o n t e m p l a t e . Already
motivated by emot ion , the philosopher extracted the lines that
divided up the compos i tes given in exper ience . He prolonged
the ou t l ine to beyond the "turn"; he showed in the dis tance
the virtual point at which they all me t . Everything happens as
if that which remained indeterminate in philosophical intuition
gained a new kind ol de te rmina t ion in mystical intui t ion — as
though the properly philosophical "probabil i ty" extended i tself
into mystical certainty. Undoubtedly philosophy can only con
sider the mystical soul from the outside and Irom the point of
view of its lines ol p robabi l i ty . 4 0 But it is precisely the exis
t e n c e ol myst ic ism that gives a higher probabil i ty to this final
transmutation into certainty, and also gives, as it were, an enve
lope or a l imit to all the aspects of me thod .
* * *
At the outse t we asked: W h a t is the relat ionship be tween the
three fundamental concepts of Duration, Memory and the Elan
Vital} Wha t progress do they indicate in Bergson's philosophy."
It seems to us that Duration essentially defines a virtual mul-
1 1 2
ELAH VITAL A S M O V E M E N T O F D I F F E R E N T I A T I O N
t ip l ic i ty (what differs in nature). M e m o r y then appears as the
c o e x i s t e n c e of all the degrees of difference in this mult ipl ic i ty ,
in this virtualitv. T h e clan vital, finally, designates the actual
ization ol this virtual according to the lines of differentiation that
cor respond to the degrees — up to this precise line ol man
where the F.Ian Vital gains self-consciousness.
A F T E R W O R D
A R e t u r n t o B e r g s o n
A " re turn to Bergson" does not only mean a renewed admira
tion lor a great philosopher but a renewal or an extension of his
project today, in relation to the transformations of life and soci
ety, in parallel with the transformations of science. Bergson him
self considered that he had made metaphysics a rigorous disci
pline, one capable of being cont inued along new paths which
constant ly appear in the world. It seems to us that the return
to Bergson, understood in this way, rests on three main features.
Intuition
Bergson saw intuition not as an appeal to the ineffable, a par
ticipation in a feeling or a lived identification, but as a true
method. Th i s method sets out, firstly, to de te rmine the condi
tions of problems, that is to say, to expose false problems or
wrongly posed questions, and to discover the variables under
which a given problem must be stated as such. T h e means used
by intuition are, on the one hand, a cut t ing up or division of
reality in a given domain, according to lines of different natures
and, on the other hand, an intersection ol lines which are taken
Irom various domains and which converge. It is this complex
" 5
B E R G S O N I S M
linear operation, consist ing in a cut t ing up according to articu
lations and an intersecting according to convergences , which
leads to the proper posing of a problem, in such a way that the
solution itself depends on it.
Science and Metaphysics
Bergson did not merely cr i t ic ize sc ience as if it went no further
than space, the solid, the immobi le . Rather, he thought that
the Absolute has two "halves ," to which science and metaphys
ics correspond. Thought divides into two paths in a single impe
tus, one toward matter, its bodies and movements, and the other
toward spirit, its qualities and changes. Thus , from antiquity,
just as physics related movement to privileged positions and
moments , metaphysics consti tuted transcendent eternal forms
from which these positions derive. But " m o d e r n " sc ience be
gins, on the contrary, when movement is related to "any instant
whatever": it demands a new metaphysics which now only takes
into account immanent and constant ly varying durations. For
Bergson, duration b e c o m e s the metaphysical correlate of mod
ern sc ience . He, o f course , wro te a b o o k , Duration and Simulta
neity, in which he considered Einstein's Relativity. Th i s book
led to so much misunderstanding because it was thought that
Bergson was seeking to refute or cor rec t Einste in , while in fact
he wanted, by means ol the new feature ol duration, to give the
theory of Relativity the metaphysics it lacked. And in this mas
terpiece, Matter and Memory, Bergson draws, from a scientific con
cep t ion of the brain to which he h imse l f made impor t an t
contr ibut ions , the requirements of a new metaphysic of mem
ory. For Bergson, sc ience is never " reduct ionis t" but, on the
contrary, demands a metaphysics — without which it would
remain abstract , deprived of meaning or intuition. To cont inue
in,
A F T E R W O R D
Bergson's project today, means for example to constitute a meta
physical image of thought corresponding to the new lines, open
ings, traces, leaps, dynamisms, discovered by a molecular biology
of the brain: new l inkings and re-Iinkings in thought .
Multiplicities
From Time and Tree Will onward, Bergson defines duration as a
multiplicity, a type of"multiplicity. This is a strange word, since
it makes the multiple no longer an adjective but a genuine noun.
Thus , he exposes the traditional theme of the one and the mul
tiple as a false problem. T h e origin of the word, Multiplicity or
Variety, is physico-mathematical (deriving from R i e m a n n ) . It
is difficult to bel ieve that Bergson was not aware of the scien
tific origin of the term and the novelty of its metaphysical use.
Bergson moves toward a distinction be tween two major types
of multiplicit ies, the one discrete or discont inuous, the other
cont inuous, the one spatial and the other temporal , the one
actual, the other virtual. Th i s is a fundamental theme of the
encounter with Einste in . O n c e again, Bergson intends to give
multiplicities the metaphysics which their scientific t reatment
demands. Th i s is perhaps one of the least appreciated aspects
of his thought - the consti tut ion of a logic of multiplici t ies.
To rediscover Bergson is to follow or carry forward his approach
in these three direct ions. It should be noted that these three
themes are also to be found in phenomenology — intuition as
method, philosophy as rigorous sc ience and the new logic as
theory of multiplici t ies. It is true that these notions are under
stood very differently in the t w o cases . T h e r e is nevertheless a
possible convergence as can be seen in psychiatry where berg
sonism inspired the works of Minkowski (l.e temps i c ' c u ) and in
117
B E R G S O N I S M
phenomenology those o f Binswanger (Le casSusan Urban), in his
explorations of space- t imes in psychoses. Bergsonism makes
possible a whole pathology of duration. In an outstanding arti
c le on "paramnesia" (false recogni t ion) , Bergson invokes meta
physics to show how a memory is not const i tuted after present
perception, but is str ict ly contemporaneous with it, s ince at
each instant duration divides into two simultaneous tenden
cies , one of which goes toward the future and the other falls
back into the past. I le also invokes psychology, in order to then
show how a failure of adaptation can make memory invest the
present as such. Scient i f ic hypothesis and metaphysical thesis
are constant ly combined in Bergson in the reconsti tut ion of
comple te exper ience .
GILLES DELEUZE
Paris, July 1988
Translated by Hugh Tomlinson
1 1 8
N o t e s
IKANSI A I O R S ' I N T R O D U C T I O N
1. Bergson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 2.
2. See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (translated by 1 lugh Tom
linson and Barbara llabberjam). London: The Athlone Press, 1987, pp. 14-15.
5. "I.ettre a Michel Crcssole," in Michel Crcssole, Deleu/e. Paris: Editions
Universitaires, 1973, p. 111.
4. Dialogues, op. cit. , p. 15.
5. Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
(>. Gillian Rose, Dialectic ofSihilism, Oxford: Basil Black well, 1984, Chapter 6.
7. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema I: The Movement-Image (translated by Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara llabberjam). London: The Athlone Press, 1986, Chap
ters | and 4; and Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image (translated by
I lugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta). London: The Athlone Press, 1988, Chap
ters 3 and 5.
N. / ime ami hrec Will, Matter and Memory, Crcatiw Involution, and Mind-Energy.
For lull references, see p. II.
l». Critique o) Pure Reason, A 8 4 / B 1 I 6 ; see Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical
Philosophy (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara llabberjam). 1 ondon:
The Athlone Press. 1984. p. HIT.
119
B E R G S O N I S M
C H A P T I U I
1. CM, 53 ( 1 2 7 1 . 2 5 ) .
2. Itttrt a Hoffding, 1916 (cf. tcrits el Paroles,\'o\. 3, p. 4 5 6 ) .
3. On the use ol the word intuition, and on the genesis ol the notion in Tl"
and MM the reader is referred to M. I lusson's book, l.'intcllectualisme tie Rergson,
Presses Universitaires de Trance. 1947. pp. 6-10.
4 . CM, 37-38 (1274-1275, 2 9 - 3 0 ) .
5 . CM, 5 8 - 5 9 ( 1 2 9 3 , 5 1 - 5 2 ) . On the "semi-divine s tate ," cf. CM, 75
(1306 , 6 8 ) .
6. According to Bergson. the category ol" problem has a greater biological
importance than the negative category ol need.
7. CM, 115 (15 36, 105). The arrangement ol examples varies in Bergson's
texts. This is not surprising, because each lalse problem, as \vc shall see,
presents the two aspects in variable proportions. On freedom and intensity
as false problems, c f . C M , 2 8 - 2 9 (1268 , 2 0 ) .
8. CM, 118 (1559, 110). On the critique ol disorder and ol nonbeing, cl.
a l soCE, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 ( 6 8 3 , 223IT.)and 302 -303 ( 7 3 0 . 278IT.).
9 . CM, 5 9 - 6 0 ( 1 2 9 3 - 1 2 9 4 , 5 2 - 5 3 ) .
10. C f . T F . C h . I.
11. CM, 7 3 - 7 4 ( 1 3 0 4 - 1 3 0 5 , 6 6 ) .
12. Cl. a very important note in CM, 305 -304 (1 306 , 6 8 ) [same reference as
note 5 ] .
13. CE, 167 (62 5. 152).
14. Qualitative differences or the articulations ol the real are constant terms
and themes in Bergson's philosophy: c f , in particular, the Introduction to
CM, passim. It is in this sense that one can speak ol a I'latonism in Bergson
(cl. the method ol division). He loves to quote the text ol Plato on cutting
up and the good cook. Cf. C E , 172 (627 . 157) .
I 5. C F . 5 4 6 ( 7 6 4 . 518).
16. For example, intelligence and instinct form a composite which in its
pure state can only be dissociated into tendencies, cf. CE, 150-151 (610, I 57).
120
N O T E S
17. On the opposition "in fact - in principle," cf. MM. Ch. 1 - notably 73
(213 . 6 8 ) . And on the "presence-representation" distinction, MM, 35
(185 , 32 ) .
18. MM, 4 8 (197, 4 7 ) .
19. MM, 36 (186, 33): "Now, if living beings are within the universe just
'centers of indetermination,' and if the degree of this indetermination is
measured by the number and rank of their function, we can conceive that
their mere presence is equivalent to the suppression of all those parts of
objects in which their functions find no interest."
20 . The line does not need to be entirely homogeneous, it can be a broken
line. Thus affectivity is qualitatively distinct from perception, but not in
the same way as memory: Whereas a pure memory is opposed to pure per
ception, affectivity is more like an "impurity" which troubles perception:
cf. MM, 58 (207, 6 0 ) . W e will see later how affectivity, memory, etc. , denote
very diverse aspects of subjectivity.
2 1 . MM, 67 (214, 6 9 ) . Translation modified.
22 . MM. 1 8 4 ( 3 2 1 , 2 0 5 ) .
2 3. MM, 185 (321 , 2 0 6 ) . Bergson oltcn seems to criticize the inlinitesim.il
analysis: Although it reduces ad infinitum the intervals that it considers, it is
still content to recompose movement with covered space: lor example, TF
119-120 ( 7 9 - 8 0 , 8 9 ) . But more profoundly, Bergson requires that metaphys
ics, lor its part, carry out a revolution which is analogous to that ol calculus
in science: cf. CE, 3 5 7 - 3 7 2 ( 7 7 3 - 7 8 6 , 3 2 9 - 3 4 4 ) . And metaphysics should
even draw inspiration Irom the "generative idea ol our mathematics," in
order to "carrv out qualitative ditlerentiations and integrations": CM, 216-217
(142 3 , 2 1 5 ) . [see also n. 2 4 ]
24 . Cf. CM, 216-217 (1416. 2 0 6 ) . And 2 2 8 (1425 . 218): "Philosophy should
be an effort l o g o beyond the human state." (The previously quoted text , on
tn« turning point of experience, is a commentary on this formula.)
2 5. CM, 1 5 7 - 1 5 9 ( 1 3 7 0 , 148-149) .
26. MR. 2 3 7 ( 1 1 8 6 . 2 6 3 ) .
1 2 1
B E R G S O N I S M
27. CM, 8 7 - 8 8 (1515, 8 0 ) .
28 . MR, 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 (1199-1200, 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 ) .
2 9 . ME, 6-7 (817-818, 4 ) , 35 ( 8 3 5 , 2 7 ) .
30. Cl". MM, 71 (218, 74): "Questions relating to subject and object, to their
distinction and their union, should be put in terms of time rather than space."
31. CM, 3 8 - 3 9 ( 1 2 7 5 , 3 0 ) .
32. C E , 13 ( 5 0 2 , 10). In this context, Bergson grants sugar duration only
insofar as it participates in the whole of the universe. The meaning of this
restriction will become clearer in Chapter 4.
33. CM. 217 (1416-1417, 2 0 6 - 2 0 8 ) .
34 . CM, 65-71 (129-130. 5 8 - 6 4 ) .
35. CE, 2 3 6 - 2 3 7 ( 6 7 9 . 217).Translation modified.
36 . MR. 202 (1156, 225).Translation modified.
37. Cf. CM, 4 2 - 4 3 (I278IT., 34IT.). And CM, 112 (1335 . 104): Intelligence
"touches one of the sides ol the absolute, as our consciousness touches
another."
38. CM, 68 ( 1 3 0 0 , 61) .
C H A P T E R II
1. See A. Robinet's excellent analysis on this point, in Rergson, Seghers,
1965, pp. 2811.
2. Admittedly, as early as lime and l-rce Will Bergson points out the prob
lem of a genesis of the concept of space, starting from a perception ol exten
sity, cf. 95-97 ( 6 4 - 6 5 , 7 1 - 7 2 ) .
3. TF, Ch. 2 and Ch. 3, 83-84 (107, 122).The badly analyzed composite or the
confusion ol the two multiplicities precisely defines lalse notions ol intensity.
4. On Riemann's theory ol multiplicities cl. G.B.R. Riemann, Oeuvres
Mathimatiquti (French Translation edited by Ciauthier-Viliars, "Sur les
hypotheses qui servent de Iondcmcnt a la geometric"): and II. Weyl, lemps,
Espace, Matierc. I lusserl too gained inspiration from Riemann's theory ol mul
tiplicities, although in quite a different way from Bergson.
122
N O T E S
5. "IT. 8 5 - 8 4 ( 5 7 . 6 2 ) .
6 . MM, 71-72 (218-219 , 7 5 - 7 6 ) .
7. CM, 1 5 7 ( 1 3 5 3 . 127) .
8. Cf. MM, 2 0 6 (341 , 231) . "As long as we arc dealing with space, we may
carry the division as long as we please; we change in no way the nature ol
what is divided."
9 . If. 81-82 ( 5 5 - 5 6 , 6 0 - 6 1 ) .
10. TF, 84 (57, 6 2 ) .
1 1. IT. 121 ( 8 1 , 9 0 ) .
12. The objective is, effectively, defined by the parts that are actually and
not virtually perceived: TF, 84-85 (57 , 6 3 ) . This implies that the subjec
tive, on the other hand, is dcFined by the virtualitv of its parts. Let us return
then to the text: "We apply the term subjective to what seems to be com-
pletelv and adequately known, and the term objective to that which is known
in such a way that a constantly increasing number of new impressions could
be substituted for the idea which we actually have of it": TF 83 (57, 6 2 ) .
Taken literally, these definitions arc strange. By virtue of the context, one
might even wish to reverse them. For is it not the objective (matter) that,
being without virtualitv, has a being similar to its "appearing" and finds itself
therefore adequately known? And is it not the subjective that can always be
divided into two parts ol another nature, which it only contained virtually?
We might almost be inclined to think it a printing error. But the terms Bergson
uses arc justified from another point of view. In the case ol subjective dura
tion, the divisions are onlv valid insofar as they are effectuated, that is, actu
alized: "The parts of our duration are one with the successive moments ol
the act which divides i t . . .and if our consciousness can only distinguish in a
given interval a definite number of elementary acts, if it terminates the divi
sion at a given point, there also terminates the divisibility": MM, 2 0 6 (341 ,
2 52 ). It can there-lore be said that, on each of its levels, the division ade
quately gives us the indivisible nature of the thing while, in the case ol objec
tive matter, the division does not even need to be effectuated: We know in
' 2 3
B E R G S O N I S M
124
advance that it is possible without any change in the nature ol the thing. In
this sense, if it is true that the object contains nothing other than what we
know, it nonetheless always contains more: MM, 147 ( 2 8 9 , 164); it is there-
lore not adequately known.
1 3. CM, 2 0 6 - 2 0 7 ( 1 4 0 8 , 1 9 6 - 1 9 7 ) .
14. The denunciation ol the Hegelian dialectic as lalse movement, abstract
movement, failure to comprehend real movement, is a frequent theme in
Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche, albeit in verv different contexts.
15. Cf. Plato, Philebus.
16. CM. 207-217 (1409-1416, 197-207) . This text is close to the passage in
I'lato where he condemns the pliancy ol the dialectic. W'e have seen that the
Bergsonian method ol division had a Platonic inspiration. The point ol con
tact between Bergson and Plato is in fact the search lor a procedure capable
ol determining in each case the "measure," the "what" or the "how many."
It is true that Plato thought a relined dialectic could meet these require
ments. Bergson, on the other hand, considers the dialectic in general, includ
ing that ol Plato, to be valid only lor the beginnings ol philosophy (and ol
the history ol philosophy). The dialectic passes by a true method ol divi
sion, it can do nothing other than carve out the real according to articula
tions that are wholly formal or verbal. Cf. C M , 95 (1321 . 8 7 ) : "There is
nothing more natural than that philosophy should at first have been content
with this, and that it began by being pure dialectic. It had nothing else at its
disposal. A Plato, an Aristotle, adopt the cutting out of reality that they Iind
already made in language "
17. TF, 110(74 . 8 2 ) .
18. Cf. a very important text in CE, 32lff. (75711., 31011.): "But all move
ment is articulated inwardly," e tc .
19. TF, 2 2 7 ( 1 4 8 , 170) and 2 0 9 - 2 1 9 ( 1 3 7 , 157).Translation modified.
ClI.MM I K i l l
I. MF.. 8 ( 8 1 8 . 5 ) : CM, 211 (1411, 201); MM, 34 (184, 31) The emphasis is
N O T E S
ours in each ol these texts. These two forms ol memory should not be con
fused with those discussed by Bergson at the beginning of Chapter 2 of MM, 78
( 2 2 5 , 8 3 ) ; this is a completely different principle ol distinction, cf. note 34.
2 . CM, 1 9 3 ( 1 3 9 8 , 183).
3 . Cf. ME. 1 3 - 1 4 ( 8 2 0 , 8 ) .
4. Cf. MM, 58 ( 2 0 6 , 5 9 ) .
5. MM, 7 7 ( 2 2 3 , 81).
6. CM, 87 (1315, 80).Translation modified.
7. MM, 148-149 ( 2 9 0 , 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 ) .
8. Nevertheless, on another occasion, Bergson maintained that there was
only a difference in degree between being and being useful: In fact, percep
tion is only distinguished from its object because it retains solely that which
is useful to us (c l . MM, Ch. I) .There is more in the object than in percep
tion, but there is nothing that is ol a different kind. But in this case, the
being is merely that of matter or of the perceived object, thus a present being
whose only distinction from the useful is one of degree.
9 . CM. 8 8 - 8 9 ( 1 3 1 6 , 81) .
10. Jean Hyppolitc gives us a profound analysis of this aspect. He attacks
"psychoiogistic" interpretations of Matter &. Memory: Cf. "Du bergsonisme a
I'existentialisme," Mercure dc France, July, 1949; and "Aspects divers de la
memoire che/ Bergson," Revue internationale de philosophic, October, 1949.
11. MM, 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 ( 2 7 6 - 2 7 7 , 1 4 8 ) .
12. The expression "at once" (d'emblec) is frequently used in Chapters 2 and
i of MM.
13. Cl. MM. 116 (261 , 129): "the hearer places himself at once in the midst
"I the corresponding ideas "
14. MM, 135 ( 2 7 8 , 150).Translation modified.
15. Cf. ME, 157-160 (913-914 . 130-131): "I hold that the formation of recol
lection is never posterior to the formation of perception; it is contemporaneous with
it For suppose recollection is not created at the same moment as per
ception: At what moment will it begin to exist? . . . T h e more we rellect, the
' 2 5
B E R G S O N I S M
more impossible it is to imagine any way in which the recollection can arise
if it is not created step by step with the perception itself. . . ."
16. A comparison could also be made here between Bergson and Proust.
Their conception of time is extremely different, but both acknowledge a
kind ol pure past, a being in itself of the past. According to Proust this being
in itself can be lived, experienced by virtue of a coincidence between two
instants ol time. But according to Bergson, pure recollection or pure past
are not a domain of the lived, even in paramnesia: we only experience a
recollection-image.
17. The metaphor of the cone is first introduced in MM, 152 ( 2 9 3 , 169).
18. MM, 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 ( 3 7 1 , 2 7 2 ) .
19. On this metaphysical repetition cf. MM, 103-104 ( 2 5 0 , 115); 161-162
( 3 0 2 . 181).
20 . Cf. MM. 103-104 ( 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 , 114). Bergson shows clearly how we neces
sarily believe that the past follows the present as soon as we establish only a
difference in degree between the two; cf. ME, 160-161 (914, 132): "The per
ception being defined as a strong state and the recollection as a weak state,
the recollection ol a perception being necessarily then nothing else than
the same perception weakened, it seems to us that memory ought to have to
wait in order to register a perception in the unconscious. Indeed, it must
wait until the whole of it goes to sleep. And so we suppose the recollection
ol a perception cannot be created while the perception is being created nor
can it be developed at the same time." Translation modified.
2 1 . MM. 1 7 0 ( 3 0 9 - 3 1 0 , 1 9 0 ) .
22 . MM, 1 3 4 ( 2 7 7 , 1 4 8 ) .
23 . MM, I 3 0 ( 2 7 4 - 2 7 S , 145) .
24 . MM, 1 6 8 - 1 6 9 ( 3 0 7 - 3 0 8 , 188) (our emphasis).
25 . For example, in the passage that we have just quoted.
26 . In fact, the level must be actualized no less than the recollection that it
bears. CI. MM. 242 I 571, 21?): "'these planes, moreover, are not given as
readv-made things superposed the one on the other. Kathcr they exist virtu-
126
N O T E S
ally, with that existence which is proper to things of the spirit. The intel
lect, forever moving in the interval which separates them, unceasingly finds
them again or creates them anew "
27. MM, 1 6 8 ( 3 0 8 , 188): "without dividing.. . ."
2 8 . M E , 195-198 ( 9 3 6 - 9 3 8 , 161-163). Hence the metaphor of the pyramid
to represent the dynamic schema: "We will descend again from the summit
ol the pyramid toward the base " It is clear that the pyramid is very dif
ferent Irom the cone and denotes a completely different movement, with a
different orientation. However, in another text (ME, 116 [ 8 8 6 , 9 5 ] ) , Bergson
evokes the pyramid as the synonym of the cone: the explanation lor this is in
the ambiguity pointed out above, note 2 5 .
2 9 . MM, 104 ( 2 4 9 - 2 5 0 , 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 ) .
30. On these two extremes, cf. MM, 153 ( 2 9 4 , 170) .
3 1 . MM, 120 ( 2 6 5 , 133) . Translation modified. And MM, 99 ( 2 4 5 , 108) :
"the last phase of the realization of a recollection - the phase of action "
Translation modified.
32 . Cf. MM, 9 2 - 9 3 ( 2 3 8 - 2 4 0 , 100-102); 98 ( 2 4 3 - 2 4 4 , 107); 112 ( 2 5 5 - 2 5 6 ,
121-122). Above all the motor scheme should not be confused with the dynamic
schema. Both intervene in actualization but at completely different phases:
I he former is purely sensory-motor, the latter psychological and mnemonic.
3 3. MM, 9 7 ( 2 4 1 , 104) .
34. Cf. MM, 108-109 ( 2 5 2 - 2 5 3 , 118-119).
35. MM, 98 ( 2 4 4 , 107) . There are therefore two forms of recognition, the
one automatic, the other attentive, to which correspond two forms of memory,
the one motor and "quasi instantaneous," the other representative and endur
ing. We should, at all costs, avoid muddling this distinction, which is made
Irom the standpoint ol the actualization of recollection, with a completely
different distinction, made from the point of view of Memory in itself
(recollection-memory and memory-contraction).
36. On these two types of disturbance, cf. three essential texts, MM, 99
(24S, 108). 110(253, 118), 174(314, 196). In this last text Bergson distinguishes
"27
B E R G S O N I S M
128
between mechanical and dynamic disturbances.
37. C f . MM, 108 ( 2 5 3 , 119): "The evocation of recollections themselves is
hindered" (translation modified); and also MM, 9 7 - 9 8 ( 2 1 5 . 108).
38. MM, 175 (314 . 196) .
5". ME, 1 7 7 - 1 8 3 ( 9 2 5 - 9 2 8 , 146-150) .
4 0 . ME, 1 3 0 ( 8 9 6 , 107).
C l I A P T I K IV
1. CI. above pp. 2 7 - 2 9 .
2. MM, 79 ( 2 2 5 . 8 5): "We pass, by imperceptible stages, from recollec
tions strung out along the course of time to the movements which indicate
their nascent or possible action in space " MM, 122 ( 2 6 6 , 155): "We have-
here a continuous movement At no moment is it possible to say with
precision that the idea or the recollection-image ends, that the recollection-
image or the sensation begins." Translation modified. MM, 125-126 ( 2 7 0 ,
140): "To the degree that these recollections take the form of a more com
plete, more concrete and more conscious representation, they tend to con
found themselves with the perception which attracts them or of which they
adopt the outline."
3. MM, 151 ( 2 9 2 , 168) .
4. On going beyond the two dualisms: ( I ) quantity-quality. ( 2 ) extended-
nonextended, cl. MM, Chs. I and 4.
5. On the movement belonging to things as much as to the Self, cf. MM.
1 9 8 ( 3 3 1 . 2 1 9 ) ; 2 0 4 ( 3 4 0 . 2 3 0 ) .
6. Rcintroduction of the theme of degrees and intensities: CI. MM, Ch. 4, pas
sim, and 222 ( 555 , 2 5 0 ) : "Between brute matter and the mind most capable
ol reflection there are all possible intensities ol memory or, what comes to
the same thing, all the degrees ol freedom." CT:. 219 ( 6 6 5 , 201): "Our li-cl-
ing of duration, I should say the actual coinciding ol our self with itsell.
admits of degrees." Ami already in IT, 239 -240 (156, 180): "It is because the
transition is made by imperceptible steps Irom concrete duration, whose ele-
N O T E S
merits permeate one another, to symbolical duration whose moments are set
side by side, and consequently from free activity to conscious automatism."
7. Reintroduction of the theme of the negative, both as limitation and opposi
tion: Cf. C E , 99-100 (571ff , 9 0 ( 1 ) , matter is both limitation of movement
and obstacle to movement, "it is a negation rather than a positive reality."
CE, 2 2 0 ( 6 6 6 , 2 0 2 ) : matter as "inversion," "interversion," "interruption "
These texts arc nevertheless related to those where Bergson challenges all
notion of the negative.
8. Cf. MM: on modifications and perturbations, 201 (337 , 2 2 6 ) ; on irre
ducible rhythms, 2 0 5 - 2 0 6 ( 3 4 2 , 2 3 2 - 2 3 3 ) ; on the absolute character of dif
ferences, 193-194 ( 3 3 1 - 3 3 2 , 219) .
9. CM, 217-219 (1461, 2 0 7 - 2 0 9 ) . The next two quotations come from the
same text , which is very important to Bergson's whole philosophy.
10. C f . C E , 1 8 4 ( 6 3 7 , 1 6 8 ) .
11 . CE, 13 ( 5 0 2 , 10): "What else can this mean than that the glass of water,
the sugar and the process of the sugar's melting in the water are abstractions,
and that the Whole within which they have been cut out by mv senses and
understanding progresses in the same manner as a consciousness?" On the
particular characteristic of the living being, and its resemblance to the Whole,
cf. CE, 18-19 (507, 15). But Matter and Memory had already invoked the Whole
as the condition under which we attribute a movement and a duration to
things: MM, 193 ( 3 2 9 , 216); 196 ( 3 3 2 , 2 2 0 ) .
12. DS, 4 5 - 4 6 ( 5 7 - 5 8 ) .
1 3. DS, 46 ( 5 8 - 5 9 ) . Bergson goes so far as to say that impersonal Time has
only one and the same "rhythm." Matter and Memory, on the contrary, affirms
the plurality of rhythms, the personal character of durations (cf. MM, 207
[3-42, 2 3 2 ] : "but neither is it that homogeneous and impersonal duration,
the same lor every thing and everyone.. ."). But there is no contradiction: In
DS the diversity of fluxes will replace that of rhythms, for reasons of termi
nological precision; and impersonal Time, as we will see, is definitely not a
homogeneous impersonal duration.
129
B E R G S O N I S M
14. I)S. 52 ( 6 7 ) .
1 5. DS, 47 ( 5 9 ) : "We catch ourselves dividing and multiplying our conscious
ness " Translation modilied. This reflexive aspect of duration brings it
particularly close to a cogito. On triplicity. cf. DS, 54 ( 7 0 ) : There are in lact
three essential lorms ol continuity: that ol our interior life; that ol voluntary
movement; and that of a movement in space.
16. DS, 52 ( 6 8 ) and 61 (81 (.Translations modified.
17. MM, 2 0 6 ( $41, 2 3 2 ) .
18. DS, 47 (59).Translation modified.
19. On this hypothesis of Relativity which defines the conditions ol a cru
cial kind of experience: Cf. DS, 71 ( 9 7 ) , 7 7 - 7 8 (114), 101 (164 ) .
20 . DS, 72 ( 9 9 ) . Translation modified. It has often been said that Bergson's
reasoning involves a misunderstanding of Einstein. But Bergson's reasoning
itself has also often been misunderstood. Bergson does not confine himself to
saying: A time that is different from mine is not lived, either by me or by-
others, but involves an image that I give myselt ol others (and reciprocally).
For Bergson fully admits the legitimacy ol such an image in expressing the
various tensions and the relations between durations that he will constantly
recogni/e for his own part. What he criticizes Relativity lor is something com
pletely dillerent: I he image that I make to myself ol others, or that Peter
makes to himsell ol Paul, is then an image that cannot be lived or thought as
livable without contradiction (by Peter, by Paul, or by Peter as he imagines
Paul). In Bergsonian terms, this is not an image, it is a "symbol." If we lorget
this point, all ol Bergson's reasoning loses its meaning. Hence, Bergson's
concern to recall, at the end of DS, 156 (2 34): "But these physicists are not
imagined as real or able to be so "
2 1 . DS, 76 -82(112-116) .
22 . DS, 8 5 - 8 6 ( 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 ) .
2 5. Bergson therefore distinguishes lour types oi simultaneity in an order ol
growing depth: (1) relativist simultaneity, between distant clocks, DS, 54
(71) and 8211. (1161)'.); ( 2 ) the two simultaneities in the instant, between
' 3 0
N O T E S
event and nearby clock; ( 3) and also between this moment and a moment of
our duration, DS, 5 4 - 5 8 ( 7 0 - 7 5 ) ; (4 ) the simultaneity of lluxes, DS, 5 2 - 5 3
( 6 7 - 6 8 ) , 60-61 (81) . Mcrleau-I'onty clearly shows how the theme of simul
taneity, according to Bergson, confirms a genuine philosophy of "coexistence"
(c l . In Praise of Philosophy, translated by John Wild and James M. Edie,
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 196 3, pp. 1411.).
24 . DS, 1 34 (199) and 155IT. (23311.).
2 5 . Cf. DS, 134 (199) and 150 ( 2 2 5 ) , an attack on a "space which swallows
time." ol a "time which in turn absorbs space."
26 . Against the idea ofa space that is given to us ready made, cf. CE, 2 2 4 - 2 2 5
( 6 9 , 2 0 6 ) .
27. In this sense, matter and dreams have a natural affinity, both represent
ing a state of expansion (detente), in us and outside us: CE, 220-221 (665-667,
2 0 2 - 2 0 3 ) .
28 . CE, 221-222 ( 6 6 6 - 6 6 7 , 2 0 3 - 2 0 4 ) and MM, Ch. 4, passim.
29. On space as scheme or schema, cf. MM, 2 0 6 (341. 232 ) ; 209-211 (344 -345 ,
2 3 5 - 2 3 6 ) ; C E , 2 2 1 ( 6 6 7 , 2 0 3 ) .
3 0 . C f . C E , C h . 3.
CHAPTER V
1. Cl. above pp. 7 5 - 7 6 .
2. This ontological "naturalism" appears clearly in MR: On naturing Nature
and natured Nature cf. 49 (1024, 56 ) . The apparently strange notion of "nature's
plan" appears in MR. 48 (1022 , 54 ) . Despite some of Bergson's expressions
("Nature intended," M R , 55 [1029, 6 3 ] ) , this notion should not be inter
preted in too finalistic a sense: There are several plans and each, as we shall
see, corresponds to one of the degrees or levels of contraction that all coex
ist in duration. Therefore, they are "planes" rather than "plans," they refer
to sections, to sections ol the cone rather than to a project or to an aim.
3. According to Bergson, the word "Whole" has a sense, but only on con
dition that it does not designate anything actual. He constantly recalls that:
B E R G S O N I S M
Whole is not given. This means, not that the idea ol the whole is devoid of
sense, but that it designates a virtualitv, actual parts do not allow themselves
to be totalized.
4. Cf. CE, 99 (571 . 9 0 ) . And MR, 282 (1225 . 313): "the essence ofa vital
tendency is to develop Ian-wise, creating, b) the mere Tact ol its growth,
divergent directions, each ol which will receive a certain proportion of the
impetus." On the primacy, here, of an undivided Totality, of Unity or of
a Simplicity, cf. C E , 99-101 ( 5 7 1 - 5 7 2 , 9 0 - 9 1 ) ; 130-131 ( 5 9 5 . 119) "the
original identity."
5 . C E . 1 0 9 ( 5 7 8 , 9 9 ) .
6. In fact, the products of differentiation are never completely pure in
experience. Moreover, each line "balances" that which is exclusive in it:
for example, the line that ends in intelligence arouses in intelligent beings
an equivalent ol instinct, a "virtual instinct" represented by sforr telling:
cf. MR, 1 0 0 ( 1 0 6 8 . 114).
7. Bergson's great reproach to the philosophies of nature is that they only-
saw differences of degree on a single line in evolution and differentiation:
CE, 1 4 9 ( 6 0 9 , 1 3 6 ) .
8. Philosophically, one might find in a system like Leibniz's a si.nilar hesi
tation between the two concepts ol the virtual and ol the possible.
9. Cf. CM, "The Possible and the Real."
10. C E , 7 2 - 7 8 ( 5 4 9 - 5 5 4 , 6 4 - 7 0 ) .
1 I. C E , 80 ( 5 5 5 , 7 2 ) : How could an external physical energy, light lor
example, have "converted an impression left by it into a machine capable of
using it"?
12. The idea ol diverging lines or ol ramified series was undoubtedly not
unknown to classifiers Irom the eighteenth century. But what matters to
Bergson is the lact that the divergences of directions can only be interpreted
from the perspective of the actualization of the virtual. In R. Ruyer, today,
we find requirements analogous to those of Bergson: the appeal to an
"inventive, mnemonic and trans-spatial potential," the refusal to interpret
' 3 2
N O T E S
evolution in purely actual terms (cf. his Elements <le psycho-biologic. Presses
Universitaires de Prance).
I 3. When Bergson (CE, 184 [637 . 168]) says, "It seems as if life, as soon as
it has become bound up in a species, is cut off from the rest of its own work,
save at one or two points that are of vital concern to the species just arisen.
Is it not plain that life goes to work here exactlv like consciousness, exactly
like memory?" The reader must understand that these points correspond to the
outstanding points that became detached at each level of the cone. Each line
ol dillerentiation or actualization thus constitutes a "plane (plan) ol nature"
that takes up again in its own way a virtual section or level (cf. note 2, above).
14. On this negative vocabulary, cf. CE, Ch. 3.
1 5. This character of life, posing and solution of a problem, appears to Bergson
to be more important than the negative determination of need.
16. CE, 188 ( 6 4 0 , 172); M R , 116 (1082 , 132) " . . . a t each stopping-place a
combination, perfect of its kind."
17. CE, 145 ( 6 0 6 , 132).
18. On the opposition of life and form, CE, 141 (60311., I29IT.): "Like eddies
ol dust raised by the w ind as it passes, the living turn upon themselves, borne
up by the great blast of lite. They are therefore relatively stable and counter-
led immobility so well . . ." On the species as "stopping place" see MR, 198
(1153, 221) . This is the origin of the notion of enclosure, which will take on
such great importance in the study of human society. The point is that, from
a certain point of view, Man is no less turned in on himself, closed in on
himself, circular, than the other animal species: It might be said that he is
"closed." Cf. MR. 2 9 - 3 0 ( 1 0 0 6 , 34) ; 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 (1193. 2 7 3 ) .
19. CE, 4 3 - 4 6 ( 5 2 6 - 5 2 8 , 3 7 - 4 0 ) .
20 . Cf. DS, 137 (203IT.) on the example of the "curved plane" and of the
"three dimensional curve."
2 1 . DS. 63 ( 8 4 ) : There is "a certain hesitation or indetermination inherent
in a certain part of things" that becomes merged with "creative evolution."
2 2 . CE, 4 7 ( 5 2 9 , 4 1 ) .
' 3 3
B E R G S O N I S M
23 . CE, 62 (54111., 5511.) "How do wo assume that accidental causes, pre
senting themselves in an accidental order, have several times ended in the
same result, the causes being infinitely numerous and the effect infinitely
complicated?" I.. Cuenot has set out all kinds of examples going in the direc
tion of the Bergsonian theory, c f . Invention et finaliteen biologic.
2 4 . CE, 5 8 ( 5 3 8 , 51).
2 5 . Cf. C E , 198-199 ( 6 4 9 , 182); ME. 8 (8I8IT., 5ff.).
2 6 . MR, 2 0 0 ( 1 1 5 4 , 2 2 3 ) .
27. On the man who tricks nature, extending beyond the "plane" (plan) and
returning to a naturing Nature, cf. MR, 48 -57 (1022-1029, 5 5 - 6 4 ) . On man's
going beyond his own condition, MR, passim, and CM, 2 2 9 (1425-218) .
2 8 . CE, 2 8 8 ( 7 1 9 , 2 6 4 ) .
29 . ME, 1 8 - 2 0 ( 8 2 5 - 8 2 6 , 14-15).
30 . MR, 189-190 (1145. 211). On the story-telling function and the virtual
instinct, 99 (1067ff., II31T.) and 109-110 (1076, 124). On obligation and the
virtual instinct, 2 0 ( 9 9 8 , 2 3 ) .
3 1 . M R . 2 9 - 3 0 ( 1 0 0 6 , 3 4 ) .
32. M R , 8 3 - 8 4 ( 1 0 5 3 , 9 4 ) ; 198-199 (1153, 2 2 2 ) .
5 3. Bergson nevertheless suggests this explanation in certain texts, lor exam
ple, MR, 200-201 (1155, 2 2 4 ) . But it only has a provisional value.
34. MR, 31 (1008 . 35) . The theory of the creative emotion is all the more
important as it gives aflcctivity a status that it lacked in the preceding works.
In Time anil tree Will, affectivity tended to become intermingled with dura
tion in general. In Matter anil Mcmorv, on the contrary, it had a much more
precise role, but was impure and rather painlul. On the creative emotion
and its relations with intuition, the reader is relerred to the study ol M.
Ciouhier, in / 'histoirc ct sa philosophic (Vrin, pp. 7611.).
35 . MR, 2 4 3 (1191-1192, 2 7 0 ) and 30-32 ( 1 0 0 7 - 1 0 0 8 , 3 5 - 3 6 ) .
36. It will be noted that art, according to Bergson, also has two sources.
There is a story-telling art, sometimes collective, sometimes individual: MR,
IS4-I86 (1141-1142, 2 0 6 - 2 0 7 ) . And there is an emotive or creative art: MR.
' 3 4
N O T E S
241 (1190, 2 6 8 ) . Perhaps all an presents these two aspects, but in variable
proportions. Bergson does not disguise the lact that the story-telling aspect
appears to him to be interior in art; the novel would above all be story-telling,
music on the contrary, emotion and creation.
37. Cf. M R , 24 3 (1192, 2 7 0 ) : " . . . c r e a t e creators."
38. MR, 5 5 - 5 6 ( 1 0 2 9 , 6 3 ) .
39. On the three mysticisms, Greek, Oriental and Christian, cf. MR. 2 0 5 - 2 0 6
(115811.. 229IT.).
40 . CI. MR. 2 34 (1184, 2 6 0 ) . l e t us remember that the notion ol proba
bility has the greatest importance in the Bergsonian method, and that intu
ition is no less a method of exteriority than of inferiority.
/
I n d e x
ABSENCE, 17 -18 . Absolute, the, 35, 49, 76 , 84. Abstraction, 25, 4 4 , 4 6 , 53, 75, 96 ,
98 , 99 . Achilles'race, 4 7 - 4 8 , 8 1 . Action, 14, 19, 24, 55, 56, 68; order
of, 33; possible, 53; psychological, 56.
Actual, the, 15, 85, 9 3 , 9 6 , 97, 98 , 101 -03 ,104 , 106. Seeobo Real.
Actualization, 14, 4 2 - 4 3 , 52 , 53, 5 6 - 5 7 , 5 8 , 6 2 - 7 1 , 73, 8 2 , 9 4 - 9 5 , 97, 98 , 1 0 3 - 0 7 , 1 0 9 , 111, 113;of past, 5 6 - 5 7 ; psychic, 42 .
Affection, 23, 53; -subjectivity, 53. Affectivity, 25 , 56. Affinity, natural, 27, 33. Alteration, 31, 32 ,47 , 92. Analysis, transcendental, 23. Animal, 94 , 95 , 101, 109, 111. Aphasia, 30, 69. Articulations. 27, 28, 68; natural, 18,
22, 27, 29, 31. See also Real, the, articulation of.
Augmentation, 31. Automaton, 67.
BECOMING , 37, 44 , 45; -conscious, 16.
Being, 17-18 , 19, 20, 35, 44 . 4 6 - 4 7 .
5 5 - 5 6 , 61, 6 2 - 6 3 , 7 6 - 7 7 , 84, 85; diminution of, 23; paradox of, 61; -present, 55; pure, 59.
Berkeley. George, 41. Biology, 94, 95, 97; taxonomy, 103 - 0 4 ,
10S. Body, 26, 30, 41, 69 , 7 0 - 7 1 , 1 0 3 , 109. Brain, 24, 5 2 - 5 5 , 69 ,107; faculty of,
and core function, 24—25; -subjectivity, 52.
CALCULUS , 27. Coalescence, 65 , 66 . Coexistence, 59 - 60, 74, 77. 8 0 - 81,
86, 91, 9 3 , 1 0 0 - 0 1 , 1 0 3 , 111; paradox of, 61; virtual, 60.77, 85, 9 3 - 9 4 .
Composite, 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 2 - 2 3 , 26, 28, 2 9 - 3 0 , 32, 34, 37, 38,47, 5 3 , 7 3 , 8 5 , 8 6 , 9 2 , 9 S - 9 6 , 1 1 2 ; badly analyzed, 17, 18, 20, 22, 28, 54, 58, 6 1 - 6 2 , 7 3 , 86.
Concept, 2 8 , 4 4 - 4 5 , 7 5 , 9 7 . Cone, metaphor of, 5 9 - 6 0 (fig.),
6 4 - 6 5 , 6 6 , 6 7 , 8 8 , 100.
Consciousness, 30, 42 , 45 , 48 , 51, 52, 56, 78, 81, 82, 84 ,106; planes of, 65 , 66; psychological, 63; self-, 52, 106, 113.
Contemporaneity, 58, 59, 71. Continuity, 21, 37, 38, 43 , 52, 57, 87.
'37
B E R G S O N I S M
Contraction. 21, 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 5, 60 , 61, 6 4 - 6 7 , 70, 74, 75, 76, 79 , 8 2 , 8 6 - 8 9 , 93 . 102, 105. 107; degrees/ levels of, 6 0 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 8 5 , 9 3 , 1 0 0 , 1 0 1 ; -memory, 26, 52, 60, 74; ontological and psychological, 65; -relaxation, 75; -subjectivity, 53.
Convergence, 29, 30, 73. See also Intersection.
Creation, 9 7 , 9 8 , 1 0 1 . 1 0 3 , 105, 106. 108,110-12.
Creative Evolution, 37, 77, 78 , 100.
DATUM, IMMEDIATE, 3 8 , 7 5 . Decomposition, 38, 53, 67, 68 , 9 2 , 96 . Deterioration, 22, 23, 46 , 47, 7 5 - 7 6 ,
103.
Determinism, 107. Difference, 35, 7 5 - 7 6 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 9 7 , 9 8 ,
100; in degree, 20, 21, 2 2 - 2 3 , 25, 3 1 - 3 2 , 34, 3 5 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 4 3 , 4 5 . 4 7 , 58, 73, 74, 75 , 7 6 , 9 1 , 9 2 - 93 , 94 , 96 , 101; of intensity. 2 0 - 2 1 , 75 , 91, 92 , 94; internal, 99; in kind, 14, 1 8 - 2 5 , 2 7 - 3 5 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 4 2 - 4 3 , 46, 47, 54, 55, 5 8 , 6 1 , 73 , 7 5 - 7 6 , 81. 82. 91, 9 2 . 93 , 95 , 96; in number, 35, 41; qualitative, 31.
Differentiation, 2 9 , 3 5 , 4 3 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 9 7 , 101-03 (fig. p. 102), 104. 106, 107. 108,110,113.
Dilation, set Expansion, Relaxation. Dimension, 23. Diminution, 2 3, 31. Discontinuity, 21, 37, 51. Disorder, 17 -18 , 1 9 - 2 0 , 4 6 - 4 7 . Distinction, 77; extrinsic, 3 7 - 3 8 ; of
quality, 35; ol quantity, 84; real, 85, 86. Disturbance, 6 8 - 7 0 , 71, 76; dynamic,
69; mechanical, 68 . Divergence, 2 8 - 3 0 , 4 3 , 5 3 , 7 3 , 9 5 , 9 7 ,
1 0 0 , 1 0 5 - 0 6 . Division, 22. 24, 31, 32, 40 , 4 1 - 4 2 . 47,
6 6 , 7 9 , 8 0 - 8 1 , 9 2 - 9 6 , 9 9 , 1 0 3 , 104, 112; two types of, 9 5 - 9 6 .
Doubt, 19. Dreams, 66 , 107. Dualism, 2 1 - 2 2 . 29. 31, 73 , 75, 76,
91, 93, 94 , 96; genetic. 96; reflexive, 9 6 .
Dualities, 74, 93 . Duration, 13 -14 , 19, 21, 22, 26, 28 .
3 1 - 3 5 , 3 7 - 3 8 . 4 0 . 4 2 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 1 - 5 2 . 54, 60 . 75 -113 ; -contraction, 2 3, 107; dispersed, 77; external, 48; in general, 45; intense, 77; internal. 81, 8 5 - 8 4 , 107; multiple, 4 8 - 4 9 , 75 , 7 6 - 7 7 , 78, 8 3 - 8 5 ; ontological, 49; psychological. 34. 37. 4 8 - 4 9 , 76. 77;'pure, 95; simultaneous, 48; single, 78.
Duration and Simultaneity, 39, 78, 85.
EGOISM. 109,110. Einstein, Albert. 40 , 7 9 - 8 0 , 83,
8 4 , 8 5 .
llan vital, 13, 14, 16, 94 , 95 , 101. 104, 106, 107, 112-13.
Emotion. 1 8 , 4 2 , 1 1 0 - 1 2 . Energy, 76 , 102.
Essai sur les elements phncipaux de la representation, 44 .
Essence, 32, 3 4 , 9 4 , 110. Eternity, 23, 55 , 56, 104. Evolution, 98 , 100, 106. Evolutionism, 23, 9 8 - 9 9 . Excitation, 24, 52. 107, 111. Existence, 20, 77. Expansion, 30. 60 , 6 6 - 6 7 , 70 , 74,
7 5 , 7 9 , 8 6 - 8 9 . 9 1 . 9 3 . 9 5 . 1 0 0 , 102, 103, 107. See also Relaxation.
Expend it t i r e , 102. Experience. 13, 22. 2 5 - 2 7 , 50, 34,
37, 5 3 , 7 4 , 8 1 - 8 2 . 9 2 , 9 9 ; conditions of, 20. 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 37,99; physical, 4 7 - 4 8 ; possible, 23; psychological, 5 3, 34, 37. 38; pure. 92; real, 23. 27. 28; turn in. 2 7 . 2 8 . 7 3 , 9 1 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 9 5 .
l 3 8
I N D E X
Extension, 22, 34 , 3 5 , 42 , 74 - 7 5 , 7 9 . 8 6 , 8 7 - 8 8 , 8 9 , 9 4 .
Exteriority, 4 9 , 7 4 - 7 5 , 7 7 - 7 8 , 9 3 , 99 .
1 0 2 , 1 0 3 .
FALSITY , 1 6 , 9 8 .
Pictions. 2 5 . 3 4 . 8 5 . 9 8 . 1 0 8 .
Final ism, 1 0 4 . 1 0 5 .
Flux, 8 0 - 8 5 , 9 1 ; triple, 8 0 - 8 1 . 8 2 . Form. 8 8 , 1 0 3 - 0 4 ; variety of, 4 5 . Fourth dimension. 7 9 , 86 . 1 0 4 - 0 5 . Freedom, 1 5 . 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 9 , 5 1 , 1 0 6 . 107. Freud, Sigmund, 55 — 5 6 . Future, the, 5 2 .
GENERALIZATION, 4 4 - 4 6 .
God, 1 0 4 , 1 0 8 . 1 1 0 . 1 1 2 .
HAMELIN, 4 4 . Ilegelianism, 44 . Heterogeneity. 2 1 . 37. 4 3 , 7 4 . 1 0 0 . History, 1 6 . Hoffdi'ng, 13.
Homogeneity, 2 0 , 21, 3 3 , 3 7 , 7 4 . 100 .
IDEALISM, 3 3 , 7 7 .
Illusions, 2 0 , 2 1 , 2 3 , 3 3 - 3 S . 58 . 6 1 , 104.
Image, 1 7 - 1 8 , 2 4 , 4 1 , 5 7 - 5 8 . 6 5 - 6 8 .
7 0 . 7 1 , 81. 9 7 - 9 8 ; recall of. 6 3 ;
virtual, 2 8 , 2 9 . Inadequacy, 44 , 4 6 , 7 5 . Indivisibles, 4 2 . Set aim Division. Inextensity, 2 3 . Instant, 2 5 , 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 3 , 7 4 , 84 , 87, 9 5 .
Instinct, 2 1 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 1 0 1 . 1 0 2 . 1 0 3 , 1 0 8 , 1 1 0 .
Intelligence, 21, 8 8 - 8 9 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 1 0 2 .
104 . 1 0 7 - 1 0 , 1 1 2 ; order of, 3 3 .
Intensity, 1 7 . 1 8 - 1 9 , 7 5 - 7 6 . 9 1 - 9 2 .
Intersection, 2 8 , 2 9 , 30 . 3 5 . 5 3 - S 4 .
Set also Convergence. Interval. 2 4 , 4 6 ; cerebral, 2 4 , 2 5 .
5 2 - 5 3 . 107 . 109 . 1 1 1 .
Intuition. 2 1 , 2 7 , 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 5 . 8 8 . 1 0 2 .
1 0 9 - 1 0 , 1 1 1 - 1 2 ; as method, 1 3 - 1 4 ,
2 2 - 2 4 . 32, J3, 3 8 . 7 3 . 7 7 . Invention. 15 -16 . 35, 108. 111.
KANT, IMMANLH I . 2 0 - 2 1 , 46 . Knowledge. 13, 17. 35.
LANGUACI. 15. 57, 62 . 68; foreign. 62; ontologv ol, 57.
Leap, ontological. 56. 57. 61. 62, 109; paradox ol. 61.
Life. 16. 19, 5 2 . 9 4 - 9 5 . 1 0 1 . 1 0 2 , 1 0 3 - 0 4 , 106. 107; attention to, 68 , 70 , 72, 80 .
MACHINE , 107. Man, 106, 109. 113. Marx. Karl. 16.
Mathematics. 1 5 - 1 6 , 27, 4 1 - 4 2 . Stt also Riemann.
Matter, 21, 22, 2 4 - 2 7 , 30, 34, 35, 41, 43 , 53, 5 4 - 5 5 , 6 0 - 6 1 , 73 , 74, 75 , 77. 78 , 82 . 86, 8 7 - 8 9 , 92, 9 3 . 9 4 , 101-03 . 1 0 7 - 0 8 ; contraction of, 2 5 - 2 6 ; -expansion, 23; order ol, 88.
Matter and Memory, 2 3 - 2 4 , 29, 40 , 41, 5 2 - 5 3 , 72 , 73 , 75 . 76 . 78 . 86, 9 2 , 9 6 , 1 0 0 .
Meaning, 88. Mechanism, 19. 23. 6 7 - 6 8 . 69 . 70,
9 8 . 1 0 4 , 1 0 5 . 1 0 7 . Memory, 13. 21. 22 , 2 5 - 2 6 . 30, 37,
4 3 , 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 3 , 5 5 , 5 7 , 6 3 - 6 4 , 6 5 . 6 7 , 7 0 . 7 3 . 7 7 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 1 0 0 , 102, 106-07 . 109, HI. 112-13; Bergson's theory ol, 43 , 5 5 - 5 6 ; ontological, 57, 59; paradox of, 5 8 - 5 9 ; psychophysiological theories of.' 58. 61; pure. 27. 58, 74, 95; two aspects of, 5 1 - 5 2 , 5 3 - 5 4 .
mens momtntanta, 75. Metaphysics. 15. 20. 2 3. 29. 35. Method. I 311.. 32. 38. 75 . 9 1 - 9 2 . 9 3 .
96 , 112; dialectical. 44-45. Stt also Intuition.
Mind. 26. $7. 62, 88. 109.
' 3 9
B E R G S O N I S M
Minil-I nenjK 30. Modification, 7 6 . Monism, 2 9 . 7 3 , 7 4 . 7 5 . 7 6 , 7 8 , 8 2 ,
9 1 , 9 3 , 9 4 .
Motive, psychological, 1 7 - 1 8 . Movement'. 2 4 , 2 7 , 3 1 , 4 5, 4 7 . 4 8 - 4 9 ,
5 2 , 5 4 . 6 5 , 6 7 - 6 9 , 7 0 , 7 1 , 7 4 , 7 5 ,
7 9 , 8 2 , 8 4 , 9 4 - 9 5 . 1 0 3 - 0 5 , 1 0 6 ,
1 0 7 ; executed, 2 4 , 5 2 ; false, 4 4 ; mechanical, 7 0 — 7 1 ; —perception. 6 7 - 6 9 ; received, 2 4 , 5 2 , 74, 87, 9 2 .
Multiple, the, 3 9 , 4 3 - 4 4 . 4 5 - 4 6 ,
47 , 7 6 , 8 0 . 8 5 . 9 3 : unity of, 4 4 , 4 5 ,
9 5 - 9 4 .
Multiplicity, 1 4 , 3 2 . 3811 . , 47 , 4 9 , 7 8 ,
7 9 - 8 0 , 8 5 ; abstract. 4 5 : actual/ spatial. 8 5 ; continuous qualitative, 38 , 3 9 - 4 0 , 4 2 - 4 3 , 4 7 , 8 0 , 8 1 ;
discontinuous/quantitative, 38, 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 3 . 47 . 8 0 ; discrete. 39 ; two kinds of, 1 9 , 2 1 , 3811 . , 47 , 5 3 ,
7 9 - 8 0 , 8 5 ; virtual/temporal.
8 2 - 8 3 , 8 5 , 1 1 2 - 1 3 .
Mysticism. 1 1 2 .
NATURE. 1 9 , 34 . 8 0 . 9 3 , 1 0 7 , 1 0 8 - 0 9 .
1 1 0 . 1 1 3 .
nature naturanut, 9 3 . nature naturec, 9 3 . Need. 6 2 . 6 8 . 1 0 8 ; order of, 3 3 ;
-subjectivity, 5 2 . Negation, 18 , 1 9 , 4 6 . 5 2 , 7 5 - 7 6 :
generalized. 1 7 . 46 . Negative, the, 18 , 46 , 7 5 - 7 6 , 1 0 1 - 0 3 ;
ol limitation and of opposition, 4 6 - 4 7 .
Nonbcing. 1 7 - 1 8 . 1 9 - 2 0 . 44 . 4 6 - 4 7 .
Nothingness, 2 0 , 2 3. Novelty. 2 0 , 6 1 .
Number, potential, 4 0 - 4 1 , 4 2 - 4 3, 4 5 .
OBJECT, 2 4 - 2 5 , 3 3 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 4 7 , 5 2 ,
5 3 . 6 8 , 7 5 , 7 5 , 7 7 , 7 8 , 1 1 0 ; image
of, 4 1 .
()bjectivitv. 50, 5 5 . 4 0 - 4 1 . 4 5 , 5 3 , 54 .
Obligation. 108 . (observation. 30 . One. the. 3 9 , 4 3 - 4 4 . 4 5 - 4 6 . 4 7 ,
80 , 8 5 , 9 3 , 100 .
Ontology, 3 4 - 5 5 . 49 , 5 6 , 7 6 .
Opposition. 4 4 - 4 5 , 4 6 . 7 5 - 7 6 , 8 2 ,
9 6 , 1 0 1 .
Order, 1 7 - 1 8 , 4 6 - 4 7 .
Organism, 1 6 , 1 0 5 .
I'ARAMNI SIA, 7 1 .
Participation, 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 8 .
Past, the, 2 5 , 3 7 , 54IT., 7 0 , 7 1 , 7 3 , 7 4 .
7 5 . 9 1 , 9 2 ; in general, 5 6 - 5 7 , 5 9 ,
6 1 , 6 2 - 6 4 ; image ol, 5 1 ; degrees/ levels of, 5 9 - 6 7 , 7 4 . 7 7 ; preservation of, 2 5 , 5 1 , 5 4 - 5 5 , 5 9 ; pure, 5 9 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 9 5 , 1 0 9 ; regions of,
5 6 - 5 7 , 58 . 6 1 - 6 6 ; totality of, 2 7 ,
6 1 , 6 2 .
Pedagogy, 1 5 . Perception. 2 1 . 2 3 - 2 5 , 2 6 - 2 7 , 3 0 ,
5 1 , 5 3 , 58 , 6 3 . 6 7 - 6 8 , 7 3 , 7 4 , 7 5 .
1 0 7 ; actual, 4 1 , 6 7 ; -image, 58 , 66 , 6 7 - 6 8 , 7 1 , 7 3 , 74, 9 5 ; - ob jec t -
matter, 2 6 ; Pure. 2 6 . 2 7 , 2 8 , 54 . 5 5 , 58 ; Real, 2 5 ; -recollection, 2 2 , 2 9 ; virtual, 2 5 . 4 1 .
Perfection, 2 3 , 1 0 3 . Philosophy. 1 3 . 1 4 . 2 7 - 2 8 , 4 4 - 4 5 .
4 6 , 7 5 , 9 4 , 9 9 , 1 1 1 - 1 3 .
Physics, 3 5 . Scealw Einstein. Plant. 9 4 , 9 5 . 1 0 1 . 1 0 2 , 1 1 0 . Plato, 3 2 , 4 4 - 4 5 . 5 9 .
Pluralism, 7 6 , 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 3 - 8 4 , 1 0 4 ;
generali/ed, 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 2 ; limited, 7 7 - 7 8 , 8 2 : quantitative, 7 6 .
Plurality, 1 4 , 24 . Point. 7 9 ; mathematical, 2 5 , 5 3; of
unity, 7 3 - 7 4 , 9 5 ; virtual, 2 8 , 2 9 , 3 0 . 1 1 2 .
Position, 2 3 . Possibility, 1 8 . 1 9 , 4 5 . 9 6 . Possible, the, 1 7 - 1 8 . 2 0 , 2 4 . 4 1 , 47 ,
9 6 - 9 8 ; l.cibni/ian. 7 1 .
I 4 0
I N D E X
Precision, I 3, 14, 29, 40 , 94 .
Prelormism, 98 .
Presence, 2 2 - 2 3 , 26.
Present, the, 25, 48 , 5 1 - 5 2 , 54IT., 68, 7 0 - 7 5 , 88 , 91 ,92; pure, 74, 95.
Probabilism, 30.
Problems. ISff., 21. 29; badly stated, 17, 18 -19 , 21; creation/statement of, 14, 15-17, 21 ,31, 35; false, 15-17, 18, 2 0 . 2 3 - 2 4 , 2 6 , 3 3 - 3 5 , 4 3 , 54 , 75 , 98, 104; nonexistent, 17, 1 9 - 2 0 ; true, 15-17 , 33.
Proportion, 23, 31.
Proust, Marcel, 85, 96 .
Psychology, 26, 57, 76. Pure, the, 22, 49 , 52.
QUALITY , 21, 31, 3 2 , 4 8 , 51, 53, 74,
87—88, 92; heterogeneous, 74.
Quantity, 21, 74, 91; homogeneous, 74.
Questions, badly stated, 17, 24.
REAL, THE , 17; 21, 29 , 3 0 , 4 1 , 44 , 47,
9 6 - 9 8 , 108; articulation of, 26 ,
92; disarticulation of, 30. Realism. 3 3,77.
Reality, 22 , 34, 42 , 45 , 97, 100; nonpsychological, 56; psychological, 34, 58.
Realization, 20, 41, 43 , 71, 9 6 - 9 7 .
Reason, 20, 108; sufficient, 2 8 - 2 9 , 86.
Recognition, 67, 68 , 69 . Recollection, 2 1 - 2 7 , 30, 37, 51,
5 3 , 5 4 , 5 6 - 5 7 , 5 8 , 6 1 - 7 3 , 1 0 7 ; -image, 58, 63, 6 5 - 6 8 , 70, 71.
73 . 74, 95 , 109; -memory, 26 , 52. 60, 74; -perception, 22; pure,
26, 55, 56, 62 , 63 , 66 , 68, 69 , 70, 71, 74; -subjectivity, 5 3; virtual,
56, 63, 71. Recomposition, 45 , 57. Relativity, theory of, 39, 79, 8 3 - 8 4 ,
86 . Relaxation, 21, 23, 60. 61, 65 , 74, 75 ,
7 6 , 7 9 , 8 2 , 8 7 - 8 9 , 9 5 : levels,
degrees of, 60 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 8 5 , 86 , 8 8 - 8 9 , 9 1 , 100 . Sec also Expansion.
Religion, 34, 108 . Reminiscence, 6 2 ; 1 1 1 ; Platos
theory of, 5 9 . Repetition. 5 1 . 6 0 - 6 1 , 6 8 , 9 3 ;
physical and psychic, 6 0 — 6 1 , paradox of. 6 1 ; virtual, 6 1 .
Representation, 2 2 , 2 4 , 5 3 , 66 , 87, 1 0 8 , IK).
Repression, 2 1 , 7 2 . Resemblance, 1 0 1 , 1 0 5 - 0 6 .
Response, 2 4 , 107 , III.
Rest, 7 9 . Riemann, G.B.R., 3 9 - 4 0 , 7 9 . Rotation, 6 4 , 6 5 - 6 6 , 6 8 , 6 9 , 7 0 ;
-orientation, 64 . Rules, 1 5 . 1 7 , 2 1 , 2 9 , 3 1 .
SCHEME, DYNAMIC, 6 6 , 6 9 ; motor, 6 7 - 6 8 , 69 , 7 0 .
Science, 1 4 , 2 0 , 2 3 , 3 5 , 4 0 . 86 . Section, discontinuous, 3 7 ; instanta
neous, 5 4 . Self, 4 4 , 7 5 , 1 0 6 .
Sensations, 1 8 - 1 9 , 5 3 , 7 4 , 7 5 , 87.
Sense, 88 . Simultaneity. 48 , 7 9 , 8 0 - 8 1 , 8 4 - 8 5 ;
ol fluxes, 8 1 , 89 . Simplicity, 4 3 , 4 6 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 9 6 , 1 0 0 . Sleep, 6 6 - 6 7 .
Society, 1 5 , 1 0 8 - 1 1 .
Solution. 1 5 - 1 7 , 2 1 , 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 0 3 ;
false, 2 0 . Soul, 1 1 2 ; immortality ol, 30 . Sources, two kinds of, 2 1 . Space, 1 9 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 5 , 3 1 - 3 8 , 4 3 , 4 7 ,
4 9 , 6 0 , 7 5 , 7 9 , 8 6 - 8 8 , 9 2 , 1 0 4 - 0 5 ;
auxiliary-, 38 ; homogeneous, 34 ; order of. 34 ; pure, 88 , 8 9 ; real, 1 0 5 : scientific conception ol, 40; - t ime , 7 9 , 8 5 . 9 5 , 1 0 4 - 0 5 .
Spirit, 3 0 , 3 5 , 9 3 . Story-telling function. 1 0 8 - 1 1 1 .
I 4 l
B E R G S O N I S M
Subject. 42 . 4 8 . 7 J . 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 ) . Subjectivity. 26 . JO. 33. 40 . 4 2 - 4 3 .
5 3; live aspects oi, 52 — 53. Succession. 25 . 45 . 48 . 59, 60 . 81;
internal, 37. Sugar, lump ol. 3 1 - 3 2 , 77. Systems, closed, 18, 43, 77; lixed and
mobile, 79 .
TENDENCY , 21, 2 2 - 2 3 , 28 . 31. 32, 9 2 , 9 3 , 9 9 ; motor, 67, 68 .
Tension, 60 , 74, 76 . 79 . 86, 87. 88, 95: levels of, 77.
Time. 22. 31, 32. 43 . 5 8 - 5 9 . 6 1 - 6 2 , 7 4 , 7 5 . 7 8 , 7911., 85 - 86, 93 , 1 0 4 - 0 5 ; multiplicity of, 76 . 78, 79, 8 3 - 8 4 , 85; relativistic. 7 9 - 8 0 , 8 3 - 8 4 ; real, 14, 78, 79; single, 80 . 8 1 , 8 2 - 8 3 . 8 5 , 9 1 , 9 3 , 1 0 0 ; spatiali/ed. 22, 23, 80, 85 . 86 . 104. Sec also Instant.
hint and Iree Will, 37. 39. 40 , 43 , 48 , 5 3 . 6 0 , 76 , 7 8 , 7 9 , 9 1 , 9 6 .
Totality, 32. 105; virtual. 93 . 95 . KM). Translation. 6 3 - 6 4 . 6 5 - 6 6 , 6 8 , 6 9 , 70,
97; -contraction, 64 , 70 . Truth, 16. 18. 29, 34.
UNCONSCIOUS , 42 , 5 5 - 5 6 , 7 1 - 7 2 ; Freudian, 5 5 - 5 6 : ontological, 71; psychological, 5 5 - 5 6 , 71; virtual. 55.
Unity, ontological. 74. 9 3. 9 5 . 100. Universe-. 78; Whole of. 77. 78. 82,
100. 103, 104. 105, 112. Utility, 27, 55. 64 , 67. 68 . 7 0 - 7 1 . 88 .
99'. 106. 107. 109.
V IBRATION, sec Movement, received. Virtual, the. 15, 4 2 - 4 3 , 56, 57, 60 ,
63 , 81, 82, 8 5 , 9 4 . 9 5 . 9 6 . 9 7 - 9 8 . 100, 103. 104, 105. 106; pure, 62.
Virtuality, 41, 8 2 - 8 3 , 93 , 95 , 97,
9 9 - 1 0 0 , 101, 103, 106,113.
W i n . 19.
142
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