disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative ...plunkett/disagreement... · expresses...

volume13,no.23 december2013

Disagreement and the

Semantics of Normative

and Evaluative Terms

David PlunkettDartmouth College

Tim SundellUniversity of Kentucky

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/013023/>

Introduction.1

InThe Language of Morals,R.M.Hareintroduceswhatisnowafamouscaseinmetaethics.Hareasksustoimagineamissionarywhoarrivesonadistantislandinhabitedbycannibals.Muchlikethemissionary,thesecannibalsusetheterm‘good’asageneraltermofpraiseforpeo-pleandtheiractions.However,thecannibalsapplytheterm‘good’todifferentsortsofpeopleandactionsthanthemissionarydoes. 2Thecannibalsarethussurprisedbyhowthemissionaryappliestheterm.AsHarewrites:

[T]heyknowthatwhenheusesthewordheiscommend-ingthepersonorobjectheappliesitto.Theonlythingtheyfindoddisthatheappliesittosuchunexpectedpeo-ple,peoplewhoaremeekandgentleanddonotcollectlargequantities of scalps;whereas they themselves are

1. Thanks to two anonymous reviewers forPhilosophers’ Imprint, Chris Barker,David Braddon-Mitchell, Josh Brown, Alexi Burgess, Sarah Buss, FabrizioCariani, Nate Charlow, Matthew Chrisman, Lenny Clapp, Terence Cuneo,Jorah Dannenberg, Stephen Darwall, Kenny Easwaran, David Ebrey, AndyEgan,David Enoch, PeterGalison, JonGarthoff,AllanGibbard, ThonyGil-lies,SandyGoldberg,BobGoodin,MarkGreenberg,ElizabethHarman,SallyHaslanger,FrankJackson,ChrisKennedy,JohnKu,BrianLeiter,AdamLerner,DustinLocke,DonLoeb,PeterLudlow,KateManne,TeresaMarques,TristramMcPherson,EliotMichaelson,KristieMiller,DanielNolan,HowardNye,Ale-jandroPérez-Carballo,PhillipPettit,PeterRailton,MarkRichard,MikeRidge,Paolo Santorio,Karl Schafer, Francois Schroeter, Laura Schroeter,Alex Silk,SamShpall,Michael Smith,Nicos Stavrapolous, Isidora Stojanovic, SharonStreet,KevinToh,PekkaVäyrynen,andDanielWodak.Versionsofthispaperwerepresentedtoaudiencesat theAustralianNationalUniversity, the2011CerisyMeaning,Context,andImplicitContentConference,UniversityofChi-cago,UniversityofHouston,UniversityofKentucky,UniversityofLeeds,Lo-gosResearchGroupattheUniversityofBarcelona,MonashUniversity,Uni-versityofMelbourne,NorthwesternUniversity,PrincetonUniversity,Univer-sityofSydney,UniversityofVermont,andYaleUniversity.Thankstoeveryonewhoparticipatedinthosesessionsfortheirhelpfulquestionsandcomments.

2. Throughoutthiswork,weuseitalicstointroduceterminologyorforrhetori-calstress,singlequotestomentionlinguisticexpressions,smallcapstonameconcepts, anddouble quotes for quotingother authors, “scare quoting”, si-multaneoususeandmention,andotherinformaluses.

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whichthemissionaryandthecannibaldidnotmeanthesamethingbytheword‘good’.(Perhapsbecauseitsmeaningisdeterminedbyhowthewordisapplied,orbywhatcausesspeakerstoapplyit.)Speakingaboutthelattertypeoftheory,hewrites:

Ifthiswereso,thenwhenthemissionarysaidthatpeoplewhocollectednoscalpsweregood(English),andthecan-nibalssaidthatpeoplewhocollectedalotofscalpsweregood(cannibal),theywouldnotbedisagreeing,becauseinEnglish(atanyratemissionaryEnglish),“good”wouldmeanamongotherthings“doingnomurder”,whereasinthe cannibals’ language “good”wouldmean somethingquitedifferent,amongotherthings“productiveofmaxi-mumscalps”.4

Hareclaimsthatthereisadisagreementbetweenthemissionaryandthecannibalwhentheyapplytheterm‘good’tosuchdifferentpeople.Hence, he argues, themissionary and the cannibalmean the samethingbytheword‘good’.5Basedontheseconsiderations,heconcludesinfavorofasemanticversionofnon-cognitivismfortheterm‘good’,atheoryaccordingtowhichthemeaningoftheterm‘good’isunder-stoodintermsofthedesire-likeattitudethatitisusedtoexpress.

Hare’sreasoning—fromthefactthattherelevantexchangereflectsa genuine disagreement to a conclusion in semantics—exemplifiesthesortofargumentthat isourfocusinthispaper.This istheargu-ment from(a) thepremise thatanexchangebetween twospeakersexpressesagenuinedisagreementto(b)thethesisthatthosespeakersmeanthesamethingsbythewordstheyuseinthatexchange.Thisisacommontypeofargumentinmetaethicaltheorizingaboutthemean-ingsofourmoralorethicalterms.Indeed,itplaysacentralrolequitegenerallyindebatesaboutthemeaningsofnormativeandevaluative

4. (Hare1991,148–149).

5. ForasimilarglossonHare’sdiscussion,see(HorganandTimmons1993)and(Smith1994).

accustomedtocommendpeoplewhoareboldandburlyandcollectmorescalpsthanaverage.3

In introducingHare’scase,wedonotendorsetheperniciousstereo-typesofnativepeoplesthatthecasedrawson.Rather,weintroduceitbecauseHare’shighlyinfluentialdiscussionofthecase(originallypublishedin1952)exemplifiesacommonformofphilosophicalargu-mentinmetaethics—aformofargumentthatdrawsonintuitionsofdisagreementtoreachsemanticconclusions—thatwillbeourfocusinthispaper.

Oneofthecore,widelysharedintuitionsaboutHare’scaseisthatthere is a disagreement between themissionary and the cannibalswhentheyapply the term ‘good’ todifferentpeopleandactions.Tobringthisout, imaginethefollowingdiscussionbetweenoneofthecannibalsandHare’smissionary:

(1) (a)Itwouldbegoodformetokillmorepeopleandcollectmorescalps.This isbecause, ingeneral, it isgood tocollectasmanyscalpsaspossible.

(b)No.Itisnotgoodforyoutokillmorepeopleinordertocollectmorescalps.Killingpeopleisnotgoodandcollectingasmanyscalpsaspossibleisnotgoodeither.

Mostofushavetheintuitionthattheexchangeconsistingof(1a)and(1b)reflectsagenuinedisagreementbetweenthemissionaryandthecannibaland,moreover,thatthisdisagreementmakesgoodsenseandisworthengagingin.

Inlightofthisintuition,manyphilosophers,includingHarehimself,havedrawnthefollowingconclusion:eventhoughthemissionaryandthecannibal systematicallyapply the term ‘good’ todifferent things,themissionary and the cannibalmust nonethelessmean the samethingbytheword‘good’.ThisthoughtisexemplifiedinHare’soriginaldiscussionofthecase.Hareasksustoimagineatheoryaccordingto

3. (Hare1991,148).

occasion, be amatter of resolving ambiguity, prescisifying a vagueterm,settingacontextualparameter,orinanyotherwaydetermininghowsomeantecedentlyindeterminatematterofmeaningshouldbesettled.Supposingwetakethemeaningofawordtobetheconceptitexpressesinthecontext,adisputeaboutanyofthesemattersreflectsinsomesenseadisagreementaboutwhichamongsomesetofcom-petingconceptsshouldbeusedinthecontextathand.

Thesenormativequestionsaboutthoughtandtalk—howshouldweuseourwords?whichconcepts shouldweuse?howshouldweusethem?—arequestionsinwhatwewillcallconceptual ethics.7Twoimportantpointsaboutouruseoftheterm‘ethics’here.First,weusetheterm‘ethics’inabroadsense,todesignatequestionsabouthowtoliveandwhattodo.Second,wedonotmeantoindicatethatconcep-tualethicsnecessarilyconcernspracticalnormsasopposedtobroadlytheoreticalones.8

Disagreementsaboutconceptualethicsneednotbeexpressedviaanyspeciallinguisticmechanismofcourse;theycanbeperfectlyex-plicit.Indeed,manydisagreementsaboutwhichconceptstoemployor about howbest to use ourwords are straightforward exchangeswherein speakers literally express their competing claims about con-ceptchoiceorwordusage.

Nevertheless,wearguethatmanydisagreementsaboutconceptualethicsarenotexpressedexplicitly.Metalinguisticnegotiationsarethemostimportantinstancesofthisimplicit,ortacit,kind.Suchdisputesmaynotatfirstglanceappear—eithertothespeakersthemselvesorto the theorist—to reflect disagreements about concept choice. Butinfacttheydoreflectdisagreementsaboutconceptchoice.Manydis-putes that theoristshave thoughtmustbeanalyzed in termsof theshared literal content are thusbest analyzedas speakersusing theirwordsindifferentways,advocating(metalinguistically)fortheirpre-ferredusage.

7. Theterm‘conceptualethics’isdrawnfrom(BurgessandPlunkett2013a)and(BurgessandPlunkett2013b).

8. Formoreonthispoint,see(BurgessandPlunkett2013a).

terms—terms(moral,ethical,aesthetic,epistemological,etc.)whosemeaningatleastpartlyinvolvesmattersofwhatoneshould do,think,orfeel,or,respectively,aboutwhatisbetter orworse. Inotherwords,thisisakeytypeofargumentnotjustinmetaethicsbutinmetanorma-tivetheorymorebroadly.

We think that the reasoning exemplified in Hare’s argument isflawed, and,moreover, that the conclusions inmany arguments ofthis typeare in fact false.Weargue thatspeakerscan,andoftendo,genuinelydisagreewitheachotherevenwhileinthedisputesreflect-ingthosedisagreements,thosespeakersdo not meanthesamethingsbytheirwords.Howisdisagreementreflectedinsuchalinguisticex-change?Via a largely tacit negotiationover howbest to use the rel-evantwords.FollowingChrisBarker,weuse the termmetalinguistic usageforcaseswherealinguisticexpressionisused(not mentioned)tocommunicateinformationabouttheappropriateusageofthatveryexpressionincontext.6InthecasesthatBarkerintroduces(andwhichwediscusslaterinthispaper)themetalinguisticusageofatermcen-tersondescriptivemattersofhowatermisinfactusedintherelevantcontext.However,byputting forwardcompetingclaimsof this type,speakerscan,viametalinguisticusesoftheirterms,debatehowitisthosetermsshouldbeemployed.Wecalladisputelikethis—onethatemployscompetingmetalinguisticusagesofanexpression,andthatreflectsadisagreementabouttheproperdeploymentoflinguisticrep-resentations—ametalinguistic negotiation.

Two featuresserve tocharacterize theclassof linguisticdisputesthatweareinterestedin—theclassofdisputeswelabel‘metalinguis-ticnegotiations’.First,metalinguisticnegotiationsemployadistinctivecommunicativemechanism—metalinguisticusage.And,second,theyconcern a distinctivenormativequestion—howbest to use awordrelativetoacontext.Thisgeneralquestion—howshouldweuseourwords?—showsupinarangeof forms. Itcould,onsomeparticular

6. WedonotassumethatBarkerwouldgrantthischaracterizationofmetalin-guisticusage,butitisinthespiritofhisdescriptionin(Barker2002).Wegointogreaterdetailbelow.

metalinguisticanalysisisanaturalandinsomecasesnearlyinevitableconsequence.Metalinguisticnegotiationis,weargue,ubiquitous.12

Becauseofthegeneralityofouraiminthispaper,wedonotargue(forpresentpurposes) that themetalinguisticanalysis ismandatoryforanyspecificdomainofnormativeorevaluativediscourse.Rather,weaimtodemonstratethatthemetalinguisticanalysisisastrong,ifnot inevitable, candidate in theexplanationandanalysisofanypar-ticulardomainofnormativeorevaluativediscourse.Thisbyitselfisenoughtoblockquickargumentsfromdisagreementtoanyparticu-larconclusionaboutsemantics.Justasimportantly,themetalinguisticanalysisprovidestheoreticalresourcestosemanticviewsofnormativeorevaluativetermsthatareoftencriticizedpreciselyforbeingunabletoaccountadequatelyfordisagreement.Theseviewsinclude,amongothers,contextualistviewsonwhichnormativeorevaluativeclaimshave a determinatemeaning only relative to some judge or group(e. g.,viewswheretheterm‘morallyright’meanssomethinglike“be-ing approvedof byme”or “being approvedof bymy community”).Ourwork in this paper shows that such views have a richer set oftoolsforexplainingdisagreementthanisnormallythought.Finally,asweargueattheendofthepaper,thequitegeneralplausibilityofthemetalinguistic analysishas importantmethodological consequences

12. ReadersfamiliarwiththeworkofCharlesStevensonmighthavealreadyno-ticedthatourproposalhascertainresonanceswithhisclassicpaper“Persua-siveDefinitions” (Stevenson1938).Stevensonargues thatmanyseeminglyordinarydisputesinfactinvolvespeakersputtingpressureoneachothertochangethedescriptivecriteriathatarepairedwithpositiveornegativeemo-tivevalence.GivenwhatStevensonhere thinksgoes into themeaningsofterms(bothadescriptiveandaso-called“emotive”component),thisprocessinvolves speakers trying to get others to changewhat theymeanby theirterms.WethinkthatStevensonwasontosomethingimportantaboutmanynormative and evaluative disputes.However, there are crucial differencesbetweenourviewandStevenson’s.For instance, inendorsingaversionofemotivism,Stevensonmakessignificantassumptionsaboutwhatgoesintothemeaningofnormativeandevaluativetermsthatwedonotmake.Further-more,hereachesquitespecificconclusionsaboutwhichaspectsofmeaningspeakerstrytochangeinnormativeandevaluativedisputes.Aswillbecomeclearinwhatfollows,wethinkthattherearemanydifferentaspectsofmean-ingthatspeakerstrytochangeviametalinguisticnegotiation.

Anumberofphilosophersareactivelyinvolvedinadvancingnor-mativeargumentsinconceptualethics,atopicthatwillplayamajorroleinourdiscussion.9Andotherphilosophershavealreadynotedthepotential formetalinguistic analyses in responding todisagreement-basedargumentsinspecificdomainsofnormativeandevaluativedis-course.10Ourpaperisheavilyindebtedtothesediscussions.However,wehaveamoregeneralaim.Ouraimistodemonstratethatanalysesofparticulardisputesasmetalinguisticdonotserveasexotic,last-resortmaneuverstoavoiddomain-specificdisagreement-basedarguments.Rather,themetalinguisticanalysisfollowsfromquitegeneralandin-dependentlymotivatedobservationsaboutthelinguisticmechanismsbywhichspeakersroutinelyexpresstheirdisagreementswithonean-other.11Whentherelevant(andexceedinglyslippery)notions—mean-ing and disagreement among them—are made sufficiently clear, the

9. See, for example, (Chalmers 2011), (Sider 2012), (Sundell 2011a), and(Haslanger2012).Fordiscussionofmoreexamplesofconceptualethics,see(BurgessandPlunkett2013a).

10. See, for example, (Sundell 2011b), (DeRose 2004), (Björnsson and Finlay2010),and(Robinson2009).

11. Perhapsaloneamong thephilosophersworking in thisarea,PeterLudlowargues that linguistic communication is pervasively metalinguistic. He ar-guesthatnearlyallconversationsproceedvia anegotiationoverhowtousethe relevant linguistic expressions. See (LudlowManuscript). Part ofwhatLudlowisarguingfor is thethesis thatmetalinguisticdisputesarecapableofexpressinggenuinesubstantivedisagreementsand thatphilosophersoflanguageneedtopaymoreattentiontothesedisputesintheirconstructionof theories of the meaning of terms (including normative and evaluativeones).Inthisrespect,Ludlowisarguingformuchthesamethesisthatweare.However,thereisanimportantdifferencebetweenLudlowandus.Ludlowreacheshisconclusionbyarguingforaviewof language—aviewhecallsthedynamic lexicon —thatwillstrikemanyphilosophersasquiteradical.OnLudlow’spicture,almostalllinguisticcommunicationinvolvesconversation-specificsettlingofantecedentlyhighly underspecifiedmeanings.Wearesym-pathetictoLudlow’sview.However,inthispaper,weaimtodemonstratethatthemetalinguisticanalysisofnormativeandevaluativedisputesisconsistentwith,andindeedhighlyplausibleon,entirelymainstreamviewsoflinguisticcommunication. In this respect,ourargumentativestrategymarksasignifi-cantdeparturefromtheonethatLudlowiscurrentlypursuing.

or evaluative terms. The third objection concerns the ability of themetalinguisticanalysistoaccountforcertainlinguisticdataabouttheacceptabilityofmetalinguisticnegationinvariouscontexts.Wetakeitthataddressingthesethreeobjectionsiscrucialtofulfillingoneofourmaingoalsinthispaper:toprovideamorethoroughandsystematicdefenseofthemetalinguisticanalysisofnormativeandevaluativedis-putesthanhashithertobeenonoffer. However,weputourdiscussionoftheseimportantissuesattheendofthepapertostreamlinethecen-trallineofargument.Moreover,werecognizethatindividualreaderswillbemoreconcernedwithsomeobjectionsthanothers.§6canthusbesampledorskippedper thereader’sowninterestandinclination.

§1 Disagreement-Based Arguments for Semantic Conclusions in Meta-normative Theory.

Togetabettersenseofthetypeofdisagreement-basedargumentthatweareconcernedwith,considerthefollowingthreeexamples:

Terrance Horgan and Mark Timmons on the case of Moral Twin Earth:HorganandTimmonsimaginethefollowingcase:therearenodifferencesbetween theplanetsEarthandMoralTwinEarthexceptforthefactthatpeopleonEarthapplymoraltermssuchas‘good’and‘right’inawaythatiscausallyregulatedbynaturalpropertyN1whereaspeo-pleonMoralTwinEarthapplythosetermsinawaythatis causally regulatedby adifferentnatural propertyN2.InfiguringouthowtorespondtothepossibilityofMoralTwin Earth, Horgan and Timmons claim that we havetwopossibilities:Ontheonehand,wecouldclaimthatEarthlingsandTwinEarthlingsmeanorrefertodifferentthingsbytheirmoral terms.Ontheotherhand,asHor-ganandTimmonswrite,“wecouldsayinsteadthatmoraland twinmoral termsdonot differ inmeaningor refer-ence,andhencethatanyapparentmoraldisagreementsthatmightarisebetweenEarthlingsandTwinEarthlings

forphilosophersworkinginmetanormativetheory.Itmeansthatphi-losopherscannotuseintuitionsaboutdisagreementasaquickmeansfordismissingviewsthatpositvariousformsofinter-personal,inter-contextual,orinter-theoreticalvariationinmeaning—amovethatispervasiveinmuchofthemetanormativeliterature.

Thepaper isdivided into six sections. In§1,we clarify the typeof disagreement-based argumentwe are concernedwith, andwhyitissoattractive.In§2,weproposeaframeworkforthinkingaboutthe relevantnotions—meaning anddisagreement among them—thatmatterinthesortofdisagreement-basedargumentweareconcernedwith.Wearguethat,whentherelevantnotionsaremadepreciseandheldconstant,itbecomesquiteeasytoseethatatleastsomedisputesinvolving differences inmeaning can nonetheless express genuinedisagreements.In§3,wemakethiscasewithrespecttodisputesingeneral.In§4,wemakethiscasewithrespecttonormativeorevalu-ativedisputes—thatis,disputesinvolvingatleastonenormativeandevaluative term—inparticular.13 In §5,we concludeourmain argu-mentbyexplainingthegeneralmethodologicalupshotsofthemeta-linguisticanalysisforthosewhoworkonthesemanticsofnormativeorevaluativeterms.

Finally, in§6,weconsiderandrespondto three importantobjec-tions to our main argument. The first objection concerns external-ism(bothcontent-externalismandcontext-externalism).Thesecondobjection concerns the distinction between explanatorily basic andexplanatorilynon-basicnormativeorevaluativeterms.By‘basic’,wemeanthoseterms(including,perhaps,‘ought’or‘good’)whosemean-ingisnotexplainedintermsofthemeaningofanyothernormative

13. Inwhatfollows,wewilltakethistobedefinitionalof“anormativeorevalu-ativedispute”.Thatis:whenweclaimthatadisputeis“anormativeoreval-uativeone”,whatweare claiming is just that thisdispute isone inwhichaspeakerusesat leastonenormativeorevaluativeterm.Itshouldalsobenotedthat,inthispaper,wewillnottakeastandonexactlywhatittakestobeanormativeorevaluativeterm.Instead,wewilltakeitasgiventhatthereisabroadclassoftermsherethatmetanormativetheoristshavebeenconcernedwith,andthatsuchterms,howevertheirnatureisbestunderstood,aretheonesthatwearetalkingaboutinthispaper.

Ineachofthesecases,theoriststaketheretobeatightlinkbetweenthefactthattwospeakersgenuinelydisagreewitheachotherandthefacts aboutwhat the respective speakersmean by theirwords.17 Incaseswherespeakersareimaginedtomeandifferentthingsbytheirwords(whetherinvirtueofambiguityordifferenceinexternalenvi-ronmentorcontextualvariation),theworryisthatthetwospeakerscouldnotgenuinelydisagreewitheachother.Toaccountforthepur-porteddatumthatthetwospeakersdogenuinelydisagreewitheachother,eachtheoristarguesthatweshouldtakethespeakerstomeanthesamethingsbythewordstheyuseinthatexchange.18

Whythinkthatthereisthissortoftightlinkbetweenfactsofdis-agreement and facts of meaning? The core line of thought can beputasfollows.Let’susethetermdispute torefertoanylinguisticex-changethatappearstoevinceorexpressagenuinedisagreement.Weastheoriststhenhavesomeintuition—anintuitionthatwewanttopreserve—thatcertaindisputes in fact evincegenuinedisagreement.The standard way to non-debunkingly explain our intuition of dis-agreement—to give an analysis that vindicates our intuition aboutthedispute—is toposit that the speakersdisagreeover the literally expressed contentofwhattheyaresaying.Insofarasoneviewscontentintermsofpropositions,thiswillamounttothinkingthatthespeakersdisagreeaboutthetruthofthepropositionsthattheyliterallyexpress.

Callanydisputethatcentersonthetruthorcorrectnessofthecon-tentliterallyexpressedbythespeakersacanonical dispute.Ifitistrue

17. Althoughwehaveglossed just threeexamplesof thisdisagreement-basedformofargumentinthissection,therearemany instancesoftheargumentinthecontemporarymetanormativeliterature.Aquicksampling:(MacFarlaneInProgress),indiscussingthesemanticsofaestheticterms;(Egan2012),indiscussingthesemanticsofvaluetermsingeneral;and(Dworkin2011),alsoindiscussingthesemanticsofvaluetermsingeneral.ForreadersinterestedinourviewsonDworkin’suseofthisargument,see(PlunkettandSundell,Forthcoming-b).Foranoverviewofthewayinwhichexpressivistsmakeuseofthisargumentativestrategy,see(Darwall,Gibbard,andRailton1997).See(Gibbard1990)foroneoftheclearestexamplesofthis.

18. Atthisstageinourdiscussion,wepaintinbroadbrushstrokeswithouruseof the term ‘meaning’.For instance,wearenotyetdistinguishingbetweencharacterandcontent.Weturntothisdistinctionin§2.

wouldbegenuine disagreements—i. e.,disagreementsinmoralbeliefandinnormativemoraltheory,ratherthandisagreementsinmeaning.”14

Michael Smith on ‘Right’: Smith argues that metaethicaltheorists“mustmakesurethatmoralclaimsdonotturnouttohavedifferentcontentsindifferentcontexts.Andyetthisseemsinevitableiftheysimplysaythat,forexam-ple,theword‘right’isusedtorefertothefeatureofactsthatiscausallyresponsibleforourusesoftheterm‘right’.ForifthecauseofA’sandB’susesoftheword‘right’arenotthesame,then,contrarytotheplatitudethatifAsays‘xisright’andBsays‘xisnotright’thenAandBdisagree,AandBarenotdisagreeing.A’sjudgmentthatxisrighthasadifferentcontentfromB’sjudgmentthatxisright.”15

Peter Lasersohn on Taste Predicates:Lasersohnargues thatthecontextualist analysisof tastepredicates “cannotberight[…]becauseoftherelationbetweencontentsandcontradiction […]. If I say ‘Roller coasters are fun,’ andyou say ‘No, roller coasters are not fun,’ on this analy-sis, you are not contradictingme, because the negatedsentencedoesn’texpressthesamecontent foryouas itdoesforme.Ineffect,myutterancemeansrollercoastersarefunforme,andyourutterancemeansrollercoastersaren’tfunforyou,andthereisnoconflictorcontradictionbetweenthoseatall—indeed,thereisnoreasontothinkwedisagreeinanyway,onthisanalysis.”16

14. (HorganandTimmons1993,130).

15. (Smith1994,35).

16. (Lasersohn2005,649).

metalinguisticnegotiation—isnotonlycapableofexpressinggenuinedisagreement,butis,weargue,particularlyplausibleasananalysisofmanynormativeandevaluativedisputes.21

If thiskindof analysis is right, then itunderminesaphilosophi-cal argument that is truly pervasive.Andnot just in contemporarywork.AsouropeningexampleofHare’scaseofthemissionaryandthecannibalssuggests,theargumenthasalonghistoryindiscussionsofexpressivismandother formsofnon-cognitivism. In thecontextofmobilizingtheargumentinsupportofhisownformofexpressiv-ism,AllanGibbardemphasizesitscloseconnectiontoMoore’shighlyinfluential“openquestionargument”.22AndoneofthemainreasonsStevenson advocates a version ofwhatwe now call “expressivism”oversubjectivismisthat“wemustbeablesensiblytodisagreeaboutwhethersomethingis‘good’”23andthatthisisarequirementsubjec-tivismcanneversatisfy.24

Finally,theuseofthedisagreement-basedformofargumentthatweconsiderinthispaperishardlyparochialtometanormativetheory.

21. It isworth emphasizinghere that, given thewayweare setting thingsup,classifyingadisputeasanormativeorevaluativeone meansonly thatitisadisputeinwhichaspeakerusesatleastonenormativeorevaluativeterm.Itdoesnotmean,forinstance,thatthedisputeisinfactaboutsuch-and-suchtopic.Anditcertainlydoesnotmeanthatitisacanonicaldisputeaboutsuch-and-suchnormativeorevaluativesubjectmatter.

22. (Gibbard2003).ForMoore’soriginaldiscussion,see(Moore1993).

23. (Stevenson1937,16).

24.ConsideralsothecaseofA.J.Ayer.Heobserves,inlanguagestrikinglysimi-lartothatofcontemporarystatementsoftheargument,that“ifamansaidthat thriftwas a virtue and another replied that itwas a vice, theywouldnot,onthistheory,bedisputingwithoneanother.Onewouldbesayingthathe approvedof thrift, and theother thathe didn’t: and there isno reasonwhyboththesestatementsshouldnotbetrue”.(Ayer1971,113–114).(Ayerishereexplicitlydrawingon(Moore1970).)UnlikeHare,Stevenson,Gibbard,and theothers,however,Ayerdoesnot take thisobservation torefute thetheories—hisownemotivismor subjectivism—againstwhichit isdirected.Butthatisnotbecauseherejectsthecentralinferencefromdisagreementtosharedmeaningsofterms.Rather,Ayersimplybitesthebullet,concedingtheadmittedly“paradoxicalassertion”that“onereallyneverdoesdisputeaboutquestionsofvalue”(Ayer1971,114).

thatadisputeiscanonical,thislendspowerfulsupporttotheconclu-sionthat thespeakersmeanthesamethingsbythewordstheyuseinthatexchange.Why?Becauseifspeakersmeantdifferentthingsbytheirwords,thentheywouldbeveryunlikelytoexpressinconsistentcontents.19Hence,fromtheassumptionthatadisputeiscanonical,oneisinareasonablygoodpositiontoconcludethat,insofarasspeakersinthatexchangeusethesamewords,thosespeakersmeanthesamethingsbythosewords.

Theabove lineof reasoning is solidas faras itgoes. If adisputeexpressesadisagreementoverthetruthorcorrectnessofliterallyex-pressedcontent, thenit is likelythatspeakersmeanthesamethingsbytheirwords.However,wetake issuewiththetruthof thepremise in that lineof reasoning.20Takingadispute tobecanonical isnotal-ways the best—let alone only—non-debunking explanation of theintuitionofgenuinedisagreement.Therearemanyinstancesofnon-ca-nonicaldisputes—disputesthatdonotcenteronliterally expressed con-tent—thatneverthelessreflectgenuinedisagreement.Non-canonicaldisputes that express genuine disagreements are, in fact, pervasive.Andonetypeofnon-canonicaldisputeinparticular—whatwecalla

19. Thereareexceptionstothisthatdependonthespecificwaysinwhichwordscanvaryintheirmeaning.Supposethat,byemployingtherelativegradableadjective‘tall’inutteringthesentence‘Johnisnottall’,Iexpresstheproposi-tionthatJohnisnottallforaphilosopher,whileyourespondwithausageof‘tall’thatexpressesthepropositionthatJohnistallforbasketballplayer.Intherelevantsense,wedonotmeanthesamethingby‘tall’.Nevertheless,wedoexpressinconsistentpropositions:IfJohnisnottallforaphilosopher,there’snowayhe’stallforabasketballplayer.Ourgoalhereistocritiquetheargu-mentativemovefromthepresenceofdisagreementtosamenessofcontent,andwetakecaseslikethisonetoadvancethatgeneralpoint.However,itisorthogonaltoourmoregeneralargument,sowesetitasidefornow.

20.One might describe the disagreement-based argument we are concernedwith as based on an inference that is invalid. Yet herewe identify a falsepremise.Butthereisnodeepdistinctionbetweenthesediagnoses.Ifapar-ticulardisagreement-basedinferencedoesnotmakeuseofapremisetotheeffectthatthedisputeinquestioniscanonical,thenitisinvalid:thepremisesaboutdisagreementdonotentailtheconclusionaboutsamenessofcontent.Iftheinferencedoesmake(perhapsenthymematic)useofapremisetotheeffect that thedispute iscanonical, then it stillofcourserequires that thatpremisebetrue.Wearguethatoftenitisnot.

featuresofouruseofthosewords(henceforth,thedomainofpragmat-ics).Bythe“meaning”ofournormativeandevaluativetermswemeantoindicatethatwearetalkingaboutthesemanticsofthoseterms.

Wedonothavenewordeep things to sayabout the semantics/pragmaticsdistinction in thispaper.Butwetake it tobepartof therulesofthegamethatanyanalysisofsomelinguisticexpressionwillinvolveapackagedealofsemanticsandpragmatics.Weunderstandpartoftheaimofmetanormativetheorytobetheconstructionofse-manticanalysesofournormativeandevaluative terms.Thus, thoseanalysesmust,likeanysemanticanalysis,bejudgedinthisway,asapackagedealofsemanticandpragmatictheory.Withthisinmind,oneofourcorethesesinthispapercanbeglossedasfollows:ifoneaimsto vindicate the intuition that adispute evinces a genuinedisagree-ment,moreworkcanbedoneonthepragmaticssideofthispackagedealthanisoftenassumedbythosemakingdisagreement-basedargu-mentsforsemanticconclusions.

Evenhavingmade thisclarificationbetweensemanticsandprag-matics,therestillremainsanambiguityintheterm‘meaning’.Afterall,evenifwesetasidepragmaticphenomenalikepresuppositionandim-plicature,anexpression,asitisusedinacontext,stillhas“meaning”intwosenses:itslinguisticallyencoded,contextuallyinvariantmeaning,anditsreferenceordenotation,relativetothatcontext.This,roughly,isthedivisionKaplanaimstocapturewithhisdistinctionbetweenanexpression’s character—its contextually invariant meaning—and itscontent—whatitpicksout,relativetothecontext.27

OurargumentdoesnotrequireustoendorsethespecificsofKa-plan’s picture as against competing ones, such as those offered byLewisorStalnaker.28Rather,weusehisterminologytomarktherele-vantdistinctionswherenecessary,howeverthosedistinctionsareul-timatelytobeunderstood.Forexample,consideracontextualistviewof‘tall’accordingtowhichspeakersusethetermtopickoutdifferent

27. See(Kaplan1989).

28.See(Lewis1979)and(Stalnaker1999).

Onthecontrary,itappearsthroughoutphilosophyasawhole,inareasrangingfrommeta-metaphysicstoepistemicmodality.25Ourfocusinthispaperisontheuseofthisdisagreement-basedformofargumentwithinmetanormativetheory,butwetakeourdiscussiontohaveim-plicationsfortheargumentwhereveritappears.

§2 Moving Parts.

Aswestatedintheintroduction,theviewthatcertainnormativeandevaluativedisputesarebothmetalinguisticandthattheyexpressgenu-inedisagreementflowsnaturally fromaplausibleandquitegeneralpictureof languageandcommunication. Inorder tomake this case,weputforwardhereawayofthinkingabouttherelevantnotions.Inthissection,wemakefourproposalsabouthowtocarveuptheterrain.Thefirstproposalconcernstheterm‘meaning’.Thesecondconcernsthenatureofcanonicaldisputes.Thethirdconcernstheindividuationofwords.Andthefourthconcernsthenotionofdisagreementitself.Whenthesefourproposalsareputtogether,wewillbeinagoodposi-tiontoexplainthegeneralappealofthemetalinguisticanalysis.

§2.1 Meaning.Tyler Burgewrites that “the term ‘meaning’ has always been vague,multi-purposed,andtosomeextentadaptivetotheviewpointofdif-ferenttheories”.26Weagree.Soit’scrucialtoemphasizethatwhenwetalkabout“meaning”inthispaper,wemeansomethingnarrowerthanthe full communicative upshot ofwhatissaid.Itisnowwidelyacceptedbylinguistsandphilosophersof languagethatthereissomedistinc-tiontobemade,withinthecategoryofinformationwecommunicatewhenwespeak,between information that ispartof the linguistical-lyencodedcontentof thewordsweuse(henceforth, thedomainofsemantics) and information that is communicated in virtue of other

25. Herearesomeillustrativeexamplesoftherolethiskindofargumentplaysintheseotherareas:formeta-metaphysics,see(Manley2009)andinepistemicmodality,see(Egan,Hawthorne,andWeatherson2005).

26. (Burge1979,398).ThankstoNateCharlowfordirectingustothispassage.

Thischaracterizationofcanonicalnessobviouslydoesnotmakeroomfor theories that explain content in terms other than propositions,such as some versions of expressivism. Yet expressivists are promi-nentamong thosewhoofferdisagreement-basedarguments,whichthemselvesdependonsomenotioncorrespondingtowhatwehavecalled‘canonicalness’.

Whatmattersforthedisagreement-basedargumentisnotthena-ture of content as such, but simply the question ofwhether the in-compatiblecontentsmustbeliterallyexpressed.Therefore, itwouldbeamistaketoruleoutsuchexpressivistanalysesas canonicalintherelevant sense. Fortunately, the characterization of canonicalness iseasilygeneralized.

Second-Pass Definition of a Canonical Dispute:Adisputecon-sisting inSpeakerA’sutteranceof e andSpeakerB’sut-teranceoffiscanonicaljustincasetherearetwoobjectspandq(propositions,plans,etc.)suchthatSpeakerA’sutteranceofe literallyexpressespandSpeakerB’sutter-anceoffliterallyexpressesq,andqisfundamentallyinconflictwithp in themanner appropriate toobjects ofthattype.(Bypentailingnot-qinthecaseofpropositions;bythesatisfactionofpprecludingthesatisfactionofqinthecaseofdesires;byp’simplementationprecludingq’simplementationinthecaseofplans,etc.)

Inwhatfollows,thissecond-passdefinitionofacanonicaldisputeiswhatwehaveinmind.Nevertheless,foreaseofpresentation,itwillof-tenhelptoassumethatliterallyexpressedcontentisbestunderstoodintermsofpropositions.

§2.3 The Individuation of Words.Indescribingthedisputesweconsiderbelow,andespeciallyinargu-ingthatsomeofthemarebestanalyzedasmetalinguistic negotiations, wetalkasifthequestioniswhetherspeakers“meanthesamething”

height-properties relative to a context. If such a view is right, thenspeakers in different contexts “mean” different things by theword‘tall’ in one sensebutnot another. Inparticular, for those speakerstheword‘tall’hasdifferentcontents,butneverthelessithasthesamecharacter:somethinglikehaving a maximal degree of height greater than the contextually supplied threshold.29 UsingthisKaplanianterminology,wekeepthesedistinctionsclearwherenecessarytoavoidconfusion.Whereconfusionseemsunlikely,orwhereourpointsapplybothtocharacterand content,wewilluse ‘meaning’withprecisely thisam-biguityinmind.

§2.2 Canonical Disputes.Howoneshouldunderstandthenotionofcanonical disputeiscloselyconnectedtoourproposalforunderstandingtherelevantnotionof“meaning”.Manyphilosophers think that the linguisticallyencodedcontentofstatementsshouldbemodeledintermsofpropositions.ButastheexampleofHare’sownbrandofmetaethicalnon-cognitivismdemonstrates, onemight reject such a view for how the linguisti-cally encoded content of some (or perhaps all) statements shouldbemodeled.Forourpurposes,itmakesnodifferencewhetheroneunderstands literallyexpressedcontent in termsofpropositionsornot.Thishasimportantconsequencesforourdefinitionofacanoni-caldispute.Consider,first,howcanonicaldisputeswouldbecharac-terizedifliterallyexpressedcontentwereunderstoodexclusivelyintermsofpropositions.

First-Pass Definition of a Canonical Dispute:Adisputeconsist-inginSpeakerA’sutteranceofe andSpeakerB’sutteranceoffiscanonicaljustincasetherearetwopropositionspandqsuchthatSpeakerA’sutteranceofeliterallyexpress-espandSpeakerB’sutteranceoff literallyexpressesq,andqentailsnot-p.

29.Weborrowthisglossof‘tall’from(Barker2002),whichwediscussin§3.

disagreementthatboth(a)mattersformetanormativetheoryand(b)meaningfullyconnectstothesortsofdisagreement-basedargumentsforsemanticconclusionsthatareourfocusinthispaper.Wethusneedanotionthat(a)picksoutsomethingthatconnectsmeaningfully tophenomena worth explaining in metanormative theory, and (b) isbroadenoughtomakeroomforarangeoftheoreticalperspectivesinmetanormativetheory,andhencedoesnotbegimportantquestionsabouthowdisagreementmustbeunderstood.31

Inthatspirit,herearethreemorespecificdesiderata.First,wewantanotionofdisagreementthatcanexplainwhatiscommonbetweenthosedisagreementsthatareevincedinlinguisticexchanges(suchasthedisagreementbetweenthemissionaryandthecannibal)andthosedisagreementsthatarenot(forexample, thedisagreementbetweenDavidLewisandHegelaboutphilosophicalmethodology).Wehavealreadysetthingsupinawaythatisresponsivetothisdesideratum:byusingtheterm‘dispute’torefertoanylinguisticexchangethatap-pearstoexpressagenuinedisagreement,wehaveimplicitlyacknowl-edged that somedisagreements aren’t expressedat all.Oneupshotofthisdesideratumisthatdisagreementisastate thatobtains, ratherthananactivitythatpeopleengagein.32

31. Thislastpointisespeciallyimportantgiventhatmetanormativetheoristsof-tentakeitasaplatitude thatspeakersdisagreewitheachotherincertaincen-tralcases.Forinstance,inthequotefromMichaelSmithinThe Moral Problem thatwegavein§1,hestatesthatitisa“platitudethatifAsays‘xisright’andBsays‘xisnotright’thenAandBdisagree”(Smith1994,35).Ifonewantstotakeitasaplatitudethatspeakersdisagreeincertaincentralcases—or,moregenerally,ifonesimplywantstotakeitasadatapointthatawiderangeoftheorists can agree on—then one shouldn’t build toomuch into one’s ac-countofdisagreement.Themoreonebuildsin,thelessclearitwillbethatitisreallydisagreementinsuch-and-suchcentralcasesthatisgoingonhere.AndthestatusofpurportedplatitudessuchasSmith’scouldthenbeseverelyundercut,and,withit,theviabilityofusingfactsofthepresenceofdisagree-mentassuchinthepremisesofdisagreement-basedargumentsoftheformthatweareconsideringinthispaper.

32. Inmakingthedistinctionbetween“state”vs.“activity”understandingsofdis-agreement,weheredrawon(MacFarlaneInProgress),whointurndrawsonCappelenandHawthorne(CappelenandHawthorne2009,60–61).

or“expressthesameconcepts”bytheirwords.Onthiswayoftalking,weusetheterm‘concepts’torefertoconstituent components of thoughts (roughly,thementalequivalenttowords).Andwearetakingitthat(a)themeaningofawordisgivenbytheconceptitisusedtoexpressand(b)thesamewordcanbeusedtoexpressdifferentconcepts.Butdoes the type of situationwehave inmind really involve speakerswhomean different things by their words?Ordo they, rather,use differ-ent words altogether — words that are homophonous, but neverthe-lessdistinctinvirtueofdifferencesinmeaning?Doestheword‘bank’meantwodifferentthings,oraretheretwowords,‘bank1’and‘bank2’thathappentobepronouncedthesame?

Forourpurposes,nothingsubstantivehangsonthedistinctionbetween these two ways of carving things up. Disputes that weanalyze as metalinguistic negotiations—in which speakers nego-tiate how aword should be used, orwhich concept it should beused to express—can,with no important theoretical changes, bere-describedasdisputesinwhichspeakersnegotiatewhichoftwocompeting,homophonouswordsshouldbeused.Infact, insomediscussionsof concepts andwordmeaning, the latter formofde-scription—which of the competing homophonous words shouldwe choose?—is more apt. However, the former form of descrip-tion—howshouldthiswordbeusedinthesecircumstances?—hascertainexpositoryadvantages,andwesticktothatwayoftalkingforthedurationofthepaper.

§2.4. Disagreement.Disagreementisatrickynotion,andtheoristswhodiscuss“disagree-ment”donotalwayshavethesamethinginmind.30Itisthuscrucialthatweidentifywhatwehaveinmindwhenusingtheterm‘disagree-ment’.Inapproachingthistopic,weneedtoidentifyacorenotionof

30.For a helpful discussion of some of the different important senses of “dis-agreement” thatmatter in contemporary discussions in philosophy of lan-guageandbeyond,see(MacFarlaneInProgress).Seealsochapter6of(RidgeInProgress).

becauseDRCCcoversdisagreementsthataren’tvoicedinanysortoflinguisticexchange(likeLewis/Hegel,orpast/presentObama), it isnotaprinciple thatconcernssemanticsassuch.Thisshouldnotbesurprising:ifDRCCisontherighttrack,thendisagreementmustbeunderstoodassomethinginvolvingtheconflictingattitudes ofthesub-jectsinvolved(e. g.,theirbeliefs,desires,intentions,etc.)ratherthananything specifically about the sentences that they utter.Accepting, whateveritis,isamentalattitude,notalinguisticact.

Theupshotof thesepoints is thatwhile thepresenceofgenuinedisagreementmaybeadatapointthatasemantictheoryshouldtakeintoaccount,itisn’tonethatisfundamentallyaboutwhatisgoingonattheleveloflanguage.This,wethink,opensupthedoorforexplor-ing different linguistic mechanisms—semantic and pragmatic—bywhich speakersmight represent or express their conflictingmentalcontents.Inotherwords,thiswayofthinkingaboutdisagreement,es-peciallywhencoupledwiththeproposalswemadein§2.1–§2.3,lendsitselfnaturallytothepossibilityofnon-canonicaldisputesthatexpressgenuinedisagreements.Thatisthepossibilitythatwenowexplore.35

§3. Non-Canonical Disputes.

Recall that the argument typewe critique beginswith the premisethatagivendisputeexpressesgenuinedisagreement.Fromthere,one

theninanobvioussenseAandBdonotdisagreewitheachotherdespiteac-ceptingincompatiblecontents.Issuesofthiskindareablyaddressedin(Mac-FarlaneInProgress).Butthistypeofcasedoesnotposeproblemsfortheviewthatweadvocateinthispaper.Thisisacasewherepeopleintuitivelydonot disagree,whiletheprimaryworryforthemetalinguisticanalysisiscapturingallofthecaseswherepeopleintuitivelydo disagree.Thus,casesliketheoneabovedonotimpactourargumentshere,andwesetthemtothesideforthepurposesofthispaper.

35.WerecognizethatsomereadersmightwellrejectDRCC.Ifso,thequestionthen is this: is there an alternative non-question-begging claim about (ordefinitionof)disagreementthatboth(a)meetstherelevantdesideratalaidoutinthissectionand(b)willvindicatethesortofdisagreement-basedargu-mentsthatweareattacking?Wethinknot.FocusingonDRCChelpstomakethispointclear.However,forthereasonwejuststated,readerswhoareskep-ticalofDRCCshouldn’tletthegeneralpointwearemakingbeobscuredbytheformulationofDRCCitself.

Second,wewantanotionofdisagreementthatallowsfordisagree-mentwithone’spastorfutureself,suchasthedisagreementbetweenPresidentObamaandhispastselfongaymarriage.

Finally,giventhatwewanttomakeroomforexpressivistaccountsofcanonicaldisputes,wewantanotionofdisagreementthatallowsfortheretobedisagreementbasedonaconflictinattitudessuchasplans,desires,orpreferences.Wewanttoaccommodate,forinstance,theintuitiveideathatifDamienusedtodesiretobecomeanastronautwhenhegrewup,andnowdesirestobeaprofessionalphilosopher,thenthereissomesenseinwhichDamiendisagreeswithhispastself.

There are other issues on which we aim to remain neutral. Butthesedesiderataallowustobepreciseenoughinstatinganotionofdisagreementrelevanttotheargumentsweconsiderhere.Thatnotionisthis:disagreementessentiallyinvolvessomeincompatibility(oftherelevant kind) between contents (whatever they turn out to be) ac-cepted(intherelevantsense)bydifferentpeople(whomayormaynotbeinconversationwithoneanother).Thisconceptioniscapturedinfollowingprinciple:

Disagreement Requires Conflict in Content (DRCC): If twosubjectsAandBdisagreewitheachother,thentherearesomeobjectspandq(propositions,plans,etc.)suchthatA acceptsp andB acceptsq, andp is such that thede-mandsplacedon a subject in virtueof accepting it arerationally incompatible with the demands placed on asubjectinvirtueofacceptingq.(Perhaps,thoughnotnec-essarily,invirtueofqentailingnot-p.)33

WethinkthatDRCChasplausibilityasananalysisof,oratleastasatheoreticallyhelpfulclaimabout,disagreement.34However,precisely

33. ThisprincipleismodeledbroadlyonGibbard’streatmentofdisagreementin (Gibbard2003).

34. Therearefurtherwrinklesthatmustbeaddressedinafinishedanalysisofdisagreementitself.Forexample,ifPersonAinworldwbelievesthatp,whilepersonBinworldw’believesthatnot-p,andifpistrueatwandfalseatw’,

consistent.Indeedtheyarebothtrue.37Thepartiestothedisputein(2)disagreeinvirtueofthefactthatthespeakerof(2a)believesthatthereisexactly oneprotoninthenucleusofaheliumatom,whilethespeak-erof (2b)believes that thereare exactly twoprotons in thenucleusofaheliumatom.Theynotonlybelievethosepropositions,buttheyalsocommunicatethem,andthereforecorrectlyperceivethemselvestodisagreewitheachother.

However,whileitistruethatthespeakerscommunicatethesein-compatiblecontents,itisnotthecasethattheyliterallyexpressthem.IfthefamiliarGricianstoryaboutnumberwordsiscorrect,thenthespeakerof(2a)literallysays thatthereisat least oneprotoninthenu-cleusof aheliumatom,while the speakerof (2b) literally says thatthereareatleasttwoprotonsinthenucleusofaheliumatom.Inthis,theyarebothcorrect,sincethereareexactlytwoprotonsinthenucle-usofaheliumatom.

The speakersof (2a) and (2b) reallydodisagreewith eachother,bothintuitivelyandbythelightsoftheprincipleDRCC.Thereisnoth-ingnon-genuineaboutthedisagreement,andindeeditisadisagree-mentverymuchworthhaving.Thespeakerof(2a)ismistakeninvirtueofbelieving,andcommunicating,thatthereisexactlyoneprotoninthenucleusofaheliumatom,wheninfactthereareexactlytwo.Noneofthisismadetheleastbitproblematicbythefactthataccordingto

37.Weassumehere the familiar scalar-implicatureanalysisofnumberwords.Thatanalysis ishardlyuncontroversial. (See (Chierchia2004)amongoth-ers.) But alternative examples are easy to come by. Even if one prefers asemantic account of scalar implicature quite generally, relevance implica-tureswilldothetrick.SupposethatSallyisextremelybrightbuthasashortattentionspan.SpeakerAsays“Sallywasabletosolvethelastproblemonthetest”,literallyexpressingthepropositionthatSallyhadtherelevantabil-ityandcommunicating,via relevanceimplicature,thatinfactshesolvedit.(That implicature need not be present, but it is easy to imagine contextswhereitis.)SpeakerBobjectsandrespondsthat“shechosetoquitbeforeshegot there”.There isno incompatibilitybetween the literal contentsoftheexpressionsuttered.Butthereisanincompatibilitybetweenfurthercon-tentthatisconveyedpragmatically,namelythatSallyinfactsolvedthelastproblemonthetest.Itisinvirtueofthatincompatibilitythatsuchadisputeexpressesagenuinedisagreement.

argues(perhapsbasedoninferencetobestexplanation,perhapsonothergrounds)thatpartiestothedispute literallyexpress incompat-iblecontents.Inourterminology,onegoesontoinferthatthedisputeis canonical. Finally, from the intermediate premise that the disputeiscanonical,onecaninferthatpartiestothedisputemeanthesamethingsbytherelevantterms.(Andfromthatconclusion,itfollowsthattheoriespositingtherelevantsortofvariationinmeaning—contextu-alism(variationincontentonly),ambiguity(variationincontentbe-causeofvariationincharacter),etc.—arefalse.)

In§1,wegrantedforthesakeofargumentthesecondstepinthislineofreasoning.Inotherwords,wegrantedthatifadisputeinfactinvolves the literal expression of incompatible contents—if it is ca-nonical — thenthespeakersinvolvedareverylikelytomeanthesamethings,intherelevantsense,bytheirterms.Inthissection,wearguethat the first step is flawed.Many disputes expressing genuine dis-agreementare in factnon-canonical. Inotherwords,manygenuinedisagreementsareexpressedviadisputesinwhichthespeakersliter-allyexpresscompatible contents.

§3.1 Non-Canonical Disputes and Genuine Disagreement.Thepointthatgenuinedisagreementscanbeexpressedindisputesinwhichthespeakersliterallyexpresscompatible contents,whileitmayatfirstseembizarre,canbeseenviaentirelyun-exotictypesofcases.Consider,forexample,disagreementscenteredoninformationthatiscommunicatedviaimplicature.

(2) (a)Thereisoneprotoninthenucleusofaheliumatom.

(b)No, therearetwoprotons inthenucleusofaheliumatom.36

Inthiscase,thereisdisagreementbetweenthespeakers,despitethefactthatthepropositionsexpressedbythetwospeakersarelogically

36.Thisexampleisintroducedinarelatedcontextin(Sundell2011a).

§3.2 Metalinguistic Disputes.Disputescenteredonimplicatedinformationmakevividtheindepen-denceofquestionsaboutsubstancefromquestionsaboutcommunica-tivemechanism.However,asnoted,thereislittlereasontothinkthatthepartiestothedisputein(2)meandifferentthingsbytheirwords.Evenifweallowthatsomegenuinedisagreementsareexpressedinnon-canonical disputes, we might remain skeptical that a disagree-mentcouldbebothgenuineandexpressedinanon-canonicaldisputethatisnon-canonicalin virtue of a difference in word meaning.However,suchskepticismisunwarranted.

Thefactthatcertaindisputesarenon-canonicalinvirtueofadiffer-enceinword-meaningiseasiesttoseeinthecaseofcontext-sensitiveexpressions,sowebeginwiththose.Consider,first,linguisticexpres-sions that are context-sensitive in virtue of being gradable. This in-cludesexpressionslike‘tall’,‘big’,‘cold’,etc.,(relative gradable adjectives, inthesenseofKennedy(2007))thatdenoteaspecificpropertyonlyonce someparameter—a thresholdalonga scaleofheight, size,ortemperature,say—hasbeensettledbytheconversationalcontextorbythepartiestothediscourseinwhichtheexpressionisused.39Forthecontextualistaboutthistypeofexpression,the“meaning”oftheworddoesnotvary inone sense—ithas the samecharacteracrosscontexts.Butinanotherimportantsense,themeaningofthewordisvariable—itpicksoutdifferentproperties(andthushasdifferentcon-tents)indifferentcontexts.

If,inacontext,weknowhowthatparameterisset—if,forexam-ple,weknowthethresholdfor“tallness”—thensentencesinvolvingexpressions like ‘tall’ can provide uswith useful information abouttheheightsofpeopleandobjectsaroundus.Thereisnoreasonatall,however,thatthingscannotworkinpreciselythereversedirection.Ifwecanholdtherelevantheightfactsconstant,thenexpressionsinvolv-inggradableadjectiveslike ‘tall’canprovideuswithuseful informa-tionaboutthecontext.ThislatterkindofusageisdescribedinBarker

39.See(Kennedy2007).

the semantic theory under consideration, the relevant propositionsarecommunicatedpragmaticallyandnotsemantically.

Theexamplein(2)doesnotprovideacaseofspeakerswhogen-uinely disagree and yetmeandifferent thingsby theirwords.We’llcome to that typeof case shortly.But it doesmakevivid twootherpoints. First, it demonstrates thedanger of assuming, basedon theexistenceofgenuinedisagreement,thattherelevantdisputeinvolvesthe literal (semantic) expression of incompatible contents. In otherwords, itdemonstrates thatnon-canonicaldisputescanreflectgenu-inedisagreements.Andthetypesofnon-canonicaldisputesthatcando so—disputes centered on information conveyed via implicature(orpresupposition,orconnotation,orahostofothercommunicativemechanisms)—arehardlyexotictophilosophersoflanguage.Thisbyitselfisenoughtoblockespeciallyquickorsimplisticinstancesofin-ferencesofsharedmeaningfromfactsofdisagreement.38

The second point demonstrated by (2) is that theorists take awrong turnas soonas they conflate thequestionofwhether adis-agreement is genuine with the question of how the information onwhich a disagreement centers happens to be communicated. AnyprinciplelikeDRCCwillentailthatforadisputetoexpressagenuinedisagreement,theremustbesomestablesubjectmatteroverwhichthepartiesdisagree.Butintuitively,questionsaboutwhetherthereisastablesubjectmatterhavenothing to dowiththelinguisticquestionofwhethercompetingclaimsabout thatsubjecthappentobecom-municated semantically or pragmatically. This intuition is preciselycorrect,and(2)offersaclearcaseofhowthetwoissuescomeapart.Thus, fromthe fact thatagivendisputereflectsagenuinedisagree-ment,wecanalreadyseethatcautionisrequiredbeforeanyspecifi-callysemanticconclusionscanbedrawn.

38. Italsoclearlydemonstratesthefalsityofaprinciplethatissometimesusedtosupportthisinference:thatiftwospeakersgenuinelydisagreewitheachother,thenatleastoneofthemsayssomethingfalse.Disputessuchasthatin(2)clearlydemonstratethatthistypeofprincipleismuchtoostrong.

Inhis(2002),Barkerdoesnotconsidercaseswherespeakersdis-agreeabouttheinformationcommunicatedbythistypeofusage.41Butitiseasytoseehowhisexamplecouldbeextendedinthatway.Afterall,anotherpartytotheconversationmightsimplyobjectandsay“no,Feynmanisnottall”.Justastheoriginalutteranceconveyedinforma-tionnotaboutFeynman’sheightbutrathertheappropriateusageof‘tall’,sotoowouldtheensuingdisputebeamatternotoffactualdis-agreementoverFeynman’sheight,but ratheropposingviewsaboutthecontextuallyappropriateusageof‘tall’.Barkeruses‘metalinguistic’torefertothetypeofsharpeninguseatplayhere.Accordingly,wecallthecorrespondingdisputesoverthecorrectnessorappropriatenessofthosetypesofusagesmetalinguistic disputes.

Within this categoryofmetalinguisticdisputes, there isa furtherdistinctiontobedrawn.Insomemetalinguisticusesofanexpression,it is quite natural to think that there are antecedently settled factsaboutthelinguisticallyrelevantfeaturesoftheconversationalcontext,factswhich are at least partially independent of the intentions—orat leasttheverylocalintentions—ofthepartiestotheconversation.ThedisputeovertheappropriatenessofcallingFeynman‘tall’isplau-siblyofthissort.Insuchcases,itisnaturaltothinkofthespeakersasexchanging information that is insome(perhapsquite loose)sense,objective—informationaboutwhatthecontextisactuallylike.Ifadis-agreement should arise over that information, as it does in our ex-tensionofBarker’scase,thenthedisagreementisafactualoneaboutwhichoftwoormorecompetingcharacterizationsofthesharedcon-versationalcontextismostaccurate.However,notallcasesofmetalin-guisticusagefitthisprofile.

SupposethatOscarandCalliearecookingtogether. Infact, theyarecookingfoodforthepartywhereBarker’sdialoguetakesplace.Os-car andCallie have each just tasted the chili, andOscar utters (4a)whileCallieutters(4b).

41. Thoughsee(Barker2013).(Sundell2011a)extendsBarker’scasetoincludedisagreementsinvolvingmetalinguisticusages.

(2002),whocallsitasharpeningormetalinguisticusageofaterm.Con-siderthefollowingcase,describedbyBarker:

Normally,[3]willbeusedinordertoaddtothecommongroundnewinformationconcerningFeynman’sheight:

[3]Feynmanistall.

But[3]hasanothermodeofuse.Imaginethatweareataparty.PerhapsFeynmanstandsbeforeusashortdistanceaway,drinkingpunchandthinkingaboutdancing;inanycase,theexactdegreetowhichFeynmanistalliscommonknowledge.Youaskmewhatcountsastallinmycountry.“Well,”Isay,“aroundhere,...”andIcontinuebyuttering[3].Thisisnotadescriptiveuseintheusualsense.Ihavenot provided anynew information about theworld, orat leastnonewinformationaboutFeynman’sheight. Infact,assumingthattallmeansroughly‘havingamaximaldegreeofheightgreaterthanacertaincontextuallysup-pliedstandard’,Ihaven’tevenprovidedyouwithanynewinformationabout the truth conditionsof theword tall.All Ihavedone isgivenyouguidanceconcerningwhattheprevailing relevant standard for tallnesshappens tobeinourcommunity;inparticular,thatstandardmustbenogreaterthanFeynman’smaximaldegreeofheight.40

Whywouldyoubotheraskingabout“merelylinguistic”factslikehowtousetheword‘tall’?Becausehowweusewordsmatters.Knowinghowpeopleinyournewsurroundingsusetheword‘tall’willallowyou to communicatemore smoothly with them of course. But be-yondthat,knowinghowtheyusetheword‘tall’revealspotentiallyimportantinformationabouttherangeofheightsyoucanexpecttoseelocally.

40. (Barker2002,1–2).

thosetruepropositionsbyvirtueofthefactthattheysettherelevantcontextualparametersindifferentways.42

Whyaresuchexchangesperceivedasdisputes,whenthespeakersfailtoassertinconsistentpropositions?Becauseinadditiontoassert-ing those propositions—in factvia their assertion of those proposi-tions—they also pragmatically advocate for the parameter settingsby virtue of which those propositions are asserted. The claim thatone“spiciness”thresholdispreferabletosomecompeting“spiciness”threshold is verymuch the kind of thing overwhich two speakerscandisagree.Toseethat,wecanjust imaginethemhavingacanoni-cal disputeabout theverysametopic.Theviewweareproposing isthatOscaracceptsthecontentthatwe should use ‘spicy’ in such a way that it applies to the chiliandCallieacceptsthecontentthatwe should not use ‘spicy’ in such a way that it applies to the chili.Thosecontentsarerationallyincompatible;thisfactwouldbeobviousifthetwoofthemwereengagedinacanonicaldisputewhereOscarsaid“weshoulduse

42. Metalinguistic uses themselves—for example, theuseof ‘tall’ inBarker’soriginal case—may be analyzed as pragmatic or as a special kind of se-manticusage,dependingonthedetailsofone’saccountofthemechanisminvolved.Forexample,thechangesbroughtaboutinthelistener’sbeliefsabout theextensionof ‘tall’mightbe thoughtofas resulting fromakindofLewisianaccommodation, inwhichcasemetalinguisticusageisakindofpragmaticmechanism.By contrast, onemight focuson the fact that iftheliteralcontentofthespeaker’sassertionisacceptedbythelistener,thisstraightforwardlyeliminatesfromthecontextsetworldswherecertain(lin-guistic)factsobtain—worlds,forexample,wheretheword‘tall’,relativetothecontext,failstoapplytoFeynman.Suchananalysismightsuggestthatmetalinguisticusageisasemanticmodeofcommunication,ifanunusualsort.Or, itmightbeanalyzed, as it is inBarker’swork,within the frame-work of dynamic semantics, inwhich the distinction between semanticsandpragmaticsisblurryandyetmorecomplex.Noneofthiswillaffectourargumenthere,sinceinanycase,themodeofcommunicationisnotseman-tic in any sense thatwould require that speakerswhodisagreewithoneanotherassertanddenyinconsistentcontents.Moreover,asweemphasizebelow,ourfocusisspecificallyonmetalinguisticnegotiations,inwhichwaysofusing linguisticexpressionsarenot justdescribedbutadvocated.Thatadvocacyisunlikelytobepartoftheliteralcontentoftheexpressionsonanyof theseanalyses, and thusour thesis that agooddealof theactionishappeningpragmaticallyholds,whateverone’sspecificviewsaboutthemechanismunderlyingmetalinguisticusageitself.

(4) (a)Thatchiliisspicy!

(b)No,it’snotspicyatall.

In this case, it ismuch lessnatural to think that there is someante-cedently settled, objective fact of thematter about the contextuallysalient threshold for “spiciness”. Rather than advancing competingfactual claims about some independently determined threshold, itseemsmostnaturaltothinkofOscarandCallieasnegotiatingwhatthatthresholdshallbe.

WhywouldOscarandCallieconsideritworththeirtimetoen-gageinsuchadisagreement,whentheyalreadyagreeonwhatthechiliactuallytasteslike?Whyengageinadisputeoverhowtouseaword?Theansweristhesameasbefore:itisworthengaginginsuchadisputebecausehowweusewordsmatters.ForOscarandCallie,asformanyofus,anagreementamongstallthecooksinthekitchenthatthechilicanbedescribedas“spicy”playsanimportantrole incollectivedecision-making. Inparticular, itplaysan impor-tantroleindecision-makingaboutwhethertoaddmorespice.Thismay have nothing at all to dowithwhat is analytic about ‘spicy’.Rather,itderivesfromsociologicalfactsabouthowpeopleinkitch-ensactwhentheircreationsearnthatlabel.WhyshouldCalliehavetorefrainfromfurtherseasoningwhenthechilicannotevenbede-scribedas“spicy”?

Weusethetermmetalinguistic negotiationtorefertothissecondtypeofmetalinguisticdispute—thosedisputeswhereinthespeakers’met-alinguisticuseofatermdoesnotsimplyinvolveexchangingfactualinformationaboutlanguage,butrathernegotiatingitsappropriateuse.Wethinkthatmetalinguisticdisputesofthislattertypearecommon.Indeedwethinksuchusagesextendwellbeyondthekitchen,todis-agreementsaboutwhatshouldcountas “tall”duringourbasketballdraft,or“cold”inoursharedoffice,or“rich”forourtaxbase.Inanysuch case, speakers each assert true propositions, but they express

Unlikethecasesofmetalinguisticsharpeninginvolvinggradablead-jectives, there is little reason to think that the relevant linguisticex-pressionhere—‘athlete’—issemanticallycontext-sensitive.44Butasinthosecases,thereisalsolittlereasontothinkthatthedisputein(5)concernsstraightforwardfactualmattersaboutthetopicathand.Thespeakersof(5a)and(5b)mutuallyknowallofthefactsaboutSecretar-iat’sspeed,strength,etc.,andwhatraces,awards,metalshewon,etc.,justasOscarandCalliemutuallyknowthefactsaboutthechemicalhotnessofthechili.Thequestiononthetable,then,isthis:supposewewanttopreservetheintuitionthatthereisagenuinedisagreementthatisexpressedintheexchangethatLudlowoverheard.Howthenshouldweunderstandwhatisgoingon?

Regardlessofone’spreciseviewsinsemantics,itshouldbeuncon-troversial that at leastone crucial typeofdata forfiguringoutwhata speakermeansbya termTare factsabout the speaker’susageofT—patterns of usage that reflect her disposition to apply that termoneway or another,more generally.Many philosophers, of course,claimthatthereareotherfactorsthatmattertoo,andwecomebacktothiswhenwediscussexternalistobjectionstoourargumentin§6. Fornow,though,weemphasizesimplythat—uncontroversially—onecrucialpieceofthepuzzleinfiguringoutthemeaningsoftermsarefactsaboutspeakers’patternsofusageforthatterm.

Supposethenthatonespeaker,thespeakerof(5a),systematicallyappliestheterm‘athlete’insuchawayastoincludenon-humanani-mals.Theotherspeaker,thespeakerof(5b),systematicallyappliestheterm ‘athlete’ in suchawayas tonever includenon-humananimals.Thisholdstrueevenwhenalloftherelevantfactualinformationisonhand,including,asnoted,thefactsaboutSecretariat’sspeed,strength,etc.This,attheveryleast,providesprima facie reasonforthinkingthatthespeakersmeandifferentthingsbytheword‘athlete’.Thus,itisnot

44. Inthiswesetasidetheories,suchasLudlow’sdynamic lexicon,onwhichallornearlyallwordsareinsomesensecontext-sensitive.Infactwearesympa-thetictoLudlow’sview,butweaimheretoshowthatmetalinguisticanalysesareconsistentevenwithlessradicalviews.

‘spicy’insuchawaythatitappliestothechili”andCallierespondedbysaying“no,weshouldnotuse‘spicy’insuchawaythatitappliestothechili”.

The contents accepted by Oscar and Callie do not suddenlybecome rationally compatible when they express those contentspragmaticallyrathersemantically.Thus,bythelightsofDRCC,thedisagreements that are reflected inmetalinguistic negotiations areentirelygenuine.Moreover,giventherightcontext—forexample,acontextwherewemustcoordinateourchiliseasoning,orourther-mostat adjusting, or our basketball picks, or our progressive taxa-tionbrackets—suchdisagreementscanbeverymuchworthhaving,apointtowhichwereturnin§4. Andtoemphasizeourearlierpoint,thequestionofwhethersuchdisagreementsareworthhavingisen-tirelyindependentofwhetherthecompetingclaimsareadvancedviasemanticorpragmaticmechanisms.

Inthecasesofmetalinguisticnegotiationwehaveconsideredsofar,thenegotiationshaveconcernedhowtofixparametersettingsforbitsofcontext-sensitiveterminology.Inotherwords,theyhaveconcerned“meaning”inthesenseofcontent,butnotofcharacter. Thecontextualistgrants,afterall,thatatermlike‘tall’ doesnotvaryinitscharacter,butonly in itscontent.Butmetalinguisticnegotiationisnotconfinedtogradableadjectivesorothercontext-sensitiveexpressions.Itcanevenconcernwordsthatareseeminglyquitefixedintheirmeaning.

Inordertoillustratethispoint,weturntoacasefromPeterLudlow.In“CheapContextualism”,Ludlowdescribesaheateddebateheheardonsportsradio.43Thedebateconcernedalistofthegreatestathletesofthe20thcentury,andthequestionofwhetherthatlistshouldincludetheracehorseSecretariat.Simplifyingabit,wecanimaginethefollow-ingexchangeaspartofthatdebate:

(5) (a)Secretariatisanathlete.

(b)No,Secretariatisnotanathlete.

43. (Ludlow2008).

oftheirchili,metalinguisticnegotiationsinfluenceandadvancemoregeneralprocessesofcollectivedecision-makingandaction.

Beforemovingon,wewanttoemphasizeanimportantpointaboutwhatisandisnotinvolvedinseeingagivendisputeasametalinguis-ticnegotiation.SupposethatourproposedanalysisoftheSecretariatcaseisright.Itislikelythatthereasonwhythetwospeakersbothertogo in for thisargument in conceptualethics (anargumentabouthowtouse the term ‘athlete’) isbecause theyultimatelyhavediffer-entnormativeviewsabouthowto liveandwhat todo. In thiscase,perhapsthespeakershavedifferentnormativeviewsaboutwhatsortsofcreaturesaredeservingofwhichsortsofrecognitionandrewards.Onemightthereforebetemptedtoask:isthisnormativeissue(ratherthanthe“merelylinguistic”issueabouthowtousetheword‘athlete’)notreallywhattheirdisagreementisabout?

To answer this question,we need to distinguish two things: (a)thebackgroundnormativeviewsheldbythespeakersthatmotivatethemtogo in foradisputevs. (b) theconflictingmentalstates thatareactuallybeingexpressedbythespeakers.Ontheassumptionthatagivenexchangeisametalinguisticnegotiation,theimmediatetopicofdisagreementinthatexchangeisoneinconceptualethics.Butitisperfectlyconsistenttothinkboth(a)thatsuch-and-suchdisputeisoneaboutconceptualethicsand(b)thatacrucialreasonwhythespeakersengageinthisdisputeisbecauseofnormativeviewstheyhaveaboutsometopicother thanconceptualethics.

SupposethatMarthaandGeorgearecarshoppingandget inanargumentaboutwhetherSubarusaregoodcars.Itisentirelynaturaltoaffirmbothofthetwofollowingtheses:(1)MarthaandGeorgearehavinganargumentaboutwhetherornotSubarusaregoodcars—theimmediatetopicoftheirdispute—and(2)thereasonwhyMarthaandGeorgearehavingthisargument isbecausetheyneedtofigureoutwhatcartheyshouldbuytogether—thebackgroundissuethatmoti-vatesthemtohavetheargumentaboutthemeritsofSubarus.Thedis-putebetweenMarthaandGeorgeisaboutwhetherSubarusaregoodcars,buttheyenterintothatdisputebecausetheydifferonwhatcarto

unnaturaltoconclude—asLudlowdoes—thatthespeakersdoindeedmeandifferentthings,andthatthedisputein(5)reflectsadisagree-mentaboutwhichoftwocompetingconcepts,C1orC2, ismoreap-propriatetotheconversation.Whatisatissueishowtheterm‘athlete’shouldbeusedinthiscontext.Inotherwords,thedisputeisaboutthecharacter oftheexpression‘athlete’.45

On this understanding of the dispute, each speaker literally ex-pressesatruepropositiongiventheconcepttheyinfactexpresswiththeirterm.Butbeyondthat, thespeakerspragmaticallyadvocatefortheconceptthattheyareusingandinvirtueofwhichtheyassertthosepropositions.Thus,theirmetalinguisticdisputereflectsagenuinedis-agreement about how to use theword ‘athlete’. In particular, it is adebateinconceptualethicsaboutwhichamongarangeofcompetingconcepts,andinparticular,whichofC1orC2,ismostappropriatetotheconversationandshouldbeexpressedbytheterm‘athlete’.

Ludlow’sSecretariatcaseisparticularlyvivid,butthereislittlerea-sontothinkthatthistypeofnegotiationisatalluncommon.Manyofusare familiarwithdisputesaboutwhetherMissouri is in the “mid-west”,orwhetherPlutoisa“planet”,orwhethertheAmericanfederalanti-drugeffortconstitutesa“war”.Ineachcase,therelevantfacts—thelocationofMissouri,thesizeandorbitofPluto,thecontentsoftherel-evantanti-drugpolicies—aremutuallyknownamongparties to thedispute.Andyetitseemsthatthedisputesare,oratleasthavethepo-tentialtobe,genuinedisagreementsinanyplausiblesenseoftheterm‘genuinedisagreement’.Itmaynotmatterverymuchwhichstateswechoosetoincludeinthemidwest.Butitcanmatteragreatdealwheth-erapolicyismeanttoaddressasocialilloradvanceourcauseinawar.AsinthecaseofOscarandCallie’sdebateaboutthe“spiciness”

45. Ofcourse,furtherfactors—externalenvironment,speechcommunity,orthelike—mightintervenetooverridetheprima facie evidenceforthisconclusion.But,asweemphasizeinourreplytoexternalistobjectionsin§6,anargumentforanexternalistalternativetoouranalysisoftheSecretariatcasemust(a)bestrongenoughtooverridetheprimary,countervailingevidenceofusage,and(b)notfallbackontheneedtoexplainthepossibilityofdisagreement.

betweengenuinedisagreementandsamenessofmeaningisbroken.Fromthesinglepremisethatsomelinguisticexchangereflectsagenu-inedisagreementbetweenthespeakersinvolved,nothing followswithrespecttothesemanticsoftheexpressionsemployedintheexchange.

If a theorist hopes to show that a particular dispute really doeslicense theconclusion that speakersmean the same thingsby theirwords,shemustprovideindependentsupportforthethesisthatthedisputenotonlyreflectsagenuinedisagreement,butalsothatithap-penstobecanonical.Butofcourse,indemonstratingthatthedisputeiscanonical,shewillhavedone,byothermeans,mostoftheworknec-essarytoshowthatthespeakersmeanthesamethingsbytheirwords.Thedisagreement-based argument itself is thus eitherunsound,un-supported,orunnecessary.

Thequestionweturn to in thissection is this:howplausible isit thatat leastsomenormativeandevaluativedisputesof thekindthat interest philosophers aremetalinguistic?One of the disputesthatwe have already canvassed—namely the one about Secretari-at—involvesaterm, ‘athlete’,thatisplausiblyunderstoodaseithernormativeorevaluative.Callingsomeonean ‘athlete’,at least inthecontextwewereconcernedwith, isplausibly insomewaytopraiseherorhim.‘Athlete’isthus(arguably)anexampleofaso-calledthick normative(orevaluative)term:roughly,atermwhosemeaningsetsapplication-conditionsthat involvebothdescriptivecriteriaandnor-mativeorevaluativecriteria.46

Giventhisunderstandingof‘athlete’asathicknormativeterm,wehavealreadyseenanexampleoftherelevanttype.Nonetheless,onemightworry that this isnotananalysis that canextend tomanyofthenormativeandevaluativedisputesthathaveinterestedmetanor-mativetheorists.This,however,wouldbeamistake.Absent furtherargument about what is special about some specific normative or

46. For a helpful recent discussion of thick normative terms, some of whichis in the same spirit asourdiscussion, see (Väyrynen2013).Note that,onVäyrynen’sview,onlydescriptiveapplication-conditionsarebuiltintothese-manticsofthicknormativeterms.

buy.Similarly,onecanholdthefollowing:thedisputebetweenLud-low’sspeakers isaboutwhichconcept isbestpickedoutby ‘athlete’,buttheyenterintothatdisputebecausetheydifferonwhetherhorsesareaptlyaffordedcertainkindsofpraise (orbecauseof someothernormativeissuethattheydisagreeabout).InthecaseofMarthaandGeorge,wewouldn’tberequiredtobuildintothecontentthattheyex-press(pragmaticallyorsemantically)thebackgroundconditionsthatexplainwhytheyarehavingthislinguisticexchange.ItwouldbejustasmistakentodosointhecaseofmetalinguisticnegotiationssuchastheSecretariatcase.

§4. Normative and Evaluative Disputes.

In the lastsection(§3),wedescribedseveralcasesofmetalinguisticdisputesthatexpressgenuinedisagreements.Thesedisputeshavethefollowingfeatures:

1. They are non-canonical: the speakers involved literally ex-pressmutuallyconsistentcontents.

2.Theyarenon-canonicalinvirtueofvariationinmeaning:thespeakersexpressmutuallyconsistentcontentsbecause theydo notmean (in the relevant sense) the same things bytheirwords.

3.Theyneverthelessserveasexpressionsofgenuinedisagree-ment:thespeakersinvolveddo accept(andcommunicate)incompatiblecontents,andthussatisfyDRCC.

Metalinguisticdisputesdemonstratenotonlythatspeakerswhogenu-inelydisagreewitheachotherneednotliterallyexpressincompatiblecontents,butthattheyneednotevenmeanthesamethingsbytheirwords. They might employ context-sensitive terms with the samecharacter butwith different contents, aswith ‘spicy’.Or theymightemployordinaryexpressionswithentirelydistinctcharacters,aswith‘athlete’. (Of course, in the typical case,when the characters aredis-tinct,thecontentswillbedistinctaswell.)Eitherway,theconnection

indefining tortureasanysuchact inflictingpain rising to the levelofdeath,organfailure,orthepermanentimpairmentofasignificantbodyfunction.50

Evenifwesupposethatthespeakersmeandifferentthingsbytheword‘torture’,itisclearthatwehavenotexhaustedthenormativeandevaluativeworktobedonehere.Afterall,inthecontextofdiscussionsaboutthemoralorlegalissuessurroundingthetreatmentofprisoners,thereisasubstantivequestionaboutwhichdefinitionisbetter.Byem-ployingtheword‘torture’inawaythatexcludeswaterboarding,thespeakerof(6b)communicates(thoughnotvialiteralexpression)theviewthatsuchausageisappropriatetothosemoralor legaldiscus-sions. Inotherwords,shecommunicates thepropositionthatwater-boardingitselfis,intherelevantsense,unproblematic—apropositionthatis,wesubmit,wellwortharguingabout.

Now consider againHorgan and Timmons’s case ofMoral TwinEarth.Torecall,inHorganandTimmons’sthoughtexperiment,thereare twoplanets that are distant fromeach other—Earth andMoralTwinEarth.TheseplanetsareexactlythesameexceptforthefactthatpeopleonEarthapplymoraltermsinawaythatiscausallyregulatedby natural property N1 whereas people on Twin Earth apply thosetermsinawaythatiscausallyregulatedbyadifferentnaturalpropertyN2.51HorganandTimmonsthinkthatinordertoexplainthepossibil-ityofgenuinedisagreementbetweenEarthlingsandTwinEarthlings,oneneedstounderstandthemasmeaningandreferringtothesame

50.See(U.S.DepartmentofJustice2002,340A).

51. WearepresentingtheMoralTwinEarthcaseinthemainwaythatHorganandTimmonsdiscussit:namely,asacaseabouttwodifferentplanetsthataredistantfromeachother.ThispresentationparallelsPutnam’soriginalversionofhistwinearthcaseabouttheuseoftheterm‘water’.Thereare,however,alsoversionsofbothHorganandTimmon’scaseandPutnam’scasethatonecanrunthat involveplanets located indifferentpossibleworlds.Ourargu-mentshere,suitablymodified,carryovertosuchcases.(Weaddressworriesaboutcross-contextdisagreementinthissection;thosepointsapplyacrossplanets,oracrossworlds.)WethereforestickwiththemainHorganandTim-monscase(i. e.,theoneaboutdifferentplanetsinthesamepossibleworld)inwhatfollows.

evaluativedispute,weseenoreasonwhythemetalinguisticanalysisshouldn’tbeaviableoptioninawidevarietyofcases.TheSecretariatcaseprovidesaplausiblemodel foraccounting fora rangeofothernormativeorevaluativedisputesthathaveinterestedmetanormativetheorists.Onsuchananalysis,thosenormativeorevaluativedisputeswouldsharetwofeatureswiththeSecretariatcase:(a)theywouldbetakento involvemetalinguisticusage(adistinctive linguisticmecha-nism)and(b)theywouldbeanalyzedascenteringonaquestionofconceptualethics(adistinctivenormativetopic).

Inthissection,wediscusstwodifferentcasestodemonstratetheplausibilityofthistypeofanalysis.Westartwithacaseinvolvingtheuseoftheterm‘torture’,which,like‘athlete’,isplausiblyreadasathicknormativeterm.Wethendiscussoneofthecasesthatweintroducedatthestartofthispaper,thecaseofMoralTwinEarth.47

Let’sstartwiththecaseof‘torture’.Supposethat,inthecontextofapolicydebate,twospeakersdisagreeaboutthestatusofwaterboard-ingandutter,inturn,(6a)and(6b).

(6) (a)Waterboardingistorture.

(b)Waterboardingisnottorture.48

Letussupposefurtherthatthespeakerof(6a)followstheUnitedNa-tions indefining tortureasanyact inflictingseveresuffering,physi-cal or mental, in order to obtain information or to punish49, whilethe speakerof (6b) follows formerU.S. JusticeDepartmentpractice

47. In§6, welookatakindofnormativeorevaluativedisputethat,forreasonsdiscussedthere,appearsperhapsmostresistanttothemetalinguisticanalysis.Thesewillbecasesofdisputesinvolvingbasicnormativeorevaluativeterms,i. e., those termswhosemeaning—suchas ‘right’, ‘warrant’,or ‘good’—canperhapsbeusedtoexplainthemeaningsofothernormativeandevaluativeterms.We argue that, absent considerable further argument, the disagree-ment-basedargumentisunwarrantedeveninthosecases.

48. Theexampleof torture ismentioned in (Chalmers2011) anddiscussed insomedetailin(Sundell2011a).Bothmakepointssimilartotheonewemakehere.

49. See(UnitedNations1984,85).

concepttouseinfiguringouthowtoliveandinguidingone’splansaboutwhattodo.

Morespecifically,ithassomethingtodowithwhichconceptshouldplayafunctionalrolethatconcernsmattersofhowwenavigateourdecisionsabouthowtotreatothers,whattoholdeachotherresponsi-blefordoing,andhowtolivemoregenerally.Thedisagreementmighttakeplaceformuchthesamereasonpeoplecareaboutwhichconceptis expressed by ‘torture’: given a certain social-historical setting—asettinginwhichcertainwords(largelyindependentofwhichspecificconcept they express) fill specific and important functional roles inour practices—participants might care a great deal (and genuinelysubstantiveresultscouldhangon)whichconcept/wordpairingsweemployinagivencontext.ThedebatebetweenBobtheEarthlingandChris the Twin Earthlingwould ultimately turn on substantive nor-mativematters,namely,thesubstantivenormativeissueof(roughly)whichisthebetterconcepttoemployinfiguringoutwhattodo.53Nev-ertheless, itwouldnot turnon thesubstantivenormative issue thatHorganandTimmons(andperhapsBobandChris)seemtothinkisatissue,namely,whatismorallyright,inaccordancewithameaningof‘morallyright’sharedbetweenthespeakers.54

53. Thestorywesuggesthereresonateswithstoriesofferedin(Copp2000)and(Merli2002).Thus,asweemphasizeintheintroductionofthispaper,onewayof seeingwhatwearedoinghere is to showwhy thisgeneral sortofresponsetotheMoralTwinEarthcaseisn’taone-offresponsetoaspecificar-gument,butratherflowsnaturallyfromageneralpictureofcommunication.

54.WewouldnotbeworriedifBobandChristhemselveshadintuitionsabouttheirdisputethatrancountertoouranalysis;ordinaryspeakershaveallkindofmistakenintuitionsaboutlanguage.Infact,wethinkitisamistaketothinkthatordinaryspeakersinfacthaveintuitionsone way or the otherondistinc-tions as subtle as this.Recall that on either analysis, thedispute betweenBob andChris ultimately turns on substantive normative questions aboutwhattodo.Whetherthatdisagreementisreflectedviainconsistentcontentsexpressedwithsharedconcepts,orviacompetingconceptsvyingtoplayasinglefunctionalrole,ismorethananyordinaryspeakershouldbeexpectedtohaveintuitionsabout.Moreover,eveniftheydidhavesuchintuitions,andeven if our analysis contradicted these intuitions,wewould not take thistobedevastatingtoourproposedanalysis.First, folk intuitionsabouthowthoughtandtalkworkscanoftenbemistaken.Second,asweexplainlaterin

thingsbytheirmoralterms.52Butthismoveistooquick:atleastsomeof thedisputes involvingmoral termsbetweenEarthlingsandTwinEarthlingsmaybemetalinguistic.

Supposethatby‘morallyright’Earthlingsmeantsomethingakinto“maximizingoverallaggregateutility”.Thatis:supposethatsomeformofanalyticutilitarianismistrueoftheterm‘morallyright’asusedbyEarthlings.Incontrast,supposethatsomeformofanalyticKantianismis trueof the term ‘morally right’ forTwinEarthlings, such that, forTwinEarthlings,what their term ‘morally right’means is somethingakinto“beinginaccordwiththeCategoricalImperative”.Nowimag-inethatsomepeoplefromEarthandMoralTwinEarthendupmeeting.Aspartofthismeeting,imaginethatthereisthefollowingexchangebetweenBobtheEarthlingandChristheTwinEarthling:

(7) (a)Lyingwiththeaimofpromotinghumanhappinessissometimesmorallyright.Infactitoftenis!

(b)No, youarewrong. It isnevermorally right to lie inordertopromotehumanhappiness.

CanweviewtheexchangebetweenBobtheEarthlingandChristheTwinEarthlingasagenuinedisagreementevenifweholdfixedourassumptionthatanalyticutilitarianismis trueofBob’s term‘morallyright’andanalyticKantianismistrueofChris’s term‘morallyright’?Recallourdiscussionof theSecretariatcase. Justas inthatcase,wemightseeBobtheEarthlingandChristheTwinEarthlingasengagedina(perhapstacit)disagreementaboutwhichconceptistherightonetouseinthiscontext.Inthiscontext,theissueisarguablyaboutwhat

52. Asourfocusonmoral termshereindicates,itisimportanttoemphasizethatweareheretakingHorganandTimmonstobetalkingaboutmoral twinearth,and not all-things-considered normative twin earth. Many of the issues thatHorganandTimmonsarediscussingbecomemorecomplicatedwhenoneistalkingaboutall-things-considered normativetwinearth.Thereasonswhywillbecomeclearin§6.2,whenwediscussthedifficultiesofapplyingourstyleofmetalinguisticanalysistoexplanatorilybasicnormativeorevaluativeterms(suchas,arguably‘good’and‘right’),asopposedtonon-basiconessuchas‘athlete’or‘morally good’.

exchange—before they are even aware of one another’s existence,muchlessoneanother’slanguage—BobandChrishaveviewsaboutwhichconceptshouldplaythisimportantfunctionalroleinthoughtandpractice.Theywouldhavethoseviewsentirelyindependentlyofanyawarenessoftheotherperson,oroftheexistenceofanotherlan-guage.Bob’sviewisthattheanalyticallyutilitarianconceptC1shouldplaythisfunctionalroleinorganizingourlivesandChris’sviewisthattheanalyticallyKantianconceptC2shouldplaythatrole.Theseviewsareincompatible,irrespectiveofwhetherBobandChrisengageinaconversationwheretheyexpresstheseviews.Thus,bythe lightsofDRCC,theydisagree,irrespectiveofwhethertheyengageinconver-sation.Inturn,iftheydostarttalkingtoeachotheritisentirelysen-siblethattheyhaveadisagreementnotjustaboutwhichconcepttodeploy, butwhich concept todeployusing the expression ‘morallyright’.Thus,thenormativeissuebecomesnotonlywhichconcepttouse,butalsowhichconceptwillbepairedwiththisparticularword‘morallyright’.Thatlinguisticexchange,onceithappens,canproceedviametalinguisticnegotiation.

Ourgoalhereisnottoadvocate,onceandforall,forthisparticu-laranalysisinthisparticulardomain.Theimportantpointisthatananalysisof thedisagreementbetweenBobandChrisas concerningconceptualethicsbeforetheymeet,andconcerningconceptualethicsandexpressedvia metalinguisticnegotiationoncetheydo—ismorethansufficientlyplausibletoundercutquickinferencetothebestex-planationarguments fromintuitionsabout theirdisagreement tose-manticconclusionsaboutwhatEarthlingsandMoralTwinEarthlingsmeanbytherelevantmoralterms.Itmaynotbeabletoundercutthemall-things-considered,butitiscertainlyenoughtoblockthequickwayinwhich these inference tobestexplanationarguments in thiscaseareoftendeployed.

WehavejustsuggestedthatthedisputebetweenBobtheEarthlingandChristheTwinEarthlingcanplausiblybereadasametalinguis-ticoneaboutwhichconceptdeploymentandarticulationpatternstoadopt.(fn56here).Awiderangeofsemantictheoriesof‘morallyright’

Butoneratherseriousworryremains.55Mostofushavethe intu-itionthat,evenifBobtheEarthlingandChristheTwinEarthlingnevertalkedwitheachother—even if theydidn’t know theotherexisted,muchlesshowtheyusedtheirwords—therewouldstillbeadisagree-mentbetweenthem.Sohowcouldourproposedanalysishaveahopeof being correct?More generally, how can ametalinguistic accountof this typeofdispute explainany caseofdisagreement across con-texts—disagreementinwhichthereisnosharedcontexttobearguingabout,ornosharedlanguagetobenegotiating?

In addressing thisworry, recall, first, thatmetalinguistic negotia-tions are distinguished from canonical disputes in twoways. Thereis the distinctive linguisticmechanism—metalinguistic usage—anda distinctive normative topic—a topic within what we have called“conceptual ethics”.On our proposal, Bob andChris’s disagreementconcernswhichconcepttoexpresswiththeterm‘morallyright’.Ourproposalisthattheyeachadvocateaviewaboutwhichconceptisbestsuitedtoplayacertainfunctionalroleinthoughtandpractice,arolethatincludesmattersofhowtotreatothers,whattoholdeachotherresponsiblefordoing,andhowtolivemoregenerally.OnereasonthatBobandChriswanttheirpreferredconcepttobetheoneexpressedbytheterm‘morallyright’isbecausetheyeachbelieve(correctly)thatwhateveriscalled‘morallyright’willlikelyplaythisrole,andthatpeo-plewho think that ‘morally right’ shouldmean somethingdifferenthaveadifferentviewaboutwhatconceptshouldplaythisfunctionalrole.Asinthecaseof‘athlete’,thismayhavenothingtodowithwhatisanalyticabouttheterm.Itmightsimplyhavetodowithsocial,histori-cal,andpsychologicalfactsaboutwhatisstandardlyassociatedwiththeuseofthatterm.

Given this sort of disagreement in conceptual ethics, it is en-tirely sensible to suppose that before they engage in any linguistic

thispaper,thereisgoodreasontosuspectthatpeoplewilloftenresistview-ingoneoftheirdisputesasametalinguisticone,evenwhenitinfactis.See(PlunkettandSundellForthcoming-a)formoredetaileddiscussion.

55. ThankstoMikeRidgeforemphasizingthisworry.

mostimportantissueonthisfront:namely,thequestionofwhetherornotmetalinguisticnegotiationscanreflectdisagreements worth having.

In thinkingaboutourchoices inhow touseour terms, it is cru-cialtounderstandthatthatmattersofwordusagearenotlimitedtomeredefinitionorstipulation,butcanthemselvesbeanswerabletosubstantiveadjudication. Indeed, insomecasesquestionsofwordsandusage can be answerable even to purely objective, descriptiveconsiderationsinthenaturalsciences.Toseethis,supposethat,inthecontextofabiologyclassroom,twospeakersdisagreeaboutthestatusoftomatoesandutter,inturn,(8a)and(8b).

(8) (a)Tomatoisafruit.

(b)No,tomatoisnotafruit.

Letussupposefurthersupposethatthespeakerof(8a)isaplantbi-ologist,andthespeakerof(8b)isachef.Justasinthe‘torture’case,even ifwe suppose that the speakersmeandifferent thingsby therelevantexpression,itisclearthatwehavenotexhaustedtheevalu-ativework to be done.While the chef’s definition of ‘fruit’ has ad-vantages relative to our culinary practices and gustatory tradition,the biologist’s definition—one according to which tomatoes reallyarefruit—isbettersuitedtothebiologyclassroom.Itisbettersuitedtothisscientificcontextnotasamatterofconventionorstipulation,butobjectivelybetter:theobjectsintheextensionofthebiologist’sterm go together more metaphysically naturally than the objectsin the extension of the chef’s definition.57 And it is precisely those

57. Fordiscussionadvocating the idea thatsomeconceptsarebettersuited todescribetheworldgivenitsobjectivenature,see(Sider2012).The‘tomato’caseandanumberofrelatedexamplesarediscussedinmoredetailin(Sun-dell2011a).Itshouldbenotedthat,althoughwehaveputourargumenthereintermsofatypeofmetaphysicalrealism,ourpointhereisageneralone.Ifonestartsoutasametaphysicalanti-realist,nothingaboutthemetalinguisticanalysisof thisdisputewould forceone tosee itasadjudicablewithrefer-encetometaphysicallyrealnaturalkinds.Theimportant(andmoresurpris-ing)pointisthatthemetalinguisticanalysisisentirelyconsistentwithafullyrobustmetaphysicalrealismaboutnaturalkinds.Moreover,itisentirelycon-sistentwith thinking that therearemetaphysically fundamentalnormative

canmakeuseofthiskindofmetalinguisticanalysisofthiskindofdis-pute.However, the availabilityof this kindof analysiswill bemosthelpfultothoseviewsthatareoftenaccusedpreciselyofbeingunabletoexplainthepossibilityofgenuinedisagreement.Theseincludecon-textualistviewsonwhichnormativeorevaluativeclaimshaveade-terminatemeaningonlyrelativetosomejudgeorgroup—forexam-pleviewswheretheterm‘morallyright’meanssomethinglike“beingapprovedofbyme”or“beingapprovedofbymycommunity”56.Theyalsoincludeviewsthattakeasubstantiveviewfromwithinmoralthe-orytobebuiltintothemeaningofatermsuchas‘morallyright’—forexampleanalyticutilitarianism,whichtakesthemeaningof‘morallyright’tobesomethinglike“maximizesexpectedutility”.Suchviewshavethepromiseofexplainingdisagreementsbydrawingonthefullrangeofnon-canonicaldisputes,andespeciallymetalinguisticones.Howviablesuchviewsarewilldependonamoredetailedexplora-tionof thespecificcases,someofwhicharegivenonlysketchyde-scriptionswhentheyappearindisagreement-basedarguments.Cru-cially,however,oncethemetalinguisticanalysisisavailabletothem,theseviewscannotberuledoutsimplyinvirtueofthepresenceofgenuinedisagreement.

§4.1 Do Metalinguistic Negotiations involve Disagreements Worth Having?.We have argued that the metalinguistic analysis of a given norma-tiveorevaluativedisputecan’tberuledoutbytheintuitionthatthedisputeexpressesagenuinedisagreement,evengrantingtheaimofvindicatingthatintuition.Perhaps,though,metalinguisticanalysesofsuchdisputescanberuledoutbytheirinabilitytovindicateotherin-tuitionsthatwehaveaboutthem—intuitionsthataretiedtothefactthat there is adisagreementof a certain sort that is expressed in thedispute.Inthissection,weconsiderwhatwetaketobeperhapsthe

56. Forhelpfulstatementsofthissortofcontextualistview,see(Dreier1990)and(Harman2000).Forcriticismofthissortofcontextualistview,includingonthegrounds that itdoesn’t adequatelyaccount fordisagreement, see (Gib-bard1990), (Smith1994), (Boghossian2006),and(Egan2012).

paraphrasingasawayofdistinguishing“merelyverbal”disputes(thataren’tworthhaving)fromsubstantiveones(thatareworthhaving)inroughlythefollowingway:substantivedisputesareonesthatsurviveparaphrase,whilemerelyverbalonesdonot.58Thus, it isworthask-ing:dometalinguisticnegotiationsofthesortwehavebeendiscuss-ingsurviveparaphrase?

Giventhatwehavealreadyshownthatmetalinguisticnegotiationscancenteroninformationthatin fact canbeworthdebating,theques-tionhereamountstothis:arespeakersinvolvedinametalinguisticnegotiationlikelytorecognizethattheirdisputeisoneworthhavingonceithasbeenparaphrasedintoafullertheoreticaldescriptionofwhat isgoingon?Or, instead,once they recognize theirdispute tobe ametalinguistic negotiation,will they think that their debate is“merelyverbal”?

Inordertogetahandleonthisquestion,firstconsiderthatwhenspeakersinvolvedinadisputetake themselves to be at oddsthereislittlereasontothinkthattheyhavefine-grainedintuitionsaboutthemodesof communicationwithwhich they express their disagreements, orabout subtle theoretical distinctions amongst equally substantivekindsofdisagreement.Ordinary speakersdonothave intuitionsofthe kind that could make subtle distinctions about the semantics/pragmaticsdistinction.Howcouldthey,whentheoristsare inmanycasesdividedaboutwhichaspectsofmeaningbelongonwhichsideofthedivide?Andneithershouldwethinkthatordinaryspeakershaveintuitions of the kind thatwouldmake subtle distinctions betweenfirst-orderissuesandcloselycorrespondingissuesinconceptualeth-ics.Questionsaboutmodesofcommunicationandfirst-ordervs.(cor-responding)conceptualissuesaretheoretical questions.Whileordinaryintuitionsofacceptability,entailmentrelations,andthelikearehere,aselsewhere,acrucialsourceofdatainansweringthesequestions,theanswersthemselvesarenotthekindofthingwehaveintuitionsabout.(Recallthattheintuitionswedo have—thatthereisadisagreement;

58. (Chalmers2011).

metaphysicallynatural categories thatwe aim to identitywhenweareinthebiologyclassroom.

Thus,evenifweassumethatthedisputein(8)islikethedisagree-mentaboutSecretariat,andthatthepartiesreallydomeandifferentthings by theirwords, there remain very real issues to be resolvedandthereexistalltheusualresources—difficultasitmaybetosortthemout—onthebasisofwhichwecantakeonepartyoranother(orboth!)tobemistaken.Thisdespitethefactthat,owingtodifferencesinmeaning,bothpartiestoeachofthedisputesliterallyexpresstruepropositions. As we have been emphasizing throughout, disagree-mentsinconceptualethicscanbecloselytiedtosubstantive,parallelissuesoutsideofconceptualethics.Theycanbetiedto(even ifnotdirectlyabout,forreasonsdiscussedattheendof§3.2)coordinatingdecision-makingandactioninourchili-preparation,questionsaboutthepraise-worthinessofSecretariat,andevenentirelyobjectiveques-tionsabouthowbesttocarveupthenaturalworldintobiologicalcate-gories.Thus,wethinkmetalinguisticnegotiationsareentirelycapableof expressing genuinedisagreements of just the type thatwe thinkwe’rehavingintherespectivecases,substantivedisagreementsthatarewellworthengagingin.

Onemightnonethelessworrythatevenifwearerightthatmeta-linguisticnegotiationsarecapableofexpressing therelevantsortofsubstantivedisagreementworthhaving,thereisstillsomethingfishygoingonhere;thatthereisatleastsome senseinwhichthesedisagree-mentsremainlesssubstantivethandisagreementsthatareexpressedincanonicaldisputes.Onewaytotrytomakegoodonthisintuitionistoappealtofactsaboutwhatspeakersthemselvestaketobeworthspendingtheirtimearguingabout.Wecanask:wouldthepartiestometalinguistic negotiations really see themselves as expressing dis-agreementsworthhavingif theyknewwhatwasgoingon?Perhapstheywouldjustrestatetheirviewinasharedvocabulary,andthedis-agreementwoulddissolve.DavidChalmers,amongothers,hasseen

facts—including metaphysically fundamental normative facts about whatconceptsoneshoulduse.

showeredwithcertainmonetaryrewards)—afeatureoftheterm(let’ssuppose)thathasnothingtodowithwhatisanalyticabout ‘athlete’,but ratherwith sociological facts about its functional role—thepar-ticipantsinLudlow’sdisputehaveverygoodreasontoresisttheirin-terlocutor’susage,eveniftheyrecognizethat,giventhedifferenceinmeaning,itmaybeliterallytrue.Allowingforsuchparaphrasewouldlimittheabilityoftheparticipantstoeffectivelyadvocatefortheirpre-ferredconcept.

Toemphasizethis lastpoint,considerthat inacontextsuchasadebateonsportsradio–and,indeed,inmanycontextsofmorepubliccommunication(suchaspoliticalrallies,protests,andarguablylargepartsofpoliticalphilosophy itself)–oneisnotjusttryingtocommu-nicatewithone interlocutor,butwithawholerangeofpeoplewhohavesomeroughassociationswiththerelevantwordssuchas‘athlete’or‘freedom’.Insuchacontext,itwillbeveryhardtoadvocateforthesortsofconceptsthatonethinksshouldplayacertainfunctionalrolewithoutdrawingonroughattitudes thatpeoplealreadyhave to therelevantworditself.Paraphrasinginsuchacontextwillthusbeatacti-callylessattractivemovethanitwillbe,say,inaphilosophyseminarroomwheretheparticipants’maingoalistogetagriponexactlywhatisatissue,ratherthanadvocatingsomepoliticalormoralcause.59

§5. Methodological Implications.

Wehavearguedthatmetalinguisticnegotiationisapervasivemeansof expressing disagreement and that this phenomenon extends todisputes involving normative or evaluative terms.We have arguedfurtherthatthisviewisperfectlycompatiblewiththeviewthatsuchdisputesevincegenuinedisagreement.Ifthisargumenthasbeensuc-cessful,itmeansthatphilosophersarewrongtoreasonfromthefactthataparticularexchangeinvolvesagenuinedisagreementtothethe-sisthatthespeakersinvolvedinthatexchangemeanthesamethingsbythewordstheyuse.Furthermore,itopensupanimportanttoolin

59.ThankstoBobGoodinforhelpfuldiscussionontheselastfewpoints.

thatthedisagreementmaybeworthhaving;thatthedisagreementisultimatelyabouthowtoseason the food, treatprisoners,categorizethebiologicalworld,etc.—arevindicatedbythemetalinguisticanaly-sis.)Thus, themetalinguisticanalysis isnot really thekindof thingthatspeakerscould,intherelevantsense,resist.

Suppose, though, that ametalinguistic analysis of some disputewere incompatible with the speakers’ own rough understanding ofwhatthedisputeisabout—thatthespeakers,forexample,firmlybe-lievedthattheywerehavingacanonicaldisputedirectlyaboutthe real nature of torture, rather than ametalinguistic negotiation abouthowtheterm‘torture’shouldbeusedinthecontextathand.Insuchacase,whether or not the speakerswill see the debate as oneworth con-tinuingtoengageinwilldependon(a)whetherthereissomethingsubstantiveatstakeinhowtherelevanttermsareusedinthecontext(which,aswehaveargued,thereoftenwillbe)and(b)whetherthespeakers recognize this fact. If there is something at stake, and thespeakersareinapositiontorecognizethis,thereisnoreasontothinkthatthespeakerswilldismisstheirdisputeasonenotworthhaving.

Beforemovingon,thereisonefurtherpointaboutparaphrasetomention.Thisisthat, insomemetalinguisticnegotiations,therecanbeanimportantreasonwhytheparticipantsinthedisputeresisttheparaphraseoftheirdiscussioneven ifbothpartiesinthedisputewouldstillcontinuetothinkthattheirdisputewasworthhavingweretheypresentedwiththeparaphrase.Considerthat,aswehavediscussed,manymetalinguisticnegotiationsworthhavingareonesinwhichtheparticipantsareinvolvedina(largelytacit)disagreementaboutwhichconceptshouldplayacertainfunctionalroleinthethoughtandprac-ticeofagroupofpeople.Insocialcontextswhereintheconceptasso-ciatedwithagivenword(e. g.,‘torture’,‘athlete’,‘democracy’,‘freedom’,‘happiness’,or‘equality’)playssomeimportantfunctionalrole,partlyin virtue of it beingassociatedwith that givenword, itmakes sensethatthepeoplecareabouttheirpreferredconceptbeingpairedwiththewordinquestion.Thus,forexample,giventhatwhatevercountsasan“athlete”iseligibletobeheldinacertainesteem(andperhaps

canonical. Hence, thewidespread understanding ofmetanormativetheoryascenteredontheSharedMeaningTaskrestsonamistake.

Metanormativetheoristsshouldnot assumethatagivennormativeorevaluativedispute is canonicaluntil there is independent reasontothinkitis.Instead,assumingthatthedisputereallydoesexpressadisagreement,theoristsshouldholdsimplythatthereissomerationalconflict inthementalcontentsacceptedbythespeakersinvolved,aconflictwhichmightormightnotbereflectedinthesemanticcontentofthespeakers’utterances.Thetheoristshouldlooktothecontentsthatthisdisagreementmightbeabout(thesurfaceofwhatitseems tobeaboutmightbemisleading)aswellastothedifferentmechanismsbywhichthatconflictinattitudesmightbeexpressed.Finally,oncewehavedifferentproposalsonthetableforhowtoaccountforwhatisgo-ingoninagivenexchange(proposalsthatwillincludebothsemanticandpragmaticelements),wecanthenevaluatetheproposalsforhowwell theydo in accounting for thevarious factors that all sides canagreeneedtobeaccountedfor—includingfactsaboutthefeelingofconflictbetweenthespeakers,thelinguisticfeaturesofthediscourse,andthesubstantiveness,suchasitis,ofthedebate.

Ifthisisright,thenitisnotatallclearthatphilosophersworkingonthesemanticsofnormativeandevaluativetermswillfacetheSharedMeaningTaskfortheterm(s)inquestion.Indeed,itmightoftenbethatthespeakersinquestionmeandifferentthingsbytheirnormativeorevaluativewordsbutthat,nevertheless,theirdisagreementisentirelygenuine.Themetalinguisticanalysisisnot,afterall, atheorythatde-bunksourintuitionofdisagreementintherelevantcases;itvindicates our intuition that the disputes in question express genuine, worth-whiledisagreements.Whilenoteverynormativeorevaluativedisputewillturnout,onfinalanalysis,tobeametalinguisticnegotiation,wego seriouslywrong in allowing the intuition of disagreement by it-selftoruleoutthosetheoriespositinginter-personal,inter-contextual,or inter-theoreticalvariation inmeaning.Thus, theSharedMeaningTask—unavoidableincaseswhere,antecedently,weknowadispute

accountingforthepossibilityofgenuinedisagreementsonviewsthatfrequentlyarethoughttorunintotroubleonpreciselythis front, in-cludingvariousformsofcontextualism.

Inconcludingourmainargument,wewanttobrieflycanvassonefinalupshotoftheseconclusions.Manyphilosophersworkingonthesemanticsofnormativeandevaluativetermsunderstandtheirtaskasfiguringouthowpeoplewithverydifferentsubstantiveviewsabouttheextensionofatermsuchas‘moralobligation’or‘right’couldnone-thelessbegenuinelydisagreeingwitheachotherwhentheyhaveadisputecouchedpartlyinthoseterms.Inmanycases,thetaskistakentoamounttothis:figuringoutameaningofthetermthatcouldbesharedbyallparties to thosedisputes, ameaning that,despite thesystematicvariationinusage,allowsfortheconceptualcoherenceoftheirrespectiveviewsofwhatfallsintotheextensionoftheterm.CallthisThe Shared Meaning Task foragiventerm.

Thisisadifficulttask:thetheoristmustthreadaveryfineneedle,constructingananalysiswhichissubstantiveenoughtodifferentiatetheexpressionunderanalysisfromother,nearbyexpressions,whilesimultaneouslybeingsodevoidofspecificcontentastoplausiblybethemeaningsharedbyspeakerswhoapplytheterminsystematicallydifferingways.Agreatmanytheoristsappeartounderstandtheirtaskinlargelytheseterms,andtotakethesatisfactionofthesetwocompet-ingconsiderationstoprovideaframeworkformetanormativetheory.60

Butifourworkisontherighttrack,thenthismethodologyisseri-ouslyundermined.Ifwecouldbeassured,aheadoftime,thatsomesubsetofnormativeorevaluativedisputeswerecanonical—thattheyexpressedgenuinedisagreementvia theliteralexpressionofconflict-ing contents—then,perhaps, theSharedMeaningTaskwouldaccu-ratelycharacterizethesubsequenttheoreticalundertaking.But,aswehaveargued,manynormativeandevaluativedisputesaresimplynot

60.For representativeexamplesof thisgeneral lineof thinking inmetanorma-tivetheory,see(Gibbard1990), (Gibbard1992), (Smith1994),and(Darwall2002).

linguistic content,amajor role isalsoplayedby, say, thecausal-his-torical factsabout theword ‘athlete’,or itsmeaning for the relevantspeech community, or the contours of the corresponding naturalkind.Correspondingly,accordingtoanexternalistaboutcontext,thecontextually-salientthresholdforbeingspicy—thesettingofthecon-textualparameterthatdeterminesthemeaningof‘spicy’relativetoacontext—isnotmerelyafunctionoftheintentionsoftheindividualspeakers,butratherisdeterminedinpartbyobjectivefeaturesofthecontexttheyshare.Contentexternalismandcontextexternalismneednotgotogether.61Butadefenderofeithertypeofexternalismmayob-jecttoourpresentationofthecorrespondingtypeofputatively-meta-linguisticdispute.Giventheroleoffactorsoutsidethecontrolorevenacquaintanceofthespeakers,therelevantlinguisticfactsare,fortheexternalist,stabilizedbetweenthepartiestothedisagreements.

To this typeof objection,wehave two responses, one a dialecti-calclarificationandtheotherasubstantivepoint.First,thedialecticalclarification.Thoughwehavepresented these casesas if the speak-ersinfactexpressdifferentcontentswiththeirwords,wedonotaskthereadertoassume thatthis is thecorrectanalysis; thatthespeak-ersexpressdifferentcontentsisnotapremiseinourargument.Rather,ourpresentationof thecaseshas the forceofasupposition:even ifwesupposethatthespeakersmeandifferentthingsbytheirwords,wecanstillexplainhowthosedisputeshavethepropertiesthattheydo.Perhapstheexternalistcanalsoexplainhowthesedisputesmanagetoexpressgenuinedisagreements.That’sfine.Butthemetalinguisticanalysishasitsownaccountofthosefacts.Thereareindependentrea-sonstobeanexternalist.(Whethertheyaredecisiveisanotherques-tion.)Buttheconsiderationsraisedhereshowthatthosereasonsdonotincludeaninabilityofcompetingtheoriestoexplainwhatisgoingon indisputes like thoseabove.Ananalysismakingnomentionofsuchmeaning-stabilizingfactorscan,inthesenseidentifiedearlierin

61. Forexample,(Stalnaker1999)advocatesexternalismaboutcontent,butnotaboutcontext.

tobecanonical—cannotplaythedebate-structuringroleitoftenhas,onpainofleavingourtheoreticaltoolkitseriouslyimpoverished.

§6. Objections and Replies.

§5concludesourmainlineofargumentinthispaper. Recall,however,thatoneofourgoalsisthis:toprovideamorethoroughandsystem-aticdefenseofmetalinguisticnegotiationthanhasbeenofferedinthemetanormativeliterature.Inordertomakegoodonthis,weconsiderandrespondtothreeimportantobjectionstothethesisthatmanynor-mativeandevaluativedisagreementsareexpressedviadisputesthatarebestanalyzedasmetalinguisticnegotiations.Thefirstobjectionconcernsexternalismaboutcontentsor contexts.Thesecondobjec-tionconcernsexplanatorilybasicnormativeorevaluativeterms.Thethirdobjectionconcerns theabilityof themetalinguisticanalysis tomake accurate predictions regarding a seemingly related phenome-non—metalinguisticnegation.

§6.1. Objection 1: Externalism.Inourpresentationofthecasesmeantmostclearlytoexemplifymeta-linguisticnegotiations—theathlete caseandthespicycase—wehaveassumedthattherelevantlinguisticitemsinfact expressdifferentcon-tents in themouthsof therespectivespeakers.That is,weassumedthatinthemouthofthespeakerof(5a),‘athlete’ wastrulypredicatedofhorses,whileinthemouthofthespeakerof(5b),‘athlete’wasnottrulypredicatedofhorses.Correspondingly,weassumedthat,inOs-car’sutteranceof(4a), ‘spicy’was,relativetothecontext,trulypredi-catedofthechili,whileinCallie’sutteranceof(4b),‘spicy’was,relativetothecontext,not trulypredicatedofthechili.

Atthisstage,thoseinclinedtoexternalismeitheraboutlinguisticcontentoraboutcontextsmaywishtoobject.Afterall,accordingtotheexternalist,what ‘athlete’ meansdoesnotdependonfactsaboutthespeakeralone,eitherhermental statesorheractualpatternsofusage.According to theexternalistaboutcontent,while thementalstatesand factsaboutusageplaysomerole in thedeterminationof

cateringcompany.Thetwoemployeesknowthatburgerscomewithfrench fries, though theywoulddescribe that fact in differentways.Theyengageinthedisputein(9)inthecontextofanargumentabouthowthemenu is tobewrittenupandhowthedishesare tobede-scribedtotheirclients.Inthiscase,thereisagreatdealhangingonwhether‘chips’isusedtorefertofrenchfriesortocrisps.

Inthisdispute,justasintheSecretariatcase,thereismutualknowl-edgeofalltherelevantnon-linguisticfactsabouttheobjectsthespeak-ersdescribe.Andjustasinthatcase,thespeakersneverthelesspersistintheirdispute,andinawaythatisinnoobvioussensepointlessorconfused.Whatismostnaturalinthiscaseistosay,justaswesaidintheSecretariatcase,thatthespeakersdisagreeabouthowtheyshouldusetherelevantterm.Note,however,thatforanexternalisttheoryoflinguistic content to reanalyze this case as a canonical disputeoverthetruthofliterallyexpressedcontentwouldbetocollapsethediffer-encesbetweentwoentirelydistinctdialectsofEnglish.Itisonethingtosaythatexternalfactorsconspiretokeepmeaningconstantincaseswhere thereare smalldifferencesorgradual changes inusage. It isanother to say the samewhere there areprofound, systematic, andcommunity-widedifferencesinusage.The‘athlete’caseandthe‘chips’casehaveprecisely the samestructure.Butnoplausible formofex-ternalismisstrongenoughtoabsorbcasesofmetalinguisticnegotia-tionbetweenspeakersofdistinct,mutuallycomprehensibledialects.Therefore,anytheorist,externalistornot,musthavetheresourcestodescribemetalinguisticnegotiationsintheirtoolkit.

Althoughthecasesaresomewhatdifferent,similarconsiderationsapplyinthecaseofthecontext-externalist.Here,inorderforthecon-textexternalistresponsetohavetraction,itmustfirstbeagreedthatthe relevant terminology is in fact context-sensitive—otherwise thedependenceofcontext-sensitivelinguisticitemsonobjectivefeaturesoftheconversationalcontextwouldbemoot.Havingnotedthat,theresponsetothechallengeofcontext-externalismisentirelyparalleltotheresponsetothecontent-externalist.Justasmetalinguisticnegotia-tionsaboutcharactercanoccuracrossdifferencesindialect,sotoocan

thispaper,doanentirelysuccessfuljobofexplainingthepossibilityofdisagreementinthesecases.

Our more substantive response is this: any form of external-ism—content or context—strong enough to address any plausiblecaseofmetalinguisticnegotiationwillbemassivelytoostrong.Thus,anyone,externalistornot,willrequiretheresourcestodescribesome disputes asmetalinguisticnegotiations in any case.Thequestion issimplyhowfartheanalysisshouldextend.Itcan extendallthewaytocasesliketheoneswehaveconsideredin§3.2(e. g.,thecasesinvolv-ing‘spicy’and‘athlete’).Wesubmitthattodrawthelinesomewhereinthemiddleprior toinvestigatingthedetailsoftherelevantcaseswillprovead hoc atbest.

Toseethateventheexternalistrequiresthenotionofmetalinguis-ticnegotiation,first consider the caseof externalismabout content.InthecaseaboutSecretariat,weconsideredtwospeakerswho,asidefromtheirusageof‘athlete’,werelinguisticallyverysimilar.Butsimilarcasescanbeimaginedbetweenspeakersofdistinct,mutuallycompre-hensibledialects.Consideradebatebetweenthespeakersof(9a)and(9b).Theyaredescribingarestaurantthey’vebothvisited.However,thespeakerof(9a)isBritish,whilethespeakerof(9b)isAmerican.

(9) (a)Burgerscomewithchips.

(b)No,burgersdonotcomewithchips.

Thedialoguein(9)isaclearcaseofwhatwecancallamerely verbal dispute.Thespeakerof(9a)uses‘chips’tomeanfrenchfries,whilethespeakerof (9b)uses ‘chips’ tomeanpotatochips (or ‘crisps’, for thespeakerof(9a)).Theirdispute ispremisedona linguisticmisunder-standingandisforthatreasonpointless—itfailstoreflectadisagree-ment,inoursense,atall.Butthereareothercontextsinwhichsuchadialoguemighttakeplace,contextsinwhichitisnotatallpointless.

Imagine for instance that thedisputeoccursbetween two speak-erswhoknowperfectlywellthattheyarenotfromidenticallanguagecommunities,butwhohavefoundthemselvesworkingforthesame

variousstripes.63Thus,foradefenderofthoseargumentstomakeuseofthecontext-externalistobjectionisinmanycasesforthemalreadytohavegivenupthegame.

Boththecontent-andthecontext-externalistwillrequirethemet-alinguistic analysis for certain cases of disagreement—certain dis-agreements between speakers of mutually comprehensible dialects,orcertaindisagreementsacrossdifferentconversationalcontexts.Thequestionthenissimplyhowmanydisagreementsthat,prima faciearesusceptibletothistypeofanalysisareinfactbestanalyzedasmeta-linguistic.Oncemetalinguisticnegotiationisinthepicture,wefinditquitenaturaltothinkthatitextendstothetypeofcasesconsideredabove. Inanycase, todrawthe linesomewhere inbetween,and tohavethatlinenotappeardisqualifyinglyarbitrary,wouldrequireseri-ousargumentationofakindthatdoesnotappearinthedisagreement-basedargumentswehaveconsidered.

§6.2. Objection 2: Basic Normative or Evaluative Terms.Weargueinthispaperfortheviabilityofthemetalinguisticanalysisof a rangeofnormativeandevaluativedisputes.Suchdisputesare,inoursense,non-canonical.Aremainingissueconcernsadifferenceamongtypesofnormativeandevaluativeterms.Insomecases,theremaybereasontothinkthatthedisputeinquestioniscanonicalafterallbasedontheexplanatoryrolethatcertainnormativeandevalua-tivetermshaveinaccountingforthemeaningofothernormativeandevaluativeterms.

In some accounts of normative and evaluative semantics, themeanings of some normative and evaluative terms are analyzed intermsofthemeaningsofothernormativeandevaluativeterms.Callthose terms that are so analyzednon-basic. For instance, on a buck-passingaccount about themeaningof ‘goodness’, ‘goodness’wouldbeanon-basicevaluativeterm.Incontrast,somenormativeorevalu-ativeexpressionswillnot beanalyzedintermsofothernormativeor

63.See,forinstance,(Richard2004), (MacFarlane2007), (Smith1994), (Boghos-sian2006), (Egan2006),and(Gibbard1990).

metalinguisticdisputesaboutparametersettings(andthuscontents)occuracrosscontexts.

For example, if we suppose that contextualism about ‘knows’ istrue,wemustbeabletooffersomeaccountofcross-contextdisagree-ment about knowledge attributions. The metalinguistic analysis isready-made for this typeof case: the speaker in thehigh-standardscontextfaultsthespeakerinthelow-standardscontext,notforliterallyexpressingafalseproposition,butforemployingoverlylaxepistemicstandards.62Andit isonethingtosuppose, incaseswherespeakershaveslightlydifferentbeliefsabouttheirsharedconversationalsetting,thatobjectivefeaturesofthecontextconspiretokeepcontextualpa-rametersettingsconstant.Itisanothertosaythesameincaseswherespeakersareparticipants inentirelydistinctconversationalcontexts.Giventheneedtoseparateoutdistinctconversationalcontexts—are-quirementfordefendingcontextualisminthefirstplace—wemustbeabletodescribecertaindisputesinvolvingcontext-sensitiveterminol-ogyasmetalinguistic.Thequestion,asbefore,issimplyhowfarthephenomenonextends.

Of course, onemay not buy into this analysis of disagreementsabout knowledge attributions in particular. Contextualism about‘knows’ishardlyaconsensusview.Indeed,onemightrejectepistemiccontextualismpreciselyon thebasisof cross-contextdisagreementsaboutknowledgeattributions.Butrecallthattheobjectionundercon-siderationhereisleviedbythecontext-externalist.Thatobjectiononlyworksbyfirstgranting that theexpressions inquestionare context-sensitive, and then submitting thatobjective featuresof the conver-sational context conspire to hold fixed the relevant parameter set-tings.Thus,fortheadvocateofthecontext-externalistobjection,thismove—the rejection of context sensitivity altogether—is not avail-able. In fact, quite generally, disagreement-based arguments of thekindweconsiderinthispaperaredeployedagainst contextualismsof

62. (Chrisman2007)makesarelevantlysimilarpointaboutthesameissue.

turnout tobe—mustbecanonical,andthus themeaningsof thosetermsinparticularmustbesharedforadisagreementtobegenuine.

This sort of argumentmight give some force toHare’s originalcannibalsandmissionaryexample,providedwethinkofitintermsof“goodness”simpliciterasopposedtosomethingmorespecificsuchas “moral goodness”.68 The same might be true for certain of themoraltermsusedbyEarthlingsandTwinEarthlings.Moreover,wethink this sortof restricteduseof adisagreement-basedargumentiswhatlendsmuchoftheappealtodisagreement-basedargumentsforvariousformsofnon-cognitivismaboutbasicnormativeorevalu-ativeterms,suchasthesortsofdisagreement-basedargumentsforexpressivismthatareatthecenterofsomeofAllanGibbard’scoreargumentsforexpressivisminWise Choices, Apt FeelingsandThinking How to Live.69Wethinkthismorerestricted(andmoresophisticated)versionof thedisagreement-basedargument isworthexploringatgreaterlength.However,thereareanumberofimportantpointsthatmustbeunderscoredaboutthispossibility.

Thefirstpointissimplythatthismoresophisticatedversionofthedisagreement-basedargument, even if it couldbemade towork, ismuchmorelimitedinscopethanthedisagreement-basedargumentstypicallyonoffer inthe literature. Inpractice,proponentsof thedis-agreement-basedformofargumenthavefreelyappliedversionsofthisargumenttonon-basicnormativeandevaluativeterms.Forinstance,takethecaseofGibbard.Gibbardnotonlyusesadisagreement-basedargumentforconclusionsaboutthesemanticsofbasicnormativeand

68.Harehimselfisemphaticthathischoicetofocusonthe“simplest,mosttypi-cal,andmostgeneralvalue-words”ispurelyfor“simplicityofexposition”,andthuswouldbeunlikelytogothisroute.(Hare1991,80).

69.Seetheopeningchaptersofboth(Gibbard1990)and(Gibbard2003).Gib-bardendorsesthedistinctionthatwe’vecalled“basic”vs.“non-basic”.How-ever,heshowsnosignofthinkingthatthedistinctionisrelevanttotheap-plicabilityofdisagreement-basedarguments,asheemployssuchargumentsindiscriminatelytotermsthatare,forhim,basic,andthosethatarenot.Nev-ertheless,anintuitivegraspofthespecialforceofdisagreement-basedargu-mentsastheyapplytobasictermsmaybewhyhisargumentsaboutthosetermsseemsocompelling.

evaluativeterms.Callthoseexpressionsthebasic normativeorevalua-tiveterms.64Forinstance,onsomesemanticaccounts,‘rationality’willbeanalyzedintermsof‘goodness’,and,inturn,‘goodness’willnotbeanalyzedintermsofanyothernormativeorevaluativeterm.Onsuchaccounts,‘goodness’isabasicterm,while‘rationality’isnon-basic.65 Forotheraccounts,however,itispreciselythereverse.66

Themetalinguisticanalysishasitsclearestandmoststrikingimpli-cationsforworkonthesemanticsofnon-basicnormativeandevalua-tiveterms,termslike‘torture’, ‘athlete’,and‘moralobligation’.Incon-trast, thesituationwithbasicnormativeorevaluativetermsismorecomplex.Toseewhy,considerthatthemetalinguisticnegotiationswehavediscussedinvolvedisagreementsaboutwhatconceptsweshould beusingorhowweoughttobeusingwords.Nowsupposethatweareaskingthesequestionsnotabouttermssuchas‘moralobligation’or‘coercion’or ‘cruel’but rathersuchputativelybasicnormative termsas‘should’or‘ought’.Ifso,thenthequestionweareaskingarguablybecomesself-reflexive:“howshouldweusetheconceptshould?”67Inthosecases,astatementofthenon-canonicalformsofdisputewehavecanvassedwillitselfrequiretheexpressionoftheveryconceptthatisunderdebate.Becauseof this, it seems that inorder tomakesenseofthedisagreement,onemusttakethedisputetobecanonical—thealternativesimplycannotbecoherentlystated,becausethetermsnec-essarytostateitarenotstableground.Soperhapsgenuinedisagree-mentsinvolvingbasicnormativeorevaluativeterms—whateverthey

64.Thedistinctionbetweenbasicandnon-basicnormative(orevaluative)termscarriesovertobasicandnon-basicnormative(orevaluative)concepts.How-ever,givenourfocusonsemantics,andnotonissuesaboutthecontentsofthoughts,weputthedistinctionhereintermsofwordsratherthanconcepts.Onemightoalsousethebasic/non-basicdistinctiontomarkthesametypeofdistinctionamongotherthings.Forinstance,onemightuseittomarkadistinctionamongnormative(orevaluative)propertiesoramongnormative(orevaluative)facts.

65. See,forinstance,(Railton2003)

66.See,forinstance,(Gibbard1990).

67. In this paper,we followone standard convention and designate conceptswithsmallcaps.Onthisconvention,see(MargolisandLaurence1999).

patternofexplainingtheirmeaningisontherighttrack,youwillonlyknowsomethingaboutonecomponentoftheirmeaning(namely,thenormativekernel), butnot about theotherpart (the such-and-suchdescriptiveapplication-conditions).Ifoneisgoingtoexplainexplana-torilynon-basictermsinthewaythatGibbarddoes,thisother partiscrucialforexplainingthemeaningofexplanatorilynon-basicterms.

Gibbardusesdisagreement-based arguments—of essentially thesameformthatheusestosettlethefirst,normativepart—tosettleonthisotherpartof themeaningofexplanatorilynon-basicnormativeandevaluativeterms.72But,ifourargumentinthispaperisright,thenhis arguments here are in serious trouble.And saving thedisagree-ment-based argument for the most explanatorily basic normativetermswon’tchangethat,evenifGibbardisright thatone component ofthemeaningofexplanatorilynon-basicnormativeandevaluativetermsisacentralnormativekernel(whichisonesingleexplanatorilybasicnormative term).Soeven if themorerestrictedversionof thedisagreement-basedargumentisontosomething,itleavesuntouchedaverylargepartofnormativeandevaluativesemantics.

Thesecondpointisthatthismoresophisticatedversionofthear-gumentwould require substantiallymore setup and argumentationthanistypicallyonoffer.Afterall,toeffectively makeuseofittoestab-lishthemeaningofagivennormativeorevaluativeterm(ratherthansimplytheexplanatorilybasicnormativeandevaluativeterms,what-ever they are),onemustfirstestablishwhichnormativeandevaluativeterms are in fact basic, amatterwhich remains entirelyunresolved.Thisisinpartareflectionofthewiderangeofviewsthatmetaethicaltheoristshaveaboutwhichconceptsaremostexplanatorilybasic.Forinstance, someaccounts (suchasGibbard’s inWise Choices, Apt Feel-ings)seektounderstandthemeaningofallnormativeandevaluativeconceptsintermsofasinglebasicnormativeconcept,suchasthecon-ceptrationalortheconceptwarrant.73Onsuchaview,theconcept

72. See,forinstance,(Gibbard1990)and(Gibbard1992).

73. See(Gibbard1990)and(Gibbard2003).

evaluative terms (the basis for his expressivism), but also uses thesameformofdisagreement-basedargumentfortermsthathehimselftakestobenon-basic(suchas‘morality’and‘moralrightandwrong’).70 OrconsiderthecaseofLasersohnthatweintroducedatthestartof§2—acaseinwhichLasersohnusesadisagreement-basedargumentforconclusionsaboutthesemanticsof‘fun’.Lasersohnhardlymeanstosuggestthat‘fun’isanexplanatorilybasicterm,aclaimthatwouldbequestionableinit’sownright.Thus,evenifthemoresophisticatedformofdisagreement-basedargumentweareconsideringhereisontherighttrack—aformofargumentthatrestrictstheclassoftermstoexplanatorilybasicterms—thenthisdoesnothingtosupportmanyap-plicationsoftheformofdisagreement-basedargumentthatwetarget.

Todrivethispointhome,considerhereGibbard’saccountofnon-basicnormativeandevaluativeterms,suchas ‘jerk’or ‘moralwrong-ness’, which exemplifies a common pattern of explanation of suchterms among expressivists. The story thatGibbard gives here—onethatstaysbasicallythesamefromWise Choices, Apt Feelings toThinking How to Live—isroughlythis: themeaningofexplanatorilynon-basicnormativeandevaluativetermsultimatelyconsists inacombinationofthemostexplanatorilybasicnormativeterm(which,forGibbard,issomethingalong the linesof ‘the thing todo’)with furthersuch-and-such descriptiveapplication-conditions.71Itisthefirstcomponentthatis thecentralnormativekernel forGibbard—it ishaving thiskernelthatmakes a termnormative at all. That kernel iswhat gets the ex-pressivistanalysis,andwhichisthemainconcernofmostofGibbard’swork.NowsupposethatGibbardisabletorunamoresophisticatedversionof thedisagreement-basedargument forwhateverhe thinksis the explanatorily basic normative term that ultimately mattershere (e. g., ‘rational’, ‘the thing to do’, or ‘should’). Even if this argu-mentworks,thatonlytellsyouaboutthemeaningofonenormativeorevaluativeterm.Forallotherterms,assumingthatGibbard’sbasic

70.See,forinstance,(Gibbard1992).

71. See(Gibbard1990), (Gibbard1992),and(Gibbard2003).

§6.3. Objection 3: Metalinguistic Negation.Settingasidephilosophical issuesabout thenatureofdisagreement,can a metalinguistic analysis make the right empirical predictionsaboutlinguisticphenomena?Canitpredictthatdenialislicensedinthedisputes in question?Can it predict that the right kind of denialislicensed?Onethingthat’sclearisthatordinarycanonicaldisputeslicenseaparticularconversationalmove:linguisticdenial.InEnglish,thespeechactofdenialcanbemarkedwithexpressionssuchas‘nuhuh’,‘nope’,andvariationsof‘noitisn’t’.Formanylinguistsandphilos-ophers,whetherornotlinguisticdenialisfelicitousisacrucialfactorindiscussionsofdisagreement.Indeed,forsome,itisthe crucial thing.Forinstance,TaminaStephensonwrites

IshouldclarifythatwhenIsaythatdisagreementispos-sibleinacertaindialogue,Imeanverynarrowlythatex-pressionslikeno (it isn’t)andnuh-uhareallowed.Idon’tmeanthatwehaveanintuitionthatthespeakersdisagree

forsemanticconclusions,argumentswhichGibbardalsogives,especiallyinhisearlierwork.Thequestionofdisagreement-basedargumentsforconclu-sionsaboutsharedconceptsisadifferenttopic,whichweplantoexploreinfurtherwork.Second,thereisperhapsanotheroptionforhowtoaccountfordisputesinvolvingbasicnormativeandevaluativeterms.Thisistograntthatthesemetalinguistic disputes are about some antecedently unsettled ques-tion,butinsistthatwehaveidentifiedthewrongquestion.Onthisfront,onemightinsistthatthesedisputesaren’taboutanormativetopicinconceptualethicsaboutwhatconceptshould beused,butratheraboutaslightlydifferenttopic:namely,whichconcept touse. Is this reallyaviablealternative? Is itevenanalternativeatall?Partoftheanswerwilldependonwhatthecorrectmetanormativestoryisabouthowwhat to doquestionsarerelatedtonorma-tivethoughtaboutwhatoneshould do.Perhaps,forinstance,(Gibbard2003)is right that the latter shouldbe analyzed in termsof the former.Or, lessstrongly,perhapsonecan’tseriouslyadvanceaviewaboutwhichconcepttouse(atleastintherelevantcontextsthatmatterforthisdiscussion)withouthavingsomesortofnormativeorevaluativeviewaboutthemeritsofusingthatconceptforthepurposesathand.Inanycase,weleavethisideatotheside,giventhatwedonotneedtodrawonitinordertoadvanceourmainlineofargument.Moregenerally,itshouldbeemphasizedthatwefullysup-port thosewishingtogiveamorefine-grainedtaxonomyofmetalinguisticdisputesthanwehavedoneinthispaper.Webelievethatthereismuchmoreworktobedoneonthisfront.

goodnessisanalyzedintermsofrational.Incontrast,otheraccounts(suchasPeterRailton’s)seektounderstandtheevaluativenotionofvalueaspriortothatofnormativenotionssuchaswarrant.74Otheraccounts still (suchasRalphWedgwood’s inThe Nature of Normativ-ity)hold that thereareanumberofbasicnormativeandevaluativeconceptsthatinter-defineeachother—oratleastnoneofwhichcanbeseenasanymorebasicthantheothers.75Thisfactofthediversityofviewsheresuggeststhatitcannotbetakenforgrantedwhichnor-mativeorevaluativetermsarebasicones.Figuringoutwhichtermsarebasicinthissenseisobviouslynoeasytask.And,moreover,itisprecisely the sort of task thatwe think cannot be pursued in isola-tionfromthinkingaboutthepossibilitythatdisputesinvolvingthesetermsarenon-canonical.Thisthusblocksaquickjustificationforcon-cludingthatspeakersmeanthesamethingsbyaspecificnormativeorevaluativeterm(suchas‘good’or‘right’)thatisseemingly abasicone.And,ifthat’sright,thendisagreement-basedargumentsevenforsolely themostexplanatorilybasicnormativeandevaluative terms—suchasGibbard’sdisagreement-basedargumentsforexpressivism—areinfactmuchmorecomplicatedtomakethanitisnormallythought,andcan’tbemadeeffectively forspecific normativeandevaluative terms(e. g., ‘should’, ‘good’, ‘obligation’ etc.)without seriously consideringthemetalinguisticoptionthatwehaveputforwardhere.Whichistosay:eveniftherestricteddisagreement-basedargumentishelpfulinestablishingsomethingabouttheexplanatorilybasicnormativeandevaluative terms (whatever they are), itwon’t help usmuch for ac-tuallydoingthesemanticsofactualspecifiedtermssuchas ‘should’,‘good’,or‘obligation’.76

74. See(Railton2003)

75. See(Wedgwood2007).

76.Twothingstonotehere.First,thisupshotmightnotcausethatmuchtroubleforthosewhowanttorunadisagreement-basedargumentforconclusionsaboutsharedconcepts,andwhoaren’tworriedaboutwhat(ifanything)thismeansforthesemanticsofanyparticularterms.Thecoreargumentsof(Gib-bard2003)arearguablybestread in thisway.However,aswehavemadeclearthroughout,ourfocusinthispaperisondisagreement-basedarguments

of Negation.78Metalinguisticnegationisaspeciallinguisticmove—onHorn’stheory,theexploitationofapragmaticambiguityinthenega-tionoperator—thatallowsspeakers toobject tosome featureofanutterance other than its literal semantic content. For example, in re-sponseto(10a),aninterlocutormightreplywith(10b)ifshefeltthatthepropositionexpressedin(10a)wasfalse.Butshemightjustaseas-ilyreplywith(10c).

(10) (a)Johnsawsomeofhisstudentsattheparty.

(b)Nuhuh,hisstudentswereallatadifferentparty.

(c)Johndidn’tseesome ofhisstudentsattheparty;hesawallofthem!

78. (Horn1989).Noteveryoneagreesthatmetalinguisticnegationisagenuinelydistinctphenomenon(see(vanderSandtandMeier2003)).Ifthatwereright,ourcasewouldbeeasiertomake,sowedonotstackthedeckinourfavorbygrantingHorn’sanalysisinthisregard.Inanimportantseriesofworks,RobynCarston,forexample,arguesthatwhiletherearedistinctiveusesoflanguagetobeobservedinmetalinguisticnegations,theydonotlineupwiththecate-goryHornpicksoutandarebestanalyzedinotherways.(See(Carston1996), (Carston andNoh 1996), and (Carston 2002) amongothers.) Inparticular,Carston(1)disputesHorn’sclaimthatthenegationoperatorisinanysenseambiguous,and(2)arguesthatwhatiscrucialtometalinguisticnegationsisamoregeneralphenomenon,namelythe“echoic”useofanexpression,inthesenseof(SperberandWilson1995).AfulltreatmentofCarston’sview(muchlessthefullliteratureonthistopic)isbeyondthescopeofthispaper.Butwenotethatwithoutastrongfurtherassumption—namely,thatanydenialthatisinanysense“metalinguistic”shouldbepredictedtoalsobeechoic—theseexpressions (on Carston’s analysis) present no particular problem for ouranalysis. Metalinguistic negotiations do not seem to involve echoic uses.Onlywhen combinedwith that additional assumptionwould this suggestthattheyarethereforenotmetalinguisticafterall.Weseenoreasontothinkthis furtherassumptionistrue,andnoreasontoattributesuchanassump-tion toCarston,whonotes that “quotations, echoes, andother representa-tionsemployedforpurposesotherthanreferringto,ordescribing,aspectsofsituationsintheworldareverycommonelementsofverbalcommunicationgenerally”, and that “…thisnon-descriptiveuseof a representationmayormaynotbeovertlysignaled”(Carston2002,299).Thus,inaddressingHorn’sanalysisspecifically,weaddress thepotentialworry in itsmostworrisomeform.

aboutsomething,whichmaybeabroaderphenomenon.I also don’t mean that the disagreement is necessarilya rational or sensible one to engage in. The dialogues[abouttaste]arejustthekindofargumentsthatareoftenpointedouttobefutile,giventhatpeople’stastessimplydiffer.Thatisnotmyconcern.Theonlyfactthatmattersformy purposes is that such dialogues can and do oc-cur—oftenenough,infact,togiveusampleopportunitytoperceivetheirfutility.77

AsStephensonpointsout,disputesabouttasteclearlylicenselinguis-ticdenial.Sodoalloftheothernormativeandevaluativedisputeswehaveconsideredhere.CanonicaldisputesobviouslyallowfortheuseoftheexpressionsStephensonmentions.Butwehaveproposedadif-ferentanalysisofatleastsomesuchdisputes.Canouranalysispredictthatdenialislicensedintherelevantcases?

Atfirst,theproblemwouldnotappeartobeserious.Ifoneisper-suadedthatexampleslikethedisputeaboutthechiliorthedisputeaboutSecretariataremetalinguisticdisputes,thenitmustsimplybeacknowledgedasadatumthatmetalinguisticdisputes(includingmet-alinguisticnegotiations)dolicensedenial.Ifametalinguisticanalysisisproposedforsometypeofdispute,thenitpositsthatthatdisputeislike the chili case orlike the Secretariat case.Sinceinthosecasesdenialis licensed, thenananalysisclaiming that someotherdispute is rel-evantlysimilarisperfectlycapableofpredictingthefelicityofdenialinthosecases.

Thatbeingsaid,onemightwonderwhetherthereisanevenmore-finegrained test in the vicinity.Consider that, inmetalinguistic dis-putes, speakers disagreewith content communicated by their inter-locutors, but not the literally expressed content. Given this featureof thedisputes,onemightwonderwhy theydonot licensemetalin-guistic negation in thesense thatHorndiscusses inA Natural History

77. (Stephenson2007,493).

However,nosuchdifferenceobtainsbetweenthedenialsincanon-icaldisputesandthosethatarelicensedinmetalinguisticones.Thinkback to thedenials thatare licensed in thedisputeswehavecalledmetalinguistic.(“Nuhuh,Secretariatisnotanathlete.”)Thosedenialsshownoneof thesignsofmetalinguisticnegation.Denials in thesesettings shownopressure towards appearing in the formof adeni-al-correction sequence; theydonot require special intonation; theyhappily toleratemorphological incorporationof thenegation (“Nuhuh,Secretariatisanon-athlete!”),andiftherearepolarityitemsinthesentence,theybehaveinalltheusualways.(Forexample,inthetypi-callicensingoftheNPI‘ever’in(14b).)

(14) (a)Secretariathasalwaysbeenanathlete.

(b)Nope,Secretariathasnoteverbeenanathlete;‘athlete’onlyappliestopeople!

The fact that this dispute does not license metalinguistic negationshowswhyappealtometalinguisticnegationcannotserveasaquicktest for separating out canonical disputes frommetalinguistic ones.However,italsocreatesapotentialproblemforouranalysis.

Disputesoverinformationofalmostanyothernon-literaltypeofcontent—implicature,presupposition,connotation,evenmanner—alllicensemetalinguisticnegation.Thatpatternmightnaturallyleadonetothinkthatthemetalinguisticanalysisofchili-andSecretariat-typedisputesiscommittedtothefalsepredictionthatthosedisputesshould licensemetalinguisticnegation,wheninfactthedenialstheylicenseseemforalltheworldtoemployperfectlyordinarydescriptivenega-tions.Soperhapsthefailureofthesedisputestolicensemetalinguis-ticnegationisareasontothinkthatthedisputesthemselvesarenotmetalinguisticafterall!

However,amorecarefullookatthedetailsofmetalinguisticnega-tionrevealsthat infactnosuchpredictionisgenerated.Toseewhy,consideracaseofrelevanceimplicature:

(15) Sallywasabletosolvetheproblem.

In(10c),metalinguisticnegationprovidesthespeakerwithawaytoindicatedisagreement,notwith thepropositionasserted,but ratherwithapropositionimplicated,namelythatJohndidnotseeallofhisstudentsattheparty.Butthetargetsofmetalinguisticnegationarenotlimitedtoimplicature.Metalinguisticnegationcantargetinformationcommunicatedalongalmostanynon-literaldimension,includingpre-suppositions(“Hedoesn’tregret goingtotheparty;heneverwent!”),connotationsorotherfeaturesofwordchoice(“He’snotasmartcanuck, he’sasmartCanadian!”)orevenpronunciation(“Itdoesn’ttarget[pro-noun-ciation],ittargets[pro-nun-ciation]!”).

Metalinguisticnegationshave,according toHorn,certain telltalemarkers.Theytendtocomeinsequencesconsistingofadenialcom-ponent(“She’snotsmart...”)andacorrectioncomponent(“she’sage-nius!”).Therelevantexpressionsaremarkedoffwithfocusintonation.(Thedistinctiveemphasisplacedon‘smart’and‘genius’.)Theydonottoleratemorphologicalembeddingofthenegationintheusualway:

(11) He’snothappy;he’secstatic!

(12) #He’sunhappy;he’secstatic!79

Andfinally,thenegationsthemselvesdonotlicensenegativepolarityitemsintheusualway.

(13) #Johndidn’tseeany ofhisstudentsatthebar;hesawall ofthemthere!

Eachof these featuresofmetalinguisticnegations serves,onHorn’saccount,todifferentiatethemasaclassfromordinarydescriptivene-gationsofthekindthatappearintypicaldisputesoverthetruthoflit-erallyexpressedpropositionalcontent.Thus,sincemetalinguisticdis-putesdonotconcernthetruthofliterallyexpressedcontent,perhapsweshouldexpectthemtolicensemetalinguisticnegation.

79.We follow standard conventionwithin linguistics in using the ‘#’ sign formarkinginfelicity.

forces the listener to goback and reparse thedenial component insuchawaythatthenegationattachestosomefeatureoftheutteranceotherthanitsliteralcontent.However,wherethereisnoinconsistencybetweenthedenialandcorrectioncomponentsofthesequenceevenonadescriptivereading,noreparsingisnecessary,andmetalinguisticnegationwillbeimpossible.Thereasonmetalinguisticnegationisnotlicensedindenialsofrelevanceimplicaturesisthatthereisnoincon-sistencybetweenanordinarydescriptivedenialoftheexpressionut-teredandthecorrectionoftheimplicatedcontent:Evenonaperfectlyordinaryreadingofthenegation,thereisnoinconsistencyinsayingthatSallywasn’tabletosolvetheproblemandsayingthatshedidnotsolvetheproblem.

For us, what is crucial about this explanation is that it appliesequallywelltodenialsinthecontextofmetalinguisticdisputes.Con-sideragainadisputeoverrelevanceimplicature:

(17) (a)Sallywasabletosolvetheproblem.

(b)Sally wasn’t able to solve the problem; she didn’tsolveit.

(17b)cannotbeinterpretedasemployingmetalinguisticnegationbe-causethedenialcomponentandthecorrectioncomponentareconsis-tent,evenonadescriptivereadingofthenegation.Thisisexactlythesamestructureasthedenialsinmetalinguisticdisputes:

(18) (a)Secretariatisanathlete.

(b)Secretariatisnotanathlete;‘athlete’canonlyapplytohumans.

Whatever their actual truth, thepropositions thatSecretariat isnotan athlete and that ‘athlete’ can only be predicated of humans areentirelyconsistent.Thus,evenifthespeakerof(18b)iscorrectlyin-terpretedasobjecting tosome featureof (18a)other than its literalsemantic content, she cannot express that objection via the use of

In(15),thepropositionliterallyexpressedisthatSallyhadtheabilitytosolvetheproblem.What’simplicatedofcourseisthatSallyinfactsolvedit.Butsupposealistenerobjectedto(15),notbecauseshedis-agreeswiththeliteralcontent.(Sheagrees thatSallyhadtheabilitytosolvetheproblem.)Ratherourinterlocutordisagreeswiththeimpli-catedcontent,thatSallyactuallysolvedtheproblem.Thisshouldbeanidealcaseformetalinguisticnegation.Eveninthisposition,how-ever,ourinterlocutorcannotrespondusingmetalinguisticnegation:

(16) #Sallywasn’table tosolvetheproblem;shedidn’tsolveit.

Whateveritdoesmean,(16)cannotbereadassayingthatSallywas able to solve theproblembut refrained fromsolving it forotherreasons. The best our interlocutor can do in objecting to (15) isemployordinarydescriptivenegationas if shewererespondingtotheliteralcontent.

Why should relevance implicatures fail to licensemetalinguisticnegationinsituationspreciselyparalleltothosewhereimplicaturesofotherkindsdolicensemetalinguisticnegation?Hornarguesthatthereasonconcernsthelogicalrelationshipbetweenthetwocomponentsoftypicalmetalinguisticnegations.Thatrelationshipisinconsistency.Consideragainthemetalinguisticnegationin(10c).

(10) (c)Johndidn’tseesome ofhisstudentsattheparty;hesawall ofthem!

If the denial component and the correction component of this se-quencewere each interpreteddescriptively, then the twowouldbelogicallyinconsistent.IfJohndidnotseesomeofhisstudentsattheparty,thenhecouldnothaveseenallofthemthere.Likewise, ifheisn’thappy,thenhecan’tbeecstatic,andifSallyisnotsmart,shecan’tbeagenius.

Horn’ssuggestionisthatitisthisfeatureofmetalinguisticnegationthatallows for it tooccur.Whena listenerattempts toparse these-quencedescriptively,sheimmediatelyrealizesthatifitwerereadthatway, then the speakerwill have said something contradictory. This

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