efficient non-malleable codes and key-derivations against poly-size tampering circuits

Efficient Non-Malleable Codes and Key-derivations against Poly-size

Tampering Circuits

PRATYAY MUKHERJEE Aarhus University (now @NYU)

Joint work with

Sebastian Faust, Daniele Venturi and Daniel Wichs

New York Crypto Day, CUNY

June 27, 2014

(EPFL) (La Sapienza, Rome ) (NEU)

Appeared in Eurocrypt 2014

Outline

• Introduction to Non-Malleable Codes.• Efficient Non-malleable codes against poly-size

tampering circuit. (Our result-1)• Applications of NMC in Crypto.• A new and related notion: Non-malleable Key-

derivation and it’s application. (Our result-2)

Introduction toNon-malleable Codes

A modified codeword contains either original or unrelated message.

E.g. Can not flip one bit of encoded message by modifying the codeword.

What is Non-Malleable Codes ?

(Only one sentence!)

NMC

The “Tampering Experiment” Consider the following experiment for some encoding scheme (ENC,DEC)

f

ENCs Tamper

2F

CDEC s*C*=f(C)

Goal:Design encoding scheme (ENC,DEC) with meaningful

“guarantee” on s* for an “interesting” class F

Note ENC can be randomized. There is no secret Key.

The “Tampering Experiment” Consider the following experiment for some encoding scheme (ENC,DEC)

f

ENCs Tamper

2F

CDEC s*C*=f(C)

Error-Correcting Codes: Guarantee s* = s F is very limited !

e.g. For hamming codes with distance d, f must be such that:

Ham-Dist(C,C*) < d/2.)

The “Tampering Experiment” Consider the following experiment for some encoding scheme (ENC,DEC)

f

ENCs Tamper

2F

CDEC s*C*=f(C)

Error-Correcting Codes: Guarantee s* = s F is very limited !

e.g. consider f to be a const. function always maps to a “valid” codeword.

Error-Detecting Codes : Guarantee s* = s or

F excludes simple functions !

The “Tampering Experiment” Consider the following experiment for some encoding scheme (ENC,DEC)

f

ENCs Tamper

2F

CDEC s*C*=f(C)

Error-Correcting Codes: Guarantee s* = s F is very limited !

Error-Detecting Codes : Guarantee s* = s or

Non-malleable Codes [DPW ’10] : Guarantee s* = s or “something unrelated”

FHope: Achievable for “rich”

F excludes simple functions !

Let’s be formal…..

f

ENCs Tamper

2F

CDEC s*C*=f(C)

If C* = C return same Else return s*

Tamperf(s)

Definition [DPW 10]:

A code (ENC, DEC) is non-malleable w.r.t. F if 8 f and 8 s0, s1 we have:

Tamperf(s0) Tamperf(s1)

Main Question: How to restrict F ?

Limitation…Limitation: For any (ENC, DEC), there exists fbad :• sDEC(C) • s* = s 1 • C*ENC(s*)

Corollary-1: It is impossible to construct encoding scheme which is non-malleable w.r.t. all functions Fall . Corollary-2: It is impossible to construct efficient encoding scheme which is non-malleable w.r.t. all efficient functions Feff .

No hope to achieve non-malleability for such

fbad !

Other Questions: Rate ( =|C|/|s| ) Efficiency Assumption(s)

…..and Possibilities

Main Question: How to restrict F ?

Codeword consists of components which are independently tamperable.

Decoding requires multiple components. Example: Split-state tampering model where there are only

two independently tamperable components.• [DPW10, LL12, DKO13, ADL13, CG14a,

FMNV14, ADK14]

Way-1: Granular Tampering

…..and Possibilities

Main Question: How to restrict F ? Way-2: Low complexity tampering

The whole codeword is tamperable. The tampering functions are “less complicated” than

encoding/decoding. [CG14b, FMVW 14]

This talk

Efficient NMC for poly-size tampering circuits

Our Result

Main Result: “The next best thing”For any fixed polynomial P, there exists an efficient non-

malleable code for all circuits of size P .

reca

llCorollary-2: It is impossible to construct efficient encoding scheme which is non-malleable w.r.t. all efficient functions Feff .

For any fixed polynomial P, there exists an efficient non-malleable code for any family of functions |F | 2P.

Even more..

Caveat: Our results hold in CRS model.

NMC in CRS model

Fix some polynomial P

. We construct a family of efficient codes parameterized

by CRS: (ENCCRS, DECCRS)

We show that, w.h.p. over the random choice of CRS : (ENCCRS, DECCRS) is an NMC w.r.t. all tampering circuits of size P

Although P is chosen apriori, the tampering circuit can be chosen from the family of all

circuits of size P adaptively.

The Construction OverviewInput: s

Inner Encoding

C1

OuterEncoding

C

Ingredient: a t-wise independent hash function h

C C1 ||h( )C1

is Valid C C is of the form R || h( )R

We choose CRS such that |Circuit computing h| > P No circuit of size P can compute h on “too many” points. (Proof: Probabilistic Method)

Intuitions (outer encoding)

described by CRS

For every tampering function f there is a “small set” Sf such that if a tampered codeword is valid, then it is in Sf w.h.p.

The Construction OverviewInput: s

Inner Encoding

C1

OuterEncoding

C

Intuitions (outer encoding)

For every tampering function f there is a “small set” Sf such that if a tampered codeword is valid, then it is in Sf w.h.p.

We call this property Bounded Malleability which ensures that the tampered codeword does not

contain “too much information” about the input codeword

The Construction OverviewInput: s

Inner Encoding

C1

OuterEncoding

C

Intuitions (Inner encoding)

reca

ll

Output of Tamperf(s) can be thought of as some sort of leakage on C1

f can guess some bit(s) of C1 and if the guess is correct, leave C same otherwise overwrites to some invalid code.

Example

A leakage-resilient code

w.h.p. the leakage range is “small”: {same, , Sf}

Leakage-Resilient CodeDef [DDV 10]: A code (LRENC, LRDEC) is leakage-resilient w.r.t. G if

8 g G and 8 s : g(LRENC(s)) g(U)

Construction [DDV 10]: Let h’ be a t-wise hash function. Then to encode s choose a random r and output c = r || h’ (r)

Our Inner Encoding

We use the same construction but improved analysis to achieve optimal rate 1.

Analysis by [DDV 10] uses bound for extractor and

therefore, r s (rate 1/2) even if the leakage is small

We show: The construction is an LRC as long as: r > even if r <<s

Putting it togetherInput: s

Inner Encoding

C1

OuterEncoding

C

Bounded Malleable Code

Leakage Resilient Code

Non-Malleable Code

Few additional remarks

• Our Construction is Information Theoretic.• It achieves optimal rate 1• Efficient as runs in poly(log(1/)) ; is the error term.

An independent and concurrent work [CG’14] : Constructed NMC for same F but the encoding/decoding runs in poly(1 ) : “Inefficient” when is “negligible” !

……but I thought this is a CRYPTO talk !

Applications in Crypto

Main ApplicationTamper-resilient Cryptography

[DPW 10, LL 12, FMNV 14, FMNV 14a]

Tamper with memory and computation (IPSW ’06)

Tamper only with memory (GLMMR ‘04)

F

k k

F

• Most General Model: Complicated

• Limited existing results !• A Natural First Step : Simpler to handle

• Might be reasonable in practice !

Theoretical models of tampering

Main Focus

Tamper-resilient compiler using NMC [DPW 10]

K

F

K’

F’Compile:

1.Initialization: K' := C= ENC(K)Execution of F‘[C](x):

2. K = DEC(K‘)3. If K Output F[K](x) & Go to: 1 Else STOP.

NMC

Adv Sim

∃∀ Guarantee:

If (ENC,DEC) is non-malleable for then the compiled F’(k’) is tamper-resilient against any memory-tampering fF≈

Other Recent Applications

• FMNV 14a : Tamper-resilient RAM- considers tampering also with computation.

• AGMPP 14: Bit-commitment to String-commitment using NMC secure against bit-permutation.

• CMTV 14: One-bit CCA encryption=> Multi-bit CCA encryption using NMC secure against continuous bit-wise tampering.

• More applications ? – Open !

Non-malleable Key-derivation (NMKD)

Intuition

Source: X

𝐍𝐌𝐊𝐃

Output: Y

NMKD guarantees that if f(X) X then (Y, Y’) (U, Y’)

Tampered Source: f(X)

Output: Y’

𝐍𝐌𝐊𝐃

A dual of Non-Malleable Extractor

NMKD: Defintion

Definition: A function is NMKD w.r.t. F if 8 f following holds

Sample x←UIf f(x) = x return ((x),same) Else return (x), (f(x)))

Real, f

Sample x←U ; y ←U’If f(x) = x return (y,same) Else return (y, (f(x)))

Ideal, f

≈

Results

• Similar to our NMC result: We construct a family of efficient NMKD against Poly-size circuits. (CRS model)

• Our construction is optimal ½)

For any of size 2P, a randomly chosen 2t-wise independent hash function is an NMKD w.h.p. as long as t > P

Theorem (informal)

Application of NMKD : Tamper-Resilient Stream Cipher

s0s1

s2

s'0

s'1

SC(.) SC(.)

SC(.) SC(.)

x0

x’0 x’1

f0f1

x1

ModelNormal

Chain

Tampered Chain

SC(.)

x2/u

Application of NMKD : Tamper-Resilient Stream Cipher

s0s1

s2

s'0

s'1

x0

x’0 x’1

f0f1

x1

Normal Chain

Tampered Chain

x2/u

prg((.)) prg((.)) prg((.))

prg((.)) prg((.))

ConstructionTRSC= PRG NMKD

Conclusion

• The first construction of non-granular and efficient Non-malleable code.– Our construction is information theoretic and achieves

optimal rate.

• A new primitive Non-Malleable Key-derivation.– Application to construct Tamper-resilient Stream Cipher.

• Open:– New Application of NMKD.– Extend our result in plain model. (partial results by AGMPP 14)– More applications of NMC

Thank You !