for proposed capacity expansion of piyala...
Post on 05-Aug-2018
237 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
QRA STUDY REPORT for
PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL
AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
Submitted by
MAY 2014
Prepared by
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD. An ISO 9001 : 2008 COMPANY &
NABET / QCI ACCREDITED EIA CONSULTANT ORGANIZATION CONSULTING ENGINEERS
KOLKATA MUMBAI DELHI CHENNAI
BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED
CONTENTS
i
SECTION DESCRIPTION PAGE NO/ REMARKS
GLOSSARY OF TERMS I to IV
SECTION - 1 INTRODUCTION 1-1 to 1-2
1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 1-1
1.2 SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PROJECT 1-1
SECTION - 2 RISK ASSESSMENT 2-1 to 2-30
2.1 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION 2-1
2.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 2-6
2.3 RISK ANALYSIS 2-12
ENCLOSURES
PLATE 1 PLOT PLAN (4 SHEETS) IN DRAWING JACKET
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
I
Emergency A situation created by an accidental release or
spill of hazardous chemicals, which poses a
threat to the safety of workers, residents, the
environment or property.
Flash Point The Flash Point of a chemical is the lowest
temperature at which a flame will propagate
through the vapour of a combustible material to
the liquid surface. Put more simply, it is the
minimum temperature at which the liquid
produces a sufficient concentration of vapour
above that it forms an ignitable mixture with air.
It can be mentioned that the source of ignition
need not be an open flame, but could equally be,
for example, the surface of a hot plate, or a
steam pipe.
Hazard Any situation that has the potential for doing
damage to life, property and/or the environment.
Hazardous Chemical A chemical, which is explosive, flammable,
poisonous, corrosive, reactive or radio-active and
requires special care in handling because of the
hazards it poses to public health and
environment.
Hazards Identification Provides information on available extremely
hazardous substances (EHSs) on site, their
nature, quantities and also on storages and
conditions of storage.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
II
IDLH Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH)
level means the maximum level to which a
healthy worker can be exposed for 30 minutes
without suffering irreversible health effects or
escape impairing symptoms.
LC50
(Lethal Concentration 50)
LC50 is the concentration of a chemical, which
kills 50% of a sample population. This measure is
generally used when exposure to a chemical is
through the animal breathing it in.
LD50
(Lethal Dose 50)
LD50 is the measure generally used when
exposure is by swallowing, through skin contact,
or by injection.
LCLO Where acute exposure data are available (30
minutes to 4 hours exposure), the lowest
exposure concentration causing death or
irreversible health effects in any species is used
as the IDLH concentration. These data are often
reported as lethal concentration, low (LCLO).
Level of Concern (LOC) The concentration of an extremely hazardous
susbstances (EHS) in the air above which there
may be serious irreversible health effects or
death as a result of a single exposure for a
relatively short period of time.
On Site Emergency An accident, which takes place in a chemical
industry and its effects, are confined to the
factory premises involving only the people
working in the factory.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
III
Off Site Emergency If an accident takes place in a chemical industry
and its effects are felt outside the factory
premises, the situation thus generated is called
an off-site emergency.
Occupier “Occupier” in relation to any factory or premises,
means a person who has control over the affairs
of the factory or the premises and includes, in
relation to any substance, the person in
possession of the substance.
Risk The predicted or actual frequency of occurrence
of an adverse effect of a chemical or other
hazard.
Risk Analysis It is a relative measure of the likelihood of various
possible hazardous events and enable the
emergency plan to focus on the greatest potential
risk.
STEL (Short Term Exposure
Limit)
STEL is the maximum permissible concentration
of a material, generally expressed in ppm in air,
for a defined short period of time (typically 5 or
15 minutes, depending upon the country). This
"concentration" is generally a time-weighted
average over the period of exposure. These
values, which may differ from country to country,
are often backed up by regulation and therefore
may be legally enforceable.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
IV
Threshold Planning Quantity A quantity designated for each chemical which
requires the occupier to take various steps in
preparation of emergency planning like
preparation of on-site plans, submission of
information for preparation of off-site plan or
making a safety report as per Manufacture,
Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals
Rules, 1989.
TLV (Threshold Limit Value) TLV is the maximum permissible concentration of
a material, generally expressed in parts per
million in air for some defined period of time
(often 8 hours, but sometimes for 40 hours per
week over an assumed working lifetime). These
values, which may differ from country to country,
are often backed up by regulation and therefore
may be legally enforceable.
Toxic End Point The threshold for serious injury from exposure to
a toxic substance in the air.
Vulnerable Zone It is an estimated geographical area that may be
affected by the release of hazardous substance
that could cause irreversible acute health effects
or death to human population within the area
following an accidental release.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-1 BPCL 1-1
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
SECTION – 1 I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) is a fortune 500 oil refining,
exploration and marketing PSU with Navratna status. BPCL has multiple refinery
units in Mumbai, Kochi, Numaligarh and Bina.
Bharat Petroleum’s Mumbai Refinery is one of the most versatile Refineries in
India. With successful implementation of various projects and de-bottlenecking,
our Refineries currently process about 12 Million Metric Tons of crude oil per
annum.
BPCL has also many common user POL Terminals spread across the country.
BPCL now wants to expand the capacity of the existing POL Terminal at Piyala,
near Faridabad, Haryana by adding additional tankage.
The proposed project is an expansion project of the existing POL terminal with
existing storage capacity 1,62,790 kL. After expansion, the capacity of the POL
Terminal will be 2,27,360 kL.
1.2 SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PROJECT
Location
The Project Site is located at Piyala which is in the south side of Faridabad town
in the state of Haryana. The distance between Piyala and Faridabad is around
20 km. The nearest railway station is Ballabgarh on the Delhi-Mathura triple
track broad-gauge line. Nearest domestic and international airport is at New
Delhi.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-1 BPCL 1-2
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Hazardous Chemicals
After proposed expansion, the terminal will cater to receipt and storage of
petroleum products as follows:
(i) Diesel (HSD),
(ii) Kerosene (SKO)
(iii) Petrol (MS)
(iv) Aviation Turbine Fuel(ATF)
The Product is received through pipeline from BPCL Mumbai & Bina Refineries.
The storage terminal will have a gross storage capacity of approx. 2, 27,360 kL
for product storage. There will be routing of different products in their designated
tanks. The existing as well as proposed expansion capacity of the POL Terminal
is furnished below:
Name of Product
Existing Capacity (kL)
Proposed Capacity
Expansion (kL)
Total Capacity after Expansion (kL)
HSD 63,520 890 64,410
MS 82,670 27,640 1,10,310
SKO 16,600 0 16,600
ATF 0 36,040 36,040
TOTAL 1,62,790 64,570 2,27,360
The dispatch of products will be done through a) Tank Lorries to Retail outlets,
b) Railway Wagons to Northern India Depots/installations, c) pipeline to BPCL
Bijwasan Installation.
----------- o -----------
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-1 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
SECTION - 2
RISK ASSESSMENT
2.1 RISK ASSESSMENT
2.1.1 Hazards Identification
Hazard identification is the first step in Risk Analysis / Hazard Analysis which
involves the following:
- Types and quantities of hazardous chemicals
- Location of the facilities
- Potential hazards associated with spills or release
a) Types and Quantities of Hazardous Chemicals
The following hazardous chemicals are proposed to be stored in the proposed project:
(i) Motor Spirit (MS)
(ii) High Speed Diesel (HSD),
(iii) Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO)
(iv) Aviation Turbine Fuel(ATF)
Types of Hazards
As per the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 2000, HSD, SKO and ATF are highly flammable chemicals and MS is very highly flammable chemical. The following scenario of
emergency may arise due to the accidental release of chemicals:
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-2 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Name of Chemical Consequence
MS Fire
HSD Fire
SKO Fire
ATF Fire
Inventory of Hazardous Chemicals
Name of Product
Existing Capacity (kL)
Proposed Capacity
Expansion (KL)
Total Capacity after Expansion (kL)
HSD 63,520 890 64,410
MS 82,670 27,640 1,10,310
SKO 16,600 0 16,600
ATF 0 36,040 36,040
TOTAL 1,62,790 64,570 2,27,360
b) Location of Facilities
The location of MS, HSD, SKO and ATF storage tank is marked in Plate 1: Plot Plan.
Storage Tanks
The storage terminal will have tanks for the storage of petroleum products of the
classes A, B and C.
The tanks for class A shall be built as internal floating roof tanks, while fixed roof
tanks shall be considered for class B and C. The followings tanks have been
envisaged for the project.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-3 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
The classification of the products is summarized below for ready reference:
Name of Product Full Name Class*
MS Motor Spirit A
HSD High Speed Diesel B
SKO Superior Kerosene Oil B
ATF Aviation Turbine Fuel B
* Petroleum Class ‘A’ - means petroleum having a flash point below 230 C Petroleum Class ‘B’ - means petroleum having a flash point of 230C and above
but below 650C Petroleum Class ‘C’ - means petroleum having a flash point of 650C and above
but below 930C
The design of the installation is in accordance with Indian standards OISD
117,118,141 and as contained in Petroleum Rules and approved by The Chief
Controller of Explosives, Nagpur (CCOE). The details of product storage / tank
firm are as follows:
Details of Existing Tanks
Tank No. Product
Tank Roof Type
Tank Diameter
(m)
Tank Height
(m)
Gross Capacity
(kL)
Pumpable Capacity
(kL) Above Ground Tanks
TK-2 MS FR 43.0 20.0 26750 25400 TK-3 MS FR 43.0 20.0 26750 25400 TK-4 MS FR 43.0 20.0 26750 25400 TK-5 HSD FR 33.0 20.0 15600 14950 TK-6 HSD FR 33.0 20.0 15600 14950 TK-7 HSD FR 33.0 20.0 15600 14950 TK-8 HSD FR 33.0 20.0 15600 14950 TK-9 SKO FR 26.0 17.0 8200 7700
TK-10 SKO FR 26.0 17.0 8200 7700 TK-11 SLOP CR 9.0 13.5 890 858 TK-12 SLOP CR 9.0 13.5 890 858 TK-13 HSD CR 9.0 13.5 890 858
Under Ground Tanks UT-1 MS U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-4 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Details of Existing Tanks
Tank No. Product
Tank Roof Type
Tank Diameter
(m)
Tank Height
(m)
Gross Capacity
(kL)
Pumpable Capacity
(kL) UT-2 MS U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200 UT-3 HSD U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200 UT-4 SKO U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200 UT-5 MS /
ETHANOL
U.G 4.0 16.2 200 200
UT-6 HSD U.G 2.012 5.0 15 15 UT-7 HSD U.G 2.012 5.0 15 15 UT-8 SLOP U.G 2.012 6.75 20 20 UT-9 SLOP U.G 2.012 6.75 20 20
Details of Proposed Tanks
Tank No. Product
Tank Roof Type
Tank Diameter
(m)
Tank Height
(m)
Gross Capacity
(kL)
Pumpable Capacity
(kL) Above Ground Tanks
TK-1 MS FR 43.0 20.0 26750 25400 TK-14 ATF CR 24.0 20.0 9000 9000 TK-15 ATF CR 24.0 20.0 9000 9000 TK-16 ATF CR 24.0 20.0 9000 9000 TK-17 ATF CR 24.0 20.0 9000 9000 TK-18 HSD CR 9.0 13.5 890 858 TK-19 MS CR 9.0 13.5 890 858
Under Ground Tanks UT-10 SLOP
ATF U.G 2.012 6.75 20 20
UT-11 SLOP ATF
U.G 2.012 6.75 20 20
All the tanks are installed in separate dyked enclosures as per OISD standards.
c) Potential Hazards Associated with Spills or Release
There are mainly Fire/Explosion Hazards associated with the spillage or leakage
of hazardous chemicals.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-5 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Flammable Chemicals are categorized into five categories in the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 2000 as defined below:
Flammable Gases : Gases which at 200C and at standard pressure of
101.3 kPa are:-
i) ignitable when in a mixture of 13 percent or less by
volume with air, or
ii) have a flammable range with air of at least 12
percentage points regardless of the lower
flammable* limits.
Extremely Flammable Liquids
: Chemicals which have flash point lower than or
equal to 230C and boiling point less than 350C.
Highly Flammable Liquids
: Chemicals, which have a flash point, lower than or
equal to 600C but higher than 230C.
Flammable Liquids
: Chemicals which have a flash point higher than 60oC
but lower than 900 C.
(*) The flammability shall be determined by tests or by calculation in
accordance with methods adopted by International Standards
Organisation ISO Number 10156 of 1990 or by Bureau of Indian
Standards ISI Number 1446 of 1985.
As per the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 2000, Toxic chemicals are the chemicals having the
following values of acute toxicity due to its physical and chemical properties and
capable of producing major accident hazards:
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-6 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Sl. No
Toxicity Oral toxicity LD50
(mg/kg)
Dermal toxicity LD50
(mg/kg)
Inhalation toxicity LC50
(mg/l)
1. Extremely toxic
> 5 <40 < 0.5
2. Highly toxic >5-50 >40-200 < 0.5 - 2.0
3. Toxic >50-200 > 200-1000 >2-10
2.2 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis is the second step of Risk Assessment and it includes
estimation of the vulnerable zone or zone of influence which requires use of
some computer models.
2.2.1 Vulnerable Zone (Zone of Influence)
As per the “Manual on Emergency Preparedness for Chemical Hazards”,
(MEPCH) published by MoEF, the vulnerable zone or zone of influence should
be estimated considering the maximum loss of containment or catastrophic
vessel rupture which leads to spillage / leakage of maximum single storage for
each hazardous chemical. It is always advisable that the vulnerable zone should
be restricted within factory premises. In order to achieve this, the following are
generally recommended:
i) Reduction of the quantity of hazardous substances stored ii) Increase of the number of storages iii) Isolation of storages that might lead to cascading effect iv) Substitution of extremely hazardous substances with less hazardous
substance.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-7 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
The methodology as proposed in MEPCH for estimation of vulnerable zone or
zone of influence is identical to Worst Case Scenario as defined by USEPA. The Worst Case Scenario is defined by USEPA as follows:
The release of the entire contents of the largest vessel in the process, with
essentially none of the safety systems and devices that are in place to prevent
such an occurrence functioning as designed. The release under Worst Case Scenario is assumed to occur under the following conditions:
- Over a 10 minute time period,
- Under the most stable atmospheric and weather conditions (Atmospheric
Stability Class F, Wind Speed of 1.5 m/s, and Ambient Temperature of
250C), which minimizes the dispersion and dilution of the release and
presents the absolute worst case that could possibly occur.
- All releases to take place at ground level.
The Worst Case Release may never occur at a facility. For this reason, EPA
also recommends reporting of an Alternative Release Scenario and is generally
accepted to be more likely, or more credible than the Worst Case Scenario.
When selecting an Alternative Release Scenario, EPA suggests a facility to
consider scenarios such as transfer hose releases, pipe / valve / flange leaks,
pump seal leaks etc.
It is also recommended in “Manual on Emergency Preparedness for Chemical
Hazards”, (MEPCH) for toxic gas releases that 1/10th of the value of Immediately
Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) concentration, or lethal concentration low
(LCLO) or level of concern (LOC) value of the chemical concerned should be
taken as the effective concentration. This concentration also matches with
EPA-specified toxic endpoint and this is also the STEL (Short Term Exposure
Limit) value for 15 minutes exposure as recommended in The Factories Act,
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-8 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
1948 (Act No. 63 of 1948), as amended by the Factories (Amendment) Act, 1987
(Act 20 of 1987)
Level of Concern (LOC) for a Thermal Radiation is a threshold level of thermal
radiation, usually the level above that a hazard may exist. As per EPA, the
flammable endpoints represent vapor cloud explosion distances based on
overpressure of 1 psi (0.07 kg / cm2) or radiant heat distances based on exposure to 5 kW/m2 for 40 seconds.
2.2.2 Computer Models
Computer Simulation
The effects of characterized hazards were generated by computer simulations.
The software used is BREEZE HAZ developed by Trinity Consultants, USA. The
package is extensively used by leading Government and private sector
organizations in India and abroad, and its use is accepted by the statutory
authorities.
The effects when superimposed on physical layouts of sources of loss of
containment and of their neighboring environment provided the essential
elements of Risk Analysis.
Loss of Containment Models
Quantitative Risk Assessment requires quantification of the possible rates of
escape of a given chemical, the duration of release and hence the mass
available either for combustion or explosion or to produce toxic effect depending
on the nature of the chemical involved.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-9 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
The behavior of release is influenced by physico - chemical properties of the
specific chemical(s), pressure and temperature of either storage, pipe line or
where the leakage occurs, ambient conditions and possible geographical location
at which the release might take place. The post-release phenomena are
influenced by prevailing weather conditions.
A few models of catastrophic failure of storage vessels have been considered to
generate the worst-case scenarios. Historically pressure vessels designed, built
and maintained according to Codes such as ASME do not fail on their own.
Failures are invariably associated with influence of external force or mal -
operation.
Conditions of Occurrence and Behavior of Characterized Generic Hazards
Various outflow models have been used to calculate the rate of release of chemicals.. The models are as follows:
a) Pool Spread and Vaporization Liquid spilt on the ground from the piping/equipment under study form a circular
pool of the liquid which may spread up to the bund (dyke) wall. Mass and heat
transfer occurs resulting in evaporation or boiling of liquid. The extent of spillage,
vaporization rate and mass vaporized of flammable/explosive/toxic liquid is
calculated by this model. This model can be linked to "Pool Fire Model" and/or
"Dense Cloud Dispersion, as necessary.
b) Pool Fire
Following an accidental spill of volatile and flammable liquid, a confined pool in
a bunded area or an unconfined pool in unbunded area will form. The liquid will
burn as POOL FIRE under influence of an external flame.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-10 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Thermal radiation generated by such pool fires can have damaging local impacts
on cables, signal lines, pipe work, valves, equipment & structures etc. and
also on people (typically plant personnel) in the immediate neighborhood. Other
people in the surrounding area may also be affected.
c) Dense Cloud Dispersion
If a flammable vapor / gas cloud does not ignite immediately after
release/formation, it undergoes atmospheric dispersion in accordance with
prevalent wind direction, relative humidity, wind speed and stability category
type, etc. As the cloud disperses, it dilutes and traverses longer distance and
envelopes larger area till such time its concentration in air falls below its Lower
Flammable Limit (LFL). Beyond this, the diluted cloud becomes harmless for
flammable hazard. But within this region any source of ignition may lead to Vapor
Cloud Explosion.
For toxic gases, however, the concentration pertaining to and below the
Immediate Danger to Life & Health ( IDLH ) value is generally considered to be
harmless.
d) Flammable Jet
The jet flame radiation model predicts the visible length, approximate diameter
and the lift-off distance of vertical gaseous jet flame resulting from high pressure
pipeline accidents in which the escaping flammable gas is ignited. It also predicts
the thermal radiation flask levels.
2.2.3 Thermal Damage Criteria
The following properties measure how readily and easily, a chemical will catch
fire :
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-11 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
▪ Volatility ▪ Flash Point ▪ Flammability Limits
Volatility is a measure of how easily a chemical evaporates. A flammable liquid
must begin to evaporate forming a vapor above the liquid before it can burn. The
more volatile a chemical, the faster it evaporates and quicker a flammable vapor
cloud is formed.
Flash point is the lowest temperature where a flammable liquid will evaporate
enough to catch on fire if an ignition source is present. The lower the flash point
of a chemical, the easier it is for a fire to start.
Flammability limits, called the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) and the Upper Expose
Limit (UEL), are boundaries of flammable region of a vapor cloud,. These limits
are percentages that represent a concentration of the chemical (vapour form) in
the air. If the chemical vapour comes into contact with an ignition source, it will
burn only if its fuel – air concentration is between the LEL and UEL.
Thermal Radiation arising out from a fire may cause injuries and even death to
people exposed to it. A large fire may cause ignition to buildings and equipment
steel structures melt due to exposure to fires at light watt doses. Skin exposed to
thermal radiation will absorb heat so that its temperature is raised, its structure
destroyed and burning occurs. The "degree of burning" is related to the degree
to which the skin is destroyed, namely:
1st degree => inner layer of skin is not destroyed - any damage to the skin is recoverable.
2nd degree => all outer skin is destroyed and some inner - damage
may or may not be recoverable.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-12 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
3rd degree => all the skin is destroyed in the irradiated zone - there will be permanent damage unless new skin is grafted on.
The degree of burning that results from a fire hazard will be function of the level
of thermal radiation that occurs and the time of exposure to that radiation. These
thermal radiation hazards emanate from exposure to Flash Fires and Pool Fire.
The following table lists some physiological effects at specific thermal radiation
levels and durations (on bare screen) :
Radiation Intensity (kw/m2)
Time for Severe Pain (seconds)
Time for 2nd Degree Burns (seconds)
1 115 663 2 45 187 3 27 92 4 18 57 5 13 40 6 11 30 8 7 20 10 5 14 12 4 11
Note : The durations that correspond to effect like pain or second-degree burns can vary considerably depending on circumstances. The effects as mentioned above were observed on bare skin that was exposed directly to thermal radiation.
2.3 RISK ANALYSIS
Risk Analysis is the third part of the Risk Assessment process. Risk analysis serves the following purposes: ▪ provide a relative measure of the likelihood and severity of various
possible hazardous events ▪ enable the emergency plan to focus on the greatest potential risks
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-13 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
2.3.1 Probable Hazard Scenarios
As recommended in the RMP document of USEPA, both Worst Case Scenario and Alternative Scenario are considered while reporting the probable hazard scenarios. The following table summarizes the probable hazard scenarios which are considered for computer simulation study:
Case Type
Hazardous Chemical (Tank No.)
Description Simulation Model
Worst Case
MS (TK-2/3/4)
Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of MS
Confined pool fire
HSD (TK-5/6/7/8)
Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of HSD.
Confined pool fire
SKO
(TK-9/10)
Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of SKO.
Confined pool fire
ATF
(TK-14/15)
Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of ATF.
Confined pool fire
ATF
(TK-16/17)
Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the largest storage tank of ATF.
Confined pool fire
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-14 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Case Type
Hazardous Chemical (Tank No.)
Description Simulation Model
Alternate Case I
MS
Leak due to pipe failure in dyke area [Diameter 250 mm, Hole diameter 20 mm, pressure 2 atm] in storage tank inlet line.
Jet fire
HSD
Leak due to pipe failure in dyke area [Diameter 250 mm, Hole diameter 20 mm, pressure 2 atm] in storage tank inlet line.
Jet fire
SKO
Leak due to pipe failure in dyke area [Diameter 250 mm, Hole diameter 20 mm, pressure 2 atm] in storage tank inlet line.
Jet fire
ATF
Leak due to pipe failure in dyke area [Diameter 250 mm, Hole diameter 20 mm, pressure 2 atm] in storage tank inlet line.
Jet fire
Alternate Case II
MS
Rupture of 200 mm downstream pipe line resulting in spillage of MS in TLF Gantry area.
Unconfined pool fire.
HSD
Rupture of 200 mm downstream pipe line resulting in spillage of HSD in TLF Gantry area.
Unconfined pool fire.
SKO
Rupture of 200 mm downstream pipe line resulting in spillage of SKO in TLF Gantry area.
Unconfined pool fire.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-15 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Case Type
Hazardous Chemical (Tank No.)
Description Simulation Model
ATF
Rupture of 200 mm downstream pipe line resulting in spillage of ATF in TLF Gantry area.
Unconfined pool fire.
a) Worst Case Scenario
As recommended in US EPA, the release under Worst Case Scenario is
assumed to occur under the following conditions:
- Over a 10 minute time period,
- Under the most stable atmospheric and weather conditions (Atmospheric
Stability Class F, Wind Speed of 1.5 m/s, and Ambient Temperature of
250C), which minimizes the dispersion and dilution of the release and
presents the absolute worst case that could possibly occur.
- All releases to take place at ground level.
Maximum loss of containment due to catastrophic vessel rupture of the
largest storage tank of MS/HSD/SKO/ATF resulting in spillage of
MS/HSD/SKO from the tank inside the respective dyke area, which will
ultimately produce a confined pool fire.
The volume of MS/HSD/SKO/ATF released under Worst Case Scenario
will be equal to the volume of the liquid in the largest tank as mentioned
as follows:
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-16 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Hazardous Chemical
Maximum volume released under Worst Case Scenario (m3)
MS : 26750
HSD : 15600
SKO : 8200
ATF : 9000
b) Alternative Case Scenario
Alternate case scenarios are releases that are more likely to occur than worst-
case releases and these consider both active and passive mitigation systems.
During this release, a realistic release profile, coupled with typical meteorological
conditions and wind speed are considered. It is also assumed that administrative
procedures and engineered controls are in place and as a result, a much more
realistic model of a likely outcome is expected.
Alternate Case I
Pipeline leakage in dyke area which will ultimately produce a Jet fire for
MS/HSD/SKO/ATF
Alternate Case II
Rupture of Truck loading pipeline in TLF Gantry area which will ultimately
produce an unconfined pool fire for MS/HSD/SKO/ATF
2.3.2 Results of Computer Simulation
Computer simulation for fire hazards was done considering MS/HSD/SKO/ATF as equivalent to n-heptane. As the Flash Point of n-heptane is far below than that
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-17 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
of the Hazardous chemicals under consideration, the results obtained during computer simulation follow a conservative approach. The results of computer simulation for the probable hazardous scenarios as identified above are listed below:
a) Worst Case Scenario Worst Case for Tank Farm-1 (Tank No. TK-2/3/4)
i) Considerations:
Scenario : Worst Case Scenario Meteorological
Conditions
: Atmospheric Stability Class F,
Wind Speed of 1.5 m/s, and
Ambient Temperature of 250C
Release type : Finite duration (600 seconds)
Pool Type : Confined pool within a rectangular dyke
Pool Dimension
: Length : 144m, width : 138m, pool liquid
height : 1.65m
Model Used : Confined Pool Fire
Hazardous Chemical : MS
ii) Result: The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:
Thermal Flux (kw /m2)
Distance from center of pool (m) Front View
(View along dike width) Side View
(View along dike 31.5 146.74 147.68
12.6 238.25 237.29 5.1 361.47 358.16
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-18 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
The "thermal flux impact zones" for such an event is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 1 of 4).
Worst Case for Tank Farm-2 (Tank No. TK-5/6/7/8)
i) Considerations:
Scenario : Worst Case Scenario Meteorological
Conditions
: Atmospheric Stability Class F,
Wind Speed of 1.5 m/s, and
Ambient Temperature of 250C
Release type : Finite duration (600 seconds)
Pool Type : Confined pool within a rectangular dyke
Pool Dimension : Length : 117m, width : 106.18m, pool
liquid height : 1.65m
Model Used : Confined Pool Fire
Hazardous Chemical : HSD
ii) Result:
The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:
Thermal Flux (kw /m2)
Distance from center of pool (m) Front View
(View along dike width) Side View
(View along dike 31.5 118.55 119.98
12.6 193.93 191.93 5.1 295.82 289.40
The "thermal flux impact zones" for Worst case scenario is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 1 of 4)
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-19 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
Worst Case for Tank Farm-3 (Tank No. TK-9/10/14/15and TK-16/17)
i) Considerations:
Scenario : Worst Case Scenario Meteorological
Conditions
: Atmospheric Stability Class F,
Wind Speed of 1.5 m/s, and
Ambient Temperature of 250C
Release type : Finite duration (600 seconds)
Pool Type : Confined pool within a rectangular dyke
Pool Dimension : Length : 84m, width : 84m, pool liquid
height : 1.65m
Model Used : Confined Pool Fire
Hazardous Chemical : SKO/ATF
ii) Result:
The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:
Thermal Flux (kw /m2)
Distance from center of pool (m) Front View
(View along dike width) Side View
(View along dike 31.5 93.07 93.07
12.6 152.20 152.20 5.1 232.70 232.70
The "thermal flux impact zones" for Worst case scenario is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 1 of 4)
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-20 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
b) Alternate Case Scenario-I MS/HSD/SKO/ATF
i) Considerations :
Scenario : Alternate Case Scenario-I
Meteorological
Conditions
: Atmospheric Stability Class D,
Wind Speed of 3 m/s, and
Ambient Temperature of 250C
Release type : Finite duration (180 seconds)
Source Type Gas outflow due to pipeline leak from
MS/HSD/SKO/ATF Pipeline inside the
dyke area.
Pipe dia : 250 mm
Hole diameter : 20 mm
Model Used : Jet Fire Model
ii) Result:
The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:
Radiation (kw /m2) Distance from center of Jet (m)
31.5
NO RESULT OBTAINED 12.6 5.1
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-21 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
c) Alternate Case Scenario-II
Motor Spirit(MS) at TLF Gantry
i) Considerations:
Scenario : Alternate Case Scenario-II Meteorological Conditions
: Ambient Pressure 1.01 bar, Wind Speed of 3.0 m/s, Relative Humidity 50 % and Ambient Temperature of 250C
Type of spill : Continuous Duration of spill : 180 seconds Surface type : Concrete Release rate : 2.5 m3 /min
Considering 50% of the flow rate(300 m3/hr) of Truck Loading Pump.
Model Used : Unconfined Pool Fire Model
ii) Result:
The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:
Thermal Flux (kw /m2)
Distance from center of pool (m)
31.5 27.46 12.6 37.73 5.1 50.32
The “Thermal flux impact zones” of Alternate case scenario-II for MS is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 2 of 4)
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-22 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
High Speed Diesel(HSD) at TLF Gantry
i) Considerations:
Scenario : Alternate Case Scenario-II Meteorological Conditions
: Ambient Pressure 1.01 bar, Wind Speed of 3.0 m/s, Relative Humidity 50 % and Ambient Temperature of 250C
Type of spill : Continuous Duration of spill : 180 seconds Surface type : Concrete Release rate : 1.25 m3 /min
Considering 50% of the flow rate (150 m3/hr) of Truck Loading Pump.
Model Used : Unconfined Pool Fire Model ii) Result:
The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:
Thermal Flux (kw /m2)
Distance from center of pool (m)
31.5 21.72 12.6 29.16 5.1 38.44
The “Thermal flux impact zones” of Alternate case scenario-II for HSD is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 3 of 4)
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-23 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
SKO/ATF at TLF Gantry
i) Considerations:
Scenario : Alternate Case Scenario-II Meteorological Conditions
: Ambient Pressure 1.01 bar, Wind Speed of 3.0 m/s, Relative Humidity 50 % and Ambient Temperature of 250C
Type of spill : Continuous Duration of spill : 180 seconds Surface type : Concrete Release rate : 0.625 m3 /min
Considering 50% of the flow rate (75 m3/hr) of Truck Loading Pump.
Model Used : Unconfined Pool Fire Model
ii) Result :
The highlights of simulations are furnished in the following table:
Thermal Flux (kw /m2)
Distance from center of pool (m)
31.5 16.67 12.6 22.24 5.1 29.92
The “Thermal flux impact zones” of Alternate case scenario-II for SKO/ATF is shown in Plate 1: Plot Plan (Sheet 4 of 4)
2.3.3 Recommendations & conclusions The recommendations & conclusions as revealed from Risk Analysis study
are as follows:
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-24 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
i) The distances of the vulnerable zones mostly fall within the plant
periphery.
Moreover, outside the plant boundary there is no habitation within 200 meter
of plant periphery and the same acts as the Safety Buffer Zone.
ii) Recommendations made by M.B. Lal Committee should be implemented.
iii) Regular maintenance of the equipment including storage tanks and
pipelines should be done to avoid any major failure. Design and
fabrication data of all the equipment should be maintained.
iv) Leak Detection System has to be provided at various places inside the
licensed area.
v) All Instruments and trip interlocks should be checked and calibrated at
regular intervals to prevent any wrong signaling and consequent failures.
vi) Fire Protection facilities should be made as per the OISD 117 guidelines.
vii) Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances should be
always kept in good working condition. Safety appliances should be
checked and kept in good working condition.
viii) Mock Drills should be conducted at regular intervals.
ix) Non -sparking tools should be used for maintenance to avoid any
spark.
x) The storage tanks, pipelines and facilities in Tank Truck loading area
should be properly earthed to avoid accumulation of static charges.
QRA STUDY REPORT FOR PROPOSED CAPACITY EXPANSION OF PIYALA POL TERMINAL AT PIYALA, NEAR FARIDABAD, HARYANA
SECTION-2 2-25 BPCL
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS
xi) Entry of personnel should be restricted inside the licensed area.
xii) Two High Velocity Long Range (HVLR) monitors are to be positioned for
each tank farm area.
----------- o -----------
top related