from collision to exploitation: unleashing use-after-free...

FromCollisionToExploitation:UnleashingUse-After-Free

VulnerabilitiesinLinuxKernelWenXu,Juanru Li,Junliang Shu,Wenbo Yang,

Tianyi Xie,Yuanyuan Zhang,Dawu GuGroupofSoftwareSecurityInProgressLabofCryptologyandComputerSecurity

ShanghaiJiaoTongUniversity

CCS2015 1GoSSIP@LoCCSShanghaiJiaoTongUniversity

Introduction

• Linuxkernelbecomesawelcomedtarget– Acompletecontrolofthesystem– Lessprotectionandmitigationschemes

• Exploitingkernelbugsisnon-trivial– Fewdocumentedtechniques– Unpredictablememorylayout

• Ourgoalistofindagenericwaytoexploitinguse-after-freebugsinLinuxkernel.

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Use-after-freeinLinuxkernel

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• Option2istofree anobjectwithoutcleaningthepointer– obj[index]isso-called“adanglingpointer”sinceitpointstoafreedspace

• Option3istouse anobjectwithoutcheckingwhetherthepointerisvalid– Here“use”representsinvokingafunctionpointerbeingstoredintheobject

Exploitinguse-after-freebugs

• Ourgoaltoisre-occupythevulnerablefreedobjectwithcontrollable data.– Thefree memoryistobereused,whichprovidesanopportunityforattackerstore-controlthefreedspace.

– Controllabledatacontributestounintendedcontrol-flowhijackingordatacorruptioninlaterusing.

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Challenges• Stability:The“hole”shouldbere-occupiedbyour

candidates.– Hundredsofscheduledtasksallaffectkernelallocators.

• Separation:The“hole”shouldbere-occupiedbypropercandidates.– Differenttypesofkernelobjectscannotbestoredinthesame

memoryregionduetoSLAB/SLUB.• Data-control:The“hole”shouldbefilledwithmeaningful

content.– Thecontentofkernelobjectsareusuallynotfullycontrolledby

users.• Universality:Onestrategyregardlessoftypesofvulnerable

objects.

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Insight:MemoryCollision

• Kernelrecyclesfreememoryforfutureuse.–Memorylimitation– Performancerequirement– Reductionoftheentropyofmemorylayout

• Memorycollisionattackstrategy– Tousepropercandidatesandletthembechosenbythekerneltooccupytherecentlyfreedspace• Infact,tocollidewiththefreed“hole”

– Probabilisticmodelwithhighsuccessrate

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Overview

• Object-basedmemorycollisionattack– Candidate:kernelbuffersallocatedbykernelallocators

• Physmap-basedmemorycollisionattack– Candidate:physmap– Generic,stableandreliable

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Overview

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Object-basedAttack

• Intuitivestrategy– Tousekernelobjectsoverwritingkernelobjects

• KernelobjectsarestoredinvariouskindsofSLABcaches.– Differentcachesarefordifferentobjectswhichimpliesanaturalseparation.

– HowtoinsertanobjectoftypeAintothecachesstoringvulnerableobjectsoftypeB?

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Object-basedAttack

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Object-basedAttack#1CollisionsbetweenObjectsoftheSameSize

• Savior:NewlyadoptedSLUBallocators– Putobjectsofthesamesizeintoonecacheforperformancepromotion.

• Candidate:kmalloc()buffers– Usedbykerneltostoretemporarydatacommonly– Easytocreatebyusers:sendmmsg()• Controllablesize:Lengthofcontrolmessage• Controllablecontent:Dataofcontrolmessage• Allpassedfromuserspace

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Object-basedAttack#1CollisionsbetweenObjectsoftheSameSize

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• Noticethatthelengthofthemessagebuffershouldbethesameasthesizeofthevulnerableobject(512).

• Limitation:– kmalloc()allocatesspaceofaroundedsize like32,48,64,128,256,512,1024…

– Whatifthevulnerableobjecthasasizeof576?• 512<576<1024

Object-basedAttack#2CollisionsbetweenObjectsofDifferentSizes

• Ifalltheobjectsinacachearefreed,thewholespaceofthecacheisgoingtoberecycledbythekernel.– Isthespacedefinitely tobere-usedforacachestoringtheobjectsoftheoriginaltype?No.

– Kernelnevercaresaboutthehistoryoffreememory.Memoryisjustmemory.

– Chancesarethatthespaceisgoingtobeusedforanewcachestoringobjectsofadifferenttype.

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Object-basedAttack#2CollisionsbetweenObjectsofDifferentSizes

• Theattackcoderemainstobethesame.– Nocareaboutthesizeofourmessagebuffer– Pickakmalloc()sizeyouprefer

• Discussions– Theoretically,collisionsalwayshappeneventually.– Practically,suchakindofblindstrategysuffersalowsuccessrate.

– Usuallyduetotheresourcelimitation,oneusercannotowntoomanykmalloc()buffersinthekernel.

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Physmap-basedAttack

• Getridofrestrictionsprovidedbythekernelallocators.– Again,memoryisjustmemory.Thekernelneverclaimsthatthememoryonceforkernelobjectsisalwaysforkernelobjects.

–Wechooseacandidateknownasphysmap toachieveagenericandstableattackagainstuse-after-freevulnerabilitiesinLinuxkernel.

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Physmap-basedAttack

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Physmap, thedirect-mappedmemory,ismemoryinthekernelspacewhichwoulddirectlymapthememoryintheuserspaceintothekernelspace.

Physmap-basedAttack

• AnEXCELLENTchoice– Easycreation:iterativelymmap()intheuserspace– Data-control:fullycontrolledbyattackersforsure– Largesize:

• Physmap filledwithourcraftedpayloadgrowsinthekernelbyoccupyingfreekernelspace.

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Physmap-basedAttack

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• Anintuitivestrategyistocreatealargeamountofvulnerableobjectsandfreeallofthem,thendothekernelsprayingbyphysmapandhopethecollisionhappens.

• Amorereliableapproach?

Physmap-basedAttack• Wesprayvulnerableobjectsingroups,foreachgroup:– ConsideringNobjectsasvulnerableones,wewilllatertriggertheUAFvulnerabilityonthem.

– ConsideringM(M>>N)objectsaspaddingones,wewilljustreleasetheminanormalway.

• Result:• (1)Largepiecesoffreedmemoryiswaitingforphysmap withpayloadtooccupy.

• (2)Wehavevulnerablefreedobjectsscatteralloverthekernelspace.

• Thesesharplyincreasethereliabilityofsuchaprobabilisticattack.

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Physmap-basedAttack

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• Inpractical,wediscoverthatuserscangetcertaindatainsidemanykernelobjectsbyspecificsyscalls.

• Thatcouldhelptoinformattackersthatthecollisionshavealreadyhappenedandthesprayingshouldbestopped.– Further increasethereliability

SecurityEffectiveness• Physmap-basedattacktotallyavoidstheseparation

providedbythekernelallocatorsandachievesoverwriting.• Physmap originatesfrommmap()areainuserspace,thusit

isfullyunderthecontrolofattackers.• Physmap iseffectiveregardlessofwhattypeandsizeofthe

vulnerableobjectwhichhasause-after-freevulnerability.• Certainsprayingtricksandpotentialapproachestoleaking

informationhelpstoincreasetheprobabilitythatmemorycollisionshappen.

• Physmap-basedattackleveragestheinherentworkingmechanismofthekernel,whichcannotbemitigatedeasily.

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Evaluation

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• Hereistheperformanceofalltheseattackstargetingonthecustomvulnerablekernelmodule.

• Infact,theattackperformsworseon64bitLinuxplatform.Andalsobothphysmap-basedattackandobject-basedattack#1haveahighsuccessrate.

Evaluation

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• WeachieveareliableuniversalrootsolutionondiverseAndroiddevicesbyleverageCVE-2015-3636,atypicaluse-after-freevulnerabilitiesinLinuxkernelcreditedtotheauthorbasedonphysmap-basedattack.

• Thatimpliesourattackisappliedbothonx86/x86_64andARMarchitectures.

Conclusion

• Weproposeanoval attacktechniquestounleashuse-after-freevulnerabilitiesinLinuxkernelwhichfeaturesreliabilityanduniversality.

• Countermeasures– Toimposerestrictionsonavailablememoryresourcesofaparticularuser.

– Tomakeisolationsamongmemoryofdifferentusages.

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Thankyou!Q&A

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