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COPY X-6678  i . 0 5

COURT

 OF

 APPEALS

  OF HEW

 YORK,

(254 N.Y. 218)

Decided. July  8 , 1930.

WILLIAM

  A .

  CAES

 OH an d

  Others,

  a s

Trustees  i n  Bankruptcy  of  LEONARD

S .

  ZARTMAN

 a n d

  ELLA

  S .

  ZAUOMAN,

Individual ly

  a n d a s

  Copartners,

Doing Business under  t h e  Firm

Name

  of G. E .

  ZARTMAN

 &

 COMPANY,

Appellants,

v .

FEDERAL RESERVE  BAM of HEW YORE,

Respondent.

APPEAL from

  a

  judgment

  of the

  Appellate Division

  i n t h e

  four th

judicial department reversing  a  judgment  o f the  Trial Term

entered  on a  ve rd ic t  of a  ju ry  i n  favor  o f th e  p l a i n t i f f s  and

dismissing

  th e

  complaint.

ARTHUR  E .  SUTHERLAND  f o r  appel lants .

COLIN McLENNAN  f o r  respondent.

CARDOZO,

  Ch. J .

Trustees

  i n

  "bankruptcy

  a r e

  seeking

  to

  recapture moneys collected

by the  defendant,  a  Federal Reserve bank, with notice that  a  preference

among creditors might

  he an

  e f f e c t

  o f the

  co l l ec t ion .

r E .  Zartman  & Company were engaged  f o r  many years  i n t h e

business

  o f

  private bankers

  a t

  Waterloo,

  New

  York.

  On May 16 an d 17 , 1927 ,

there came into  t h e  possession  o f t h e  defendant,  t h e  Federal Reserve Bank

i n t h e  Second Fede ral Reserve Di st r i ct ,  157  checks drawn  on the  Zartman

bank

  f o r

  sums amounting

  i n t h e

  aggregate

  to

  $15 ,271.56. These checks ,

drawn  by  Zartman depositors  i n  favor  of  various payees,  h a d  been indorsed

by the

  payees

  t o

  banks, thir ty- seve n

  i n

  number, members

  of t he

  Federal

Reserve banking system,

  and by

  these indorsed

  a nd

  t ransmit ted

  to the

defendant.  The  indorsements  by the  member banks show diversities  o f

form, some being simply

  to the

  order

  o f the

  Federal Reserve Bank

  of New

York, some

  to the

  order

  of any

  bank, banker

  o r

  trust company, some

  to the

order  of any  bank  o r  banker,  a n d  some  to the  order  of any  Federal Reserve

bank. Accompanying

  t h e

  checks, when re ce iv ed

  by the

  defendant, were

l e t t e r s  of  remit tance .  I n  these  t h e  member banks gave notice  to the

defendant that  th e  checks were inclosed  f o r  c r e d i t , "  o r ,  more commonly,

f o r

  " c o l l e c t i o n

  a n d

  c r e d i t ,

n

  "co l l ec t ion

  a n d

  r e t u rn , "

  o r

  "co l l ec t ion

  a nd

remit tance ."  The  defendant pursuant  t o  this mandate caused  t h e  checks  t o

be  presented  f o r  payment  t o t h e  Zartman bank,  t h e  drawee named therein.

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—2—

I n

  response

  t o

  this demand,

  i t

  received

  two

  d r a f t s ,

  o ne f o r

  $8,699.25,

th e  other  f o r  $6,572.37, drawn  by the  Zartman bank  i n  Waterloo upon  the

American 3xchange Irving Trust Company

  of New

  York. These d r a f t s ,

  r e -

ceived

  by t he

  defendant

  on May 18 and 19,

  were presorted

  to the

  t rus t

conpany

  f o r

  payment

  on May 20 and

  again

  on May 2 1 . On

  each presentation

payment  w as  r e fused  on t he  ground that  t h e  d r a f t s  h a d  been drawn  b y

Zartman ag ai ns t un co ll ec te d fun ds. Thereupon,

  on May 23 , th e

  defend-

ant's manager went

  t o

  Waterloo

  an d

  made demand upon Zartman that

  the

d r a f t s

  be

  pa id

  i n

  ca sh . There

  i s no

  occasion

  to

  r e c i t e

  th e

  conversa-

t i on t h a t ensued. Enough  f o r  present purposes that what  was  said might

reasonably

  be

  found

  by t he

  t r i o r s

  of the

  f a c t s

  t o

  have been notice

  to

t h e  manager that Zartman  was  insolvent . Af te r  a  delay  of a few  hours

there

  was

  pa id

  t o t h e

  defendant

  i n

  cash

  th e

  sura

  of

  $10,363.93.

  The

fol lowing  day, May 24 , th e  doors  o f t he  Zartman bank were closed  f o r

business ,

  a n d

  have never been reopened.

  A

 p e t i t i o n

  i n

  bankruptcy,

f i l e d  on  June  27, was  followed  by an  ad judica t ion  of  bankruptcy  a nd t he

appointment

  of

  t r u s t e e s .

  The

  t r us t ee s

  a r e

  suing

  to

  recover

  t h e

  cash

pa id

  t o t he

  defendant

  on May 23 a s a

  voidable preference under

  t he

provis ions  o f t he  Federal s ta tute .

To  turn back  a t  this point  to  s t a t e  t h e  defendant ' s  use of

th e

  proceeds

  of

  co ll ec ti on s. Uach

  of the

  member banks

  h a d a n

  account

with  th e  defendant,  a n  account exacted  by the  statute (Federal Reserve

A ct , 38 U. S .

  S t a t .

  pp. 251, 270, § 19) as one of the

  inc idents

  of

membership. These acc oun ts were cr edi t ed  on May 19 and 20  with  the

amount

  of the

  Zartman drafts,

  i . e . , t he

  drafts drawn

  on the

  t rust

company, which were supposed, when received

  by the

  defendant,

  to be

equivalent

  t o

  cash.

  As

  soon

  a s

  notice came that these drafts

  h a d

  been

dishonored,

  t h e

  entry

  was

  rever sed. Later,

  on May 31 , th e

  c redi t

  was

r e - e s t ab l i shed  t o t h e  extent  of  $10,363.93,  th e  cash payment then  i n

hand, each

  of th e

  thi r ty-seven banks being al lot ted

  i t s

  appropriate

share. Before  t h e  bankruptcy pet i t ion,  th e  banks  h a d  withdrawn from

their deposit accounts

  i n t h e

  usual course

  of

  business moneys equal

  to

t h e  balances  i n  thei r favor  a t t h e  date  of the  contested credits, though

they

  h a d

  also made

  new

  deposits which kept

  t h e

  daily balances

  a t a

  level

nearly uniform.

  I f t he

  first payments

  out of t he

  accounts

  be

  appropri -

ated  to the  f i r s t r e c e i p t s ,  a l l  moneys collected from  th e  bankrupts  ha d

been remitted

  by t he

  defendant

  to the

  thirty-seven member banks,

  i t s

correspondents

  and

  deposi tors .

The

  t r i a l j udge l e f t

  i t t o t he

  jury

  to say

  whether

  th e

  co l l ec -

t ions  h a d  been made  by the  defendant  a s  agent  o r a s  owner.  The  jury

found

  f o r t h e

  p l a in t i f f , t hus holding

  by

  the i r verd i c t tha t

  t h e

  co l lec t ion

was as  owner.  The  Appellate Division held  a s a  matter  of law  tha t  the

co l l ec t i on

  was as

  agent, basing

  i t s

  holding

  i n

  large degree upon

  a n

agreement  y e t t o be  considered between  t h e  defendant  a n d i t s  members.

The

  collection having been made

  a s

  agent,

  t h e

  conclusion

  was

  thought

  t o

follow that  t h e  agent  was not  l iable s ince  i t h a d  se t t l ed wi th  i t s  p r i n c i -

pals before

  t h e

  r i g h t

  o f

  reclamation

  h a d

  been perfected

  b y t h e

  bankruptcy.

We

  think

  t h e

  defendant

  was an

  agent

  a nd no t a n

  owner

  i n i t s

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r e c e i p t  o f t h e  Zartman drafts  a n d t h e  su bs t i tu te d moneys.  How th e 15 7

checks were indorsed

  by the

  payees when deposited with

  t h e

  member banks,

t h e  record does  n o t  t e l l  u s . T he  problem  to be  solved, however,  i s :

no t one a s t o t h e  re la t ion be tween  t h e  member banks  r n d  the i r depos i to rs .

I t i s a

  problem

  a s t o t h e

  relation between those banks

  a n d t h e

  defendant .

We

  assume t h a t

  t h e

  form

  o f t h e

  indorsements,

  i f n o t

  q u a l i f i e d

  by

  ag ree -

ment, would have pas se d  t o t h e  defendant such t i t le ,  i f a n y , a s  belonged

t o t h e  i nd or se rs (F eder al Reserve Bank  v .  Malloy,  2 64 U. S . 1 60 , 16 4 ;  City

of

  Douglas

  v .

  Federal Reserve Bank,

  27 1 IT. S . 48 9;

  2:editable Trust

  Co. v .

Rochling,  275 U. S . 248 ;  Heinr ich  v .  F i r s t  M a t .  Ban :,"  219 N. Y. 1 ) . An

agreement, however,  i s i n  ex is tence ,  t h e  terms thereof proscr ibed  b y

regula t ions adopted

  b y t h e

  Feder al Reserve Board under au th or it y co nfe r-

r e d b y t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h e  s t a t u t e .  We  must loo k  t o  this agreement  t o

discover  t h e  re la t ion between  t h e  defendant  a n d i t s  members  in the

process  of  c o l l e c t i o n .

By the  Federal Reserve  Ac t , a s  f i r s t e n a c t e d  in 1913, a .  reserve

bank  w as  au tho r i zed  t o  collect only those checks which were drawn  on

member banks  a n d  which were deposited  b y a  member bank  o r  another reserve

bank

  o r t h e

  United States (Farmers Bank

  v .

  Federal Reserve Bank,

  262 If.- S .

6 4 9 , 6 5 4 ) .  Even then , however,  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  of t he  Board provided  ̂ I n

handling i tems  f o r  member banks,  a  Federal Reserve Bank will  a c t a s  agent

only" (Circular

  No. 1 of 1916,

  Fe de ra l Reserv e Board Report

  of 1916, p .-

1 5 3 ,  note; Federal Reserve Bulletin,  May, 1916 , p p . 259 , 26 0) . The

s t a t u t e  w as  amended  i n  September,  1916 ( § 13 ) (39  S t a t .  7 52 ) , so a s t o

author ize

  a

  reserve bank

  to

  rece ive

  f o r

  co l lec t ion f rom

  an y

  member checks

drawn  o n  non-member banks located  i n t h e  d i s t r i c t .  The  Board renewed  i t s

order that

  t h e

  r e l a t i on shou ld

  be one of

  agency (Regulation

  J ,

  subd»

  7 ,

Federal Reserve Board, Report

  o f 1 9 1 6 , p . 1 7 1 ) . I n 1 9 1 7 t h e

  s t a t u t e

  was

again amended, this time  b y a  provi s ion tha t " s o le l y  f o r t h e  purposes  of

exchange

  or of

  c o l l e c t i o n , "

  a

  reserve bank

  may

  receive f rom

  a

  non-member

bank  o r  t r u s t company checks payab le upon pr es en ta ti on , upon co nd it io n

that such non-member bank  o r  t r u s t company mai nt ain  a n  adequate balance

with

  t h e

  reserve bank

  of i t s

  d i s t r i c t

  (Act of

  June

  21 , 191 7, ch , 32, § 4;

4 0  S t a t .  2 3 2 , 2 3 4 ; c f . 2 6 2 U . S . a t p . 6 5 5 ) .  Col lec tio ns were thus  p e r -

missible both  f o r  members  a n d f o r  non-members. •

I n t h e

  s e t t i n g

  of

  t h i s s t a tu t e , Regu la t i on

  J

  ( s e r i e s

  of 1924)

was

  adopted

  b y t h e

  Board,

  and i s now to be

  cons t rued .

  I t

  r e c i t e s

  ( i n

  terms

s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t h e  same  a s  those  of  ea r l i e r r egu l a t i ons ) t ha t  t h e  Board,

" des i r i ng

  t o

  a f fo rd both

  t o t h e

  pub l i c

  a n d t o t h e

  various banks

  of the

country  a  d i r ec t , exped i t i ous  a n d  economical system  of  check co l l ec t io n  and

se t t l ement  of  ba lances ,  h a s  arranged  to  have each Federal reserve bank

exe rc i s e

  t h e

  func t ions

  o f a

  c l ea r i ng house

  a n d

  co l l ec t chocks

  f o r

  such

  of

i t s

  member banks

  a s

  d e s i r e

  t o

  av a il themselves

  of i t s

  p r i v i l e g e s , "

  t o

which  i s  added  a  r e c i t a l t h a t l i k e p r i v i l e g e s w i l l  be  a f f o r d e d  t o n o n -

jnembor banks

  a n d

  t rust companies qual i fying

  i n

  cer ta in ways.

  I t

  then

proceeds  to a  s ta tement  of t he  terms  a n d  condi t ions  o n  which business  may

b e  dene.  The  Feder al Reserve Board hereby aut ho ri ze s  t h e  Federal reserve

^b&riks

  t o

  handle such checks subject

  t o t h e

  following terms

  a n d

  condi t ions;

a n d

  each member

  a n d

  nonmember clearing bank which sends chocks

  to any

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Fede ral re se rv e bank: sh al l

  by

  such action

  b e

  deemed

  ( a ) t o

  au thor ize

t h e  Federal reserve "banks  t o  handle such checks subject  t o t h e  following

terms

  a n d

  condi t ions ,

  ( b ) to

  warrant

  i t s own

  a u t h o r i t y

  t o

  give

  t h e F e d -

er al r ese rve banks such au th or it y,  a nd ( c ) to  agree  to  indemnify  any

federa l reserve bank

  f o r a n y

  loss resu l t ing f rom

  th e

  f a i l u r e

  o f

  such

sending bank  t o  have such a u t h o r i t y . " Among  th e  terms  a n d  condit ions

thus proscr ibed  a r e  these :  A  Federal r es er ve bank wi ll  a c t  only  a s

agent

  o f the

  bank from which

  i t

  receives such checks."  A  Federal

  r e -

servo bank  may  pr es e nt such checks  f o r  payment  o r  send such chocks  f o r

c o l l e c t i o n d i r e c t

  t o t h e

  bank

  on

  which they

  a r e

  drawn,"

  o r

  forward them

t o  another agent ."  A  Fed era l res erv e bank  may * * * a t- i t s  option,

e i t h e r d i r e c t l y

  o r

  through

  a n

  agent , accept

  * * *

  frank drafts

  * * *

c a s

k»" without being l iable  f o r a n y  loss thereby resu l t ing .

The

  amount

  of any

  check

  f o r

  which payment

  i n

  a c t u a l l y

  a n d

  f i n a l l y

co l lec ted funds  i s n o t  received shal l  b e  charged back  t o t h e  forwarding

bank, regardless

  of

  whether

  o r n o t t h e

  check i t se l f

  can be

  re turned ."

Finally each Federal  He se rve bank  may  promulgate  i t s o w n  r egu la t ions ,

n o t

  inconsis ten t wi th

  l a w o r

  with

  t h e

  r egu la t ions  o f

  t h e

  Board,

  and

such regulat ions shal l  be  binding upon member  a n d  n o n m e m b e r  banks  a -

v a i l i n g  o f  i t s  p r i v i l e g e s .

Pursuant

  t o t h e

  authori ty thus conferred,

  t h e

  defendant made

i t s o w n

  r egu la t ions ( c i r c u la r

  Ho . 728 ,

  Ju ly

  1 ,

  1926) , reaf f i rming

  the

regula t ions adopted  by the  Board  a n d  supplementing them  by  o t h e r s .  One

of the

  supplemental rules prescribes

  t h e

  period that shal l elapse before

a n y  c r e d i t s h a l l  b e  al lowed, e i t her p rov is ional  o r  f i n a l ,  f o r  checks

sent

  i n b y

  members. Cr ed it

  may be

  given

  a t

  once

  i n

  what

  i s

  known

  as a

deferred, account,  n o t  sub jec t  to be  drawn  o n , b u t  t h e r e  is to be no

c r e d i t

  i n t h e

  reserve account un t i l

  t h e

  appropriate t ime indicated

  on

e  current t ime schedule  h a s  el ap se d, " though even upon en tr y  i n  that

account , "cred i t

  a n d

  a v a i l a b i l i t y

  a r e i n a l l

  ins tances sub ject

  to * * *

ac tua l r ece ip t  o f  payment."  The  t ime schedule thus referred  t o i s  based

upon  th e  average ma ili ng time re qui re d  f o r  i tems  t o  reach  t h e  paying bank,

p lu s

  t h e

  t ime required

  f o r t h e

  paying bank

  to

  remit

  t o t h e

  defendant .

Another supplemental rule gives notice  t o  member banks  a n d  others that

defendant will handlo chocks

  a s

  cash items only

  i n

  accordance with uniform

i n s t r u c t i o n t h e r e i n  s e t  f o r t h ,  a n d  t h a t  a n y  cont rary  o r  spec ia l i n s t ruc -

tions noted

  on

  c a s h l e t t e r s

  o r

  a t t ached

  to

  checks will

  b e

  'd isregarded."

Another yule prescribes  t h e  form  of the  indorsement  to be  adhered  to by  t r ans -

mitting banks, whether members

  o r

  non-members.

  The

  indorsement must

  b e

" w i t h o u t r e s t r i c t i o n  t o t h e  order  of the  Federal Reserve Bank  of New  York

or to the

  order

  of any

  bank, banker,

  o r

  t r u s t company wi th

  a l l

  p r i o r

  i n -

dorsements guara ntee d.." This form  i s  necessary,  a s h a s  been stated, whether

t h e

  checks t ransmit ted

  t o t h e

  defendant

  a r e

  from members

  o r

  non-members

though  t h e  s t a t u t e  i s  e x p l i c i t  t o t h e  e f f ec t t ha t t here sha l l  be no  power

i n a

  reserve bank

  t o

  handle checks

  f o r

  non-members except "solely

  f o r t h e

purposes

  of

  exchange

  or of

  co ll ec ti on " (Fed eral Reserve Bank

  A ct , 6 13 ,

amendment^of  191 7, § 4) .  P la in l y , then,  th e  form  o f th e  indorsement  was

n o t

  conceived

  of as

  involv ing

  a

  departure from

  t h e

  mandate

  o f th e

  s ta tu te*

P la in ly ,

  t o o , i t w a s n o t

  conceived

  of as

  inconsistent with t5je regulat ions

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an d t h e  circular whereby checks received from  any  "bank  a r e to be handled

by the  reserve "banks  i n t h e  capaci ty  o f  agents only.  The  same circular

an d

  regula t ions tha t prescr ibe

  th e

  form

  of th e

  indorsement establish

  the

p r a c t i c e

  an d t h e

  agreement

  to

  receive

  th e

  checks

  a s

  agent ,

  a n d

  give

not ice

  t o

  tra ns mit t in g banks tha t

  t h e

  terms thus established shall

  be

exclusive  of any  o thers .

Th e  inference  of  ownership that follows  i n  most cases from

a n  unqualified indorsement  i s one  dependent upon intention.  I t may be

overborne

  by

  agreement

  to the

  contrary, whether

  th e

  evidence

  of

  agree-

ment

  be

  d i r e c t

  o r

  circumstantial (Federal Reserve Bank

  v .

  Malloy, supra,

a t p . 1 6 4 ) .

  Direct

  a s

  well

  a s

  c i rcumstant ia l

  i s t h e

  evidence before

  u s .

The  r egu l a t i ons  of the  Board, reinforced  by the  defendant

4

s c i rcular ,

an d  assented  to by the  transmitt ing banks,  a r e  equivalent  to an  express

agreement that

  a s

  between

  t h e

  defendant

  and the

  other banks

  t h e

  r e l a t i on

engendered

  by the

  r ece ip t

  of

  un col lect ed paper sha l l

  be an

  agency

  and

nothing more.

  The

  agreement

  i s

  confirmed

  b y t h e

  underlying purposes

  and

p o l i c i e s  of the  Federal reserve system"  ( p e r  CROUCH,  J . , i n t h e  court

be-low),  by the  p lace  of the  reserve banks  in t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  banking

func t i ons  a s  conceived  a n d  developed  by the  framers  of t he  st at u te . There

i s no  token  of a  purpose  to  burden clearance  a n d  co l lec t ion wi th  t h e r e -

s p o n s i b i l i t i e s

  of

  ownership.

The

  argument

  i s

  made that

  a

  d i s t i n c t i o n

  i s to be

  drawn between

co l l ec t i on

  f o r t h e

  member banks

  a n d

  co l l ec t i on

  f o r t h e u s e o f

  o thers .

The  regula t ions  an d t h e  c i r c u l a r  do no t  express such  a  d i s t i n c t i o n ;  i f

i t i s t o b e  made,  i t  must  b e  i n t e rpo l a t ed  by a  process  of  cons t ruc t ion .

We are  told that what  i s  sa id  i n t h e  ru l e s  as to the  ex i s tence  of an  agency

h a d i t s  o r i g i n  in an  at tempted adaptat ion  of the  s t r u c t u r e  of the  system

t o t h e

  n e c e s s i t i e s

  of the new

  "business made possible

  in 1917

  through

  th e

amendment

  of t he

  s t a t u t e . Ti l l then, co l lec t ions

  b y a

  reserve bank were

always

  f o r t h e

  account

  of

  member banks,

  f o r

  whom

  i t was

  a l so

  a t

  l i be r t y

t o

  receive checks

  o r

  moneys

  f o r

  dep osi t . Since then, the re

  may

  a l so

  b e

co l l ec t i ons

  f o r t h e

  convenience

  of

  non-members.

  To

  these

  an d t o

  these

only,

  we a r e

  t o ld ,

  t h e

  r egu l a t i on

  an d t h e

  circular were intended

  to

  apply.

The  h i s t o ry , s t a t u to ry  and.  adminis t ra t ive ,  of the  Federal Reserve system

teaches  a  di f f er en t less on. There  i s no  connection, temporal  o r  causal ,

between  th e  genesis  of the  rule that  th e  r e l a t i on sha l l  be one of  agency

an d th e

  enlargement

  of the

  f i e l d

  of

  business following

  t h e

  amendment

  of

t h e

  st a t u t e . Long "before the re

  was

  power

  t o

  make clearances

  o r

  co l lec t ions

f o r

  banks

  n o t

  members

  of the

  system, there

  was

  a l ready

  a

  statement

  in t h e

rules that  i n t h e  handl ing  of  checks  and  drafts when forwarded  by  members.,

t h e  reserve banks were  to be  deemed  t o a c t i n t h e  capaci ty  of  agents only.

Amendments  of the  ru l e s have r e s t r a ined r e spons ib i l i t y s t i l l f a r t he r  by

adding

  a

  provis ion tha t

  th e

  agency shall

  b e o n e f o r t h e

  forwarding bank,

an d n o t f o r any

  other, thereby excluding

  a n

  at tempt

  t o

  convert

  i t

  in to

  an

agency

  f o r t h e

  payees

  of the

  checks,

  th e

  or iginal deposi tors (Federal

  R e-

serve Bank

  v .

  Malloy, supra; City

  of

  Douglas

  v .

  Fede ral Reserve Bank, s up ra ).

From  t h e  beginning, however,  th e  r e l a t i o n  h a s  been c l a s s i f i ed  a s  agency,

n o t  ownership.  A  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  so  e x p l i c i t  may no t be  he ld  to  have been

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neu t ra l i zed  by the  terms  of the  "cash letters,'* vzith their varying decla-

ra t ions that

  t h e

  checks

  a r e

  inclosed

  f o r

  " c r e d i t , "

  o r f o r

  "co l lec t ion

a n d

  c r e d i t , "

  o r f o r

  "co l l ec t ion

  an d

  remittance"

  ( c f .

  Bank

  of

  America

v. Way d e l l ,  187 N. Y. 115 , 12 0) . By  express provision  of the  defendant

1

 s

c i r c u l a r

  th e

  le t ters must

  be

  disregarded

  i f

  inc ons ist ent v;ith

  th e

  uniform

prac t i ce es t ab l i shed  b y t h e  c i r cu la r  and by the  regula t ions  of the

Board behind  i t .  There  an d  novzhere e l se , l e a s t  o f a l l i n a  perfunctory

notice

  of

  remittance embodied

  i n a

  printed form,

  th e

  agreement governing

t h e

  r e l a t i o n

  ha s i t s

  f i n a l

  an d

  complete expression.

I f t h e

  defendant

  was an

  agent

  i n t h e

  r ece ip t

  of the

  Zartman

d r a f t s  an d t h e  substituted moneys,  t h e  ques-tion must s t i l l  be met  whether

i t s  l i a b i l i t y  w as  enlarged  b y an y o f i t s  a c t s t h e r e a f t e r .  We must  say

whether

  t h e

  agent became subject

  to t h e

  l i a b i l i t y

  of an

  owner when

ins t ead

  o f

  r emi t t i ng

  t h e

  proceeds

  of

  co l l ec t ion d i r ec t ly

  t o i t s

  p r i n c i -

pa l s ,  i t p u t t h e  proceeds  to  thei r cred i t  i n a n  ordinary deposit account,

thereby turning

  th e

  re la t ion f rom

  one of

  agency into

  one of

  c r e d i t o r

  and

debtor .

  I n

  e f f e c t ,

  th e

  s i t u a t i o n

  was

  then

  th e

  same

  as i f t h e

  defendant,

receiv ing

  t h e

  money

  i n t h e

  capaci ty

  of

  agent,

  h a d

  handed

  i t

  over

  to t h e

p r i n c i p a l s ,  a n d h a d  received  i t  back  a t  once  to be  r e t a ined  a s a  deposit

(Commercial Bank  of  Penn.  v .  Armstrong,  14 8 U. S. 50, 58, 5 9;  Marine Bank

  Fulton Bank,

  3

  Wall. ( U.S. )

  2 5 2 :

  Evansville Bank

  v .

  German American

Bank,  1 55 U. S. 5 56;  National  B. & D.  Bank  v .  Hubbell,  117 N. Y. 384, 396 ;

Langley  v .  Warner,  3 N. Y# 32 7, 3 2 9 ). We  think  the new  r e l a t i o n  d id no t

take from

  t h e

  defendant

  t h e

  p ro tec t ion

  of the

  r ul e th at money pa id

  to an

agent,

  and

  lawful ly accepted,

  may no t

  t h e r e a f t e r

  b e

  reclaimed

  by one who

h a s  made  t h e  payment with notice  of the  agency,  i f  before  t h e  attempted

reclamation

  th e

  agent

  i n

  good faith

  h a s

  se t t le d wi th

  t h e

  pr incipal

(National Park Bank

  v .

  Seaboard Bank,

  114 IT. Y. 28;

  National City Bank

  v .

Westcott ,

  118 N. Ye 468, 47 3, 474 ;

  Hooper

  v .

  Robinson,

  98 U. S. 528 ;

  Buller

v .

  Harrison,

  1

  Cowper,

  5 6 5 ) .

  True, indee d,

  i t i s

  tha t

  th e

  settlement

s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c al l th i s pre ce pt into play must  be  ac tua l  and no t  construc-

t ive (Buller  v .  Harrison, supra: Mowatt  v .  McLelan,  1  Wend.  173, 178; La

Farge

  v .

  Knee la nd .

  7 Cow . 4 5 6 , 4 6 0 ) . I f a l l

  t h a t

  t h e

  agent

  h a s

  done

  i s

t o  agree with  t h e  pr in cipa l that  th e  fund , s t i l l i n t ac t , sha l l  b e  held

t h e r e a f t e r  a s a  debtor,  h e i s n o t  sub jected  to any  l o s s  i f  d i r ec t ed  to

make res t i tu t ion

  o u t o f t h e

  moneys thus retained

  ( c f . La Far go v . Kne

 elan d

a n d

  Mowatt

  v .

  McLelan, supra).

  On th e

  other hand, when once

  th e

  fund

h a s  been depleted  b y  payment  of the  debt,  th e  situation becomes  th e  same

a s i f t h e

  payment

  t o t h e

  p r i n c i p a l

  h a d

  been made

  a t t h e

  beginning.

  The

agent

  i s no

  b e t t e r ,

  o f f b y

  reason

  of the new

  r e l a t i o n ,

  b u t

  even

  if no

b e t t e r ,

  h e i s

  equal ly

  no

  worse.

As to  this aspect  of the  case,  th e  ru l ing  i n  National Park Bank

v .

  Seaboard Bank (supra)

  i s a

  precedent

  so

  nearly ident ical that

  i t

  must

b e

  accepted

  a s

  de ci si ve . There

  th e

  Seaboard Bank received

  a

  check

  f o r

c o l l e c t i o n  a s  agent  f o r t h e  Eldred Bank  an d  upon receipt  o f t h e  proceeds

gave notice

  t o i t s

  p r i n c i p a l

  i n

  accordance with

  a

  course

  of

  dealing that

t h e

  proceeds

  h a d

  been credi ted

  i n a n

  account current between them

  on

  which

drafts from time  t o  time were drawn  as on an  ordinary account between  a

bank

  an d a

  dep osi tor . There

  can be no

  question that

  t h e

  collecting bank,

»

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af ter

  t h e

  giving  o f  this notice,  was at  l iberty  to use the  proceeds with

a l l

  th e  freedom

  of an

  owner, discharged

  of any

  duty

  to

  remit

  i n

  specie

to  th e  principal  ( c f .  Commercial Bank  of  Penn.  v .  Armstrong, supra;

Marine Bank  v .  Fulton Bank, supra). Even  so, the  ruling  was  that  i t

could  no  longer  be held  to  res t i tu t ion  at the  su i t  of the  drawee bank

a f t e r  th e  drafts  on the  account current  had  exhausted  the  credit balance

exist ing  at the  time  of the  col l ec t ion .  To  determine whether  t h e b a l -

ance  had  been used  up, the  court applied  th e  rule  i n  Clayton's Case

( 1

  Meriv.

  572, 604, 608)

  whereby

  the

  successive payments

  and

  credits

are to be

  appropriated

  in

  discharge

  of the

  items

  o f

  debt antecedently

due in the  order  o f  time  i n  which they stand  in the  account, th e  f i r s t

payments  o u t  extinguishing  the  first payments  i n .  There  a r e  many other

cases, State

  and

  Federal, enfor cing

  a

  like rule (Allon

  v .

  Culver,

  3

Denio,  284, 293;  Thompson  v . S t .  Nicholas  Hat.  Bank,  1 13 N. Y. 32 5, 333;

Delaware Dredging  Co. v.  Tucker  Co ., 25 Fed. Rep. (2d ) 44, 46;  Cory Bros.

& Co. v .  Ownors  of S. S .  Mecca,  1897 A. C. 28 6, 288;  Deeloy  v .  Lloyd's

Bank,

  lt d . , 1912 A. C. 756 , 783;

  Matter

  o f

  Stenning, (1895)

  2 Ch. 433) .

We have  no  thought  t o  suggest that this  or any  other formula  as to the

application  o f  payments  to the  items  of an  account  i s o f  such inflexible

va l id i ty  as to  admit  of no  excep tio ns. Whatever rule  i s  framed w i l l  be

subordinated

  to the

  broader pr inc ip le that

  an

  application, usually

  ap -

propriate,  may be  varied  by the  court when variance  i s  necessary  to  promote

th e  ends  of  justice (Korbly  v .  Springfield Inst,  f o r  Savings,  245 U. S. 330 ;

Lichtenstein

  v .

  Grossman Constr. Corp.,-

  248 N. Y. 390 ;

  Matter

  o f

  Hal let t ' s

Estate.  13 Ch. D iv . 696;  Cunningham  v.• Brown,  365 U> S. 1 , 12, 1 3 ) .  Hone

th e  l e s s ,  th e  formula  i s  expressive  of a  rule that must prevail  in the

absence  o f  persuasive reasons  f o r  qual i f icat ion  or  exception.  We  cannot

f a i r l y  say  that just ice wil l  be  thwarted  i f t h e  rule  i s  followed here,

The  principals  ar e  solvent banks,  and the  trustees  a r e a t  l iberty  t o  pursue

th e  moneys  i n  their hands (Matter  of  Hil l  Co. . 130 Fed . Rep. 315 , 31 8) .

At  l e a s t ,  i f  there  is any  obst acle , there  i s  nothing  in the  record  to  te l l

u s

  what

  i t i s . No

  obvious requirement

  o f

  pol icy

  or

  justice exacts

  the

suspension  or  abandonment  of an  established rule  of law to the end  that

collection from  an  agent  may  take  th e  place  of an  exi s t ing  and  suf f i c i en t

remedy  by  suit against  th e  principals .

Passing, then, from

  th e

  question

  of the

  application

  o f

  payments,

we  come back  to the  inquiry whether  th o  immunity  of the  agent  i s  l o s t  or

impaired when  the  proceeds  of the  collec t ion, instead  o f  being remitted  to

the

  principal

  a t

  once,

  a r e

  retained

  a s a

  deposit

  and

  remitted later

  on.

What  was  held  on  that subject  in t h e  case  of the  Seaboard Bank  has not

been modified  by  anything decided si nc e that time. National  B. & D.  Bank

v..H ubbel l (su pra), w ith some ana logie s  on the  surface,  i s  essent ial ly

dissimilar.

  The

  f a c t s

  in t h e

  Hubbell case were th es e: Checks forwarded

f o r  c o l l e c t i o n  had  been placed when collected  to the  credit  o f a  deposit

account. Upon  th e  fa i lure  of the  bank,  the  depositor made claim  to the

proceeds

  in t h e

  hands

  o f a

  receiver

  a s i f

  subject

  to a

  trust, though

  the

entry

  in t h e

  deposit account

  had

  been made with

  i t s

  assent.

  Tho

  court

held that  t h e  claim  h ad  been turned into  a  debt,  and  that  the  depositor

must come  in and  share with  the  general creditors  ( c f .  Latzko  v .  Equitable

Trust  Co ., 275 U. S. 2 5 4 ) . The  point  to be  determined  was the  l i a b i l i t y  of

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a n

  agent

  t o a

  p r i n c i p a l ,

  of a

  bank;

  t o i t s

  correspondent , af ter

  the

terminat ion  of the  agency.  Ho  question  was  involved,  a s t o i t s  l i a b i l i t y

to a  th i rd person ,  th e  drawee  of the  checks, seeking r e st i tu t i on a f t e r

th e

  agent

  an d t h e

  p r inc ipa l

  h a d

  made

  a

  settlement between themselves.

We

  conclude,

  as i n t h e

  Seaboard case, that

  th e

  defendant

  d id

n o t  enlarge  i t s  l i a b i l i t y  to the  r ep resen ta t ives  o f t h e  bankrupts

when, af ter col lect ion

  w as

  complete,

  i t

  transformed

  i t s

  r e l a t i o n

  to

th e  forwarders from agency  t o  debt, le ga l concepts wi ll  not be

s t r a ined

  t o

  r e l i e v e

  an

  agent

  of

  l i a b i l i t y

  by

  force

  of a

  settlement that

i s

  merely formal

  o r

  const ruct ive ,

  b u t b y t h e

  same token they will

  not be

s t ra ined agains t  him to  charge  him  w it h l i a b i l i t y .  I n a  formal  o r co n -

struct ive sense,

  th e

  defendant, acting

  a s

  agent , s et t l ed with

  i t s

principals when  by t he  e n t r i e s  i n i t s  books  i n  accordance with  th e

course

  of

  deal ing

  i t

  gave

  u p t h e

  moneys received

  b y i t a s

  agent

  and

took thorn back

  a s

  de bt or . Such

  a

  set t lement wil l

  n o t

  h a l t

  th e

  pursu i t

and  re l ievo f rom l i a b i l i t y while  th e  fund  i s  s t i l l i n t a c t .  I t  w i l l  not

open

  t h e

  door

  to

  enable

  t h e

  pu r su i t

  to be

  continued when

  t h e

  fund

  h as

been disbursed.

,7e  have s ai d th at  th e  money  was  lawful ly co l lec ted  by the

agent

  and was

  paid

  by the

  drawee with notice

  of the

  agency. Lawful

  the

co l l ec t ion  w as a t t h e  moment  of the  making, though  th e  agent  i n  c o l l e c t -

i n g h a d  cause  to  believe that  th e  e f f e c t  of the  payment would  be a  p r e f e r -

ence among creditors.

  The

  statute does

  n o t s ay

  that

  one who

  accepts

  a

payment from  a  debtor believed  to be  insolvent  i s  g u i l t y  of a  fraud

(Van

  Ide r s t ine

  v .

  National Discount

  C o. , 2 27 U. S. 575, 5 82;

  Wilson

  v .

Mitchell Woodbury  Co . , 214  Mass.  514, 519;  Grandison  v .  Robertson,  231

Fed . Hep . 785 , 78 8) . A payment  so  made  i s n o t  even voidable th er ea ft er

unless

  a

  p e t i t i o n

  i n

  bankruptcy follows within four months.

  I f

  that

interval elapses with bankruptcy postponed,  th e  preference, however

dubious

  i n i t s

  making,

  i s

  proof against assaul t ,

  'we may n o t

  hold

  i n

such conditions that

  t h e

  defendant

  by the

  mere acceptance

  of the

  money

was  g u i l t y  of a  wrong,  and so  chargeable wi th l iab i l i ty  i f i t d id n o t  keep

th e

  fu nd i n t a c t (Mechem

  on

  Agency,

  v o l . 1 , § § 1435 ,

  1436). Before re tu rn

became  a  duty,  t h e  money  was  paid  o u t . I f  there  was  need  of  notice  t o

th e

  drawee that

  t h e

  drafts were col lected

  by the

  defendant

  a s

  agent

  and

not as

  owner (Mechem, supra,

  § 1439;

  Holt

  v .

  Ross,

  54 N, Y. 472 ;

  National

City Bank

  v .

  T/estcott ,

  118 JT. Y. 468 , 47 3;

  Canal Bank

  v .

  Bank

  of

  Albany,

1

  Hi l l ,

  2 8 7 ; c f . ,

  however, Williston,

  on

  Contracts ,

  v o l . 3 , § 1 5 9 5,

  note),

we  think  t h e  no t ice  w as  imparted  by the  regula t ions  an d t h e  c i r cu la r s ,

publ ic

  an d

  official documents, which, like

  th e

  l i m i t a t i o n s

  of a

  corporate

charter, were

  to be

  heeded

  by the

  world

  a t

  l a r g e .

  But

  no t ice

  was

unnecessary,  i f t h e  defendant  was not a  c red i to r ,  f o r t h e  r i g h t  to  avoid

th e

  p re fe rence

  i s t h e

  creature

  of the

  s t a t u t e ,

  and the

  f a c t ,

  not the

supposi t ion  o r  fancy  o f t h e  debtor, must tell  u s  when  t h e  r igh t ex i s t s .

17e  pas s t hen  to t h e  f i n a l question, whether wit hin  th e  meaning

of th e Ac t of

  Congress

  a

  bank collecting

  a

  d r a f t

  a s

  agent,

  an d n o t a s

  owner

(Matter

  of

  H i l l

  C o . ,

  supra) ,

  i s a

  credi tor subject

  to a

  duty

  to

  make

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r e s t i t u t i o n

  of a

  preference, though there

  h a s

  "been remittance

  t o i t s

pr inc ipa l p r io r  t o t h e  'bankruptcy. There  can he no  answer without

r e c a l l i n g

  t h e

  prov is ions

  of the

  s t a tu t e .

Bankruptcy

  A c t ,

  sect ion

  6 0 - b

  (Jiason's

  U. S«

  Code, t i t le

  11,

ch . 6 , § 96)

  provides:

  I f a

  "bankrupt shall

  * * *

  have made

  a

  t r ans fe r

of any of h i s  proper ty ,  a n d i f , a t t h e  time  of the  t r a n s f e r  * * * an d

* * *

  within four months before

  th e

  f i l i n g

  of the

  p e t i t i o n

  i n

  bank-

ruptcy  * * * , th e  bankrupt  b e  inso lven t ,  and * * * the  t ransfer then

operate  a s a  p re fe rence ,  an d t h e  person receiving  i t o r to be  benef i ted

thereby,

  o r h i s

  agent ac ti ng ther ei n, sh al l then have reas onabl e cause

to  bel ieve that  t h e  enforcement  o f  such  * * *  t ransfer would ef fect  a

preference,  i t  s h a l l  b e  voidable  b y t h e  t r u s t e e  and he may  recover  the

proper ty

  o r i t s

  val ue from such pe rs on ."

One who

  accep ts

  a

  preference

  n o t f o r h i s o wn

  account

  b a t a s

agent  f o r a  p r i n c i p a l  i s n o t t h e  person receiving  i t o r t o b e  benef i ted

thereby."  To be  sure,  th e  p r inc ipa l  i s  chargeable with notice imparted

t o t h e

  agent

  as t o t h e

  f inancia l condi t ion

  o f t h e

  debtor

  a n d t h e t e n -

dency  of th e  payment  to  e f f e c t  a  p re fe rence .  To be  sure, als o,  the

agent

  may be

  sued direct ly

  i f t h e

  t i t l e

  i s i n h i s

  name

  a n d t h e

  subject

of the

  t r a n s f e r i n t a c t

  i n h i s

  possession, ju st

  a s

  suit might

  be

  brought

i n  l ike condit ions against  any  other trustee holding money  o r  other

proper ty

  t h e

  f r u i t s

  of an

  unlawful sale.

  The on e who

  r ece ives

  a

  p r e f e r -

ence, however, within  t h e  meaning  of th e  s t a t u t e ,  i s th e one who i s

p r e f e r r e d ,  and the one who i s  p r e f e r r e d  i s n o t t h e  mere custodian  o r

intermediary,

  b u t t h e

  cred i to r , p resen t

  o r

  cont ingent ,

  who

  receives

  b y

v i r tue  of the  preference  a n  excessive share  of the  e s t a t e .  The  s t a tu t e

does

  n o t

  in tend ,

  of

  course, that

  t h e

  fo ra

  of th e

  t ransact ion shal l

  be

permi t ted

  t o

  o b s c u r e r e a l i t i e s .

  To

  cons t i t u t e

  a

  preference,

  i t i s n o t

necessary that  t h e  t r a n s f e r  be  made directly  to t h e  c r e d i t o r .  I t may be

made

  to

  another

  f o r h i s

  be ne fi t" (na tio nal Bank

  of

  Newport

  v .

  national

Herkimer County Bank.  2 3 5 U . S . 1 7 8 , 1 8 4 ) .  This wi ll happen,  f o r  example,

i f  bankrupts make  a  t r a n s f e r  of  the i r a s se t s  t o a  c red i to r  o f  t h e i r  own

c r e d i t o r ,

  who i s

  thus p re f e r r ed

  to t h e

  same extent

  a s i f t h e

  t ransfer

h a d

  been made

  to h im

  d i r e c t l y

  ( 2 2 5 U . S . a t p . 1 8 4 ) .

  There

  h a s

  been

  no

attempt  i n t h e  decis ions  t o  catalogue forms  of  b e n e f i t  an d  methods  of

evasion.

  No

  doubt

  t h e

  case supposed

  i s

  typ ical

  of

  o t h e r s .

  One

  thread

of

  un i formi ty

  may be

  looked

  f o r ,

  none

  th e

  less, among

  a l l

  d i v e r s i t i e s

  of

circumstance*•  The  person  to be  charged wi th l i a b i l i t y ,  i f h e h a s  parted

before

  t h e

  bankruptcy with t i t l e

  a n d

  possession, must have been more than

a  mere custodian,  an  intermediary  o r  conduit between  t h e  bankrupt  and the

cred i to r . Di rec t ly

  o r

  i n d i r e c t l y

  he

  must have

  h ad a

  benef i c i a l i n t e res t

i n t h e  preference  to be  avoided,  th e  thing  to be  reclaimed.  One  wi l l

f i nd  a n  a p po si t e i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f t h e  e f f e c t  an d  meaning  of the  s t a t u t e

i n t h e

  holding

  i n

  Keystone Warehouse

  Co. v . Bis

 s e l l

  ( 2 0 3 Fed . Rep . 6 5 2 ) . •

The   buyer  o f  f lour , in tending  t o  p r e f e r  t h e  s e l l e r , made payments  to a

warehouseman  who had  no t ice  of  insolvency.  The  holding  was  that  th e

warehouseman,

  who had

  r emi t t ed

  th e

  payments

  t o t h e

  s e l l e r ,

  was no t

  charge-

ab le the rea f t e r

  a t t h e

  s u i t

  of the

  t r u s t e e s .

  A

 possessory r igh t

  o r

  special

4

  •

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property having

  i t s

  o r i g in

  i n t h e

  bailment

  nay

  have given

  him

  capacity

t o

  maintain

  a

  su i t

  f o r

  flour wrongfully withdrawn,

  b u t d i d n o t

  turn

  him

into

  a

  c redi tor rece iv ing d i rec t ly

  o r

  i n d i r e c t l y

  t h e

  b e n e f i t

  of a

  p r e f -

erenc e. Merc anti le Trust  Co. v.  Schlaf ly  (299 Fed . Hep . 202) ,  much

r e l i e d  on by the  p l a i n t i f f s ,  i s no t a  holding  to t h e  contrary,  f o r  there

th e  defendant  to be  charged,  a  trustee under  a  mortgage,  h a d t h e  moneys

i n i t s

  possess ion ,

  th e

  suit being brought before distribution among

  th e

bondholders

  ( 2 9 9 Fed . Rep . a t p . 2 0 3 ) .

  True, indeed,

  i t i s

  tha t

  the

phraseology  o f t h e  s t a t u t e  i s  inexact  an d  ambiguous. Even  so, a  court

wi l l

  be

  caut ious

  i n

  imputing

  to the

  lawmakers

  a

  purpose

  to

  uproot

  th e

s e t t l e d p r i n c i p l e s

  of the

  common

  law as to th e

  e f f e c t

  of

  payment

  to an

agent when followed  by a  se t t l ement .  A l l  t h i s  i s t h e  more pl ai nl y t ru e

i n  view  o f t h e  a n ti th es is cl ea rl y marked upon  th e  f ace  of the  enactment

between

  t h e

  r e c i p i e n t s

  of

  bene f i t , d i r ec t

  o r

  i n d i r e c t ,

  who a r e t h e p e r -

sons  to be  sued,  and  the i r agents  i n t h e  business  of the  t r ans f e r ,

whose l i ab i l i t y ,

  i f i t

  e x i s t s ,

  i s

  secondary

  a n d

  i n c i d e n t a l

  to t h e

  l i a b i l i t y

of  others .

We  fi nd nothing in con sis ten t with these views  i n  Marine Trust

Co. v .  Lauria  (21 3 App. D iv. 64;  a f f d . ,  244 IT. Y. 577) and  Matter  of

Veler  (249 Fe d . Rep . 63 3) . A  bank  t o  which  a  check  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  by a

res t r ic t ive indorsement

  f o r

  col lect ion only

  may

  maintain

  a n

  ac t i on

  on the

check

  in i t s own

  name because section

  67 of t he

  Negotiable Instruments

law  (Cons. Laws,  ch . 3 8 )  says that  i t may  (Marine Trust  Co. v .  Lauria,

supra;  c f .  Hays  v .  Ha.thorn.  74 N. Y. 486 ;  Spencer  v .  Standard  C. & M.  Corp..

237 N. Y . 479) .  Th is does  n o t  mean that  i t i s  owner fo r  every purpose;  i n -

deed  by the  very hypothesis  i t i s n o t  owner,  b u t  co ll ec to r. Whether  i t

i s  p r i v i l e g e d  i n  l ike circumstances  t o  maintain  a  p e t i t i o n  i n  bankruptcy

mast

  b e

  h e l d

  to be

  s t i l l u n c e r t a i n .

  The

  opinion

  i n

  Matter

  of

  Veler (supra)

deals with

  a

  case where there

  w as

  more than

  a

  mere agen cy.

  The

  assignee

h ad a

  t i t l e a b s o l u t e

  o n i t s

  face, though

  t h e

  motive

  of the

  assignment

  was

t o

  f a c i l i t a t e c o ll e c t io n

  f o r t h e

  b e n e f i t

  of

  ano th er . Motive witho ut more

may be

  i n s u f f i c i e n t

  t o

  derogate from t i t l e (Sheridan

  v .

  Mayor.

  68 N. Y. 30;

Hays  v. Ha thorn, supr a) .  Bu t t h e  r i g h t  to su e , i f i t  exists, does  n o t  mean

of  necessi ty that  t h e  su i t o r  i s  rec iproca l ly subjec t  t o a  l i a b i l i t y  to be

s u e d

  (Keystone Warehouse  'Co. v .  MsselT.' sugraT."We^think  t h e  mnsf

be

  read

  i n

  conformity with common-law analogies

  to

  exempt

  a n

  agent

  o r

custodian from

  t h e

  duty

  to

  account

  f o r

  proper ty

  o r

  money,

  t h e

  subject

  of

a

  preference ,

  i f

  oefore

  t h e

  coming

  of

  bankruptcy

  h e h as

  s e t t l e d v i t hh i s

p r inc ipa l .

The  judgment should  be  aff i rmed vi th cos ts .

POUND,

  CRA2I3

LEHMAN, K3LL0G-G, O'BRIEN

  a n d

  HUBBS,

  J J. ,

  concur.

Judgment affirmed.

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