hci in aircraft

HCI in AircraftHCI in Aircraft

Serious BusinessSerious Business

OrOr

Monkey BusinessMonkey Business

January 31, 1961 “Ham”, a chimpanzee, worked levers during his 16 minute space flight. The

astrochimp traveled 5,800 mph in a Project Mercury capsule.

Human Factors Human Factors

Ergonomics Ergonomics

Human Automation Factors Human Automation Factors

Human Computer InteractionHuman Computer Interaction

Since the Beginning Since the Beginning

Deregulation of the Deregulation of the Airlines in 1978Airlines in 1978

Leads to further stimulation of the economy Leads to further stimulation of the economy

Horizontal Situation Indicators(HIS)Horizontal Situation Indicators(HIS)

LoranLoran

Global Positioning Satellites (GPS)Global Positioning Satellites (GPS)

Ground Collision AvoidanceGround Collision Avoidance

By the early 80’s the term “The By the early 80’s the term “The glass cock-pit had immerged.glass cock-pit had immerged.

My Personal FavoriteMy Personal Favorite

Today's modern equipmentToday's modern equipment

The Modern Glass CockpitThe Modern Glass Cockpit

A340 Airbus most popular airplane today.

Strangely enough these Strangely enough these aircraft keep turning up in aircraft keep turning up in

crash sites, sometimes killing crash sites, sometimes killing hundreds of people!hundreds of people!

There is only one answer in most There is only one answer in most cases investigated by the FAA, cases investigated by the FAA,

NTSB, and NASA.NTSB, and NASA.

““Pilot Error”Pilot Error”

““Work-load” and Work-load” and “Complacency” “Complacency”

(Moscow, 1991 and Nagoya, Japan 1994), an auto flight mode (Moscow, 1991 and Nagoya, Japan 1994), an auto flight mode

commanded nose-up pitch while the pilot commanded nose-down pitch commanded nose-up pitch while the pilot commanded nose-down pitch

during an autopilot-coupled go-around. In the Moscow incident, the during an autopilot-coupled go-around. In the Moscow incident, the

airplane went through a number of extreme pitch oscillations until the airplane went through a number of extreme pitch oscillations until the

crew was able to disconnect the automation and gain control. In crew was able to disconnect the automation and gain control. In

Nagoya, the crew inadvertently activated the go-around mode during a Nagoya, the crew inadvertently activated the go-around mode during a

normal approach. The crew attempted to reacquire the glide slope by normal approach. The crew attempted to reacquire the glide slope by

commanding nose down elevator, but this conflicted with the auto flight commanding nose down elevator, but this conflicted with the auto flight

mode’s logic and pitch up commands. In addition, the automated mode’s logic and pitch up commands. In addition, the automated

stabilizer system had trimmed the aircraft to maximum nose-up, stabilizer system had trimmed the aircraft to maximum nose-up,

following its go-around logic (which may not have been clearly following its go-around logic (which may not have been clearly

annunciated to the crew). annunciated to the crew).

The crew should have allowed the automated flight mode to control the The crew should have allowed the automated flight mode to control the

aircraft, or should have completely disconnected the automation. The aircraft, or should have completely disconnected the automation. The

situation was recoverable, but the crew, interacting with the automation situation was recoverable, but the crew, interacting with the automation

(and in the presence of reduced feedback), put the aircraft into an (and in the presence of reduced feedback), put the aircraft into an

unrecoverable position. An underlying issue relates to the mechanism unrecoverable position. An underlying issue relates to the mechanism

enabling a pilot to disconnect the auto flight mode and regain manual enabling a pilot to disconnect the auto flight mode and regain manual

control. The autopilot was designed not to disconnect using the control. The autopilot was designed not to disconnect using the

standard control column force when in go-around mode below a standard control column force when in go-around mode below a

specific altitude (for protection), and needed to be disconnected by an specific altitude (for protection), and needed to be disconnected by an

alternate mode; the crew may have believed they disconnected the alternate mode; the crew may have believed they disconnected the

autopilot and were manually controlling the aircraft when, in fact, the autopilot and were manually controlling the aircraft when, in fact, the

automation was still operating. Ultimately, the automated flight mode automation was still operating. Ultimately, the automated flight mode

dominated, the aircraft pitched up, stalled and crashed” (Rudisill, March dominated, the aircraft pitched up, stalled and crashed” (Rudisill, March

1, 2000).1, 2000).

Night flying, in bad weather is one of the deadliest combinations for airline pilots

December 20, 1995 – 160 die when an American Airlines 757 crashes into a mountainside near Cali, Colombia

August 6, 1997 – 228 people die when a Korean Air 747 plunges into a hill at night on the island

of Guam

A look at what a Synthetic Vision screen might appear like, showing the oncoming

terrain

But more technology only adds to the But more technology only adds to the work load.work load.

70% of aircraft accidents are still attributed to human error..

Then what's fueling the changes Then what's fueling the changes today to maintain and keep the today to maintain and keep the

glass cock pit?glass cock pit?

Analog gauges and systems are not compatible with the Analog gauges and systems are not compatible with the airlines needs to survive!airlines needs to survive!

• NEXCOM

• Controller Pilot Data Link Control (CPDLC)

““The most common questions pilots The most common questions pilots ask with regard to flight deck ask with regard to flight deck

automation are:”automation are:”

““What’s it doing now?”What’s it doing now?”

“Why did it do that?”“Why did it do that?”

andand

“What will it do next?”.“What will it do next?”.

(Wiener, 1989)(Wiener, 1989)

Surprise FunctionsSurprise Functions

Vertical navigation logic

Data entry

Infrequently used features & modes

Data propagation

Partial system failures(Sarter & Woods, 1992a)(Sarter & Woods, 1992a)

Not all that differentNot all that different Neilsen’s 10 Heuristics Naval Aviation Human Factors

1. Visibility of system status 1. Sensory-Perceptual2. Match between system and the real world 2. Medical/Physiological3. User control and freedom 3. Attitude/Personality 4. Consistency and standards 4. Judgment/Decision 5. Error prevention 5. Communication6. Recognition rather than recall 6. Crew Factors 7. Flexibility and efficiency of use 7. Design/Systems8. Aesthetics and minimalist design 8. Supervisory9. Help users recognize, diagnose,

and recover from errors10. Help and documentation

Another significant set of standardsAnother significant set of standards

Billings - Aviation Automation Human Factors

1. Accountable 2. Subordinate

3. Predictable 4. Adaptable 5. Comprehensible 6. Simple 7. Flexible 8. Dependable 9. Informative 10. Error resistant and Error tolerant

BibliographyBibliography M. Neville - Ag Cat photoProctor, P., (1995). “What price is a mistake?” Industry Outlook. New York: McGraw-Hill. Pg. 17.Nordwall, D., “FAA launches Nexcom with ATC radio contact” Aviation Week & Space Technology. Pg. 47.

Aug. 6th, 2001.Rudisill, M.Ph.D., “Crew Automation Interaction…” NASA. March 1, 2000. Online. Internet.

Feb.6,2002.Available:<http://techreports.larc.nasa.gov/ltrs/PDF/2000/mtg/NASA-2000-hstew-mr.pdfftp://techreports.larc.nasa.gov/pub/techreports/larc/2000/mtg/NASA-2000-hstew-mr.ps.Z >

Flottau, J., “Runway Incursion Kills 118 at Milan-Linate” Aviation Week & Space Technology. Pg. 47. Oct. 15th, 2001.

Wells, A., (2001). Commercial Aviation Safety New York: McGraw-Hill.Billings, C.E. (1991) “Human-Centered Aircraft Automation: A concept and guidelines” NASA. Technical

Memorandum 103885. Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center.Billings, C.E. (1997) “Aviation automation: The search for a human-centered approach”

Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence-Erlbaum Associates.Norman, D.A. (1989) “The “problem” of automation: Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not “over-

automation.” Human Factors in High-Risk Situations, The Royal Society.Wiener, E.L. (1989) “Human factors of advanced technology (“glass cockpit”) transport

Aircraft. NASA Contractor Report 177528. Moffett Field, CA: Ames Research Center.Sarter, N.B. and Woods, D.D. (1991) “Pilot Interaction with Cockpit Automation I: Operational Experiences with

the Flight Management System (FMS”). Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Ohio State University.

Sarter, N.B. and Woods, D.D. (1992a) “Pilot Interaction with Cockpit Automation II: Anexperimental study of pilots’ models and awareness of the Flight Management System”.Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory, Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Ohio State University.

Sarter, N. B. and Woods, D. D. (1992b) “Pilot interaction with cockpit automation I: Operational experiences with

the flight management system”. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 2(4), 303-321.