ilagan watershed reports 5tongson
Post on 24-Oct-2014
30 Views
Preview:
TRANSCRIPT
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Chapter 5: Developing Payments for Environmental Services in the Abuan Watershed
By
Edgardo E Tongson Sr Consultant on Water Resources
WWF-Philippines
Abstract
Watersheds provide important environmental services to society, including flood
regulation, water retention, soil formation, nutrient cycling, landscape beauty, carbon
sink and as habitat for biodiversity. Payments for Environmental Services is a
market-based tool linking buyers and sellers of environmental services in order to
generate sustainable financing for watershed management. The Abuan watershed,
with its flood regulation and water retention features, has the potential to generate at
least 3.3 MW of hydropower, irrigate 1,025 hectares of rice paddy, and supply
domestic water to 130,000 population in the town of Ilagan. With reforestation of
2,146 has of open grasslands and arrest of illegal logging activities, the watershed can
generate carbon credits of 21,250 CO2 tons and 718 CO2 tons from CDM and REDD
respectively. The scenery and clean water also offer opportunities for river-based eco-
tourism such as boating, kayaking, white water rafting and rappelling. The total
economic output from these environmental services can reach USD 9.3 Million a
year, of which USD 715,329 (or 7.7%) can be realized annually through voluntary
and involuntary PES schemes and provide sustainable financing for watershed
protection. If we remove payments from carbon credits, the annual payments through
PES amounts to USD 539,580 or the equivalent of USD 9.50/hectare. Examples of
model PES schemes and institutional design to implement PES in Abuan are
presented.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
1.Introduction
Watersheds provide a host of services beneficial to society. Unfortunately, society
attaches no value to these services. As such, this results to their further loss and
degradation. Watershed values, when realized, have the potential to generate
significant economic activity that will benefit the watershed communities.
Beneficiaries of these services pay for activities that enhance these services. Part of
these values may be captured and monetized as part of Payments of Environmental
Services (PES) schemes. PES schemes are growing in popularity because they
provide sustainable financing to defray the cost of watershed activities.
In relation to the Abuan watershed, four types of services stand out:
1. Watershed protection (e.g. hydropower companies and water utility pay upland
farmers for avoiding deforestation, soil erosion, pollution, flooding risks)
2. Landscape beauty (e.g. tourism operator paying local community not to cut trees
and pollute river that are used to enhance visitor experience)
3. Carbon sequestration and storage (e.g. Foreign power company paying farmers in
tropical countries to plant or maintain trees)
4. Biodiversity protection (e.g. conservation groups paying local community to restore
areas to create biological corridors).
1.1EmergenceofPESasaConservationTool
Land use activities can produce both positive and negative impacts to the hydrology
of a watershed. PES is a tool to provide incentives to encourage sustenance of
positive impacts and to minimize the negative effects. These activities entail costs
such as conduct of patrols to stop illegal logging, sustainable upland farming,
reforestation and provision of alternative livelihoods to logging-dependent
communities.
While the conventional way of funding watershed activities is through government
budgets, PES schemes diversify sources of funding by capturing payments from
private users of water for different types of watershed services. Compared to the use
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
of public resources such as taxes, PES schemes offer a more direct, efficient and more
equitable allocation of resources. PES schemes mimic market transactions between
buyers and sellers. Buyers of watershed services, such as end users, will continue to
make voluntary periodic payments for watershed activities as long as watershed
functions and services are well-defined and maintained.
The theoretical framework of PES is derived from the Coase theorem (Coase 1960).
The theorem states that, in free markets without transaction costs, buyers and sellers
will reach an equilibrium in which externalities are internalized through payments,
entitlements or transfers made in either direction. Voluntary, conditional and periodic
payments for a well-defined Environmental Service (ES) describe the nature of PES
schemes (Wunder 2005).
1.2CasesandBestPracticesinPESworldwide
There is growing literature presenting cases and examples of its application world
wide (Landell-Mills & Porras 2002, Pagiola 2002). Similar experiences were
documented for the Philippines (Padilla et al 2005). Some examples of water
payments through self-organized deals are presented in Figure 5-1. The cases include
a well-known water company (Vittel) who acquired upstream farmlands at the
beginning and gave incentives in the form of PES later on. In Ecuador, the
hydroelectric companies contribute to a fund, called FONAFIFO, to compensate
landowners residing in watersheds for land use activities. In Colombia, irrigators’
groups pay upstream land owners to control erosion in springs and waterways.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Figure51.ExamplesofWaterPayments(UNEP2008)
The payments from PES for land use activities can range widely. In PES cases
compiled in Costa Rica, the payments range from USD 10 to 45/ha-year (Figure 5-2).
Figure52.RangeofpaymentsforForestServicesinCostaRica(Pagiola2007)
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
To conserve 18,000 ha of watersheds in Costa Rica, hydropower companies, bottlers,
hotels and irrigation farmers pay a total of USD 500,000 a year (Pagiola 2007). The
higher payments reflect higher opportunity costs such as when forests are near
urbanizing areas, or where there are competing alternatives, e.g. rubber, oil palm,
soya, logging, etc.
1.3 Watershed Services from Abuan Watershed: Use it or Lose it.
The hydrology of the Abuan watershed offers a range of benefits that could be
harnessed for conservation and development. The potential economic values from
watershed services in Abuan will come from the clean and abundant year-round
surface water that can be delivered by gravity to different users, such as hydroelectric
power plants (through runoff-river schemes), river-based tourism, irrigation and
domestic water supply.
The watershed generates high levels of surface run-off estimated at 1,234 Million
m3/year (Rojas 2009). A large drainage area (63.79 sq km), steep slopes and thin
soils underlain by semi-permeable pyroclastic materials contribute to high levels of
surface runoff. Sixty-seven (67%) percent of the annual precipitation of 2900 mm is
converted to surface run-off. Water absorbed as soil moisture results in interflow that
find their way into channels and into Abuan river. The soil, however, is vulnerable to
erosion as ninety percent (90%) of the watershed areas have slopes exceeding 30%
(Evangelista 2009). The study site has low groundwater potential with ground water
recharge limited to just 5% of annual rainfall (Rollan 2009).
The baseline scenario shows that we will lose the forest and the watershed services to
destructive activities. The recent campaign against illegal logging in Abuan in 2008-
2009 yielded half a million board feet of timber valued at P 8 Million pesos (Ly
2009). This paper argues that the economic gain from logging is small compared to
potential gains from protecting the forest. However, unless the watershed services of
Abuan basin are utilized by Ilagan town and by society at large, these gains will not
be fully realized.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
The objective of this study is to determine the feasibility of setting up a PES program
in the Abuan watershed.
This paper will present the potential uses of watershed services in Abuan, potential
economic contribution, indicative amounts that can be captured through PES
schemes, identification of buyers and sellers and a conceptual arrangement of
instituting a PES system.
2.Methods
PES requires clear definition of land use activities that would lead to hydrological
effects that are important for investors, or “buyers”, in different economic sectors –
whether irrigation, hydropower, domestic water supply, agriculture or tourism. It will
require the understanding of the socio-economy and farming practices of watershed
communities, site geomorphology, soil profiles and erosion, land use trends,
hydrology, hydrogeology and economics. This emphasizes the need for inter-
disciplinary research and expertise that will be involved in the design and operation of
PES schemes.
The preceding studies by Rojas (209), Rollan (2009) and Evangelista (2009), provide
background information on the hydrology, hydrogeology, soils and land use activities
respectively. These studies assessed the conceptual feasibility of a run-off river
hydropower facility, irrigation and domestic water supply. Carag (2009) assesses the
tourism potential for river-based ecotourism.
Figure 5-3 describes the pathways in preparing a business case for PES. It starts
from understanding the science and economics, charging services users, paying
services providers and establishing the institutional framework.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Figure 5-3. The Multi-Disciplinary Nature of PES Schemes (Pagiola 2007)
The first step is developing the business case for investors and buyers to pay for
environmental services1. The business case will outline the opportunities for PES by
identifying the environmental service(s), understanding their linkages to land use
activities, measuring the hydrological impacts, estimating opportunity costs of buyers
and sellers, designing contractual agreements and designing an institutional
framework for collection, disbursement and monitoring of payments to upland
communities.
The methodology of developing a business case for a PES scheme in the Abuan
watershed is enumerated as follows:
1. Defining ecosystem services in Abuan Watershed and measuring economic
output
2. Identifying prospective buyers
3. Identifying sellers, and Watershed Protection Services
4. Assessing legal and policy context for PES
5. Prospective PES amounts per sector
6. Surveying available PES support services, organizations and institutional
arrangements
1There are no current investments in Abuan for water-related operations. This paper lays the empirical basis for exploring combined and integrated schemes to maximize its natural endowments beneficial to society,
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
The next section presents the results from the research. The findings are organized
following the methodology outlined above.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
3.Results
DefiningecosystemservicesinAbuanWatershedandmeasuringeconomicoutput
IntheAbuanwatershed,regularandyear‐roundstreamflowsaretheprimary
watershedservicethathavethepotentialtogeneratesignificanteconomic
benefitstothetownofIlaganandprovinceofIsabela.Flowregulation,asa
watershedservice,canbemeasuredusingahydrographwhichshowsthe
dischargeorstreamflowsagainsttimeduringarainfallevent.
Therearefour(4)hydrauliccontrols–sizeofriverbasin,vegetation,slopeand
soiltype‐thatinfluencethefloodperformanceofawatershed.Ofthese,
vegetativecoverandsoiltypecanbealteredbyhumanactivities,whiletherest
arebeyondhumancontrol.Figure54illustratestheeffectofchangesinsoil
andforestcoverondischargeratesandflooding.
Figure54.SoilandVegetationEffectsonStreamHydrograph
Inforestedwatersheds,thehydrographshowsagradualrise,alaterpeakingof
floodsandagradualrecessionofstreamflow(greenline).Whenforestsare
removed,thegraphshowsahigherandquickerpeakfloodandasteeper
recessioncurve(blueline).Themeanamplitudeasmeasuredbythedistance
betweenpeakandbaseflowiswiderfordeforestedorimpermeablewatersheds.
10/26/09 10:10 PMigcse_flood_hydrographs.jpg 616!590 pixels
Page 1 of 1http://www.geographyalltheway.com/igcse_geography/natural_environments/river_processes/imagesetc/igcse_flood_hydrographs.jpg
10/26/09 10:10 PMigcse_flood_hydrographs.jpg 616!590 pixels
Page 1 of 1http://www.geographyalltheway.com/igcse_geography/natural_environments/river_processes/imagesetc/igcse_flood_hydrographs.jpg
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Theconversionofsoilsfrompermeabletoimpermeablesurfacematerialdueto
landdevelopmentsiscommonlyfoundinurbanizingwatersheds.Soil
conversionhasthesameeffectonthehydrographasadeforestedwatershed.
Soilcompactionorsurfacepavingresultsinhigherrun‐off,quickerpeakfloods,
lesserinfiltrationanddiminishingbaseflows.
Withforestcoverstillat89%,theAbuanbasinretainsabout33%ofa10‐year
24‐hourstormwithacumulativerainfallof308.8mmandabout25%ofa50‐
yearstormwithacumulativerainfallof389.2mm(Rojas2009).Theforestsand
itssoilsarelargelyresponsibleforwaterretention,storageandfloodpeak
attenuation.
Intactforestsretainwaterasitiscaughtinthebranchesandleavesofthetrees
andneverhitsthegroundandalotissoakedupbytheleaflitter,grassandother
organicmaterialontheforestfloor.Thismaterialprotectsthesoilfromerosion,
reducescompactionfromtheimpactofheavyrainsandconservesmoisture.If
theforestisremoved,thegroundisexposedtohigherrainfallwithhigher
intensitiesandtosolarradiationresultinginhigherevaporation,lesswater
infiltration,highersoilerosion,quickerandhighervolumeoffloods.
Theconversionofpermeablesoilstoimpermeablesurfacessuchas
establishmentofbuilt‐upareaswillexhibitthesameimpactsasadeforested
watershedi.e.highervolumeofrun‐offandquickerfloodingdownstream.The
lossofsoilduetoerosionresultsinlesserinterflowanddiminishedbaseflows
duringthedrymonths.
Theflowdurationcurveisatoolthatmeasuresthepercentageofthetimethat
flowratesequalorexceedthevariousflowratesduringtheperiodofstudy.
Rojas(2009)developedaflowdurationcurve(Figure55)whichshowsan80%
dependableflowofabout15m3/secondor1.3Millionm3/dayanda95%
dependableflowofabout9.5m3/secondor0.8Millionm3/day.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Fig. 55. FlowDuration Curve (FDC) of Abuan River for Hydropower and
IrrigationDevelopment
Fortheconceptualhydropower/irrigationscheme(Figure56),abouthalfofthe
95%dependableflowestimatedat4.65m3/secondwillbeused.Theotherhalf
oftheflowsislefttomaintaintheriveranditsecologicalprocesses.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Figure56.SchematicConfigurationofConceptualHydropower/Irrigation
Development
3.1.1 RunoffriverHydropower
Thehydropowerpotentialandirrigationpotentialofthebasinwasevaluatedas
acombineddevelopment.Theschemeconsistsof7diversiondams(weirs)anda
tunnelwaterwaytotakewatertoapowerstationatlowerelevation.The
schemeisconceivedinriverstretcheswithsteepgradients(>1/60slopes)orin
placeswheretheequivalentheadismadeavailable.
Theoutflowfromthetailraceofthepowerplantwillbedischargedtothemain
canaltoallowtheslightlywarmerwatertocooldowntoambienttemperatureas
itflowsthroughacanalparalleltotheriverandisdistributedtotheindividual
farmlots intheirrigableservicearea.Notall thewater isneededfor irrigation
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
throughouttheyear.Partofthewatervolumemaygotoawatertreatmentplant
tosupply thedomesticwatersystem for Ilagan town,withdistanceof18kms.
With the combined development and conjunctive use of surface water for
multiple use, the infrastructures needed and the initial capital investment are
significantlyreduced.
Inestimatingtheeconomicbenefitsfrommini‐hydropowergeneration,we
assembledthehydrologicdataonthestreamsanddeterminedtheamountof
wateravailableanditsdistributionthroughouttheyearandfromyeartoyear.
Forthispurpose,thecatchmentarea,approximateavailablehead,andannual
rainfallisused.
Rojas(2009)suggestsusingf95%dependableflowof4.65m3/secondas
exploitabledischarge.Withassumedhydraulicheadof80m,theschemecan
powera3.3MWhydropowerplant.Weassumealoadfactorof0.8andaselling
priceofUSD0.10centsperKWHgenerated.
Theestimatedannualsales(inUSD)fromhydropowergenerationiscomputed
asfollows:
GrossSales=Plantcapacityx1000KW/MWxLoadFactorxNo.ofdays
operationsx24hours/dayxUSD0.10/KWH
GrossSales=3.3MWx1000KW/MWx0.8x360x24x0.10/KWH
GrossSales=USD2,280,960/year
CapitalCosts/MWinstalledcapacity=USD2Million
HurdleRate=12%p.a.
3.1.2Irrigation
Assuming1hectareofricepaddywillrequire1meterofwaterpercropping
season,thismeans10,000m3/hectareofirrigationrequirement.Fromtheflow
durationcurve,the80%dependableflowisequivalentto7.0m3/secondwhich
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
amountsto6.35MCMin105days.Dividingthisbytheirrigationrequirementof
10,000m3/hectare,anequivalentareaof6,300hectarescanbeirrigatedinone
(1)croppingseason.
ThereisnoformalirrigationsystemtoservicethefloodplainsoftheAbuan
watershed.Farmerswhowereinterviewedarewillingtoplantriceifirrigation
systemsareinplace.Theirrigationschemewillconveywaterbygravityto
channelsanddikesandirrigate1,025haofSanManuelclayloaminthelower
terracesandthefloodplainofAbuanwatershed(Evangelista2009).Irrigation
willcomplementtherain‐fedmonthsandtappedfor105daysinsummer.
Excesswatercanbeusedtoirrigatefloodzonesinadjacentwatersheds.
Assumptions:
Servicearea=1,025
Riceyield/ha/cropping=4.2MetricTons(MT)(basedonaverageyieldsof
adjacentirrigatedriceareas.
Projectedriceproduction=4,305MT/ha‐crop
Projectedannualriceproduction=4,305x2.5=10,763MT/yr
Priceofpalay=USD0.25/kg(@P48:1USD)
Gross income per yer = 10,763 x 1000 x 0.25 = USD 2,690,750
Netincome/ha‐cropping=P25,900(Evangelista2009)
Annualnetincome=P25,900x2.5=64,750orUSD1,249perhectare
CapitalCostIrrigationInfrastructure/hectare:P280,000(USD5,833)
Capitaloutlay:USD5,833/hax1,025has=USD5,978,825
Hurdlerate:18%p.a.
3.1.3FutureDomesticWaterSupply
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Thissamewater,usedtopowerthehydropowerplant,isreturnedtotheriver.
Fromhere,thewatermaybeusedconjunctivelytosupplyirrigationwaterfor
drymonthsanddomesticwaterallyearround.Waterfordomesticusemayflow
toawatertreatmentplantandthenpiped17kmdownstreamtodomesticusers
inIlagantown.Atpresent,domesticandindustrialwaterrequirementsofthe
townaresuppliedbygroundwater.
Asthetownurbanizes,theincreasingdemandforgroundwaterwillleadto
heavyabstractionthatmayresultindepletionofwatertables,interferencecosts,
saltwaterintrusionandlandsubsidence.Bychannelingsurfacewatertosupply
urbandemand,competitionwithindustrialusersanddepletionofwatertablesis
avoided.
Assumptions:
Averagepercapitawaterconsumptionperyear=0.2m3/dayx365days/year
=182.5m3/year
PopulationofIlagantown=130,000(NSO2007)
PriceoflevelIIIwatersystem=USD0.20/m3
GrossSales=182.5x0.20x130,000
GrossSales=USD4,745,000/year
3.1.4RiverbasedEcoTourism
River‐basedtourismisgrowinginpopularityintheregion.Afeasibilitystudyby
Carag(2009)onthetourismpotentialinAbuanriveridentifiedboating,
kayaking,rappellingandwhite‐waterraftingaspossibleactivities.Dayand
weekendpackagetoursarebeingdevelopedinAbuanRiver.Thesetourscater
toweekendvisitorsfromManila.Thepackagesaretobemadepartofthe
tourismprogramoftheIlaganMunicipality,IsabelaprovinceandRegion2.Eco‐
tourisminAbuancancreateemploymentopportunitiesforformerlogging‐
dependenthouseholds.Smallentrepreneurscanbenefitbyleasingpicnichuts
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
andboats,sellinglunchesanddrinks,tourguidingservices,souvenirsales
amongothers.Theseinvestmentsspurthelocaleconomythroughmultiplier
effects.
Assumption:
Visitor‐tripsperyear:1,000
AveragespendingorTravelCostpervisitorassuming2D/2N:$50
Tourcost/tourist: $20/pax
GrossSales/year: 1000x$50+1000x$20
GrossSales/year: $70,000
3.1.5CarbonMarkets
Withgrowinginterestincarbonmarketsandemergingincentiveschemessuch
asReducingEmissionsFromDeforestationandDegradation(REDD),
opportunitiesareemergingtogeneratepaymentsforcarbonsequestrationto
benefitAbuancommunities.
CleanDevelopmentMechanism
TheCleanDevelopmentMechanismallowsAnnex1countriestobuycarbon
creditsfromdeveloping(non‐Annex1)countriesinorderfortheformertomeet
regulatorycapstocarbonemissions.Thelattermaysellcarboncreditsby
sequesteringcarbonthroughtreeplantations,energyefficiencymeasures,
switchingtobiomassfuels,andthelike.InthecaseofAbuan,opengrasslands
maybeplantedtoagro‐forestrytoprovidetree‐basedlivelihoodsandtosell
carboncreditsatthesametime.
Thefollowingtableshowstherateofcarbonsequesteredforagro‐forestry
plantations.Assuming2,146hectaresofopengrasslandinAbuanisplantedto
agro‐forestry.Thecarbonsequesteredandequivalentsalesfromcarboncredits
iscomputedasfollows:
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Assumptions:
Opengrasslandconvertedtoagro‐forestry=2,146has
Csequestrationrateofagro‐forestry=2.7tons/ha‐year(Lascoetal2000)
TotalCsequestration=5,794tons/year
Atomicweightofcarbon=12
Atomicweightofoxygen=16
AtomicweightCO2molecule=(12+(16x2))=44
TotalweightofCO2=5.79x103tonsx44/12=21.25x103tonsCO2
Priceof1tonCO2equivalent=US$8/tCO2‐e
Grosssales/year=21,250x$8=$170,000
PaymentsThroughAvoidedDeforestation(REDD)
Thisapproach,alsoknownasREDD(ReducedEmissionsfromDeforestationand
Degradation),isbeingnegotiatedbytropicalcountriesintherun‐uptothe
CopenhagenClimateChangenegotiationsinDecemberof2009.Thismodeof
financingaimstoarrestthedeclineinforestcoverandgloballossofcarbon
sinks.Itwillgeneratefinancialresourcesbymaintainingorimprovingexisting
carbonsinksinintactforestsbyprotectingforestreserves.Paymentsaremade
basedonreducedratesofdeforestation.
ThebaselinedeforestationrateinAbuanWatershedisderivedfromthevolume
ofconfiscatedtimberasreportedbytheProvincialTaskForceonForest
Protectionfor2008‐2009(Ly2009).Infourteenmonthsofthecampaign(July
2008toSeptember2009),thetotalvolumeofconfiscatedtimberoriginating
fromAbuanwatershedisreportedat1,449m3.Thistranslatestoannual
volumesof1242m3.
Deforestationrate/year=1242m3
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Assumptions:
1ton=2.83m3
Equivalentmassintons=438.87
%Carboncontentofbiomass(Lascoetal2000)=44.7
Ccontentremoved(tons/year)=196
Priceof1tonCO2equivalent=US$8/tCO2‐e
AtomicweightCO2=(12+(16x2))=44
Atomicweightofcarbon=12
TotalweightofCO2removedayear=196*44/12=718tons
Grosssales/year=718x$8=$5,749
3.2 Identifyingprospectivebuyers
TheprospectivebuyersdifferwithrespecttotheES.Thebuyerscanrangefrom
hydropowercompanies,bulkwaterproviderssuchaswaterdistricts,the
NationalIrrigationAuthority(asproxyforricefarmers),carbonbrokers
representingAnnex1countriesandvisitingtourists(Table51).
Summarizingthepotentialeconomiccontributionsfromhydropower,irrigation,
watersupply,carboncreditsandtourism,theeconomicvaluesgeneratedby
conservingtheAbuanforestsmayreachUSD9.34Millionayear.
Table51.EnvironmentalServices,PotentialBuyersandAnnualEconomicOutputinAbuan
WatershedService PotentialBuyers AnnualEconomicOutput(inUSD)
Hydropower(runoffriver)
IndependentPowerProducersIPPs,ElectricCooperatives
2,280,960
Irrigation VIBANARAfarmers* 2,069,750
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
RiceIrrigatorsassociations
River‐basedAdventureTourism
Tourists,adventuregroups 70,000
WaterSupply BarangayWaterAssociationIlaganWaterDistrict
4,745,000
Carbonsequestration(CDM)
KyotoProtocolAnnex1CountriesCarbonbrokers,banks
170,000
AvoidedDeforestation Same 5,749TOTAL 9,341,459
• VIBANARAfarmersmaybebothbuyerandsellerofES
3.3 IdentifyingSellersandWatershedProtectionServices
“Sellers”ofPEScanbedefinedasactorsthatlegallyownthelandorwho
exercisesmanagementcontrolpertainingtolanduseswithinthewatershed.
Thesecanbestateactors,non‐stateactorsoramixofboth.Themajor“sellers”
aretheparkauthoritiesoftheNorthernSierraMadreNaturalParkandtheCBFM
organizationwhohasjurisdictionto69%and16%ofthewatershedarea
respectively.
3.3.1 NorthernSierraMadreNaturalParkProtectedAreaAuthorities
TheNorthernSierraMadreNaturalParkcovering69%ofthewatershedareais
locatedinthehighercatchmentandprovidesthelargestproportionateshareof
benefits.Theagencyhavingjurisdictionoverlandusedecisionsintheparkis
theDeptofEnvironmentandNaturalResources(DENR)throughtheProtected
AreasManagementBoard(PAMB).UnderthePAMBaretheexecutivestaff
consistingoftheparksuperintendentandtherangers.Theparkoffice,aswith
otherparksinthecountry,isunderstaffed,lacksresourcesandequipment,and
untrainedtohandleacomplexjobinparkmanagement.
Somepartsoftheparkmaybetraditionallyownedandcontrolledbyhunting
andgatheringindigenouscommunitiessuchastheAgtaandDumagattribesby
virtueoftheirancestralclaims.Reportsshowthat13bandswith5‐7familiesper
bandbelongtothesegroups.Theysubsistsonkainginorswiddenfarming,
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
hunting,fishingandgatheringofnon‐timberforestproducts(rattan,honey,
resin,etc).
3.3.2CBFMArea
Thestateawardeda25‐yearleaseagreementtothePeoplesOrganization,called
Vibanarra,underaCommunityBasedForestManagement(CBFM)Agreement.
Throughthisagreement,theorganizationhaslegalcontroltoover16%ofthe
watershed.
WithintheCBFMarea,migrantandindigenouscommunitiescanbefoundinthe
lowersub‐catchmentofthewatershed.Thisarea,clearedthroughaprevious
loggingconcession,isnowpre‐dominantlyplantedtocorn,uplandrice,tree
farmswithexpansiveopengrasslands,shrubsandresidualforests.Intherainy
monthsafteraheavydownpour,theAbuanriverturnsbrown,ladenwithsilt
fromupstreamdeforestedareas.Cornplantationsanduplandriceplantedin
hillyareasarereportedtohavehigherosionrates(Evangelista2009).
Alargepartofthehaulersofillegallogs(calledbugadors)consistingofabout
150familiescomefromthiscommunity.Becauseofpovertyandhigherreturns
fromlogging,thesebugadorsrelyontheillegaltimbertrade.Attheheightofthe
anti‐loggingcampaignin2008,someofthesepeoplewereapprehended.Others
havetoseekotherformsoflivelihood.Giventherightincentives,theyplayan
importantroleinreversingforestdenudation,landdegradationandinproviding
bufferingactivitiestothenaturalpark.TheyarealsokeytoanyfuturePES
scheme.
Theincentiveschememaybechanneledtotheorganizationwhoallocatesthe
benefitstoitsmembers.Thisreducesthetransactioncostofrelatingto
individualfamiliesparticipatinginthePESscheme.
Inthecaseofroamingtribalgroups,theirfootprintorimpactonforestresources
isnotassevereasthemigrantfarmers.Leftontheirown,thesetribalgroups
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
willcontinuetolivesustainablyofftheparkresourcesastheyhavesincethe
timeoftheirancestors.Theirsubsistenceactivitiesandrightsoverancestral
territoriesareguaranteedundertheIndigenousPeoplesRightsActof1996.
3.3.3WatershedProtectionServices
Landusepracticesthatdisturbthesoilresultsinhigherosion.Road
construction,agriculturecroppingpractices,deforestationmaygreatly
accelerateerosion.Soilerosionresultsindepositionofsiltinwaterways,canals,
weirs,pipesandotherhydraulicstructures.Thesedepositsreducetheavailable
volumethatthestructureisdesignedtoconvey.Everyyear,waterutilitiesand
hydropowerplantsspendconsiderablemoneytoremovesiltinloggedcanals
andstructures.
Swiddenfarmsorkainginespeciallyinsteepslopesareresponsibleforhigh
erosionrates.ThepredictedannualerosionratesforkainginfarmsintheAbuan
watershedcanrangefrom1524to3671tonsperhectaredependingonslope
categories.Theseerosionratesareclassifiedasextremelyhigh.Ifkainginfarms
areconvertedtoagro‐forestryareas,theannualerosionrateswillbereduced
dramaticallyby99%to14.98‐18.52tonsperhectare.Kainginfarmersarebest
candidatesforanyPESschemeinAbuan.
Theorganizedfarmersmightoffertoimplement,forafee,specificnatural
resourcemanagementpracticesoractivities,suchasmaintainingforestcover;
reforestation,possiblywithafocusonnativespecies;adopting‘sustainable’or
‘best’landusemanagementpractices,suchassustainablefarmingorsustainable
forestry.Byadoptingthesepractices,theyarecreatingormaintainnaturalfilters
inthewatershedtoreducesoilerosionandwaterpollution.Bymaintaining
vegetation,waterflowsareregulatedthroughtheyear,controllingforfloodsand
minimizingsoillossandsedimentation.
3.4.1 Assessinglegal,policycontextforPES
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
ThepolicyenvironmentenablingadoptionofPESorPES‐likeschemesis
embeddedinsectorpolicieslinkedtotheuseandmanagementofnatural
resources.Thesepoliciesarefoundinpowergeneration,protectedareasand
irrigation.
ThedevolutionofpowersunderthelocalGovernmentCodepresents
opportunitiestogeneratelocalfinancingfromextractionoruseofnatural
resources,e.g.mining,domesticwateruse,hydropower,forestry.Thelaw
providesfora1%shareofLGUsinthenationalwealthasstipulatedintheLocal
governmentCodeof1991(RA7160).
Asummaryofthesepoliciesastheycorrespondtospecificwatershedserviceis
presentedinTable52.
Table52.EnablingPolicyforPES,valuationmethodsusedandresponsibleagency
EcosystemService
Policy Valuationmethod
ImplementingAgency
Hydropower ENR94‐1RA7638(DOEAct),RA9136(EPIRA)
1/2of1centavo/kwhofgrosssalesVoluntary
IPP,DOE,LGU,NAPOCORIPP
Hydropower
1%shareofnationalwealth,LocalGovernmentCode
1%ofgrosssales
LGU
Irrigation Voluntary %ofsummeryield
IrrigatorsAssociation,CBFMO
Eco‐Tourism LGUordinance WTP,TravelCost
LGU,operators
Biodiversity,bio‐prospecting
NIPASAct(RA7586)WildlifeAct(RA9147)
WTPorCost‐BasedFee‐based
PAMB,DENRPAMB,DENR
DomesticWater PD1067WaterCodeofthePhilippines1%shareofnationalwealth,Local
Cost‐based1%ofgrosssales
NationalWaterResourcesBoard,WaterDistrictWaterDistrict,LGU
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
GovernmentCodeCarbonPayments
KyotoProtocolREDD
$/ton‐CO2esequesteredcarbonstocksintrees
DNA,DENR
Forestservices ExecutiveOrder318
(2004)
3.5ProspectivePESamountspersector
ThissectionexplorestheamountsthatcanberaisedfromPESschemesunder
existinglawsandsectoralpoliciesthatcansustainablyfinancewatershed
protection.
PowerSector
ThepowersectorisoneofthepotentiallysignificantcontributorstoPES
schemes.Forallpowerprojects,theDeptofEnergyestablishedthe
Reforestation,WatershedManagement,Healthand/orEnvironment
EnhancementFund(RWMHEEF)throughRepublicAct7638of1992.The
ImplementingRulesandRegulations,ascontainedinER‐94‐1,Sec6(f),states
that:
“Onehalfofonecentavo(PhP0.005)perkilowatthourofthetotalelectricitysales
oftheenergygeneratingfacilityshallbesetasidebythepowerproducertobeused
forreforestation,watershedmanagement,healthand/orenvironment
enhancement.Thepowerproducerandtheenergyresourcedeveloper,tothe
extentoftheirrespectivecontributiontothefund,shalleachsubmitwork
programsforreforestation,watershedmanagement,healthand/orenvironment
enhancementwhichwouldhavetobeapprovedbytheDOEinconsultationand
closecoordinationwiththeDENR,theDOH,therelevantwaterdistricts,local
governmentunits,regionaldevelopmentcouncils,nongovernmentorganizations,
andotheraffectedparties…”
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
ThiswasamendedbyDepartmentCircularNo2000‐03‐003,wherebythe
electrificationfundwillget50%ofonecentavoandtheremaining50%willbe
sharedequallybetweentheDevelopmentandLiveihoodFindandthe
RWMHEEF).
RepublicAct9136alsoknownastheElectricPowerIndustryReformActof2001
(EPIRA)adoptedtheseamendmentstoER94‐1.
UndertheRWMHEEFFund,therehavebeenatotalof349projects,withatotal
disbursementofPhP413,935,169for38powerplants,overaperiodof8.5years.
ThemajorityoftheprojectsarefoundinLuzon,mainlyinMetroManila,
correspondingtothenumberofpowerplantslocatedperregionalcenter.
(Rosales2003)
ThefundsaccruingfromRWMHEEFareadministeredbytheDepartmentof
Energy.ForNAPOCORassets,thefundisadministeredbyNAPOCOR.Thelocal
governmentunitsubmitsproposalstoDOE/NAPOCORforevaluation.The
proposalsmayincludeconstructionofhealthcenters,communaltoilets,water
supplysystem,erosioncontrol,forestmanagement,reforestation,rehabilitation,
soilfertilityconservationandenhancement,wastedisposalandotherrelated
projects.
TheamountaccruingtoRWMHEEFforhypotheticalAbuanhydropower
operationisestimatedasfollows:
AnnualVolumeinKWH=3.3MWx1000KW/MWx0.8x360x24
=22,809,600KWH
RWMHEEF=22,809,600KWHx.005/KWH
=114,048Pesos(USD2,376)
Whiletheseamountsmaybesmall,thehydropowercompanymayaugmenttheir
investmentinthewatershedcorrespondingtothevaluestheyattachfor
watershedservices.InadditiontotheRWMHEEFschemes,thepowerproducer
mayprovideforvoluntarypaymentstakenfromtheirproducersurplus.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Forexample,Ina1MWrun‐offriverhydroelectricprojectinSanFernando,
Romblon,thepowercompanyisvoluntarilysettingasideP400,000ayearfor
reforestation,enforcement,livelihoodsandscholarshipstobenefitindigenous
uplandcommunities(ROMELCO,perscomm.).
AssumingtheeconomicsandproducersurpluswiththeRomblonhydropower
projectarethesame,theenvisioned3.3MWrun‐offriverschemeinAbuanmay
annuallygenerateanadditionalP1.2M(orUSD25,000)forwatershedactivities.
LGUSharefromNationalWealth
Thelocalgovernmentcodeprovidesa1%sharefromgrosssalesinfavorofthe
localgovernmentunit.WithprojectedannualsalesofUSD2,280,960,the1%
shareoftheLGUamountstoUSD22,809perannum.
IrrigatorAssociations.
TheNationalIrrigationAdministration(NIA)ismandatedtobuildirrigation
infrastructures(weirs,canals,pumps,etc)toincreasefarmproductivityinrice
andcornlands.NIAalsoorganizesfarmersintoirrigatorgroupsinorderto
accessloansforirrigationinfrastructure.
InasurveyoffarmersinRomblon,thefarmergroupshaveindicatedwillingness
topay1cavanofriceforeachhectarefor1croppingseason.Assumingthesame
socio‐economicprofilesandwillingness‐to‐payisfoundinAbuanricefarmers,
thefutureirrigationschememaypotentiallygenerate$12,812ayear,computed
asfollows:
Assumptions:
Price=$0.25/kg
1cavan=50kg
Potentialirrigablearea=1,025has
Voluntarypaymentsbyfarmers=$0.25/kgx50kg/cavanx1cavan/hectarex
1,025has
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
=$12,812peryear
Ecotourismpayments.
Paymentsfromvisitingtouristscanbeintheformofentrancefeesauthorized
throughprovincialormunicipallegislation.ExamplesofLGU‐legislated
financingcanbefoundinTubbatahaReefs,Mabini‐Tingloy(Anilao)Batangas,
PuertoGalera,OlangoIslandandHiluturaninCebuandStPaulsSubterranean
RiverinPuertoPrincesaCity.
FutureoperatorsinAbuanwatershedcanrunpackagesforboating,kayaking,
rapellingandwhite‐waterraftingactivities.Theseoperatorscanpayafee
similartothosechargedbycompetingsitesalongChicoandPinacanauanRivers
respectivelyinCagayanProvince,orbyassessing10%oftheirtravelcost.
ForAbuan,weassumeanentrancefeeofP100perpassenger/daytotheriver.
Assumptions:
DailyEntrancefee=P100
Visitor‐tripsperyear:1,000
Entrancefee:P100/visitor
Grosscollectionsperyear=P100/pxx1,000pax/year=P100,000
Biodiversity
TheNIPASLawof1992isanactprovidingfortheestablishmentand
managementofNationalIntegratedProtectedAreassystem,definingitsscope
andcoverage,andforotherpurposes.Thelawallowstheparktocollectentrance
fees,donations,penaltiesandfinesarisingformparkadministration.Thepark
collectionsaredepositedinthenationaltreasurywhere75%areallottedtothe
parkfordirectuseand25%accruestotheIPAFsub‐fundtosubsidizeother
parks.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
TheWildlifeActof2001isanactprovidingfortheconservationandprotection
ofwildliferesourcesandtheirhabitats,appropriatingfundsthereforeandfor
otherpurposes.Thelawupgradesthepenaltiesandfeesasadeterrentto
commitwildlifeviolations.Italsosetstheprotocolandfeesforbio‐prospecting
bylocalandforeigninstitutionsforcommercialandnon‐commercialand
academicpurposes.
ThePAMBmaysetvisitorfeesforentrancetothepark.Sincevisitorsdonot
crossintotheparkboundary,weomittheentrancefeesincalculatingthe
potentialamountstoberaisedfromPESschemes.
DomesticWater
TheLGUmaycollect1%fromthegrosssalesofthewaterdistrictasitsshareof
nationalwealth.ForAbuan,thesecollectionscanearntheLGUuptoUSD
474,500peryearfromdomesticwateruse.Thesecollectionshoweverdonot
guaranteeearmarkingforwatershedactivities.
UnderthePhilippineWatercode,theNWRBthroughtheLocalWaterDistrictis
responsibleforsettingwatertariffstobechargedtoconsumers.Currentwater
policieshoweverdonotreflectthetruecostofwaterprovisionwhichincludes
thecostofmaintainingwatersheds.Apartfromthe1%levybyLGUs,thewater
districtmayhowevervoluntarysetasidefundsforwatershedprotection.
Carbon
ThecreditsfromCDMandREDDandequivalentmonetaryvalueswillgodirectly
tothecommunitiesthathostandmanagetheforestresources,includingplanting
treestosequestercarbon.Thereishoweveraneedforlocalconsolidator,
broker,andverifiertovalidatethecarboncredits.
ThecarboncreditsfromCDMandREDDcangenerateuptoUSD175,749ayear
assumingalltheopengrasslandsarereforestedandillegalloggingiscurtailed.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
ForestServices
ExecutiveOrder318(2004)onPromotingSustainableForestManagement
“providesforpropervaluationandpricingofforestryresourcesandcollectionof
feesforuseofenvironmentalservicesofforestsandwatersheds.Italsoprovides
foraplough‐backmechanismthatensuresserviceprovidersareproperly
compensated.
PoolingallpotentialPEScontributionsfromdifferentsources,theproposed
schememaygenerateUSD715,329peryear(Table53).Withforestcoverat
56,807has,thisisequivalenttoUSD12.59perhectare.
TheESindicatorsforthehydropowerandirrigationschemesaretheaverage
baseflowsduringdrymonths(March–June)measuredinaverageMCM/day.
Forthewatercompany,itiswaterqualitymeasuredinTotalSuspendedSolids
andotherparameters.Forcarbonbrokers,theindicatoristheforestcoverin
numberofhectares.Fortourism,itmaybeacombinationoftheabove
indicators.
Table53.IdentifyingESBuyers,indicatorsandestimatedamountsforPES
ESBuyer PESamountsInUSD
Amounts(inUSD/year)
ESindicators
RWMHEEF
2,376 Stablewaterflowsyear‐round,baseflowsduringdrymonths
Voluntary
25,000 same
HydropowerPowerCompany
1%sharefromgrosssales
22,809 same
Irrigatorsassociation
Voluntary1cavan/HH‐yr
12,812 Dryseasonflows,MCM
Tourists WTP 2,083 Scenery,Clean&flowingwater,H2Oquality
WaterDistrict 1%Sharefromgrosssales
474,500 Abundant,clean&Potablewater,H2Oquality
Carbonbrokers
CDM
170,000 Re‐Forestationcover(has)
REDD 5,749 OldgrowthForestcover
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
(has)Total 715,329
Ifweremovepaymentsfromcarboncredits,theannualpaymentsforPESis
reducedtoUSD539,580ortheequivalentofUSD9.50/hectare.Thisis
comparabletothelowendoftherangeofPESpaymentsintheCostaRica
examplemadebyahydropowerproducer(seeFigure52).Butthisratiois
higherthanwhattheotherprotectedareasareearningandwillimprove
managementeffectivenessifspentwisely.
3.6SurveyingavailablePESsupportservicesandorganizations
PESprogramscanbeintheformofself‐organizeddealsbetweenfewsellersand
buyersorlegislatedschemesandstructuredarrangementsinvolvinglarge
numbersofbuyersandsellers.Thelatterwillrequirebrokerstosetuppayment
mechanisms,aggregatesellersand/orbuyers,conductstudies,anddefraythe
transactioncostsessentialforitsestablishmentandmonitoring.NGOsusually
performthebrokeringrolewhileLGUsprovidetheenablingframeworkand
initialfunds.Nohardandfastruleisprescribedinsettingupvoluntaryand
involuntaryschemes,butamixofbothmaybemoreapplicable.
3.6.1InstitutionalArrangement
ThereisnostandardblueprintindesigninginstitutionstoimplementPES
schemes.ItisimportanttohighlightthatPESneedtobeadaptedonacase‐by‐
casebasisandusedasappropriate,keepinginmindthatPESaremeansof
securingecosystemservicesthatareimportanttosocio‐economicdevelopment.
InthecaseofAbuan,thepotentialroleoftheCBFMcommunityistoprovide
bufferingor“socialfencing”tothepark.ThisshouldbethegoalofanyPES
scheme.Thesefarmersarelocatedinareasthatprovideaccesstothepark,and
arethereforeinthebestpositiontospotandreportillegalactivities,monitorand
dissuadepoachers,outsidersandmigrantsfromenteringthepark.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Thusitisimportantforthesefarmerstobenefitfromincentivesystems
includingcashandnon‐cashrewards.Non‐cashincentivescanincludeland
tenure,credit,infrastructureorpost‐harvestfacilities,andothersupportthatare
madeconditionaltofarmers’sustainablymanagingtheirland.PESschemescan
beearmarkedtosubsidizesustainableagriculturesuchasagro‐forestry
schemes,treefarms,inter‐croppingsystems,organicfarmingandother
practices.Farmerscanorganizethemselvesintocommunitywatchdoggroups
andbeemployedtomonitorandpatroltheforestsforanyillegalactivities.
Themoresectoralbenefitsarerealized,thegreatertheamountoffundsthatcan
begeneratedfromPES.WatershedactivitiesentailcostsandPESschemesare
gainingpopularitybecauseoflatentdemandforservicesfromarangeofbuyers,
whetherhydropower,eco‐tourism,irrigationorwaterutilities.Ifopportunity
costsfromloggingarehigh,orifthereisabignumberofsellers,the
contributionsfrombuyers’canbepooledtopayforwatershedactivitiesthat
wouldotherwisebedifficultforasinglebuyer.InmostcaseswherePESschemes
operate,thefundsarekeptinatrustaccountandatrusteeorganizationorNGO
istaskedtomanagetheaccount.
Thefunctionsofthetrusteeorganizationincludeorganizingthewatershed
communities,buildingtheircapacities,reviewingproposals,workplansand
budgets,disbursingfunds,monitoringandreportingprogress,evaluating
outputs,andrepeatingtheprocessaftereachprojectcycle.
Thetrusteewillalsoreportprogresstoitsbenefactorsusingindicatorsthatare
importanttothem.Theseindicatorsshouldsignifyhealthofthewatershedand
arelinkedtothelevelofwaterflowsduringsummer,amplitudeofflows
throughouttheyear,waterquality,forestcover,poverty,amongothers.
OneoftheimportantindicatorstomonitorinanyPESschemeistheopportunity
cost,especiallythosebornebyfarmersingivinguplandusesthataremore
profitable,butmaybeecologicallydestructive.Theselandusescaninclude
small‐scalemining,swiddenfarming,orestablishingexotictreefarms.Because
opportunitycostsvaryandfluctuatesovertime,itwouldbeimportantfor
paymentsfromPESschemestobeflexibleinordertomatchoratleastcoverthe
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
opportunitycosts.Auctions,biddingandotherschemesaresomeofthemeansto
derivetheopportunitycostsofsellers.
Figure57depictsaPESgovernancestructureopereatinginSibuyanIsland,
RomblonProvince.Thewatershedmanagementprojectcyclecoincideswiththe
intra‐LGUplanning,budgetingandmonitoringcycle.Thisscheme,whichstarted
inearly2006,isintoitssecondcycleofimplementationbytheLGUofSan
Fernando,Romblon.ThefundscomefromcontributionsoftheMunicipalLocal
Government,andWWF.Thesellersaretheuplandcommunitiesconsistingof
SibuyanMangyanTagabukidindigenousgroup.Theuplandcommunitiesreceive
paymentstoperformpatrols,surveillance,plantnativetreesandagro‐forestry
species.
Thefundsfortheseactivitiesareheldintrustusingaseparatebankaccount.The
donors’representativesareco‐signatoriestodepositsandwithdrawals.Funds
aredisbursedaftersatisfactoryreviewofprogressreportsandverificationbya
monitoringcommitteewhichiscomposedofthebarangaycaptains,DENRand
theNCIP.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Figure57.PESGovernanceStructure,SibuyanIsland,RomblonProvince
2009.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
Conclusions:
ThevaluesbeingderivedformtheAbuaniscurrentlybasedontimber
extraction.TherecentcampaignagainstillegallogginginAbuanin2008‐2009
yieldedhalfamillionboardfeetoftimbervaluedatP8Millionpesos.The
baselinescenarioshowsthatwewilllosetheforestandthewatershedservices
todestructiveactivities.AssumingthereturnsfromloggingisP8Millionayear(
orUSD166,667)basedonconfiscationrecords,thisamountissmallcompared
totheUSD9.3Millioneconomicvaluesthatcanbederivedfromeconomic
sectorsthatdependonmaintainingforestservices.Thisdoesnotincludethe
potentialdamageavoidedfromdeforestationsuchasfloodingandlandslides.
Withoutthecarbonpayments,thepotentialreturnperhectareofforest
preservedisUSD9.50/hectare.Thisiswellwithinthelowendofpayments
beingmadetoprotecttheforestsinCostaRica.
WhileAbuanshowshighpotential,thechallengeistoconverttheseeconomic
valuesintofinancialreturns.ThepaperrecommendsthattheLGUofIlagan
presentthebusinesscasetotheRegionalDevelopmentCouncilchairedbythe
NationalEconomicDevelopmentAuthorityofRegion2(NEDA‐2).NEDA‐2will
thenprepareaninvestmentkit,conductinvestors’roundtable,andmarketthe
sitetoinviteinvestorsinhydropowerdevelopment,irrigationanddomestic
watersupply.TheDepartmentofTourismRegion2(DOT‐2)shouldadoptthe
recommendationoftheCarag(2009)study,buildcapacitiesofoperatorsandset
tourismstandardstolauncheco‐tourisminAbuan.Eachsectorwilleventually
undertakedetailedfeasibilitystudiesandoperationalplanstomakethese
schemeswork.ThePESschemesandgovernancestructurescanbeestablished
lateronceoperationsstartinAbuan.
UnlessthewatershedservicesofAbuanbasinareutilizedforthebenefitofits
residents,theIlagantownandsocietyatlarge,thepullofdeforestationwill
alwaysremain.TheAbuanwatershedhasmuchofferandthebenefitscanbe
significantasarguedinthispaper.Itiseitherweuseit,orweloseit.
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
References:
CoaseR.1960.TheProblemofSocialCost.JournalofLawandEconomics.II(1959),26‐27.
EvangelistaP.2009.SoilandLandUseStudyoftheAbuanWatershed.TechnicalreportsubmittedtoWWF‐Philippines.Manila.
GunnR&KinzerGD.1949.TheTerminalVelocityofFallforWaterDropletsinStagnantAir.J.Meteorol.Vol.6pp.243‐248.
Landell‐MillsN&PorrasI,2002.SilverBulletorFool’sGold?Aglobalreviewofmarketsforforestenvironmentalservicesandtheirimpactonthepoor.UK.InternationalInstituteforEnvironment.
LascoRD&FBPulhin.2000.ForestLandUseChangeinthePhilippinesandClimateChangeMitigation.MitigationandAdaptationtoGlobalChangeJournal5:81‐97.
LinsleyRK,KohlerM&JPaulhus.1982.HydrologyforEngineers.McGraw‐HillInc.P.322.
LyDD.2009.ListofForestProductsApprehendedbyProvincialTaskForceonForestProtection(5July2008toSeptember2009).OfficeofGovernor,ProvinceofIsabela.
PadillaJE,TongsonEE,andRDLasco(eds).2005.SustainableFinancingforConservationandDevelopment:ProceedingsfromtheNationalConference–WorkshoponPaymentsforEnvironmentalServices:DirectIncentivesforBiodiversityConservationandPovertyAlleviation.ManilaMarch1‐2,2005,WWF,ICRAF,REECS,UP‐CIDS,UPLB‐ENFOR,CARE.279pp.
PagiolaS.2007.Usingmarketstopreserveforestsandtheservicestheyprovide.IUFROSymposium.IntegrativeScienceforIntegrativeManagement.www.worldbank.org/environmentaleconomics
PagiolaS,Landell‐MillsN&JBishop.2002.MakingMarket‐basedmechanismsworkforforestandpeople.InS.Pagiola,&NLandell‐Mills(eds.).SellingForestEnvironmentalServices:Market‐basedmechanismsforconservationanddevelopment.Pp261‐290.LondonUK.Earthscan.
RojasDJr.2009.HydrologyandFloodStudiesintheAbuanWatershed.AtechnicalreportsubmittedtoWWF‐Philippines.Manila.
RollanR.2009.Hydro‐GeologyStudyoftheAbuanWatershed.AtechnicalreportsubmittedtoWWF‐Philippines.Manila.
Rosales,RinaMariaP.2003.DevelopingPro‐poormarketsforenvironmentalservicesinthePhilippines.InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment,London.http://www.iied.org/pubs/display.php?o=9248IIED&n=8&l=8&s=MES
DevelopingPESintheAbuanWatershed
UNEP,KatoombaGroup,ForestTrends.2008.PaymentsforEcosystemServices:GettingStarted,APrimer.Accessibleat:www.unep.org.
WunderS.2005.Paymentsforenvironmentalservices:Somenutsandbolts.CenterforInternationalForestryResearch.OccasionalPaper42,Bogor.
top related