immune building program - iis7proceedings.ndia.org/5460/5460/1_bryden.pdf · immune building...
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1ColPro 200521 June 2005
Immune Building Program
Wayne A. BrydenDARPA Special Projects Office
National Defense Industrial AssociationJoint Program Management Office for Collective Protection
Collective Protection Conference21 June 2005Monterey, CA
2ColPro 200521 June 2005
Overview
Objectives:• Protect building occupants (keep
aerosolized agent from harming humans)
• Restore building to function quickly• Preserve forensic evidence
Payoffs:• Save lives• Restore OPTEMPO• Determine appropriate
treatment• Attribute source of attack
perimeter security
air intake
physical security portal
security
Threat: aerosolized chemical or biological agents; toxic industrial chemicals (TICs)
External standoff External proximate Internal
Goal: Make buildings less attractive targetsGoal: Make buildings less attractive targets
3ColPro 200521 June 2005
Threat Spectrum
Based on Unclassified Sources
TICsChemical agents
Toxins and bioregulators
BacteriaViruses
• Thousands of substances with characteristics
• Nerve agents• Blister agents• Blood agents• Choking agents
• Neurotoxins• Cytotoxins• Enterotoxins• Mycotoxins• Neuropeptides
• Vegetative cells• Spores
• DNA viruses• RNA viruses
0.00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91.0
1.00E-13 1.00E-11 1.00E-09 1.00E-07 1.00E-05 1.00E-03 1.00E-01 1.00E+01 1.00E+03 1.00E+05
Variolamajor
C. burnetii
F. tularensis
B. anthracis
SEB
Botox VX
GB
Ricin
MIC
Chlorine Ammonia
Mass (mg)
Pro
babi
lity
of In
fect
ion
/ Let
hal E
ffect
s
VEE
4ColPro 200521 June 2005
Challenges
ToolkitDevelop and validate a software-based planning tool to assess building vulnerability and compare the cost and effectiveness of protection options
No validated capability exists to design and optimize building protection systems
Program componentTechnical challenge
Full-scale demonstrationInstall and demonstrate protection system at an operational military site
Active chemical/biological building protection has never been used in an operational military building
Integrated system experimentation– Conduct systems analysis and full-scale
experimentation for candidate architectures– Design, implement, and evaluate optimized
systems
• Active-response building protection has never been demonstrated
• Data and models to fully and confidently perform systems trades and systems evaluations do not exist
Technology developmentDevelop required components and technologies necessary for system implementation
Many enabling components and technologies do not exist today
5ColPro 200521 June 2005
Building Protection Concept
Continuous Monitor
In-duct neutralization
Triggered filtrationLaboratory
Analysis
DecontaminationForensicsMedical
SAFE? SAFE?
SAFE?Outside air
inlet
Neutralize at Source
High-efficiency filtration /
neutralization & over-pressurization
Internal passive airflow control
Fast trigger
sensors
COMMAND AND
CONTROL
Airflowdiversion
Identification/Confirming Sensor
Evacuate/PPE
POSS
IBLE
ATT
AC
KPO
SSIB
LE A
TTA
CK
PROBABLY YES
MAYBE NOT
CO
NFI
RM
EDC
ON
FIR
MED
ATT
AC
KA
TTA
CK
POST
EVE
NT
POST
EVE
NT
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
RM
AL
NO
RM
AL
OPE
RA
TIO
NO
PER
ATI
ON
6ColPro 200521 June 2005
Components
OperationalDemonstration(Fort Leonard Wood, MO)
Technology Development
Phase IIFull Scale Experimentation
Building Protection Toolkit
Feedback
Predictions
Feedback
Predictions
Product II Product III
Phase IAnalysis and modeling
FY06FY05FY04FY03FY02FY01
TransitionDemo siteTest Bed
Prototypes
= Go/No-Go= Evaluate
Product I
7ColPro 200521 June 2005
Frac
tion
of B
uild
ing
Exp
osed
(FB
E)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Unprotected
“Unfilterables”Passive Only
Segmentation
Modeling
Mass of agent released (mrel)
Frac
tion
of B
uild
ing
Exp
osed
(FB
E)
8ColPro 200521 June 2005
Frac
tion
of B
uild
ing
Exp
osed
(FB
E)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Unprotected
Active only
Sensors don’t work Sensors work
Mass of agent released (mrel)
Frac
tion
of B
uild
ing
Exp
osed
(FB
E)
Modeling
9ColPro 200521 June 2005
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
TACT = 25 sec
TACT = 0 sec
Unprotected
Active Only Passive Only
Passive + Active
Sensors don’t work1-12 logs passive protection
Sensors work• Trigger detection < 30 seconds• Advanced shelter-in-place capability
Frac
tion
of B
uild
ing
Exp
osed
(FB
E)
Modeling
Mass of agent released (mrel)
10ColPro 200521 June 2005
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Passive + Active
Unprotected
30,000 ft2 testbed
Internal release
Experimental data point
Mass of agent released (mrel)
• Active strategies are critical − Experiments show sensors
effectively initiate active protection
• Optimal architectures include both passive and active components
• Immune Building systems can be applied to diverse building types− Specifics will differ from
building to building: characterize beforehand (to design an appropriate system) and afterwards (to maintain performance)
− Coordinate design with HVAC, fire suppression, blast protection, etc. to avoid conflicts (e.g., structural, airflow)
Frac
tion
of B
uild
ing
Exp
osed
(FB
E)
Testing
11ColPro 200521 June 2005
Demonstration
Challenge the IB system in an occupied building under real-world operating conditions:– IB System sensors, neutralization,
filtration, and active controls will be fully propagated in building
– Releases in arbitrary locations and will include internal and external releases for BOTH chemical and biological threats
– Challenge against simulants for spores, encapsulated agents, filter penetrants (SF6), low vapor pressure agents, mid-vapor pressure agents, and dusty agents
– Subset of releases carried out as independently refereed validation tests
IB System Installation is complex and risky– Modeling will reduce risk in the design phase– Testbed will be utilized to optimize strategies,
components, and CONOPS
IB System Installation is complex and risky– Modeling will reduce risk in the design phase– Testbed will be utilized to optimize strategies,
components, and CONOPS
Nord Hall, Fort Leonard Wood, MO
12ColPro 200521 June 2005
Technology DevelopmentAdvanced Filtration
air ++++++
- - -- - -++++++- - -- - -
++++++
- - -- - -++++++
Regeneration(Heat)
Photocatalytic Oxidation
Chemical Filtration
Electrostatic Precipitation
SMART Filter FosterMillerFosterMiller
22 22
CL 2 + 2Na CLO 2 2 CLO 2 + 2Na CL
RegReg Reg
to HVAC
Control Signals
Gas
eous
Chl
orin
e
Dilu
ent
Dilu
ent
(Air,
N 2, …
Solid
Sod
ium
Chl
orite
Hum
idifi
er
CLO 2 + Diluent
CLO 2 + Diluent
CLO 2Generator
CLO 2Generator
CLO 2Generator
AlarmSignal
CLO 2Sensor
AirflowMultiport Injectors
HVACDuct
CL 2 + 2Na CLO 2 CLO 2 + 2Na CLCL 2 + 2Na CLO 2 CLO 2 + 2Na CL
RegReg Reg
to HVAC
Control Signals
Gas
eous
Chl
orin
e
Dilu
ent
Dilu
ent
(Air,
N 2, …
Solid
Sod
ium
Chl
orite
Hum
idifi
er
CLO 2 + Diluent
CLO 2 + DiluentReg
Reg Reg
to HVAC
Control Signals
Gas
eous
Chl
orin
e
Dilu
ent
Dilu
ent
(Air,
N 2, …
Solid
Sod
ium
Chl
orite
Hum
idifi
er
CLO + Diluent
CLO + DiluentReg
Reg Reg
to HVAC
Control Signals
Gas
eous
Chl
orin
e
Dilu
ent
Dilu
ent
(Air,
N 2, …
Solid
Sod
ium
Chl
orite
Hum
idifi
er
CLO + Diluent
CLO + Diluent
CLOGenerator
CLOGenerator
CLOGenerator
CLOGenerator
CLOGenerator
CLOGenerator
AlarmSignal
CLO 2Sensor
AirflowMultiport Injectors
HVACDuct
Decontamination
Real-Time Neutralization
22
2
2
2
2
22
dielectric capillaries
volume-filling non-thermal plasma
e-
e- e-
OH-
OH-
O3
air
other compounds
added to airstream
RF energy
Enhancements
oxidative species
13ColPro 200521 June 2005
Chlorine Dioxide Effects
20,000 ppm-hours ClO2• Only polyurethane foam seriously damaged
200,000 ppm-hours ClO2• Copper and steel corroded• Polycarbonate discolored
Collateral DamageExposure Time (hours)
0 5 10 15 20
Odor threshold
Spores
Incipient collateral damage
Explosive limit
TWASTEL
IDLHNIOSH human
standards
Bacteria & Viruses
Effective Kill Levels
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1000000
0.1
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
ClO
2ga
s ph
ase
conc
entra
tion
(ppm
)
0.01
Mechanism of Inactivation
Active Inactive
ClO2 Oxidation
Protein “unfolds”and is
inactivated
• Demonstrate and validate the effectiveness of ClO2decontamination technology in a building
• Develop and validate EPA approved decontamination protocols and techniques
• Transition capability to government and industry
U.S. Government Joint Program
First Operational TestAnniston, AL
14ColPro 200521 June 2005
AUVS
Flux multiplier cavityIntense UV source
Airflow
500 – 10,000 cfm
BP246i BioProtector commercial prototype
Technology Transition:Novatron High-Intensity UV
ApproachCreation of intense UV and killing of microorganisms in HVACTechnology
• Low power, continuous-wave UV DC lamps• Uniform photon flux multiplication (increases
UV flux by a factor of 50 or more)• UV interaction with DNA to induce
crosslinking• Air sterilization – in less than 1 second – only
a few feet needed for high kill levels even for high velocity airflow
• B. subtilis 4.5 to 6.2 log kill• 0.3 I.W.G. pressure drop
15ColPro 200521 June 2005
Technology Transition:Cold Plasma
Cold Plasma Neutralization• In-duct air neutralization• Scalable – low power, “real-time kill”
(single pass) [duct mounted] e-
e- e-
OH-OH-
O3
dielectric capillaries
volume-filling non-thermal plasma
oxidative species
air
> 1 (model agreement)DFP (nerve)
> 3 (experimental constraint)B. anthracis
Log reductionAgent
TITAN Technology• Cold plasma induced hydroxyl radical
generation (BIT)• Activation of H202 yielding exponential
number of long-lived hydroxyl radicals• Mesh “active layer”• Scaleable system
> 5Diazinon (nerve)
> 5CEES (mustard)
> 6B. subtilis (spore)
Log reductionAgent
PlasmaSol Technology• Ambient air plasma generator• Non-thermal electrical plasma• Dielectric wall discharge suppresses the
glow-to-arc mode transition• Electrode configuration enables plasma
to have 100% contact with species of gas treated
• High energy density (typically energy densities of barrier, corona discharge are 0.01 – 0.1 w/cm3)
• Air / medical equipment sterilization
16ColPro 200521 June 2005
BPTK Modeling and Simulation
• External threat• parameters
• Internal threat parameters• CB component parameters
• People movement• Responder actions
CONTAM model (.PRJ file)
• External concentration• Wind pressure
ExternalEnvironment
ProtectiveArchitectures
Building CADDrawingThreats Population
Characteristics CONOPS
MESO.dat TK Wrapper IFC Translator ACATSWrapper
MESO/RUSTIC CONTAMX ACATS
• FBE for Architectures• Costs of Architectures• Recommended Architecture
• Casualties For Responses• Recommended Response
• Internal Room Concentrations, Pressures, & Airflows• Room and Inhabitant Exposures• Sensor Response Times• HVAC Response Times
IFC file
TK Post-Processor ACATS Post-Processor
17ColPro 200521 June 2005
Immune Building Transition • Demonstration system provides test platform for
future technology development.• Improved sensors• Improved neutralization technologies
• Fort Leonard Wood will continue to operate the demonstration system (MOA in place, DoD memorandum issued for support beyond DARPA’s departure).
• Contractor involvement helps mature building protection technologies.
• IB is coordinating with the DoD R&D and user communities.
• Promulgate IB lessons learned to protective building design processes (Toolkit).
• Working with homeland security community on technology development and extension of concept to tall buildings
Science & technologycommunity
DOD chem/biocommunity
DoD civilengineeringcommunity
DoDoperationalcommunity
Industrialbase
homeland security
community
18ColPro 200521 June 2005
Additional Information
Publicly accessible sites with additional information about the DARPA Immune Building Program:
http://www.darpa.mil/spo/programs/ib.htmhttps://dtsn.darpa.mil/ibdemo/default.asp
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