implementation of the npt safeguards agreement in the islamic republic of iran

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in

the Islamic Republic of Iran

Mr. Yukiya AmanoReed College

November 12, 2012

Outline• Paths to the Bomb• Iran’s Nuclear Facilities• Recent Failures• Recent Progress• Outstanding Issues• Further Reading• Conclusions

Paths to the Bomb

FEP(5%) + PFEP (20%)54000 IR-1 planned9423 IR-1 installed9156 IR-1 operating6876 kg LEU (3–5%)124 kg HEU (20%)

FFEP3000 IR-1 planned2836 IR-1 installed696 IR-1 operating65 kg HEU (20%)

HWR40 MWth

LWR1000 MWe

LWR360 MWe

Recent Failures• Qom Enrichment Facility

– Work apparent 2002, 2004, 2006

– Iran claims allocated to AEOI in second half of 2007

– 3000 IR-1 Centrifuges– Iran in violation of Code

3.1 of safeguards agreements

• Parchin Site– 2000 test chamber– 1996–2002 “foreign

expert”– Require access

Recent Progress• February 15, 2012

– Iran agreed to take part in six-party talks (France, Germany, UK, China, Russia, US)

• March 6, 2012– Conditional visit to

Parchin

• January 2012–present– IAEA/Iran intensified

dialogue, structured approach

– 24 August meeting: still unresolved

Outstanding Issues• Iranian safeguards 1976

– Suspended Code 3.1 (DIV)

– Need Additional Protocol• Clarify

– Uranium metal document– Procurement and

production by military-related industries

– Weaponization and delivery systems studies

• Compliance– Suspend enrichment– Suspend construction of

HWR, FFEP– Access to HW plant– Access to Parchin site

Further Reading

Conclusions