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Advanced Review
Individual understandings,perceptions, and engagementwith climate change: insights fromin-depth studies across the worldJohanna Wolf1∗ and Susanne C. Moser2,3
Public understandings and perceptions of, as well as engagement with, climatechange have garnered the interest of research and policy for almost three decades.A portion of this growing body of literature examines such perceptions in-depth,using largely qualitative methodologies, such as personal interviews, limited sam-ple size surveys, focus groups, and case studies. This area of research has beenconducted on different continents, with individuals of different cultural back-grounds and ethnic groups, and a variety of demographic characteristics. It hasexamined various aspects of the communication process, such as audience differ-ences, influence of framing, messages and messengers, information processing,etc.). This paper focuses on this subset of the climate change literature, highlightingsimilarities and differences across cultural, social, and geographical landscapes.Apart from demographic and regional differences, this literature also offers moredetailed insights into the effectiveness of different communication strategies andinto the cognitive and psychological processes that underlie public opinions. Theseinsights are generally not obtained through large-scale opinion surveys. Our reviewhighlights great variation and sometimes direct contradiction between these piecesof research. This not only points to a need for further refinement in our knowledgeof public understanding and engagement, but also simply to accept that no onetheory will explain the variation in human experience of climate change and actionin response to it. 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Clim Change 2011 DOI: 10.1002/wcc.120
INTRODUCTION
Individuals play an important role in respondingto climate change. Whether they are leaders in
government, business, or a neighborhood association,or members of the public at large, individuals areultimately the actors who initiate, inspire, guide,and enact the necessary cuts in greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions to slow down global warmingand who develop and implement the sustainedand sustainable adaptive responses to minimize its
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the onlineversion of this article.∗Correspondence to: johannawolf@gmail.com1Labrador Institute and Faculty of Arts, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, Happy Valley-Goose Bay, NL, Canada2Susanne Moser Research & Consulting, Santa Cruz, CA, USA3Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University, PaloAlto, CA, USA
DOI: 10.1002/wcc.120
impacts. Recognizing these roles does not imply adisregard for the larger (enabling or constraining)contexts in which individuals act, nor do we meanto place inappropriate responsibility on individuals.There is forever a tension between structure andagency, which can only be acknowledged, but notresolved one way or the other. To the extent werecognize the critical role of individuals, however, inresponding to climate change, what matters is theirlevel of cognitive and emotional engagement as wellas how that engagement leads to, or is affected by,behavioral changes and civic and political activities.
The Backdrop: Insights from Large-ScaleOpinion SurveysA significant body of literature comprised of large-scale public opinion surveys is available, especiallyfrom highly developed nations such as the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, other European countries,
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Canada, and Australia. This literature helps torecognize widespread patterns of opinions, attitudes,levels of understanding, and concern among differentpublics. In instances where such surveys havebeen taken repeatedly over time, we also havesome understanding of long-term trends in theseindicators, as public communication of climate changehas made information available and shaped theseopinions and beliefs.1,2 In recent years, studies intoindividual understandings of climate change haveemerged using other methodologies and focusingon specific audiences, yet the fine-scaled insightsfrom these studies have not yet been reviewedand synthesized. It is the primary goal of thispaper to fill this gap. In synthesizing existinginsights about individuals’ role in climate change,we distinguish between understanding (acquiring andemploying factually correct knowledge of climatechange), perception (views and interpretations basedon beliefs and understanding), and engagement (a stateof personal connection that encompasses cognitive,affective, and/or behavioral dimensions, see below).We recognize that there is an inherent and unavoidabletension between our dual attempt to synthesize theinsights gained from this body of work—inherently amatter of generalization—and to illustrate the detailedinsights that can be gleaned from it. We try tobalance generalization and detail through overarchingfindings and examples in the text, but also a tablelisting a subset of studies and much longer, detailedsupporting information with the specific insights fromthe pertinent studies cited in this article.a
Evidence for the importance of individuals’understandings and perceptions is demonstrated bythe significant volume of literature that examinespeople’s views on and knowledge of the climateproblem.3–8 These scholars argue that how individualsunderstand climate change is important in shapingtheir responses, including their understanding of andsupport for policies that aim to address the problemand their willingness to change behavior.9 Some policyresponses indeed count on the active, behavioralinvolvement of individuals for their success. Forexample, to meet the ambitious UK emissions targetof 34% reduction below 1990 emissions by 2020,which lists ‘homes and communities’ as one areawhere efficiencies are thought to help meet the goals,engagement of individuals is absolutely essential.10
Similarly, Dietz et al.11 illustrate that a nontrivial‘wedge’ of US emissions reductions could be achievedthrough individual and household actions, if behaviorchange programs were designed and deliveredeffectively. In order to mitigate effectively, futureregulation, incentive programs, taxation schemes, and
other policies may enlist individuals to change energy-consuming habits, travel modes, leisure activities, andcould conceivably include calls for adjustments toindividuals’ food, lifestyle, and reproductive choices.
The majority of studies to date have examinedcollective, public perceptions of climate changeusing primarily quantitative data drawn from large,often nationally representative samples. The resultsof these studies suggest the following generalizedfindings: climate change is as yet perceived by mostpeople in developed countries as a distant threatthat is removed from their lives both spatiallyand temporally. More specifically, climate changerisks are perceived as nonpersonal, concerning thefuture, other places and people, and other species(plants and animals).6,12,13 While many risks sharethis pattern—whereby individuals view themselvesas less at-risk than they perceive others to be—theimplication of such a pattern is that mitigative actionis simply not perceived as particularly compellingor urgent. Previous studies have also found thatthe public commonly confuses or conflates climatechange with other environmental issues, especiallystratospheric ozone depletion, air pollution, andweather.3–8,14–20 This still holds true after 30 yearsof communicating climate change.1,2,21,22
The implication of these predominant yetincorrect mental models is that they set people up tobelieve in the wrong (or largely irrelevant) solutions(ozone-depleting substances in spray cans have longbeen banned), or to feel disempowered (if extremeweather events are acts of God, then there is nothingwe can do about them except cope). High levels ofawareness and varying levels of concern about climatechange coincide with still very limited knowledge inmany developed countries.2,4,23–26
Belief in the reality of climate change is waxingand waning, depending on concurrent events suchas particularly cold winters and other weatherextremes, or nonclimatic events like terrorist threats,economic recessions, or major public controversieslike that following the illegal retrieval and publicationof personal emails from the University of EastAnglia or discoveries of mistakes in the 2007report of the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange.24,27,28 Still, generally more than half thepopulation in surveyed developed countries ‘believe’in the science.27–30 At the same time, perceptions ofthe prevailing level of consensus among scientists varyconsiderably from year to year, but generally have notfundamentally changed since surveys started askingquestions about it more than 20 years ago.23,31
While evidence is not uniform, gender, age, andethnicity seem to affect the levels of understanding,
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WIREs Climate Change Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change
perception of reality and urgency of climate change,the sense of responsibility to act, concern for thefuture, and—importantly—the roles different demo-graphic groups hold with regard to climate-relevantbehaviors (e.g., making decisions about consumptionlevels, food choices, the number of children, or impact-ful choices such as car purchases).32–36 For example,McCright37 found in a longitudinal review of GallupPoll data between 2001 and 2008 for the United Statesthat—contrary to expectations from scientific literacyresearch—American women actually have greater sci-entific knowledge of climate change than men do, yetthey underestimate their climate change knowledgecompared to men. Women express slightly greaterconcern about climate change than do men, and thisgender divide is not accounted for by differences inkey values and beliefs or in the social roles that menand women differentially perform in society.
There is emerging evidence from large-scalestudies suggesting that recent direct experience withweather-related disasters increases concern aboutclimate change,38 yet willingness to take adaptiveor mitigative behavior following such experiences isinconsistent, probably because of the many physical,psychological, social, and political influences on riskperception.38–41 Concern about climate change incomparison to other problems varies over time withinand among countries and by proposed policy solution.Often, climate change falls short, and sometimes by aconsiderable margin, when compared to other, moredirectly experienced environmental problems (such aswater or air pollution) or when listed against broaderconcerns such as the economy, health care, nationalsecurity, and other pertinent issues of public policy.42
Both the information the public receives and hearsabout climate change, and the appraisal of the risksfrom climate change lead to an overall low level ofconcern.43
The Added Value of In-Depth Studiesof Individual UnderstandingsOn the basis of this work, it has been suggestedthat current levels of awareness of and knowledgeabout climate change are insufficient in leadingto effective behavioral change. Support for climatemitigation policies varies significantly over time andfrom country to country, with the major emittingeconomies showing limited but not insignificantsupport for (hypothetical) climate policies.32,44–46
What is more difficult to discern from these studiesis how individuals explain the causes and impacts ofclimate change, how they process information, formtheir views and come to change their climate-relevant
behavior (rather than just expressing willingness todo so), and what the deeper motivations for, andbarriers to, actual behavioral changes and other formsof engagement are.
A small but growing number of studies haveexamined perceptions of climate change using smallsamples and mainly qualitative, in-depth methodolo-gies such as focus groups, personal semi-structuredinterviews, small-sized surveys using experimentalstudy designs, processes with participant observation(e.g., scenario discussions with visualization), expertelicitation, or case studies. This research offers severalcategories of insights into individuals’ understanding,perception and engagement with climate change thatcannot be obtained from large-scale surveys.
Deep insights into understandings, perceptionsand engagement among particular population seg-ments: Small-scale studies, by virtue of focusingon a small and particular subset of larger audi-ence segments or populations, provide insights intothe particular understandings, perceptions, and lev-els of engagement of the group studied, as wellas into the audience-specific barriers to more activeengagement. For example, such studies reveal differ-ences in individual understandings, perceptions andlevels of engagement among very young or olderstudents; youth versus older individuals; particularprofessional groups; particular urban or rural popu-lations, value/attitude-based segments (e.g., high/lowenvironmental values, ideologies or party affiliation)or a set of influentials considered critical to reachfor larger campaigns. Some studies also focus on,or allow insights into, the ways regional populationsdiffer from national averages, allowing for more tai-lored outreach campaigns. Cultural differences may beas significant as those among different demographicgroupings but may be glossed over (by averaging) innational samples. Studies of this sort can reveal cultur-ally resonant framings and reveal regional ‘hooks’ thatare of interest and meaning only to the regional pop-ulation. In sum, such differentiated insights provideessential information when trying to design commu-nication that is meant to resonate with a particularaudience segment.
Testing of the impact of different communicationstrategies and campaigns or policies designed tochange behavior: Some studies involve testingdifferences in receptivity to different communicationchannels, messengers, framings, or the use of differentcommunication vehicles (graphic, iconic, spoken,written communications). Typically it is only possiblein very careful experimental, comparative studies tounderstand what aspects have what particular impacton the audience. It is also more economical to test
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a particular strategy at smaller scale, make necessaryadjustments after the testing phase and only then scaleup to a large-scale, national test or campaign. Researchthat examines behavioral responses to policies alsobenefits from in-depth approaches to help explainmotivations for behavioral change and whether/howthese connect with relevant policies.
Deeper insights into the cognitive and emotionalprocesses underlying responses to climate changeinformation: In-depth studies, such as interviews andfocus groups, or some experimental study designsallow researchers to more fully understand whyindividuals react the way they do to a particulartype of information or communication. They mayreveal underlying mental models, misunderstandings,belief systems, affective, and behavioral responses toclimate change information that offer greater leveragefor designing effective outreach and engagementcampaigns. Large-scale surveys, by virtue of the natureof standardized, often automated and fixed questionsand, in some cases, responses, do not allow forfollowing up to better understand the responses given.
Our synthesis of the existing in-depth qualitativestudies aims to provide an integrative review of thework conducted on individuals’ attitudes toward andopinions of climate change, focussing on studies linkedto understanding of climate change (science) and (toa lesser extent) GHG mitigation, but not adaptation(which will be the subject of a separate paper).
In the next section, we review in more detailwhy individuals’ views on climate change matter vis-a-vis societal responses to climate change. Section‘Selected Findings from In-Depth Studies on PublicUnderstanding’ reviews the findings from small andlargely qualitative studies that examine understand-ing, traditional knowledge, perceived responsibility,faith, and behavior in relation to climate change.Section ‘Synthesis: Individuals’ Understandings, Per-ceptions, and Engagement’ synthesizes the researchfindings focussing on the three aspects, understand-ing, perception, and engagement, and the final sectionoffers some suggestions for further research.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THEINDIVIDUAL IN CLIMATE CHANGE
Individual and Household EmissionsGHG emissions attributable to household andpersonal consumption as a percentage of totalnational emissions are highly significant in thosewestern societies that have contributed the majorityof emissions to date.47 Direct energy use by UShouseholds, for example, accounted for 38% of
overall US carbon dioxide emissions in 2005, or626 million metric tons of carbon, though differencesfrom state to state make generalizations as totheir sources within household use difficult.48–50 Bycomparison, this amount is larger than the emissionsof any entire country except China.11 A recent studyof both direct and indirect energy consumption byChinese households suggests that residents’ lifestylesand related economic activities contribute 30% oftotal carbon dioxide emissions.51 Of course, there aresignificant urban-rural differences in China that playa role for emissions;52 indirect emissions exceed directemissions for urban residents while direct emissionsare more significant in rural settings.51,52 Energyconsumption and income are strongly correlated inChina; higher income brackets emit significantly morethan low income brackets.52 Western developmentpathways, lifestyles and notions of progress haveset emerging economies on a path similar to thatof already industrialized countries and this willincreasingly translate into significant personal andhousehold emissions there unless rapid steps are takento decarbonize the economy.53 It is clear thereforethat individual and household emissions are significantcontributors to climate change.
The Engaged IndividualHaving established the importance of the individualin terms of contributing to climate change, it is alsoimportant to define what we mean by ‘engagement’. Ifwe assume that individuals are actors who contributeto climate change, need to deal with its impacts,and identify, develop, support, and implement climatesolutions, then involving them is not an optionbut an imperative. Engagement has been defined as‘a personal state of connection with the issue ofclimate change, in contrast to engagement solely asa process of public participation in policy making’.54
Individuals can be engaged on three levels: with theirminds, hearts, and hands. By implication, these waysof engagement can be achieved through rational-cognitive and affective means and practical actions.While much research remains to be undertaken inhow to increase, balance, and effectively motivate andsustainably engage on all of these levels, it is quitewell established that one-way communication tendsnot to foster deep cognitive engagement or systematicinformation processing and typically is insufficient tolead to sustained behavioral or political engagement.45
Deeper affective engagement with an issue is difficultto achieve through one-way communication, and evenharder to sustain, much less to control from theoutside.55 Dialogic processes can make up for some of
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WIREs Climate Change Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change
these deficits.56–58 Cultural narratives (stories) and theconstruction of meaning in social interaction tend totouch people more deeply, even if they are not deeplyknowledgeable about climate change, and can bettermotivate interest and sustain engagement.59–61
Knowledge of One’s Contribution to GHGEmissionsWhat then if individuals were aware of and knewhow their energy use and the products they consumecontributed to GHG emissions and thus to climatechange? Would they change their climate-significantbehaviors? Knowledge of climate change alone is com-monly considered a desirable but insufficient conditionfor mitigating GHG. More specifically, knowledge ofthe causes of anthropogenic climate change is gener-ally considered useful as it lays an initial foundationfor directing people to the right kinds of mitigativeactions. However, research has shown repeatedly thatknowledge, even of the causes of climate change, aloneis not enough to motivate and shape effective mitiga-tion outcomes due to cognitive, social, practical, andinstitutional barriers.54 Despite the continued relianceon information campaigns to mobilize action, commu-nication research has largely dispelled the knowledge-or information-deficit model of environmental educa-tion and communication.62–65 More knowledge of aproblem does not necessarily, directly, and by itselflead to change in behavior, and sometimes it can actu-ally hinder behavior change.66,67 At the very least,more concrete guidance and pragmatic help with howto realize changes in energy consumption are neces-sary. Typically, however, a range of enabling and sup-porting conditions must also be met, including socialand institutional support, policy and infrastructurechanges, and often clear signals from the market.32
The Role of Individuals in the PoliticalSystemMore generally, whether and what depth of under-standing is necessary for effective mitigation actionon climate change depends on what type of action issought and how we understand the political system.Of course, it could be argued that in governance sys-tems other than democracies, and in situations whereexclusive top-down policy making of the authoritarianstyle is considered favorable and feasible, only indi-viduals in leadership positions would be influentialactors on climate change. Action by individuals (andthe masses) then could—theoretically—result simplyfrom their enactment of the rules set in place by thosein power. Public understanding of climate change or
affective engagement would then be largely unneces-sary to motivate implementation of GHG mitigationmeasures. In practice, however, this type of dictatorialaction on climate change is extremely unlikely for atleast three reasons. First, top-down policy making hasbeen found to be less than effective without publicbuy-in given the unstable realities of party politics ofmost democracies.68,69 Political support for and pub-lic engagement in climate change policies are neededfor political leaders to realize emissions reductions.Second, in light of the now almost 20-year historyof largely unsuccessful international negotiations onemissions reductions under the UN Framework Con-vention on Climate Change, and the lack of effectiveaction by many national leaders to produce andimplement meaningful solutions, a ‘leaders-at-the-top-only’ solution is already not being realized andseems very unlikely in the consensus-based system ofthe UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.And finally, current discourses about bottom-up andinformed decision making, participation, and deliber-ation suggest that (overtly) authoritarian governancehas largely, with some notable exceptions, gone outof fashion.70 Given further that most major GHGemitting countries are in fact nominal democracies,at least some degree of electoral and political supportfor mitigation policies is a required (but probablyinsufficient) prerequisite for effective GHG reduction.These arguments do not preclude that a more strate-gic approach to communication may be needed toreach large-scale policy goals, and that it would bewise to employ the power of social relations to tar-get primarily influential elites who in turn reach wideraudiences.71,72 However, the political reality and bothnormative and strategic arguments suggest that indi-viduals at all levels play important roles in achievingthe radical reductions in GHG emissions that manynow view as necessary (see also Ref 73).
SELECTED FINDINGS FROM IN-DEPTHSTUDIES ON PUBLICUNDERSTANDING
We now turn to the results of in-depth, typicallysmall-scale studies on public understanding of climatechange from around the world, concentrating oncontextualisation of understanding, the importanceof direct and vicarious experience, traditional ways ofknowing, perceived responsibility, and the role of faithin determining climate-relevant behavior. Details ofthe studies reviewed, including geographical location,studied population, objectives, methods used, and keyfindings are included in Table 1, just a sample of the
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types of studies we draw on in our discussion, and inthe supporting information.
Individual Understandings of ClimateChange Vary but Are AlwaysContextualized Within BroaderConsiderationsThere is strong evidence that individuals contextualizethe issue of climate change within much broader,though not necessarily environmental, perspectives.Focus group research conducted in Frankfurt,Germany and Manchester, United Kingdom, andother studies in Newcastle, Australia, as well as inRoxbury, Massachusetts and rural southern Oregon(United States), for example, suggest that participants’thinking about climate change transcends strictlyenvironmental issues and includes consideration ofglobal inequalities, fairness, and health or livelihoodconcerns in addressing the issue.75,85,86 Furtherevidence for this contextualisation is that Australianparticipants draw on scientific and local knowledgeand on moral and value-based considerations intheir responses to questions about climate change.75
This contextualization of climate change amongother issues also exists in developing countries. Forexample, among biosphere reserve managers climatechange threats were found to be less than illegalactivities such as poaching.87 These studies highlighthow individuals’ perceptions about climate changeare linked to equity, development, and perceivedeconomic power, where socio-political context andthe connection between management and science playan important role in risk perception.
Recent experimental research combining cul-tural theory and psychometric risk perception researchin the United States puts these findings into a broadercontext: People are not ‘blank slates’ receiving infor-mation about risks (such as climate change) andinterpreting them at face value. Rather, such infor-mation is always and inevitably filtered through pre-existing cultural worldviews (beliefs about how natureworks, what constitutes a ‘good’ and fair society, whatroles governments and individuals play respectively inbringing about such a society and how humans shouldinteract with nature, etc.). These worldviews influ-ence people’s uptake, understanding, interpretationof and response to climate change information.88–92
These findings are confirmed in in-depth cross-national studies,81 within-nation, cross-cultural sub-group studies12,93,94 as well as within-nation studiesexploring alternative explanatory drivers of attitudesand behaviors95,96 clearly reveal the influence of deep-seated values and beliefs about the workings of the
world—partly also reflective of differences in individ-ual personalities (e.g., more pessimistic or optimisticindividuals)97—on interpretations of climate change.Weber98 therefore concludes that social and moralframings of climate change may be more effectivethan purely cognitive-rational or affective appeals toget through to people.
In fact, research examining personal responses toclimate change highlights that there are some commonattitude types among publics around the world. Earlywork on cultural theory99 suggested that the four(or five) generalized types of cultural worldviewsheld by an individual (the solidarist, hierarchist,individualist, and egalitarian (as well as fatalist)predispositions)b have an effect on how climate changeis viewed.94,96,100,101 Increasingly, this is shown inempirical work. For example, Norwegian focus groupresearch suggests four typical response types (theacceptors, the tempered acceptors, the uncertain,and the skeptics).83 Some aspects of these typescorrespond to the egalitarian (acceptors and temperedacceptors) while the uncertain and the skeptics do notcorrespond well to cultural theory types. A study ofAustralian responses to climate change also suggeststhat there are four types of basic attitudes; concern,skepticism, apprehension, and action.102 In this case,the concern and action groups resonate with theegalitarian and the apprehensive resonate with fatalistviews, but the skeptics as well as aspects of theapprehensive do not easily correspond to culturaltheory typology. Research conducted in Canadaalso found four typical responses, the individualist(resonant with the egalitarian), the systemist (alsoresonant with the egalitarian), the skeptic (resonantwith the individualists of cultural theory), and theeconomist (a version of the egalitarian).84 Theseresults converge on several findings: they showsystematically varying levels of concern, the presenceof skeptical views in all societies studied, and somedegree of acceptance, ranging from solid to tempered.Most importantly, however, the cultural worldviewsof individuals fundamentally determine their attitudestoward climate change.
Direct and Vicarious Experience of ClimateChange Shapes Individuals’ ViewsThe imagery (as part of the larger set of elements thatmake up the framing of an issue) can play an importantrole in shaping how climate change is perceived byindividuals. In a UK study using a survey and focusgroups, participants who had seen the film ‘The DayAfter Tomorrow’ felt more concerned about climatechange than those who had not seen it.103 However,
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WIREs Climate Change Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change
TAB
LE1
Sele
cted
In-D
epth
Stud
ies
onIn
divi
dual
s’Cl
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eCh
ange
Und
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eptio
ns,a
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t(Fo
rAdd
ition
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s,Se
eth
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ting
Info
rmat
ion)
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y(a
utho
r,ye
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try/
loca
tion
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ding
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aker
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king
and
unde
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gab
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mm
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win
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ostE
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feel
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wer
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ther
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wbe
lieve
that
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Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
TAB
LE1
Cont
inue
d
Stud
y(a
utho
r,ye
ar)
Coun
try/
loca
tion
Stud
ypa
rtic
ipan
tsSt
udy
aim
sM
etho
dKe
yfin
ding
s
Bulk
eley
,200
075Au
stra
liaHi
ghsc
hool
and
univ
ersi
tyst
uden
tsan
dth
eirp
aren
ts(n
=24
2)
Asse
ssm
ento
fpub
licun
ders
tand
ings
ofcl
imat
ech
ange
Surv
ey(5
6qu
estio
ns)
—Pu
blic
unde
rsta
ndin
gof
glob
alen
viro
nmen
tali
ssue
sin
corp
orat
essc
ient
ific
and
loca
lkno
wle
dge,
valu
es,
and
mor
alre
spon
sibi
litie
s—
Clim
ate
chan
geco
nnec
ted
bypa
rtic
ipan
tsto
thei
rloc
alco
mm
uniti
es—
Conc
ern
abou
teffi
cacy
ofin
divi
dual
actio
n—
Stro
ngev
iden
ceag
ains
tthe
‘info
rmat
ion-
defic
itm
odel
’;pr
ovid
ing
info
rmat
ion
toim
prov
ekn
owle
dge
amon
gth
epu
blic
isin
suffi
cien
talo
neto
effe
ctbe
havi
oral
chan
ge
Byg
and
Salic
k,20
0976
Tibe
t,Ch
ina
15vi
llage
rsin
each
ofsi
xvi
llage
sin
Deqi
nCo
unty
(n=
90)
Toex
amin
eTi
beta
nvi
llage
rs’
perc
eptio
nsof
clim
ate
chan
ge
Sem
i-stru
ctur
edin
terv
iew
s,st
atis
tical
anal
ysis
ofth
ere
sults
—Pa
rtic
ipan
tsno
ticed
ava
riety
ofch
ange
sre
late
dto
clim
ate
chan
gein
sign
ifica
ntde
tail
—Vi
llage
rsha
dno
thea
rdof
clim
ate
chan
gean
dat
trib
uted
the
chan
ges
they
perc
eive
dto
loca
lphe
nom
ena
—Th
ere
wer
esi
gnifi
cant
dive
rgen
ces
betw
een
som
eof
the
perc
eive
dch
ange
sbe
twee
nvi
llage
s—
Varie
dex
plan
atio
nsfo
rthe
perc
eive
dch
ange
sin
clud
eco
smol
ogy,
mod
ern
life,
envi
ronm
ent,
polic
y,an
dbo
thlo
cal
and
outs
ider
s’re
ligio
usm
isco
nduc
t—
Wea
ther
isco
nsid
ered
alo
cal
phen
omen
onde
term
ined
larg
ely
bylo
cald
eitie
s.Ad
vers
eco
nditi
ons
are
ther
efor
ese
enas
are
sult
ofne
glec
tof
relig
ious
dutie
sor
abr
each
ofta
boos
—Ti
beta
nvi
llage
rsse
emco
ncer
ned
abou
tth
esa
me
issu
esas
scie
ntis
tsw
ithre
spec
tto
clim
ate
chan
geef
fect
son
glac
iers
,for
ests
,but
also
tour
ism
,en
ergy
use
and
tran
spor
tatio
n
2011 John Wiley & Sons, L td.
WIREs Climate Change Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change
TAB
LE1
Cont
inue
d
Stud
y(a
utho
r,ye
ar)
Coun
try/
loca
tion
Stud
ypa
rtic
ipan
tsSt
udy
aim
sM
etho
dKe
yfin
ding
s
—An
xiet
yan
dps
ycho
logi
cals
tres
sbe
caus
eth
ese
conc
erns
are
real
and
influ
ence
wha
tact
ions
are
cons
ider
edap
prop
riate
bype
ople
inth
ear
ea
Ferg
uson
etal
.,in
pres
s77U
SM
idw
est
Univ
ersi
typo
pula
tion
(n=
79)
Exam
ine
whe
ther
colle
ctiv
egu
iltfo
rthe
ingr
oup’
sco
llect
ive
GHG
emis
sion
sm
edia
tes
the
effe
cts
ofbe
liefs
abou
tthe
caus
esan
def
fect
sof
glob
alw
arm
ing
onw
illin
gnes
sto
enga
gein
miti
gatio
nbe
havi
or
Surv
eyin
expe
rimen
tal
desi
gnva
ryin
gca
uses
and
effe
cts
ofCC
—G
uilt
ishi
gher
whe
nre
spon
dent
sbe
lieve
that
CCis
hum
an-c
ause
dan
dw
illha
vem
inor
effe
cts.
—Co
llect
ive
anxi
ety
does
notm
edia
tesu
chbe
liefs
inth
eca
uses
and
effe
cts
ofCC
nort
hew
illin
gnes
sto
enga
gein
miti
gativ
ebe
havi
or
Gre
enet
al.,
2010
78To
rres
Stra
it,Au
stra
liaIn
dige
nous
Aust
ralia
nsTo
docu
men
tloc
alob
serv
atio
nsof
envi
ronm
enta
lcha
nge
rele
vant
ford
evel
opin
ga
bett
erun
ders
tand
ing
ofcl
imat
eim
pact
sin
the
Torr
esSt
rait
Wor
ksho
ps,i
nter
view
sw
ithel
ders
Torr
esSt
rait
indi
geno
usun
ders
tand
ing
ofen
viro
nmen
talc
hang
eis
supp
orte
dby
soph
istic
ated
know
ledg
eth
atco
vers
flora
–fau
na–c
limat
ein
tera
ctio
ns,
seas
onal
wea
ther
patt
erns
and
clim
ate,
and
indi
cato
rsof
seas
onal
chan
ge.
Joire
man
etal
.,20
1079
Uni
ted
Stat
es/
Nor
thw
est
Psyc
holo
gyst
uden
tsat
ast
ate
univ
ersit
yin
the
NW
US
(Stu
dy1
n=
93;
Stud
y2
n=
42);
mar
ketin
gun
derg
radu
ate
stud
ents
atst
ate
univ
ersi
tyin
NW
(n=
159)
Expl
ore
the
impo
rtan
cean
def
fect
ofex
perie
nce
and
heur
istic
son
belie
fofg
loba
lw
arm
ing
Wor
dse
arch
puzz
les
follo
wed
bybr
ief
surv
ey(in
dex)
—Si
gnifi
cant
posi
tive
corr
elat
ion
betw
een
the
outd
oort
empe
ratu
rean
dbe
liefs
ingl
obal
war
min
g—
Peop
lew
ere
mor
elik
ely
tobe
lieve
ingl
obal
war
min
gw
hen
they
had
first
been
prim
edw
ithhe
at-re
late
dco
gniti
ons.
—Pe
ople
wer
em
ore
likel
yto
belie
vein
glob
alw
arm
ing
and
mor
ew
illin
gto
pay
tore
duce
glob
alw
arm
ing
whe
nth
eyha
dfir
stbe
enex
pose
dto
ahi
ghvs
.alo
wan
chor
forf
utur
ein
crea
ses
inte
mpe
ratu
re
2011 John Wiley & Sons, L td.
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
TAB
LE1
Cont
inue
d
Stud
y(a
utho
r,ye
ar)
Coun
try/
loca
tion
Stud
ypa
rtic
ipan
tsSt
udy
aim
sM
etho
dKe
yfin
ding
s
Ledu
c,20
0780
Pola
rreg
ions
Inui
teld
ers
(n=
unkn
own)
Gai
na
deep
erun
ders
tand
ing
ofth
eIn
uitn
otio
nof
‘Sila
’and
itsre
latio
nshi
pto
Wes
tern
notio
nsof
wea
ther
and
clim
ate
Dial
ogue
betw
een
Inui
tan
dsc
ient
ists
The
Inui
tcon
cept
ofSi
lare
fers
tom
ore
than
‘wea
ther
chan
ges’
buta
llude
sto
cultu
rala
ndsp
iritu
aldi
men
sion
sth
atin
terp
retc
limat
ech
ange
asth
ew
orld
’set
hica
lres
pons
eto
impr
oper
hum
anac
tions
Lore
nzon
iand
Hulm
e,20
0781
Rom
e(It
aly)
,N
orw
ich
(Uni
ted
King
dom
)
Adul
tsan
dhi
ghsc
hool
stud
ents
,n=
135
(Nor
wic
h)an
dn
=20
6(R
ome)
;Di
scus
sion
grou
ps(n
=10
,Ro
me
and
n=
19,N
orw
ich)
Cros
s-cu
ltura
lexp
lora
tion
ofen
viro
nmen
tala
ttitu
des,
pers
onal
view
son
clim
ate
chan
ge,a
ndop
tions
and
resp
onsi
bilit
ies
form
anag
ing
clim
ate
chan
ge
Surv
eyan
ddi
scus
sion
grou
pw
ithsu
bset
ofsu
rvey
resp
onde
nts
—Pa
rtic
ipan
tsfe
llin
tofo
urse
gmen
ts,
base
don
thei
rbel
iefs
abou
tCC:
deny
ing,
doub
tful,
unin
tere
sted
,and
enga
ged
—Pa
rtic
ipan
tsex
hibi
ted
stro
ngaw
aren
ess
ofcl
imat
ech
ange
and
mos
t,al
beit
with
som
ehe
sita
tion
and
skep
ticis
m,
ackn
owle
dged
ahu
man
cont
ribut
ion
—M
ostc
onsi
dere
dcl
imat
ech
ange
anin
trac
tabl
epr
oble
mdu
eto
scie
ntifi
cun
cert
aint
yan
din
effe
ctiv
eso
lutio
ns—
CCw
aspe
rcei
ved
tobe
dist
ant
—Im
agin
ing
long
-ter
mfu
ture
s(u
sing
scen
ario
s)pr
oved
diffi
cult;
two
deca
des
isfe
asib
le—
Myo
pia
was
reco
gniz
edan
dde
noun
ced,
butv
iew
edas
inev
itabl
e—
Rega
rdle
ssof
attit
udes
tow
ard
clim
ate
chan
ge,d
iscu
ssan
tssh
ared
the
hope
that
the
futu
rew
ould
bea
‘‘bet
ter
plac
e’’(
mor
efa
ir,eq
uita
ble,
less
envi
ronm
entd
isru
ptio
n)—
Aspi
ratio
nsw
ere
tem
pere
dby
pers
onal
expe
rienc
esan
dvi
ews
—Pa
rtic
ipan
tsbe
lieve
da
maj
orcr
isis
was
nece
ssar
yto
radi
cally
alte
rsoc
ieta
ltra
ject
orie
s—
Inco
nsist
ency
betw
een
scie
ntifi
cpr
ojec
tions
and
pers
onal
view
sle
adto
ques
tioni
ngof
scie
nce
2011 John Wiley & Sons, L td.
WIREs Climate Change Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change
TAB
LE1
Cont
inue
d
Stud
y(a
utho
r,ye
ar)
Coun
try/
loca
tion
Stud
ypa
rtic
ipan
tsSt
udy
aim
sM
etho
dKe
yfin
ding
s
Mor
ton
etal
.,20
1182
Uni
ted
King
dom
Stud
y1,
adul
tpar
ticip
ants
,fa
irly
wel
ledu
cate
d(n
=88
);St
udy
2,un
iver
sity
stud
ents
(n=
120)
Exam
ine
how
fram
ing
clim
ate
chan
gepr
edic
tions
diffe
rent
lym
ight
mod
erat
eth
ete
nden
cyfo
runc
erta
inty
toun
derm
ine
indi
vidu
alac
tion
Que
stio
n-na
ire,
expe
rimen
tald
esig
n,ve
rbal
debr
ief
—Hi
gher
unce
rtai
nty
com
bine
dw
itha
nega
tive
fram
e(h
ighl
ight
ing
poss
ible
loss
es)d
ecre
ased
indi
vidu
alin
tent
ions
tobe
have
envi
ronm
enta
lly—
High
erun
cert
aint
yco
mbi
ned
with
apo
sitiv
efra
me
(hig
hlig
htin
gth
epo
ssib
ility
oflo
sses
notm
ater
ializ
ing)
prod
uced
stro
nger
inte
ntio
nsto
act
—Ef
fect
sof
unce
rtain
tyw
ere
med
iate
dth
roug
hfe
elin
gsof
effic
acy
Rygh
aug
etal
.,20
1083
Nor
way
Mem
bers
ofva
rious
soci
alne
twor
ks(4
–8in
divi
dual
spe
rgro
up,n
=62
,24
men
and
38w
omen
)
Anal
yze
how
peop
lere
ason
abou
tand
mak
ese
nse
ofhu
man
-mad
egl
obal
war
min
g
10fo
cus
grou
ps—
The
dom
estic
atio
nof
clim
ate
scie
nce
know
ledg
eis
shap
edby
five
sens
e-m
akin
gde
vice
s:ne
ws
med
iaco
vera
geof
chan
ges
inna
ture
,pa
rtic
ular
lyth
ew
eath
er,t
heco
vera
geof
pres
umed
expe
rts’
disa
gree
men
tab
outg
loba
lwar
min
g,cr
itica
latt
itude
sto
war
dm
edia
,obs
erva
tions
ofpo
litic
alin
actio
n,an
dco
nsid
erat
ions
ofev
eryd
aylif
e—
Sens
e-m
akin
gal
low
sfo
ram
bigu
ity,
resu
lting
info
urau
dien
cese
gmen
ts:
the
acce
ptor
s,th
ete
mpe
red
acce
ptor
s,th
eun
cert
ain
and
the
skep
tics
Wol
feta
l.,20
0984
Cana
daRe
side
nts
ofVi
ctor
ia,B
Can
dSa
ltSp
ring
Isla
nd,B
C(In
terv
iew
s:n
=86
;Q
sort
:n=
38)
Toex
amin
eho
win
divi
dual
sco
ncei
veof
resp
ondi
ngto
clim
ate
chan
ge
Q-M
etho
dolo
gyin
clud
ing
inte
rvie
ws,
Q-s
orta
ndfo
cus
grou
ps
—Pa
rtic
ipan
tsvi
ewa
civi
c,no
n-re
cipr
ocal
and
non-
terr
itoria
lres
pons
ibili
tyth
atin
clud
esth
epr
ivat
esp
here
inits
rem
itfo
rres
pond
ing
tocl
imat
ech
ange
—Fo
urfa
ctor
sw
ere
iden
tified
;the
indi
vidu
alis
t,th
esy
stem
ist,
the
skep
tican
dth
eec
onom
ist
—Ev
enth
ese
enga
ged
and
know
ledg
eabl
epa
rtic
ipan
tsst
rugg
led
with
mak
ing
chan
ges
inth
eirl
ives
that
wou
ldtr
ansl
ate
into
effe
ctiv
eem
issi
ons
redu
ctio
ns
2011 John Wiley & Sons, L td.
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
participants viewed extreme events as less likely afterhaving seen the movie.103 Research on visualizationtools and experimental interventions using icons andimagery suggest that such tools can help increaseknowledge and concern if the information embeddeddoes not overly appeal to negative emotions suchas fear.104–106 While offering significant potential toattract individuals’ interest, representations of climatechange that promote fear are generally ineffectivein motivating personal engagement because theyare often perceived as manipulative.106 The twoseparate studies examined in the paper both findthat nonthreatening visual representations that link toindividuals’ everyday emotions and concerns engagedmore effectively.106
Level of concern about climate change, however,cannot be solely explained with individuals havingbeen affected by impacts but rather from engagementwith the issue through cognitive, affective, behavioral,and moral means. Evidence from the United Kingdomsuggests that exposure to floods, as one type of climatechange impact, does not necessarily affect concernabout climate change.107 Therefore, even directexperience with impacts may not motivate behavioralresponses to mitigate emissions. Rather, the studyfinds that individuals with pro-environmental valuesare significantly more likely to address climate changethan those with other value orientations. Moreover,the direct experience with impacts may orientindividuals more toward taking adaptive actions,rather than focus on the root causes, as a study ofcommunities in Alaska showed where energy use andincome generated from energy production is so deeplywoven into people’s daily lives that they do not easilysee a way out.108
Traditional Ways of Knowing ShapePerceptions of Climate ChangeIndividuals in modern, heavily urbanized society livelargely disconnected from their natural environment.A ‘Human Activity Pattern’ survey conducted of theAmerican public in the late 1990s illustrated that 51%of the population spent no time outside in a normalday at all (except maybe for the short walk from thehouse to the car to the office and back), and another30% spent under one hour per day outside.109,110 Suchmodern lifestyles essentially disconnect individualsfrom directly experiencing changes in the environmentand instead make them completely dependent onmediated information about nature and climatechange (e.g., the news, TV documentaries, or storiesothers tell). By contrast, those working directlyon the land (or sea) and with natural resources,
and particularly many traditional societies, are stillimmersed in their natural surroundings and infact dependent on subsistence from the land andits resources. Thus, their direct experience andknowledge of the environment can be expected tobe quite different from that of urban dwellers.
Traditional ecological knowledge has beendefined as a ‘cumulative body of knowledge,practice, and belief, evolving by adaptive processesand handed down through generations by culturaltransmission, about the relationship of living beings(including humans) with one another and with theirenvironment’111 (p. 1252). Traditional knowledgeabout peoples’ environment including weather andclimate suggests not only that knowledge passeddown through generations is still used today butthat it can complement scientific knowledge andpotentially help to adapt to faster changes thanwould be associated with variability alone. Researchin Uganda, for example, points to a differentiatedand dynamic system of local climate knowledge thatis open to new information112 and similar resultsemerge from indigenous Australians78 and traditionalpeoples in the high Arctic.113 The authors arguethat the system could be used to inform climatescience because of its spatial scale and practicality.112
Also, Samoan classification of clouds and windsare consistent with western scientific classifications,which could be integrated into scientific knowledge.114
Kenyan pastoralists rely on indigenous knowledgeabout rainfall variability and use this knowledge asa framework within which they interpret scientificinformation such as meteorological forecasts.115
Various scholars working with traditional peopleshave thus argued that indigenous knowledge, theirways of life, with their differing value, governanceand belief systems must be better reflected in scientificassessments of climate change and that indigenouspeople need to be more closely involved in respondingto the challenges of climate change.116
In climate change research, traditional knowl-edge and observation of weather are often used to sub-stantiate and extend scientific evidence, for example,in data-scarce regions such as the Arctic.113,117–119
There is much less evidence on discrepancies betweentraditional knowledge and scientific understandingsor competing knowledge claims than there areattempts to substantiate scientific with traditionalknowledge.120 One example of such work exploresalternate ways of perceiving, explaining, and respond-ing to climate change. For example, in South Pacificsmall island developing states perceived risk fromcoastal flooding does not result in any increasedmigration away from the islands.121 Islanders do not
2011 John Wiley & Sons, L td.
WIREs Climate Change Individual understandings, perceptions, and engagement with climate change
see climate change as a reason for concern, let aloneto move away, and those with intentions to migratedo not cite climate change as a reason.121 Similarly,perceived causes of climate change diverge from sci-entific knowledge among Senegalese smallholders andagricultural extension agents.122 Subjective percep-tion can also influence what farmers, for example,feel they need. Meze-Hausken123 has suggested thatrainfall needs among Ethiopian farmers in part deter-mine perceptions of changes in rainfall that divergefrom observed changes (see also Ref 124). Grothmannand Patt125 found farmers in Zimbabwe hesitant oreven resistant to change crops when a drought wasprojected, in part because they did not know how tocorrectly interpret climate-related probabilities. Thus,while disconnects are reconciled, there remains a gapin understanding how the discrepancies between sci-entific and traditional knowledge can be reconciled,and how alternate ways of understanding change canbe respected, while acknowledging the potential for avery different world as a result of climate change.
Ranging Views on Personal and CollectiveResponsibilityA number of small studies have examined howresponsibility for acting on climate change is perceivedby individuals. This research demonstrates thatpublics around the globe have formed diverse attitudesabout responsibility that are strongly influenced bylocal cultural dynamics, religious dimensions, andethics.
In the mid-1990s, Hinchliffe126—based oninterviews with individuals in the United Kingdomabout an energy saving campaign—argued thatappealing to individuals as the primary site of actionis ineffective. More recent evidence suggests thatsome individuals openly acknowledge a moral75 orcivic84 responsibility for acting on climate change. Inneither case is this responsibility necessarily viewedas contingent on action from political actors orgovernments. In fact, a study of Canadian individualssuggests that those who act on climate change doso because they feel let down by their governmentwhich is not committing to meaningful emissionreductions.84 A comparative study of British andSwedish students, however, showed distinctly differentassignments of responsibility for causing climatechange (individual consumer behavior, policies,market structures, lifestyles) and resulting differingexpectations of individual versus government actionsto solve the problem.127 Thus, while a higherpercentage of British students than Swedish studentssaw individuals as the main cause of global warming
and government lagging far behind, youth fromboth countries put their hopes in the governmentto solve the problem.127 Interestingly, a focusgroup-based study from New Zealand found thatwhen discussing individual responsibility for GHGemissions, tourists distinguished between their traveland their everyday life, with greater responsibilityfor mitigation perceived in everyday life.128 Thevalue of freedom to travel is firmly established inthe minds of many tourists and limiting travel isconsidered unacceptable.128 While these may seemlike contradictory results, context-specific cognitivedissonance and its resolution could explain why thereare situations in which individuals admit and act on aperceived responsibility and others in which they donot.129
Framing is critical in its function to allocateresponsibility for taking action. For example, ifclimate change is framed as a scientific matter,many lay people do not feel directly included oraddressed (since science falls under the purview of‘experts’, i.e., others). Similarly, if it is framed as amatter of technological innovation, researchers andengineers are perceived as the primary actors. Inframes that rely on the notion of environmentalstewardship (as in many religious communicationson this topic), individuals and communities feelmore directly implicated.130 The imagery, language,messengers, and stories used in different framescan thus underscore or detract from an individual’ssense of responsibility. For example, among theparticipants in the aforementioned UK focus groupstudy that examined the effects of the movie‘The Day After Tomorrow’, viewers experienced anincreased motivation and sense of responsibility to actpersonally on climate change.103 While participantsgenerally felt that public concern could not leadto action without the aid of political support, theyarticulated a collective human responsibility for thecauses of climate change.103
The discourse surrounding certain behaviorsalso affects how individuals negotiate responsibility.As argued by Butler,131 evidence from focus groupdiscussions in the United Kingdom suggests amoralization of certain individual behaviors that havecome to be associated with climate change, andthereby creating an individualized responsibility. Inparticipants, this discourse produced feelings of guiltbut not a change in behavior.131 This is not surprisingin light of studies on guilt appeals, which typically findthat ‘Responses to guilt [. . . , ranging from resentmentto rationalization to a search for self-affirmation] aimprimarily at maintaining one’s sense of a moral self,
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and may or may not also motivate behavior that endsor rectifies the guilt-invoking action’55 (p. 71).
Religious Beliefs Shift Perceived Agencyon Climate ChangeBelief in a higher spiritual being plays an importantrole in determining whether people believe that humanaction can influence the climate or the weather. Thisinsight has emerged from research in Tibet, Fiji, partsof Africa, Central America, Polar regions, and theUnited States. Donner in fact, traces these deeplyheld beliefs about the skies as the ‘domain of theGods’ back throughout the ages and many cultures.132
The implication of beliefs in a higher power beingresponsible for weather extremes (and any possiblechanges therein) is that people or governments arenot perceived as having any control, influence orresponsibility for that which is in God’s hands.Particularly, if climatic change is interpreted as Godteaching people a lesson or punishing sinners, publicacceptance of climate policy may be undermined.
For example, among Tibetans there is abelief that the mountain deities have been angeredcausing the climate to change76 (see also Ref. 133).Donner132 showed, that the perceived role of Godin affecting the weather is common also amongFijian peoples. Even in western(ized) societies, extremeweather events are still often viewed as ‘acts ofGod’.134 Similarly, participants of the results fromthe Tuvaluan study explain their findings with the‘‘special relationship Tuvalu shares with God anddue to the promises of God made to Noah in thebible121 (p. 109). Leduc80 found through a carefullyfacilitated dialog between Inuit and scientists thatthe Inuit concept of ‘Sila’—inadequately translatedas ‘weather changes’—actually alluded to a culturaland spiritual dimension of the observed changes inweather and climate, namely nature’s response toimproper human action.80
In Africa similarly strong beliefs in the hand ofGod in changing the climate are apparent. Researchconducted by the BBC World Service Trust in10 Sub-Saharan countries (DR Congo, Ethiopia,Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan,Tanzania, and Uganda) illustrates that most ruralpopulations in these developing countries have littleawareness and understanding of the concept of climatechange (and only slightly more so of ‘global warming’)even though they are already contending with itsimpacts. While specific findings vary from countryto country, key insights gained from interviewswith individuals in rural Ethiopia are illustrative.74
Generally, knowledge of climate change and global
warming is very low in Ethiopia with very fewrecognising the terms or the concepts. Most Ethiopiansinterpret the term ‘climate change’ to literally mean‘weather change’, largely because the term ‘climate’ islittle used or understood. Instead of linking climatechange or global warming to the warming of the Earthas a result of the emission of GHG, the majorityof Ethiopians connect it to localized increases intemperature caused by local activities that producevisible pollution or smoke, such as the burning offirewood for fuel. For the few Ethiopians in urbanareas even aware of human-caused climate change,global warming is inaccurately associated with theirprior knowledge of ozone depletion.74
Regardless of people’s awareness and under-standing of climate change, Ethiopians recognize thattheir weather is changing and that these changes (suchas erratic and insufficient rainfall, dwindling watersources, failed harvests and dying livestock) are pro-foundly affecting their lives. They explain that theland simply cannot support them anymore. More-over, most Ethiopians, regardless of their religion,feel that God alone has the power to change theweather. This ‘God frame’ leaves little if any roomfor human activity as a cause, and therefore for arole for humans in mitigating emissions. While suchdiffering explanations of change need to be respected,they raise questions about whether and how to helpprepare strongly belief-based societies for adaptationor convince them of ‘green’ development pathways.
The pervasiveness of some version of the‘God frame’ across cultures and time has importantimplications for public engagement and policydevelopment: (1) the impacts of a changing climatecan be viewed as punishment for people’s climate-irrelevant actions, and (2) there is nothing one cando but cope. In terms of mitigation (including low-carbon development) and adaptation, this has seriousimplications for those countries where such beliefs arepervasive.
Questions of faith, it is important to note, arenot only relevant in less-developed, less-Westernizednations. Even in highly developed nations like theUnited States, faith-based beliefs play an importantrole in problem understanding, raising concern,and motivating practical engagement.130,135–138 Mostinteresting for the purposes of understandingthe relevance of religious beliefs for individuals’understandings, perceptions, and engagement here isthat studies of religious discourses in the United Statesillustrate how climate change is framed as a directand severe threat to God’s creation and to notions ofsocial justice, that is, a violation of the dictum to ‘lovethy neighbor’, and, in turn, acting on these threats is
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promoted as ‘God’s work’.136 Thus, climate change asframed in not just conservative-evangelical, but alsomore progressive-religious terms—regardless of therelative lack of a direct experience with climate changeimpacts—has become a salient and immediate issuewith morally motivated, personal responsibility. Thediscussion here of the various ways in which climateis being associated with God, however, illustrates thatfaith can help or hinder active engagement with theissue.
The (Missing) Link Between Understandingand BehaviorThere is now much evidence on the gap betweenknowing about climate change and changing behaviorto help mitigate.139,140 Qualitative research hasexplored this disconnect and provides valuableinsights into how it can be addressed. Lack of asense of urgency vis-a-vis other, more immediate andpressing issues certainly play a role. But denial isalso important in remediating the cognitive dissonancethat climate change can induce.141 Recognizing one’scontributions to the problem, and thus acknowledgingfeelings of complicity and guilt, may or may not leadto remedial action regarding climate change.55,142 Assuggested by Whitmarsh,143 there is an asymmetryof behavioral intentions and the actual effects ofbehavior in terms of emission reductions. Behaviorin response to climate change consists largely oftoken actions that can broadly be described asenvironmental (e.g., recycling) but that do little toreduce GHG emissions.143 This has been attributed toa lack of knowledge about how to reduce emissionseffectively143 (see also Ref 103). Further, there aresignificant social, institutional and practical barriersto public engagement.44,45,54 Thus, even people whowant to mitigate are faced with obstacles or changetheir behavior in ways that are unlikely to yieldeffective emission reductions.84
An area of growing interest to researchersis the affective dimension of climate change, asit is believed to provide a critical link betweenknowledge and attitude on the one hand, andaction on the other.40,98,144–147 In Canada, evidencefrom research into ecological citizenship suggeststhat ecologically minded individuals are not onlycognitively and behaviorally but also affectively moreengaged.148 Similar findings emerged for some, butnot other studies of pro-environmental behaviorsin Britain.149,150 Even those most motivated to actstruggle with making their actions meaningful interms of emission reductions.84 Individuals tendto be more effectively engaged emotionally by
positive messages, while appealing to fear hasbeen found to be largely counterproductive.106
But in order to overcome obstacles and barriersto action and change, path-dependent institutionalstructures, market signals, organizational cultures,and policy-making procedures need to be adjustedor reinvented.151
SYNTHESIS: INDIVIDUALS’UNDERSTANDINGS, PERCEPTIONS,AND ENGAGEMENTThe in-depth studies cited above provide considerableexplanatory power in understanding people’s thoughtprocesses, barriers, and what might serve to motivatepeople to act on climate change.
UnderstandingAcquiring and employing factually correct knowledgeof climate change was defined above as understandingclimate change. Individuals’ understanding of climatechange is still limited according to the small-scale studies reviewed here. Part of the reasonmay be lack of focused education on climatechange, powerful cultural, and perceptual filtersthat screen out new and challenging informationwhile selectively letting other bits in, peripheralinformation uptake through the media, and lack ofdirect immersion in natural environments amongpeople in industrialized countries. Evidence ontraditional knowledge systems suggests that theyoften complement western scientific knowledge andhave been used to substantiate scientific evidence, forexample, in the rapidly changing Arctic. However,some ways of understanding diverge from scientificevidence and there is much less research on this thanon convergent or complementary ways of knowing,and on the consequences of divergent knowledgesystems and beliefs. In some places knowledge ofclimate change or the concept it represents is verylimited. Yet, where this lack of knowledge coincideswith a climatically exposed livelihood, individualsrecognize that the weather or other aspects ofnature is changing and that these changes areaffecting their lives. What the review of numerousin-depth studies also reveals is an inconclusiverelationship between the level of education and thelevel of understanding of climate change; the relativerole of understanding in raising concern and inmotivating action. Clearly, individuals enact climate-relevant behavior without or with an incompleteand sometimes misguided understanding of climatechange, while others understand the problem full welland do or do not act to reduce their emissions.
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PerceptionsIn terms of perception, that is, the views andinterpretations of the climate issue based onbeliefs, experiences, and understanding, the evidencefrom in-depth studies reviewed here suggests thatindividuals’ perceptions of climate change are stronglycontextualized and encompasses other, not necessarilyenvironmental, issues. Positionality in society (asindicated by gender, age, socioeconomic status, andother social variables) may play an important role inthese differentiated judgments of climate change byvarious groups, but evidence about how much of adifference it makes in different contexts is not uniform.The observed perceptions also explicitly accounts forethical and moral dimensions, such as those relatingto equity, development, and economic power. Climatechange is perceived through the lenses of pre-existingcultural worldviews. This means that perception ofthe issue is strongly determined by beliefs held byindividuals about the functioning of nature and whatwould constitute a ‘good life’, fairness, and theappropriate role of individuals versus markets and thegovernment. Accordingly, evidence from developedcountries on differences in individuals’ perceptionsconverges on systematically varying levels of concern,the presence of skeptical views in all societies studied,and some degree of acceptance, ranging from solid totempered.
Perception of climate change is also shaped bythe framing used in climate change communications,particularly the imagery and stories employed, whichcan help increase knowledge and concern if theembedded emotions do not overly emphasize (i.e.,manipulate) negative feelings such as fear, guilt orhopelessness. Negative affective appeals seem largelycounterproductive, especially when unaccompaniedby messages that build listeners’ sense of efficacy,hope, and optimism about the future. How climatechange is framed can fundamentally affect howthe issue is perceived. For example, appeals toparenthood and hero’s stories, such as that foundin the film ‘The Day After Tomorrow’, can shapeperception, but such demographic variables, includingparenthood, do not show consistent evidence forpeople’s concern and intentions to reduce personalemissions. Moreover, concern about climate changedoes not necessarily stem from having been affectedby the effects of climate change directly; in fact,evidence is inconclusive as to whether those directlyimpacted by events such as floods are as or morelikely than others to attempt mitigation of GHG.Some limited evidence suggests that individuals openlyacknowledge a responsibility, either moral or civic, foraddressing climate change. While one may hypothesize
that notions of responsibility and motivation to actare similarly shaped by the deeply held culturalworldviews, further research is needed to discern thereasons.
EngagementIn this article, we defined engagement as a stateof personal connection that encompasses cognitive,affective and/or behavioral dimensions. The studiesreviewed here suggest that denial as well as distancingand an active disconnect between recognizing causesand assigning responsibility for action play importantroles in mitigating the cognitive dissonance climatechange causes in individuals. There is evidence foran asymmetry of intentions and actions in partdue to insufficient practical knowledge about howto reduce emissions effectively. Incorrect mentalmodels (such as global warming being the resultof the ozone hole) or the cross-culturally common‘God frame’ can effectively hinder or, as seenin evidence from US progressive Christian beliefs,promote individual engagement; this has significantimplications for mitigation and adaptation. Onthe other hand, there is no direct or uncontestedlinkage between a correct understanding of climatechange and active engagement either, and a widevariety of framings can motivate action withoutdeep, scientifically correct understanding. Even whereindividuals perceive a sense of personal responsibilityand show a willingness to act, many experience asense of futility in light of the barriers they face, thelack of government leadership and facilitative policies,and the immensity of this ‘global’ problem versusindividual actions. Affective engagement with climatechange requires further research; clear is, however,that negative emotions such as fear—unmitigatedby communication on how to translate worry andconcern into effective remedial action—are more likelyto disengage individuals, while positive emotions helpinspire and motivate people. Limited evidence suggeststhat ecologically minded individuals feel and aremore actively engaged—pointing to the importanceof identity in pro-environmental behavior—but stillstruggle to make changes in their lives that wouldreduce their emissions effectively.
FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
Suggesting broad-stroke research directions for small-scale studies is hampered by the same dilemma asunderlies this synthetic review: the juice is in thedetails. As the studies reviewed here, future researchin this area will continue to be highly contextual,
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focus on specific audiences and employ a wide varietyof approaches, framings, and participants, in diversesettings. Specific questions are virtually endless due tothese differences. Nevertheless, we attempt to providesome categorical suggestions.
First, in-depth studies focused on understandingallow us to learn how people process information,how they make sense of it in a very contextualizedfashion, how they do or don’t learn, and thus—prag-matically—how stubbornly hindered climate changecommunication and education is vis-a-vis pre-existingmental structures, and in turn, what possibilities thereare to tap into people’s prior understandings. Futureresearch should be more explicitly interdisciplinary,joining forces between learning and communicationsexperts, and examine how understanding differs notjust by socio-demographic or cultural groups, but bylearning contexts. For example, what settings allowfor better uptake, systematic processing, and improvedassimilation of new information? What sequence ofinformation is most conducive to improving people’sunderstanding without overwhelming them cogni-tively or affectively? How can selective informationuptake in highly polarized contexts be circumvented?
Second, in-depth perception studies lead usinto the inner workings of people’s beliefs andemotions. Evidence cited above is inconclusive as towhat experiences and mental processes lead to whatperceptions, and how they do or do not motivate moreactive engagement. Future research should examinehow and what could stabilize or change individuals’perceptions. While more seems to be understoodabout how people maintain certain beliefs, whatinternal processes and/or outside events can changethem? Again, interdisciplinary research might yieldinteresting insights, for example, on how stages inhuman/personal development (not just chronologicalage), life experiences, levels of maturity, social roles,or personality types affect beliefs and perceptionsof climate change. What psychological capacities areneeded for people to confront the ‘inconvenient truths’of climate change?
Third, with regard to engagement, past researchhas established how difficult it is to actively engagewith climate change. While much has been said aboutthe value-attitude-action gap, and the lack of directlinkages between understanding, perceptions andbehavior, more needs to be understood about thosewho do make changes in their lives. In fact, cuttingacross these three focus areas of research, we foundthat much of the research we report on here is focusedon what is lacking and what does not work. One of thegreat advantages of small-scale studies is the relativelylow cost for testing out alternative approaches to
public communication and engagement. We believe,therefore, that more such smaller, in-depth studies areparticularly well suited to examine what does workin terms of cognitively, affectively, and behaviorallyengaging individuals. Already, many campaigns areunderway, but often they lack pre-interventionestablishment of baselines, monitoring, and post-intervention evaluation. These campaigns offer ready-made opportunities to further our understanding oneffective communication. More importantly, maybe,the fact that we find such significant differences, andsometimes opposite findings from studies of differentpopulations, suggests that one-size-fits-all campaignsare doomed, if not to fail, at least to only reachlimited goals with far smaller audiences than intended.‘Retail’ communication approaches on the basis ofbetter understanding of particular target groups maythus be more promising.
Such subgroups may be selected on thebasis of strategic considerations, that is, withan eye to bigger impact. For example, expertsincreasingly recommend that campaigns should targetopinion leaders—individuals considered particularlytrustworthy by specific segments of the population(e.g., local political leaders, civic leaders, business, orreligious leaders). Thus an area of valuable researchwould be to focus attention on the understandings,perceptions and the barriers and motivations of elites,policy-makers, business leaders, and other influentials.This would help set in motion much wider publicsupport for climate action. Effectively reaching suchpolicy elites may also help in facilitating high-levelaction that can remove some of the barriers the widerpublic faces.
On the basis of the insights reported here, wehypothesize that many publics seem ready to act iftheir leaders were to take some bold action at thepolicy level. It is possible, and worth examiningmore specifically, that people feel paralyzed notjust or maybe not as much by the magnitude andcomplexity of the climate change threat (i.e., the threatappraisal), but by not being able to do much aboutthe ossified structures that constrain their actions(election systems, energy systems, transportationinfrastructure, markets, etc.), and not because theydo not want to help address climate change. Inother words, they may disengage because of theirnegative (but not at all irrational) appraisal of capacityand efficacy. Specifically investigating such questionsmight produce helpful results to bring to the attentionof leaders who claim they do not have enough backingin the electorate.
Finally, while it is quite common in manywestern societies that only small percentages of
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populations are civically active and that participa-tion in elections in many democracies is lessening,more research on engagement is necessary to betterunderstand what would (again) or already does moti-vate people to engage in civic or political actions onclimate change.
It has been our own experience in reviewingthis literature of in-depth studies that a deeper under-standing of individuals’ responses to climate changehas resulted in a more compassionate understandingof people’s reaction to this daunting challenge. It isfrom there, maybe, that a more civil conversation canbe had.
NOTESa The supporting information table lists 68 in-depth,often small-scale studies reviewed for this paper.The three principal criteria for inclusion are: (1) asubstantive focus on understanding, perception, orengagement with climate change; (2) an emphasis onmitigation behavior or generic issues related to under-standing of climate change, rather than on adaptation
behavior; and (3) the study does not report on a large-scale survey of nationally representative populations.While we do not claim this to be an all-encompassingreview, the reader will find detailed insights in thesestudies that helps us better understand human cog-nitive, affective, and behavioral responses to climatechange. In the ‘Findings’ column of the supportinginformation we briefly summarize what if anythingis different from the large-scale, quantitative stud-ies/surveys, what is surprising, and/ or what offersdeeper insights.b Cultural theorists distinguish cultural subgroupswithin a 2 × 2 matrix, clustered by people’s adherenceto two fundamental dimensions of what is perceivedas a ‘good’ and just society, for example, a highlystratified society with strong emphasis on loyalty toone’s peer group would be a high grid/high groupor ‘hierarchist’ society. A minimally stratified soci-ety with strong emphasis on individuals standing outfrom the group would be an ‘individualist’ society.Some researchers see little evidence for fatalism as acultural type and thus drop that category; others addsolidarism as an alternative, resulting in inconsistentnumbers of groupings.
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