interested in him, dallas. oswald information knomn about ...jfk.hood.edu/collection/weisberg...
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Handbook, w
hich is in the possession of every Bureau special agent,
provided:
Threats against the P
resident of the U.S., m
embers of his im
- m
ediate family, the P
resident-elect, and the Vice-P
resident
Investigation
of threats again
st the P
residen
t of the U
nited
States, m
embers of his im
mediate fam
ily, the President-E
lect, and the V
ice-President is w
ithin the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S.
Secret Service. Any inform
ation indicating the possibility of an attem
pt against the pewes, or safety of the P
resident, mem
bers of the im
mediate fam
ily of the President, the P
resident-Elect or
the V
ice-Presid
ent m
ust b
e referred im
med
iately by th
e most
expeditious means of com
munication to the nearest office of the
U.S
. Secret S
ervice. Ad
vise the B
ureau
at the sam
e time b
y teletyp
e of the in
formation
so furn
ished
to the S
ecret Service
and the fact that it has been so disseminated. T
he above action should be taken w
ithout delay in order to attempt to verify the
information and no evaluation of the inform
ation should be at-tem
pted. When the threat is in the farm
of a written com
munica-
tion, give a copy to local Secret Service and forward the original
to the Bureau w
here it will be m
ade available to Secret Service h
eadq
uarters in
Wash
ington
. Th
e referral of the cop
y to local S
ecret Service sh
ould
not d
elay the im
med
iate referral of the
info
rmatio
n b
y th
e fastest available means of com
munication to
Secret Service locally."
Th
e State D
epartm
ent ad
vised th
e Secret S
ervice of all crank
and
threat letter m
ail or crank visitors and furnished reports concerning any assassination or attem
pted assassination of a ruler or other major
official anyw
here in
the w
orld."
Th
e several military in
telligence
agencies reported crank mail and sim
ilar threats involving the Presi-
den
t." A
ccordin
g to Sp
ecial Agen
t in C
harge B
ouck
, the S
ecret Service had no standard procedure for the system
atic review of its
requests for and receipt of in
form
ation fro
m o
ther F
ederal agencies."
The C
omm
ission believes that the facilities and procedures of the P
rotective Research Sect ion of the Secret Service prior to N
ovember
22, 1963, were inadequate. Its efforts appear to have been too largely
directed
at the "
crank
" th
reat. Alth
ough
the S
ervice recognized
th
at its advan
ce preven
tive measu
res mu
st encom
pass m
ore than
these m
ost obvious dangers, it mude little effort to identify factors in
the activities of an i nd i vi dos or an organized group, other than specific
threats, which suggeSted a sonrre of danger against w
hich timely pre-
caution
s could
be tak
en. E
seete fo
r its special "trip
index
" file of
400 names, none of the cases in the P
BS
general files was available for
systematic review
on a geographic basis when the P
resident planned a particular trip.
As reported in chapter H
, when the special file• w
as reviewed on
Novem
ber 8, it con
tained
the n
ames of n
o persons from the entire
432
Dallas-F
ort W
orth
urea, n
otw
ithstan
din
g th
e fact that A
mb
ematior &
- Stevenson had b
een ab
used
by p
ickets in
Dallas less th
an a m
onth befo
re. Bouck
explain
ed th
e failure to
try to
iden
tify th
e indiv
iduals
inv
olv
ed in
the S
teven
son
incid
ent after it. o
ccurred
on
the g
rou
nd
that P
RS
required a more direct indication of a threat to the P
resident, an
d th
at there w
as no such
ind
ication
un
til the P
residen
t's sched
uled
visit to that. area becam
e known." S
uch an approach seriously under- m
ines the precautionary nature of PB
S w
ork; if the presence in Dallas
of the Stevenson pickets m
ight have created a danger for the President
on a v
isit to th
at city, P
RS
should
hav
e investig
ated an
d b
een pre-
pared to g
uard
again
st it O
ther agencies occasionally provided information to the S
ecret. Serv-
ice concern
ing p
oten
tially d
angero
us p
olitical g
roups. T
his w
as d
on
e in
the c
ase
of th
e N
atio
nalist P
arty
of P
uerto
Ric
o, fo
r ex
ample, b
ut
only after
mem
bers o
f the g
roup
. had
resorted
to
political v
iolen
ce." How
ever, th
e vag
ue req
uests fo
r info
rmatio
n
wh
ich th
e Secret S
ervice m
ade to
Fed
eral intellig
ence an
d law
en-
forcement agencies w
ere not well designed to elicit inform
ation from
them
abo
ut p
erson
s oth
er than
tho
se wh
o w
ere ob
vio
us th
reats to th
e Presid
ent. T
he req
uests sh
ifted th
e responsibility for evaluat- ing difficult
cases from
th
e Serv
ice, the ag
ency
mo
st respo
nsib
le for p
erformin
g that
task
, to th
e o
ther a
gencie
s. N
o specific
gu
idan
ce was p
rov
ided
. Alth
ou
gh
the C
IA h
ad o
n file req
uests fro
m
the T
reasury
Dep
artmen
t for in
form
ation o
n th
e counterfeitin
g o
f U
.S. cu
rrency
and certain
smugglin
g m
atters," it had
no w
ritten
specification of intelligence information collected by C
IA abroad w
hich w
as desired by the Secret S
ervice in advance of Presidential trips out-
side th
e United
States.
Info
rma
tion
kno
Mn
ab
ou
t Lee H
arvey O
mea
ld p
rior to
the a
a-
eassination.—N
o in
form
ation
con
cernin
g L
ee. Harv
ey O
swald
ap-
peared in P
RS
files before th
e Presid
ent's trip
to D
allas. Osw
ald
was know
n to oth
er Fed
eral agen
cies with
which
the S
ecret Serv
ice m
aintain
ed in
telligen
ce liaison. T
he F
BI h
ad b
een interested in him
, to som
e degree at least, since the time of his defection in O
ctober 1959. It h
ad in
terview
ed h
im tw
ice sho
rtly after h
is return
to th
e Un
ited
States, ag
ain a y
ear later at his req
uest an
d w
as investig
ating h
im at
the tim
e of th
e assassinatio
n. T
he C
om
missio
n h
as taken
the testi-
mony of B
ureau'agents who interview
ed Osw
ald after his return from
the Soviet U
nion and prior to Novem
ber 22, 1963, the agent who w
as assig
ned
his case at th
e time o
f the assassin
ation
, the D
irector o
f the
FB
I, and
the A
ssistant to
the D
irector in
charg
e of all in
vestig
ative
activities u
nd
er the D
irector an
d A
ssociate D
irector." In
add
ition
, th
e Directo
r and D
eputy
Directo
r for P
lans o
f the C
IA testified
con-
cerning that Agency's lim
ited knowledge of O
swald before the assassi-
natio
n." F
inally
, the C
om
missio
n h
as review
ed th
e com
plete files
on Osw
ald, as they existed at the time of the assassination, of the D
e- p
artmen
t of S
tate, the O
ffice of N
aval In
telligen
ce, the F
BI, an
d th
e C
IA. T
he in
form
ation
kn
ow
n to
the F
BI is su
mm
arized b
elow
. 433
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ewe "
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hite d
epiet L
awson
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t ;to rihe
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ews th
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AtiSiall Ale
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ed to be a potential .wager
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idlltu
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ptim
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o S
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e S
eam
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ite depends liem
ely
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o is
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isie
ly h
elm
th
e v
isit
of
the I
Feesid
en
iOM
* o
ven
ton
en
ev.
flaws his a
rriv
al is
Deals
ea
Som
mem
ber to
loses* o
nsh
mn
sei
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sgess
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ee o
f
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tem
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is D
efie
s s
oil*
Ata
testim
u;lo
r
Sts
on
men
oA
06.161110r 14p 1004 L
W*" bagel sad about the incident
an
d o
bta
ined
rb
ro
At d
bo kW
torsos p
hoto
grap
hs o
f born
e o
f the p
ea so
ns in
volv
ed
. a
Cite
usis
feer 0
1 a
Hoer* S
ervic
e agen
t stood et th
e e
ntr
an
ce to
the
Trad
e K
W, "W
O0 P
ot w
ee s
eh
ed
ule
d t
o s
peak
, wit
h c
op
ies
aso Fps.
Dalla
s d
ete
ctiv
es in
the L
ibb
y o
f the T
rad
e
$a$
en
d is th
e lu
nch
eon
em
s a
lso h
ad
esp
ies o
f them
ph
oto
grap
hs
otenbar of p
oi*
who r
esem
ble
d s
om
e of
those la
, the phalm
eraphs
ware ple,s4 vendee s
urveilla
nce a
t the T
rad
e ][a
rt."
TM
dim
in D
an
es g
ee. t
he k
cal S
wot Service represents-
giro the ewe of a pom
iblly dangerous individual in the Dallas area
ek
e w
oe in
veseir
stid
, It id
ea a
dvis
ed
the Sweet S
ervic
e o
f the c
irca-
letlein on Were dyer ill et a hated1411 onandy
critic
al o
f Presid
en
t
gan
ked
y,"
amn
ia ha ah
oolor ill Of
Is* ooport, S
hortly
befo
re,
'ha D
'of P
OO
himi-41104stisi w
est WI* l'4 , vviLso that the handbill
had
own
* on th
e sWoriss o
f I
mo.
Ush
er the D
alla
s p
olic
e n
or
the I'M
bed in
it learned the *oat* o
f the h
an
db
ill.' No o
ne e
lse w
as
iden
tified
to th
e *
Oat S
ervic
e th
ron
gs lo
cal in
qu
iry a
s p
ote
ntia
lly
+444
1 "1401
k, *be
fit
t 4 sievotop
arty ad
ditio
nal in
form
atio
n b
etw
een
Ifooresm
dsg
t $01, O
we to
mm
tteio
loft Itta
ak
ingto
n, a
nd
Novem
ber 2
2. T
he
od
tV
o* O
st ;
roi r o
ttigeo
. . wean
maintained by the Secret Service
et 414 Im
emoo6T
ialtitire, ir, ohuling a d
eta
iled
deoorip
tion
of
the "noir" 41410 en Les lbkrior O
swald axed the m
iaow w
hy his
moue had suit h
ew faeu
ished
to the *gess A
metos, tt d
imm
ed in
chapter V
III. k
itopoop
iat UP ,
k•Ukpixnagrit 111firria*
tNeos,z.z*tellit s i>ilt to
Dalla
s w
as to
sp
eak
ei • em
em
thess g
iven
4-5
oin
issok
e3.
"*3 A
mad
ora. T
he W
hite
Hou
se
wed
,÷orgessoest
*M
fg
.sr' f‘e
i the P
resid
em
wou
ld a
rriv
e
essay., 4ffitoete from D
ella? 4 ee e•i••; ,i crams a inet/at*.oie
throu
gh
the
sou xerewe area
of M
ah
e to
ow
!mo...,-latom
i site should b
e a
rran
ged
;
an
al O
at fo
llow
ing th
e lo
w- h
olm
N
esiden
t wou
ld retu
rn to th
e
airport b
y the m
ost nin
es route
Aevaed
irig
ty, it w
as im
porta
nt to
aetermine Y
AW
sueunevu pity could be established at the site and the m
otorcade route selected. O
n Novem
ber 4, Gerald A
. Behn, agent in charge of the W
hite House
detail, asked Sorrels to examine three potential sites for the luncheon."
One building, M
arket Hall, w
as unavailable for Novem
ber 22. The
second, the Wom
en's Building at the State F
air Grounds, w
as a one-story b
uild
ing w
ith few
entran
ces and
easy to mak
e secure, b
ut it
lacked necessary food-handling facilities and had certain unattractive
features, including a low ceiling w
ith exposed conduits and beams.
The third possibility, the T
rade Mart, a handsom
e new building w
ith
all the n
ecessary facilities, presen
ted secu
rity prob
lems. It h
ad
numerous entrances, several tiers of balconies surrounding the central
court where the luncheon w
ould be held, and several catwalks crossing
the court at each level. On N
ovember 4, Sorrels told B
ehn he believed security difficulties at the T
rade Mart could be overcom
e by special
precau
tions."
Law
son also evalu
ated th
e security h
azards at th
e
Trad
e Mart on
Novem
ber 18"
Ken
neth
O'D
onn
ell mad
e the fin
al
decision to hold the luncheon at the Trade M
art; Behn so notified
Law
son on Novem
ber 14." O
nce the Trade M
art had been selected, Sorrels and Law
son worked
out detailed arrangements for security at the building. In addition to
the reventive measures already m
entioned, they provided for con-
trol/mg access to the building, closing off and policing areas around
it, unstring the roof and insuring the presence of numerous police offi-
cers inside and around the building. Ultim
ately more than 200 law
enforounent officers, mainly D
allas police but including 8 Secret Serv-
ice w
ets, w
ere deployed in and around the Trade M
art."
The M
otorcade Route
Osa N
ovember 8, w
hen Law
son was briefed on the itinerary for the
trip to D
alla
s, h
e was told
that 45 m
inu
tes had
been
allotted for a
osotoreade procession from L
ove Field to the luncheon site." L
awson
was not specifically instructed to select the parade route, but he under-
stood th
at this w
as one of h
is fun
ctions."
Even
before th
e Trad
e
Mars had been definitely selected, L
awson and Sorrels began to con-
eider the best m
otorcade route from L
ove Field to the T
rade Mart..
On N
ovember 14, L
awson and Sorrels attended a m
eeting at Love
Field and on their return to D
allas drove over the route which Sorrels
believed best. suited for the proposed motorcade." T
his route, eventu-ally selected for the m
otorcade from the airport to the T
rade Mart,
measured 10 m
iles and could be driven easily within the allotted 45
min
utes."
From
Love F
ield th
e route p
assed th
rough
a portion
of
suburban Dallas, through the dow
ntown area along M
ein Street and
then to the Trade M
art via Stemm
ons Freew
ay. For the P
resident's
return to Love F
ield following the luncheon, the agents selected the
Duos direct route, w
hich was approxim
ately 4 miles."
A flee the selection of the T
rade Mart as the luncheon site, L
awson
and Sorrels met w
ith Dallas C
hief of Police Jesse E
. Curry, A
ssistant
81
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