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Week 12: Ethnic and

Religious Conflicts and

Problems of

Democratization

INTL 450

Murat Somer © 2016

• Cold War used to contain ethnic-regional conflicts and self-determination movements by supporting nation-states

• 1990s: resurgence? of ethnic-regional conflicts

• 2000s: authoritarian regimes learned to use these conflicts to buttress their own powers

Chapter 2 (Debating Secession Peacefully and

Democratically by R. Simeon) in Stepan, A.

(Ed.). (2009). Democracy in Danger.

Managing diversity

• Case of success: Canada. – in terms of accomodation and management of difference.

• Three distinct dimensions of «deep diversity»: – 1. Language: French-speaking Quebecers.

– 2. Aboriginal population.

– 3. Immigrants mostly from non-Western cultural background.

Managing diversity

• What is meant by «success» in managing

diversity? – Reference to the striking fact that a debate about the very

future of the country as a single political entity has been

conducted vigorously since the early 1960s in a democratic

and peaceful manner.

Quebec issue

• Quebec referandum (Do you agree that Quebec should

become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for

a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the

bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed

on June 12, 1995?): Yes: 49,42%

No: 50,58%

Quebec leaders: standard democratic rule is «50% plus one».

vs.

Federalists: fundamental constitutional change requires «super

majority».

Quebec issue

• Canadian Constitutional Court: – In international law, the right to self-determination is possible

only if the claimant nation suffers from oppression by the

majority. This is not the case in Canada.

– BUT, if Quebec were to vote for secession «by a clear

majority» and on a «clear question», then the rest of Canada

is constitututionally obliged to negotiate the matter.

– The method is unclear, yet fundamental principles are

obvious in the Constitution: democracy, federalism,

constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for

minorities.

Quebec issue

• The federal government: – declared the Clarity Act (2000), clarifying the terms under

which a referandum could trigger a negotiation process:

Parliament reserves itself the judgment about the fairness of

the referandum question and the «sufficient majoirty»

required to trigger negotiations.

• Quebec: – Simple majority would be enough to secede!

Quebec issue

• In the first decade of 21st century: – sovereignist movement seemed to be in decline with the rise

of federalist Liberal government at the provincial level.

• In 2008: Conservative government which

replaced Liberal party: – espoused a decentralist «open federalism»: Major fiscal

transfers to the provinces and the recognition of Quebec as

«nation».

Quebec issue

• It is striking that this long-debated issue of

secessionism remained democratic,

nonviolent and peaceful on both sides. – Due to which factors?

• We can distinguish cultural, historical,

institutional and contextual factors.

1. Cultural factors

• 1.a. Democratic cultures: Both in Quebec and

in the Rest of Canada, there is a powerful

commitment to democratic values and to

free and open discussion. – None have argued that secessionists were «traitors». And they

were never denied the right to defend secessionism.

– The result is that the separatist movement was never driven

underground. No need to resort to violent means.

– The lesson is that the more open the democratic space, the

greater the chances of a peaceful process, whatever the

outcome.

1. Cultural factors

• 1.b. Predominantly «civic» nationalisms:

English-Canadian nationalism has never been

rooted in an ethnic definition of the country.

Quebec’s nationalism is also inclusive.

• 1.c. Common political and social values:

Canada-Quebec debate is not one of competing

and antithetical worldviews. These are very

similar societies in social and economic terms.

2. Historical legacies

• Canada has always been a «negotiated

country». – In the first encounters between Europeans and indigenous

people: negotiation on fur trade.

– When Britain defeated France and took control of Canada:

people kept their Catholic religion, language and civil law.

– Confederation in 1867 was negotiated among the British

North American colonies.

– Canada’s step-by-step independence from Britain.

3. Institutional factors

• 3.a. A multi-unit federeation: – Quebec’s dual role in the federation: simultaneously one of the two

«nations» and one of ten provinces.

– A decentralized Canada helps accomodate Quebec and the presence of Quebec ensures that Canada’s federalism will be highly decentralized.

– The lesson is that polarization is less likely to occur when the federation has multiple units.

• 3.b. Provincial autonomy: – The Canadian federal system has provided a high degree of

autonomy to Quebec.

– The lesson is that decentralization –to give minority groups control over matters important to their identity and survival and to protect them from the imposition of the will of the majority- can provide an effective means of accomodation.

3. Institutional factors

• 3.c. Integration at the center – Quebec and Quebecers have also been built into national

political structures.

– Not possible to form a federal government in Canada without

substantial support from Quebec.

– Almost all Canadian prime ministers since the 1960s have

been Quebecers.

– The lesson is that autonomy for minority groups is one

element in a larger accomodation, but equally important is the

integration of minorities into the central political system.

3. Institutional factors

• 3.d. The role of an independent court – When the stakes of political conflict are high, an independent

institution, trusted by all sides can be of critical importance.

– The Supreme Court of Canada has played this role on several occasions.

– The lesson is that accomodation is facilitated where there exists institutions that are above the fray, not captured by any side, and commited to critical constitutional values.

• 3.e. Caution about constitutional reform – Following years of fruitless constitutional negotiation,

Canadians and Quebecers have tacitly agreed that constitutional bargaining and referanda are to be avoided unless absolutely necessary.

4. Contextual factors

• 4.a. Distinct but interdependent societies – Strong economic linkages, decreasing economic disparities and

more and more cooperation among civil society organizations from both sides.

• 4.b. Presence of the US – Both sides recognize that the US has a major stake in political and

economic stability of the country on its northern border, with which it is joined in the NAFTA.

– The lesson is that unbiased external actors and a benign geographic neighborhood can mitigate domestic conflicts.

• 4.c. Saying no to violence – While violence must be stopped, the channels for democratic

politics must be kept open at the same time.

Chin-Huat Wong, James Chin & Norani Othman

(2010) Malaysia –towards a topology of an

electoral one-party state, Democratization.

Malaysia: An electoral authoritarian

regime

• The most accurate characterization of

Malaysia’s political system is «electoral

authoritarian regime». – hybrid regimes with elections without democracy.

– the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (National Fornt, BS)

has been in power for several decades.

Malaysia: electoral one-party state

Democracy Authoritarian

systems

One-party-

predominant

democracy

Electoral one-

party state

One-party state

Party system and

its freedom

A dominant

party, but real

oppositions

unconstrained

A dominant

party, and real

oppositions

constrained

A dominant

party, and real

oppositions

not allowed

Elections Free and fair Controlled or

manipulated

No elections

Separation of

state and party

Clear separation Blurred

boundary

between state

and party

No separation

Historical overview

• The emergence and growth of dominant party – Except for the 1969 elections, the ruling coalitions, the

alliance (1955–1974) and later the expanded Barisan

Nasional (BN) have always won more than half the popular

vote and more than two-thirds of parliamentary seats.

– Alternation hardly imaginable.

Historical overview

Historical overview

• Barisan Nasional: – formed as Alliance coalition among three parties (United

Malays National Organisation, Malaysian Chinese Association and Malaysian Indian Congress) after the defeat in the elections in 1969.

– Increased tension among different communities (13 May Riots) led to the suspension of democracy until 1971.

– In 1973, it took the name «Barisan Nasional». A grand coalition of 11 parties.

– Why opposition parties accepted to be coopted? • They hoped that a power-sharing pact with the alliance would

strengthen their own positions within the party

• They believed that their subnational governments cannot survive without UMNO’s blessing in the post-1969 political climate

Historical overview

• UMNO’s splits: – UMNO’s schisms in 1987 and 1998 had given birth to two

splinter parties,

– the Malay-nationalist Semangat 46 Party

– the multiethnic centrist Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, PKR, since 1999),

– And three opposition coalitions: the Gagasan Rakyat-Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (1990–1995/6), Barisan Alternatif (1999–2001) and Pakatan Rakyat (since 2008).

• Sensing no future in the opposition, many opposition parties have instead hoped to become UMNO’s partners and join BN. A contemporary example is the Indian Progressive Front (IPF).

Construction and maintenance of

electoral dominance

• The ability of a dominant party to eliminate its

rivals in elections and/or co-opt them after

elections lies in the construction and

maintenance of a powerful electoral base.

• It can be enhanced via: – Control of enfranchisement

– Changing of international and administrative boundaries

– Mal-apportionment and gerrymandering

– Other forms of electoral manipulation: ‘phantom voters’, non-

transparency

Blurring of state and party lines

• Fusion of the Malayan/Malaysian state and the

UMNO-led ruling coalition – Ideology: Malaya’s Constitution has stipulated a special

position for the Malays and defines a Malay person with

Islam, Malay language and Malay customs.

– Economic redistribution: the public sector expanded

tremendously to elevate the Malays, UMNO’s powerbase.

– Politicization of state institutions: All the institutions such

as the EC, police and military, universities, state-owned media

to all and sundry government agencies and state-owned

corporations are packed by the party.

Blurring of state and party lines

• An electoral one-party state cannot survive

functioning federalism or decentralization

(with vertical division of power). – The erosion of federalism.

• Four tactics to eliminate state-level rivals used

by alliance/BN: – 1. administrative and economic discrimination against the

state governments, so that they will be deprived of economic

development and the electorate will be compelled to vote for

the federal ruling coalition to get development funds.

Blurring of state and party lines

• Four tactics to eliminate state-level rivals used by alliance/BN (cont’d): – 2. political persecution, including selective investigation and

prosecution.

– 3. triggering defection of opposition lawmakers.

– 4. direct federal intervention.

• Like state governments, elected local governments which were once controlled by the opposition parties and provided an effective check to the electoral one-party state soon became the latter’s victim.

Conclusion

In sum, how the Barisan Nasional has managed

to perpetuate its rule?

Initial electoral strength due to:

• control of franchise

• alternation of international and administrative boundaries,

• mal-apportionment and gerrymandering of electoral constituencies

• controlled electoral campaigns and polling irregularities.

Political opposition is disempowered with:

• infringement of civil and political liberties

• extensive patronage networks

• abuse of federal apparatus to suppress intergovernmental competition.