javascript heap analysis: from browser exploits to safe javascript subsets adam barth joel...

JavaScript Heap Analysis: From Browser Exploits to Safe JavaScript Subsets

Adam BarthJoel Weinberger

Matt FinifterDawn Song

University of California, Berkeley

This presentation is copyright © 2009 Joel Weinberger

JavaScript Contexts

JavaScript Context 1

JavaScript Context 2 JavaScript Context 3

Overview• Current JavaScript Security Model

• Cross-Origin JavaScript Capability Leaks

• Capability Leak Detection

• Browser Defense Mechanism

• Safe JavaScript Subsets

The DOM and Access Control

DOM Reference Monitor

Object

JavaScript Context

Granted

Access?

The DOM and Access Control

DOM Reference Monitor

Object

JavaScript Context

Granted

Access?

The DOM and Access Control

DOM Reference Monitor

Object

JavaScript Context

Denied

Access?

The JS Engine and Capabilities

Object 1 Object 2

Accessible Inaccessible

JavaScript Context

DOM vs JS Engine

• The DOM provides an access control layer

DOM vs JS Engine

• The DOM provides an access control layer

• The JavaScript engine treats objects as capabilities

Overview• Current JavaScript Security Model

• Cross-Origin JavaScript Capability Leaks

• Capability Leak Detection

• Browser Defense Mechanism

• Safe JavaScript Subsets

Cross-Context References

Window 1 Window 2

Global Object Global Object

document function foo()

document function bar()

Cross-Context References

Window 1 Window 2

Global Object Global Object

document function foo()

document function bar()

Cross-Context References

Window 1 Window 2

Global Object Global Object

document function foo()

document function bar()

Cross-Context References

Window 1 Window 2

Global Object Global Object

document function foo()

document function bar()

DOM meets JS EngineJavaScript Context 1 JavaScript Context 2

DOM Reference Monitor

Object

Access?

DOM meets JS EngineJavaScript Context 1 JavaScript Context 2

DOM Reference Monitor

Object

Access Granted

DOM meets JS EngineJavaScript Context 1 JavaScript Context 2

DOM Reference Monitor

Object

Granted

Access?

DOM meets JS EngineJavaScript Context 1 JavaScript Context 2

DOM Reference Monitor

Object

Granted

Access?

DOM meets JS EngineJavaScript Context 1 JavaScript Context 2

DOM Reference Monitor

Object

Granted

Access?

Cross-Origin JavaScript Capability Leak

Overview• Current JavaScript Security Model

• Cross-Origin JavaScript Capability Leaks

• Capability Leak Detection

• Browser Defense Mechanism

• Safe JavaScript Subsets

JavaScript Heap Inspection

?

Instrumentation

• In the JavaScript Engine object system

• Object creation, destruction, and reference

• Calls into analysis library

Empty Page Heap Graph

google.com Heap Graph

Graph Stats• empty page

– 82 nodes– 170 edges

• google.com– 384 nodes– 733 edges

• store.apple.com/us– 5332 nodes– 11691 edges

• gmail.com– 55106 nodes– 133567 edges

Computing JavaScript Contexts

Object Prototype

Global Object

Object

Computing JavaScript Contexts

Object Prototype

Object

Global Object

Object

__proto__

Generated Coverage

• Total WebKit tests:– 9957 tests

• …but most of these tests are for drawing

• Security tests:– 143 tests

Example Vulnerability

Example Vulnerability

•2 WebKit Vulnerabilities

•Major flaws in CrossSafe cross-domain JSON request library

Overview• Current JavaScript Security Model

• Cross-Origin JavaScript Capability Leaks

• Capability Leak Detection

• Browser Defense Mechanism

• Safe JavaScript Subsets

Access Control Checks

Window 1 Window 2

Global Object Global Object

document function foo()

document function bar()

Access Control Checks

Window 1 Window 2

Global Object Global Object

document function foo()

document function bar()

General Benchmarks

Overview• Current JavaScript Security Model

• Cross-Origin JavaScript Capability Leaks

• Capability Leak Detection

• Browser Defense Mechanism

• Safe JavaScript Subsets

Safe JavaScript Subets

Safe JavaScript Subets

Dynamically Enforced Containment

read write

Cajita 21% 20%

Valija 1493% 1000%

Microsoft Web Sandbox 1217% 634%

Slowdown on the “read” and “write” micro-benchmarks, average of 10 runs

Statically Verified Containment

•ADsafe•Dojo Secure•Jacaranda

Statically Verified Containment

•ADsafe•Dojo Secure•Jacaranda

Statically Verified Containment

Statically Verified Containment

Potential Exploits in Alexa 100

Potential Exploits in Alexa 100

ADsafe

Guest Accessible Object

Safe Object

Safe Object

foo

bar

ADsafe

Guest Accessible Object

Safe Object

foo

bar

Safe Object

Blancura

Guest Accessible Object

Safe Object

Safe Object

BLANCURA_OBJ_foo

BLANCURA_OBJ_bar

Conclusion

• Heap Graph Analysis can be used to find vulnerabilities in web browsers– And these exploits can be eliminated

• Heap Graph Analysis can reveal properties of JavaScript code

• Static Containment for JavaScript subsets can be useful and safe

Conclusion

• Check out http://webblaze.cs.berkeley.edu

• http://webblaze.cs.berkeley.edu/2009/heapgraph– Heap Graph Tool and Access Control Prototype for

WebKit– USENIX Security 2009 Paper

WebKit Unmodified vs. Access Control