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Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Organized by Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development
(HiPeC-II)
in Partnership with
JICA, IDE-JETRO, UNITAR, Hiroshima Prefectural Government
2-3 August 2012 Hiroshima, Japan
Published by Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development (HiPeC-II) Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC), Hiroshima University Kagamiyama 1-5-1 Higashi-Hiroshima City, Hiroshima 739-8529, JAPAN Tel/Fax +81-82-424-6936 Email: hipec@hiroshima-u.ac.jp http://home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/hipec/ Cover design and book layout Bessho Yusuke Copyright©2013 HiPeC All rights reserved
ii
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
CONTENTS
Preface v
Workshop Program vi
Concept & Objectives of the Workshop viii
Day 1: 2 August, 2012
Opening Session
Opening Address by the President of Hiroshima University
Welcome Address by the Dean of IDEC, Hiroshima University
Congratulatory Address by the Chief of International Affairs, Hiroshima Prefecture
Briefing on HiPeC Activities by the HiPeC Secretary General, Hiroshima University
1
3
5
6
Panel-1: Mindanao (the Philippines) Group Presentations
“Keys to Shift Conflict from Arms to Dialogue”
Mohagher Iqbal
10
“Understanding the GPH – MILF ceasefire and the Peace Process”
Rasid T. Ladiasan
15
“A Mindanao Historian’s View on the Basic Issues of the GRP-MILF Peace Process”
Rudy “Ompong” Rodil
19
“Lumad: Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan-Manobo Ethnic Groups’ Position on
the Peace Process By and Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF)”
Timuay Melanio U. Ulama
25
Comments on Mindanao Case
Kei Fukunaga
28
Open Discussion 30
Panel-2: Aceh (Indonesia) Group Presentations
“Transformation of conflict into peace in Aceh”
Sofyan A. Djalil
33
“Presentation on Aceh Peace Process 1”
Muhammad Nur Djuli
39
“Presentation on Aceh Peace Process 2”
Shadia Marhaban
42
Comments on Aceh Case
Akihisa Matsuno
46
Open Discussion 48
iii
Panel-3: Nepal Group Presentations
“Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 1”
Padma Ratna Tuladhar
53
“Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 2”
Shekhar Koirala
57
“Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 3” (Attended by paper)
Krishna Bahadur Mahara
60
Open Discussion 63
General Discussion 70
Day 2: 3 August, 2012
Summary of Analysis & Discussion 77
Synthesis: the Result of Analysis & Discussion 86
Closing Discussion 87
Statement
97
Acknowledgement
98
Annex 1: List of Participants 99
Annex 2: Guide to Acronyms 101
Annex 3: The Lumad Concept of Peace and Justice 102
Annex 4: Photo Documentation 109
iv
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
PREFACE
Peace Process Exchange Workshops are one of the main active research endeavors of
Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development, or
HiPeC-II. The basic idea is to put experiences of the parties of conflicts in the comparative
experimental workshop during the phase I of HiPeC (HiPeC-I) in March 2008 by inviting both the
conflicting parties, government side and liberation movement side, from Mindanao, the
Philippines, and the Sudan, to discuss about Ceasefire and Development.
When we resumed the project as HiPeC-II in 2010, we decided to hold two workshops of
this kind and this volume is the record of the second one held in August 2012. In the first
workshop in HiPeC-II, we expanded the covering areas to include Nepal and Aceh, Indonesia,
and discussed reconciliation. Putting the four cases in comparative framework made our
discussion more dynamic but also more complicated. We found many insights as well as
differences that should not be overlooked when we approach the peacebuilding issues. We
increasingly felt it necessary to prepare order-made solutions to each of the conflicts, although
there clearly existed some lessons that could be learned from others.
In this second workshop, we henceforth focused more on the Asian conflicts by
requesting those having come to Hiroshima in 2010 from Asian region once again and invited
observers from another conflict area, though still in embryotic situations, i.e., West Papua,
Indonesia, so that lessons could be more vividly discussed for those who were currently fighting
for peace. For this purpose, we set the topic of the workshop as Keys to Shift Conflicts from
Arms to Dialogue.
I am very grateful to those coming all the way to Hiroshima to share their experiences.
My thanks is particularly directed to Mr. Muhammad Nur Djuli and Ms. Shadia Marhaban, who
gave us an instinct to hold this workshop as was done. My gratitude also goes to those who
spare their precious time to attend the workshop; Dr. Sofyan Djalil, Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar,
Dr. Shekhar Koirala, Prof. Rudy "Ompong" Rodil, Mr. Melanio U. Ulama, Mr. Rasid Ladiasan, Mr.
Kei Fukunaga and Prof. Akihisa Matsuno. My list of great appreciation does not conclude
witout mentioning Mr. Mohagher Iqbal’s continuous cooperation for the HiPeC activities. His
determination to attend this workshop in the most hectic days of peace negotiation with the
Philippine Government encouraged us very much.
Osamu Yoshida
Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee, Hiroshima University
perspectives by themselves to learn lessons from others’ processes toward peace. We had an
v
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
WORKSHOP PROGRAM
Tuesday, 2 August
Venue: Large Conference Room, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hiroshima University
09:00 - 09:30 Opening Session
(09:00 - 09:10) Opening Address: Toshimasa Asahara (President, Hiroshima Univ.)
(09:10 - 09:15) Welcome Address: Akimasa Fujiwara (Professor and Dean of IDEC,
Hiroshima Univ.)
(09:15 - 09:20) Congratulatory Address: Yasuo Hashimoto (Chief of International Affairs,
Hiroshima Prefecture)
(09:20 - 09:30) Project Briefing: Masahiko Togawa (Associate Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,
HiPeC Secretary General)
09:30 - 11:20 Panel 1: Presentations: The Mindanao Group
Chair: Noriaki Nishimiya (Director General of Japan International Cooperation
Agency Chugoku International Center)
Commentator: Kei Fukunaga (Member of International Monitoring Team,
The First Secretary of the Embassy of Japan to the Philippines) Open Forum
11:20 - 12:50 Panel 2: Presentations: The Aceh Group
Chair: Koki Seki (Associate Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,
Member of HiPeC Executive Committee)
Open Forum
13:00 - 14:30 Lunch Break / Prayer Time
14:30 - 16:00 Panel 3: Presentations: Nepal Group
Chair: Osamu Yoshida (Professor, Hiroshima Univ.
Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee)
Open Forum
16:00 - 17:00 General Discussion
Chair: Masahiko Togawa (Associate Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,
HiPeC Secretary General)
vi
Friday, 3 August
Venue: Large Conference Room, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hiroshima University
09:00 - 11:30 Summary of Analysis & Discussion
Chair: Osamu Yoshida (Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,
Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee)
Maharjan Keshav Lal (Professor, Hiroshima Univ.)
Group Summary
Yusuke Bessho (Assistant Professor, Hiroshima Univ.)
Humayun Kabir (HiPeC Research Fellow)
Meg Kagawa (HiPeC Research Fellow)
Synthesis
11:30 - 13:00 Lunch/Break/Pray
13:00 - 14:00 Closing Session
Chair: Osamu Yoshida (Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,
Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee)
19:00 - 21:00 Reception at Mermaid Café
vii
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
CONCEPT NOTE & DISCUSSION POINTS
Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuidling and Capacity Development (HiPeC)
II is pleased to announce that it will hold the Second Peace Process Exchange Workshop from
August 2 to 3, 2012, with ‘Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue,’ as its subject.
HiPeC II was started in 2006. It is a project to assist “Indigenous Initiatives for
Peacebuilding” by university academia, peacebuilding practitioners and indigenous people
working together and sharing each experience. In order for the academia to have first-hand
knowledge and experiences of peacebuilding, HiPeC II so far established two field offices, one in
Nepal in Sep., 2010 and the other in the Philippines in Feb., 2011, to which HiPeC researchers
have been dispatched in the short and medium terms.
At the same time, HiPeC is keen to invite people from the conflict and/or post-conflict
areas to Hiroshima, a city of peace, whose peaceful environment creates pro-dialogue
atmosphere. The Peace Process Exchange Workshops are among those opportunities HiPeC
provides and representatives are invited from both sides of conflicting parties, governments and
rebels along with representatives of civil society in different conflict areas, aiming to facilitate the
peace by learning from others’ experiences.
We discussed “A Ceasefire and Development” in our first and experimental workshop
held in March 2008 by inviting representatives of Mindanao and Sudan conflicts and found that
development and a ceasefire have reciprocal effects. The officially first workshop was met in
March 2011, and discussed “Peace and Reconciliation” among peace negotiators from Nepal,
Mindanao, the Sudan and Aceh. The delegates agreed that a peacebuilding theory for local
conflicts and initiatives must include the painful reconstruction process among conflicting parties.
From the results of these two workshops, we, the HiPeC, have concluded that to find the
key moments that conflicts shifted from armed ones to dialogue in the actual peace negotiation
processes would be one of the most crucial lessons we could draw from this kind of endeavors.
This is reason we decided that the Second HiPeC Peace Process Exchange Workshop
would be to discuss “Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue” and invite Asian peace
negotiators from Aceh, Mindanao and Nepal. The subjects to be discussed include 1) triggers
to shift conflicts from arms to dialogue, 2) a consensus making process within each of the
contending camps and with other stakeholders, and 3) its necessary environments to bring
consensus among the people of the camps and with other stakeholders.
A brief history of each of the peace processes of invitees and subject matters of each
case are provided below. The sessions of the Workshop will be closed to the public; only HiPeC
partners and members besides official invitees will participate in a discussion.
viii
Mindanao:
The official peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH) and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been conducted since 1997 to find a
comprehensive, just and lasting solution for the Moro struggles for self-determination and to put
an end to the armed conflict. The MILF is the third Muslim independence movement in the
Philippines from 1968 by Moro people, composed of 13 Muslim tribes in Mindanao and Sulu
Archipelago in the Southern Philippines. Moro people are descendants of the sultanates in
Mindanao in the 15thcentury and onward which kept independence against Spanish invasion.
However, they were merged into the Philippines without their consent at the Treaty of Paris
between Spain and the USA in 1898. Through a development-resettlement program of the
American colonialism, Japanese occupation and the Philippine government policy, Moros have
been marginalized in their own ancestral lands. They founded Muslim Independence
Movement in 1968 which was disorganized after their leader had been appointed as the
Presidential Adviser on Muslim Affairs in the same year. The Moro National Liberation Front or
MNLF took it over in 1969, and then the MILF in 1984.
After the full-scale civil war from1973 to 75 between the GPH and the MNLF, the 1976
Tripoli Agreement brought a ceasefire and established the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao or ARMM in Southwestern part of Mindanao under the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. But it was after twenty years that two parties finally
agreed on the Final Peace Agreement in 1996 and how to administer the ARMM. Meanwhile,
the MILF broke away from the MNLF in 1984 seeking the right to the Moros for self-determination.
After the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the MNLF and the GPH, the MILF started to
engage in armed struggles.
Some negotiations and a couple of all-out wars had preceded the MILF’s negotiated and
thus compromised solution to the self-determination that directly affects 13 of the 25 provinces of
Mindanao, Sulu Archipelago and Palawan now. The terms of negotiation are to recognize
political existence of Bangsamoroor Moro state within the Republic of the Philippines. In 2008,
the GPH-MILF panels produced the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD), a guide to the formulation of the Comprehensive Compact; however, the popular
opposition, especially from local politicians, was widespread in Mindanao before the signing of
the agreement and the Temporary Restraining Order, or TRO, was requested at the Supreme
Court, which issued the requested TRO and aborted the signing of MOA-AD. The Supreme
Court later also declared that the document was unconstitutional, and then the parties went into
armed conflict once again. In July 2009, the GPH-MILF re-established official contact after
nearly a year of deadlock in the peace negotiations, and negotiations for a Bangsamoro political
entity continues even today.
This independent movement of Moros also affected the communities of Lumad -
Indigenous People of Mindanao with 35 tribes and sub-tribes which occupies 8.9 % of the
ix
Population of Mindanao in 2000, while Moros occupy 18.5 % and Christian migrants and their
descendants 72.5 %. In August 2008, more than 200 leaders of various Lumad tribes stated
their position on the MOA-AD issue and their desire to be excluded in the Bangsamoro body.
While most of Lumad recognize the legitimacy of Bangsamoro aspirations and claim distinct
identities, ancestral domains and right to self-determination of their own, the Teduray tribe,
already inhabited within the ARMM, makes it clear that they do not oppose the MOA-AD and
want the Bangsamoro body to recognize their Teduray identity, their ancestral domain and their
right to self determination within this area.
With these historical complexities of Mindanao conflict, all the invitees, the GPH and the
MILF panel members and a Lumad leader, will discuss at this Workshop about ; 1) trigger
moments –why and how the GPH and the MILF picked up peace talks after all-out wars in 2004,
2) a consensus making process - why and how the GPH and the MILF panel members after
2008beganto speak in public about the peace process, and 3) elements of necessary
environments for unity of the people within their own camps and with stakeholders for resuming
the peace negotiations.
Aceh
The Peace Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or
GAM (the Free Aceh Movement) is one of the noted examples of the transformation of a
separatist conflict into transitional peace the international community has witnessed in recent
years. Aceh, an independent sultanate state until the second half of the nineteenth century, had
been exploited by the Dutch colonial power and the Japanese military occupation. After the birth
of Indonesia as an independent nation-state in 1949, Aceh was annexed as a part of a new state
with special autonomy status. The continuity of this status had been interrupted several times
in later period.
Many contend that the centralized unitary statecraft’s intervention in and exploitation of
Aceh in its natural resources for the benefits of ruling and military elites of Javanese Indonesia
had contributed to the growing resentment among Acehnese against the Indonesian state. The
resentment was transformed into separatist movement after the foundation of the GAM in the
1970s to free Aceh from Indonesia. The continued conflict between the GAM and the Indonesian
state until the early years of 21st century had caused severe human rights violation including
deaths of several thousands of people. Internal political dynamics and the transition from
dictatorship to democracy in Indonesian power politics also affected the transformation of the
conflict in Aceh. Peace talks between the government and the GAM began in 2000, but they
were unsuccessful several times due to the lack of trust between the two parties and continued
military and other law enforcing forces’ intervention in Aceh.
The great Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami that took away estimated lives of
170,000 Acehnese in 2004 added a new dimension of Acehnese sufferings. In this context,
x
international community came forward with humanitarian assistance to save Aceh from the
severe sufferings caused not only by natural but also by human disasters. A more
comprehensive peace negotiation facilitated by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari
began in January 2005. After several rounds of discussions and negotiations in Helsinki, the
Peace Agreement was signed between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM in August
that brought the Aceh conflict to the end.
Considering the background context of Aceh’s conflict, the discussions of this workshop
will focus on the factors, mechanism and modalities of the peace negotiation. The invited
speakers, former activists of Free Aceh Movement and the representative from the Indonesian
government, both of whom played profound roles in the peace negotiation process, will discuss
a) what contributing factors affected the transformation of the Aceh’s armed conflict into peace
dialogue, b) how the leaderships of the Indonesian government and the GAM mobilized other
members of their own groups in order to get consensus on the peace agreement, and c) what
techniques and modalities were applied for this. The lessons learned from the transformation of
conflict into peace in Aceh would be beneficial to those countries currently experiencing political
and other forms of conflicts.
Nepal
The “People’s War”, launched by the Maoist party, a faction of Communist Party of Nepal (CPN),
in February 1996, came to an end with the Peace Accord between the Maoist and the Seven
Party Alliance government of Nepal in 2006. Many believe that successful growth and spread of
Maoist movement in Nepal were closely associated with several factors characterized in Nepal
such as fragile democracy, powerful monarchy, socio-economic, cultural and ethnic-caste
inequality. Eventually, the end of insurgency transformed Maoists not just to be a legitimized
political force but also the largest and strongest power in the post-conflict Nepali state. What
motivation brought the Maoist to the open space as a legitimized democratic force in Nepal?
In this workshop, the invited participants who played profound roles in the peace dialogue
would focus on three major topics: a) what triggered the initiation of peace talk between the
Maoists and the Government of Nepal i.e. in what particular social and political contexts and time
both parties recognize the necessity for dialogue; b) how the leaderships of Maoists and the
Seven Party Alliance could get consensus and endorsement from their own party members; and
c) how leaderships, facilitators and negotiators could able to gain greater solidarity from other
stakeholders and peoples of the society in the process of dialogue, which was crucial for the
recognition and acceptance of the outcome of the dialogue by different social groups, political
and ethnic leaderships and international community as well.
xi
DISCUSSION POINTS:
1) triggers to shift conflicts from arms to dialogue,
2) a consensus making process within each of the contending camps and with other stakeholders
3) its necessary environments to bring consensus among the people of the camps and with other
stakeholders
ACEH
The Peace Agreement in 2005
b/w the GOI – GAM
to end the armed movement for Aceh’s
independent and to recognize the
“self-governance” of the people of Aceh
1) what contributing factors affected the
transformation of the Aceh’s armed conflict
into peace dialogue
2) how the leaderships of the Indonesian
government and the GAM mobilized other
members of their own groups in order to get
consensus on the peace agreement
3) what techniques and modalities were applied
for the peace agreement.
MINDANAO
In Process of Peace Negotiation
b/w the GPH-MILF since 1997
to find a comprehensive, just and lasting solution for
the Moro struggles for self-determination
1) trigger moments –why and how the GPH and the
MILF picked up peace talks after all-out wars in
2004
2) a consensus making process - why and how the
GPH and the MILF panel members after 2008
began to speak in public about the peace process
3) elements of necessary environments for unity of
the people within their own camps and with
stakeholders for resuming the peace
negotiations.
NEPAL
The Peace Accord b/w the Maoist and the Seven Party Alliance government of Nepal in 2006
to end the People’s War, transition to Federal Democratic Republicanism and to a peacemaking
process without Monarchism
1) what triggered the initiation of peace talk between the Maoists and the Gov. of Nepal i.e. in
what particular social and political contexts and time both parties recognize the necessity for
dialogue.
2) how the leaderships of Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance could get consensus and
endorsement from their own party members.
3) how leaderships, facilitators and negotiators could able to gain greater solidarity from other
stakeholders and peoples of the society in the process of dialogue.
xii
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
OPENING ADDRESS
Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, thank
you very much for your coming all the way to my
university. You are most welcome, I would like to say
‘welcome back’ as some of you already came here
once or more times, to Hiroshima, the Symbol of
Peace, for this second workshop for exchanging the
precious experiences of you, our distinguished guests,
about your peace process .
On behalf of Hiroshima University I am very
pleased and honored to welcome you, great
peacebuilders of Ache, Mindanao and Nepal.
Established on the devastated city destroyed by
the single atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima at the
end of the last world war, my university has emphasized the “Pursuit of Peace” as one and the
first of its five guiding principles. However, our peace does not end at the nuclear weapon
issues but has a broader scope including peace from the immediate and contemporary issues
like regional conflicts. As a national university on the City of Peace, we recognize this
responsibility of disseminating peace in every aspect.
Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development or
HiPeC is a leading project for peace in my university and struggling hard to establish the studies
of peacebuilding as an integrated science with special emphasis on the “Indigenous Initiatives” in
conflict and post-conflict areas. HiPeC’s uniqueness in peace research in Japan is its academic
commitment to the practical issues of peacebuilding to such an extent that it has established two
field offices, one in Kathmandu and the other in Davao, Mindanao, the Philippines, with the help
from our partner universities.
With HiPeC, we would like to contribute more to the peace in contemporary world and this
workshop is one of these attempts we are making for this direction. I know that we must learn
from the local realities of contemporary peace. And distinguished peacebuilders, you are the
ones that guide us for peace updated.
My congratulations on their coming back to this workshop is to two old friends from Aceh,
Sir Nur Djuli and Ms. Shadia Marhaban, tough negotiators of Free Aceh Movement, and I would
like to welcome His Excellency Dr. Sofyan Djalil, also from Aceh and from Indonesian
Government working hard at Helsinki for resolving the longstanding conflict and creating
sustainable peace in Aceh.
I have a deep sympathy for the resumed efforts of negotiations on peace in Mindanao, the
Philippines, and I put a great hope to the roles to be played by Chairman Mr. Mohagher Iqbal and
1
Mr.Rasid Ladiasan. I also believe from the bottom of my heart that continued efforts of
Chairperson Mr. Melanio Ulama and Mindanao Historian Professor Rudy Ompong Rodil will
bring peace in this futile island.
I would like to congratulate a Nepali peacemaker, His Excellency Mr. Padma Ratna
Tuladhar, on his historical role to bring the two parties in armed conflict together to the dialogue
for peace. He came to Japan so often and this is the second time to come to my university. I
feel very much honored to see you today for the first time.
Since I am a medical doctor, and since I have my former student in Nepal, I have special
pleasure to meet Dr. Shekhar Koirala, who is also a medical doctor and has a deep insight in the
future of the beautiful country. I hope I can make a trip to Nepal after you and all other political
leaders come together to create a stable democratic country soon. It is my great regret that His
Excellency, Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, is not with us today to discuss the peace process in
Nepal in which he was a crucial figure. I heard he was suffering from the fever. I wish his
earliest recovery and another chance to meet him.
I sincerely believe that this workshop with all of you here will bring a new horizon to the
research on and practice of peacebuiding. Hiroshima University through HiPeC will continuously
do our best to bring peace in Asia and everywhere in the world with our reliable partners, JICA,
IDE-JETRO, UNITAR and Hiroshima Prefectural Government, by creating a team for peace in
which Hiroshima University plays a pivotal role.
Thank you very much once again for joining us here and hope you enjoy your time in my
university.
Asahara Toshimasa
President, Hiroshima University
2
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
WELCOME ADDRESS
First of all, on behalf of IDEC, graduate school for
international development and cooperation, I wish to
express my hearty welcome you to Hiroshima University.
I feel very much honored to be part of this both timely
and highly fruitful workshop.
IDEC was established in April 1994 on a special mission
of actively nurturing expertise in various challenging
issues facing developing countries. Since then, IDEC
has brought together internationally leading researchers
and exceptional students, and we are consequently
being a distinguished center of excellence in the field of
international cooperation studies with 3 pillars of research and education; international peace
cooperation, international environmental cooperation and international educational cooperation.
Within the context, IDEC gives great emphasis to the importance of broadening the students'
opportunities in developing countries to meat the major challenges. As of March 2012, totally 274
students composed of approximately 70% of international ones are now studying in IDEC. The
graduates including 1,194 with master’s degrees and 225 with doctoral degrees since the
establishment play an active part as leaders in the global world.
As our president introduced, HiPEC, Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding
and Capacity Development has initially established in 2005 supported by Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology as a representative project of peacebuilding study field
in collaboration with worldwide academic/practical and global/local institutes. For instance,
HiPeC established two field offices in the conflict and post-conflict areas, those are in Katmandu,
Nepal and Mindanao, the Philippines, in order to conduct researches on peacebuilding closely
with the people who have experiences of conflict and peace making. The uniqueness of HiPEC
can be found in their emphasis in the activities at local places.
IDEC also follow the uniqueness to take an importance role and contributions to their valuable
research and educational activities on peace.
Distinguished delegates,
Almost one half year has passed since the devastating accident of March 11 in Northeast Japan.
3
The whole country and indeed the whole world were eyewitnesses for the first time in history to
an unfolding major nuclear accident, triggered by a super-scale earthquake and a super-size
tsunami. These succeeding events turned into a complex disaster of calamitous proportions.
The March 11 earthquake and tsunami caused human casualties going up to nearly 20,000
people, 93% of whom by tsunami. One year after, the number of people displaced from their
homes by the nuclear accident is more than 100,000 and several hundred thousand more people
continue to live with fears of radiation.
My own background will constrain my capacity to discuss the procedure of recovery and the
building resilient society against the terrifying disaster. However, I can believe the world network
to share and exchange our experience will lead us to a solution, by witnessing a lot of anxiety
and encouraging e-mails from all parts of the world at that day. Hiroshima University has a long
and strong tradition in peace study for obvious reasons. In this sense, I sincerely hope that
today’s workshop would also be quite meaningful.
Let me end on an optimistic address here to finally express my sincere thanks to all domestic
partners, JICA, IDE-JETRO, UNITAR Hiroshima Office, and Hiroshima Prefecture for your daily
great contributions.
Thank you
Akimasa Fujiwara
Dean of IDEC, Hiroshima University
4
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
CONGRATULATORY ADDRESS
Dr. Asahara, president of Hiroshima University and
distinguished guest and ladies and gentlemen, good morning.
On behalf of Hiroshima prefectural government I would like
to express my sincere welcome to Hiroshima to our friends
from Ache in Indonesia, Nepal, Mindanao in Philippines as
participants of this workshop and also I would like to
welcome friends from Papua New Guinea as observer to this
workshop. We are very happy to receive you in our
prefecture I hope you enjoy stay in the prefecture.
Last year Hiroshima prefectural government
formulated Hiroshima for global peace plan in order to contribute for global peace, that is why
Hiroshima is satisfied this HiPeC project. we are hoping support this program and work together.
As you know Hiroshima was completely destroyed by atomic bomb first time in human history.
However thanks to support from around the world and untiring effort we were able to reconstruct
Hiroshima from ashes. Mr. Mejia, head of UNITAR, one of United Nation’s institutes in Hiroshima
said knowledge technology and funding/money is important for reconstruction. However faith
and belief in reconstruction is essential. I hope Hiroshima can be a place that gives this faith
people who visit here. I think faith in reconstruction is faith in the future, also hope for the future.
This seems important for reconciliation and collaboration for the future or development of
country’s future. I hope Hiroshima might be a place of peace dialogue and reconciliation. I again
welcome you from Ache Nepal Mindanao Papua New Guinea. You will feel power of faith in
Hiroshima and return Hiroshima’s message of peace. In closing I would like to express
appreciation to all the people who work hard for this workshop and I wish this work shop will be a
meaningful and fruitful successful one. Thank you very much.
Hashimoto Yasuo
Chief of International Affairs, Hiroshima Prefecture
5
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
BRIEFING ON HiPeC ACTIVITIES
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am Togawa Masahiko, Secretary General
of HiPeC. I am very honored to speak to you about the Hiroshima University Partnership Project
for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development (HiPeC) and about our event today -- the Second
Peace Process Exchange Workshop.
Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development
or HiPeC is a research project which started in 2005. Hiroshima University has a long history of
peace studies but research on peacebuilding is a new phenomenon after the end of the Cold War.
As a matter of fact, the ‘practice’ in peacebuilding went much ahead of the ‘research’ work on
peacebuilding. This contributed on how HiPeC evolved. It has been organized in such a way that
it works in close partnership with those practitioners’ organizations assisting peacebuilding such
as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the Prefectural Government of Hiroshima has just joined us as
a new partner. From the academic side, the Institute of Developing Economies – Japan External
Trade Organization has been a partner since the beginning of HiPeC-I (the first phase) just like
UNITAR and JICA.
We have overseas academic partners too including Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies
(CNAS), Tribhuvan University, and University of the Philippines, Mindanao. In the partnership
framework, we learned a lot from the problems and difficulties they encountered and were
convinced that not only the practitioners with ‘research’ mind but also researchers with ‘practice’
mind were necessary to facilitate the research on peacebuilding.
In addition to our partnership research, we invited the activists in the field of
peacebuilding to hold an international conference in March 2007. The aim of that conference
was to find ways of assisting agencies to have more interactions with the peacebuilding activists
to facilitate indigenous initiatives for peacebuilding. Further in 2008, we brought leaders from the
conflicting parties in Mindanao, Philippines and South Sudan to Hiroshima where we held an
experimental Peace Process Exchange Workshop as a platform for them to exchange their
peace process experiences.These occasions were very valuable first-hand sources for our
research on peacebuilding and made us conclude that people in the conflict areas who suffer
from the direct impact of the conflict must be at the center of the peace and post-conflict
reconstruction. At the same time we also thought that if facilities for those indigenous
peacebuilders to learn more from other indigenous peacebuilders were provided, it would be
more beneficial for peace and reconstruction processes to proceed. I believe provision of those
facilities is what the international community can do to help peacebuilding processes. Thus,
academic institutions can contribute significantly to this international endeavor in peacebuilding.
Deriving lessons from our experiences, we realized the need to have research offices in
the places where peacebuilding is going on. Thus, we decided to establish the three pillars in the
6
current HiPeC, as we call it “HiPeC-II” since this is the second phase of our project. We added
the activities of our own peacebuilding efforts as academicians to the existing two pillars in phase
I, namely: the Peacebuilding Research Seminars and the Peace Process Exchange Workshops,
though the latter was still experimental.
Furthermore, I would like briefly to explain the three pillars of HiPeC activities.
‘Peacebuilding research seminars’ will always remain as the core activities from the academic
point of view. We expect these seminars to be held simultaneously at the three offices
(Hiroshima, Kathmandu and Davao). The aim is to be able to apply the results of the academic
researches to the areas of peacebuilding activities and vice versa through trans-dimensional
exchanges between researchers and practitioners. By trans-dimensional, I want to imply various
meanings and perspectives coming from different actors, different places and different phases of
peacebuilding.
The second pillar, as an attempt to exchange experiences of peace and peacebuilding
processes in different conflict or post-conflict areas, all parties of the conflict including the local
civil society representatives will be invited to Hiroshima to participate in workshops. This
workshop is the second occasion after last Peace-Process Exchange Workship in 2010 under
such intention and concept in HiPeC-II.
The third pillar is the ‘Peacebuilding Research Project. This is the new pillar in the
project of HiPeC- II. In phase I, we in Hiroshima University mainly did the coordinating work for
the practitioners to exchange their experiences and ideas and through these processes we get
the research data and materials. But we came to realize that to further our activities, our own
involvement in the real peacebuilding efforts was necessary. Thus we have decided to establish
the local offices of HiPeC at the areas where peacebuilding is required. Following this thought,
we are establishing two local offices for researchers to practically involve in the ‘Indigenous
Initiatives for Peace and Reconstruction Process’. Dispatching the teachers and the researchers
from Hiroshima to the offices for medium-term and cooperating with the organizations, we
encourage the search for establishing peacebuilding studies on the basis of indigenous
initiatives. We do not mean that we will go and do the job of reconstruction together with those
peacebuilders. Our mandate limits us. Rather we should work closely together with researchers
in those places.
Hiroshima University has relatively many South Asia specialists as academic staff who
have decade-long experiences of academic exchange with other universities in Japan as well as
with Tribhuvan University in Nepal. During that period, mutual understanding of the tasks and
problems of Nepal was deepened. Coincidentally, while we were planning the second phase of
HiPeC, the peace process in Nepal progressed making it possible for us to involve them in the
process from the very early stage. This is the reason why we established our first local office in
Kathmandu in September 2010.
Similarly, Hiroshima University had a decade-long experiences of academic exchanges
with the University of the Philippines System. In HiPeC-I, we did a lot together with them on the
development of the peacebuilding. The Mindanao peace process occupies a unique place also in
7
Japan’s aspiration to contribute to the peacebuilding efforts. Japan for the first time embarked to
be involved in the peace process through development assistance even before any peace
agreement was reached. This encouraged us to open the second office in Davao, Mindanao.
With the tripartite office of the three organizations, namely, HiPeC, UP Mindanao and SSN, we
can start the joint research projects together. This will encourage other Filipino and
international researchers to join us eventually.
In summary, Hiroshima University’s HiPeC-II in cooperation with partner organizations of
practitioners as well as researchers in Japan, namely: JICA, IDE-JETRO, UNITAR, the
Hiroshima Prefectural Government and with our overseas partners will conduct the activities
according to the three pillars with a shared goal of enriching and developing a comprehensive
theory for seamless assistance for peacebuilding with indigenous initiatives at its core.
Through this 2nd Peace Process Exchange Workshop, we will have a comparative
exchange of views based on the different experiences we learned from each of you. We will then
proceed to a general discussion and hopefully we will be able to synthesize the entire exchange
of experiences. So that’s all I have to tell you and please enjoy the workshop. Thank you very
much for your attention.
Masahiko Togawa
HiPeC Secretary General, Hiroshima University
8
Panel-1: Mindanao (the Philippines) Group Presentations
Chair
Noriaki Nishimura
Director General of JICA Chugoku International Center
Presenters
Mohagher Iqbal
Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel
Rudy “Ompong” Rodil
Former Vice Chair of the Govt. of the Philippines Peace Panel
Professor, Mindanao State University
Timuay Melanio U. Ulama
Chairperson of the Organization of Teduray-Lambangian Congress
Rasid T. Ladiasan Head of Secretariat of the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities of the MILF
Commentator
Kei Fukunaga
Member of International Monitoring Team
The First Secretary of the Embassy of Japan to the Philippines
9
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue
Mohagher Iqbal, Chairman, MILF Peace Panel
This paper aims at directly responding to the theme of this workshop, “Keys to Shift Conflicts from
Arms to Dialogue,” with my thought also drifting to the other auxiliary issues that require serious and
sincere reflections on why and how this shift has taken place, but whose terminal point is yet to be
reckoned by the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
They are still in the thick of hard negotiation. Honestly, the end of this process is difficult to say,
although what is clear now is that it is in the final stretch; and for which reason, discussions are
getting more intense and, at times, emotional. The cliché’ that in negotiation, the devils are in the
details is very much evident.
As a backdrop, as a member of the underground revolutionary movement for almost 40
years since 1972, I must confess that this shift from militancy to dialogue is not an easy
transformation. This was also true with the rest of the leaders in the MILF. How much more difficult
if the decision is made at the formal organizational level. Consider the following obstacles in the
shift of policy: First, when one decides to fight the government, it carries with it not just the litany of
legitimate grievances against it, but a program to change the system or status quo, which, in the
first place, caused the miseries and sufferings of our people. To achieve this, the main approach is
through armed struggle. The premise is that the status quo will not yield to reformist approach
except by force of arms or revolutionary struggle. Second, the excesses of the state and its armed
forces continued unabatedeven in the course of the negotiation. Third, any appearance of
“softening” by anyone in the movement does not auger well for the rest. Sometimes, it is viewed
very negatively. Fourth, after persevering in organizing the people into committees and the military
into a fighting force, in addition to asupport from those who are engaged in the open and legal
struggle, any radical shift in approach, even for strategic or tactical reasons, is hard to justify in the
eyes of our people and our fighters. And fifth, a localized peace talks is largely considered as giving
in to the dictate of the enemy, because the playing field is not level. The government has all the
edge, in terms of resources, skills, and manpower. It can also use the open engagement to pry on
the secrets of the rebel organization. This is the rationale why it took the MILF 20 years before it
decided to negotiate peace with the GPH in 1997.
Indeed, the negotiation that ensued was not easy. Our counterparts in government were
former military generals, and at times, while we were still facing each other in the negotiating table,
fighting had already or was already taking place somewhere. This harsh state of the negotiation
remained for years until it suffered a major setback in 2000. President Joseph Estrada declared an
all-out war against the MILF, despite the ceasefire and the on-going negotiation. More than a million
10
people were displaced; hundreds of combatants and civilians on both sides died or wounded; and
millions worth of properties were destroyed. As a consequence, the negotiation bogged down
completely. The MILF withdrew its peace panel and hit back, using ahighly mobile tactical counter-
offensive. But in his characteristic “arrogance”, Estrada summarily declared victory after
government forces succeeded to occupy some of the major camps of the MILF, without knowing
that the withdrawal was largely part of the tactical maneuver of the MILF to engage the enemy in full
guerrilla warfare, which is most suited for smaller forces fighting a superior enemy.
The bloodshed could have prolonged indefinitely, but an unexpected event took place.
President Estrada was ousted from office and Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed
the presidency. She immediately reversed the all-out war policy of Estrada into all-out peace policy
and asked Malaysia’s help to convince the MILF to resume the negotiation. True enough, the talks
resumed not long after. This, however, elevated the peace talks from the domestic stage to the
diplomatic stage, with third party facilitation. However, barely two years after, Arroyo resorted to the
same policy of her predecessor by declaring another all-out war against the MILF, this time in Buliok
Complex in Pikit, North Cotabato on February 11, 2003. The target, dubbed as “high value”, was no
less than the late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim who was delivering an early morning sermon for
the Eid’l Adha prayers marking the culmination of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Almost
simultaneously, the lairs of Vice Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and Vice Chairman Ghazali Jaafar
were also target. Both leaders luckily anticipated the dragnets and escaped unscathed.
Because of this treachery, reviving the talks was very difficult. Trust was at its lowest level.
It was compounded by the lengthening peace process. Adding to this difficulty was the intense
lobbying of the Arroyo administration with the United States Government to declare the MILF as a
“terrorist organization”. The Arroyo government almost succeeded had not the MILF was quicker in
the draw when it engaged the United States constructively earlier on. The late Chairman Salamat
Hashim had sent a letter to President George Bush reminding him of the unfinished obligation of the
United States to correct the “historic injustice” committed against the Moros when it “illegally and
immorally” annexed the Moro homeland into the Philippines in the grant of independence in 1946.
President Bush responded through the US Assistant Secretary of State affirming that the US
recognized the “legitimate grievances” of the Moros which shall be addressed through a peaceful
negotiation between the two parties. When President Bush addressed the Joint Session of the
Congress of the Philippines in 2003, he mentioned the Salamat’s letter and urged the Philippine
government and the MILF to resume their negotiation immediately. He also promised to extend help
to the peace process “politically” and “economically”.
At this juncture, the two parties signed the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the GPH-MILF Ad
Hoc Joint Action (AHJAG) whose main task and responsibility is “to interdict and isolate” kidnap-
for-ransom groups; and by extension covers also the so-called terrorists, because kidnapping is
also their forte. These twin developments effectively staved off the terrorist tag to the MILF. The
11
main reason, however, is the fact that the MILF is truly a revolutionary organization with a clear
political agenda. As such, it disdained resort to anti-people activities like kidnapping, robbery,
extortion, etc.
In the meantime, the peace negotiation continued to crawl forward, despite the fragile
ceasefire on the ground and the occasional flare-up of skirmishes in some part of Mindanao. But
the parties persevered and moved on. This time they agreed to bring in the International Monitoring
Team (IMT) led by Malaysia, and with Libya, Japan, Brunei, as members. The task is mainly to
monitor the ceasefire agreement and create peace and tranquility on the ground while the two
parties engage in the negotiating table.
By this time, the parties had already signed the implementing guidelines for the two aspects
of the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, namely, on security and relief, rehabilitation, and development,
which brought them to confront the third and last aspect, the ancestral domain, which is a very
difficult matter to crack. They put this in the agenda of talks in December 2004 and after three years
and eight months of hard bargaining, they clinched a deal called Memorandum of Agreement on
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which they initialedon July 27, 2008, but not after an MILF walkout the
day before, in protest of the changing of positions by the government. They set August 5 as the
formal signing ceremony, which attracted several foreign dignitaries including the US Ambassador
to the Philippines, Kristie Kenny. But what was set as a day of rejoicing turned out to be a black day.
The Philippine Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.
Given this setback in the negotiation, the reaction of the MILF, at least its three
commanders – Abdullah “Bravo” Macapaar, Omra Kato, and Ali Pangalian – was almost predictable
and instantaneous. Without clear mandate from the MILF central leadership, they initiated firefights
in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte. At first, the Arroyo administration adopted a hardline stance,
and sent massive force for a counter-offensive. But the MILF stood its ground and refused to budge
an inch including condemning its three commanders. The most that it conceded was to call for a
third party investigation to determine who was really guilty in starting the firefight. While it can easily
concede that Bravo started the haywire in Lanao del Norte, but in North Cotabato, Kato was the
aggrieved party. He was attacked by government soldiers and militias in Aleosan, North Cotabato
on July 1, 2008, without justifiable reason.
Not long after, the Arroyo administration agreed to cease fighting and wanted the
negotiation to resume. The MILF refused to return to the negotiating table and denounced the
government as traitor for failing to sign the MOA-AD. Malaysia, as third party facilitator, intervened
and asked the MILF to reconsider its decision and to return to the negotiating table immediately.
After some serious inner thoughts, the MILF agreed to resume the negotiation on the condition that
an international guarantee must be in place. The government refused to accept the nomenclature,
citing that no state on its own volition could accept outside imposition. However, after some back-
channeling or shuttling, the term “International Contact Group” or ICG was agreed by the parties,
12
whose main function is to “exert proper leverage” to the parties. The ICG is composed of states and
international non-government organizations (INGOs) namely, for the states: the United Kingdom,
Japan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and for the INGOs: Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Asia
Foundation, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiyah.
Meanwhile, while there was relative peace in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte, the
Province of Maguindanao became the new scene of disturbances. More than 300,000 people fled
their homes and evacuated to safer places. The military also blocked the flows of food, medicines,
and other supplies to the beleaguered communities. The desperate situation came to fore when Lt.
Col. Jonathan Ponce, spokesman of the Army 6th Infantry Division in Awang, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Maguindanao, described these internally displaced persons (IDPs) as “enemy reserve force’. He
made matter worst when he made the pronouncement during an interview with a group of media,
some of whom came from Manila, and a few were members of international news agencies and
wire services. As a consequence, the MILF pounded on this blunder and demanded that a
mechanism attached to the IMT must be in place for the protection of non-combatants including
children, women, and old folks. This gave way to the creation of the fourth componentcalled
“Civilian Protection” of the IMT, now having additional members namely, Norway, Indonesia, and
the European Union.
Currently, CPC has four members: Non-Violent Peaceforce, an international NGO,
Mindanao People’s Caucus, MinHRac, and MOGOP. By the way, the other components of IMT are
Security, Socio-economic, and Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, and Development. Malaysia leads the
security; Japan the socio-economic; and the European Union the HRDC.
Today, the GPH-MILF peace negotiation is creeping forward very slowly. Two years into the
Aquino administration, the parties have managed only to sign one agreement of consequence. This
is GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles which they signed on April 24, 2012. Whether there will
be signing of the comprehensive compact or merely a framework agreement is difficult to say. The
difficulty lies in the very nature of the Moro Problem or Moro Question, which is centuries-old
problem, and the protracted nature of negotiation. By their nature, all sovereignty-based
negotiations, except perhaps, the Aceh-Indonesia peace negotiation, are incremental in character.
Besides, the status quo is so established that undoing it is not an easy task. Those enjoying the
benefits will naturally resort to everything, including brute force, to prevent any change thereof. The
problem gets even more difficult, because those in the top echelon of government, who are the
decision-makers, are the ones mainly benefitting from the status quo. Moreover, there are many
spoilers who do not want the peace talks to succeed., Their motives are varied, ranging from hatred
to whatever is associated with the Moros or Islam to ensuring that their selfish or vested interests
are not put in harm’s way. Their eyes and ears are closed and they cannot see reasons except
theirs.
13
By the way, there are other institutions, blocs and players, aside from the Philippine state,
which are powerful and are not onboard the peace process. If they are only supportive, they will
make a big difference, perhaps including the signing of the comprehensive compact. Who are they?
They are the business groups, some of whom are in government, the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, which holds at least the spiritual side of the majority Christians in the Philippines
including their leaders, and members of the Fourth Estate or the media, which are generally hostile
when it comes to giving powers to Moros in general. One can see the extent of their biases,
prejudices, and hatred in their writings, editorials, columns, and talk shows.
Similarly, the international community is not fully mobilized in support of the peace process.
The inability partly rests in the limited capability of the parties to involve or rally them on the basis of
clear proof that it is to their national interests that the Moro Question will be settled once and for all.
The other consideration is the fact that there is no enough stakes in the problem in Mindanao that
the international community will consider as very important and strategic. This explains why the
international community is slow in the coming, as compared to their swift responses in Kosovo, East
Timor, South Sudan, Northern Ireland, and even Libya. In these conflicts, the stakes for the
international community are high in terms ofsecurity, military, political, and economic.
The GPH-MILF peace negotiation is entering its 16th year and by any stretch of imagination,
this is already too long a process. Surely, uneasiness to fatigue is creeping into the players,
particularly on the rebel side, who, after all, want a fundamental change, a real change for the better.
The ideologues in their ranks can certainly sustain through to the end. But surely they will not be
there in the driver’s seat forever. Thereafter and inevitably, the young will soon be in the saddle.
What can we, therefore, expect from this crop of new leaders who are borne in the heat of
frustration and treachery of the government? Combine these with their idealism and the radicalism
of the day, the outcome is not hard to foresee. This is the concern of the current leadership of the
MILF. If the problem will not be settled during their lifetime, a chance of solving it in the next episode
with the emerging young Moro leaders is hard to imagine. It is on this urgency that solving this
conflict without delay is of paramount priority. Thank you very much for lending me your ears.
14
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Understanding the GPH – MILF ceasefire and the Peace Process
Rasid T. Ladiasan, MILF-CCCH Head of Secretariat
This presentation focuses on understanding the GPH – MILF ceasefire and the Peace Process.
This is a good opportunity to understand local way of peace process. What is Ceasefire and what is
the definition?
1. Ceasefire by definition and essence
A state of peace agreed to between opponents in order to discuss (negotiate) and forges peace
terms/accord and implementation. In order to stop firing, suspension of active hostilities and
temporary cessation of hostilities by mutual consent of the contending parties are necessary. It is
temporary, fragile and not a final solution to armed conflict.
2. GRP – MILF Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities
It is mother of all ceasefire accords and implementing guidelines between the government and the
MILF. Two issues are important- first is the agreement between the two parties, signed on July 18,
1997 in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and second is commitment of both parties for their
respective armed forces to a general cessation of hostilities. For this parity of esteem and equal
footing of the government and MILF forces, essential element in this smooth continuity and
successful conclusion of the peace talks aimed at forging a just and lasting solution to the
centuries-old “Bangsamoro Problem” and the conflict in Mindanao, which resulted in the GPH and
MILF CCCHs and the subsequent ceasefire accords and mechanisms on the ground.
3. Peace building Framework
In this section the function and significant to the GPH – MILF peace process is important. Mainly
two issues for this framework: (1) Builds trust and confidence, teamwork and cooperation between
and amongst principal parties and stakeholders at various levels down to the ground and (2) Assist
in the implementation of humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development undertakings within the
context of the peace process. This is not happened overnight this happened in long time. Within
these aspects Established within the operational structure and system of the four pillars of the
ceasefire mechanisms on the ground – CCCH, IMT, AHJAG and LMTs are very important.
4. Conflict: historically the centuries of continuing moral and legitimate Moro resistance against
colonialism and assertion of rights is important to discuss the conflict situation. More than four
centuries of war and armed conflict imposed by the Spanish colonialism in the 16th century (1570)
15
against the Moros under the Sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao. This is cession of the Philippines,
incorporating the Moro homeland, to the United States by Spain with the Treaty of Paris on
December 10, 1898. Similarly the Illegal and immoral usurpation of the Bangsamoro freedom and
independence, and annexation of the Bangsamoro people and homeland (Mindanao and Sulu)
could be seeen when US granted independence to the Philippine Republic in 1946. Until now we
are in the conflict situation, Continuing suppression and denial of Bangsamoro’s Right to Self-
Determination through restoration of self-governance, homeland and identity by Philippine
government up to present time. It’s basically political. Until now we are not in the peaceful position.
The MILF agreed to enter the arena of peace negotiations with the GRP with the sole intent
of addressing the root cause of the Mindanao conflict and the Bangsamoro Problem, which is the
continued denial of the historic and legitimate right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination.
This is the photo of the leadership of the central committee. We do not indented to solve only the
Bansamoro problem we also wanted to resolve the interest into Philippine government. This is the
peace process background and we have 3 words in spite of the ceasefire and this is the question us
what are the common grounds with the continuous of the peace process. Firstly it is the
Commitment of the both side to negotiate with sincerity and mutual trust. That is the common
ground. Second is the Commitment to honor, respect and implement, without derogation, all GRP /
GPH – MILF agreements. The third common ground is negotiation and peaceful resolution of the
conflict must involve consultations with the Bangsamoro people, free of any imposition in order to
provide chances of success and open new formulas that permanently respond to the aspirations of
the Bangsamoro people for freedom and self-determination through self-governance. Finally, the
incrementally and irreversibility. We never going back to square one or ground zero, Work in
progress, without let ups and lost opportunities, in order to solve and not just manage the conflict.
This is the picture of MILF solders are holding guns and the Ceasefire Mechanisms on the
ground with gunman. This was taken in this year and this is unbelievable. I never say that this is
the picture of peaceful situation with the gunman. These are all agreement basis on our operation.
In 1997 they made agreement of the guidelines of the peace process with acknowledgements of
MILF camps and communities. Rehabilitation and all sign documents are presented in this slide.
This is the structure of ceasefire and it has four pillars: ceasefire coordination, 3rd Party Monitoring,
action vs. lawlessness, and LMTs. These are the so-called four legs or pillars of the GPH – MILF
Ceasefire / Security Mechanisms. This is the operational framework of CCCH. MILF central
committee, MILF peace panel, Chief of staff BIEF, MILF CCCH, General and staff of front
commands, MILF LMTs, Base commands, MILF interim local monitors, Local and unit commands;
MILF Task Force ITTIHAD (UNITY) & ISLAH Reconciliation) Internal Peacekeeping.
5. BIAF general staff
16
The formation of BIAF staff are as follow: Chief of staff and vice chief of staff, 7 Front commands:
Central Mindanao Front (biggest in strength), Southern Mindanao Front, Eastern Mindanao Front
(biggest in area), National Guard Front, Western Mindanao Front, Northeast Mindanao Front,
Northwest Mindanao Front. This is our functions. And we should avoid confrontational situations
and stop fighting. This is the prohibited hostile acts. Terroristic acts such as kidnapping hijacking,
torture and arrests are prohibibited. GRP and MILF shall desist from committing any prohibited
hostile and provocative acts.
6. Ground rules
All those forces not identified by the GRP and MILF CCCH shall be deemed not covered by this
implementing guidelines and ground rules. Government and MILF forces shall comply with the
provisions of cessation of hostilities and support the conduct of inquiry by the government – MILF
CCCH and other mutually agreed.
7. Ceasefire mechanism
Supervise and monitor the implementation of the guidelines and general rules of the GRP-MILF
agreement on the general cessation of hostilities. Conduct fact finding inquiry, investigation,
prepare reports and recommend measures and actions in order to sustain the ceasefire.
8. International Monitoring Team (IMT): The second pillar of the ceasefire mechanism is the
International Monitoring Team (IMT). It serves as the third party observer to the implementation of
the ceasefire agreement between GRP and MILF. Third party observer to the implementation of the
ceasefire agreement between the GRP & MILF is also important to IMT. As shown is the disposition
of IMT- Mindanao and its team site within the Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (CAAM).
The third pillar of the ceasefire Mechanism is the Adhoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG). The
ahjag is a coordinating body which is tasked to coordinate, monitor and disseminate information
between and among the AFP/PNP and MILF- BIAF to effect the apprehension and arrest of
suspected criminal syndicates, kidnap for ransom groups, lost command and other criminal
elements within or near MILF affected communities/ communities. This is the local monitoring teams
that are established in the 13 provinces in Mindanao. It has also composed by the five members
representing the local government concerned, MILF political committee, religious sector, NGO
nominated by MILF, and NGO nominated by GPH. This is the gains armed hostilities in the conflict
prone areas effectively contained.
Allows the peace negotiating panels are tackle to substantive issues/agenda of the
negotiations. Another issues negotiations are: help accelerate implementation of relief, rehabilitation
and development projects in CAAs; Blosters international participation and support to the peace
17
process; increased level of trust and confidence among BIAF and AFP combats to the ceasefire
mechanisms; Heightened participation of CSOs in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement;
improved awareness and support of some LGU executives as well as BIAF and AFP/PNP unit on
the GRP-MILF ceasefire agreement and drastic decrease in armed skirmishes between the GRP
and MILF forces to an upward trend on trust and confidence to the peace process mechanisms and
negotiations.
18
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
A Mindanao Historian’s Views
On the Basic Issues of the GRP-MILF Peace Process
Rudy “Ompong” Buhay Rodil**
1. Historical Background.
The peace process between the government and the Bangsamoro Fronts, the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been going on in the last
37½ years, from January 1975 to August 2012. Already between 100,000 to 120,000 lives have
been lost. Billions of pesos have gone down the drain. If the problem has taken so long to discuss
and has not yet been solved, maybe we do not have a common grasp of the problem. So, how
about re-thinking the problem? Some military generals have said: we were second lieutenants
when we starting fighting the Moro rebels in the early 70s. Now, we are generals and are still
fighting. They have solid reason to think that military force is not the answer, they said.
The peaceful way, peace process, peace education, community dialogues just might
provide the way, they added.
2. Agenda of the GRP/GPH-MILF peace talk, Jan 1997-Aug 2012
1) In 1997 the MILF presented “Solve the Bangsamoro problem” as the sole agenda. In the course
of subsequent deliberations this was broken down into six sub-agenda items.
2) In the Tripoli Agreement on Peace, the following three agenda items were agreed upon:
a. Security Aspect
b. Rehabilitation Aspect
c. Ancestral Domain Aspect
i. Concept
j. Territory
k. Resources
l. Governance
3. In the first agreement between the GPH Panel and the MILF panel on April 24, 2012, two years
since they started, They signed the Ten Decision Points on Principles which would serve as the
basic framework in the formulation of the comprehensive compact . I will not enumerate all ten
Delivered at the Peace Process Exchange Workshop, hosted by HiPec, IDEC, Hiroshima University, July 30 to August 5, 2012. ** Mindanao Historian, retired professor of history, MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology, Iligan City. Twice member of the Government Peace Negotiating Panel, GRP-MNLF in Aug 1993 to Sep 2, 1996; GRP-MILF Aug 2004 to Sep 3, 2008.
19
points, they are too numerous for our limited time here, but let me just focus on three items of
interest, not necessary in their order of appearance.
4. The first item is that both parties recognize Bangsamoro identity and the legitimate grievances
and claims of the Bangsamoro people.
5. The second item is that the status quo, meaning the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) is unacceptable and that a new political entity, ministerial in form, will be created by them
in its place.
6. The third point is that they would have a transition mechanism from the present ARMM to the
new political entity.
7. My observations as a historian follow. Let me use the three items from the ten decision points
as my reference points.
1) The name Moro had a bloody history in the Philippines. In the 333 years that the Spanish
colonizers tried to conquer the Moros, they always employed thousands of Filipino Christians as
soldiers and supporters. In their counter-attacks, the Moros would also hit these Filipino Christian
communities. Since it was the Spanish chroniclers who wrote the stories, they naturally labeled the
Moros as pirates. They even wrote books, one of them being titled Guerras Piraticas. Unfortunately
for us historians, the Moros never wrote their own impressions of these bloody events. What we
have inherited is the deepseated mutual distrust that that Filipino Christians have for Moros. This is
one of the invisible problems that we face today. It interferes with the proper objective appreciation
of the political issues being raised by the Bangsamoro advocates. The Moros hated the name that
is why when I was in the grade school, if one wanted to have a fight with Moro kids, all one had to
do was call him Moro. After the Moro National Liberation Front used this name in Moro National
Liberation Front and fought for it, it has now acquired an honored position in Bangsamoro
consciousness. It has become a badge of honor.
It took a while for government to accept the name Bangsamoro. I remember using it in 1973
in one of the early meetings of the GRP Panel in the talk with the MNLF, was immediately told by
my chair that the government panel, representing the Republic of the Philippines, cannot used this
name because government did not recognize that there is such a thing as Bangsamoro or Moro
nation in our republic.
Again, when I was member of the GRP panel in the peace talk with the MILF, the same
name Bangsamoro was being used in panel meetings, even in meetings with other officials of
20
government and nobody was raising any issue about it. This was between 2004 and 2008. It was
gaining public acceptability.
So, now we see both GPH and MILF panel using the name in an agreement and, to me as
Mindanao historian this is historic and unprecedented. More so, because the recognition of the
name is followed by the recognition of the legitimate grievances and claims of the Bangsamoro
people.
If I may go back to the early years of the struggle for self-determination, the immediate
labels and comments – this was in the time of President Ferdinand Marcos and remained so until
the reign of President Fidel Ramos – that I would read or hear about were: Moro secessionist, the
government cannot allow the dismemberment of the national territory and the integrity of the
Republic. The assumption of course was that the formation of the Republic was based on solid
historic grounds, and that the challenge being posed by the Bangsamoro Fronts were wrong.
But what does history say? The Bangsamoro were definitely not Filipinos prior to the Treaty
of Paris in 1898, nor their sultanate territories part of the Spanish colony. And the Philippines, that
was once Spanish colony, had declared its independence six months prior to the Treaty of Paris.
What Spain sold to America, the newly independent Philippines, the uncolonized Moro Sultanates,
and the Pat a Pongampong ko Ranaw, she did not own. It was the Filipino and Moro defeat in the
war against American that brought them together, as colonial subjects, under the American flag.
For the government to sign an agreement recognizing the legitimate grievances and claims
of the Bangsamoro people is also equally unprecedented, if not unheard of. What does this imply?
That the Bangsamoro Front, the MILF in this case, is right after all? Am I getting this right, Mr.
Chairman? And so, it is alright to agree to another point… (please move on to #2 below)
2) that the ARMM is unacceptable and the right thing to do is create a new political entity,
ministerial in form, to put in its place. Wow! To my non-lawyer’s mind, this is mind-boggling. For
one, ARMM is really a product of the GRP-MNLF peace process and the GRP-MNLF Final peace
agreement of September 1996 has yet to be fully implemented, in fact meetings are still being held,
presided over by the OIC Committee of the Eight, to put in legal form the remaining points of
agreement so that its processing by Congress which will lead to the amendment of the Organic Act
governing ARMM can be initiated.
There is also the fact that honest to goodness reforms are being undertaken by the current
Acting Regional Governor who seems to be doing a great job cleansing the whole ARMM
machinery. And now here comes the Ten Decision Points that will lead to its dissolution. Not only
that. How to insert the ministerial form of regional government into the national structure which is
both presidential and unitary? This is enshrined in the Philippine Constitution but the ministerial
form is not even mentioned. Does the new agreement mean that the ministerial form can be
inserted into the constitution without constitutional amendment? Or does it mean that that
21
administration of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III is ready and able to bring about a
constitutional amendment without fail?
3) The transition mechanism is another name for provisional government as it was called in the
Tripoli Agreement of 1976. Within the context of martial law where the president had dictatorial
legislative powers, this was possible. But since the post martial law government of President
Ramos did not anymore allow the president to create such a government, what came out of the
GRP-MNLF peace talk was the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, a
mechanism that was not a government, only a structure with advisory or recommendatory powers. It
did not even have the authority to receive and disburse funds. Now, given the ambitious push for a
ministerial form of structure, my question is, does the present constitution allow the President, or
Congress for that matter, to create such a transition mechanism, with power to govern, with
authority to create the way for the smooth passage to the new political entity? Another mind-
boggling proposition, I should think. But I leave it to the wisdom of the present negotiating panels.
Where there is a will, there is a way.
8. Before I close, let me comment on two important items which both sides tended to take for
granted in the past.
1) The Lumad or Indigenous Peoples as they are referred to in the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
of 1997 have equal rights to their ancestral lands, as the two Bangsamoro Fronts, the MNLF and
the MILF often state both in writing and in public declarations. Both sides, Lumad and Muslim,
claim common ancestral roots. These are duly documented in my book A Story of Mindanao and
Sulu in Question and Answer (2003) This is partly why they are included in the Front’s \definition of
Bangsamoro. It must be noted, however, that these Indigenous Peoples have reached a level of
political maturity such that in 1986, they had their own Congress in North Cotabato where 15 of the
then known 18 tribes of Mindanao decided to adopt Lumad as a collective name – this means
indigenous or native. It is Bisaya but it is common knowledge that when Lumad come together in
big assemblies they spontaneously shift to Bisaya as their lingua franca. Along with the name they
also proclaimed that they have their own right to self-determination and they wished to govern
themselves within their respective ancestral domains in accordance with their customary laws.
Eleven years later, the government enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act recognizing the
right of the Indigenous Peoples to their ancestral domains/lands and the right to use of their
customary laws to govern themselves. Now, they, too, like the Bangsamoro, cite the provision in the
UN Declaration of Indigenous Peoples Rights recognizing their right to self-determination.
22
I should point out that from 1975 to 1996, both government and MNLF saw no need to
consciously involve the Lumad in their negotiations. It was only in the last two years of the three-
year negotiation that the MNLF saw the need to include in their delegation one Lumad for a while,
then a larger number in the last two rounds of negotiations. But they just sat there, in silence. On
the government side, there was zero attempt to even consider Lumad presence in the negotiations.
To the credit of the GRP-MILF negotiations, Lumad presence was felt but only in the
background, as invited consultants, as deemed appropriate, in government technical working group
meetings. In subsequent negotiations, starting from 2004, the government panel had one lady
Lumad, and three, one lady, two gentlemen in the technical working group. The MILF has had one
in the technical working group until the present. In the current government panel, there used to be a
Lumad member but then his status was modified to senior consultant on IP affairs.
Lumad voice was also getting louder and more systematic in the espousal of their cause.
Among the points raised is the assertion that while they recognize the legitimacy of the
Bangsamoro struggle, they must insist that they, too, have their distinct identity, their own ancestral
domain and their own right to self-determination. They also recall, louder and more clearly, that their
ancestors, Moro and Lumad, had entered into agreements which included territorial borders. They
urged upon their Bangsamoro counterpart to affirm these sacred agreements. For one thing, not
only are these sacred, these also have no expiration dates.
I like what I heard that the MILF panel had been holding dialogues with Lumad leaders in
their public sorties. And more positive developments to date, there have been held already several
re-affirmation ceremonies between Lumad and Moro leaders in Maguindanao, in Cotabato, in
Bukidnon and in Pagadian City.
2) Migrants and their descendants have been made to believe by government that the lands they
acquired were public lands and their acquisitions were legitimate under the law, and that this
government is the only legitimate government they know. They are bewildered not only by
Bangsamoro claims to ancestral homeland, as it was articulated by the MNLF – the MILF later
shifted the language to ancestral domain-- but also by their audacity to assert their right to self-
determination, not hesitating to employ the weapons of war. Threatened by these claims, they are
naturally wary and afraid that they lands might be taken away from them and their lives disrupted by
the wars that intermittently erupt in their midst.
In my experience in peace advocacy, I have noted that that a patient narration of history will
tell them that we have all been heirs to a history that brought about the marginalization of the
Lumad and the Bangsamoro in their ancestral lands, and the settlers were unwitting instruments in
this marginalization process.
23
Many participants in my various audiences have consistently asked: how come your version
of history is not taught in our Philippine history books? It is incumbent upon government to ensure
that correct Mindanao history is told in Philippine history books used in schools.
9. So, while the two panels are trying to sort out the details of their agreements, the public must
also be prepared through dialogues to come to terms with each other. So much the better if the
details the agreements can be publicly discussed with them. They themselves ought to appreciate
that they will positively gain from the comprehensive compact.
It is important for all, Lumad, Bangsamoro, setllers to realize that coming to terms with
history is also coming to terms with each other’s presence in a land that is now shared.
We need to dialogue to determine acceptable social space for everyone in a spirit of mutual
recognition and mutual acceptance of each other’s collective rights. We must learn to dream
together, to find peace in each other presence.
24
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Lumad: Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo Ethnic Groups’ Posotion on
the Peace Process by and between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic liberation Front (MILF)
Timuay Melanio U. Ulama
My courtesies to the officials of the Japanese Government, the organizers, officials of the Hiroshima
University, participants from the other countries and my colleagues from the Philippines, guests,
facilitators and expectators, ladies and gentlemen, Good Day. FIYO TERESANG!
Indeed, I am greatly honored as representative of the disadvantaged, least fortunate and
marginalized group in Mindanao, the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples that I
was invited to this very momentous activity to attend as participant and to reveal to this international
forum our unified position as distinct group of People in Mindanao particularly the conflict affected
area on the ongoing peace process between the government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF).
We, the Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo are among the distinct Indigenous
People inhabitant of Mindanao, particularly in the province of Maguindanao in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim.
Mindanao and in Sultan Kudarat in the Administrative Region XII have consistently been a
part of the struggle of the Bangsamoro for self -determination. We shared and experience the
travails and difficulties of war. We were a witness and victims of the armed confrontation between
the government forces and the Moro revolutionary fronts during the past decades. Many of us• were
rendered homeless and displaced notwithstanding the numerous lost of lives and property
concomitant with the armed struggle because our ancestral domains were used as a battle field.
But now we see "light in the tunnel" as the MILF -GPH are about to conclude a Peace Agreement
that may redound to a just and lasting solution of the so-called "Mindanao Problem".
As stakeholders of the Peace process, we are not merely "fence sitters" but very much, we
are "role players", and ultimate end -users ' and beneficiaries of whatever "peace formula" that may
be reached and agreed upon by both parties. We are therefore presenting our views and proposal
as agreed upon by our group and product as series of tribal consultations, as follows:
1. On Ancestral Domain
That our Ancestral Domain claim shall be delineated pursuant to the present and future
laws that may be applicable. For the moment, the tribes had laid claim to our ancestral domains
covering a land area of 289, 268 hectares comprising the municipalities of Upi, Datu Blah Sinsuat,
25
South Upi, Ampatuan, Shariff Aguak, Datu Hoffer, Datu Unsay, Datu Saudi, Guindulungan, Talayan,
and Datu Odin Sinsuat in Maguindanao Province and portions of Esperanza, Lebak, Bagumbayan,
Sen. Ninoy Aquino, Kalamansig and Palembang in Sultan Kudarat Province and the City of
Cotabato where the tribes are predominantly situated.
2. On Political Territory
We support the proposal of the MILF panel to create and compose the 48th
province
primarily for the Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan. Manobo tribes who are already and presently
in the area prior to such creation. It is also the desire of the tribe to be at liberty to practice and
promote their cultural identity by way of actual implementation of tribal and customary laws through
the Timuay Justice and Governance.
3. On Resources
The rights of the IPs-Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo in matters of exploitation and
exploration of natural resources that may be found within their ancestral domain areas shall be
upheld and respected. The tribe shall have an equitable share in all natural resources to include
strategic minerals and forestry resources.
4. On Governance
As earlier stated, the tribe shall conform to any type or form of governance that maybe
agreed upon and mutually adopted, hence it is also the desire of the tribe to have equal
opportunities and representation on all levels of governance, side by side with their Muslim brothers.
Provided, that in the province designated for the Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo
tribes, their right to rule and govern must be pursued, implemented, recognized, and respected vis-
a-vis their traditional and customary laws in a form of a genuine autonomy within the Bangsamoro
nation.
Conclusion
As Indigenous Peoples inhabiting the areas since time immemorial, the Teduray,
Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo tribes are very much part of Bangsamoro nation. However, it is
the belief and aspiration of the tribe to cultivate and promote their own distinct traditional and
cultural practices as a vital and potent factor to consider in their own struggle for self-determination.
The tribes may have joined the mainstream society, be it in public and private endeavors, but none
the less, we maintained our own identity throughout all these years.
We are strongly supporting the MILF who initiated to resolve the problems in Mindanao
through negotiated Political settlement. We are touching the kind hearts of people in higher
positions in our government to understand deeply and give what are the demands of the MILF; this
26
place is ours, return what is ours and therefore must be OURS. Further, we are appealing to both
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces not to bring their
armed confrontation to our ancestral domains and put an end in using our communities as their
Camps and Barracks.
"THANK YOU VERY MUCH AND FIYO BAGI, MEUYAG"
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Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
COMMENTS on Mindanao Case
Kei Fukunaga
Thank you very much, chairman. As I am Japanese citizen, but assigned to Japanese embassy,
as a member of IMT, from outsider it is very difficult to understand situation in Mindanao
especially as historian already explained it has very long historical background. So I just pick up
some of point of very nice presentation, it may be useful for your consideration from observation
of outsider. Mr. Rashid explained about ceasefire mechanism in Mindanao conflict. It was very
unique when panel discussion started between government and MILF, they organized
simultaneously CCH ceasefire stopping mechanism and also invited international monitoring
team that I belong. This is still ongoing and very functioning as Mr. Rashid mentioned. As he
finally showed it graphically, until formalized 2004 more than 100 cases per year fire attacking
both sides. There was quite rapidly increase 2008 and 2009 at that time NGO members withdrew
but after efficient negotiation coming back since 2010. We are hoping the Philippine government
and MILF very function not only for top level but rural area as Mr. Rashid mentioned rural
monitoring team functioning with NGO people to observe especially humanitarian rights violence.
That can be not also from outsider organized relation itself can introduce basic idea in detail. You
have time during this workshop to ask Rashid. Second point is Mr. Ulema mentioned about
indigenous people problem because it is long history also important things it take so long time
more than 40 years even MILF started to talk with government.
In Mindanao there are several provinces each province consists of different people,
some of indigenous, some of Christian immigrant from outside, even Muslim people, fisherman
in island, some of few different tribe, it is very important making consensus among those
Bangsamolo people. Third point is Prof. Ompon mentioned from historical view Bangramolo is
new approach to solve this problem from broader point of view. Molo means only Islam from
Christian view but Bangsamolo consists with indigenous people or who are living in Mindanao in
proper way, he mentioned first time as he was a member of government panel, Philippines
government denied to admit Bangsamolo. When Japanese government started IMT of
Japan-Bangsamolo initiative, Japanese government recognized Bangsamolo as counter body
for support that was very important step to solve the problem. In detail he has more experience
and a lot of papers documents, if you have interest about historical view you can question him.
Finally Mr. Iqbal, he is still acting chairman of peace panel as he mentioned MILF started
negotiation from 1997, takes 16 years a lot of time, president changed, even Philippines
government side said it is a rollercoaster game, negotiation comes to good mood but suddenly
slow down. Fortunately since last year there was good mood, I am very proud Japanese
government had good contribution. Since then regular meeting in Kuala Lumpur but as he
mentioned still long way and last month JICA president mentioned it is a long panel but there is
small light. We are still keeping on it is good momentum to fix this trend but it takes time. There is
28
negotiation as he mentioned he is back to panel negotiation but it is good chance for not only
Molo but international community because Mindanao problem make step forward, Mindanao is
not only a place however Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and also Philippines, south east Asian
regional hostility zone. That is why not only Philippines but Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei started to
contribute, Luckily Indonesia sending 15 member of IMT. We have good timing and it is chance
to come here, we are learning much from Ache and can learning from Nepal situation. Because it
is very complicated issue but from complicated issue, there are some idea to newly introduce
each. Because each conflict area have different background, different case some of ideas they
have already made in their paper, but unfortunately limited time.
We hope coming two days you may have some more detailed question directly to ask
each presenter that can help more bright idea for what we are talking. Thank you very much.
29
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Open Discussion - Mindanao (the Philippines) Group
Chair: Thank you very much. I guess a couple of questions and answer may be possible. Do
you have any questions? This is an academic seminar, not critical dialogue anyway. You need
not to be better by the official position. Please raise your hand to ask questions. Mr. Tebay, To
whom?
Tebay: To one speaker. It is my surprise that you have been going through the post of
negotiation for 60 years. My question would be what is the base for formation and binding both
parties together to go through whole process of negotiation without or with all success of
welicious, what bring your parties together again come to evil of negotiation, I want to know this.
Thank you.
Chair: Please select by yourself.
Tebay: I want to get more, I think for participants. Thank you.
Iqbal: There are two answers to your question. First, the parties have decided to conclusion.
They are neutral decision to negotiation second, on the basses, it’s parties have experience
that heeling has indeed in the battle field and seen enterprise. And thirdly for the quiet
government, I think everything spent a lot of money. Fighting of Moro in Mindanao until this time
there was table to succeed. Military solution has never succeeded in Mindanao. Because all
regard of military very strong militarily. But we don’t have experience, 40 years in battle field, by
fighting regarding in mobile Manila for secure fighting by government in confront of China,
fighting Government is stronger, naturally if you fight them. In conclude of china mother then,
you are given advantage of enemy, we are heating them in highly mobile one phase escapes in
negotiation arrive, and after vote of parties have been arriving, we have gotten in harder. You
much 1,300 people dead, fighting. The problem right now is forgotten text too long for
government to evaluate central issues. It is very long historical background. It is very
complicated issues.
Secondly, the start school is who established, that any chase is not school. It is then to be
accepted by people who are enjoyed it. I think this is a great deal to answer your questions.
Ladiasan: It is just preferring. This part is potential published procedures established principal
and mechanism. It is then, it is to participants by Islam. Bothe sides are on track whatever by
consequences.
Chair: If you get ……
30
Djuli: Let me have a few minutes. I think, I have a book on the GRP to emulate peace process.
And this is well my questions to persuade in the book. And my answer, first answer is that they
don’t know because there is no official statement of Government and all related, why they
consented to negotiate. But I made some guesses to educated guesses of course. Number one
is that this package course of the world are the more than 100,000 people were killed and most
taken placed in 1973 to 1976. The cost was 70 million dollars faced. The part of the rest, I found
the Libyan Government spent some like that 30 million ponds, so emulate, so just the course.
The other, otherwise, there is apparently, but I cannot exactly pin-point the exact, but there is,
there are signs of OIC pressure talking about your organisations of Islamic countries.
Now, how much is express, purely remember of Arab-Israel war in 1973 in which the Arab
states have great difficulties for winning. So what is the thing they did was to analyze the
countries and supporting Israel, and Philippines was a weapon of them.
Both is oily-mingle in October 1973, and they remember by December there was an official
announcement by Government that gasoline and diesel oil would be related. I found related
when I was writing in my books. Then at that time, the Philippines could only offer three month’s
line of oil at any given time. There was no because of embargo, there was no assurance after
December UN had any more supply. So, that is what only first things president Marcos they was
done to open the embassy in Saudi Arabia. There was no diplomatic relations at that time with
Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Araba was principal actor in the embargo.
That was, it was all worried to have been to parties of the Government to negotiate except them,
if they engaged the relation. It was very imbalance of Government‘s initiate the negotiation. So,
it operated through intervenes mainly before I have seen. But it’s very carefully because at that
time Libya was the number one ventures of the emulation. It was very powerful influences I
have seen before I see. The Philippine Government was actually big boring. Eventually they
succeed indeed in January 1975. They were political compliments only a first meeting as the
Philippine Government and said. At least, Ice was broken, now they could talk with them indeed
before they could talk a research. Now, I started the story because in my time parties you after
deciding of peace agreement with eliminated enemy. Then we talk to MILF, and supposed
another group after MILF. Let me talk to this agreement that is the enough. The Government
has raw answer of peace process. And heavily discover very early in whole process. Having
discover my early in the world, let me military solution was not the answer. Let me begin your
letters in 1973. The Government, military and a number of actors come with the issues. I don’t
know if you are.
Chair: I intervene you have some general intersession in the schedule. Please discuss it later.
Thank you for your cooperation. Next presentator. Thank you very much. I transfer my abolition
to the Secretariat.
31
Panel-2: Aceh (Indonesia) Group Presentations
Chair
Koki Seki
Associate Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University,
Member of HiPeC Executive Committee
Presenters
Sofyan A. Djalil
Special Advisor to the Vice President of Indonesia,
Government Negotiator during Helsinki Peace Negotiation and Former State Minister for
Information and Communication of the Government of Indonesia
Muhammad Nur Djuli
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Leader for the Helsinki Peace Negotiation
Shadia Marhaban
President of the Aceh Women’s League
GAM Member for the Helsinki Peace Negotiation
Commentator
Akihisa Matsuno
Professor, Osaka School for International Public Policy, Osaka University
32
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Transformation of Conflict into Peace in Aceh
Sofyan A. Djalil
I think later on Nur can complement because, you know, we were working together even though
from different table. I want to make presentation on some theoretical perspectives. If you see,
there are theoretical perspectives on conflict or struggle between opposition parties. Actually
conflict exists in any society. If well managed, it will become a normal part for transformation
process for more mature community at large or nation building process. Stages of conflict could
be latent, emerging and manifested. This is very theoretical. Powers involve in a conflict such as
coercive power, soft power, economic power, and so on. If you see here theories of conflict, the
mosaic for comprehensive resolution, community relations theory says what is the cause of
conflicts and what could be the approach for solution. Principle of negotiation theory states
different interests on the zero-sum objectives and its approach. There are also theories relating
to human needs theory and identity theory. I think problem of Moro is a part of this identity theory.
Also there are intercultural miscommunication theory and conflict transformation theory. These
are from Fisher et.al. (2000).
I think we need to analyze conflict comprehensively. By analyzing conflict
comprehensively, we can theoretically find easier way to solution. Now I talk about Aceh. This is
the brief history of Aceh. Actually, Aceh was independent country from 1500 to 1873 and until
1900.Aceh Sultanate had embassy in Turkey and UK. At that time both European powers
admitted the legacy of Aceh Sultanate. In 1873, because of increasing competition between
Dutch and British, Dutch declared colonial war on Aceh. This is formal colonial war in Indonesia
that was declared by Dutch imperial government. War on Aceh took place for 40 years. The last
king of Aceh surrendered in 1904. In 1945, during independent of Indonesia, Aceh joined
Indonesia and contributed to the struggle of Indonesia. In 1950s, Aceh became a province. But
bureaucratic decision integrated Aceh into north Sumatra. This creates a problem of identity
actually. And then there was first rebellion from DI/TII, which was motivated by Islamic movement
from 1953 to 1960. It was a kind of civil war against central government. The rebellion was
concluded in 1963. As you know, the 1970s was the time of exploration of natural gas in Aceh.
Indonesia is still the biggest gas exporter in the world right now, even though in terms of reserve
it is smaller. In 1970s and 80s, gas exported from Indonesia mostly came from Aceh. But the
amount of money spend back to Aceh was very small. This was one of the reasons that Tengku
Hasan di Tiro, founder of Free Aceh Movement, declared Aceh Sumatra National Liberation
Front. From 1976 to 1999, during the Suharto regime, a series of military operations including
DOM were implemented and a lot of people were killed. As you know, Suharto stepped down in
1999. Then the issue of Aceh became full blow and everybody can discuss about that and the
Acehnese also get Banda Aceh one million people as for referendum. Since then the negotiation
takes place to seek peace solution through negotiation. In 2001, the law on Special Autonomy of
33
Aceh was issued without consulting with GAM at that time. The COHA (Cessation of Hostilities)
agreement was signed which was facilitated by Henry Dunant Center. The COHA failed after the
Peace Talk facilitated by JICA, Japan in May 2003. In 2004, military emergency was declared in
Aceh, martial law was implemented. As you know, the Tsunami hit Aceh in 2004, which led to
restart initial contact for peaceful resolution. From January to August, 2005, we negotiated with
GAM in Helsinki. We reAcehd to conclusion within six months. Negotiation was very intensive.
Every month the negotiation continued for one week in Helsinki which was facilitated by
President Ahtisaari. We signed MOU in Helsinki in August 2005. You can access to MOU in
internet. Outcome of that was the enactment of the law on governing Aceh. This was the result of
Helsinki. This is another Special Autonomy that replaced the law of 2001. But this time it was
with the participation of GAM and with aspiration of GAM.
In 2006, we introduced reintegration agency where Nur Djuli worked as former Chairman.
The local government election was held successfully in the same year. I heard the case of Moro.
It is very complicated. The case of Aceh is not that complicated. In some respects, it was based
on economy and historical perspectives rather than ideological war. If you see conflicts in Aceh
and Indonesia, they share so many similarities. GAM leadership is also important, which consists
of political and military factions, civil society, think tankers and representatives in various
countries. Later, Shadia can share on this.
Solution is at high level. We negotiate with top leaders. We were very fortunate that we
had very disciplined organization i.e. GAM. Decision made in Helsinki, Sweden by top political
leaderships of GAM was honored in the field. This is very important and fortunate. We can
resolve this problem very effectively. Demand for independent is simply unreasonable as there is
no support from friendly countries. GAM leaders wanted to talk with the government of Indonesia
as long as facilitated by credible third party. It must be solved without losing faces of the parties
involved. The last part is very important. We wanted the solution for Aceh conflict with dignity for
all.
Impact of conflict on economy of Aceh was very direct one as compared to national level.
Aceh had been suffering very much in terms of economic perspective. The problem of tsunami
brings some blessings. Tsunami effects, as some people believe that it was a divine warning to
solve conflict in Aceh, to no more conflict and no more victims. Stronger commitment from the
government of Indonesia and strong support from international community to rebuild Aceh in
post-tsunami period is very important from initial perspective. After tsunami tens of thousands
foreigners and expatriates came to Aceh to have rebuild Aceh. Governor of Aceh was very
worried if anyone of those people arrested or kidnapped by whomever, the full effort to rebel
Aceh after tsunami will be disarrayed. That was very strong motive from government to speed up
the peace talk. When we started negotiation a very important proposition was proposed by
President Ahtisaari: “nothing is agreed until everything has been agreed”. Therefore, we can talk
whatever in the room. From GAM side, they can upload all animosity toward the delegation of
Indonesia. We talked everything. In the first day of negotiation, Nur’s friend used sometime the
dirtiest word against Indonesia. That is part of conflict and we have been prepared by Jusuf Kalla.
34
At that time, we faced a very environment of animosity. Can you imagine 30 years of conflict?
And we met together. Everybody will abuse and curse the other part. From Indonesian part, we
did not take the advantage to curse GAM. But GAM used all dirty words against Indonesia. Just
listen, Jusuf Kalla told us.
The issue of internationalization of Aceh became very sensitive in Indonesia. There was
status quo during the peace talk. At the time, military operation still is in Aceh. We keep pressing
through military from government perspective, no truce during the peace talk. Indonesia
prepared to give the most whatever demand except independence. Government was ready to
give concession except independence. First, GAM surrenders the weapons and accepts the
integrity of Indonesia. We put all the issues in MoU. The role of president Ahtisaari is also very
important. He has a lot of experiences in dealing and mediating conflicts. He is very tough. The
President and Vice-President picked the negotiation team. This is not the issue of foreign affairs.
Foreign affairs were not involved in this negotiation. We asked the junior diplomats from foreign
affairs just to take notes. Last part is what we call diplomacy sui generis. The government of
Indonesia sent very high level negotiating team including two ministers. This created lot of issues
in Jakarta among opposition party. They said how comes that two ministers were sent to
negotiate with the rebel group. From government perspective, Jusuf Kalla said if you wanted to
show sincerity to solve the problem send the highest possible team. If I could go Helsinki I would
go but it was impossible for me. So he sent two ministers including me. We got strong support
from president and vice-president and it was very important. In the case of Philippines, a lot of
interests, a lot of spoiler and a lot of stakeholders are involved and they may not like to sign the
peace treaty. Sometimes military takes benefit out of conflict. Conflict for military is part of their
business. They are trained to kill or how to kill.
Be flexible. In the case of Aceh the only thing is that GAM cannot ask for independence.
Also important is to be creative and think outside the box to find options. Trust each other and
treat each other with respect. Never underestimate the importance of informal talks is also
important in the negotiation process. It is not a linear process based on official agenda. This is
the most important thing. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed that is the great creation
created by president Ahtisaari. Both parties were required to agree on broad outline of political,
economy, security, justice, human rights formula before ceasefire and military and security
arrangements take into effect. Small issues and technicalities should not change the main
principle that has already been agreed. Foreign advisors may disturb the process that is what
president Ahtisaari believes. He said that the foreign advisors are often more orthodox than the
negotiators themselves, holier than the Pope. High expectation for gaining agreement within
short-time period is not reasonable; be prepared and accept for longer talks as long as it is
leading to the mutual agreement. But talking 15-16 years in the case of Philippines may be too
long.
Economic compensation to Aceh has been introduced. Because of law, Aceh will get
more money in the next 20 years as compensation from central government. In the past, central
government took so much from Aceh. Poverty increased in 2005 but decreased more in 2006.
35
This is very short period of time, one year after the conflict resolved. After the Helsinki agreement,
67 percent are very satisfied and only 23.7 are less satisfied with the peace agreement. From
Indonesian perspective, a better position of Indonesian nationhood is found. “Are you proud of
being Indonesian?” This was asked one year after the agreement. Originally it was 56 percent
because of oppression and human rights issues. It became 77.7 percent.
What issue faced by Aceh today. This is the answer. Peace-making process requires
marathon mentality and determination to keep moving forward for prolonged period even after
the signing of peace agreement. I believe Nur can tell us some issues that were not expected
because of political process. The signing is just a beginning for further long journey to make it
sustainable by implementing peace transformation, relief, rehabilitation and sustainable
development, and democratization processes. Aceh has experienced twice local general
elections for the legislature and for the executives under new Law on the Governing of Aceh.
These elections are considered to be the fruit of peace agreement: an important step for Aceh's
continued reconstruction and democratization. The local “Aceh Party”, founded by former GAM,
has dominated at the local legislature (47%) and won governorship twice. The first governorship
was in 2006. It was won by former GAM activist, even though he ran in the election as an
independent candidate. There was election three months before. The former minister of foreign
affairs of GAM now became the Governor of Aceh. They are involved in improving Acehnese
welfare. In fact economic progress is not as fast as expected due to external/global disturbances,
but at least it is much better compared to during the conflict period. Years after the tsunami,
major reconstruction projects has driven higher growth. The different challenge emerges after
the end of reconstruction period. Creating huge employment under current economic
condition is still a challenge, hence it is possible that some may not be relieving enough and
creating resentment. It is very critical to keep on moving forward to avoid the spoiler ruining this
peaceful situation and therefore we can not just wait and see, but to keep on supporting this
transformation process constructively.
Is Aceh peace talk model applicable to other conflicts? I think, no. There is no universal
solution applicable for all conflicts, but we can learn from previous experiences to avoid
unnecessary mistakes. General peace building and talking activities can be applicable, but the
specific solution to the conflict may need some adjustments accordingly. Each conflict has its
own background, root cause(s), context, involved parties, etc, and hence it deserves for its own
customized solution. Each conflict has its own background, root cause(s), context, involved
parties, and hence, it deserves for its own customized solution. Leadership and commitment for
peace are indeed among key factors. This is very important. Without strong and top leadership of
the country, I do not think the peace agreement in Aceh can be achieved. The government of
Indonesia gives concession. Concession is given whatever is legitimate. GAM was willing to set
aside the goal of independence. They accept solution based on self-governance. This is the key.
Indonesia does not recognize self-governance; we call it as special autonomy. But meaning is
self-governance for Aceh within the Republic of Indonesia. If see Hong Kong and China, it is one
country with two systems. Hong Kong is self-governed and completely different from China. If
36
communist China can accept that why not other countries can do so. GAM also demobilized all
its military troops and decommissioned of all arms. They promised to give away 840 rifles, but
they gave more than 1000 rilfes to be destroyed. The government of Indonesia gave consensus
among others that non-military police forces would be withdrawn from Aceh. Like the case in the
Philippines, we believe that we cannot solve the problem in Aceh with the military means. Before
the negotiation, Jusuf Kalla called the Chief of military and asked him that could he resolve the
problem in Aceh by military means. Yes, he replied, because we fought with them and there were
1,000 troops in Aceh. Jusuf Kalla asked him again that how long you have been fighting in Aceh?
Thirty years, but you cannot resolve it! How could you resolve it within one or two years? Finally,
military admitted that they could not resolve the problem in Aceh by military means. During the
martial law, Indonesian government sent more than 36 batallion military to Aceh, a place where
the population was not more than three million. Also special force of police was sent. A part of the
consesus was non-organic military and police forces would be withdrawn from Aceh. You gave
100 weapons, we would withdraw 10 batallion army. Finally all the weapons were surrendered
and all militaries were withdrawn from Aceh. In return, Aceh got 70 percent of revenues. In
addition to that, the government of Indonesia also pays 2 percent of national allocation fund to
Aceh as a part of compensation, which is applicable in the next 20 years i.e. until 2026. This is a
big amount of money. Of the earnings from hydrocarbon and other mineral resources in Aceh, 70
percent will return to Aceh. Amnesty is granted for all persons who have participated in GAM
activities. We released more than 3,000 political detainees those involved in GAM except two
persons. These two persons were considered as terrorist because they involved in bombings in
Jakarta. This is still in dispute with former GAM. At that time, we brought justices and judges from
Sweden and Norway to review all cases. Whatever they said the government of Indonesia
accepted. Even though the people who were convicted of killing someone or many people were
released if their activities were based on GAM activities. The Norwegian judge still considers
these two persons as not eligible for amnesty. So, we released all of them. We gave back the
citizenship of all former GAM members, if they want to be Indonesian again. Many of GAM’s
active member became citizen in other countries, now they get Indonesian citizenships.
Reintegration fund is allocated for GAM for reintegration into civil society, even though the
success is not that much great. The new governor of Aceh will exercise authority in all sectors of
public affairs except six issues, which will be governed by central government. This is
self-governance concept. These are foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary
and fiscal matter, justice, and freedom of religion. These are administered by central government
in conformity with the constitution. Local political parties are also allowed in Aceh. It is the only
region where local political parties are allowed. This was very critical at the time of peace
negotiation. Because of it, the MoU was about to fail. GAM demanded for the establishment of
local political parties; however, Indonesian constitution does not allow that. At that time, the
opposition parties oppossed the peace agreement. When the issue of local political parties were
raised by GAM, the government of Indonesia could not give that until the last minute of the
negotiation. Finally, we created a formula. We put in the MoU that stated “the government of
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Indonesia will create a political condition which allows the establishment of local political parties
with the approval from parliament”. Actually, this one did not promise anything. If we gave them
the establishment of local parties it would be against the constitution and parliament. But we
promised to create a local political situation. The political condition can be created if GAM is
sincere to surrender the weapons. In fact, when GAM surendered the weapons, the whole
environment of Indonesai actually has been changed. At that time, so many skeptical people said
the MoU is just a MoU and it will fail like COHA. But when GAM surrendered the weapons to be
destroyed and televised nationally, everybody beleived that that was a real MoU and could be
implemented. Since then no more criticism. We passed the law to establish local political parties
and there were no opposition any more in the parliament. We passed a new law on government
of Aceh and there was no opposition any more. The legislature of Aceh will redraft the legal code
of Aceh. Only six affairs is administered by central government authority. There is need to draft
legal code by the legislature of Aceh. Both parties accepted more robust monitoring provision.
Aceh Monitoring Mission was sponsored by European Union and participated by ASEAN
countries. We invited international monitoring team, which consisted of European Union and
ASEAN. They stayed in Aceh almost for one year. Everything went smoot. Now I think Aceh is
better than earlier and now Indonesia is getting stronger than before.
Thank you very much.
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Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Presentation on Aceh Peace Process 1
Muhammad Nur Djuli
Sofyan Djalil made a very detail presentation. There are, however, different opinions. For
example, there is stress on the root of the problem in Aceh. Much stress is given on economy.
For us and GAM, the economic injustice is the consequence of the real issue. The real issue is
the question of sovereignty. As mentioned by Dr Sufian, Aceh was an independent nation way
back in the14th century that had been recognized by international countries. We had
communication with Europe and even with US. Of course, we had a long war with the Dutch. For
Aceh, it was Dutch War. For Dutch, it was Aceh War. The Dutch suffered causalities which was
bigger than all causalities in entire colonial war before World War II. We also saw the Japanese
time. We in Aceh do not consider Japanese as a colonial military occupation because Japan
never established a real rule in Aceh. Japan was invited to come to Aceh. First, a small intelligent
force that came by boat and on bicycles was welcomed in Aceh. Only later, when the Dutch
reenacted their promise to give independence to Aceh, we started to fight with the Japanese
after chasing the Dutch out.
Again the question is of sovereignty, which is also important to understand for other
conflicts. In 1945, when the Japanese surrendered in World War II not a single foreign officer
remained in Aceh. We consider 1945 to 1949 as a de facto independent, not part of any other
country. Of course, there was no foreign diplomatic mission and it was only de facto independent.
On 31st December of 1949, the sovereignty from Dutch East India rule to the republic of
Indonesia, in fact, federal republic of Indonesia, was declared in the Hague conference by the
United Nations. Aceh was not part of this delegation. This is the question we consider why the
inclusion of Aceh was illegal. That started the problem with Indonesia. Later, there were some
disputes that our leader has, in fact, signed or accepted to be part of Indonesia in the
arrangement of autonomous rule. But when the autonomy rule was inscribed in the Lamte
agreement, it was in the name only. In fact, it was very small autonomy at the time which just
covered cultural, religious and educational matters. Everything else was in the hands of
Indonesia. So, we had first Islamic rebellion that lasted for 12 years. And then there was an
agreement. We had Cessation of Hostilities Agreement…in fact, is not real agreement; it’s a
framework agreement that was supposed to be agreed later in Aceh between the lower ranking
officials of the party. That broke and then we went to Tokyo under the Tokyo Conference and it
was failed. Then we had the Helsinki negotiation.
The key success for Helsinki, in my view and general view of GAM, is that military
solution is not possible, which is also mentioned by Dr. Sofyan. I think both sides were on parallel
line. Our goal has always been independence. Indonesian goal has always been national
unitary republic. So whatever agreement we had, it was just in our minds. But this battalion lines
banned in war. In our view, the fall of General Suharto and the reforms took place in Indonesia i.e.
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Indonesia has been democratized, highly democratized, and also decentralized—these put us in
a very weak position. We became the only province in Indonesia that fought for independence.
The rests had given up, you know, like such South Sulawesi, which were our partner. So the
goal of independence became more and more impossible. But still we have not given that up.
There was still some hope that we could achieve. But then Tsunami happened that was the
triggering that made us to realize that nothing was more important than survival of the people.
Within 20 minutes more than 100,000 people, some estimated that 200,000 people, were buried.
So we said that we had to get into the peace process.
In Helsinki, the biggest problem was that the word autonomy is dirty word for us, the
Acehnese, because it had dirty connotation for us. As for Indonesian government, independence
was the word we did not talk about. What the wisdom of President Ahtisaari was at that time that
the phrase—nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Later, we agreed that three
words—autonomy, referendum and independence—were taboo. We did not talk about these on
the table. But of course, if you see now what we have you can say it autonomy. Autonomy is the
self-government and self-rule. But this word was avoided. Other strength of Helsinki was that
both sides were able to control its own side. Whatever we said our forces accepted or obeyed.
Same was in the Indonesian side. Of course, there were minor violations about that. The key is
also the realization. You can not write the wrong of history. Of course, Aceh has suffered the
wrong of history. We were independent and attacked by the Dutch. If you think in that way you try
to go back to your previous glory that was not achievable. It is no longer possible. Even for
Britain you don’t need to be Great Britannia. For Palestine, the Jews want to get 2,000 year back
and Palestinians want to go back before 1946. So the key, I think for our talk here, is that how we
can accept the reality and today’s situation. Can we accept today’s situation? What can we get
today? What the Moros can get from Philippines government today? You cannot demand all the
migrants who are settled in your land to go away. That is the reality of life, the painful reality of life.
But if you keep doing that, for the Papuan and for everyone else, it is not possible to write the
wrong of history. In order to be able to face the future, we have to accept this reality.
The foreign adviser fortunately gives some comments for us from the beginning. We took
the foreign adviser because we lost our own legal expert who died in jail during the tsunami. So,
we became just inexperienced people. She (Shadia Marhaban) did not know anything about law
because we were living abroad. But she was the last who left Aceh. Most of us were living in
abroad for decades. So, we need somebody to advise not on the content of negotiation. For
these, we have to be careful. The foreign adviser is not to be allowed to dictate your policies.
What we needed was the format i.e. how the tactics and how to present our case in an
acceptable manner or in the diplomatic way. That is his strength because he is a professor of
foreign relation in different universities. In the last moment when another situation almost
scuttled the agreement, though we agreed on everything, but we wanted to reform the initial
agreement on the number of the Indonesian soldiers remained in Aceh was too high that was
5,700. Even before the Marshall Law, the highest number of soldiers in Aceh was no more 6000.
So, we protested on that and fierce talks took place with the mediators who remained at that time.
40
For the Indonesian side, everything was done. They were gone home. There was no chance any
more that we could call back the Indonesian side. This was our own fault. In fact, our advisors did
not sign. But we decided at that time that we could not allow this hot negotiation to be thrown
away because of this. If you are weak, you should have foreign advisors. I think I should end
here.
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Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Presentation on Aceh Peace Process 2
Shadia Marhaban
Thank you very much for the opportunity. I think Dr. Sofyan Jalil and Nur Djuli have already
mentioned a lot. I would just like to add few things. I think all of us who sits here are victims of
colonization and we have to realize that and really take a look on different angle from what we
have seen in hundreds of years ago. So this is very important to look because I think on our case
why we hold the war for 30 years is for the sake of pride and the dignity of the people. So, when
the resolve of the problem in Aceh use dignity model that really clicks to our demand. Dignity for
all—this is not an anti-promise; this is the promise made by the President himself to solve the
problem in Aceh in a dignified way. We used that as a key to enter the negotiation room. The key
which is very important for us to look not Aceh hundred years back but 20 years from now. What
opportunities we can get 20 years from the signing of peace agreement. I think this is I would like
to share. The second thing is that during the negotiation most of the negotiators are a
combination of people in exile including myself, all of them. So, those people who are mentioned
and who signed the peace negotiation are living in exile at least for 20 years or 20 to 30 years.
Because of the GAM leadership lives in Stockholm and even the war itself in Aceh conducted
through phone because there is a discipline hierarchy of the troops to listen and obey the
instructions from Dr. Hassan Di Tiro from Sweden. There is no war conducted by the field, only in
the emergency matters. But every instruction is coming from Sweden. So, if you think about such
a strong hierarchy-based leadership you could imagine what kind of guy he is, like so powerful in
terms of managing from distance and at the same time looking at the problem closely as it can
be. I am just giving you a slightest example. Sofyan said about discipline army i.e. when the top
said “A” all at the bottom follow “A” and when the top refused everyone would refuse. So this is
very important thing, not very positive, I would say, sometimes it could create problem. But in
terms of implementation of peace agreement this could be very powerful. Because then you
don’t have spoilers, very little spoilers, then you don’t have people to dissatisfied with the result.
I want to comment on the democratization in Indonesia after the reformacy in 1998.
There was a tremendous freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of everything. That was
never happened for the last 32 years under Suharto rule. So when that happened, all the secret
talks that people hide in their rooms just to have a meeting five to ten people clandestine, we
have been organizing also clandestine movement, we manage to show our faces. We talk on TV
and GAM commander can give live talks in TV every week because of freedom of press and
media after the reformacy in Indonesia. So I think that is the plus and also the willingness—the
political will, very great political will from Indonesia to solve the problem in Aceh. Also that was
from the GAM leaderships. I would say the Tsunami is one of the factors because before
Tsunami there were 2 attempts of peace process. It’s not because of the tsunami GAM wants to
sign the peace process, I disagree with that. I think the reason of the tsunami is to expedite the
42
whole thing. But there were 2 attempts in 2000 and 2001 which were failed in Tokyo after the
Tokyo Conference. So, there is willingness even before, long before the tsunami in 2000. There
were willingness to solve the conflict by GAM and also by the Indonesian government; but the
sincerity is not there yet. The sincerity came later when both realize that they cannot win militarily.
Indonesia spent a lot of money on their military budget; unnecessary money spending which they
can use that money for development in various parts of Indonesia. That is used for stopping the
secessionist movement in Aceh. Now they are probably doing the same thing in Papua which is
too much money being spent. I remember when Jusuf Kalla came to Hiroshima, he challenged
the General by saying how much money can you save if I can stop the war in Aceh. I think this is
powerful words. He challenged the General and the General said oh! let me count and then he
found out that if the war stop in Aceh’s 5 provinces can be covered economically in terms of
development. So that huge amount of money to keep soldiers and all the logistics of war. GAM
can stay for another 30 years, it is guerrilla warfare. You know, during the day people are farmers,
they fight at night. Of my families some are fighters. So we used to live like that for many years.
So, for us, it is nothing strange if one of our members becomes GAM. GAM controlled 60-70
percent of the territory, only the main road controlled by the Indonesian army. But once you
stepped out of the main road, let us say for 2-5 kilometers, there is like GAM people are raining
flags and get marry, divorce and everything. Everything is structured under GAM in the village
level. It is almost like the LTTE in Sri Lanka, to that level, not all over in Aceh but in some part like
Northern Aceh and other areas. These are the strong hold pockets of GAM.
The good thing about this agreement, I think, is the big commitment from the European
Union because GAM refused to be mediated by ASEAN or Muslim countries or it’s the other way
around the Mindanao if I understood, you know. We are more like to seek a different instrument;
we want to see something different. So we do not want to experience an agreement where
everybody is pressuring us because more you know the person the easier you can pressure, you
know, on the party. So, GAM wants to have a little bit of flexibility, a room to breathe and that’s
why we agreed to the European Union. When Martti Ahtisaari came and asked for to mediate the
conflict, immediately GAM says ‘yes’ after the tsunami that expedite the whole things. And also
what is amazing, I think, that the GAM is also looking at the opportunity for the economic growth,
for example, at the international level. Since the signing of the peace agreement we managed to
have a direct trade with Malaysia, for example. There is a daily flight now to Malaysia, and to
Penang, which were happening hundred and hundred years ago. Indonesia blocked these
routes for 50-60 years but now it re-opened. So, the gate of Aceh is re-opened, the trade of
Malacca is re-opened and the South East Asia is welcomed to Aceh. It is huge economic benefits.
So, GAM thinks about this. And also they count the role of Indonesia, I think, at the ASEAN level,
as an important aspect. If they signed the peace agreement, economy will grow and everything
will come up. So, they see this possibility because the 30 years of war GAM cannot achieve
anything in terms of economically benefit for the people. I think, since the signing of the peace
agreement Indonesia economic growth rises from 4 to 6 percent per year, if I’m not mistaken.
GAM looked at shifting of the global power. United State is no more the police of the world. The
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police of the world will be shifted to Asia. So, the Western powers will become more and more
irrelevant in the future. So it will be Asia; it will be China; it will be Indonesia; it will be Thailand; it
will be, you know, Japan, may be, not now in the economic crisis, may be in the future. It’s
something that they oversee these kinds of things. To me, it is something great, you know, to talk
about them about this opportunity. This first thing GAM did, after the signing of the peace
agreement, during the period of the first Governor Irwandi Yusuf, was to organize a universal
health care for 4.2 million populations. You don’t have to pay anything, just bring your ID,
anything including her operation, her surgery, dental, eye care, you name it. This system, to me,
is an achievement. When I visit a village, I come to a house and I visit, and I see women groups
sitting there and they said when they just delivered a baby. I asked her did you have to pay for
c-section. No, nothing at all, she replied. I asked, did the doctor charge anything? No, only some
part, you know like diapers and things like that. I was like wow! This is something. Another
example is, tuberculosis goes down because most of the people can go to doctors, can visit to
hospitals, which are not like a luxury place but people come in and out easily. Second is
education. Invest for education is very very important for GAM and for the Indonesian
government because the Indonesian government’s policy do not charge and is very keen to
support the education system in Indonesia including the Islamic boarding school. I think Islamic
boarding school in Indonesia is one of the most successful stories that can share throughout the
world. If you look at Pakistan and others are mostly damaged by the Islamist, you know, and by
all the sorts of violent things. That is another achievement, I would say, that GAM is looking from
a different angle, really from a different angle.
The other is the self-government, the self-government model. I remember Ahtisaari
came to me and asked me to read this thick book about Oland Island in Finland, the example of
Oland Island’s self-government rule and territory, a Swedish speaking population but situated in
Finland. So, I said how could that be? And he said just read it and let me know what you think.
Three days later, I came to him and said Mr. President, I do not think Indonesia will implement;
this is too sophisticated; it is impossible. He said Shadia we live in a reality. If the Indonesia
government wants to implement this even 20 percent, you have something. Because the
question is to start everything is to get a good social welfare for the people and that is what we
did. We did first on health; we did on education; and we did on other social welfare matters that
like the facilities of hospitals, schools and so forth. The money we use from the reconstruction
money, from the tsunami money and also from the post-conflict money that were given by the
central government and also the international donors. So we have all sources of combinations. I
think that the war time is totally different. There is no development, very little development; very
little education, lack of education. The other achievement for what GAM, I think, is quite
successful is the Scholarship Commission. Scholarship Commission is the big investment on
scholarship for Masters and for Ph.D students for Acehnese to go to places like Malaysia,
Canada, Australia, United States, Germany, whatever, and Taiwan. It really invests on science
and technology, and agriculture. Well, some of them think that may be they are not coming back.
We will make them sign and make sure that they come back, and if not, we come and get them.
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So this is the question of want to do it or not. But the willingness is there, very big. The only
problem with GAM is to manage. Because there were managing wars but they cannot manage
administration of government. They are good at work. But they have problem in managing
government. So, this will take time for them because of the military hierarchy; because of the
structure that they have; because of the convenient experience they have for the last 30 years
and nepotism and everything. These are the problems.
The second, of course, is corruption. But the basic service delivery to the people is very
very crucial. Because at the end of the day what do you fighting for? Are you fighting for you? Or
are you fighting for the people? If you say fighting for the people then the people should get what
they demand. At the end of the day you ask yourself. When I visit the village and I said myself
that all the women are happy; they go to paddy field; they can take their kids to school. I’m like
man! This is independence! What do you ask for more? Free school, free education, but of
course, there is a question—how do you sustain it. This is another big issue but a technical issue.
But at least a political will is there, the willingness to serve the people is there. I know, it is not an
easy task for a rebel group but that’s a good start and we try to share this experience. Aceh now
becomes a model for free healthcare. Lot of provinces from Java and West Java came to Aceh
and try to learn how Aceh can do a basic deliver of free health care for the people. I mean, of
course, it is still messy, you know, in terms of arrangements. But at least the willingness is there,
you can learn. So I think that’s all my presentation today. Thank you very much.
45
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
COMMENTS on Aceh Case
Akihisa Matsuno
My comment will be very brief. Looking back at seven years of peace process after peace
agreement in 2005 in Ache, very simply I would say it started with the successful peace
agreement and it went through half successful peace process. After all these things, now we
have relatively grim prospect of becoming stable democracy. Why is this happening? May be this
is purely an outsider’s view, I am not sure whether the insiders have the same view. I think, the
presentation is enough to understand why the peace negotiation was such successfully done.
There are number of factors behind this.
I want to stress here as a student of conflict resolution that the peace negotiation in Ache
was the type of comprehensive solution type. It was more like northern island pattern of conflict
resolution. You discuss everything until down to the details and nothing is agreed if everything is
not agreed. This is unlike an Oslo accord, for example. This is not a step by step resolution
process. I think, the key of the success of peace agreement in Ache was this approach of
comprehensive solution. Very classic but very skillful notion of Martti Ahtisaari, I think.
Then another factor was, of course, the support by international actors such as the EU
with little bit backing of the US and ASEAN involvement in the peace process. But I would say
half successful peace process retrospectively. I was not really aware of this kind of notion when I
was looking at the contemporary situation, but retrospectively because we see now, after seven
years, the present political situation in Aceh is not very democratic. Of course, we cannot expect
Aceh’s democracy exceeds Indonesian level of democracy. It is totally within the Indonesian
political framework. But democracy is much more important in post-conflict society, because I
have experience in East Timor. Yes, East Timor made a successful peacebuilding but
nonetheless after four years of independence it is changing to another conflict. They had to invite
foreign troops from Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia once again to restore stability. The
second phase of peace building began after this political crisis in East Timor in 2006. But this is
not happening in Aceh. So, half successful peace process in Aceh, I think, number of things I
have to raise. One is successful aspect of peace process was DDR, political party formation, and
election. These major parts of political military peace building were successful.
What was lacking in peacebuilding in Aceh was what I called “democracy building”.
Weakness of democracy building is proliferating to all peacebuilding in all over the world. This is
a new area of study. I think that scholars pay more and more attention to the importance of
democracy building rather than security maintainence, political institution, election and so on.
Because democracy is more abstract and it’s scope is really wide; you have to build up not only
democratic institution but you have to build up the notion of democracy deeply rooted in the
society. So that you will have really functioning democracy not only the past democracy formed
in the Indonesian Suharto regime. If you talk about democracy building, you also deal with
46
accountability, transparency, and civic education. Many other things must be done. At the bottom
of democracy building also you have to have a rule of law and transitional justice must be
successfully addressed. You also have to create more democratic environment with the freedom
expression, infrastructure for democracy, facilities for community meetings, and reasonable
political party system. You also have to define competences in power of legislative and executive
and so on. It is very technical area but we have to go beyond just election and political party
formation in post conflict peacebuilding. If we really want to have functioning democracy in a
post-conflict society, this is the new challenge for the peacebuilding in Aceh. So far, I would say
we have been successful, even though I say half successful. Half successful is successful but
then we have to go beyond this.
Thank you very much.
47
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Open Discussion - Aceh (Indonesia) Group
Koirala: What about the combatatants? Are they integrated?
Djuli: As pointed out by Dr. Sofyan, I was in charge of this. Prof. Akihisa said that it is
half-successful. If you look into the task given to me, it was successful because all the duties
assigned to me were carried out. Of 35,000 buildings, 29,000 were built when I left.
Compensations for 3,000 combatants and for another 6,500 non-armed combatants were given.
We also gave compensation for many conflict-victims and orphans. In that sense, it was
successful. When I took office I did initiate another stage of reintegration, which is social
cohesion. We have not even started doing that. There are many reasons for the failure of this. In
the final analysis, I would say that there is non-understanding of what reintegration is either
among central government and Aceh government. I do not think everybody reads carefully the
UN term DDR, which is not, in fact, just DDR. There is another R there which is recession, which
we skip in providing jobs and we did not do that. A specific time-limited was given to me. We
need very long time up to educate for social cohesion to take out the term like “ex-combatants”.
People are just people, not ex-combatants or victims of conflicts. I would say, if we look back, it
was 50 percent successful.
Marhaban: I would like to comment on that because your question is whether the GAM’s
ex-combatants became Indonesian national army. The answer is no. None of them. There is the
article in the MoU that allows them if they want to be trained to become Indonesian national army.
But none of them apply. Not a single person apply. I think that is understandable. People are still
having mix feeling with their pride and dignity to become Indonesian army. But may be in the
future, through education and through lot of cultural exposures with the other Indonesian people.
Imagine that they have been living in that kind of conditions for 10-15 years. The only thing they
know about Indonesia is the army. They have not been the places like Bali and Joyapura, which
are totally different. Their understanding about Indonesia is only soldiers. They need some
cultural exposures to understand this and to regain their trusts. Who are Indonesians? They are
not all the armies. This needs some education and time and also some psychological supports. I
do not think that the Indonesian army is ready to take them because of the issue of trust and so
forth. In the days of conflict, many Acehnese soldiers were defected and became very hard-core
GAM supporters. They still have the issue of trust. I think it is really about time.
Iqbal: Declaration of amnesty was part of whole debate. I raise the question first. When a group
of people struggle, they belive in the justice of their struggles. When an agreement specified that
they are going to be given a general amnesty, I do not think that it would be fair for those people
who undertook struggles. How did the GAM harmonize this? They believe on the justice of their
48
struggle. The declaration of amnesty means that they have committed something against the
Indonesian government. Now they accept the amnesty proclaimation. How did you harmonize?
You believe in justice of your struggle and all of a sudden you are granted amnesty.
Marhaban: The amnesty, what I understood, is given and totally, they do not have to do anything.
GAM person who killed many people during the conflict, they were given amnesty on the basis of
the Helsinki MoU and they can be free. They did not have to require to do anything. There is a
mechanism i.e. Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Due to time, we cannot discuss about this
issue and also it is very complex not only in the case of Aceh but also in the case of Timor Leste.
Djuli: I think, I understood your question. It is a matter of principle. If you have not committed any
offense, why you should be given amnesty? I think, I did quarrel with this term. Then our advisors
said what other term did we have? Those who have commited offenses in Indonesia, how they
can be released from prison? What were we going to say? We decided at that time with just
semantic. The importance was for those people who would be released within two weeks after
the signing of agreements. The majority, I think, more than 1200 were released within two weeks
and for others there were problem of logistic mechanisms. They were released later. There was
very serious contentions about the remaining two, even among ourselves. To me, I stress, they
should be given amnesty because of general amnesty and general means all. People said that
they committed offense under their orders. But there were GAM leaders who gave orders to
these bombers. They were not bombers themeselves. They were businessmen. The man who
did that said it is under them. That was a direct order from Commanders, which amnestiable
offenses. They were charged with treason and possession of arms in the name of terrorism. It is
a mistake to call them terrorist now. Lif imprisonment for them is for treason and belonging to
rebel movement and for possessing of arms which were found in their workshops. I am on the
side that they should be given amnesty. But unfortunately, our top leaderships until today have
not declared openly that they were acting under their orders and thereby, they are giving the
Indonesian government the pre-text for not to free them. I agree with you that the term of
amnesty does not go well with our side but I do not know what other term we can use. Thank you
so much.
Ladiasan: I have a very short question. What do you really mean by foreign advisor? Are they
part of the structure of the peace process? Do they have well-defined functions?
Djuli: Well, he is a foreigner. He was advisor. In fact, when he came, he was in secret. The next
day, the mediators asked us who were those two persons in your room? They are academics
and visiting here for conference and also visiting us, we replied. But of course, later, we admitted
that they were there to advise us because we did not have advisors. In the second round, they
were acknowledge and given recognition. There was no objection officially from Indonesian side
for their presences. From the first day, we made it clear to him and to also among ourselves that
49
he was there for advise us on how to conduct the format. We were not diplomats and we did not
know how to go with the negotiation. I had some experiences in Geneva. But it was different
because we had proximity meeting in Geneva. We talked among ourselves and conveyed it to
the mediator and the mediator went to other room to convey it. We did never meet face to face.
The only time we met face to face was in the openings where we attacked the other side and
they attacked us, that’s all. But we never talked face to face. This was the first time we talked
face to face and we did not even know how to go with this, how to present our case and who
should we talk. This was different in the case of Indonesian team, the leaders would talk. In our
side, the leaders did never say anything unless we needed to be corrected. This gave us
freedom. So, I became the number one shout-shooter. That was not chance. We discussed it
night before. This is what you say tomorrow. We cannot correct our leaders but our leaders can
correct us.
Marhaban: I think the advisor, Prof. David, advised us academically. We knew what we were
suppossed to do but he structured it. He helped us structure the whole things so that we did not
fall to the ground. I think every decision was made by GAM except on the academic issue. When
we thought that he knew more, we seeked for his advice. It was not like that he was advising the
whole political issues and policies. The leadership of GAM, he himself decided at the last
moment whether should we agree or disagree. I think it is just the style, the style of dialogue and
communication. President Ahtisaari was very clear from the begining that that was not an
ongoing negotiation for long. He has already said, “I am here to succeed and if you guys cannot
produce worth, I am out of here”. So, the first thing he did that he gave us that impression
whether we wanted to solve the problem or not. So, the willingness came immediately from both
of us. I think both of us were ready and also momentum were there. So, it is a combination of all.
This is the beauty of the Helsinki agreement; willingness is there; momentum is there; timing and
everything are perfect. It was a game; actually, all of us played different games in that room. We
managed that. We understood that was only the negotiation, which should be delivered
successfully. It was very different because that was in Europe. Everytime we walked out of the
negotiation, there were like 40 cameras, like BBC, CNN, and we had to deliver something. We
had to say something to the press. We could not just walk away. We were pressured to say
something. I have been chased by all the radio and tv reporters. We had to deliver something to
the international community because they are banking on the reconstruction efforts in Aceh.
Indonesia is a huge country, one of the democratic Islamic country in the world. And the world
needs to save Indonesia. So, it was not a small task for us. We were just nine of us. We had to
say something to the press after every meeting whether it was good or bad.
Djalil: I want to add some perspectives from Indonesian side. We knew that they had advisors,
but we never met them. Only five people from GAM and five people from Indonesia see each
other. Actually, all the strategies are discussed in the bed room. The speaker or the negotiator
just delivers what they have discussed or what we have prepared in our room. I think, talking
50
directly is very important. You can see their faces and body languages. You can hear and feel
their angers and animosity.
Chair: I know there are more discussions and questions. But we can discuss more later in this
afternoon. I think now it’s time for break.
Yoshida: Thank you very much for your active participation in the morning session.
51
Panel-3: Nepal Group Presentations
Chair
Osamu Yoshida
Professor, Graduate School of Social Sciences/IDEC,
Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee
Presenters
Padma Ratna Tuladhar
Facilitator for the Peace Talk between Govt. and Maoist during “People’s War”,
Former-Minister of Health and Labour
Shekhar Koirala
Former Member of the Constituent Assembly,
Member of the Central Committee of the Nepali Congress
Krishna Bahadur Mahara (Attended by paper)
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Former Minister of Communication, Govt. of Nepal,
Member of the Center Committee in charge of the International Affairs of the United
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
52
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 1
Padma Ratna Tuladhar
Today I would like to share my personal experiences as one of facilitators.
From the very beginning of Maoist insurgency, In short I just wanted to inform you that
Nepal was ruled by say Monarchy and the family, autocratic rule was imposed for hundred and
four years. So when Nepali congress the Democratic Party led one revolution for introduction of
democracy in Nepal for the first time that was said to be a successful revolution but because of
several reasons you see our leader could not have constituent national election to make new
constitution and transition period was prolonged for long eight years.
In 1950 the revolution was there but only in 1958 we could have general election for
parliament. So the monarchy was there you see which always intervened and say ruled by
himself. King Mahendra that was a sort of royal coup which say the elected government was
there led by B.P. Koirala a famous democratic and socialist leader of Nepal or even south Asia
that the government was Nepali congress, they won the election with couple whelming majority
more than two third but the king was there you see so ambitious to rule by himself.
After that Nepali congress leaders, prime minister, ministers or so many leaders were
imprisoned and some of them fled to India as exile. So it took another say, 1960 to 1990, 30
years. It took 30 years. 30 years long you see, period of time for Nepalese political parties to
restore multiparty democracy and that movement was unitedly led by congress and the
communist fronts, Seven party, left parties were together in one front and another 5 communist
groups were together in another front. But the seven party front was together with Nepali
congress and the pro democracy movement was supported by India and other European
countries for democracy and peace Nepal. And there was say the parliament but the stability
was not there, political old stability was there but the parties could not deliver the expected
results from democracy. So there was a sort of dissatisfaction from the people from manifest.
So when the parties became weaker and weaker, then the King Gyanendra he also came to
rule the country by himself.
Then the elected government was disclosed, prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was
there and the parties were so weak, they could not come to the street to oppose the royal action
immediately. Only civil society group including myself were there in the center of Kathmandu to
oppose the King’s undemocratic intervention, resolution of parliament etc. When it became a
very serious problem for the country regarding democracy, development so the Nepali congress
and the united left from supported from civil society they led another prodemocracy movement
which is said to be ‘jana andolan second’ the people’s movement second that was also
supported by India and other democratic countries from all over the world.
That was successful within 19 days. The king was compelled to give up his rights and
parliament was restored and again the political parties could form democratic government. And
53
before that Maoist had started for example on Mindanao wise you have signed peace accord in
1996 but at the same time you see the Maoist party in Nepal declared for the first time in Nepal
in their own term that was ‘long term people’s war’.
At the beginning, the communist party, Maoist, was a very small party so many many
people could not believe that they could do any achievement but Nepalese people being poor,
you know Nepal being small country but very rich in diversity, we have ethnic diversity,
language diversity, cultural diversity, numbering more than 100. So Maoist although you see
they were small organization but when they started the war with the declaration that they
wanted to destroy parliamentary system and they want to establish people’s government,
people’s code, everything people’s like in China you see. So the Internationals also became
concerned because on the one hand China was there with people’s government with people’s
system, communist system, one party rule was there again on the other you see in India also
Communist party known as Naxalite now better known as Maoist also they are waging people’s
war or insurgency so for this region there was international concern also from the very
beginning that the Nepalese Maoist may create very big problem by imposing another
communist rule in Nepal.
And when the Maoist started insurgency for example in the beginning that was not so
affective but when they began to organize people from several ethnic groups because they
were deprived, they were discriminated, they were very poor. So once when Maoist commies
for the better life most of them joined insurgency raising arms including the women. And that
affected the whole country for example once they claim that they had already captured 80% of
the land but the international players or independent observers who visited several parts of the
country they said that if not 80% but at least 50% had already been captured by the Maoist i.e.,
police force were withdrawn by the government because of the Maoist threat.
Similarly the political parties also withdrew their party officers because of the terrorist
like actions or attacks against the party. That was the meaning of Maoist party capturing so
many parts of the country. And because of insurgency from both sides’ states and the Maoist
began to kill people even the innocent people, unlawful killings were there, exclusions were
there, so the Nepalese civil society, human rights movement also wanted the problem to be
solved peacefully through dialogue. So from the very beginning the civil society was there,
human right movement was there and people like myself were there to convince the Maoist and
the government.
But to start the dialogue for the peaceful solution, in the beginning it was very difficult to
trust Maoist if they come to the dialogue table or not because Maoist were also associated with
rim revolution international movement based on London which was said to be the international
center for the Maoist and their policy was said to be to fight to finish and to compromise to have
any solution to peaceful means etc.
Similarly in south Asia Maoist themselves formed, composed the Maoist center of the
south Asian countries. So it was very difficult for many national international could come to the
54
dialogue table. But with so many people involved, as facilitators formally and informally and
international press was there, so Maoist accepted to come to the dialogue table.
In 2001, that was the first official talks between them and government, Nepali congress
government that was. Maoist delegates came to Kathmandu for talks and that was failed within
month because Maoist had demanded a sort of say constitute assembly was said to be their
bottom line, then global sorry round table conference, interim government and the institutional
development of republican state. That time Nepal is a monarchical country so then government
the palace and other parties also couldn't accept the Maoist demand for republican, constituent
assembly, and people conference etc. The talks thus failed in 2001 and 2003 also. Only when
you see the King was there to rule by himself the parties became united and also they went to
Maoist for serious talks and Girija Prasad Koirala the great leader of Nepal who led our peace
process he was the one who decided by himself to go to New Delhi to talk to Prachanda the
supreme of communist party Maoist and that was a success. So the 7 party alliances, the
parliamentary parties and the Maoist have 12 point historical, 12 point agreement which
accepted for example multi party democracy, human rights and also constitution assembly etc.
The people became very hopeful that the parties, 7 party alliances, the Maoist party if
they come together to fight against monarchy the autocracy then we could bring democracy,
restore again. So people support was there, parties were united, international communities
support was there so we began our peace process. The interim constitution was promulgated
you must know because the present interim constitution, Nepal was declared by constitution as
a Hindu Kingdom because Hindus are there more than 80% of the population but because of
the movement led by Nepali congress and also the communists so they agreed to go for
secularism multi party democracy, periodical election, new constitution by constitution assembly
so many fundamental things were written in the interim constitution and that was said to be the
very successful beginning of peace process.
The interim parliament was there, restored parliament was there, the Maoist back from
jungle, the rebels were also met the members of parliament without any election as a major
political force for example Nepali congress was the first force the largest one in the parliament
and the second largest was another communist party known as united Marxist Leninist. The
Maoist got the seats just as par to the second largest communist party. So they also joined
interim government. Thus our peace process was started very successfully and the election for
constitution assembly was there, national international observers were there including all united
nation was there, including UNMIN United Nation was there.
All said that the election was free and fair and peaceful and Maoist came as the largest
political party through that election that was not expected by many many you see because they
came to peace process and they are just back from jungle from war how could they capture the
support of the masses. But you see to the surprise of many they became the largest one. So
Maoist formed new government led by Prachanda himself but as one of you said that the
process was successful or the experience in war was good but no good governance etc.
Similarly our Maoist also have been recognized as good in war people’s war but failed in
55
administration so Prachanda within 9 months he resigned and now again we do have another
problem on stability for example after Prachanda we did have another three governments one
after another. So many people were hopeful including myself that our peace process would be
concluded in time, our constitution could be finally drafted and promulgated within 2 years, but
we failed our leaders failed and the constitution assembly was elected for two years and that
was extended for another two years and the peace process for example the major party of the
peace process was that of integration of Maoist combatants into national armies that is also not
yet completed. So in our case, peace process is still going on and the constitution is to be
drafted again, promulgated again. Now the parliament parties are again in conflict. You must be
quite aware of the fact that in Nepal the conflict was totally political one on the one hand
revolutionary Maoist are there ideology is there, Marxist ideology and on the other the major
political party Nepali congress a democratic party a socialist party. So this conflict in Nepal is
said or recognized as purely a political conflict so we wanted the political parties to sit together
again and have seriousness or will power to be stronger to solve the problem that is to conclude
the peace process and to promulgate the new constitution. Thank you.
56
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 2
Shekhar Koirala
First of all, I thank to the organizer for providing this opportunity to share my views in this
workshop. The topic itself of the workshop is shifting conflicts from arms to dialogue. Since that
the dialogue and more meaningful dialogue is important and is the only answer for any conflict.
If we don't have dialogue or meaningful dialogue then it will be difficult.
As Mr Tuladhar has already said it in brief, He believe that the Maoist movement which
started in 1996 and which came to an end with comprehensive peace accord between Maoist
and the government that is seven party alliance in 2006. The triggering factor for conflict was
the monarch who was autocratic. The other factors of course was there like socio economic,
cultural, caste and ethnic discrimination and economic disparity. And there was also regional
imbalance in Nepal. There was a triangular fact between the monarch, the political parties which
represents the parliament or who believes in parliament and the Maoist. In fact there are three
political actors in the Nepalese political conflict, the monarchy, the seven political alliance and
the Maoist. Interestingly the history of politics in Nepal is the history of struggle for power
between the monarchy and the political parties as Mr Tuladhar has already said. However it
seems that monarchy and the political parties built the Maoist as the third force. Since the
Maoist were weakening in the political powers on the grass root level the monarchy was not
interested in wiping out the Maoist. As its main political force were the political parties that are
deprived the monarchy of the executive power through the people’s movement in 1990.
On the issue of deployment of army initially there was a tussle between the prime
minister that time it was GP Koirala and King Birendra and later on King Gyanendra also who
was not in favor of military action as he was lust to tacit working understanding with the Maoist
which the present Prime Minister Baburam, he is a Maoist has acknowledged in his article too.
During King Gyanendta’s tenure, Mr Koirala resigned due to the passive rule of Nepal
army in taking an action on mass gathering of Maoist in one of the district in Nepal that is Rolpa.
The Maoist on the other hand were interested in weakening the political parties because it
wanted to capture the state power with the help of monarchy.
From the very beginning, Maoist were against multi party democracy and parliamentary
system but not against the Monarchy as an institution initially and this was suitable to the King
too. In the meantime lots of civilians specially those affiliated with Nepali parliament particularly
in the rural areas were killed by the Maoist on the pretext of them being either informers for the
Nepal army or having feudal inclinations. Apart from civilians many Maoist rebels were killed by
the security forces and those in the police and the army were killed in encounter too. It’s very
interesting then Prime Minister Mr Koirala he was stanch anti communist and was not in favor of
any kind of dialogue with the Maoist that time. However his perceptions has changed when two
young Nepali congress cadres were murdered by Maoists in the tour far from districts when he
57
was on tour. Following this incident he spoke publicly in a meeting promising the people that
there will be no bloodshed and that he would work to make Nepal peaceful again. And he
tirelessly worked and he have no connection with Mr Prachanda that time and some how other
he got the middle person whom he could contact and its written in my paper. That way he came
in contact with Mr. Prachanda and later on he flew to China he was on a tour to China he
contacted Prachanda from there. Mr. Prachanda was there in Delhi and imagine a Nepali leader
who is in a tour to China flew straight from China to Delhi that is very many objectionable from
Chinese point of view or something like that. In the meantime the political parties we have
seven political parties who believe in parliamentary system. We were agitating but we could not
reach to any conclusion.
And the civil society people like Mr Tuladhar and others few of you might have met Mr
Daman Nath Dhungana also last year. They insisted that the political parties should come with
one agenda. Then only we can convince the Maoist. And the seven political parties they sat
together for several days and come up with the statement saying that the restoration of the
parliament is a must and we will go up to the election of CA. This led to the Maoist to being
assured that the political parties were serious about the peace process.
And then following this we had a 12 points understanding between the seven political
parties and the Maoist. And there was a debate between the seven parties and the Maoist.
Maoist they want to have an agreement. But Mr Koirala categorically said that if we will have an
agreement then we cannot move ahead in Nepal because there is a terrorist tag was put in by
US and other countries for the Maoist. So he convinced the Maoist that we should not have an
agreement we should just have understanding and we should move ahead. Secondly, Maoist
wanted to have republican system to be written in the 12 point understanding. Mr Koirala
convinced the Maoist leader that look if you will write republican system right now it will be
difficult for me to convince the international communities as well as the national actors. So we
should go for total democracy should be written instead of republican.
While going for the movement you can say that republican system and we will say the
total democracy. That way we have, that is there in the 12 point understanding. And third is
everyone in Nepal was concerned about there should be some supervision or some monitors or
some thing should be there for the combatants and royal Nepal army that time we used to call
royal Nepal army. And its written clearly in the agreement that combatants and the royal Nepal
army would have to be kept under the supervision of United Nation to please the Maoist and to
please India or other reliable international agency because you cannot displease India and go
ahead that was the situation at that time so we have mentioned other reliable international
agencies. And after that 19 days movement, of course we had a hectic telephonic conversation
and one to one conversation.
GPK(Girija Prasad Koirala), it’s very interesting, GPK has a separate telephone or
satellite telephone to talk to Prachanda that was the scenario because army was after him and
that's how we have reached the peace process and the CA (Constitution Assembly) elections.
But the latest situation, I will just be very brief we failed to promulgate the constitution. And the
58
take of 3000 plus Maoist combatants are waiting for integration in Nepal Army. Frustration
among them is increasing, if we don't start the integration process then things may go from bad
to worse. We don't have truth and reconciliation commission. We don't have we have yet to
make a disappearance commission yet to be formed. We are not able to form it because the
Maoist, the Nepal army and the leaders of the political parties they are bit afraid that if we go for
truth and reconciliation commission according to the international laws they may lined up in
trouble.
This is the scenario at present. I will stop it here. Time is also running out, I suppose
and if there is any question I will be happy. Thank you.
59
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 3
Krishna Bahadur Mahara (Attended by paper)
Dignitaries, Valued Participants, Ladies and Gentleman, please allow me to express my
heartiest thanks to the organizer for providing the opportunity of my opinion in this very
important second HiPeC Peace process Exchange workshop. I regret to mention that in spite of
my interest and will, I couldn't participate in this very important second HiPeC Peace process
Exchange workshop due to my bad health. Despite my illness, I was still planning to attend the
program but doctor strongly suggested having a complete rest. I had a great interest to
participate in this workshop and share my views and feelings, by my sudden sickness didn't let it
happen. So, I have sent my opinion as a brief statement.
At the outset I would like to briefly appraise the political discourse of last almost one and
half decade. People's war and movements in this period remained epoch making and
unprecedented in the global history of nations. Nepal's political movement dates back to
hundreds of years but I am briefly appraising the political movement of last decade that brought
a historic political transformation in Nepal. The then Nepal Communist Party Maoist (United
Nepal Communist Party, Maoist) launched peoples war in February 1996 for the first time in the
Nepalese history. The poor state of socio-economic conditions of the people, hierarchical
society that discriminates people based on caste and largely ever widening economic
inequalities were the real source of people's dissatisfaction that provided a solid ground for
revolt. State power monopolized by the monarchy limiting democratic rights of the people further
fueled the people's movement and people's war. People's war continued for a decade and
intensified affecting every walk of life. War raised the voices of oppressed and deprived people.
Legitimate government sequised to few urban areas that too with limited control. Different trials
with ad hoc policies adopted by frequently changing government but failed to yield any desired
result. In the midst of widely spreaded insurgency, uncertainties and political squabbles in the
capital among political parties with the then king a Royal Take Over took place in 2004. Royal
government intensified the war against Maoists and concurrently tried to limit the rights of
parliamentary parties. Parliamentary parties launched street protest in capital and few other
urban areas that was largely ignored by the royal regime. Democratic and human right
institutions stimulated the political parties to voice jointly with Maoists against the Royal move
which paved the way for polarization of political parties with the king and his supporters. Maoists
too while intensifying their war mounting pressure to king where trying to bringing in
socioeconomic transformation in Nepal with minimum casuality and loss. When autocratic
dynasty ruled feudal regime was emerging Maoists thought that the regime must go first to
secure the people' s right and liberate from feudal regime. They convene a meeting, which is
popularly known as Chunawang plenum, took decision to fight against monarchy joining hand
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with parliamentary parties. This was a big opportunity for the political parties to bring the Maoist
nearer to them rallying against the king. Alliance of the political parties for Peoples movement
(Jan Andolan) fighting against kingship took momentum only when seven party alliance signed
a 12 point pact with CPNM against royal regime in November 2006 vowed to fight against king.
Seven party alliances too were not strong enough to fight against royal government. That
compulsion dragged them to join hand with the then rebel forces. Both the forces realized that
feudal monarchical system is the primary cause of deprivation, discrimination and
backwardness of the Nepalese society that had to do away with first for the socioeconomic
transformation of Nepal. Joint movement succeeded to step down the monarchy and seven
political parties with the CPNM took over the power. The major factor that brought in the political
parties together with Maoists was their inability to bringing desired change in the country fighting
separately or independently. Maoists could have secured the goal but with huge loss of lives
probably and with protracted war for several years to come. Maoist didn't opt that route. Seven
parties too took people into street for several months and realized that king will not listen them.
King had largely ignored their movement in many occasions. There was broader consensus
among civil societies, political actors and people's from different walks of life that Nepal should
remain a democratic country abiding by fundamental principles of democracy and human right.
That brought broader consensus among many stake holders. Many independent civil society
leaders facilitated the negotiations directly and indirectly. The basic characteristics of Nepal’s
peace process was no external mediation, as normally used to in many a case, there. In many
times we fiercely divide and reach virtually to a point to collapse peace process but again
resume for dialogue and came to conclusion. We sometime reach to deadlock and see no light
to move ahead but after sometime we find ways to settledown over differences. This was a
protracted, tedious and tireless job demands tremends patience, wisdom, flexibility, and ability
to take risk. We never give up hope of peace and agreement through dialogue even if sharp
differences emerge over issues in the negotiating table.
When Maoists suspended all armed movement after signing comprehensive Peace
Accord with the then Seven Party Alliance in November 2006 that paved the way for peaceful
transformation of the society. After the success of the popular people's movement the
intensively launched for 19 days, which is popularly known a spring movement, the political
situation changed remarkably. The success of the movement paved way to create conducive
platform of meetings and dialogue between political parties and the then CPN Maoist. A number
of agreements were made fallowed by decision made on consensus for restating the dissolved
house of parliament, agreement on ceasefire and formation of Negotiation Team of six
members-three from seven party alliance government and three from Maoist to discuss on each
aspect of the state affairs are few to mention. Historic Comprehensive Peace Accord was
signed and made public which was a milestone and foundation document for furthering peace
process in Nepal. Interim constitution was promulgated as a consensus document among
parliamentary political parties and Nepal communist party Maoists to run state affairs. This
document also paved way for the election of constitution assembly for the first time in Nepalese
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history. The interim constitution also declared Nepal as a federal democratic country with the
aim of empowering people at the grass root level.
Election of the constitutional assembly held for promulgating constitution through
elected representatives and eventually king ousted from throne in 2008. Last king of the Shah
dynasty, Gyanendra shah, had to quit throne after the first ever elected constitution assembly
took decision to abolish monarchy and declared Nepal a federal republic by its very first meeting.
Eventually king was forced to abandon power privileged to rule Nepal for last 240 years under
the shah dynasty. By this process Nepal become the newest republic in the world.
Although declaration of republicanism, election of constitution assembly and suspension
of all armed movement by the NCPM were historic achievements we have ever made the
doubting task remained adjacent to the political parties such as making constitution, integrating
and rehabilitating Maoist army to the Nepali security agencies and society for concluding peace
process founded on the comprehensive peace accord.
Constitutional assembly worked for four years, two years term as elected before and
two years extended period. Unfortunately, the most inclusive constituent assembly failed to
promulgate constitution and its term expired on May 27, 2012. The incumbent government has
declared fresh election of constitution assembly. Election requires amendment of different laws
that needs a broader political consensus in absence of parliament to amend laws. Government
is trying to care conducive environment for the election. The only way to legitimize the
government is election. Nepalese people want constitution written by their representative
nothing less. For that to happen we have to go for fresh election sooner than later, there is no
alternative to election, however intensive dialogue, understanding and flexibility in the part of
different political parties is required to bringing in consensus for election.
All the people's aspirations for socioeconomic transformation remained pending until
the new constitution evolves with the incorporation of basic expectations of the people.
Federalism, identity, rights of the oppressed and deprived, system that ensures fair and
equitable access over state resources are the required prerequisites for new constitution. Under
that foundation we can embark on a picture of a prosperous, just and equitable society of
Nepalese people. For achieving this negotiation will all stakeholders and regimes is must. So I
personally strongly believe that this kind of HiPeC exchange program with conflicting parties in
State will definitely help to build thrust and learn from each other experiences. I wise better
success on its aim.
Thank you.
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Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Open Discussion - Nepal Group
Djuli: Can you please elaborate how Maoists were able to establish the foothold? Does China
has anything to do with it?
Tuladhar: China being a northern neighbor and also a communist country so the impression in
the beginning when Maoist started insurgency that the Maoist party was directly influenced by
Chinese party but that was not true because the Maoist all over the world thought and said that
after Mao there is no communist party at all and the present Chinese communist party is
indigenous party. So there was no influence from China politically but when Maoist came to
power leading the government then state regulation began and Prachanda as Prime Minister
visited China first before visiting New Delhi otherwise the precedent was there that each and
every Nepalese Prime Minister should visit first to India but Prachanda a communist leader
visited first to China that was a problem that time with India also. So I think the Nepalese
communist movement was directly influenced by Indian communist movement not the Chinese
communist movement because we are so close to New Delhi or India and was still was far to
China because of our huge Himalayan mountains.
Djuli: What is the logic in calling them Maoist?
Tuladhar: After the election they came as the largest party in the constituent assembly. Logic
behind calling them Maoist…..Again communist movement they were divided when Soviet Union
was there the Chinese communist and the Russian communist divided. One center was that at
Moscow and another center was that of Peking. So in India for example the communist party of
India was with Soviet Union and communist party Marxist were with China. Similarly in Nepal
also the communist parties were divided similarly so this Maoist party other communist just took
Maoist thought as Mao. This communist party Maoist took the Maoist thought as Maoism. So
they are known as Maoism, not only in Nepal but also in India and several countries.
Chair: Probably it is most south Asian, to call that kind of communist party are called Maoist.
There strategy is may be typically the Maoist when we see the history of the communist party in
China during the Second World War after Second World War to control the whole state of China
so that their basic strategy is to encircle the city by the control of the rural areas. That kind of
strategy is sometimes called Maoist. That is the reason why they call themselves as Maoist.
Marhaban: I would like to address this question to Dr Padma may be can answer. I remember
when I visited in 2009 or 2010 I cannot remember exactly but there was a big hope for the
constitution building at that time. So my question is what are the most challenging enriching the
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political consensus in terms of enriching the political constitution….what are the biggest
challenges because you see the feeling of 2010 was very big in terms of hope gaining trust and
you can build this trust already so but now the constitution failed and you have to start again so I
just curious you know to know what are the biggest tumbling block, biggest challenges you may
face.
Tuladhar: You must know our constitution was elected for two years to draft the constitution and
to promulgate it. So the expectation was that the 7 party alliance and the Maoist when they
agreed to go for constitution assembly election along with several other democratic values
accepted and the interim constitution said that each and every thing to be decided consensus all
political parties in CA more than 25 parties were there major parties were just four and that was
extended for another two years, six months, three months, three months etc. because the parties
could not draft major issues in CA. Now at last when it is to be just last phase of four years the
parties very badly divided on federal issues that is for federalism while say committed by all the
parties including Nepali Congress and Maoist. But they differed all a sort of nature of provinces
to be formed. For example the Maoist wanted the provinces to be formed from the basis of ethnic
identity. Also the indigenous movement wanted the same, Tarai also wanted same. So Nepali
congress and UML two major parties could not agree with Maoist and indigenous movement to
go for a sort of racial type of ethnic type of state.
Chair: Dr Koirala may want to speak something on this issue, please.
Koirala: Mr Tuladhar has already said about the difference, the real difference is on federalism
whether we should go for ethnic federalism or that is single identity in hills and two in the plains
because Nepal is a multiethnic, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic and multi state and no community
and no ethnic community is in majority in anywhere. So Nepali Congress and UML is saying that
we should not go for the ethnic federalism number one and in plains there should be more than
two states or two provinces you can say because it's a long strip 1400km strip small strip
extending from far east of Nepal to far west and it should be divided into two or three otherwise it
would be difficult to manage but the Maoist and the Madeshi Morcha the another political group
they didn't agree they said that in hills it should be 8 states and in plain that two in single identical
base and secondly in plains it should be two. That is the major contentious issues in federalism
and that created the problem and we could not have the constitution on 27th of May.
Djuli: Thank you I have two questions…mentioned and during the first seminar of HiPeC there
was mentioned that the number of Maoist troops were increased when compensation were paid.
So the initial number there was some number mentioned then when the compensation was
started to be paid the numbers were somehow increased. The second question is that now has
the disarmament taken place, has the troops disarmed completely, partly or not at all. Thank
you.
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Koi: In fact we the political parties initially thought that Maoist combatants won’t be more than six
thousand to seven thousand and so initially we thought that we have to integrate round about
three thousand to four thousand something like that and we will send back home to others but
when the integration process started when they came to the camps it came around almost 30
thousand or so initially and we were very much dissatisfied with the Maoist because the Maoist
leader has a one to one discussion with our leader and all the time Maoist leader was saying that
we should not we will not have more than six to seven thousand or so. And secondly there was
lots of miners and the UNMIN, the UN mission they have sent the miners back home and
disarmament has now already been done in the sense that there was a chaotic situation within
the camps and the deputy commanders, commanders and everyone was very upset because
there was a political differences while the peace process because we have to know then only we
can, the leadership became weak not only in the Maoist but also in 7 party alliances of course
there is no 7 party alliance it has weaken. Similarly in the Maoist also there was a infighting
within their own party and the combatants were also divided in that line and that was the reason
that we had to and Maoist leader he promptly without wasting any time he just ordered that all
the camps should be taken over by the army and now they are disarmed and 3000 plus 3127
something like that is about to be integrated, they are still in the camps.
Chair: Thank you very much.
Iqbal: I don't know if I got correctly, the way I understood the presentation that right now the
current situation in Nepal is that president resign, president or prime minister resign.
Maharjan: It’s not resign, the constitution assembly equivalent to parliament is dissolved.
Iqbal: There is no new prime minister, dissolved. Consequently if the parliament is dissolved
new election is not called for then. There is no prime minster. That's how I understand it. I
understand that constitution was not promulgated. And then the reintegration process of Maoist
combatants has not been completed. So in other words I am trying to say here is the current
situation in Nepal right now is that there is no group in control, there is a vacuum power because
there is a vacuum power, and this opened to three situations. One, it is fertile for outside
intervention. Second, there is going to be a civil war because nobody is in control. Third, may be
a stronger party its obliviously military will take over. What’s the real situation in Nepal right now
and what’s going to be happened in the near future if you make time to figure out what is going to
happen, that's my question.
Tuladhar: After the end of constitution assembly we still do have interim constitution and the
prime minister was there, elected prime minister he was. He had majority. But the interim
constitution did not imagined that constitution assembly will be dissolved without new
constitution. So that's the big problem. We do have elected president and elected prime minister
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now. Now prime minister has been as president himself stated that he is now just a caretaker
government. Now the parties are still you see having serious discussions for the solution of this
present crisis. The prime minister before the dissolution of CA itself because he was to be
dissolved at the midnight 12 o’clock. So he declared new election for CA before the dissolution of
parliament. The controversy is prime minister dissolved the CA and constitution CA was
automatically dissolved. This kind of debate is also going on so as per as your concern about say
military take over for an intervention etc. etc. we don't think so because we still do have serious
political party, Nepali congress historical political party. Maoists are also for peace and
constitution. So we are quite hopeful that parties could come again together for the solution,
democratic solution or the solution for the benefit of the country will certainly happen.
Koirala: Constitution assembly is dissolved. The prime minister is caretaker. And the
constitution, the interim constitution is silent about how to go for next election. Of course up to
that part there is a vacuum. We all agree on that but there is seriousness on the part of the
political parties that we are having discussions almost every day. May be there are four major
political parties at present. Sometimes we four sit, sometimes only three. And sometimes just
bilateral. And we are serious about it that things should move as early as possible and personally
not only from my side but all political parties if u ask the same questions there is a vacuum but
there won’t be any outside intervention, there won’t be any army coup we don't think so and
there won’t be any civil war at present. Thank you.
Chair: Thank you very much. Any questions?
Tanggahma: May I ask the questions to all three? My first question is really about history and its
I think for the two cases were history doesn't seem to be same from one side into the other there
is different interpretation of how history in one case. The Philippines took over, before that
people who already more or less nation state or people were and on the other side we have
Ache who is recognized by other nation state as a separate entity. So my question really is
during these negotiation talks that you have what do you do with that side of history do you talk
about it or do you leave it aside and you don't talk at all about the differences or interpretation
that you might have with the other party. Because for in our case we have completely different
version of history with Indonesians. Indonesians tell us or tell the world that they freed us from
the Dutch colonizers and we say know we became annex we became next annexation to
Indonesia and we were not freed all. We went from one colonizer to another. And I really don't
see how during such negotiation we would be able to forget about that so that's one thing that I
curious to know during such dialogue such a dialogue what do you do with that? Do you start
recognizing that or do you not talk about it at all. The second question is about the role of women.
What is the role of women? Do they play a prominent role, dominant role in bringing about these
dialogue or during the dialogue? As see during the dialogue we do have seen in Ache. A
prominent player how does it happen in other cases. In our case what I believe is that the women
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will have to carry a lot to actual push towards the dialogue so I am curious to know about that
side of issue or that kind of perspective. So it was my 2 questions to all three.
Chair: Thank you for the questions about the status, then female role that can be a topic for
general discussion so that we will keep these questions for next session. So any other questions
for Nepali case. If not, ok please.
Djalil: To the Nepal group, who facilitated negotiation among the parties and who appointed their
facilitator? Thank you.
Tuladhar: Nepali peace process was appreciated by many experts as home grown indigenous
or facilitated by insiders because outsiders an agencies or staffs could not be accepted by our
government and Maoist. So in the first official talks that the Maoist proposed two names, myself
and Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana a democrat. then accepted by prime minister by Congress
leader Sher Bhadur Deuba and in the second talks that was during the Kings’ regime under two
prime ministers we were four facilitators, two proposed and supported by Nepali Congress and
another two were added from the palace but we all together worked as one group. And during
our this ongoing peace process I of us was nominated as observer from civil society. Although
civil society human rights movement were there offering facilitation for peace process of this
insurgency but finally with the government and the Maoist party they themselves decided to
appoint the facilitators, observers.
Chair: Thank you very much and now the as the time to stop this session and we have the ten
minutes break and after that we have general discussion for one hour that is the last session for
today. Thank you very much for the participation.
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Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Day 1 : GENERAL DISCUSSION
Chair: Let’s start the last session for today, general discussion for about one hour. We have
summarized the discussion of each group. I think still we have some questions and you can
exchange our views.
Ladiasan: My question is about Nepal. Koirala’s presentation mentioned about 12-point
understanding. Was the issue of terrorist target on the Maoist cover under the agreement? For
us, it was an issue. MILF was targeted as “terrorist” organization. Is the agreement only about
constitutional promulgation?
Koirala: The 12-point understanding is the annex of the Interim Constitution. When we had the
12-point understanding, there was a terrorist tag on Maoist.
Ladiasan: How you did this? I mean what is the implication of that tag?
Koirala: From Nepal side, that had already been gone. I mean that we did not mention terrorist
issue in the 12-point understanding. It is only about the roadmap that how we reach to
Constitutional Assembly and to make a new Constitution.
Tuladhar: Before the 12-point agreement in New Delhi, when the Maoist were having attacks,
destroying infrastructures and killing people, that was said to be terror like actions. Government
branded them as “terrorist” and also declared prizes for the heads of individual leaders. When
there was ceasefire, especially when the 12-point agreement was settled, there was no problem
in Nepali side. The problem was, for example, US. They also branded Maoists as “terrorist” after
the 9/11. It is still to be withdrawn. India also declared Maoist “terrorist”, although Maoist was said
to be hiding in New Delhi. When the Maoist came to the peace process and through the election
they became the largest one, the rebel relation with US was stopped. For example, the US
Ambassador used to visit the Maoist Prime Minister. May be they did not discuss on the
withdrawal of “terrorist” tag. Recently, the Americans said that now they are in the process of
withdrawal of the tag. Americans accepted Maoists and cooperated fully in the peace process.
Iqbal:At the beginning of your presentation, you mentioned Nepal is a Hindu state and right now,
there is democratization. My question is how democratization affects caste system in Nepal?
Tuladhar: According to our Interim Constitution, Nepal is a secular country, though Hindu
population is around 80 percent. There were several movements and civil society movements
that one day Nepal would be a democratic country and equal rights given to all including religious
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groups. We do have Christians, Buddhists, Hindus and smaller sections of religious groups.
According to Human rights value, all the religions should be treated equally. We thought that
these kinds of problems would be resolved by the Interim Constitution. But at the same time,
Hinduism, being the largest religion, guides so many things such as culture. We had King, who
used to be believed as the incarnation of Hindu God; still there are some people having that kind
of faith. Politically, we are secular. When we had, say, republican state, he (the King) was
criticized because he used to visit Hindu sites only; he immediately corrected himself and started
visit other religious places also.
Regarding the caste system, it is based on Hinduism. We do have Dalits in the caste
system. Almost 20 percent of our population is still being treated as untouchable caste people; it
is very bad and inhuman. They are fighting against this kind of discrimination. Their movement is
very strong. Dalits are scattered in many parts of the country and they could not have any
specific area or zone to have separate province or state. The Commission for state restructuring
issue proposed for one non-territorial province for Dalits. But they denied saying that they are
scattered.
Tanggahma: What about the differences in historical perspectives or interpretations? During the
negotiation talk did you leave that aside? In our case, it is one of the issues because we look
history very differently. The second question is about the women’s role in bringing about such
peace talks. Do they play certain roles? My questions are for all three cases.
Iqbal:In the Philippines, there is strong women movement. Of course, we do recognize the role
and importance of women’s participation in the current peace process. As a matter of reality, we
have two women members in the MILF board of consultation, one is lawyer and the other is an
educator. To me, men and women are equal in individual capacity. It is a requirement to include
women in peace negotiation.
Djuli: Well, I mentioned earlier that you cannot write the wrong of history. We have been wrong
many times by the Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesia. Do you want to accept the reality today or
you want to return to history? That is clearly impossible. If you want peace, you have to accept
the reality and look for future. Our struggle is about sovereignty. We want to get back our
sovereignty that was taken by the Dutch and returned to Indonesia, not to us. The Dutch
declared war against Aceh, not against Indonesia, because we were recognized as nation-state.
We had been in war since 1873. We felt that are we going to continue fighting with Indonesia with
half a million soldiers. We arrived at the place that we realized that this is really nowhere. People
are suffering and eventually we will be in extinct. Facing that fact, we realized that we have to
look into the future. We decided to get the best what we could get on that day. What is possible
for us then? We try to get the best. This is very important. Ask yourself. Can you accept the
reality of today? If you can, then you can proceed to the negotiation. Give your bottom line. What
is your bottom line? You do not have to tell but ask for the most. I am happy to say that our
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bottom line was met finally. If we discuss it and say Indonesia you are wrong because you took
our sovereignty and Indonesia would say no, we neither—it will bring you nowhere. The point of
discussion has to be what we can get for future. There are some people saying that we have sold
out our oath to get independence. There are numbers of our people who look at us as being
‘traitors”. If you want negotiation, you have to be ready to face such possibility.
Iqbal:There is little difference with Aceh. For us, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, history is
really a factor. We need to look back the history in order to understand the present and to project
the future. We are pragmatic but we need to look back in history. The historical incidence will
guide us to understand the situation now. What is in our history, we want to look back. Before the
coming of Spaniard, we were independent people; for 333 years, before and during the regime of
Spaniard. When the Americans came, we fought with the Americans. They established Moro
province. We protested and wanted our homeland to be separated from Manila. But the
American did not listen to us. They proceeded to grant the independence to the Philippines
including our homeland. We were never given to have consent on the grant to independence. We
were not given the right to be heard. So, history affects in our struggle. But we are also pragmatic.
We did not demand what was asked before because those were in the history. Similarly, we need
to understand the situation. The whole of Mindanao belonged to us before, but right now, I think,
around 25-30 percent is at our hand. So, we had to balance history and the current situation.
History really played very important role in our current negotiation with Philippine government.
One aspect of this, if we try to understand the history of the Philippines, their independence was
declared on June 12, 1898 and at that time we were not part of the Philippines. If stick on history,
definitely the Philippines government cannot claim our homeland as part of the Philippines
territory because their independence said that we were not part of the Philippines. I repeat
history is a factor in our current negotiation with the government of the Republic of the
Philippines but at the same time we are pragmatic. We are not dreaming; we know the past and
the situation right now.
Rodil: From the government side, there has never been recognition of this version of history.
What has been taught in the Philippines schools and in the Philippines history books is that the
Republic of the Philippines is… based on historical grounds. But I questioned this in my own
study. Up to now what is being taught? A lot of people are reacting without thinking to the Moros’
struggle that the Moros are really bad. This is the thinking of the Christians of the Spanish period.
We were being made to fight one another. As far as I am concerned, many of these
misconceptions can be corrected by simple act, I hope government will do something, such as
pulling together historians to correct the Philippines history courses. Just teach the proper history.
Indirectly, we can correct many misconceptions. I noticed that the chairman of new government
panel earlier proposed rewriting the Philippines history books. In a public forum I said negotiate
over facts of history. You research and write on them. Earlier this morning, I said that it seems
that the negotiation is taking too long because the two parties do not see eye-to-eye on history.
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They do not have a common version of the problem. Partly because the government side do not
see history as it should be seen.
Marhaban: I think I need to respond to Leoni’s question regarding the women. In the last survey,
I think, in 2010 under the UNIFEM (UN Women now), women participation in peace negotiation
is less than 2%, very small and very tiny. The role is not given in full force, not with full capacity. If
you look the cases not only among the rebel groups throughout the world but also in the case of
the UN themselves, for example, all of 35 special envoy of Kofi Anan to Syria were men. If you
look at the qualifications in various countries in Latin America, most educated population are
women. But they are not being included in the peace negotiation because of various reasons.
The inclusive model of peace process is very new. Now a day people ask for more inclusion.
There has been huge debate at the UN level at the mediator support unit that they should involve
women, civil society, and other elements in the society that includes indigenous communities and
different religious elements. This is a noisy process. Not many parties have the gut to jump into
the inclusive model. Sometimes, this could be stamping block and could be a problem for parties
to negotiate at the very beginning. Now they use special tools for this model. Mediators are now
trying to find formula that how to bring more people into peace negotiation. And one of the best
example, the case of Sudan, though it is not a good quality of peace process. The process itself
involves many people and elements in the society but the quality of the peace process is poor.
There is no guarantee that inclusiveness will bring good quality of peace process. Now if we ask
ourselves what does a good peace process look like? We do not have the answer because
every model is different. Aceh is different; Mindanao is different and may be Papua will be
different in future. You can look at different continents and the way mediators solve in that part of
the world. If try to implement that in Asia, for example, from Asia to Africa, that would be different
issue.
Under UN resolution 1325, women peace and security, women should be included be it
on affirmative action or capacity. We have been working on and trying to involve with more
women in peace negotiation.
I just want to make a comment on the history. In the Aceh case, we put in the MOU our
own flag. We have the rights of our Aceh flag; we have the rights of our hymn, kind of national
anthem. At the end of the day, you think whether you want a visual history or something for
educating the people. Now we are trying to educate our children the real history of Aceh. This is
what exactly our history looks like. This is what Indonesian told you about. So we teach both.
This is something that people promote and also Acehnese language is widely used since the
peace agreement. There are more different kinds of nationalist elements in terms of
understanding their own culture, history and religion.
Meg: I would like to raise issue to Aceh and Mindanao. For the Aceh case, the negotiation was
very short period. In the Aceh on the ground, do they talk about peace talk, about the subject? In
the case of Mindanao, they do not talk detail; how MILF try to pursue their peace talk. I can hear
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it in the public now. But I think before 2008 there was not much visual about peace talk in the
public and we could not see you in the public. Why MILF choose to speak about themselves in
the public?
Djalil: When the negotiation took place, at that time, if you see from outside, the negotiation was
not structured at all. We could talk everything. All complains could be put forward. We could talk
from vary serious thing to very trivial one. Some discussions were very emotional especially the
first two days discussions. The GAM expressed all the animosity to Indonesia. They accussed
military raping women. They accussed military killing children. We the Indonesian delegation at
that time was prepared for that. The Vice-President selected the members of delegations. You
know, majority of Indonesian are Javanese. These people idenify Indonesian government as
Javanese government, not Indonesian. When they hit Indonesia they told that the Javanese
people killed our people and raped our women. The Vice-President wisely selected the members
and none of us are Javanese. Because it may create some emotional problems. If there was
Javanese and GAM attacked Javanese, he might take it personally. I myself by born Acehnese. I
moved to Jakarta when I was 24 years old. The Chairman of the delegation was the Minister of
Justice. He was from the same tribe of Jusuf Kalla. We had also a General representing military.
He was Sundanese, people from West Java. Java alone consists of three tribes: Javanese,
Sundanese and Bandanese. The Sundanese never identify themselves as Javanese. The
military guy was from Sundanese. When GAM attacked Javanese, they did not care it. There
was doctor. He was also Sundanese and confident of Jusuf Kalla. We had also a junior diplomat.
He was a Balinese. He was just to take note.
The issue was raised from history to whatever. In the last four or five meetings, there
was no structure at all, if you see from outside. President Ahtisaari and his team chalked down
everything and recorded. At the end of third round meeting, he produced a draft of MoU and
gave it us and said that he summarized and concluded from the discussion. It took all the
important things that we raised. He took the most important substances and put into the MoU.
We brought this into cabinet meeting in Indonesia. 0f the draft, 80-90 percent was accepted by
our cabinet. Only 10 percent needed to discuss again with the delegation. In the next round
meeting, we talked about more technical issues. In the fourth meeting, all the issues can be
resolved except the local political parties that was about to derail the whole negotiation process.
Fortunate enough that one Finnish diplomate formulate the article, which is, if you see from our
side, as if not a committment at all. “The government of Indonesia will create a political condition
that allows the political establishment of local political parties with the approval of the parliament.”
The government of Indonesia promised this. I told GAM that the government of Indonesia cannot
give permission of local political parties because it would violet the law. If the law is violeted, the
President can be impeached. If the government of Indonesia is impeached by the parliament,
there would be nothing and no MoU. I think this kind of arrangment will make the talk easy. You
have to have a good note-taker, good formulator so that you can differentiate which one is
important.
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Djuli: I add a little bit. Did the people in Aceh talk about it? Not the people in Aceh but also the
people in Jakarta talked about it. In Aceh every time the negotiation took place, the whole prayer
houses open for prayer for the peace in Aceh because it was very hard for the people. The
economy was down and schools were closed and practically almost no food to eat and they
could not walk a few hundred meters without being stopped by the military. The people could not
stand any more in this war. So, they did talk. In Jakarta, press, TV of which three TV channels
stationed in Helsinki along with international channels had widely covered the issue. There were
wide media talks. As for convincing the people on the third round talk, we managed to bring
nearly 300 people to Denmark from all over the world except from Aceh because they could not
go out. Then we laid down what we were going to achieve and what we were going to accept.
They gave us eight conditions and of all these conditions we were able to achieve six but the two
we were not able when finally we signed the agreement. Of the two, one was controlling police
and demilitarized. When you go to the negotiation, you have to understand that you cannot get
all. You need to put your bottom line.
Iqbal: Negotiation requires ownership. This ownership does not mean that the two peace panels
and their principles are involved in. More importantly, the people have to be involved in. People
have to own the peace process. Telling the people what is going on is really important. This is the
reason that why MILF and the government of the Philippines created an advocacy group. This
group is composed with the members from MILF and government and we conduct advocacy
separately or jointly. This is how we value the importance of informing the people. After all,
people will benefit from the peace process and they will have the final say in any negotiation. But
we have to balance confidentiality and transparency. When there is a need for confidentiality, we
need to keep secret otherwise it would be spoiled. When there is a time for transparency, we
have to tell the people what is going on. This is the reason also that why MILF is undertaking so
many advocacy forums throughout Mindanao and even in Manila we faced diplomatic community.
Even we faced those people who are considered as spoilers against the peace negotiation. I
think there is some improvements in the way people understand the peace process, and there is
less opposition to the negotiation especially among the people in Mindanao including Christian
politicians. Before there was so much animosity between MILF and these politicians (Christian
politicians) and Muslims and Christian population, but right now there is certain level of trust.
That is why we can communicate with them.
Rodil: During the days of confidentiality, I would talk about history and eventually the discussion
would lead to ancestral domain. I can talk about the details of the negotiation without them
knowing that I can talk about the details of the negotiation. I must emphasize that the people who
demand transparency are already the people who do not like to be part of the whole thing. It is
because historically, these are the people who benefitted from the resettlement program that
brought them in Mindanao and in the process, they became the majority. When I come around to
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tell them you are also part of the party to the making of this problem. So, you must take a
responsibility for finding a solution. Now the politicians, settlers and large land owners do not
want to listen this kind of story. Government also does not want to listen this kind of story
because that will mean that it was government, whether Spanish colonial or American colonial or
the Republican government, that created a policy or project that brought the people in Mindanao.
Of course, I do not leave it hanging that way. Eventually we get around to the matter that how do
we look forward to the future. It starts by saying that we need to accept each other’s presence.
We need to be able to talk with each other so that we can figure out how we can live in peace.
This is how I developed the theory that this problem is not only a question of panel to panel
solution. There are prejudices among the people which are so deeply rooted that they carry over
the sentiments from the past. The only way to get rid of this that more people need to talk with
each other and figure out by themselves that how to live with one and another in peace. There
are models and there are communities which have done this. In Cotobato, we have at least
seven Barengais and they decide themselves and talk each other and established peace zone.
Later on, other NGOs create other peace zones. The idea is that the people are organized to talk
to each other. By doing this, we are able to show that we are not only creating the nucleus of
brotherhood and sisterhood among the people and residences but at the same we are creating a
situation for general acceptance. I must admit that we have not reached the critical mass. I have
involved in the dialogue business in 1981. What I can tell you that in 1981 you can count the
number of participants in the dialogue. Now we cannot count them anymore. A lot of people have
become peace advocators. We have not reached the critical mass. I do think if only the schools
can be encouraged to go into extension service other than academic works, and NGOs can
participate in facilitating dialogues, let the people talk, the whole business of dialogue can
snowball very quickly. My worry, of course, is if the peace agreement come soon, may be in the
six months, we may not able to say that the community is ready. This is one phenomenon that we
have to deal with. The schools must be used for the purpose. The government could have done
something. Until this time, it has not been mobilized such as education, the commission of higher
education and the textbooks have not been changed. It is basically because the government
does not know what the problem is.
Maharjan: We learnt from Sadia that there are two kinds of histories: Acehnese and Indonesian
version. We also learnt that history has to be recognized by the other party. My question now
would be what about the language? Is language taught in the schools like in the case for Aceh,
Acehnese and Javanese, or in the case of Mindanao, Mindanao language or Tagalog language?
And may be if our Nepali delegates can talk little bit about language issue, I think, we can
understand the common frame.
Marhaban: Indonesia covered only six areas of powers, as Dr. Sofyan has already mentioned in
his presentation slides. The rests are ours. It’s self-government; you can teach whatever you
want. If the department of education in Aceh decided to put Acehnese language as a medium of
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study in the schools, they can. But it will be for the students to graduate and also to go for higher
education. There is also pragmatic thinking also. Since the conflict and until today, many
Acehnese speak in Acehnese at home. None of us speak Indonesian language. In many cases,
when Acehnese people were arrested by the military they could not answer the questions
because they did not understand Indonesian language. Now what we are trying to do, I mean,
the Aceh government is to be realistic and even try English. There are lots of bilingual schools,
also Turkish because Turkish schools are coming to Aceh. We try to be internationalized. We
have special council that is Bahasa Aceh. We have produced lot of dictionaries from Dutch to
Acehnese and Acehnese to Dutch and English. Your identity is your identity and nothing can take
that away from you.
Djalil: Language is not a problem in Indonesia. According to the policy of Ministry education, it is
mandatory to teach local language in elementary schools. Bahasa Indonesia is very powerful. In
Aceh, there is need to teach Bahasa Aceh again. In Papua if you go to small village in mountain,
people speak Bahasa Indonesia. In many part of Indonesia, people feel proud if they speak
Bahasa Indonesia. Our concern is now that local languages are disappearing because of the
very powerful influence of Bahasa Indonesia.
Iqbal:In our case, we have 13 ethnic-linguistic groups. There is no common language that we
can use. Of these 13 ethnic-linguistic groups in Mindanao, there are three major groups. The
most populous group is Maguindanao. Other major tribal group is the Maranao. When Maranao
speaks we can understand it. The three groups make up 60 percent of the whole population in
Mindanao. The remaining 40 percent speak other languages and the most prominent language
is Tausug from Sulu area. We are still in the process of formulating our national language
because language evolves. What is important in the current negotiation is that we are able to
settle the issue of identity. We are Bangsamoro but we consider that we are still Filipino citizens.
Identity is really very important and language evolves from identity. I hope the current negotiation
will be able to settle everything in due time so that we can start to develop our own nationality.
Right now the government of the Philippines recognized that there are two nationalities in
Mindanao—Filipino and Bangsamoro. It’s not a question that one country has so many
nationalities and it’s not a problem. It takes time before we can succeed to have one common
language, which is a unifying factor in nationality formation.
Tuladhar: In Nepal, the problem is rich diversity. We do have more than 70 different languages.
Major language groups’ numbers are more than 10. Our Interim Constitution stated that all the
languages spoken in Nepal are national languages. In the previous Constitution it was stated
that the Nepali language written in Devnagari script is to be the national language. Still our
government has no national language policy. Language movement started since we started the
movement for democracy. They wanted equal rights to all the language groups in Nepal. Now the
Constitution recognizes all the languages but there is no policy. Still medium of administration,
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medium of court, medium of education—all mediums are in one language. There are demands
for democracy and language policy from indigenous communities, human rights groups and civil
society. After the 1990 movement, we had a Constitution that stated that the community
themselves learn languages for education in mother tongue. The state was not there to take any
responsibility and still it is going on. People can learn languages in private schools. We are
expecting that at least major languages will be the provinces if federalism is drawn. At present,
we can have major languages such as Newari, Sanskrit, and Hindi at college level, for example,
and in universities but at primary level we do not have any official government schools, which
have created a very big problem for the language groups.
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Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Day 2: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION
Introduction
The discussion divided mainly into four aspects as: Issues of conflict; Trigger moments from
arms to dialogue; Consensus building; and Necessary environment for successful peace
process by referring three cases: Bansamoro, Aceh, and Nepal. The purpose of this
classification is to make understanding about the different cases in different situation and
generate the discussion further by using the designed framework. In the meantime, these
aspects rated according to that impact of those particular cases. The importance of the factors
differ with each case therefore, rating based on its essentiality and the scale that particular factor
plays its role as contributing factor for shifting from arms to dialogue. While thinking about this
quantification method adopted in this discussion, there is another fact is to be understood that
the need for qualifying the terminology, otherwise it is difficult to specify one factor in its whole
picture for example, timeframe. However, the discussion included the timeframe on the basis of
entering into the sustainable peace via dialogue.
Elements and features are listed out according to these following categories and sub
categories: Issues of conflict: self determination, state imposed migration, status of military,
ethnic, linguistic and religious unity, natural resources, issue of injustices, and autocratic king
and economic disparities; Trigger moments from arms to dialogue: democratization, change of
policy as well as government structure, multilateral intervention, neighboring countries influence
and natural disasters; Consensus building: readiness to accept realities, cohesiveness in a rebel
groups, strong hierarchical leadership in government, balanced exposure to media, good
communication between and among the contending parties, and, bringing all the main
stakeholders; and, Necessary environment for successful peace process: ceasefire monitoring
mechanism, acknowledge the history of the other side, issue of relief, rehabilitation and
development, domestic support, arrangement of peace process, and, economic assistance.
Among the all above mentioned factors some of them might be more significant than the
others however, it depends on the situation where it is applicable. At the same time judgment put
on for rating it, whether it becomes very high, high, middle, or low, is the own. The following
sections are going to discuss deeply about the all selected categories by applying on the three
above mentioned cases.
Issues of Conflict
Issues identified here are mostly the elements or causes of the problem. In addition, these
elements are deciding the situation and determining the further progress.
Self-determination
Mindanao- Factors comprised together to claiming for self-determination in Bansamoro based
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on territory, identity, nationality, culture, religion, traditional mechanism, judicial system and etc.
Here self-determination considered as political rights of the people to determine their political
status and also social and economic development. It’s highly people-centered. Therefore,
political status is the most concern under the category of self-determination.
Aceh- self determination related to issue of independence, sovereignty, self-governance,
self-autonomy while talking about this conflict.
Nepal- Not extremely the core issue for Nepal compare with other cases.
State imposed migration
Mindanao- This is not only the claim in Bansamoro. Migration occurred in the purpose of
development. But migration occurred not like in Nepal. Contrast view: migration is very high
because at present number of population decreased in a greater number, main cause is
migration.
Aceh- numerical degree of the rating is required to talk about Ache case because it differs during
various times. For example, during the Suharto ruling period state imposed migration was very
high. But later it was stopped. Therefore, qualifying the terminology is required. In other sense,
most of the migration in Indonesia is voluntary, not sponsored by State. Of course some military
induced migrations made during Suharto regime but it was met a high level criticism by many
international organizations such as World Bank, International Monitoring Agency.
Nepal- Compare with the State imposed migration; scale of rebel imposed migration is high in
Nepal.
Status of military
Status of military is somehow different. Actually using the military power sometimes creates
resentment and conflict even in the democratic regime. Moreover, there are possibilities for State
to use the military for suppressing the other people. Therefore, even both democratic and
autocratic States; and even use the military power democratically or more discipline way is very
important for avoiding conflicts. In some cases, military is being used for repression, human
rights violations, and deployment for many instances, to control over resources. In most of the
cases, military is more powerful in the State. The main concern to put military in this discussion is,
military sometimes plays an independent or autonomous role in conflict, that can be as a 3rd
player in that particular conflict. Therefore, here it understood as whether the military plays its
own official role or uses as a tool by the government to act accordingly. However, when we talk
the status of military as an institution, they do not allow making orders to execute; therefore, they
can’t be as autonomous unit, especially in the case of Philippines. At the same time, military also
became as one of the important components in the conflict. In some events, those who became
as victims in the government side were soldiers. Therefore, soldiers should be take part in peace
process. Moreover, the role of the military is different from one country to another. In these
senses, qualifying the status of military, in terms of co-operation as well as in peace process, as
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an institution, can be as a separate third party and third element in the peace process. But this
has still under question because still military is the part of the government.
Mindanao- this is rating quite high compare with Aceh and Nepal because the government
control on military is in a high level. In other sense, control of military here is getting different
meaning. In Philippine military: they have control; they might follow the order, but still the
discipline of the military is questioned. Because the military can sell their weapons from the
storage; and the small arms spread everywhere. Discipline something is an issue for the military
and at the same time keeps the military in a well-disciplined manner is a kind of challenge for
many governments. In the Philippine context, role of military during the Marshal Law was very
strong. After the abolition of the Marshal Law till present, the military is very prominent.
Aceh- though the State is democratic there is a possibility that military could be misused by the
state power. Obviously the State was not purely democratic during the Suharto rule. Moreover, in
the case of Aceh, the term of autonomy for military is incorrect. In other sense, in Indonesia there
is a control by State over military; military will not oppose if the government says pull out or
withdrew. But sometimes this is the fact that the State itself allowed the military to perpetrate all
the violations of human rights and all other related events. When state control over military is
high the degree of violation also became high, this was happened during the Megawatt’s ruling
time. When we measure the impunity level, it implies this impunity whether because of the lack of
state control or because the State allows it since it doesn’t want to control just allows it.
Therefore, impunity level is measurable as high/ medium/ low level of impunity.
Nepal- military in Nepal is well disciplined and at the same time very independent. After the
abolition of monarchy, it gets influenced by Gurka soldiers; they are well disciplined. Role of the
military during the Maoist insurgency started since the inception of Maoist insurgency. During the
first event done by Maoist by capturing huge number of civilians, then the Government
responded to that event and rescued the people by using the military, continuously the following
events handled by using military towards Maoist. Therefore, it is clear to say that, any conflict
using military is given because the law and order is no longer is not sufficient and maintaining
law and order. Government has to use the military when the circumstances occurred but their
practice should hold the impunity. In general, the role of military according to these three cases
concerned as: role of military and government; role of command and control; secret instructions;
and military of personal decision. In other suggestion hold that, role of the military can be
measured its impunity after the violation is done or violation will be done because in the field that
is always happen, but these violations are tolerated or even it secretly initiated by the
government or not.
Ethnic Unity
Mindanao- it is far descriptive. People are fighting among each other because one group
belongs to the other ethnic tribe. Therefore, this is the real situation in Mindanao.
Aceh- usually unity in ethnicity has less probability for conflict compare with other causes. But
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here the unity of different ethnic groups formed high possibility for engendering the conflict.
Nepal- disparity prevails in Nepal in relation to ethnicity, caste, and gender.
Linguistic and Religious Unity
Mindanao- there are big number of diversity prevails with regard to language and religion.
People are diverging among each other linguistically but religiously unity is there because
population comprised 100% with Muslims.
Aceh- more than 98% of the population belongs to Islam and majority speaking language is
Acehnese, unlike the situation in Nepal and Bansamoro in Philippines.
Nepal- more than 92 languages are in practice and multi religious nation by having Hinduism,
Buddhism, and Christianity.
Natural resources
Mindanao- resources has already been taken. Lack of natural resources is a real issue in
Mindanao.
Issue of injustices
Mindanao- number of violation against human rights and international humanitarian law
committed towards Moro people; many massacres, killing, these all are issues still in the conflict
in Mindanao.
Nepal- autocratic king and economic disparity
Trigger moments from Arms to Dialogue
Generally trigger moments are really lead the contending parties to seek for dialogue.
Democratization
All these three cases have a long history of having official democracy. This may be, to some
extent, controversial.
Mindanao- Though the country itself a democratic country, it highly missing transparency, and
accountability in the rule. In this respect, democratization in Bansamoro is rating low compare
with rest of the cases.
Aceh- most triggering moment referring in Aceh case is reforming Indonesia. This reformist era
consisted by democratization and de-centralization, those made them to feel for giving up the
extreme demands. Both parties realized that the arm struggle is not the mean to achieve their
goals. Therefore, it has considered that democratization is very important factor that can make
you to realize the peace talk. Furthermore, this is the clinching point in Aceh; the democratization
came as a main consideration because excessive state repression may be as a factor. For
example, during the 80s, popular support for GAM was in a very lower level. But when the
incidents occurred, such as, State repression, massive open killings by the military, then it
triggers anger among the population as a result GAM got massive popular support. But still it
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needs the qualification of rating since this situation differs time to time.
Nepal- during the monarchy era stagnation of democratic process was prevailing and human
rights also suppressed by monarchy rule.
Change of Policy
Mindanao- first trigger moment from arms to dialogue in Mindanao is changing policy by both
government and rebel organization.
Change of Government structure
This factor is related with the above mentioned democratization.
Mindanao- in other word this can be used as transformation of the government structure. But in
this particular case, there is a change still expected to modify the constitution.
Aceh- nature of the government was changing due to the Presidential election.
Nepal- this also highly realized due to the domination of monarchy issues related to
de-centralization. At last monarchy became as a common enemy for political parties in Nepal.
Multilateral intervention
This is focused here as interventions from multilateral actors from international community on the
one hand, and the influence from the very strong neighboring countries on the other. In general,
this is a very sensitive terminology during the experiences faced by most of the countries. It is
required to classify the term ‘intervention’ instead of ‘influence’ because intervention used to
create thinking as well as it creates problems.
Mindanao- As far as Mindanao is concerned, there was no more interventions, but was invitation.
In this context, rating for invitation is very high because there are international contact group,
countries like United Kingdom, Southi Arabia, Turkey, Japan and further, 4 NGOs, International
Monitoring team composed with Libya, Malaysia, Brunei, Japan, Indonesia, Norway and the EU.
Aceh- After the tsunami, Aceh was opened for international community. Actually, intervention
can be made in positive and negative ways. Therefore, while looking at this, we have to know
that what type of intervention, and at the same, whether it is looked by the out sider as real
intervention. For example, there were up to 60,000 Acehnese gained refuge in Malaysia. This
caused a pressure from Indonesian government on Malaysian government to take actions
against the Acehnese fighters in Malaysia. Is it really looked as intervention by foreign country?
This is actually intervention by Indonesian government against a foreign country. So again it
required qualification in rating.
Nepal- considering the UN operation in Nepal called as “UNPMN”, they faced more difficulties to
perform their activities on the ground. They faced restricted activities and very hard to came to a
settlement through negotiation with regard to their activities due to the political conditions. Here
most appropriate word to use ‘involvement’ instead of intervention.
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Neighboring Countries influences
Mindanao- rating is high because influences backup with ideas and advices.
Aceh- there is no much influence formed from neighboring countries in Aceh.
Nepal- this is very high in Nepal because they are having strong influence from India, US, China.
Their cause of influence related to human right issues and refugee issues, especially Tibetans.
Natural Disaster
Mindanao- Flood is the major natural disaster so it rating as low.
Aceh- tsunami is the one of the triggering moment for peace dialogue in Aceh. After the effect of
tsunami, which created a double effect on Acehnese people after having 30 years of conflict, it is
very clearly realized the necessity for peace dialogue.
Nepal- there are no much natural disasters hit on Nepal. Only in some particular areas effected
but not in a massive scale. Nepal has experiencing with floods and landslides.
Consensus building
This group includes the easiness of difficulties to reach between and among the parties. If you
cannot manage your own conflict and if you cannot get a greater consensus from your society,
then peace dialogue ultimately wouldn’t gain. Therefore, consensus building is most important.
Readiness to accept realities
Structure or related issues of the each competent party also another important part understood
in this discussion. It may highly relate to government structure or structure of the each group. It is
necessary to know and understand the reality. Then it can make consensus within the parties
and outside the parties.
Mindanao- First they claimed independence but now they step back for self-autonomy. Moreover,
they are ready to accept the reality because of the number of population. Moreover, the
consensus building can be divided into two: in the perspective from Mindanao, historical side and
the reality side. Although there are arguments, held across the negotiating table, based on
history; for example homeland. History has put at first and argued the claim. Moreover, there is a
need to decide the claim through historical evidences of the struggle and to show the reality,
especially in the area of land.
Cohesiveness in a rebel group
Mindanao- In fact, there are splits within the rebel group, which is a general feature in the overall
rebel groups functioning in world wide. Though there are problems existing among the rebel
groups, at the end of the day the leadership will take the final decision.
Strong Hierarchical leadership in government
Aceh- due to the strong hierarchical structure of the leadership possibilities created to establish
conscious building among the party members as well as among the government side.
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Balanced exposure to Media
Role of media should also be considered, especially focused here the importance of initiating the
people not always being involved in a conflict. Media is an effective tool that can play negative
and positive roles.
Mindanao- media does not play its role neutrally. It failed to carry a balanced message.
Compare with national media local media presence is quite high. Therefore, broadcasting
balanced in information is rating as low.
Aceh- Negotiation during Helsinki, media reported that government negotiation team has
nothing to do which means not willing to do any progressive actions. Therefore, this statement
highly intervened and MOU would not work anymore. In this sense, balanced exposure of the
media can effectively contribute for the consensus building in the society. In addition, one time
there was balanced reporting by media but in another time military banned any reporting in Aceh.
In sometimes there was one sided reporting and in other time even very balanced reporting
prevailed. So again timeframe plays an important role in rating.
Good communication between contending parties
Mindanao- comparing with Aceh, having direct communication and try to establish substantial
agreement between competing parties are being pravailed. Moreover, there are communications
but not directly. Communication always preferred through facilitators. If anything want to write
and send that also preferred through facilitators. At the same time, in the ground there are
communications directly between each other.
Aceh- it’s very effective. They had direct telephone calls throughout their communication. In
addition, while considering about the communication between the GAM and the Indonesian
government, it again required the specific qualification because in certain time communication
was very good and another time it was not existed at all.
Good communication among themselves
Mindanao- Even in the internal level they have a good communication even through informal
ways as well.
Nepal- lack of trust and understanding prevail between and among the major parties.
Bringing all the main stakeholders
Mindanao- it is medium rating
Necessary environment for successful peace process
Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism
Aceh- this factor is not very much applicable in Aceh case. But when this factor came into
discussion, it highly required the timeframe.
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Nepal- there was a Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism but it was hardly functioning.
Acknowledge the history of the other side
This is very important because the other side of the competent party or people should know and
acknowledge the history. At the same time, the interpretation of the history is also should take in
to account seriously.
Mindanao- Actually the interpretation of the history by both sides is low rating. There is a
necessity to learn about the history of Bansamoro. They can understand the historical reasons
for the claims and their legitimate grievances.
Aceh- this was not a main issue in Aceh.
Issue of Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
Mindanao- this will create a necessary environment for successful peace process. But in the
case of MILF or any other rebel organizations that allowed development projects to launch
during the negotiation process. On the Parallel track putting the political track and economic
track together is quite challenging but in Mindanao it was happened. Therefore, the relief,
rehabilitation and development are being realized necessary for peaceful environment. Japan,
World Bank and EU are being involved in this process. This effort can be rating as medium.
Domestic Support
Mindanao- this also should be mentioned in Mindanao case.
Arrangement of Peace process
Aceh- it is considered as acceptance of rebel groups and the people in Aceh, civil society also to
be counted in this aspect. Civil society can make an impact to create an environment. Moreover,
peace process is created in a social democratic framework/ system. Because it is really a
combination of reconstruction, political settlement, and social development since it is not very
much used in other models. Further, this consisted reconstruction, reconciliation, rehabilitation of
ex-combatants. This combination is quite unique. In addition to this, bringing different agencies
together to rehabilitate the tsunami victims and the victims of the conflict, how these 2 different
issues can be differentiated in the rehabilitation framework is the basic question. Actually, both
issues are totally different and the recipients’ satisfaction level also differs among each other due
to the assistance the victims received and the quality of the assistance they get. By addressing
the all above mentioned, ‘social democratic system’ is unique but this has used in different terms
academically as holistic or comprehensive peace agreement. This system is being applied in
many countries but they adopt that system in different names but the soul is same. Moreover, the
rate and the degree of the application differ in each case due to the context of the conflict
situation.
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9
Economic Assistance
Usually in the conflict areas economic condition as well as assistance delivered are bad in nature
and deliver at the same time poorly organized. Once the assistance extended through the
government or international organizations, it should deal with effective mechanism and delivering
that assistance to the needy people in an appropriate manner.
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Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
SYNTHESIS
The Result of Analysis and Discussion
86
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
Day 2: CLOSING DISCUSSION
Chair: So this is a proposal from our side as a concluding statement of today’s workshop. And
we regard these five points are those raised and understood as conclusive remarks. Probably I
should read them out first and then try to get your comments, suggestions and any proposals to
change this statement. And hopefully we can reach some conclusions.
Chair: Let me read out statement of HiPeC-II Peace exchange Workshop 2012 draft. We
assembled at Hiroshima, city of peace from second and third of August 2012 to discuss the
issue of the peace process. You see the conflict shifting from arms to dialogue and these
conclusions as follows:
1. The difference of real conditions of different conflicts around the world should be
recognized and there has been no universally applicable formula to solve them.
2. There are some common issues such as self-determination but conditions to achieve or
settle them are not identical.
3. The elements to change the policy of government as well as the levels should be
pursued in particular conditions of the conflict.
4. If there is ever improved communication between and within the contending parties
should be encouraged.
5. Domestic and multilateral supports can create a necessary environment for the peaceful
settlement of the conflict.
The nonexistence of a single formula does not mean that we do not need to compare the
different conflicts for peaceful solutions. Rather, by comparing various conflicts, we can identify
strategies for the dialogue to replace the armed conflict. This is the proposal. It is very short. We
would like to offer this to you and hope to gather any suggestions.
Koirala: In number two there were some comments on some of the conditions in achieving or
settling them are not identical. The words self-determination we have to slightly define because
if I am correct it’s up to the secession also. So there are some combinations such as self-
determination with or without secession, but conditions to achieve or sever them are not
identical.
Chair: Self-determination with or without secession.
Tebay: I want to suggest, number one, a statement saying that we agree that dialogue is a
dignified means to seek just and comprehensive solutions. So this is why we want to shift the
conflict from arms to dialogue. We opt for dialogue. It was the first sentence in number one. So
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we opt to support dialogue. I don’t know how to formulate but just to say we prefer dialogue to
arms solutions.
Chair: In the very first beginning, there is the second line of the first sentence saying, “we
assembled at Hiroshima city of peace from 23 August 2013 to discuss the issue of the peace
process, to shift the conflict from arms to dialogue.” So maybe, doesn’t that cover?
Any more comments or suggestions?
Tanggahma: I don’t know if you know, you insist the words rebels. I was thinking more in terms
of liberation movements. That’s how they usually call themselves, or call ourselves. If you want
your freedom, you want the respect of your right to self determination or your liberation
movement. I don’t know if others have other opinions… because ‘rebels’ might sound a bit
strong.
Chair: Can you suggest any appropriate words to replace the word ‘rebels’?
Iqbal: The use of the term liberation is not good because you are rebelling against an authority
so it’s not good. Meaning, it’s not good so I think revolutionary would make a better term.
Maharjan: Maybe rebels and revolutionary have the same connotation.
Iqbal: When you are rebelling against any established government, or let’s say established
authority then you are rebelling against them and that implication is not good. It implies, not
necessarily but, what you are standing for, what you are fighting for is legitimate. But when
you think you are using the word revolutionary, it means a change from bad to good, so I would
prefer it. I am speaking also for other cases using the revolutionary movement or a
revolutionary organization.
Maharjan: Does that serve your question? Like whether it’s revolutionary? OK may I have some
words from Nepalese delegates?
Djuli: We have always hated the word ‘rebels’. You know it has the connotation that you are
already part of the government and you rebel against it, you know. So as in ‘rebels against low
pay’, you know, that kind of thing. But there were revolutionaries have been good independency
movements, like the French to use independence, things like that, but it’s not popular in English.
So I think I’m open to anything other than rebels.
Iqbal: Can I suggest? Revolutionaries are also good but I have a second thought as my first
proposal, especially when the organization has some alleviating for the Islamic...especially in
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the case of Bin Ladin. So I would be comfortable in using liberation instead of revolutionary.
Liberation front, liberation organization or Liberation front.
Chair: Liberation organizations or movements?
Meg: May I invite Nepalese to the discussion?
Maharjan: Maybe revolutionaries? Is that a good word?
Djalil: It sounds to me that revolutionaries is usually used by the Left movement. In the case of
our friend from Bangsamoro and Aceh I have heard revolutionaries called themselves this in
Aceh. So that you know revolutionaries means in Guatemala, I think in the case of Maoist in
Nepal is right but is not covered in the case of Bangsamoro and Aceh.
Meg: But maybe when the rule ended in the German revolution movement?
Djalil: Yes as a form of revolution to form government I like the word rebel (laughing)
Iqbal: I will offer a compromise. Because using the word liberation can apply to Aceh and
Mindanao, but to our friends in Nepal, the Maoists, that would not capture their whole intention.
So how about using the word ‘liberation slash revolutionary’. Either way it cannot marry. For
liberation can apply to Aceh and Mindanao, ‘revolutionary’ can apply to Nepal. So ‘liberation
slash then revolutionary movement’. I have consumed my time I will not speak anymore.
Djuli: I think that’s a good compromise.
Chair: Probably the levels has some negative connotation, and seen from the government’s
side.
Meg: Yeah, that’s self-defence.
Chair: Revolution means that the ruling elite will be changed from one group to the other. So
this is not what the MILF or GAM try to do
Meg: I have a dictionary. The Oxford dictionary said that revolutionary means connected with a
political revolution.
Maharjan: That’s the meaning of revolutionary
Chair: What is a political revolution? (laughter)
89
Humayun: I think the meaning of the dictionary has something to do with the leftist movement,
because revolutionary is much more frequently used for the leftist movement because the leftist
movement wanted to overthrow the existing political system and would like to re-establish a new
political system. That is the meaning. So instead of revolutionary what we can see for example
is liberation is we see from the perspectives of the quote and unquote ‘rebels’ you know I would
not like to say ‘rebels’ so for them it is a liberation movement, and if we see from the
government perspective for them it is a secessionist movement. So liberation or secessionist
movement we can say. If we would like to meet the neutrality.
Meg: Well another meaning in the dictionary: “Involving a greater or complete change” – that’s
revolutionary.
Chair: But in political science, revolution is the change of the ruling community, the ruling party.
So in this sense it is very different from a secessionist movement. Secessionist means that they
claim their own authority in a particular area or over a particular people.
Humayun: So liberations last secessionist movement would be…
Chair: Secessionist is OK?
Meg: They were not secessionist. They wanted independence.
Chair: Liberation/revolution is the point we can reach as a compromise, at least to these three
cases.
Tuladhar: In Nepal, the Maoists, the rebels, the revolutionaries etcetera. There were none
among themselves, or among the left, but officially, our government or non-Maoist parties didn’t
recognize Maoist as revolutionaries, rebels, they just used the address called the communist
party of Nepal: Maoist. And in the agreement it is said there are two sides, one side is
government and another side is the communist party of the Nepal Maoists. And the Maoist used
to say that they did have revolutionary programs to liberate the people from all kinds of
exploitations etcetera. Similarly their army was known you see as “The People’s Liberation
Army” PLA that was not also recognized by the state or the non-Maoist parties so in the
agreement, in the accord it is said you see the combatants of Mao’s army they were not
recognized as the PLA people’s revolution army.
Chair: Mr. Nur, please
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Djuli: Before we start fighting. I think our problem starts from the first sentence with the context
of our discussion. You know, we need to say that we only discussed the cases of the MILF,
Aceh and Nepal. And from the discussion of these three cases, we derived the following
conclusions. Let me start, we can start enumerating. And even number three, it doesn’t have to
be number three. We can say that this one in the case of the MILF and this one in the case of
Aceh and this one in the case of Nepal. We don’t stay away from the context. So we use, it
depends how they use you. What we are trying to do is come up with a common name but it
seems that uh, the difference already is there.
Chair: I have a proposal. Maybe this debate is because of our use of the word government. So
instead of using the word government we may choose a word, say in such a way that, that
elemental change of the policy of both of the contending parties…
Meg: among, or both
Chair: Both of the contending parties.
Chair: Then, any other suggestions?
Tanggahma: With the first point, with the style. Twice the word is different so if we could find a
synonym of the second one. If we could do, when you right click to find a synonym, or, because
it’s twice different, the word. Could you give us some suggestion to change?
Chair: The first line is number one. The difference of the other condition of different conflicts.
The “difference” and “different”.
Tanggahma: (woman speaker) Or various conflicts?
Maharjan: But this difference is of different things. The first difference is differences of the real
conditions and the second one is there are different kinds of conflicts. So, these conflicts have
differences, conditions and the conflicts are different in nature.
Tanggahma: So maybe the second difference can be replaced, because it sounds less….
Humayun: Various?
Tanggahma: Yes, various.
Ladiasan: Can I raise a point? This is one statement I just want to raise the issue of my
understanding to this place, to discuss the issue of peace process, to shift the conflict from arms
91
to dialogue. For me it connotes the total abandonment of the party waging an armed force. That
is my understanding, that is the connotation of this phrase to my understanding. And that would
be very contradictory to, on our side because this is not actually the point of discussion. It’s not
actually the principles that we discussed. And to that effect I am suggesting consideration to
state it as this, in this way, to discuss the issue of peace process on the shift from arms to
dialogue.
Chair: On the shift? It’s not “to” shift but “on” the shift.
Ladiasan: On the shift to dialogue. And this conclusion is one of them.
Meg: And also when we were making this I in my mind separated the conclusion and the
findings, so from ah, to me we assembled at the Hiroshima University … blah blah blah…on this
shift of the conflict from our arms to dialogue and reached finding. Is this a conclusion or
finding? And then we can put the conclusion after the five points. Are you thinking this is a
conclusion or these are findings?
Humayun: It’s a conclusion I think. It’s not findings. I mean it’s not that we researched to
explore or something like that, in my view. So it's a discussion, and after the discussion we
come up with some general points and then the conclusion.
Chair: Maybe we should say agreement. Or if the conclusion is not very much appropriate we
can replace it with the agreement. But I don’t think they are findings.
Maharjan: I think conclusion is better than agreement.
Humayun: In my view I think conclusion is better in the sense that we agreed on these points.
Chair: Any objections?
Rodil: My suggestion is there the shift should be number one. There’s a reword introduction,
because our first – whether you call it conclusion or what – Our first item in the enumeration
should be the shift from arms to dialogue. So that should dictate the content or that should
create the framework for the succeeding numbers.
Djalil: Yes that’s true.
Chair: So maybe your suggestion is “we assembled in Hiroshima, conclusion follows number
one: We carry the shift, we encouraged the shift from arms to dialogue. We encouraged the shift
of the conflict from arms to dialogue.”
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Rodil: More or less. I mean, we can reword it much better later on but my point is that the
introduction should notate what we did in the last two days. That we discussed the cases of the
MILF what do you call it Aceh and Nepal, and we arrived at the following conclusions.
Maharjan: But did we discuss about that we encouraged them to shift to the dialogue?
Maharjan: No. we discussed the matters and what we are doing. But did we discuss about the
encouragement? Maybe not.
Humayun: And by the way everyone encouraged the shift from Amsterdam.
Rodil: We have been discussing dialogue for the last two days. Maybe not in those terms. I
mean you may object with whether to encourage it or not.
Maharjan: I’m not objecting. What I was thinking is when we say we are encouraging, maybe
we are pushing too hard.
Rodil: What happened in the peace process in the first place, these were dialogues? I use
dialogue generically. Ah these were peaceful resolutions of conflict by talking. That is exactly
what happened. And look at the results. The results are good. So from that foregoing we can
say it is good. So we are encouraging it.
Chair: What’s your opinion?
Ladiasan: I have a question. I will not make a recommendation. I have a suggestion that will
attend to the issues raised by Professor Rudy. The first issue raised was in the draft statement
we reflect the states Mindanao Ache and Nepal. And that can be addressed with this suggestion
if we find it proper. “We assembled at Hiroshima City of Peace, in fact I am also suggesting to
put Japan. “We assembled at Hiroshima City of Peace, Japan, from 2 to 3 August 2003 to
discuss the peace processes in Mindanao, Aceh and Nepal. It’s keys to shift conflict from arms
to dialogue, and reached conclusions as follows. Because it could not be a conclusion, ah, the
shift from arms to dialogue could not be a conclusion, could not be made part of the conclusion
because this is a theme that this theme bears all the conclusions as stated from one to five. So
that is my suggestion to attend to these recommendations, thank you.
Chair: Could we put the name of the places in alphabetical order? Aceh… Any suggestions?
Meg: Mindanao in the southern Philippines. Because Mindanao might not be popular
enough…but the country is.
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Humayun: So you want to add Mindanao, comma, Southern limits?
Meg: Mindanao in the Southern Philippines.
Humayun: It’s too much. Then we have to put Indonesia islands in.
Meg: Yes Aceh too. Aceh is very famous for us though.
Chair: Mindanao is also very famous.
Djuli: Also add US to the peace process...
Chair: Anything else? So can we agree upon this? Our Japanese researchers, any
suggestions?
Iqbal: As for the item number four, It’s not very clear. The meaning of that. It means you are
working toward communication? What’s the meaning of that? Ever improve communication.
Chair: Maybe this is not very much clear. Improvement of communication?
Iqbal: What is not clear is the use of the word ‘ever’.
Chair: ‘Ever’ means, continuous effort to improve the communication. That’s what we want to
be.
Humayun: So should be like that ‘continuous effort to improve communication’?
Iqbal: Is there a replacement of the word ‘ever’? I think it’s misplaced there.
Rodil: My idea is to remove totally number four. Because if you have a peace process going on
and dialogues here and there between the two contending parties, then you do not state the…
there will naturally be communication between them.
Maharjan: I just want to capture what was said. There was a dialogue but the dialogue was
limited within the leaders. And it was not shared, and when they come back to their respected
parties, the parties have another idea so the dialogue, the promises they make among the
leaders cannot be implemented and that consequently that turns to the loss of trust. So the trust
building is not done. So how to capture that aspect? So that should be remedied for example.
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Rodil: And also, I would like to have the number of dialogue. I need to answer. If we do then we
can talk about dialogue between the leaders and their people, between themselves and the
other party.
Chair: Here we should also imply that the importance of bringing the more inclusive process of
the peace, for peace so that there is a more participant process and more communication
between the leadership and people. Maybe even communication between the leadership on the
one side and people on the other side. That kind of communication in different levels and
different ways. That’s what I mean by ‘ever improve’ or ‘continuously’ for to improve the
communication. I believe that it was discussed very much squarely in this workshop.
Humayun: In the case of Aceh, Aceh speaker mentioned several times that direct and
immediate communications are important, for example, from Ache to Jakarta. And also, for
example, during the negotiation, the member of the negotiation team phoned directly to the
Vice-President. So that kind of direct communication is somewhat, you know, very much useful
to facilitate the peace dialogue. That’s why we captured these things here.
Chair: It’s not just what we mean her by number four. We also try to bring some more effort to
broaden the inclusions.
Tanggahma: It’s very interesting to me. I always uh favor communication. To me it’s a bit
logical that we need to improve it. If it’s wrong then if it’s right we don’t need to improve it. In
some cases ever improve, it might not be necessary. I would just mention the fact that it needs
to be clear, it needs to be effective and unambiguous, so that when you communicate that
people won’t think one thing when it’s actually something else. So just those three things would
suffice to me that it’s a, that clear, effective and unambiguous communication between and
within the contending parties should be encouraged.
Iqbal: You know improving something is very difficult especially when you’ve reached the limit
of your capability. So I would propose that instead of improve, effective.
Chair: Maybe the ‘clear effective’ can be…(writing). When it is effective it covers ‘clear’;
Clearness and unambiguity. So take out the clear and unambiguous, just leave ‘effective’
because if it is effective it is clear and unambiguous.
Koirala: Effective communication between and win the contending parties should be
encouraged.
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Chair: Just leave effective only…So, anything else? Do you have any suggestions? Matsumoto
Sensei, do you have any… so then we have agreed (laugh). Thank you very much for a very
effective discussion for making the final statement.
Chair: So we will print out and bring to today’s reception party in the evening. At that time we’d
like to request you to sign it and we will give you the copies of the signed document to you.
Maharjan: Just one word. Taking the change of the words different conflicts to various conflicts
were one. So the note, the final three lines, instead of different conflicts on the second line it will
be various conflicts.
Chair: So the second line is various conflicts. Please change different with various as we did in
number one. Thank you very much. So this is the end of the workshop and thank you very much
for your very active participation in this workshop. We still have one more event for today, that is
the reception from 7:00 at Mermaid Café, on the other side of the building.
Thank you very much for all the active participation you did during the second-day workshop as
there was the one preliminary meeting on the 31’st of July. Thank you very much and please
come back again to the reception venue at 7:00 in the evening.
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Statement of HiPeC Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
We assembled at Hiroshima, City of Peace, Japan, from 2 to 3 August 2012 to discuss the issue
of peace processes in Aceh, Bangsamoro (Mindanao) and Nepal on the keys to shift from arms
to dialogue and reached conclusion as follows:
1. The difference of real conditions of various conflicts around the world should be recognized
and there would be no universally applicable formula to solve them.
2. There are some common issues such as self-determination with or without secession but
conditions to achieve/settle them are not identical.
3. Elements to change the policy of both of contending parties should be pursued in particular
conditions of the conflict.
4. Effective communication between and within the contending parties should be encouraged.
5. Domestic and multilateral supports can create necessary environment for peaceful
settlement of the conflict.
Non-existence of single formula does not mean that we do not need to compare the different
conflicts for peaceful solutions. Rather, by comparing various conflicts we can identify strategies
for the dialogue to replace the armed conflicts. 3 August 2012, Hiroshima University
97
広島⼤学平和構築連携融合事業Hiroshima University Partnership Project forPeace Building and Capacity Development
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
During the period of three years of HiPeC-II since then we have developed “Indigenous
Initiative” concept for promote active peace building research through understanding and
learning the peace processes in various conflict affected areas, we invited representatives from
Nepal, Aceh, Philippine and Papua.
I, on behalf of the organizers of this conference, would like to express my great
appreciation to everyone who made this event successful. Foremost, I would like to thank all the
participants from conflict or post-conflict areas. By their participation, this conference was
proved to be to understand our views better and to realize that we share a common goal of
sustainable peace by the approach of “Indigenous Initiative”.
Secondly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Asahara Toshimasa, the
President of Hiroshima University, Uye Shinichi, the Vice-President of Hiroshima University,
Fujiwara Akimasa, Dean of IDEC, Hiroshima University, HiPeC partners, and other scholars and
officials of Hiroshima University for their strong supports and continuous assistances. Also, Our
deep gratitude from the bottom of heart is offered to Mr. Ken Harada who showed around the
Peace Memorial Park on August 1 for the memorable study tour in spite of having been
scorching heat in that day.
Same acknowledgement of mine also goes to the staff of Hiroshima University
Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development (HiPeC), Humayun Kabir,
Megumi Kagawa, Haruka Araki, Mie Fujita, Natsumi Kumozu and Yusuke Bessho on various
tasks before, during and after the workshop.
I would also like to acknowledge the remarkable help from our student-assistants,
Yukino Abe, Kazuhiro Itakura, Ranjan Saha Partha, Vaidya Arija, Shamini Chandran, Yang
Xiaoping and Yoshihiko Fujimoto also assisted in the documentation of some parts of this report.
On behalf of the organizers,
TOGAWA Masahiko
Secretary General, HiPeC Executive Committee
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ANNEX 1: List of Participants
(Honorifics omitted) Mindanao / PHILIPPINES Mohagher Iqbal Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel Rudy "Ompong" Rodil Former Vice Chair of the Gov. of the Philippines Peace Panel, Professor, Mindanao State University Timuay Melanio U. Ulama Chairperson of the Organization of Teduray-Lambangian Congress Rasid T. Ladiasan Head of Secretariat of the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities of the MILF Aceh / INDONESIA Sofyan A. Djalil Special Advisor to the Vice President of Indonesia, Government Negotiator during Helsinki Peace Negotiation and Former State Minister for Information and Communication of the Government of Indonesia Muhammad Nur Djuli Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Leader for the Helsinki Peace Negotiation Shadia Marhaban President of the Aceh Women’s League, GAM Member for the Helsinki Peace Negotiation NEPAL Padma RatnaTuladhar Facilitator for the Peace Talk between Gov. and Maoist during People's War, Former-Minister of Health and Labour Shekhar Koirala Former Member of the Constituent Assembly, Member of the Central Committee of the Nepali Congress Krishna Bahadur Mahara (Attended by papers) Former Deputy Prime Minister, Former-Minister of Communication, Govt. of Nepal, Member of the Central Committee in charge of the International Affairs of the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) Observers Papua (INDONESIA) Neles Tebay Roman Catholic Priest and Coordinator of the Papua Peace Network Julianus Septer Manufandu Executive Secretary of PAPUA NGOs FORUM
99
Leoni Tanggahma Liaison officer in Europe, Elsham Papua, the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy JAPAN Akihisa Matsuno Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University Kei Fukunaga Member of International Monitoring Team, The First Secretary of the Embassy of Japan to the Philippines Masako Ishii Associate Professor, Graduate School of Human Science, Osaka University Noriaki Nishimiya Director General of Japan International Cooperation Agency Chugoku International Center Takeo Ishikawa Director of Training Program Division of Japan International Cooperation Agency Chugoku International Center Organizers(from HiPeC, Hiroshima University) Osamu Yoshida Professor, Graduate School of Social Sciences/IDEC, Hiroshima University Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee Masahiko Togawa Associate Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, HiPeC Secretary General Maharjan Keshav Lall Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, Member, HiPeC Executive Committee Yuji Uesugi Associate Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, Member, HiPeC Executive Committee Koki Seki Associate Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, Member of HiPeC Executive Committee Yusuke Bessho Assistant Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, Meg Kagawa HiPeC Research Fellow Humayun Kabir HiPeC Research Fellow
100
Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012
ANNEX 2: Guide to Acronyms
AHJAG Ad Hoc Joint Action Group
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
CPC Civilian Protection Component
CCCH Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
CNAS Center for Nepal and Asian Studies
CPM Communist Party of Nepal
GPH Government of the Republic of the Philippines
HiPeC Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Building
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GPH (or GRP) Government of the Republic of the Philippines
ICG International Contact Group
IDP Internally Displaced People
IMT International Monitoring Team
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
LMT Local Monitoring Teams
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
SSN South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement
UN United Nations
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UP University of the Philippines
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SECRETARIAT COMMITTEE
Chair:
YOSHIDA Osamu
Secretary General:
TOGAWA Masahiko
Staffs of HiPeC Headquarters:
BESSHO Yusuke
KAGAWA Meg
Kabir Md. Humayun
KUMOZU Natsumi
FUJITA Mie
ARAKI Haruka
Research Assistants:
ABE Yukino
FUJIMOTO Yoshihiko
ITAKURA Kazuhiro
Ranjan Saha Partha
Shamini Chandran
Vaidya Arija
Yang Xiaoping
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