media commercialization and authoritarian rule in china
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Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China
Daniela StockmannDepartment of Political ScienceLeiden University
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Media Marketization in Authoritarian StatesDeregulationCommercializationPartial PrivatizationGuang Niu/Getty Images
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The PuzzleWhy does media marketization contribute to political liberalization in some countries, but not in others?
What is the role of the audience in explaining these outcomes?Media MarketizationRegime StabilityPolitical Liberalization& Regime Instability
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A. Theoretical Framework and Research Design
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State-Society Relations under AuthoritarianismAuthoritarian rulers stay in power by means of:Repression (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965; Bellin, 2004)Exchange of economic benefits in return for political support (Ross, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Lust-Oskar, 2006)
Compliance not explained with regime support
A.1. Theoretical Framework
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The Dictators Dilemma (Wintrobe, 1998)The use of repression makes citizens hesitant to state their true opinionsThe dictator suspects opposition
Distribution of rents as a solution
A.1. Theoretical Framework
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Marketized Media as a Solution to the Dictators DilemmaMarketized media provide information about citizen beliefsMedia marketization makes the state less reliant on coercive measuresMedia become more credibleMarketized media are attractive propaganda instruments
But: what happens, if market demands conflict with the official line?
A.1. Theoretical Framework
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Regime Type and Media MarketizationCondition for media marketization to work in favor of authoritarian leaders:Institutions in charge of editorial control of news content Single-party regimes tend to have this institutional capacityRegime type mitigates the effects of media marketizationA.1. Theoretical Framework
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Media as Instruments of Regime StabilityA.2. Hypotheses
In China and Other Single-Party Regimes:
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A.3. Research DesignChongqingFoshanShenyangBeijingWuxi
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Research DesignInterviewsOpen-ended, semi-structured interviews with 46 media practitioners
Content AnalysisComputer-Aided Content Analysis of news reporting in Chongqing and Beijing
Public Opinion SurveysBeijing Area Studies of Beijing Residents (BAS)Survey of Legal Mobilization conducted in Chongqing, Shenyang, Foshan, and Wuxi (LLM)
ExperimentsNatural experiment of media management during the 2005 Anti-Japanese protestsExperimental vignettes (among citizens in Beijing)
Cross-country ComparisonCollection of macro-level data on authoritarian states in Africa, East Central Europe, and the Middle EastA.3. Research Design
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Evaluations of Labor Law and Sentiment towards the United States1.Both issues are open, but related to regime stabilityMost-difficult test of counter-hypotheses2.Issues differ in terms of the relationship between the official line of the state and audience demandsObservation of the relationship between institutions and market forces
A.3. Research Design
Labor Law
United States
Official Line
Positive
Positive
(or Less Negative)
Audience Demand
Positive
Negative
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Media as Instruments of Regime StabilityA.2. Hypotheses
In China and Other Single-Party Regimes:
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B. Evidence from the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing
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Media Management During Crisis
Nationalism as a source of state legitimacyNationalism poses pressures and constraints on foreign policy towards Japan (and the US)
Media as a tool to massage negative sentimentExcept during CrisisB.1. Background
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Timeline Quasi-ExperimentB.2. Empirical Example
April 9
April 10
April 17
April 27
May 4
Protest
Machimuras visit
Lians visit
Soongs visit
Loose state control over news reporting
(Control Group)
Press Restrictions: News content is synchronized
(Treatment Group)
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Newspaper Types in BeijingSpace for News ReportingOpenClosedDegree of Media MarketizationHighLowCommercializedSemi-OfficialOfficialB.2. Empirical Example
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TreatmentB.2. Empirical ExampleB.2. Empirical Example
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Media Credibility
Official papers are perceived as propaganda organs and mouthpieces of state units.
Commercialized papers are perceived to publish real news from the perspective of ordinary people.B.2. Empirical Example
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Newspaper Types in BeijingSpace for News ReportingOpenClosedDegree of Media MarketizationHighLowCommercializedSemi-OfficialOfficialB.2. Empirical Example
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Data AnalysisData:Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling (response rate: 56.1 %, n= 617)
Statistical Models:
1. Media Selection ModelDV: Newspaper Consumption (dummy variable)2. Media Effects Model
Assumption: People were at least moderately attentive to news about Japan.DV: Feeling Thermometer toward Japan (continuous variable, 1-100)B.2. Empirical Example
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Media EffectsControlling for national identity, exposure to alternative media sources, travel to Japan, education, generation, and gender.B.2. Empirical Example
Positive Views of Japan
(Feeling Thermometer)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables:
Exposure to Commercialized Messages
-14.33**
(7.1)
Exposure to Commercialized Messages * Post-April 9 Interview
6.33
(10.68)
Post-April 9 Interview
-9.62*
(5.85)
Intercept
50.66***
(13.19)
R-squared
0.11
Valid N
481
p-value * p
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Media EffectsB.2. Empirical Example
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Summary
Despite marketization, newspaper content tends to be uniform.At the same time, marketization boosts the credibility of newspapers, thus promoting the ability of the state to influence public opinion.
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AppendixQuasi-Experiment
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Assumption of Quasi-Experiment
Respondent Characteristics by Treatment Groups
Average
(s.d.)
Whole Survey
Pre-Protest
Press Restrictions
Years of Education
11.34
(3.17)
11.43
(2.79)
12.03
(3.04)
Personal Income
(RMB)
2,212.28
(5918.01)
2,212.92
(7,266.22)
2,548.68
(4,409.72)
Female
0.43
(0.5)
0.43
(0.5)
0.38
(0.49)
Age
47
(9.78)
48.3
(9.51)
45.21
(9.6)
Valid N
617
385
232
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Official Paper Use(Raw Data)
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Data AnalysisData:Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling (response rate: 56.1 %, n= 617)
Statistical Models:
1. Media Selection ModelDV: Newspaper Consumption (dummy variable)2. Media Effects Model
Assumption: People were at least moderately attentive to news about Japan.DV: Feeling Thermometer toward Japan (continuous variable, 1-100)B.2. Empirical Example
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Selection EffectsB.3. Selection EffectsControl variables are not displayed in the table.
Use of Official Papers
(Among Readers)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Use of Commercialized Papers
(Among Readers of Non-Official Papers)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables:
Press Restrictions
-0.47***
(0.15)
0.1
(0.17)
Official Visits
0.53**
(0.27)
-0.68**
(0.34)
Intercept
-1.51**
(0.62)
1.72**
(0.95)
Pseudo R-Squared
0.05
0.05
Valid N
492
314
z-value * z
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Selection EffectsB.3. Selection Effects
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Selection Effects (Controls)
Use of Official Papers
(Among Readers)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables:
Press Restrictions
-0.47***
(0.15)
Official Visits
0.53**
(0.27)
Control Variables:
Cadre
0.19
(0.21)
Party or State Unit
0.60***
(0.22)
Neighborhood Committee Worker
0.68*
(0.38)
Education
1.07
(0.73)
Personal Income
0.46
(0.31)
Intercept
-1.51**
(0.62)
Pseudo R-Squared
0.05
Valid N
492
z-value * z
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Media Effects (Controls)
Positive Views of Japan
(Feeling Thermometer)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables:
Exposure to Commercialized Messages
-14.33**
(7.1)
Exposure to Commercialized Messages * Post-April 9 Interview
6.33
(10.68)
Post-April 9 Interview
-9.62*
(5.85)
Control Variables:
Watching TV News
-2.65
(3.64)
Reading the News Online
-8.44***
(2.71)
National Identity
-12.5***
(3.94)
Japan Threat Peceptions
-8.36***
(3.18)
Travel to Japan
10.14*
(5.94)
Education
3.73
(13.18)
Age 38 - 53
5.56***
(2.01)
Female
1.67
(1.99)
Intercept
50.66***
(13.19)
R-squared
0.11
Valid N
481
p-value * p
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Effects of Exposure to More Commercialized Papers as Reading Additional Papers and Press Restrictions Change
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Effects of Reading up Ten Papers as Exposure to Commercialized Papers and Press Restrictions Change
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Credibility
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Media Labels and BrandingMedia branding refers to marketing strategies by media outlets to establish themselves as distinctive players in the media market.Advertising We make a Paper that is close to YOU! The Paper that Responsibly talks about everything!Corporate identitiesSpecial columns and famous reportersDesignOverstepping of boundaries for news reporting(playing table tennis by the edge)
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Beijing Readership Survey, 2002 (I)
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Beijing Readership Survey, 2002 (II)
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Experimental Vignettes:Official Frame According to (Beijing Evening News / Beijing Daily), Wang Village Colemin owed Deng Pingjun and others, a group of 20 people, wages of more than 30000 Yuan. Approaching the spring festival the migrant workers wanted to visit home and asked several times for their wages, but the cole mine refused due to lack of money. The migrants had no alternative but to go to Beijing city court, demanding to be compensated for their work. To the benefit of the workers, the court took their case very seriously, speeded up the process, and waived the application fee. Under the hard work of the judges the case was resolved through mediation. The migrants received partial compensation on the same day and they had enough money to travel home for new years. According to statistics, since my countrys labor law was passed in 1995 the number of accepted cases in the whole nation was 425726. these disputes rightful, timely, and proper application had advantages for protecting the legitimate rights of the large working population. The court guided and shaped the complicated labor relations during the reform process, as well as solved the problems arising during reform and development of enterprises. (/)203 1995425726Original source: Peoples Daily, 21 March, 2002. :
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Experimental Vignettes:Commercialized Frame According to (Beijing Evening News / Beijing Daily), Liu Dingwei, Li Demin and Chen Qian belong to a group of 19 farmers in the city of Nancheng in Sizhou. Between July and December 2005 they worked at a construction site of TongXin Company in Chengdu. Throughout the process, the company outsourced to Mr. Zou. After arriving at the construction site, Mr. Zou asked Liu Dingwei and the other 18 to hurry up. Working hours and wages were decided by Mr. Zou. While working at the site Mr. Zou only gave these migrant workers a small sum to pay for living expenses. Each migrants wages was delayed to a different extent. In total wages in the amount of 26050 Yuan were not paid. Liu Dingwei and the others asked several times for their wages, but without any result although Mr. Zou said he would inquire about the reasons for the delay. In February the workers asked the provincial legal aid center for help. Together with two lawyers and staff they contacted TongXin Company and after positive coordination and communication eventually received a compensation of 13000 Yuan. (/)192005722121191926050 200721223000Original source: Chengdu Evening News, 18 September 2007.
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Experimental Vignettes (Gibson and Gows, 2003)Survey Question (asked in all conditions):Source: LLM, 2005.
Have you heard about the labor law? If yes, respondent was asked: In general, is the implementation of the labor law very effective, somewhat effective, not so effective, or not at all effective in protecting workers rights? Variable was coded one if respondent had heard about the labor law and thought it was somewhat or very effective, otherwise it was coded zero. 1
13 out of 138 participants had never heard about the labor law and were therefore not asked the second question. Among those 4 were sampled into the control group and 9 in treatment groups.
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Experimental Vignettes:Results
Independent Variables
Perceived Effectiveness of the Labor Law
(Dummy Variable)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Commercialized Label
0.510*
(0.31)
Commercialized Frame
-0.026
(0.307)
Control Group
0.058
(0.331)
Constant
0.422*
(0.254)
N
118
Pseudo R2
0.02
z-value * z
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Experimental Vignettes:Results
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Institutions
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Institutional Restrictions
Sponsoring InstitutionsState Publication and Press AgencyConglomerationAbsence of Media LawPropaganda Department
Institutions establish boundaries for news reporting
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Attitudes toward the United States
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News Reporting about the United StatesTopicsPositivity / NegativityB.2. News Content
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News Reporting about the United States* Control variables are not displayed in the table.
Dependent Variable:
Tone of US
All Articles
Variables
Coefficient
(s.e.)
People's Daily
1.142***
(0.309)
Politics
-3.592***
(0.876)
Article on China and the US
1.199***
(0.238)
Constant
0.582**
(0.277)
N
2,272
R2
0.06
*** p
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News Reporting about the United States
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Sensitivity of News Reporting about the United States
Peoples Daily
Average
(s.d.)
Beijing Evening News
Average
(s.d.)
Total N
Political Leaders
China and US
0.57
(0.6)
0.47
(0.51)
110
Only US
0.54
(0.58)
0.31
(0.48)
269
No Political Leaders
China and US
0.36
(0.68)
0.2
(0.42)
202
Only US
0.26
(0.5)
0.18
(0.4)
221
Total N
420
382
802
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News Reporting Over Time:Tone
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Tone Over Time (Table)
Dependent Variable
Tone of News Reporting about the US
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables:
Among All Articles
Peoples Daily
Beijing Evening News
People's Daily
0.257***
--
--
--
(0.088)
People's Daily*2003
0.067
--
--
--
(0.103)
2003
-0.139**
-0.197***
-0.308***
-0.171*
(0.066)
(0.074)
(0.117)
(0.096)
China and the US
0.451***
0.374***
0.139
0.484***
(0.053)
(0.075)
(0.118)
(0.099)
China and the US * 2003
--
0.157
0.398**
0.061
(0.102)
(0.156)
(0.135)
Control Variables:
Politics
-1.381***
-1.192***
-1.101***
-1.530***
(0.189)
(0.185)
(0.275)
(0.26)
Sensitivity Over Time
-0.896***
-0.321*
-1.090***
-0.626*
(0.222)
(0.179)
(0.279)
(0.355)
Length
1.070*
1.074*
1.241*
0.778
(0.569)
(0.57)
(0.727)
(0.892)
Constant
0.404***
0.398***
0.806***
0.410***
(0.069)
(0.071)
(0.145)
(0.092)
N
2,272
2,272
945
1,327
R2
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.08
p-value * p
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Data AnalysisData:Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling
Statistical Model:
Attitudes = Attention + AttentionSquared + Exposure + Attention*Exposure + AttentionSquared*Exposure + Controls + u
DV: Feeling Thermometer toward the United StatesB.3. Media Effects
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Media Effects: Theory(Exposure +) Attention + Susceptibility = Effect
AttentionAttitude ChangeLiberalConservativeB.3. Media Effects
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B.3. Media Effects
Positivity toward the United States
(Feeling Thermometer)
Variables
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Peoples Daily
-0.123
--
--
(10.935)
Attention
-38.950**
-43.303*
-35.013**
(15.726)
(23.749)
(16.767)
Attention2
43.749***
47.507**
40.509***
(14.919)
(23.896)
(15.552)
Peoples Daily*Attention
29.319
--
--
(44.185)
Peoples Daily*Attention2
-38.681
--
--
(40.273)
Beijing Evening News
--
3.449
--
(6.896)
Beijing Evening News*Attention
--
12.115
--
(30.072)
Beijing Evening News*Attention2
--
-13.981
--
(29.27)
Official Papers
--
--
2.572
(7.811)
Official Papers*Attention
--
--
13.07
(34.887)
Official Papers*Attention2
--
--
-24.933
(34.463)
National Identity
-15.534***
-14.946***
-15.211***
(4.134)
(4.135)
(4.148)
Personal Contact
32.251***
34.170***
33.386***
(11.865)
(11.817)
(11.91)
Education
(logged)
15.6
16.255
15.149
(12.992)
(12.96)
(13.024)
Generation
4.530**
4.112*
4.298**
(2.131)
(2.139)
(2.136)
Intercept
38.375***
35.596***
37.695***
(11.955)
(12.173)
(12.177)
N
487
487
485
R squared
0.08
0.09
0.08
p-value *** p
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Beijing Evening NewsB.3. Media Effects
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Peoples DailyB.3. Media Effects
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B.3. Media Effects
Positivity Toward the US
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables
Attention
-92.676**
(38.978)
Attention Squared
106.965***
(38.31)
Exposure to Official Messages
-10.54
(15.992)
Exposure to Official Message * Attention
127.604*
(71.822)
Exposure to Official Message*Attention Squared
-153.769**
(72.429)
National Identity
-17.751***
(4.127)
Personal Contact
34.129***
(11.718)
Generation
4.269**
(2.101)
Education (logged)
16.942
(13.692)
Tension
-9.119***
(2.144)
Constant
47.394***
(14.866)
N
482
R2
0.12
*** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value
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Media Effects e More Paper: Medium AttentionB.3. Media Effects
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One More Paper: High AttentionB.3. Media Effects
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Official Papers
-
Views of the Labor Law
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Labor Law and Labor DisputesLabor protests have been increasing in recent yearsLegal Reform: Building a Rule of Law- Increase its legitimacy- Channel worker grievances into legal institutions- Improve Implementation
Use the law as a weapon!(!)A.3. Issue Selection
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Newspapers in ChongqingOpen Space for News Reporting ClosedCommercialized PapersOfficial Papers
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The Official Line: Labor Law Protects Workers"The central government is very clear: Wen Jiabao said that migrant workers should get their salary on time. Those kind of problems are labor disputes. If the employer is from a private corporation, they should give salary on time; if the employer is from a state-owned enterprise, then he should even more do so."
(Interview # 7)
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News Reporting on Labor Law: Tone
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News Reporting on Labor Law:Selection This year in May Lao Du happily took the labor compensation.(Peoples Daily, 2005)"Filing a lawsuit is too exhausting, I no longer believe in legal channels. Chinese people do not have human rights. Zhu Rongji has really sacrificed our generation, especially since the beginning of the reform period. Justice in China is not real."(Interview with Lao Du by Mary E. Gallagher, University of Michigan) Happy endings: Articles do not address the problem of implementation
-
Media Effects: Theory(Exposure +) Attention + Susceptibility = Effect
AttentionAttitude ChangeLiberalConservativeB.3. Media Effects
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Attentiveness and Views of the Labor Law (among media users)* Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies, 2011
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Media Effects of Official and Non-Official Papers on Views about the Labor Law* Parallel regression assumption holds; Control variables not displayed in the Table
Perceived Effectiveness of the Labor Law
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables
Official Papers
0.393**
(0.19)
Attention
0.784***
(0.196)
Official Papers * Attention
-0.704**
(0.299)
Foshan
0.103
(0.085)
Wuxi
0.390***
(0.07)
Shenyang
0.181**
(0.071)
Cut 1
-1.812***
(0.296)
Cut 2
-0.278
(0.293)
Cut 3
1.464***
(0.294)
N
2,049
Pseudo R2
0.02
z-value * z
-
Media Effects of Official and Non-Official Papers on Views about the Labor Law
-
Likelihood to Perceive the Law as Effective / Coefficient
-
Likelihood to Perceive the Law as Effective / Coefficient
-
Applicability to Other Media Types
-
Newspaper Use (Raw Data)
-
Newspaper Use
-
Newspapers and News Websites* Forthcoming in Susan Shirk, Changing Media, Changing China, 2010
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable
Newspaper Consumption
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Online News Consumption
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Press Restrictions
0.657(0.459)
0.497(0.520)
Negativity toward Japan
0.742**(0.335)
0.875**(0.401)
Press Restrictions*Negativity
-1.063*(0.608)
-0.627(0.673)
Cadre
1.053**(0.438)
-0.038(0.236)
Travel
-0.558*(0.291)
0.953***(0.274)
English
-1.462(1.166)
7.552***(1.422)
English Squared
2.177(2.028)
-9.505***(2.999)
Years of Education
3.101***(0.673)
3.898***(1.132)
Income
0.376(0.275)
0.918**(0.382)
Constant
-2.316***(0.601)
-6.054***(1.015)
N
603
597
Pseudo R2
0.09
0.27
*** z
-
Newspapers and News Websites* Forthcoming in Susan Shirk, Changing Media, Changing China, 2010
-
Media Sources, Attentiveness, and Views of the Labor Law(among frequent media users)* Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies, 2011
Perceived Effectiveness of the Labor Law
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
Coefficient
(s.e.)
(s.e.)
(s.e.)
(s.e.)
(s.e.)
(s.e.)
(s.e.)
Attention
0.136
0.242
-0.175
0.441***
0.456***
0.479***
0.460***
(0.207)
(0.261)
(0.431)
(0.169)
(0.161)
(0.172)
(0.175)
Frequently Watching Legal TV Shows
-0.335*
--
--
--
--
--
--
(0.2)
Frequently Watching Legal TV Shows * Attention
0.867***
--
--
--
--
--
--
(0.321)
Frequently Reading Newspapers
--
-0.229
--
--
--
--
--
(0.205)
Frequently Reading Newspapers * Attention
--
0.42
--
--
--
--
--
(0.327)
Frequently Watching TV
--
--
-0.441
--
--
--
--
(0.293)
Frequently Watching TV * Attention
--
--
0.788*
--
--
--
--
(0.463)
Frequently Listening to Radio*
--
--
--
-0.415
--
--
--
(0.297)
Frequently Listening to Radio * Attention
--
--
--
0.554
--
--
--
(0.472)
Frequently Listening to Legal Radio Show
--
--
--
--
-0.809
--
--
(0.517)
Frequently Listening to Legal Radio Show * Attention
--
--
--
--
1.575*
--
--
(0.884)
Frequently Reading Magazines*
--
--
--
--
--
-0.005
--
(0.279)
Frequently Reading Magazines * Attention
--
--
--
--
--
0.188
--
(0.441)
Frequently Surfing News Websites*
--
--
--
--
--
--
-0.064
(0.264)
Frequently Surfing News Websites * Attention
--
--
--
--
--
--
0.258
(0.411)
Constant
0.835**
0.874***
1.100***
0.767**
0.752**
0.756**
0.804**
(0.327)
(0.339)
(0.412)
(0.32)
(0.319)
(0.32)
(0.324)
N
2,309
2,309
2,309
2,309
2,309
2,309
2,309
Pseudo R2
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
*** z
-
GeneralizabilityChina
-
Regional Advertising Income in China
-
24 Chinese Provinces and MunicipalitiesNo data on dependent variable available for Jilin, Tianjin, Neimenggu,Sichuan, Xizang, Gansu, Qinghai, Hong Kong, Macao.
cases
Province/MunicipalityAdvertising IncomeInternet users
Beijing Shi345574646.6
Shanghai Shi298950545.8
Guangdong Sheng256719735.9
Jiangsu Sheng130538423.3
Zhejiang Sheng124667630.3
Shandong Sheng68955913.5
Fujian Sheng49741024.3
Liaoning Sheng39964418.3
Hunan Sheng33311310.9
Anhui Sheng3106099.6
Chongqing Shi29344212.7
Hubei Sheng28713212.4
Henan Sheng24140410.2
Jiangxi Sheng21299811.8
Heilongjiang Sheng19253512.5
Shanxi Sheng18626315.9
Yunnan Sheng1644656.8
Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu13424417.7
Hebei Sheng12745411.1
Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu10000011.9
Guizhou Sheng764196
Shaanxi Sheng3856613.9
Hainan Sheng3315617.2
Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu2719310.1
24 cases out of 34
2008
tianjin
Neimenggu
Jilin
Sichuan
Xizang
Gansu
Qinghai
Hong Kong
Macao
Taiwan
2008
GBCOUNTSUM_AREASUM_PERIMEADVERTISINGNAME_PINGYmediatrusttvtrustpapertrustinternetusersgdppercapitaruralpopminoritypopsizehighedupopabove6XY
1100001516631315696.00002374422.05903455746.0000Beijing Shi-0.02833180.09610390.088600346.65820415.595.714554421313984961354.40625646528.75000
1200001211720791040.00001732931.9140737137.0000Tianjin Shi26.74612223.6997.729896149895171056399.15625561517.18750
130000164187737100176.125024586790.8790127454.0000Hebei Sheng-0.08876440.02410350.01058211.11987759.759663501245459018994710.09375541936.38281
140000107156681356448.000019645420.0540186263.0000Shanxi Sheng-0.03061220.09501760.078911615.91694555.9799.7131069210529277641824.93750324515.01855
150000881131066998680.000046974794.821069434.0000Neimenggu Zizhiqu13.42539349.8579.24220661560209201049132.412321199865.60938
210000105146067771237.781015804747.8240399644.0000Liaoning Sheng-0.1329696-0.0463618-0.062182918.32572940.883.98393173765376661435878.81250813275.96875
22000052191266641960.000016689114.2400165187.0000Jilin Sheng15.91938346.8490.97250671790238981693960.812501122944.78125
23000088471247090208.000033075142.5490192535.0000Heilongjiang Sheng-0.1710692-0.0602883-0.07232712.51847846.194.98351932151336101678839.875001681706.25000
310000136681244452.00001427467.69802989505.0000Shanghai Shi0.05491070.18303570.172619145.86636711.399.38167083457161991545197.06250-292087.12500
32000090100839226564.938013973343.02901305384.0000Jiangsu Sheng-0.04384920.09523810.064484123.33392846.899.67695035355659881303640.12500-120131.19531
330000163101930972536.502015385867.13901246676.0000Zhejiang Sheng-0.1786436-0.0569358-0.078659630.33741142.899.15458443727433781480108.50000-535236.68750
34000082140106656776.000016653335.4140310609.0000Anhui Sheng-0.09703860.008915-0.00450139.61204561.399.37562472054522121145903.25000-261309.40234
350000119121503151039.190016796980.9290497410.0000Fujian Sheng-0.00201460.14200680.089847324.32590851.398.33327541741306991326013.62500-923737.90625
36000092167380979120.000020409930.8830212998.0000Jiangxi Sheng-0.181746-0.0400794-0.05105111.81263360.299.73399452638365341079269.96875-804731.34375
370000152154051467139.721021106446.9450689559.0000Shandong Sheng-0.04169920.07179940.084202613.52780753.2599.32856964652804661211253.56250249067.35596
410000130165241929580.000021949602.0830241404.0000Henan Sheng0.02680780.15234220.118165810.21601265.6698.7886460323780045774162.06250-82252.09375
42000080185817520024.000020324109.2870287132.0000Hubei Sheng-0.11681410.0123756-0.003620212.41620655.795.6652408.004057.0049735.00695378.10938-414362.03125
430000105211626418400.000025264414.8200333113.0000Hunan Sheng-0.08665490.05185190.003401410.91449259.5589.7958382.003384.0054867.00649867.92188-830547.40625
440000185177032179689.971023348861.74302567197.0000Guangdong Sheng-0.00563380.11454310.103286435.93315136.8698.5885649.005207.0080650.00850901.90625-1322830.50000
45000099235857063170.500025058157.0420100000.0000Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu-0.04562960.09965840.063703711.91255563.7661.6643442.001606.0040026.00334615.68164-1222139.65625
46000014335301210170.06405549050.848033156.0000Hainan Sheng-0.2170068-0.01924-0.112244917.21455552.882.717696.00447.007139.00519203.37500-1736691.43750
510000199566504259152.000054091855.4810450144.0000Sichuan Sheng9.91289364.495.0275201.002901.0070787.00-108422.90625-534149.65234
52000083175866891824.000020502298.373076419.0000Guizhou Sheng0.00257940.13305320.10466276691571.7662.1534587.001026.0031909.00157746.34375-899704.37500
530000126383475103296.000037258922.9890164465.0000Yunnan Sheng-0.0243590.0640590.07337536.81054068.466.5941269.001540.0038261.00-323230.16016-1080055.43750
540000781202978229248.000048482173.353020955.0000Xizang Zizhiqu12.71210971.715.532587.0029.002401.00-1510733.37500-256506.70313
61000098205962274232.000022223302.058038566.0000Shaanxi Sheng-0.12380950.0185748-0.025534813.91460759.3899.5034383.002525.0032678.00407516.7066185520.90625
62000089404120851480.000028877007.013036122.0000Gansu Sheng8.41034668.4191.3123990.00864.0022562.00-218655.24774314995.48438
63000043714827786784.000027292521.866020533.0000Qinghai Sheng111425759.9354.495045.00331.004679.00-784380.2265694017.10938
6400002051559928704.00005088046.796027193.0000Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu-0.129554-0.0120937-0.027966710.11464955.9865.475560.00380.005117.0085193.76758259802.08691
650000891636395596584.000054858769.5930134244.0000Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu-0.3510852-0.223194-0.234049217.71699960.8540.6118872.001567.0017464.00-1677290.90625952402.26563
7100004636280747747.43804555158.7520Taiwan Sheng1633790.31250-1131063.71875
810000191073646257.5630456765.4680Hongkong950501.56250-1360111.06250
820000115423141.000017897.9260Macao892430.46875-1382637.12500
293442.0000Chongqing Shi-0.4666666-0.3333333-0.333333312.71466051.6693.582585091824352
CH:situation as of the end of 2007
CH:situation as of 2007
CH:sitution as of 2007
CH:situation as of 2007
CH:diqu shengchan zongzhi from zhongguo tongji nianjian 2008 -> statistics refers to the situaion in 2007 in 100 mio yuan
Danie Stockmann:zhongguo tongji nianjian 2008 referring to situation in 2007; percentage of rural pop (1-percentage = urban)
Danie Stockmann:percentage of han chinese according to 2000 census data source:http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/dfrkpcgb/index.htm
Danie Stockmann:not available on stats website -> internethttp://wenwen.soso.com/z/q100970018.htm
Danie Stockmann:based on zhonguo tongji nianjian 2008 referring to situation in 2007
Danie Stockmann:number of people who College and higher education as erported by china statistical yearbook 2008
Danie Stockmann:as reported in China statistical yearbook 2008
2005
GBCOUNTSUM_AREASUM_PERIMEADVERTISINGAD. INCOME RANKNAME_PINGYXY
1100001516631315696.00002374422.05902515576.00005Beijing Shi961354.40625646528.75000
1200001211720791040.00001732931.9140527801.000023Tianjin Shi1056399.15625561517.18750
130000164187737100176.125024586790.879087393.00009Hebei Sheng994710.09375541936.38281
140000107156681356448.000019645420.0540141259.000021Shanxi Sheng641824.93750324515.01855
150000881131066998680.000046974794.821038193.000026Neimenggu Zizhiqu1049132.412321199865.60938
210000105146067771237.781015804747.8240455363.00008Liaoning Sheng1435878.81250813275.96875
22000052191266641960.000016689114.2400131380.000018Jilin Sheng1693960.812501122944.78125
23000088471247090208.000033075142.5490171865.000015Heilongjiang Sheng1678839.875001681706.25000
310000136681244452.00001427467.69802664690.00003Shanghai Shi1545197.06250-292087.12500
32000090100839226564.938013973343.0290906323.00002Jiangsu Sheng1303640.12500-120131.19531
330000163101930972536.502015385867.1390956970.00004Zhejiang Sheng1480108.50000-535236.68750
34000082140106656776.000016653335.4140226023.000010Anhui Sheng1145903.25000-261309.40234
350000119121503151039.190016796980.9290360925.000012Fujian Sheng1326013.62500-923737.90625
36000092167380979120.000020409930.8830163354.000019Jiangxi Sheng1079269.96875-804731.34375
370000152154051467139.721021106446.9450611084.00006Shandong Sheng1211253.56250249067.35596
410000130165241929580.000021949602.0830229651.000014Henan Sheng774162.06250-82252.09375
42000080185817520024.000020324109.2870263469.000011Hubei Sheng695378.10938-414362.03125
430000105211626418400.000025264414.8200208724.00007Hunan Sheng649867.92188-830547.40625
440000185177032179689.971023348861.74302346230.00001Guangdong Sheng850901.90625-1322830.50000
45000099235857063170.500025058157.0420115448.000020Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu334615.68164-1222139.65625
46000014335301210170.06405549050.848032606.000029Hainan Sheng519203.37500-1736691.43750
510000199566504259152.000054091855.4810295371.000017Sichuan Sheng-108422.90625-534149.65234
52000083175866891824.000020502298.373076419.000024Guizhou Sheng157746.34375-899704.37500
530000126383475103296.000037258922.9890136536.000022Yunnan Sheng-323230.16016-1080055.43750
540000781202978229248.000048482173.353018456.000031Xizang Zizhiqu-1510733.37500-256506.70313
61000098205962274232.000022223302.058038883.000016Shaanxi Sheng407516.7066185520.90625
62000089404120851480.000028877007.013030359.000027Gansu Sheng-218655.24774314995.48438
63000043714827786784.000027292521.866011000.000030Qinghai Sheng-784380.2265694017.10938
6400002051559928704.00005088046.796023922.000028Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu85193.76758259802.08691
650000891636395596584.000054858769.5930107192.000025Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu-1677290.90625952402.26563
7100004636280747747.43804555158.7520Taiwan Sheng1633790.31250-1131063.71875
810000191073646257.5630456765.4680Hongkong950501.56250-1360111.06250
820000115423141.000017897.9260Macao892430.46875-1382637.12500
271022.000013Chongqing Shi
ChinaDataCenter
GBENAMEXY
11Beijing Shi0.004829000.03018100
12Tianjin Shi0.005610000.02934800
13Hebei Sheng0.005159000.02923400
14Shanxi Sheng0.001808000.02742600
15Nei Mongol Zizhiqu0.006201000.03537400
21Liaoning Sheng0.009133000.03145600
22Jilin Sheng0.011637000.03419400
23Heilongjiang Sheng0.011808000.03926000
31Shanghai Shi0.009636000.02184200
32Jiangsu Sheng0.007535000.02301000
33Zhejiang Sheng0.008609000.01923200
34Anhui Sheng0.006052000.02189100
35Fujian Sheng0.007233000.01578300
36Jiangxi Sheng0.005229000.01702400
37Shandong Sheng0.006869000.02623300
41Henan Sheng0.002846000.02362900
42Hubei Sheng0.001936000.02080800
43Hunan Sheng0.001345000.01698200
44Guangdong Sheng0.003049000.01251000
45Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu-0.001594000.01348000
46Hainan Sheng-0.000190000.00880500
50Chongqing Shi-0.001949000.01980300
51Sichuan Sheng-0.005815000.02011400
52Guizhou Sheng-0.003030000.01656600
53Yunnan Sheng-0.007434000.01519100
54Xizang Zizhiqu-0.017574000.02317300
61Shaanxi Sheng-0.000362000.02533200
62Gansu Sheng-0.005898000.02778300
63Qinghai Sheng-0.010971000.02602500
64Ningxia Huizu Zizhiqu-0.003148000.02707500
65Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu-0.018555000.03395400
71Taiwan Sheng0.010042000.01377500
81Xiangkong Tebiexingzhengqu0.003858000.01202900
Ranking
NAME_PINGY2005 RANK2006 RANK
Beijing Shi56
Tianjin Shi2324
Hebei Sheng99
Shanxi Sheng2122
Neimenggu Zizhiqu2625
Liaoning Sheng88
Jilin Sheng1818
Heilongjiang Sheng1515
Shanghai Shi33
Jiangsu Sheng22
Zhejiang Sheng44
Anhui Sheng1010
Fujian Sheng1214
Jiangxi Sheng1920
Shandong Sheng65
Henan Sheng1411
Hubei Sheng1113
Hunan Sheng77
Guangdong Sheng11
Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu2019
Hainan Sheng2927
Chongqing Shi1717
Guizhou Sheng2423
Yunnan Sheng2221
Xizang Zizhiqu3131
Shaanxi Sheng1616
Gansu Sheng2728
Qinghai Sheng3030
Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu2829
Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu2526
Taiwan
Hongkong
Macao
Sichuan Sheng1312
Area Directly under the Central Government25.2%
East Area44.4%
Middle Area20.2%
Western Area10.1%
Table8OA1
Province / Municipality20052008NAME_PINGY
Beijing25155763455746Beijing Shi
Tianjin527801737137Tianjin Shi
Hebei87393127454Hebei Sheng
Shanxi141259186263Shanxi Sheng
Neimenggu3819369434Neimenggu Zizhiqu
Liaoning455363399644Liaoning Sheng
Jilin131380165187Jilin Sheng
Heilongjiang171865192535Heilongjiang Sheng
Shanghai26646902989505Shanghai Shi
Jiangsu9063231305384Jiangsu Sheng
Zhejiang9569701246676Zhejiang Sheng
Anhui226023310609Anhui Sheng
Fujian360925497410Fujian Sheng
Jiangxi163354212998Jiangxi Sheng
Shandong611084689559Shandong Sheng
Henan229651241404Henan Sheng
Hubei263469287132Hubei Sheng
Hunan208724333113Hunan Sheng
Guangdong23462302567197Guangdong Sheng
Guangxi115448100000Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu
Hainan3260633156Hainan Sheng
Sichuan295371450144Sichuan Sheng
Guizhou7641976419Guizhou Sheng
Yunnan136536164465Yunnan Sheng
Xizang1845620955Xizang Zizhiqu
Shaanxi3888338566Shaanxi Sheng
Gansu3035936122Gansu Sheng
Qinghai1100020533Qinghai Sheng
Ningxia2392227193Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu
Xinjiang107192134244Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu
Chongqing271022293442Chongqing Shi
Average456886.677419355561600.838709677
-
Media Marketization and Media Credibility in China
Newspaper Credibility
Television Credibility
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables
Commercial Liberalization Index
0.602***
0.591***
(0.159)
(0.164)
Ratio of Rural Population
0.647
0.545
(0.44)
(0.456)
Level of Economic Development
0.005
-0.042
(0.214)
(0.222)
Ratio of Han Chinese
0.195
0.205
(0.129)
(0.134)
Municipality
-0.196**
-0.222**
(0.086)
(0.089)
Constant
-0.564
-0.473
(0.334)
(0.346)
N
24
24
R-Squared
0.53
0.51
*** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value
-
Generalizability: Single-Party States
-
37 Countries / 137 CasesCases were included if coded as partly free or not free according to FH or as authoritarian according to Polity
Sheet1
CountryYearRegime TypeSingle PartyIrex_Media MarketizationFreedom HousePolity 2
Armenia2008411.314.55
Ethiopia2007511.6451
Georgia2008411.7747
Kenya2007512.5937
Mozambique2007512.0136
Tanzania2007511.973.51
Tunisia2005511.35.5-4
Zambia2007411.953.55
Zimbabwe2007511.946.5-4
Azerbaijan2008301.545.5-7
Bahrain2007301.995-7
Belarus2008300.826.5-7
Burkina Faso2007301.3440
Burundi2007201.354.56
Cameroon2007301.296-4
Chad2007301.035.5-2
Egypt2005601.875.5-3
Guinea2007302.095.5-1
Jordan2007301.84.5-3
Kazakhstan2008301.395.5-6
Kuwait2007302.714.5-7
Libya2005300.097-7
Mauritania2007200.864.59
Morocco2007301.764.5-6
Oman2007301.755.5-8
Qatar2007302.275.5-10
Russia2008301.995.55
Rwanda2007102.015.5-3
Saudi Arabia2007301.676.5-10
Sudan2007201.347-4
Syria2007601.276.5-7
Tajikistan2008301.575.5-3
Togo2007300.845.5-4
Uganda2007302.124.5-1
United Arab Emirates2007302.56-8
Uzbekistan2008300.427-9
Yemen2007300.985-2
Sheet2
Sheet3
-
OLS Regression Results of Media Marketization on Diversity of Information as Regime Type Changes
Diversity of Information
Freedom House
Press Rating
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables
Commercial Liberalization
3.780***
-43.588***
(0.365)
(8.116)
Single Party Regime
0.882**
-22.074***
(0.35)
(7.781)
Commercial Liberalization*Single Party Regime
-2.129***
31.741*
(0.797)
(17.741)
Level of Economic Development
-0.178***
0.561
(0.053)
(1.18)
Length
0.478
-17.354***
(0.298)
(6.635)
Middle East/North Africa
-0.419**
8.915**
(0.183)
(4.078)
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.037
-2.281
(0.132)
(2.929)
Constant
1.625***
89.578***
(0.42)
(9.351)
N
137
137
R-Squared
0.55
0.46
*** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value
-
Partial Regression Plots
-
OLS Regression Results of Media Marketization on Media Credibility
Media Credibility
Coefficient
(s.e.)
Independent Variables
Commercial Liberalization
1.862**
(0.294)
Single Party Regime
-0.346**
(0.058)
Level of Economic Development
-0.184**
(0.031)
Length
-0.004
(0.03)
Constant
0.874**
(0.14)
N
7
R2
0.95
*** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value
-
Partial Regression Plot
Dictators face a dilemma since the use of coercion increases the chances of a breakdown of the regime. As repression increases people become more afraid to speak out. As a result, the less the dictator knows about what they are really thinking or planning, and the more reason he or she has to fear them.
All conceptualizations of legitimacy share that legitimacy requires loyalty to the state or rulers, even when there is disagreement (Hallin, xxx)irrational attachment, because it becomes important precisely when the quality of governance declines (hirschman, x)This cannot be established by distribution of economic benefits and authoritarian rulers try to legitimate their rule by means of information control
Two-way relationship between media institutions, news content, and public opinionIn order to assess these three factors I combined multiple methods.
In order to assess media commercialization, three options: time series, compare media types, or newspaper types.-> time series data no available for developing countries-> for my dissertation I chose to focus on newspaper types-> for my book I would like to repeat the analysis for media types
Content AnalysisQuantitative to improve comparability across issue areasMeasure variation in terms of tone of news reporting-> Maryland data coded by trained chinese students-> yoshikoder: multilanguage program in chinese
Public opinionPPS for BAS -> residents which excludes migrant population-> designed after detroit area study at michiganGPS for Chongqing -> migrant population-> survey captures migrant population!!-> I am happy to talk more about these surveys and survey data in general from china in the discussio section
EP-3: collision of US surveillance plane with Chinese fighter -> emergency landing on hainan. Both parties blaimed each otherTaiwan: Japanese colony until 1945 (WW II). When the nationalist party lost the civil war the island became the refuge of the GMD. When the PRC was on the verge of taking control in 1950 the Korean war began (shift of Chinese troups to korea and US: defend taiwan)-> division blaimed at internal backwardness, military weakness, American imperialism-> incomplete sovereignty of the PRC
ROC Independence:strategic threat to china due to ally of ROC with the USPublic Opinion: leaders sell out the country -> collapse of the partyDomestic dominoe effect: separatist movements in Tibet, Uighur, Mongolia
The commercialized newspaper is always more negative / less positive than the official paper, most evident with respect to foreign domestic policy
Some variation, especially at the boundaries between the sensitive and the non-sensitiveMore commercialized papers are closer to public opinion
BUT: on the whole, the commercialized papers follow the lead of the official papers.
Mechanism is NOT coercion: strategic relaxationNo need for oppressive measures in areas where public opinion and state policy converge (for example, stories about US sports and entertainment)During international crises absence of political control can be instrumental=> appeasement of public outrage domestically=> boost of legitimacy of the states position internationallyIn recent years, political protests have been increasing in China, one kind of political protest has been organized by workers. The government has relied on legal measures to address these grievances and so the first issue area I look at are Chinese perceptions of the labor law.
Labor unrest in China has increased throughout the 1990s. The precise number of worker protests is unknown, but observers agree that these protests have been rising.
There is two types of labor protests, workers in state-owned enterprises and migrant workers. Both groups of workers feel that their treatment during the reform period stands in sharp contrast with Socialist state ideology.
Because of that, the central government has recognized that both groups of workers deserve protection by the state. The governments solution is to reform and develop a legal system that will protect the loosers of the reforms. With respect to labor issues the government has provided citizens with a National labor law.
The National Labor Law has been passed for the first time in 1995, and at the last NPC congress meeting in 2007 a new Labor Contract Law has been passed. The 2007 draft was passed in response to the black kiln scandal in which some workers had been kidnapped and forced to work in a brick factory. The new law signals that the state aims to punish government officials for abuse of office and dereliction of duty. The labor contract law also stipulates the labor contract system in more detail.In passing labor and employment law the government has several goals:
First, the state wants to increase its legitimacy among workers. click The National Labor Law enhanced the rights of workers on paper.For example, the law stipulated higher standards for working conditions - minimum wages, working hours and so forth - than is commonly practiced in many enterprises. The law thus signaled to workers that they were equal before the law and that the government did not support exploitation of labor. The Labor Law stipulates, for example, a 40-hour workweek, a maximum of 36 hours of overtime per month and at least one day off per week. According to a study by the Communist Party Youth League in six cities in Guangdong in 2001 most migrant workers worked 12 to 14 hours per day. About half of migrant workers said they rarely had any holidays or rest on weekends (cited in Lee 2007: 237).
Second, the government wants to channel worker grievances into administrative and legal institutions. ClickIn doing so, the state intends to split up collective grievances into individual ones and redirect conflict from being displayed publicly in the streets toward being controlled by judicial officials in the courtroom. Prior to the reform era, social conflicts and disputes were often resolved directly through state intervention. Conflicts at workplaces, which were virtually all state or collectively owned, were handled first by the firms party committee and management or if still intractable, by the next level of administrative oversight and control. During the reform period, a regulatory and legal framework have been created to enhance the governments ability to resolve workplace disputes in arbitration committees and court rooms.
Third, the government wants to strengthen implementation of key laws and regulations.
click In reality, many of the high standards of the labor law have not been implemented by local governments. For example, every emoloyee in China should have a labor contract, but in Chongqing only 41 percent of our survey respondents had signed a labor contract. Among migrant workers in Chongqing, 73 percent had not signed a labor contract. Now, the government hopes that if an increasing number of citizens claims their rights and protections in the legal system, workers own actions will expose firms and local governments who violate or ignore the law. This way the state hopes to improve implementation.
In order to achieve these three goals, the government has started a widespread "legal dissemination"() campaign that is supposed to create legal consciousness among citizens. ClickAs a vehicle of state propaganda the media assume an important role in this legal dissemination campaign.
In the specific issue area of labor and employment law, the state tries to mobilize citizens to use the law to protect their rights. One of the slogans is, for example:Click: Use the law as a weapon!
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