national unions as organizations
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231
NATIONAL UNIONS AS
ORGANIZATIONS
Jack Fiorito, Paul Jarley and John T. Delaney
ABSTRACT
Although the study of unions and their effects has a long history, only
recently have researchers begun to analyze unions as organizations. In
such studies, the union itself is a focus, rather than its effects or the
behavior of individuals in relation to unions. Some key topics include union
environments, goals, strategies, structures, and outcomes, including inno-
vation and effectiveness. This paper reviews recent research in order to
summarize current knowledge on national unions as organizations, andoffers suggestions for further research. Particular attention is devoted to
national unions, as they occupy a critical place in the network of union
organizations. U.S. unions have faced serious challenges in recent decades,
and their efforts to cope with these and adapt to their changing environ-
ments may have lessons for the study of organizations more generally.
INTRODUCTION
Why study unions as organizations? After all, unions are anachronisms; like
dinosaurs they are facing extinction. American society has passed unions by,
and so should scholars interested in contemporary employment relationships.
Human resource management has prevailed and the study of unions should be
left to historians.
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Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, Volume 20, pages 231267.Copyright 2001 by Elsevier Science Ltd.All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.ISBN: 0-7623-0840-0
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This is a view commonly expressed in management departments, one we hear
frequently. Unions are in trouble, but they are far from dead and still represent
about 14% of American workers (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). Unions
speak directly for over 16 million U.S. workers, and can claim to speak for U.S.
workers with greater legitimacy than can any other group. Paradoxically perhaps,
it is partly the decline in unions that makes them such fertile ground for study.
At the most fundamental level, unions played an important role in setting con-
ditions of employment and championing wider social change for most of the 20th
Century. If they are passing from the scene, it is important to understand why
and what the ramifications are for American workers and society generally. Arethe functions traditionally filled by unions no longer necessary? Are these func-
tions being assumed by other organizations? If not, might new organizations rise
to fill the void left by unions? These are big questions with obvious links to issues
of central importance to the study of organizations generally.
Importantly for immediate purposes, unions offer an opportunity to examine
the relative roles of environment on the one hand, and strategy and structure on
the other, in organizational survival. This speaks directly to the long-standing
debate in social science between advocates of environmental determinism and
those that tout strategic choice. Union influence has diminished over the last two
decades, but it is clear that they are not going down without a fight and have
engaged in much soul-searching and internal reform in an effort to reverse their
fortunes. Can organizations like unions transform themselves in the face of strongenvironmental imperatives? Do they have the capacity to adapt to their environ-
ment or are they destined to fall victim to overwhelming environmental pres-
sure? That unions have governance systems and processes that are distinct from
businesses and many nonprofit organizations only adds to their appeal as a focus
of study. Such unique characteristics may condition the responses of unions to
change and prove to be important contingencies that must be incorporated into
organization theory and theories of organizational change generally.
In this paper, we explore what we know and dont know about unions as
organizations. In critiquing our work, as well as the work of others, we hope to
contribute to theory development about unions, shed light on the issue of union
renewal, and set out an agenda for future research in this area. We also hope
to stimulate more interest in the study of unions by human resource scholars
interested in how human resource systems influence organizational performance.
NATIONAL UNIONS AS ORGANIZATIONS
The study of unions has been around almost since their creation, but the study
of unions as organizations is a much more recent phenomenon. The distinction
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is a subtle, but important one. Quantitative studies of unions have generally
been about unions in the aggregate, more precisely about the effect of their
presence or absence on some outcome of interest. It is the outcome of interest
that drives model specification. For example, one of the most popular social
science research topics of all time is undoubtedly the union wage effect.
Typically, such analyses compare union and nonunion workers pay, using a
dummy variable to mark union status or representation, and its coefficient is
interpreted as a union wage effect. In such studies, all unions are presump-
tively alike and each union is a black box. The goal is not to understand
how unions operate, but merely estimate their average effect on some impor-tant outcome.
In contrast, the study of unions as organizations takes the union as the focal
point and seeks to understand how unions function and achieve their objec-
tives. The quantitative literature is much more recent than work on unions
generally, dating from the early 1970s (e.g. Child, Loveridge & Warner, 1973),
although it was influenced by case study and more qualitative efforts dating
from much earlier periods (e.g. Barbash, 1969; Webb & Webb, 1911). It has
also borrowed heavily from the literature on organizations more generally. The
organizational science literature contains many competing paradigms and over-
lapping measures, but we think it fair to say that the application of this literature
to unions has tended to gravitate around two perspectives. First, there are open
rational systems models (Scott, 1987), especially contingency theory, whichrecognize the importance of the environment in shaping organizations and their
performance. Second, there are natural systems approaches, such as the
strategic contingency and institutional literatures, that recognize that organiza-
tional structures and practices are partly the result of political contests within
organizations and cultural pressures to conform to conventional beliefs. Such
insights seem especially salient to unions given their formal democratic nature
(a point we address further below) and heavy legal regulation.
Our synthesis of these two approaches as they apply to unions yields a fairly
succinct framework in which the environment influences but does not wholly
determine both the internal workings and performance outcomes of unions.
Within unions, our model suggests a dominant causal path such that goals lead
to strategies, strategies lead to structures, and both strategy and structure
influence performance (Fiorito, Gramm & Hendricks, 1991; Fiorito, Jarley &Delaney, 1993). These internal union systems (i.e. goals, strategies, and
structures) are key choice variables for unions (i.e. things they control and can
change in an effort to enhance performance). Thus key questions in the
literature on unions as organizations are the degree to which union goals,
strategies, and structures do vary, the role of the environment in explaining
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such variation, and the relative influence of environment, strategy, structure,
and internal union practices on union performance.
The potential for variation in union environments, attributes, and outcomes
is very large. In the U.S. alone, there are over 100 distinct national (in some
instances international) organizations, and tens of thousands of local and
mostly subordinate organizations (Gifford, 2000). Many of these national
unions, and at least some of the larger locals, are full-fledged bureaucracies
with specialized departments staffed by professionals who provide expertise on
particular issues such as health and safety, law, organizing, or negotiation with
employers. Bargaining with employers is typically the raison detrefor theseorganizations.
In addition to these basic elements, there is a national federation of unions
to which most U.S. national unions affiliate (the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, AFL-CIO) and state, area and
city counterparts to the AFL-CIO (often referred to as central councils). These
central bodies tend to emphasize political issues in their jurisdictions, providing
a common forum for worker interests in corresponding political units (i.e. with
federal, state and city authorities). Internationally, these patterns are repeated
(with important variations) within different nations and there are even transna-
tional bodies that focus on global or transcontinental issues of interest to various
types of unions and workers in different countries.
Clearly, there is an abundance of union organizations in the world. Our mainfocus here is on a particular cross section of these, U.S. national unions. These
are the sovereign bodies of the U.S. labor movement. Accordingly, they deserve
considerable research attention. This is not to say that studies of other cross-
sections (e.g. central councils, local unions, international bodies) are not needed
or would not be informative, of course. But, U.S. national unions occupy a key
position in the complex network of organizations that unions comprise, and
have been the topic of many studies. It is a good time to ask what we know
about them as organizations, and how we might direct future research efforts
to maximize knowledge gains. To provide some order to this discussion, we
use the succinct framework outlined above to review the evidence to date,
moving from environment to goals, strategies, structures, and finally perfor-
mance outcomes.
ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES
Aggregate studies of union growth and decline as well as research on union
organizing and bargaining outcomes suggest that a variety of environmental
influences impact unions, including public opinion, government regulation,
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employer strategies, economic conditions, worker attitudes, and the shifting
nature of employment to name just a few (e.g. Fiorito & Maranto, 1987). But
much of this research has focused on outcomes such as membership growth,
election success, or negotiated settlements, not union structures or internal prac-
tices. In addition, while many of these factors have varied considerably over
long periods of time, the bulk of the research on unions as organizations has
been cross-sectional and there may be little variance in some environment
elements across national unions. Thus, a challenge has been to conceptualize
and measure national union environments, and to link variations in these envi-
ronments to variations in internal union structures and outcomes.
The Law, Public Opinion, and the Economy
Inspiration has come from diverse sources, each with its own problems, and
cumulatively these various efforts to conceptualize and measure national union
environments have produced limited results. One source of inspiration has been
aggregate studies linking broad changes in the economy and society to union
membership growth. Here, the underlying logic is that the factors that have
been identified as important in the aggregate may be present to varying degrees
in national union environments. For example, few would argue that changes in
the legal environment havent played an important role in shaping union struc-
tures and practices. Most obviously, passage of the National Labor RelationsAct in 1935 (commonly referred to as the Wagner Act) created a statutory
process for determining union representation and banned certain employer anti-
union practices. Subsequently, the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947
(commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act or Amendments) outlawed
various union practices including the closed shop. In 1959, the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (commonly referred to as the
Landrum-Griffin Act) was passed. It requires unions to formalize and regularize
such internal governance practices as elections of union leaders.
The legal environment as a whole could be described as one that nominally
grants workers rights to form or join unions of their own choosing without
employer interference, and to engage in collective activities in pursuit of their
interests at the workplace and in the political sphere. From the perspective of
unions as organizations, the legal system grants them a right to exist, engage incertain activities on behalf of their members, and carry on their internal affairs
with a limited degree of external regulation. Although many employers respect
these rights, for various reasons including competitive pressures, private sector
employers have been increasingly prone to violate or circumvent these rights in
their efforts to prevent or weaken unionization among their workforces:
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The reality of NLRA enforcement falls far short of its goals. Many workers who try to
form and join trade unions to bargain with their employers are spied on, harassed,
pressured, threatened, suspended, fired, deported, or otherwise victimized in reprisal for their
exercise of the right to freedom of association. Private employers are the main agents of
abuse . . . [L]abor law enforcement efforts often fail to deter unlawful conduct (Compa,
2000, p. 9).
Thus, the overall legal environment for unions can be considered mildly hostile,
with considerable variation particularly as between private sector and public
sector environments. Nominal rights exist, yet in many instances these rights
cannot be effectuated without great cost, if at all. Not surprisingly, unions devoteconsiderable political effort to changing the legal environment, but prospects
for reforms that unions favor are poor. Union efforts to mobilize public support
for favorable legislative change, (e.g. in suggesting that employers are waging
a secret war on workers) have failed to take hold.
In general, federal regulation has served to homogenize contemporary national
union environments and structures, forcing conformity. This is especially true
in the private sector, where only railroad and airline employees operate outside
the NLRA framework. Greater diversity exists between public and private sector
settings and within the public sector itself where state regulations differ on a
number of dimensions. This variation has been exploited to some degree by
researchers as there is evidence of links between sector (i.e. legal framework)
and union characteristics. For example, unions operating under the Railway
Labor Act tend to have more homogenous memberships, consistent with the
craft-based bargaining structure and relatively narrow industry jurisdiction of
that law. A number of private-public sector difference have been detected as
well (Jarley, Fiorito & Delaney, 1998), including greater innovation and more
democratic structures among public sector unions.
Similarly, some argue that public opinion about labor unions (Lipset, 1986)
has played a key role in membership decline. While this hypothesis is contro-
versial it is virtually impossible to test in the national union context because
the general publics views are rarely available in a form that would allow such
data to be linked to particular unions (e.g. by union environment or industry).
Furthermore, it may be reasonable to assume that the public holds opinions
about such unions as the Teamsters, National Education Association, or Major
League Baseball Players, or about the appropriateness of unions for varioustypes of employees (e.g. police officers, firefighters, plumbers). It is doubtful
that much of the public knows that such unions as the Graphic Artists, Office
and Professional Employees, or Train Dispatchers even exist.
A more promising area of inquiry focuses on economic factors. Some of the
earliest studies of union growth and decline over time found a strong link
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between economic variables (e.g. price changes, unemployment) and union
growth. A virtual truism in earlier literature on union growth and decline was
that unions grew in prosperous times and declined in times of economic diffi-
culty. More recent evidence is less clear on this (Stepina & Fiorito, 1986), and
casual observation fails to reveal any obvious link between the long period of
economic expansion in the 1990s and union membership trends.
For our purposes, a key point is that unions face different economic condi-
tions in their respective environments. We would expect these differences would
lead to different union characteristics and outcomes. Once again, however, it
is easier to say union environments differ than it is to measure such differ-ences. A key problem is that while data on economic conditions such as
employment growth, wage changes, and sales are available by industry, mapping
industry data to national unions is complex. Union decline has brought
diversification through jurisdictional expansion and mergers, seriously diluting
traditional jurisdictions based on a single industry or occupation. This lack of
a clear one-to-one correspondence between unions and industries creates the
prospect for considerable measurement error in relying either on matching the
union to the industry characteristics where it has the greatest concentration of
membership (i.e. primary jurisdiction), or by creating synthetic environments
based on some scheme that weights the characteristics of each industry where
the union operates by the proportion of the unions total membership working
in that industry. Perhaps because the problems in this approach are sosignificant, attempts to create such measures of union environments have been
sparse and the results mixed. For example, in studies of organizing effective-
ness, findings from Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney (1995) have linked some
organizing success measures to employment growth in different industries (i.e.
different union environments), but Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney (2001) found no
confirmation of this link.
Employers and Workers
A second source of inspiration has been studies of specific union outcomes,
especially representation elections and bargaining outcomes. The notion of using
worker and employer attitudes and actions to form national union environments
has considerable appeal. Unions confront specific employers in both organizingand bargaining contexts, and workers face the choice of electing and working
through a specific union.
With respect to employers, a key variable has been the degree to which they
actively oppose unions. Employer opposition to unions ranges from generally
mild in the public sector to generally vigorous in the private sector, with
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considerable variation within each. Union wage and benefit effects are substan-
tial, estimated at upwards of 10% (higher for benefits; Freeman & Medoff,
1984). Even if we ignore other union effects (or allow for the possibility that
these effects may be partly offset by positive productivity effects; Freeman &
Medoff, 1984), there are substantial financial implications associated with
unionization. As representatives of owner or shareholder interests, managers
almost instinctively respond unfavorably to organizing efforts and unions.
Beyond the economics, managerial opposition to unions may also stem from
union threats to managerial control.
Not surprisingly, most workers who have experienced organizing campaignsreport that management opposed the union, and most nonunion workers who
say they want union representation cite management opposition as the main
reason they dont have one (Freeman & Rogers, 1999). The vast majority of
managers prefer to deal with workers individually, a majority would oppose
unionization efforts, and a substantial minority, one-third, feel that their promo-
tion chances would be harmed by a successful organizing drive among their
workers (Freeman & Rogers, 1999).
Some unions may face more hostile employers than others, making it more
difficult to achieve organizing and bargaining objectives. Evidence from studies
of unions as organizations is sparse on this matter. A key reason is that it is
difficult to determine in a systematic way the characteristics of employers that
deal with particular unions. NLRB data on employer unfair labor practiceactivity can be sorted by charging union to provide an indicator of employer
opposition for each union Results generally show that more objective union
outcomes, such as NLRB election win rates and membership growth, are
reduced by more intense employer opposition. More subjective outcomes based
on perceptions (e.g. leader perceptions of their unions organizing effective-
ness) do not demonstrate the same linkage, possibly because such assessments
already take into account the employer opposition environment. That is, leaders
may rate their unions organizing success highly even with few victories because
those few victories arose in the face of intense opposition (Fiorito et al., 1995,
2001). It should also be noted that reliance on NLRB data comes at a price,
since many public sector, railroad and airline unions have little or no contact
with the NLRB, and as a result they typically are not included in such analyses.
We are unaware of any theory or empirical results that attempt to link thedegree of employer opposition to the internal structure and operating practices
of unions, but other employer characteristics have been linked to unions in this
fashion. Unions are sometimes called secondary organizations in the sense
that their existence is to some extent defined in terms of another organization.
Again, unions exist largely to bargain with employers. With no employment
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relationship, there is no union, or at least the union would be a very different
sort of organization. Accordingly, one would expect that characteristics of their
referent organizations (i.e. employers) might exert a number of influences.
Centralization of bargaining authority in unions, for example, is likely to reflect
the locus of decision making in bargaining partner organizations (Hendricks,
Gramm & Fiorito, 1993). A recent effort to model information technology (IT)
adoption in unions found some evidence that union IT adoption is driven in
part by IT sophistication among relevant employer organizations (Fiorito, Jarley
& Delaney, 2000a).
By law and tradition, unionization decisions are normally a reflection ofworker preferences. Although the preceding discussion on the legal environ-
ment, public attitudes, and employer attitudes suggests important qualifications
on this view, worker attitudes are nonetheless critical. Numerous studies have
linked worker attitudes and beliefs to voting in representation elections and
similar voting intentions (Barling, Fullagar & Kelloway, 1992; Fiorito & Young,
1998). In such studies, dissatisfaction with jobs and perceptions of union
instrumentality stand out as decisive attitudinal variables, with a somewhat lesser
role for variables representing workers general attitudes toward unions. A
variety of other key union issues such as member commitment and participa-
tion are also linked to attitudes in individual-level studies (Barling et al., 1992).
Data at the macro level consistently show that a sizeable share of nonunion
workers desire union representation. For example, Freeman and Rogers (1999)reported that in 1994, roughly one-third of nonunion workers and nine-tenths
of union members would vote for union representation if given the opportu-
nity. Roughly 20 years of such data indicate fairly stable results over time.
More recent polls suggest that there may be growing attitudinal support for
unions, and perhaps especially among younger workers (AFL-CIO, 1999). This
result on youth may be particularly important as union members are typically
older than nonunion workers. Union density is highest among workers aged
4554 (18.8%), lowest among those 1624 (5%), and generally increases with
age up to age 65 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). Unions have had
serious difficulty in relating to young workers, and any change in this pattern
would be a major development.
As for worker attitudes and activities in the study of unions as organizations,
it is also reasonable to speculate that different national unions attempt toorganize and bargain for workers who support unions to varying degrees, with
obvious implications for union performance. Yet here too, as with other
environmental influences, it is difficult to obtain data that correspond closely
to union environments, and prior research has relied on industry-based
tabulations and mappings of unions to industries. There is thus some evidence
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linking worker attitudes to organizing effectiveness differences in unions
(Fiorito et al., 1995, 2001). In effect, some unions may achieve (or leaders may
perceive) greater success as a result of more favorable attitudes among the
workers they are trying to enroll.
In addition, variables measuring the heterogeneity of union memberships have
been found to play a role in studies of union innovation (Delaney, Jarley &
Fiorito, 1996), political activities (Delaney, Fiorito & Masters, 1988; Delaney,
Fiorito & Jarley, 1999), and possibly governance systems (Jarley, Fiorito &
Delaney, 2000). Although membership heterogeneity is clearly not an attitude,
presumably the causal mechanisms involving any heterogeneity effects entailattitudinal differences among the various membership components. Given that
membership heterogeneity is likely to be associated with equality structures
(e.g. having departments for gay and lesbian workers, women, racial minori-
ties), results finding an association between equality structures and adoption of
the organizing model (Heery, Simms, Delbridge, Salmon & Simpson, 2000a)
suggested one additional possible influence. (More is said on the organizing
model later.)
Complexity, Uncertainty, and Munificence
A third source of inspiration has been the organizational science literature and
its more abstract treatment of the environment. Unlike the economic andindustrial relations literatures that have tended to examine single item measures
of concrete aspects of the environment (e.g. employer opposition, employment
growth), the organizational science literature has focused on multi-item
measures of more abstract dimensions of environments. Notions of complexity,
instability, and munificence have been linked to national union characteristics,
but not outcomes. As with other measures created from objective industry level
data, these efforts suffer from the multi-industrial character of most unions, and
thus the difficulty of mapping industries to unions. In addition, while these
constructs seem best captured through multi-item measures, the literature to
date has been guilty of using single item proxies. Thus, for example, Delaney
et al. (1996) used both membership change and changes in bargaining coverage
as proxies for environmental uncertainty with limited success in models of
national union innovation. In perhaps the most extensive application oforganizational science concepts and measures of the environment in the national
union context, Jarley, Fiorito and Delaney (1998) reported links between
environmental complexity and centralized control and administrative rational-
ization within unions, as well as some evidence of a negative association
between structural differentiation and environmental munificence.
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All told, while we know a considerable amount about how various aspects
of the environment influence union outcomes, we still know very little about
how variations in national union environments lead to variations in national
union structures and practices. Data limitations, difficulties in matching the
available data to national unions, and perhaps a lack of sound theory have all
contributed to unimpressive empirical results. This seems especially true of
efforts to link environments to union characteristics, a key element of any effort
to separate out the various effects of environments and organizational attrib-
utes on union performance.
UNION GOALS
As noted elsewhere (Fiorito et al., 1991), union goals can be delineated along
various lines. Goals can be workplace-focused (e.g. wage improvements) or
external (e.g. tax fairness). They can be distinguished in terms of whether they
are defined in terms of members (i.e. narrowly) or in terms of class interests
(broadly). Union goals can be further differentiated as to whether they involve
improvements within the existing social order (instrumentalism) or change in
that order (reformism or radicalism).
Despite their importance, there has been little study of union goals per se at
the organization level. One likely reason for this research neglect is that main-
stream typologies of union goals, while useful in capturing fundamentaldifferences in the labor movements of various countries, are of little value in
distinguishing among American unions. With a few exceptions, U.S. unions
focus on instrumental goals and put primary emphasis on members workplace
interests. Truly radical goals are not a serious issue for the vast majority of
unions and members, and even their interest in meaningful reform is sometimes
questioned.
To capture true variations in union goals, researchers will need to dig
deeper. Collective bargaining agreements differ substantially in content (e.g.
Kochan, 1980). To some extent this reflects differences in bargaining power
and employer preferences, but different union goals are also a factor. Workforces
differ from workplace to workplace and union to union, and so too will
the goals of various worker groups. Preferences will differ for wages versus
benefits, for job control and professional standards, safety, job security, leisuretime, and so forth. Separating these effects is difficult (Fiorito & Hendricks,
1987b). Unions may also differ in the degree to which they emphasize workplace
versus social issues, but these too can be difficult to separate. For example,
recent controversies on international trade policies are a bit removed from the
workplace in the sense that there is little point in bargaining with employers
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on such, yet at the same time many members job interests may be greatly
affected.
A further limiting factor arises because of agency issues. Union goals are a
reflection of both leader and members influences and how these play out (i.e.
agency effects). Given that relations between member and leader goals are a
core issue, data are needed from samples of members in different organizations
as well as from leaders in different organizations in order to provide any system-
atic analysis of the agency issue. We know of no such database, and to construct
such a database would be a daunting task. Yet, this may be a useful way to
isolate goals of members, leaders, and unions from the effects of employerinfluence and bargaining power.
UNION STRATEGIES
Many discussions of union strategy begin with Webb and Webb (1911). The
Webbs identified three distinct methods for advancing worker interests:
bargaining with employers, legal enactment (legislation), and mutual insurance
or self-help (e.g. providing a union-funded pension or direct services to
members). Variations on these three basic strategies have been noted, as have
complementary strategies including resource acquisition, solidarity-building, and
organizing (Fiorito et al., 1991; Fiorito et al., 1993).
A further refinement has been suggested by Boxall and Haynes (1997).Focusing specifically on contemporary neo-liberal environments and empha-
sizing worker-union relations and union-employer relations, Boxall and Haynes
outlined four distinct union strategies. Classic unionism is defined as
emphasizing service to members and organizing along with adversarial employer
relations. Paper tiger unionism emphasizes services but not organizing, and
formalistic adversarial relations with employers. Partnership unionism
emphasizes both servicing and organizing, but in contrast to classic unionism,
adversarialism is de-emphasized in favor of cooperative relations with
employers. Finally, consultancy unionism emphasizes servicing, including
direct services from the union to its members, and routine adversarial relations
with some cooperative practices. Boxall and Haynes noted that these are
idealized types, and that in practice unions may combine elements of these
strategies.Although illustrating their typology with New Zealand unions, their analysis
appears pertinent to distinctions, directions, and controversies evident in union
strategies elsewhere (e.g. Australia, Britain, and the U.S.). As Boxall and Haynes
(1997) noted, their schema does not address union-state relations (e.g. peak-level
tripartism, etc). That limitation aside, it does seem a promising direction for
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further analyses of union strategies. Boxall and Haynes took union strategy
analysis to a greater level of specificity than many previous conceptions, and as
noted, their conception seems to encompass some key issues currently in play.
Heery, Simms, Simpson, Delbridge, and Salmons work (e.g. 2000b) analyzing
British union organizing policies and practices in detail provides guidance as to
how conceptions about organizing strategies might be elaborated.
Does union strategy matter? Given the controversy surrounding this issue in
the literature on business strategy (e.g. Child, 1997), and the relative infancy
of union strategy analysis despite its early roots in the work of the Webbs
(Boxall & Haynes, 1997), the lack of clear answers to this question is notsurprising. Although Heery suggested that the literature now abounds with
typologies of union strategy (1998, pp. 346347), there has been little testing.
Heery further noted that in reality union strategies are often hybrids combining
various types. This no doubt contributes to difficulties in operationalizing
measures for testing purposes. Aside from case studies that employ the
high-resolution microscopic lens of hindsight, there have been few empirical
studies.
One of the first studies examining the impact of union characteristics on
representation elections outcomes used a number of archival measures that
could be linked to strategy (Maranto & Fiorito, 1987). For examples, Maranto
and Fiorito considered dues levels and levels of direct benefits provided to
members (i.e. pricing strategy and product strategy?) along with whetherelections were in the unions primary jurisdictions (i.e. product-placement
strategy?). At least for elections among white-collar workers, they found some
evidence that lower dues levels and greater direct benefit levels were associ-
ated with union victories. The relation between union jurisdiction and the
election units industry was positive for blue-collar units (i.e. unions achieve
greater success in their traditional focus industry). For white-collar workers,
however, an interaction complicated interpretation, but it appears that unions
that were already strong in an industry achieved relatively greater success in
organizing white-collar workers in that industry. A key point here is that there
is some evidence linking union characteristics that have strategic interpreta-
tions with union outcomes.
More recent studies that have attempted to analyze strategy-structure,
strategy-outcome, and strategy-environment links in broad samples of unionshave yielded mixed results for relatively abstract strategy variables.
Conceptualizing strategy in terms of two dimensions, scope of methods and
scope of issues, Jarley et al. (1998) found little variance in the scope of
issues that U.S. unions pursued and no evidence of relations for it with other
union variables. This is consistent with the point about a lack of variation in
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goals noted earlier, but also note the point about the need for greater speci-
ficity in discussion of Boxall and Haynes work (1997) just above. They
did, however, find greater variance in the scope of methods (i.e. strategies)
used, and a positive correlation between this measure and perceived union
effectiveness.
In contrast, Fiorito, Stepina, Jarley, Delaney and Knudstrup (1997) found
perceived union effectiveness positively correlated with the scope of issues
pursued but unrelated to the scope of methods used. The latter study analyzed
individual-level data and controlled for other influences in contrast to the former
study which used bivariate correlation for union-level data, yet the underlyingdata and measures in both studies are essentially the same.
In more recent studies of organizing and union effectiveness with newer
union-level data, Fiorito et al. (2000a, 2001) combined these two strategic
scope measures and found limited evidence of a positive link to effectiveness
measures, but no evidence of a link between strategic scope and information
technology (IT) use.
On the whole then, the evidence suggests that union strategies may matter
for union outcomes. Specifically, there is some hint among the conflicting
evidence that unions that pursue broader strategies (e.g. workplace and non-
workplace) and use a broader range of methods (e.g. bargaining and legislation)
may be more effective than those that focus on narrower goals and use fewer
methods. As much of the cited empirical literature suggests, however, ifconceptualizing union strategy is in its infancy, then measuring union strategy
is still in an embryonic stage. Rather like management strategy . . . strategic
action by trade unions appears to be more complex and less coherent than
available theoretical models suggest (Heery, 1998, p. 350). To take the
biological metaphor one step further back, definitive results on the effects of
union strategy are no more than a gleam in the eye of researchers at this point.
More detailed specification of union strategy may be a promising direction for
future studies.
UNION STRUCTURES
Organizational theorists place considerable emphasis on the importance of
structure (e.g. Perrow, 1986). Union researchers have shared this perspective,and there is a considerable conceptual and empirical literature on the role of
union structure (e.g. Fiorito et al., 1991; Jarley et al., 1997; Strauss, 1993;
Willman, 2001). This literature can be divided into three general topical areas:
external structure, administrative structure, and governance structure (with the
latter two types emphasizing internal structure).
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External Structure
External or horizontal structure (Fiorito et al., 1991) refers to the boundaries
between unions and their environments. This includes boundaries between
national unions and between locals. Issues of jurisdiction and bases for orga-
nization (e.g. occupation or craft, industry, and enterprise) fall under this
heading. Relations between a national union and its locals, however, are more
properly seen as involving a vertical dimension, including both administrative
and governance issues, and are dealt with more fully in following sections.
Research on external structure issues varies by issue. National union mergershave increased considerably since the 1980s and have received considerable
attention (e.g. Chaison, 1996; Clark & Gray, 2000). We know that there are
different types of mergers (e.g. proper mergers where two unions come
together to form a new union versus absorptions where a smaller unions
identity is subsumed within that of its larger partner), and that absorptions are
far more common than true mergers. Key factors favoring and obstructing
mergers have been identified, as has the importance of idiosyncratic influences.
The latter, along with a relatively small number of cases, limit efforts to advance
and test any general theory. Less is known about the consequences of mergers.
There have been few if any credible studies of whether mergers accomplished
their intended purposes or how the members felt about the merger some time
afterwards. One exception is provided by Jarley, Harley, and Hall (in press), whofound little evidence that merger activity among Australian unions had an impact
on their innovative activity. Chaison, Sverke, and Sjoberg (2001) reported that a
union merger had only a modest effect on member participation.
There also has been little research on union jurisdictions per se. Seeber (1984)
noted an expansionary trend in jurisdictions many years ago, and those trends
appear to have persisted. Yet, there is little work in this vein (Sherer & Leblebici,
1993). Jarley et al. (1998) found that unions having a general jurisdiction (i.e.
open or inclusive membership) were more likely to have heterogeneous member-
ships and complex structures. There was no association with union effectiveness.
Heery et al. (2000b) found that open-membership unions were more likely to
adapt the organizing model. These results seem plausible and suggest some
important relations, but there is obviously much we dont know about
jurisdiction or openness and its consequences. Similarly, although many nationalunions have recently pushed for consolidation among their subordinates, there
are few if any systematic studies of this phenomenon. Obviously there are some
interesting questions to be addressed. Are the consolidated unions more effec-
tive or efficient in organizing, bargaining, or in service to their members? How
do the members feel about their new union as compared to their old one?
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Administrative Structures
Theorizing and empirical work on administrative structures in unions have been
heavily influenced by earlier work on business organizations (e.g. Child et al.,
1973; Warner, 1975). The need for unions to operate in a business-like fashion
was noted long ago (Barbash, 1969), and contemporary scholars continue to
stress similar themes. Unions need to become more bureaucratic, in the sense
of operating through expert representatives, in a routine manner, using a web of
procedural and substantive rules if they are to have more than a transient impact
(Heery, 2001, p. 316). This need has been noted in more trade-oriented outletsas well: Trade unions need efficient internal management in order to become
experts in dealing with constant change (McCarten, 2001, p. 22).
Within the context of administrative structures, a key distinction is typically
drawn between centralization and rationalization of decision making (e.g.
Warner, 1975). Centralization refers to the vertical locus of decision making
within the organizational hierarchy, although it has been operationalized both
in terms of organizational subunits (e.g. national headquarters versus locals)
and individuals (e.g. top leaders versus members). It can also be conceptual-
ized in terms whether decisions are concentrated in the hands of a few or
distributed more widely (Jarley et al., 1997; Knoke, 1990).
Rationalization is sometimes referred to as structuring of activities or
structuring. A further distinction within the broad concept of rationalizationcan be made between administrative structuring and administrative rationaliza-
tion (Jarley et al., 1997). More often, rationalization is described as consisting
of several distinct dimensions, including standardization, specialization, formal-
ization, and configuration or hierarchy (e.g. number of levels of hierarchy and/or
span of control). Consistent with the overall thrust of the concept, additional
dimensions may include coordination, communication, and even elements of
strategic planning such as environmental scanning (Fiorito et al., 2000a; Jarley
et al., in press).
Theory and Research on Centralization
Centralization has long been a topic of interest in the study of unions. In part
this is due to its close conceptual proximity to autocracy, oligarchy, democ-
racy, and related governance concepts. The difficulty of distinguishing betweendecentralization and democracy at a conceptual and (even more so) practical
level is often noted (e.g. Delaney et al., 1996; Fiorito & Hendricks, 1987a). It
is certainly possible to divide the two at conceptual levels. For example, central-
ization could be defined in terms of the unions officers and staff only, and in
that sense closely parallel conceptions used in business organizations. Then,
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one could define democracy solely in terms of the relation between members
and officers. A problem with even this seemingly clear distinction lies in the
nature of unions being by the members (Fiorito et al., 1993). That is, those
carrying out the unions work are not limited to formal staff. Union reliance
on lay activists and members to carry out work on behalf of the union blurs
the distinction between staff and membership, and thus contributes to blurring
between centralization-decentralization in the administrative system and
autocracy-democracy in the governance system.
Nonetheless, researchers have posited and tested relations involving
centralization for many years. These have progressed from single items withquestionable face validity (e.g. Roomkin, 1976) to seemingly more sophisti-
cated, almost certainly more reliable, and presumably more valid multi-item
scales based on general conceptions in the organizational literature (e.g. Fiorito
et al., 1995; Jarley et al., 1997).
As a criterion, theorizing about centralization has emphasized the influence
of union environments, goals, and strategies. In essence, the argument is that
unions will structure their decision making to optimize their outcomes within
a given environment (Fiorito et al., 1991). This is of course not to suggest that
union structures at any point in time are optimal. There are founding effects
(Stinchcombe, 1965), and unions change slowly, perhaps more slowly than
business organizations due to their governance systems (Craft, 1991). Still, there
has been some success in relating centralization to both conventional organi-zation science variables representing environmental influences such as stability,
munificence, and complexity, and to variables more unique to industrial
relations literature representing market structure, employer, and union charac-
teristics (e.g. Hendricks et al., 1993; Jarley et al., 1997, 1998). In sum, despite
the complication of administrative-representative systems conflict, conventional
organizational science and industrial relations seem to apply to the analysis of
centralization in national unions.
As a predictor, studies have typically emphasized the adverse potential
impacts of centralization. For example, one could argue that local unions can
contribute much to the design and conduct of organizing campaigns, and hence
centralization would have an adverse effect on organizing outcomes. Similarly,
and consistent with organizational science literature, one might expect
centralization to impede innovation. Expectations for an adverse centralizationimpact have generally been borne out in studies of organizing effectiveness and
perceived union (organizational) effectiveness (Fiorito et al., 1995, 1997, 2001).
The evidence is largely unsupportive on the expected negative relation between
centralization and innovation (Delaney et al., 1996; Fiorito et al., 2000a; Jarley
et al., 1998, in press) and Jarley et al., (1998) suggested that factors relatively
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unique to unions, such as membership heterogeneity, may be more critical for
innovation. Also, Fiorito and Jarley (1992) suggested the possibility that the
development of innovations in unions may be enhanced by decentralization,
while innovations diffusion may be aided by centralization.
Theory and Research on Rationalization
The virtues of rationalization have been noted (e.g. Barbash, 1969) and seem
almost self-evident. Specialization, formalization, and the like are almost
indispensable in large organizations, and studies have consistently linked these
and many other aspects of rationalization with organization size (e.g. Warner,1975). Recent analyses of union revitalization or renewal here and abroad cite
important potential roles for national union bureaucracies and national union
managerial practices, including reference to concepts such as formalization and
specialization (Heery, 2001; Heery et al., 2000a; Voss & Sherman, 2000).
Controversies arise in some important areas, however. Adler and Borus
(1996), for instance, distinguished between enabling and coercive forms of
bureaucracy, and it not difficult to extend this distinction to the concept of
rationalization (along with centralization, one of the two distinct general dimen-
sions of bureaucracy in Warners terms). The same specialization that allows
the large union to apply appropriate expertise to complex technical problems
(e.g. how to design a pension plan) also tends to shut out member influence as
tasks become the province of experts who do not answer directly to themembers. In a study of revitalization among local unions, Voss and Sherman
framed their research question in terms of how social movement organizations
can break out of bureaucratic conservatism (2000, p. 303). Thus conflicts can
arise with democracy although these may be subtler than conflicts between
centralization and democracy. The tension between administrative and repre-
sentative systems (Child et al., 1973) can occur between the representative
system and elements of both centralization and rationalization in the adminis-
trative system. Added to the familiar line-staff tensions noted in organizational
literature (i.e. tension between centralization and rationalization for our
purposes), the situation in unions is potentially quite complex.
In addition, the virtues of rationalized bureaucracy are situational. By most
accounts, bureaucracy is well suited to stable environments with routine tasks.
Globalization of markets, de-regulation, and increased employer oppositioneasily come to mind as important sources of instability in the environments
confronting many unions recently. One can argue that greater flexibility is
needed. The mantra of flexible specialization may have its place in unions.
Studies of rationalization in unions are few. As expected, size correlates
directly with rationalization and some of its elements (Heery et al., 2000a; Jarley
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et al., 1998), but while this relation holds up for administrative structural differ-
entiation in a multivariate model of rationalization, it is not borne out in a
multivariate model of administrative rationalization. In fact, only one of the
environmental variables examined is predictive of both criteria, and it has an
opposite influence on each (Jarley et al., 1997).
Studies of rationalizations effect on union outcomes are mixed but broadly
consistent within outcome areas. Specifically, rationalization has been found to
be a key predictor of innovation (Delaney et al., 1996; Jarley et al., in press)
and of information technology (IT) use (Fiorito et al., 2000a). Consistent with
this finding, Heery et al. (2000b) reported that rationalization (specificallyformalization) is associated with adoption of the organizing model. There is
mixed evidence on rationalizations relation with leaders perceptions of
effectiveness (i.e. from positive to not evident; Fiorito et al., 1997, 2001). There
is almost no systematic evidence of any positive relation between rationaliza-
tion and organizing effectiveness, and in some cases the results for
rationalization appear to be disconfirming (Fiorito et al., 1995, 2001). Consistent
with the lack of findings already noted, Charlwood (2001) found no evidence
of a relation between national union structure (specifically, structure for
organizing) and organizing success in the U.K. Charlwood, however, did find
a positive relation between union structuring at the workplace level and
organizing effectiveness in previously nonunion workplaces. Further, in their
study of union locals, Voss and Sherman (2000) found that the national unionsbureaucracy played a key role in initiating change in those locals that
revitalized. Structuring rewards (e.g. matching funds) to encourage local
organizing is one such initiative they cite, and very clearly fits in with our
conception of rationalization.
All told, the evidence is scant regarding the determinants of rationalization
(beyond the familiar size effect) and less clear when possible subdimensions
of rationalization are considered. It is fairly clear that rationalization contributes
to innovation in unions, consistent with results on organizations elsewhere
(Damanpour, 1991). Studies of effects on outcomes such as organizing
effectiveness and overall union effectiveness suggest little impact in some
instances (e.g. Fiorito et al., 1995) but perhaps a very important impact in others
(e.g. Voss & Sherman, 2000). Also, while rationalizations impact on such
outcomes is less clear, its impact on innovation, which in turn affects otheroutcomes such as organizing, is strong. Distinctions in dimensions of rational-
ization or types of bureaucracy, and situational considerations may warrant more
attention in future research.
For example, research assessing convergent and discriminant validity among
concepts including administrative structuring, administrative rationalization, and
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managerial competence could be useful, along with similar research focused on
the distinction between Adler and Borus (1996) enabling and coercive
forms of bureaucracy. It is important to know whether various aspects of bureau-
cracy affect outcomes differentially, and if effects are situational or not. Such
research may help clarify the meaning of conflicting results for broader concepts
such as rationalization as a predictor of different outcomes (e.g. innovation
versus organizing effectiveness).
Democracy and Governance Structures
As we have noted elsewhere, as have others in various terms, unions are unique
in being organizations for, by, and of the membership (Fiorito et al., 1993). In
addition to administrative systems designed to run the day-to-day business of
the union, unions must maintain representative systems to form goals, specify
the rules that govern the organization, and to choose and monitor leaders who
are accountable to the members to direct organizational efforts in pursuit of
those goals. Representative and administrative systems serve different purposes
and their structures reflect different influences (Jarley et al., 1997).
While governance and administrative structures are distinct, in practice lines
can blur between exercising discretion within ones legitimate scope of authority
and illegitimate assumption of authority. Thus, there is considerable opportu-
nity for tension between the systems designed to carry out the governance andadministrative functions (Child et al., 1973). Debate about the degree and effects
of such tensions has centered around Michels Iron Law of Oligarchy, which
posits that the representative system (and therefore democracy) is inevitably
overwhelmed by the administrative system and a considerable amount of
literature has challenged its veracity (e.g. Knoke, 1990; Voss & Sherman, 2000).
For some, concern about the level of democracy within unions goes beyond
normative issues (i.e. unions should be democratic), and extends to a hypoth-
esized link between democracy and effectiveness. (e.g. Fiorito et al., 1993;
Strauss, 1991). Democracy is seen as a key element of efforts to legitimize
union goals and policies, maintain member satisfaction with the union and
promote the voluntary rank-and-file activity necessary to achieve and sustain
union power (i.e. membership mobilization).
Of course, the particulars of any assessment will depend upon onesdefinition of democracy, and there are many possible definitions (Strauss, 1991).
There are probably even more ways to measure democracy, and unfortunately,
none has emerged as a clearly reliable and valid indicator (Jarley et al., 2000).
Examinations have included officer turnover, closeness of elections, member
participation, frequency of elections and conventions, whether executive board
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members are elected by district or at-large, and perceived influence of members,
among others. In some instances, these indicators have been operationalized in
terms of constitutional provisions, and in others via behavioral or attitudinal
indicators. Not surprisingly, this diverse set of concepts and indicators has led
to conflicting results and interpretations.
Jarley et al. (1997) might be the only study that has examined influences on
a democracy indicator (representative structures) at an organizational level.
They found a modest link with potential bargaining unit capacity (i.e. well-paid
members in larger establishments), and a strong link with centralized decision
making. The latter supports suggestions that representative structures are usedto balance centralization; that is a system of checks and balances (Fiorito &
Hendricks, 1987a).
Relatively few studies have actually tested for democracy effects. Jarley et
al. (1997) found no evidence supporting a hypothesized effect on concentration
of decision making. Delaney et al. (1996) and Jarley et al. (in press) reported
conflicting results on the relationship between democracy and innovation.
Delaney et al. (1999) found no effect on political activity, although Delaney et
al. (1988) did find a negative democracy effect in one of six specifications.
Fiorito et al. (1995) found no evidence for a hypothesized positive effect on
organizing among most indicators of organizing effectiveness, but they did find
mixed evidence of a positive effect on union leaders self-reported organizing
effectiveness. Maranto and Fiorito (1987) found some evidence of a positivedemocracy effect on union success in representation elections. Yet, neither
Fiorito et al. (1997) nor Jarley et al. (1998) found evidence of a link between
democracy indicators and perceived union effectiveness. When one considers
the poor measurement properties of the types of measures often used in union
democracy studies, the diversity of results is predictable, apart from the
diversity of concepts.
This state of affairs led Jarley et al. (2000) to suggest a different approach.
Instead of attempting to define and assess the elusive and value-laden phenom-
enon of democracy, they proposed that scholars take a step back to look at the
bigger issue of governance systems. Governance systems are described as
structures designed to identify, legitimize, and foster member commitment to
organizational goals and leaders (Jarley et al., 2000, p. 228). Considering prior
literature and the national union constitutions that define union governancesystems, Jarley et al. proposed five basic dimensions: codification, division of
authority, federation, member access, and activity. Relations among these
dimensions are considered conceptually, and then empirically based on corre-
lational analysis of content-coded national union constitutions. Finally, Jarley
et al. conducted a cluster analysis based on these governance dimensions,
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examined the resulting groupings, and related characteristics of these groups to
union environments and governance outcomes (i.e. cluster profiling).
The findings were mixed. There was generally found to be support for
expectations about the relations among governance system dimensions, and
environmental characteristics and governance outcomes (e.g. perceived democ-
racy) tended to correlate with governance dimensions. The cluster analysis
results were generally encouraging in that they formed four groups that were
interpretable and generally sensible. The four different governance systems
identified seem to correspond to other known characteristics of the unions and
their environments. An interesting result is that all five unions identified asinvolving serious corrupt or undemocratic practices by a 1980s Presidential
Commission appeared in the same cluster, one in which local product markets,
divided union authority, and codified governance provisions are common. Jarley
et al. (2000) had little success, however, in linking cluster membership
systematically to environmental characteristics or governance outcomes. They
suggested that reasons for poor results regarding environments could be
founding effects (Stinchcombe, 1965); that is, that current governance structures
reflect historical influences and thus cannot be expected to relate closely to
current environment.
Overall, the approach seems promising, and further empirical assessment
is warranted. Notably, this approach casts union governance in terms that
are more readily generalized to a wide range of organizations than is democ-racy. Although trends toward empowering employees in work organizations
may not amount to democratization, all organizations have governance systems.
Issues of how these are to be configured to meet environmental contingencies,
and their impact on governance outcomes, are salient to many organizational
forms.
INNOVATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
Organizational scholars sometimes refer to effectiveness as the ultimate
dependent variable in organizational research (Cameron & Whetten 1983b,
p. 2). This concept is broader than notions of profitability or efficiency and
its measurement is frequently complicated by the presence of multiple organi-
zational interests, each with different objectives and preferences. Unions area case in point. Differences between members and leaders and among the
membership itself over the relative importance of servicing current members
versus organizing new members, or stressing social over workplace goals
makes it difficult to arrive at a valid measure of global effectiveness. Because
many of these conceptual issues have been dealt with elsewhere in general
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terms (e.g. Cameron & Whetten, 1983a), and in the context of unions (Fiorito
et al., 1993; Hammer & Wazeter, 1993), we do not review them here.
Instead, we turn attention to empirical research on national union innovation
and effectiveness. Although innovation is not an end itself, it has been closely
linked to effectiveness outcomes (Bronfenbrenner, 1997; Fiorito et al., 1995,
1997; Jarley et al., 1998; Shostak, 1991), and thus constitutes a reasonable
penultimate variable for analysis in the study of unions as organizations. Indeed,
many impressionistic analyses of U.S. unions emphasize a lack of innovation in
the face of changing environments as a critical failing (e.g. Craft, 1991; Shostak,
1991). Conversely, recent signs of innovation in American unions (e.g. the callfor a transformation from a servicing to organizing orientation) are sometimes
hailed as something to be emulated by unions elsewhere (Carter, 2001).
Research on Union Innovation
Studies of particular innovations date back to at least 1990 (e.g. Fiorito & Jarley,
1992; Jarley & Fiorito, 1990; Jarley & Maranto, 1990; Shostak, 1991). Analyses
of innovation as a general phenomenon are more recent (e.g. Delaney et al.,
1996; Jarley et al., in press). Although the organizational science literature
suggests that innovation is a product of decentralization, neither Delaney et al.
or Jarley et al. found a positive link between decentralization and innovation
within unions. Results with respect to democracy are even murkier, withDelaney et al. reporting some negative effects, and Jarley et al. reporting an
opposite finding. Instead, both studies underscore the importance of resources
(i.e. as measured by membership size), rationalization, and strategic planning
in union innovation. Membership heterogeneity also appears to play a role,
perhaps because more diverse unions have greater opportunities to engage in
mimetic behavior or because a more diverse membership requires unions to
experiment with a wider array of strategies and tactics to meet member needs.
The two studies also attempt to link variations in union innovation to
differences in union environments to very limited effect, leading Delaney et al.
(1996) to speculate that the general crisis in union membership may serve as
a relatively uniform incentive for all unions to innovate.
Applying a variant of the Delaney et al. (1996) model to information
technology (IT) use, Fiorito et al. (2000a) found roughly comparable results(particularly as compared to Delaney et al.s perceived innovation and innov-
ative tactics results). Rationalization (inclusive of an item on environmental
scanning) and size are found to be consistent positive predictors of IT use. In
contrast to the Delaney et al. and Jarley et al. studies, Fiorito et al. found some
evidence that decentralization has a positive impact on IT use. They also extend
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the model to consider union strategy, without apparent effect, and to employer
IT use and prior innovation. They found some evidence that employer IT use
is a positive influence (i.e. mimetic behavior or perhaps a keeping up with the
competition effect), and that previously innovative unions are likely to use IT
most extensively.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that innovation is less a product of
environment than of union characteristics. Concerns about the adequacy of the
environmental measures employed in the literature to date serve to temper this
conclusion, but the evidence suggests that much of what is necessary to invoke
change in unions is within their control. Achieving such change may be a slowprocess, but a well-administered union with adequate resources can place itself
in a position to identify, develop and adopt new methods and services in an
effort to become more effective.
Research on Organizing and Union Effectiveness
There are a good number of penultimate variables that one could examine under
the broader heading of union effectiveness. Fiorito et al. (1993) propose six
penultimate goals: bargaining, politics, self-help, organizing, member solidarity,
and resource acquisition. Yet, only organizing (Charlwood, 2001; Fiorito et al.,
1995, 2001) and overall union performance (Fiorito et al., 1997; Jarley et al.,
1998) have been examined directly in attempts to assess effectiveness on aunion-by-union basis among national unions. (But see Hammer and Wazeter
[1993] for a broad set of measures for union effectiveness among local unions.)
Although focused on NLRB elections, the Maranto and Fiorito (1987) study is
also relevant since winning elections is an element of organizing effectiveness
and that study relates election outcomes to union organizational characteristics.
Union leader perceptions of their own unions effectiveness correlate with a
number of union and environmental characteristics, and results are generally
consistent across differing levels of analysis (e.g. individual or organizational),
statistical methods (bivariate correlations versus multivariate regression), and
time periods (1990 and 1997 data have been examined). These results indicate
that perceived effectiveness is positively linked to size, rationalization,
innovation, scope of issues (or breadth of strategy), membership heterogeneity,
and environmental scanning. Perceived effectiveness is fairly consistently linkednegatively to centralization, and in some instances, to employer opposition
(Fiorito et al., 1997, 2001; Jarley et al., 1998; Maranto & Fiorito, 1987).
Results for organizing effectiveness are broadly similar, although they vary
somewhat with alternative indicators (e.g. NLRB election win rates, membership
growth, and perceived organizing effectiveness). One notable difference arises for
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rationalization measures. Although rationalization sometimes displays a positive
bivariate relation to organizing effectiveness indicators, there is no multivariate
evidence in support of this hypothesized relation. Also, some additional environ-
mental variables that are particularly relevant to organizing (i.e. representing
employment growth and worker attitudes) have produced mixed results.
Most significant in our mind is the innovation to effectiveness link. Results
from both studies of leadership perceptions of effectiveness and from studies
of organizing effectiveness suggest innovation has a strong positive impact on
such outcomes. Combined with our earlier discussion of the determinants of
innovation, our reading of the literature to date suggests unions have directcontrol over several important factors that shape their future. By increasing size
and rationalizing administrative structures, unions can enhance innovation, and
through innovation they influence effectiveness.
Whether such change can result in a resurgence in unionism is an open
question. Although empirical models can identify factors that explain variation
in measures of interest, such variation needs to be placed in the proper context.
In this regard, it should be noted that both the studies that employed objective
and subjective indicators of organizing or global union effectiveness took place
in a period of relative union decline. The analyses identify those unions that
did and felt that they did relatively better than others over the period, but few
if any unions experienced dramatic improvements in their fortunes.
EMERGENT ISSUES
Although there are many particular topics that one could address under the
heading of national unions as organizations, two in particular strike us as
currently at issue and deserving attention. These are union renewal and the
organizing model, and information technology.
Union Renewal and the Organizing Model
Union renewal (or revitalization) generally refers to union efforts to reverse
their decline. Although there is some debate about the meaning of particular
terms such as renewal, there is general consensus that unions in several advanced
industrial nations, including the U.S. and Britain, have declined substantially,and need to restore their vitality through membership growth.
In examining the U.S. case, Hurd (1998) referred to the need for unions to
contest the dinosaur image. That is, unions need to reestablish their relevance
in todays society to turnaround the sort of dinosaur perception alluded to at
the opening of this essay. Hurd provided a cogent historical review of how U.S.
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unions came to their present predicament. He reviewed how the AFL-CIO
leadership of the 1980s and early 1990s belatedly accepted the need for change,
and initially favored structural changes (e.g. creating a new department focused
on organizing, establishing the Organizing Institute to provide a school for
organizers).
Although such changes may have ultimately contributed to a turnaround, by
the mid-1990s, there was a growing sense that the AFL-CIOs reform initia-
tives were offering too little too late, leading to a change in AFL-CIO leadership,
the new Sweeney administration. The key thrust of the new administration has
been an emphasis on organizing. In a broader context, this is part of an emphasison activism and mobilization (Hurd, 1998). But clearly the emphasis is on
organizing. Sweeney set a goal of spending 30% of union budgets on
organizing by 2000. No one knows what the corresponding percent was in 1995
when Sweeney took office. Most observers estimate it was less than 5%, and
a 1997 survey showed that national unions estimated they were spending about
12% of their budgets, on average, on organizing at that time (Fiorito, Jarley &
Delaney, 1998). (It seems quite likely these self-reported figures were a bit
inflated given the social desirability effect in the context of public calls from
Sweeney and others for much higher percentages.)
Along with a philosophical and budgetary commitment to organizing, a key
element of Sweeneys program has been the promotion of the organizing
model (OM), although its development preceded his leadership of theAFL-CIO by several years (Hurd, 1998). Interpretations of this model vary,
and the discussion following simplifies for illustration. The OM is generally
seen to involve an emphasis on worker activism and mobilization in the pursuit
of new members, bargaining and political effectiveness, and social justice. In
many respects, it is a return to the mutual aid logic that governed union
organization and development in the American labor movements formative
years (Bacharach, Bamberger & Sonnenstuhl, 2001). It is often contrasted with
the servicing model (SM). In its simplest form, the SM refers to the idea of
union members paying dues in exchange for services. It stands for a passive
membership who look upon their union membership as a sort of insurance
policy, their union as a sort of vending machine. In the SM, workers ask what
can the union do for us? In the OM, workers ask what can we do through
the union? As Hurd put it: Under the organizing model, the role of the unionwould be to help workers find collective solutions to their work-related
concerns (1998, p. 23).
In principle, the budgetary objective and the OM are complementary. Unions
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