performance assessment of emergency operation 200266
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Performance Assessment
of Emergency Operation 200266
Delivering Food Assistance
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
i
Contents
Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... ii
Map ........................................................................................................................... iii
Executive Summary ................................................................................................... iv
Context ..................................................................................................................... vi
Letter of Understanding ................................................................................................. vi
Resourcing ................................................................................................................ viii
Monitoring and Evaluation ............................................................................................. ix
End-of-Project Review ................................................................................................... ix
Part 1: Monitoring and Evaluation ............................................................................. 1
M&E Management and Responsibilities ............................................................................. 1
Analysis of Monitoring Indicators ..................................................................................... 2
Site Visits by WFP Teams ............................................................................................... 2
End-of-Project Review .................................................................................................... 4
Limitations of the Review ............................................................................................... 6
Effectiveness, Efficiency and Equality ............................................................................... 7
Food Distributions ......................................................................................................... 7
Food Receipts ............................................................................................................... 8
Suggested Food Basket Changes ..................................................................................... 8
Distribution Delays ........................................................................................................ 8
Food Quality ................................................................................................................. 9
Food Usage .................................................................................................................. 9
Food Production ............................................................................................................ 9
Specific Findings from Children’s Institutions ................................................................... 10
Paediatric Wards ......................................................................................................... 10
Children’s Institutions .................................................................................................. 10
Part 2: Findings on Food Security ............................................................................ 11
Food Availability .......................................................................................................... 11
Food Access ............................................................................................................... 11
Food Utilization ........................................................................................................... 14
Food Security ............................................................................................................. 16
Coping Strategies ........................................................................................................ 17
Targeting ................................................................................................................... 17
Vulnerable Groups and Priority for Food Assistance .......................................................... 17
Geographical Vulnerability ............................................................................................ 18
Public Distribution System Dependents and Cooperative Farmers ....................................... 19
Kitchen Gardens and Livestock ...................................................................................... 19
Household Size and Composition: Large Families and Elderly People ................................... 20
Part 3: Outcomes and Outputs ................................................................................. 21
Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies ............................. 21
Strategic Objective 5: Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger through hand-
over strategies and local purchase ................................................................................. 25
Part 4: Impact and Effectiveness ............................................................................. 27
Awareness and Value of WFP Assistance ......................................................................... 28
Suggestions for the Future ........................................................................................... 28
Part 5. Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions ...................................................
Findings ..................................................................................................................... 29
Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 30
Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 30
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
ii
Acronyms
CFSAM Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
CMB Cereal-Milk Blend
CSM Corn-Soy Milk Blend
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EMOP Emergency Operation
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCS Food Consumption Score
FFCD Food For Community Development
LFP Local Food Production
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MUAC Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
PDC Public Distribution Centre
PDS Public Distribution System
PRRO Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RFSA Rapid Food Security Assessment
RMB Rice-Milk Blend
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WHO World Health Organization
WFP World Food Programme
Korean terms
dong Neighbourhood
pyeong Area = 3.3 m2
ri Village
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
iii
Map
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
iv
Executive Summary
This report focuses on the procedures used to assess the outcomes and effectiveness of
Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200266: Emergency Food Assistance for Vulnerable Groups,
implemented in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) for 15 months, from 1 April
2011 to 30 June 2012.
The operation was launched in response to an appeal for food assistance by the Government
following a harsh winter, heavy rains affecting the main 2010 harvest, and high post-harvest
losses. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the Government signed a Letter of
Understanding that gave WFP staff unprecedented access to food-insecure areas. The aims
were to address chronic hunger and stabilize and reduce acute malnutrition among particularly
vulnerable groups – 310,500 metric tons of food were to assist 3.5 million people in 117
counties, mainly children and pregnant or breastfeeding women – and to support local
production of nutritionally fortified foods. WFP data show that actual food deliveries during the
15 months of EMOP 200266 totalled 103,300 metric tons and reached 3 million people. The
operation did not fully meet its targets because contributions received were insufficient to
provide the resources and inputs required for food deliveries during the lean season.
Nonetheless, WFP assistance over 15 months helped significantly to enhance food intake and
the nutrition status of 3 million vulnerable children, women and men at a time of serious food
insecurity in DPRK. When EMOP 200266 started in April 2011, much of the population were
suffering from prolonged food deprivation, largely because the Public Distribution System ration
had been reduced to less than 200 grams per person, per day following a drought and
successive poor harvests.
The production of locally fortified food has been central to WFP’s work to address undernutrition
and hunger in DPRK since 1998. Through a unique partnership between WFP and the
Government, a network of 13 factories produce fortified biscuits and Super Cereal (blended
food such as Cereal Milk Blend or Corn Soy Milk Blend) enriched with vitamins and minerals.
These are distributed as supplementary food to children and women. During Emergency
Operation 200266, 35,547 metric tons of these foods were produced – 40 percent fortified
biscuits and 60 percent Super Cereal.
Continuous monitoring and evaluation was carried out in all counties.WFP teams conducted
over 3,000 visits, including 2,364 regular monitoring visits to households, schools and
children’s institutions, and 276 logistics monitoring visits. The teams used specific checklists to
standardize their enquiries, and were supported by local officials. There were also two country-
wide assessments and several visits by high-level United Nations and international observers.
The teams found that WFP food had been much appreciated and that it had made a significant
contribution to the alleviation of chronic hunger and malnutrition resulting from drought and
poor harvests. The interventions had been successful in that most of the targeted beneficiaries
had been reached, albeit with reduced rations because of the funding shortfall, and food
consumption scores (FCS) had progressively improved. Proposals to enhance the operation
included improvements to knowledge dissemination, targeting, reporting, travel and food-
management processes.
The various recommendations included scaling up monitoring visits to achieve the targets in the
Letter of Understanding, training in record-keeping for local officials, and updating the
implementation plan and checklists.
A mid-upper arm circumference assessment by the Institute of Child Nutrition and WFP in
November 2011 found acute malnutrition at 14.1 percent among 696 children under 5
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
v
examined in the 35 counties where Emergency Operation 200266 was implemented. This figure
ranks as “serious” in the World Health Organization classification.
The End-of-Project Review in July 2012 was conducted by WFP staff in 41 operational areas.
They interviewed 134 households, held 81 discussions with county officials and focus groups
and visited 41 children’s institutions and 6 food factories to assess the efficiency, effectiveness
and impact of EMOP 200266.
All targeted counties had received monthly deliveries of wheat and maize, Super Cereal,
biscuits, beans and vegetable oil, but pipeline breaks had reduced the quantities from the
planned amounts. The county officials wished to receive more food and to expand WFP
coverage and increase the range of activities, and 95 percent of households interviewed wish to
receive WFP food in future. In general, the project was successful in reaching the most
vulnerable beneficiaries, but inadequate donor support resulted in food shortages, which in turn
meant that the elderly beneficiary group received only small quantities of food assistance.
Food quality was generally been reported as good. Children had particularly appreciated the
Super Cereal and biscuits. The local food production factories had been pleased with the quality
of raw materials. The review data showed that EMOP 200266 had improved
food consumption and health among children and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
The food security situation had improved from 2011 as a result of larger public distribution
system rations and deliveries of WFP food. The household food consumption output indicator
also improved and achieved its target. But the situation remains fragile, particularly because
households are utilizing coping strategies such as reducing the size of meals and adding water
to food to increase volume, which reduces nutritional value.
The overall conclusions were that EMOP 200266 had been successful in reaching particularly
vulnerable groups, but that food deliveries had fallen short of the original targets because
contributions received were insufficient. Food insecurity was mitigated, but the situation
remains fragile. County officials and beneficiaries wanted WFP’s food assistance to continue in
the longer term. The reviewers felt that with additional resources more could be done to assist
elderly people and promote sustainable development and local food production. Advocacy with
donors should continue with this in mind.
The successes of EMOP 200266 were achieved with the support of the Government and of the
county officials and focus groups, whose commitment is warmly acknowledged. The
contributions received from donors are also gratefully acknowledged.
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
vi
Context
Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200266: Emergency Food Assistance for Vulnerable Groups was
launched on 1 April 2011 in response to an appeal for humanitarian food assistance by the
Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) following a harsh winter,
heavy rains during the main harvest in 2010 and high post-harvest losses. Implementation was
guided by a Letter of Understanding between the World Food Programme (WFP) and the
Government, which enabled WFP officials to visit beneficiary households, institutions and
markets across the country to an unprecedented extent, and by a rapid food-security
assessment (RFSA) carried out in March 2011 by WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). EMOP 200266
initially aimed to support 3.5 million beneficiaries in 1171 counties with 310,500 metric tons of
food over 12 months. It was later extended to 30 June 2012 at the request of the Government.
The objectives of EMOP 200266 were (i) to provide nutritional support to chronically
undernourished children, women and vulnerable groups with a view to stabilizing and reducing
acute malnutrition, and (ii) to help the Government to reduce hunger and undernutrition by
supporting production of fortified foods in DPRK. The operation provided fortified biscuits and
Super Cereal enriched with vitamins and minerals to address protein and nutrient deficiencies
among children and women resulting from food shortages caused by drought and poor
harvests. These shortages mean that many people in DPRK are chronically hungry, which in
turn impedes their physical and intellectual development. For many young children and
mothers, WFP food is one of the main sources of protein and micronutrients.
During EMOP 200266, which addressed WFP’s Strategic Objective 1 (Save lives and protect
livelihoods in emergencies) and Strategic Objective 5 (Strengthen the capacities of countries to
reduce hunger through hand-over strategies and local purchase), the ongoing Protracted Relief
and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200114 Nutrition Support for Women and Children (1 April
2011 to 30 June 2012) was suspended.
LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING
The Letter of Understanding signed by WFP and the Government of DPRK on 16 April 2011
increased WFP’s access for monitoring and oversight of its operations under EMOP 200266.
The provisions of the Letter of Understanding were respected, but a lack of funding slowed food
procurement and delayed WFP’s plans for expanding its staff numbers and opening new field-
offices. There were no indications that the Government was reluctant to respect the agreement.
Since 1996, when WFP first began operations in the DPRK, there has been progressive
improvement in operating conditions. The conditions of the 2011 Letter of Understanding were
an improvement on those negotiated for the 2008 emergency, and as a result WFP’s ability to
oversee food distributions was much enhanced.
Staffing
The Letter of Understanding provided for an increase in international staff from 11 to 59, of
whom 60 percent were to be involved in field monitoring, and for the deployment of Korean
speakers of any nationality. Actual staffing increased from 11 to 25 in September 2011,
including five Korean-speaking international food aid monitors whose visas were granted
without problems. Considering EMOP 200266 was only 30 percent funded, the staffing level
exceeded the target.
1 The EMOP started in 107 counties and the coverage was extended to 117 counties at the request of the Government following a WFP review.
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
vii
Field Offices
WFP has had by far the largest international presence outside of Pyongyang since 1996, but
funding constraints in the last two years forced it to reduce its presence to a main office in
Pyongyang and field offices in Wonsan and Chongjin. The 2011 Letter of Understanding
provided for six field-offices, some in remote areas of the north and east. WFP opened a new
field office at Hamhung in South Hamgyong province but plans to open offices in Haesan and
Haeju were shelved because of funding shortfalls.
Food Distribution and Targeting
The Government’s Global Implementation Plan included a list of beneficiary institutions and
outlets and a breakdown of beneficiaries as a basis for the distribution of food assistance. This
plan was signed by the WFP Representative and the National Coordinating Committee, and was
adhered to throughout EMOP 200266.
Capacity-Building
About 500 government and county officials were trained at six regional workshops in May 2011.
This was to familiarize officials with the terms and conditions of the LoU governing EMOP
200266 and train them to complete the forms, logbooks and tracking sheets used during
implementation.
Monitoring
Food movements and distribution
The Letter of Understanding allowed WFP staff to access any facility where WFP food was stored
or handled, and to access warehouses at entry points to verify stocks and dispatches. WFP was
permitted to install and operate its own computerized tracking system, and the Letter of
Understanding envisaged corresponding improvements in the timeliness of documentation
provided by the Government, enabling rapid access to information on food dispatched and
received.
The Government provided WFP with a list of the schools, nurseries, kindergartens and
orphanages where food was to be distributed, which facilitated monitoring and control. WFP had
to provide only 24 hours’ notice of a monitoring visit to a county. The 2011 Letter of
Understanding was an improvement over 2008 in that WFP was able, on arrival in a county, to
choose the sub-county, institution or household it wished to visit, which greatly increased the
randomness of the monitoring process. WFP’s monitoring teams were in all cases granted
permission to visit households, children’s institutions and Public Distribution Centres chosen at
random. Government officials were fully cooperative.
As soon as food shipments arrived in DPRK, Distribution Plan 1 was activated to transport the
food from the port to county and provincial warehouses and the local food production (LFP)
factories. After verification of these deliveries by WFP monitoring officers, Distribution Plan 2
was issued to move the food to final distribution points.
Food security
WFP was for the first time granted access to markets to monitor the supply and demand for
food and track prices. Some of the markets did not operate every day because people were
planting rice and maize, but those that were open could be visited. WFP and its partners were
also allowed for the first time to measure mid-upper arm circumference to monitor malnutrition
among young children.
Assessment
The Government provided full support for three assessments: (i) the FAO/WFP crop and food
security assessment in October 2011; (ii) mid-upper arm (MUAC) measurements among
children under 5 in November 2011; and (iii) the End-of-Project Review in July 2012.
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
viii
Logistics and record-keeping
During the monitoring visits there were no signs of food diversions, and the few discrepancies
found in stock keeping were clerical errors of the kind found in other countries where WFP
operates. Food was properly stored, the first-in/first-out principle was observed, and stock
cards were usually accurately kept.
Communications and public information
Fibre-optic cables were installed in all of WFP’s field offices, which greatly improved
connectivity. The government facilitated visits by WFP public information officials, including a
stills photographer and video producer, which produced a good deal of audio-visual and other
material that was posted on WFP’s website.
RESOURCING
Because EMOP 200266 was launched immediately after the Government’s request for
international assistance and the subsequent food security assessment, there was only limited
time for resource mobilization. The operation started with financing via loans from PRRO
200114 and early commitments from Brazil, India, Luxembourg, Norway, Russia, Switzerland
and South Africa, as well as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). This enabled WFP
to distribute limited amounts of locally produced Super Cereal and pulses for the most food-
insecure children and pregnant and breastfeeding women. A few months later, China, Ireland,
Italy, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands and Switzerland, as well as private donors, provided
further support to continue the production of Super Cereal.
At the height of the lean season, Australia, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid and
Civil Protection (ECHO), Sweden and CERF made significant contributions that enabled WFP to
increase assistance for the most vulnerable groups. By the beginning of 2012, Australia,
Canada, Liechtenstein, Norway, Poland and Switzerland reconfirmed financial support, enabling
WFP to maintain distributions until the end of the operation. Allocations of almost US$22 million
were also received from WFP’s Strategic Resource Allocation committee. Overall, EMOP 200266
received US$83.5 million – 32 percent of the funding requirement of US$259.5 million.
WFP arranged 65 visits to implementation sites by donors, who received monthly
implementation reports that included information about monitoring and the food-security
situation. The funding committed by about 20 donors is shown in the table below:
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
ix
Donor US$
Australia 7 530 843
Brazil 4 016 716
Canada 4 012 036
China 1 000 000
European Commission 12 142 857
India 1 000 000
Ireland 356 125
Italy 429 185
Liechtenstein 198 425
Luxembourg 642 933
Netherlands 34 105
Norway 2 662 657
Poland 155 135
Private donors 190 130
Russian Federation 5 000 000
South Africa 142 878
Sweden 1 600 512
Switzerland 9 863 057
CERF 10 399 003
Multilateral funds 21 924 300
Miscellaneous income 122 319
Total donations 83 423 415
MONITORING AND EVALUATION
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) continues throughout an operation to assess progress in terms
of specific indicators, with a view to adjusting activities in response to changing circumstances.
Monitoring is the day-to-day task of visiting operational sites and collecting data on outputs and
processes; evaluation involves the assessment of longer-term outcomes and impacts. These
complementary functions are the basis of reporting to donors and stakeholders on results
achieved with the funds and resources allocated to an operation.
END-OF-PROJECT REVIEW
An end-of-project review is an assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of a
completed operation. It judges the extent to which operational approaches and activities have
reached their objectives, the effectiveness of activities and the efficiency with which resources
have been used, and considers issues such as outcomes, impact and sustainability.
This report synthesizes the data and findings of project M&E and the end-of-project report for
EMOP 200266.
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
1
1. The M&E system in DPRK is designed to ensure that: i) adequate food assistance is distributed
as planned; ii) operational problems are identified; and iii) changes in food security in particular
areas are recognized with a view to optimizing the targeting of food to the people in greatest
need. The system assesses results in relation to Strategic Objectives 1 and 5 and the outcome
and output indicators in the logical framework of EMOP 200266.
M&E MANAGEMENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES
2. Teams of WFP international and national staff regularly visited all operational counties, as
envisaged in the Letter of Understanding with the Government and in accordance with the
Guidelines for Planning Food Monitoring Visits. Three Korean-speaking international staff were
the core of the monitoring team. The principles for planning monitoring visits are shown in
Figure 1.
FIGURE 1. PRINCIPLES FOR MONITORING VISITS
Monitoring
type Food movement flow Criteria
LOGISTICS
monitoring:
distribution
plan 1
Blended food raw
ingredients: transport
from the port of entry
to LFP factories
Food for direct
distribution: transport
to county warehouses
For each consignment dispatched, 70% of
total tonnage and 50% of logistics
distribution points are inspected to ensure
complete delivery
Visits are arranged by the logistics unit
according to dispatch information from the
port of entry
24-hour notification required to visit
BENEFICARY
monitoring:
distribution
plan 2
From factories/county
warehouses to the final
distribution points for
beneficiaries (children’s
institutions or public
distribution centres)
24-hour notification required to visit
county/district
Selection of sub-county to visit on arrival
in county
Random selection of institutions to visit
from the Global Implementation Plan – the
list of beneficiary institutions, by county
Random selection of beneficiary
households from WFP logbooks of PDS
centres
Part 1:
Monitoring and Evaluation
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
2
3. Monitoring teams visited an average of four operational sites per day. This involved:
discussions with county officials from as many departments and offices as possible;
visits to nurseries, kindergartens, primary schools, baby homes, children’s centres and
boarding schools;
visits to paediatric wards and hospitals; and
visits to at least one household including elderly people, a pregnant woman or a nursing
mother.
4. Specific monitoring checklists were developed to ensure that quantitative and qualitative data
were systematically collected and entered into a central database for analysis.
5. Logistics monitoring struck a balance between locations handling large quantities such as LFP
factories, and counties with large beneficiary populations and geographical coverage. The
system ensured that 60 of the 117 counties and half of the LFP factories were visited whenever
a new distribution plan was issued.
6. Beneficiary monitoring captures information on food distribution, operational issues and food
security, focusing on:
storage conditions at warehouses, public distribution outlets and WFP stocks;
receipts and delivery of WFP food and non-food-items;
the number of beneficiaries receiving WFP assistance, by sex and age;
the availability of food and any unmet needs;
government records of food movements, storage and distributions; and
operational issues to be addressed by the Government or WFP.
ANALYSIS OF MONITORING INDICATORS
Site Visits by WFP Teams
7. Between April 2011 and June 2012, WFP teams made random visits to 3,030 sites, of which
716 were county visits (see Figures 2 and 3). Each county was visited five times on average.
WFP monitoring teams travelled 600,000 km during these missions.
FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF COUNTIES VISITED, APRIL 2011–JUNE 2012
23
8
27 21
57
80
73
96
55
29
59 54
22
64
48
0
20
40
60
80
100
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
2011 2012
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
3
FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF FIELD VISITS, APRIL 2011–JUNE 2012
8. During the reporting period, WFP teams made 2,364 regular beneficiary monitoring visits and
276 logistics monitoring visits. There were two country-wide assessments – a Crop and Food
Security Assessment Mission (CFSAM) covering 133 sites and a MUAC survey in 53 locations.
There were also 94 site visits by donors and high-level missions such as the European
Commission on Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, the Swedish International Development
Agency and the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. WFP
management made 62 visits, and there were an additional 34 visits to LFPs and 14 to food for
community development (FFCD) locations (see Figure 4).
FIGURE 4. NUMBER OF FIELD VISITS, BY ACTIVITY
9. Figure 5 shows regular beneficiary monitoring visits by site. This does not include assessment
missions, visits by donors and WFP management, and visits to LFP factories and FFCD sites.
92
36
130
84
187
306
389
346
193
135
220 245
83
349
235
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
2011 2012
14
34
53
133
62
94
276
2,364
1 10 100 1,000 10,000
FFCD
LFP
MUAC assessment
CFSAM
Management visit
Donor/High level visit
Logistics monitoring
Beneficiary monitoring
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
4
FIGURE 5. FIELD VISITS, BY SITE
*Nurseries, kindergartens, primary schools, baby homes, child centres and boarding schools.
END-OF-PROJECT REVIEW
10. In line with standard WFP practice, an end-of-project review in July 2012 assessed the
efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of WFP’s assistance under EMOP 200266 with
a view to deriving lessons for future operations. After two days of training, six teams of
reviewers covered 41 counties or city districts in eight provinces that had received food since
the start of EMOP 200266 in April 2011. In Pyongyang an LFP factory was visited, but no other
information was collected.
11. The review2 was based on discussions with county officials3 and focus groups representing
pregnant and breastfeeding women and parents of children in institutions, as well as visits to
households,4 children’s institutions and LFP factories.
12. Selection of counties was semi-random: 40 of the 117 counties covered by the operation were
selected initially; Hwangju was added later. Pujon county was visited, but poor roads prevented
access to distant ri and information had to be gathered from county officials. In each county, ri
dong were selected randomly for assessment.
13. The selection of households at the second stage of sampling was not random, but focused on
households with pregnant and breastfeeding women.
2 Sample per site: interview with county officials, visit to one or two children’s institutions or paediatric wards, meeting with focus group for pregnant and breastfeeding women or parents of children at institutions, visits to two, three or four households and, where applicable, to an LFP factory. 3 From county coordination councils and departments of food administration, commerce, public health and education. 4 Two, three or four households, ideally a mix of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households.
579
815
415
427
96
32
County officials
Child institutions*
Pediatric wards/hospital
Households
Distribution sites
Market
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
5
14. Figure 6 shows that 134 household visits were made in the eight provinces, 51 percent were on
the east coast and 49 percent on the west coast. Of the respondents, 97 percent were women;
data was also collected from 53 children under 5 on illnesses and feeding practices.
FIGURE 6. REVIEW SAMPLE
Province No. of
counties
No. of interviews conducted
County
officials
Focus
groups Households
Children’s
institutions
LFP
factories
Kangwon 3 3 3 10 4 1
Nampo 1 1 1 4 0 0
N Hamgyong 7 7 7 28 9 1
N Hwanghae 7 7 7 16 4 0
Pyongyang 0 0 0 0 0 1
Ryanggang 2 2 2 7 2 1
S Hamgyong 9 9 8 21 10 1
S Hwanghae 4 4 4 22 4 0
N Pyongan 3 3 3 12 4 1
S Pyongan 5 5 5 14 4 0
Total 41 41 40 134 41 6
15. Of the households visited, 64 percent had a pregnant or breastfeeding woman, and 25 percent
were non-beneficiaries; of the remaining 10 percent, most had a child receiving assistance from
a children’s institution (see Figure 7). Most of the 41 children’s institutions visited were
nurseries, primary schools and kindergartens (see Figure 8).
FIGURE 7. HOUSEHOLDS BY BENEFICIARY CATEGORY
86
8 7 7 10
33
0
20
40
60
80
100
Pre
gnan
t /
bre
astf
eed
ing
wo
men
Nu
rser
y
Kin
der
gart
en
Pri
mar
y sc
ho
ol
Oth
er
No
n-b
enef
icar
y
Nu
mb
er o
f h
ou
seh
old
s
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
6
FIGURE 8. CHILDREN’S INSTITUTIONS VISITED
16. Of the households visited, 97 percent were headed by men. Household size ranged from two to
six people, averaging 3.2 members (see Figure 9); 40 percent had at least one child under 5,
62 percent had a child under 18, and 33 percent had an elderly person.
FIGURE 9. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION Children Adults Total
<6mo 6-23mo
2-4yrs 5-17yrs 18-59yrs 60+ yrs
Mean 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.0 0.4 3.2
17. A change in household composition had occurred in the preceding year in 38 percent of cases:
82 percent had a baby, 4 percent had a death and 14 percent had a marriage or other event.
18. PDS dependents accounted for 64 percent of the households; 35 percent were cooperative
farmers and one household was mixed. Data on household type was not recorded in eight
cases.
LIMITATIONS OF THE REVIEW
19. Sampling did not reach planned levels in every location because the time available was limited,
and the assessment covered areas assisted under EMOP 200266 and PRRO 200114. The sample
was not large enough to enable comparison among provinces, but it can be considered
representative in coastal areas. It was not equally divided between PDS dependants and
cooperative farmers, but valid information on household types was obtained. Data on child
illness and feeding practices is limited to children aged under 18 months.
4
10
2
7
3
9
6
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Bab
y h
om
e
Nu
rser
y
Ch
ild c
ente
r
Kin
der
gart
en
Bo
ard
ing
sch
oo
l
Pri
mar
y sc
ho
ol
Ped
iatr
ic h
osp
ital
/war
d
Nu
mb
er o
f in
stit
uti
on
s
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
7
EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY AND EQUALITY
Food Distributions
20. WFP distributed food assistance with the help of the Government. When food arrived – by sea
at Nampo, Hungnam or Chongjin, or by rail at Sinuiju and Namyang – the Government
unloaded it in the presence of WFP logistics officers. The food was then stored at the port or
distributed to county warehouses or LFP factories. When the WFP staff were satisfied that food
had arrived, a distribution plan guided delivery by government officials to children’s institutions
and paediatric hospitals, or to pregnant and breastfeeding women and elderly people, using
public distribution outlets in the north-eastern provinces.
21. Actual distributions observed by M&E are compared with planned figures in Figure 10.
Distribution targets were not reached, particularly in the first five months of EMOP 200266,
because of pipeline breaks, lack of funding and delays in procurement and external transport.
FIGURE 10. PLANNED AND ACTUAL FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
Ap
ril
May
Jun
e
July
Au
gust
Sep
t
Oct
No
v
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Ap
r
May
Jun
2011 2012
me
tric
to
ns
Plan
Actual
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
8
Food Receipts
22. Of the assessed counties, 68 percent had first received WFP food in 1998 or earlier; another
20 percent had been assisted for the first time in 2007/08. Food deliveries under EMOP 200266
were received most often from June 2011 (see Figure 11).
FIGURE 11. INITIAL FOOD RECEIPTS, BY COUNTY
23. All the counties received wheat and maize, Super Cereal, biscuits, soya beans and vegetable
oil. Food was received monthly, but there were pipeline breaks for some food types and the
quantities were reduced from the tonnages planned in EMOP 200266. Not all county officials
were aware of the planned tonnages, but those who were realized that the amounts actually
received amounted to only a third of the planned quantities. The counties wished to receive
more food and to expand WFP coverage and increase the range of activities.
24. Pregnant and breastfeeding women reported that they usually received food monthly. In some
locations adequate quantities of food were not available from May to September 2011; Super
Cereal rations were also reduced in April 2012.
25. Children’s institutions received food monthly. Distributions were regular because they were
prioritized by WFP and the Government. Some institutions requested larger quantities of food
and a wider range of food types.
26. The LFP factories received the food, premix and packaging in bulk and stored them in their
warehouses.
Suggested Food Basket Changes
27. Changes to the WFP food basket suggested by county officials and women in focus groups
included:
increase the ration of oil for hospitals, children’s institutions and pregnant and breastfeeding
women;
increase rations of Super Cereal for children and pregnant and breastfeeding women;
making rice the main cereal, especially for hospitals and nurseries, because it is easier to
digest;
adding a biscuit ration for nurseries and baby homes;
adding soybeans to rations for children’s institutions to make tofu or soya milk; and
increase the amount of biscuits because children liked them.
Distribution Delays
28. County officials did not report distribution delays, but noted that deliveries from ports to central
warehouses had sometimes been late. A few officials reported difficulties with transport to final
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Apr 11
May 11
June 11
July 11
Aug 11
Sept 11
Oct 11
Nov 11
Dec 11
Jan 12
Feb 12
Mar 12
Apr 12
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
9
distribution points. Food was generally dispatched to distribution points within a week of
receipt.
29. Pipeline breaks delayed or reduced the amounts of biscuits, Super Cereal and oil. The breaks
lasted for up to three months, particularly in the initial phase of EMOP 200266. Cereal supplies
were irregular between May and September 2011, and cereals did not reach all beneficiaries
during the lean season.
Food Quality
30. Food quality was generally reported as “good”. All the institutions and beneficiaries interviewed
were very satisfied with food quality, especially Super Cereal and biscuits.
31. The LFP factories were generally very satisfied with the quality of raw materials and were
certain that their products were of good quality. The factories reported adherence to safety and
hygiene standards during production.
Food Usage
32. Women in focus groups stated that their children received and consumed food at schools and
institutions. In a few cases where children had brought biscuits home to share with siblings,
their parents had reminded them that they should eat the biscuits on-site. Half of the pregnant
and breastfeeding women shared some food with their children and husbands. They were
familiar with the foods received, knew how to prepare them, and liked them very much.
33. Institutions were familiar with Super Cereal and could prepare dishes that the children enjoyed,
particularly bread made from CMB. In general they reported that the children enjoyed the food
in any form, particularly Super Cereal. CSM was usually mixed with cereals or prepared as
porridge.
Food Production
34. Since 1998 the local production of fortified food has been central to WFP’s work to address
undernutrition and hunger in DPRK. Under a unique partnership between WFP and the
Government, 13 factories produce biscuits and Super Cereal for distribution as supplementary
food to children and women.
35. The Government provided the factories, warehouses, staff, electrical power and maintenance.
Under WFP oversight, the Government was responsible for supplying ingredients and
distributing biscuits and Super Cereal to nurseries, kindergartens, primary schools and
hospitals. WFP provided a cooking mix of iodized salt and baking soda and a micronutrient
premix of vitamins and minerals – funding shortfalls limited these supplies – and supplied
packaging materials, spare parts and technical expertise in food processing and fortification.
36. During EMOP 200266, production of biscuits and Super Cereal totalled 35,547 metric tons (MT):
biscuits accounted for 40 percent – 14,169 MT – and Super Cereal for 60 percent – 21,378 MT.
The initial plan was to increase production from 3,256 MT to 4,700 MT per month, and a
monthly quota was established for each factory. An optimistic monthly quota of 5,300 MT was
subsequently established on the basis of updated beneficiary numbers and the rations assigned
to them.
37. Between April and August 2011, when most factories suspended their activities, production
varied from 227 MT to 2,311 MT; this was largely because of shortages of raw materials. From
September 2011 stable production was resumed, and in January 2012 production peaked at
4,300 MT. Between January and June 2012, the monthly production quota was revised
quarterly to enable the LFP factories to plan more efficiently. Munchon biscuit factory reported
that its capacity was not fully utilized.
38. WFP teams made 34 regular monitoring visits to LFP factories; review teams re-visited six
factories. The visits included verification of accounts, stocks, raw materials and final products,
and assessments of warehouses. Production lines were checked to ensure that WFP standards
of food production were applied.
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
10
39. The LFP factories require uninterrupted supplies of power, water and packaging materials and
need periodic maintenance. The main needs reported during factory visits were spare parts and
maintenance of the ageing machinery. Storage space was adequate, but tarpaulins were
needed to protect the stocks from rain.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS FROM CHILDREN’S INSTITUTIONS
Paediatric Wards
40. WFP monitoring teams visited 415 paediatric wards or hospitals; another six were visited during
the end-of-project review.
41. Figure 12 shows the main diseases in children admitted to paediatric wards between April 2011
and June 2012, as reported from the 415 visits to hospitals. Of the medical staff at the
hospitals, 55 percent were women.
FIGURE 12. MAIN DISEASES IN PAEDIATRIC WARDS ON ADMISSION
42. The WFP monitoring teams collected information about sources of water at the paediatric
hospitals because it is directly linked to the health and nutritional status of the children. The
main sources were piped water – 84 percent – and well water – 11 percent.
Children’s Institutions
43. WFP monitoring teams visited 815 children’s institutions; the end-of-project review teams
visited another 35. The findings showed that 95 percent of the school officials interviewed
confirmed that all the biscuits provided by WFP were consumed by the pupils and that they
were fully satisfied with the quality.
44. Of the 815 children’s institutions visited during regular monitoring, 75 percent had access to
piped water. Of the caregivers and management staff at children’s institutions, 70 percent were
women.
90% 89%
70%
55%
41%
16% 12%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
11
FOOD AVAILABILITY
45. The October 2011 CFSAM indicated that cereal production in the 2010/11 marketing year had
been 4.7 million metric tons (MT) compared with national requirements of 5.4 million MT. This
constituted an improvement of 347,000 MT compared with the previous year, largely
attributable to increased availability of fertilizers, fuel and electricity. The cereal gap remained
739,000 MT. However, the Government imported 325,000 MT, leaving a shortfall of
414,000 MT. The CFSAM recommended the provision of 120,000 MT of food for 3 million
people.
46. Production of wheat, barley and potatoes in July 2012 was reported by the Government as
207,000 MT, significantly less than the 500,000 MT estimated by the CFSAM. The main reason
for reduced production was the dry spell in May and June. Flooding, which is common from
June to August in DPRK, affected a number of areas.
FOOD ACCESS
47. Households reported that the main food sources in the week preceding the team visit had been
state shops, PDS and cooperative rations, and home production. Cooperative farmers used a
higher share of home production; PDS dependents relied on state shops, PDS rations and gifts
(see Figure 13).
FIGURE 13. HOUSEHOLD FOOD SOURCES
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Pu
rch
ased
fro
m
stat
e sh
op
PD
S/C
oo
p r
atio
n
Ow
n p
rod
uct
ion
Gif
t
Gat
her
ing
Pu
rch
ased
fro
m
mar
ket
Hu
nti
ng
or
fish
ing
Foo
d a
id
All Coop farmer PDS dependant
Part 2:
Findings on Food Security
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
12
Kitchen Gardens and Livestock
48. Kitchen gardens and livestock are two important sources of food that can be directly controlled
by households. On average, 81 percent of the households assessed had kitchen gardens –
98 percent of cooperative farmers and 69 percent of PDS dependents. The average size of the
gardens was 21 pyeong.5 The main crops were vegetables, potatoes, maize and fruit (see
Figure 14).
FIGURE 14. KITCHEN GARDENS
Crop Production
Kg/year
(average)
Kg/year (range)
Maize 32 2-180
Potato 51 6-150
Fruits 37 2-150
Vegetables 126 7-800
49. The July review found that animals were kept by 78 percent of the households – 86 percent of
cooperative farmers and 72 percent of PDS dependents. These were mainly rabbits and poultry
for home consumption. In 2012, the average household kept two animals of each kind, slightly
fewer than in 2011.
Wild Foods
50. Wild foods are an important dietary supplement. Households reported consuming wild
vegetables twice a week. Gathering, hunting or fishing provided 5 percent of household food in
July 2012.
51. Focus group participants noted the importance of wild food in protecting food security:
13 percent ranked it as “very important” and 78 percent as “somewhat important”. County
officials reported that people are advised to maximize the use of wild foods, especially during
difficult times.
Household Expenditure on Food
52. Household expenditures were obtained in July 2012 by using the proportional piling method.
The findings may be inaccurate for food purchases, however, because more food was received
through the PDCs than was purchased. The main expenditure items were food, fuel, clothes and
housing (see Figure 15).
FIGURE 15. HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES
5 69.3 m2.
Food 39%
Energy 18%
Housing 11%
Health 1%
Education 1%
Transport 5%
Loan payment
1%
Savings 7%
Clothes 13%
Other 4%
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
13
53. Of food purchases, households prioritized vegetables, condiments and oil. PDS dependants
allocated more to vegetables, pulses, meat and cereals than cooperative farmers, who
purchased more condiments and oil (see Figure 16).
FIGURE 16. HOUSEHOLD FOOD EXPENDITURE PRIORITIES
PDS and Cooperative Farm Rations
54. Government rations are the main source of cereals for households in DPRK. PDS dependents –
70 percent of the population, mainly workers, officials, professionals and state farmers – are in
principle entitled to an average ration of 573 g per person per day in fortnightly or monthly
allocations. In view of their heavy workload, cooperative farmers are entitled to 600 g per day,
provided in an annual allocation after the main harvest.
55. These entitlements were never received in full: the rations varied according to the availability of
cereals. During EMOP 200266, rations decreased after April 2011 to 200 g or less per person
per day until September, but increased in October 2011 to 350 g per person after the main
harvest and have remained at or above this level since then (see Figure 17).
FIGURE 17. PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM RATIONS, 2008–2012
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Cer
eals
Fru
its
Mea
t/fi
sh
Oil
Pu
lses
Suga
r
Veg
etab
le
Co
nd
imen
ts
Cer
eals
Fru
its
Mea
t/fi
sh
Oil
Pu
lses
Suga
r
Veg
etab
le
Co
nd
imen
ts
Cer
eals
Fru
its
Mea
t/fi
sh
Oil
Pu
lses
Suga
r
Veg
etab
le
Co
nd
imen
ts
All Co-op farmer PDS dependant
3rd
2nd
1st
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
gram
s/p
ers
on
/day
Govt. Target
2008/2009
2009/2010
2010/2011
2011/2012
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
14
FOOD UTILIZATION
Number of Meals Consumed
56. Adults generally consumed three meals per day; very few households reported two meals. Most
pregnant and breastfeeding women also consume three meals, and some four. But in two-
thirds of the households, servings were reduced as a coping strategy.
Dietary Diversity
57. Households consumed at least one type of cereal, vegetable and condiment almost daily.
Animal or plant protein6 was consumed at most once per week (see Figure 18). The average
household consumed protein on 2.4 days per week, but 19 percent reported zero consumption
of any protein in a week. In general, people’s diet does not provide enough protein, fat or
micronutrients.
FIGURE 18. NUMBER OF DAYS PER WEEK ON WHICH FOODS WERE CONSUMED
6 Pulses, meat, fish, eggs.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
# d
ays
foo
d it
em w
as c
on
sum
ed Coop farmers PDS dependents Total
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
15
58. Food consumption patterns were further analysed in terms of the number of food groups7
consumed. In general, a daily diet of four food groups8 or fewer is not diverse and lacks
nutrients. Of the households assessed, 83 percent had poor diet diversity at 2010 levels, which
nonetheless constituted an improvement from 2009 and earlier (see Figure 19). Of PDS
dependants, 84 percent had poor diversity, compared with 77 percent of cooperative farmers.
FIGURE 19. HOUSEHOLD DIETARY DIVERSITY
Food Consumption
59. Households were asked about the food items consumed in the week before the assessment to
enable the calculation of a standard food consumption score (FCS) as a proxy indicator for food
insecurity.9 The FCS score is expressed as “poor”, “borderline” or “acceptable”.
60. The findings from WFP’s regular monitoring of 427 households during EMOP 200266 suggest
that food consumption progressively improved only after December 2011 and that the
percentage of “poor” household food consumption decreased until April 2012. After that the
situation deteriorated, mainly as a result of the lean season, and remained stable until the end
of June 2012. The monthly information was obtained from a limited number of households.
Although a trend can be discerned, caution is needed when interpreting the findings on a larger
scale.
61. Data from the end-of-project review (see Figure 20) showed improved food consumption
compared with 2011, but the timing of the assessments was not the same. It can be assumed,
however, that the situation in July 2011 was worse than in 2012 because the CFSAM was a
post-harvest assessment and the RFSA took place after a series of shocks. Nonetheless,
57 percent of households had borderline consumption: if a shock were to reduce food
production and rations, these households could slip into the “poor” category. Even with the
improvement after 2011, food consumption had not returned to 2009/10 levels but was still
better than in 2008.
7 Based on the WFP standard food consumption table: eight food groups are analysed: cereals, pulses, animal protein, dairy products, oil or fat, sugar, vegetables and fruit. 8 Based on International Food Policy Research Institute guidelines: <4.5 food groups consumed during the previous 24 hours indicates low diversity, 4.5–6 medium and 6+ high diversity. 9 FCS is a composite based on dietary diversity, food frequency and relative nutritional importance of the food groups consumed: the higher the FCS, the higher the dietary diversity and frequency. High food consumption increases the possibility that a household achieves nutrient adequacy. The FCS cut-off points used by WFP for DPRK include “poor” <=28, “borderline” >28-42 and “acceptable >42.
91% 97% 81% 83%
8% 3% 19% 16%
0% 1%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
RFSA WFP WFP WFP
June Jun/Jul May-June July
2008 2009 2010 2012
1 - Low (<4) 2 - Medium (5-6) 3 - High (>=7)
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
16
FIGURE 20. HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION
FOOD SECURITY
62. Of the counties visited during the review, 71 percent had a food deficit, 22 percent had a
surplus and 7 percent were mixed10 in terms of county food production. Imported foods came
from the cereal basket and provincial sources. The pattern was similar for exports.
63. County officials and women in focus groups reported that the three main factors affecting food
security were floods, cold winters and lack of agricultural inputs; 50 percent of the county
officials identified all of these. Natural disasters were mentioned by 24 percent of county
officials.
64. Asked to rank factors affecting food security in order of importance, the women identified
floods, low food production, drought, low PDS rations, and lack of agricultural inputs. Wild
foods, kitchen gardens and livestock were rated as “somewhat important” factors, but food
prices were generally regarded as not important (see Figure 21).
FIGURE 21. FACTORS AFFECTING FOOD SECURITY
WASH = water, sanitation and hygiene.
65. County officials categorized 59 percent of the counties as neutral and 22 percent as more food
insecure than other counties in their provinces, but were unable to report on variations over
10 Some food items are imported and some are exported.
41%
17% 4%
77% 66%
25%
30%
35%
25%
19% 28%
57%
29% 48%
72%
4% 6% 19%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
RFSA WFP WFP RFSA CFSAM WFP
June July May-Jun Feb Oct July
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Poor (<28) Borderline (28-42) Acceptable (>42)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100% Very important Somewhat imporant
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
17
periods of years. The main causes of county food insecurity were limited arable land,
mountainous terrain, reliance on food imports and a high proportion of PDS dependents.
66. Of the 41 counties, 39 reported that food security was better in July 2012 than in the previous
year, largely as a result of increased PDS rations. A few also observed that WFP food had
improved the situation. Many officials expected the situation to deteriorate in the coming
months with the news of reduced early crop production.
COPING STRATEGIES
67. County officials reported that in times of food shortage people were encouraged to utilize wild
foods, cultivate more vegetables and use food sparingly. The counties had mobilized as many
people as possible for agriculture to maximize food production. Focus groups listed utilization of
wild foods, cultivating kitchen gardens, keeping livestock, eating smaller meals and obtaining
support from relatives as the main coping strategies.
68. The most common household coping strategies were to rely on less preferred foods, limit
portion sizes, obtain support from relatives and add water to food to increase its volume (see
Figure 22). The percentage of households limiting portion sizes and relying on less preferred
foods had increased compared with 2011 and 2010. Adding water to meals had returned to
2008/09 levels after an improvement in 2010.
FIGURE 22. HOUSEHOLD COPING STRATEGIES
69. Data from the regular monitoring visits to 427 beneficiary households during EMOP 200266
showed that 52 percent preferred less expensive food and 47 percent relied on relatives and
friends.
TARGETING
70. The review focused on the most vulnerable and those prioritized for food assistance, and sought
data on the characteristics of vulnerable households.
Vulnerable Groups and Priority for Food Assistance
71. Asked to name the most vulnerable groups, county officials and focus groups identified elderly
people, pregnant and breastfeeding women, children, PDS dependents and households with
many children or dependents (see Figure 23). The main reasons for vulnerability were inability
to work and earn income and dependence on PDS rations.
59%
26%
40%
61% 66%
14%
70%
50%
73%
37%
13%
71%
25% 32%
2%
38%
1% 0%
47%
0%
26%
59% 64% 68%
10%
87%
25% 29%
Add water to meals to increase volume
Borrowed food, helped by friends or
relatives
Limited portion sizes
at meals
Reduced number of
meals per day
Rely on less preferred, less
expensive food
Restricted consumption by adults for
children to eat
Wild food collection
2008 - RFSA 2009 - WFP 2010 - WFP 2012 - WFP
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
18
FIGURE 23. VULNERABLE GROUPS IDENTIFIED
HH = householders.
72. Half of the county officials stated that WFP’s activities reached the most vulnerable. The focus
groups were of the view that WFP had reached more than half, but not elderly people or, in
some cases, PDS dependents. If EMOP 200266 had been better funded, more elderly people
could have been assisted. The officials and householders said that in future activities they
would give greater priority to children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and elderly people
(see Figure 24). All county officials and 95 percent of householders emphasized that food
assistance would be needed in future.
FIGURE 24. PRIORITY GROUPS IDENTIFIED FOR ASSISTANCE
Geographical Vulnerability
73. Asked about differences in food security between their counties and other counties in the
province, the officials observed that in general differences were minimal, but that towns were
sometimes reported as more food-insecure because there were fewer kitchen gardens or wild
foods. In some counties the most vulnerable people lived in remote mountainous areas.
78%
46% 39%
46%
22% 12%
2% 0
68%
54% 49% 46%
24%
0 8% 5%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Eld
erly
Pre
gnan
t /
bre
astf
eed
ing
wo
men
Ch
ildre
n
HH
wit
h m
any
child
ren
PD
S d
epen
den
t
HH
wit
h m
any
dep
end
ants
Sick
ch
ildre
n
Urb
an H
H
County officals Focus groups
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Elderly
Pregnant / breastfeeding women
Children
HH County officials
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
19
74. The household data revealed differences between the coastal areas, but sample sizes were
limited and counties had not been selected to represent the geographical areas so much as WFP
coverage. Poor food consumption was more common on the east coast, but dietary diversity –
based on recalled consumption on the day before the review took place by 24 respondents –
was better (see Figures 25 and 26). This suggests that households on the west coast were
more vulnerable in case of a decline in food production.
FIGURE 25. FOOD CONSUMPTION IN COASTAL AREAS
FIGURE 26. DIETARY DIVERSITY ON THE EAST AND WEST COASTS
Public Distribution System Dependents and Cooperative Farmers
75. Cooperative farmers were more food-secure than PDS dependents, who were less likely to have
kitchen gardens and livestock, but PDS dependents had marginally higher proportions of
“acceptable” and “poor” consumption than cooperative farmers. On the other hand, dietary
diversity based on 24-hour recall among PDS dependents was poorer than among cooperative
farmers.
Kitchen Gardens and Livestock
76. Focus groups and county officials observed that households without kitchen gardens or
livestock were more vulnerable to food insecurity. The household data showed a strong
correlation between poor food consumption and diversity and the absence of kitchen gardens
and livestock, which clearly contribute significantly to household food utilization.
22% 27%
63% 50%
15% 23%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
West East
Poor (<28) Borderline (28-42) Acceptable (>42)
87% 79%
12% 20% 1% 2%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
West East
1- Low (<4) 2 - Medium (5-6) 3 - High (>=7)
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
20
Household Size and Composition: Large Families and Elderly People
77. Two commonly reported vulnerabilities were families with many children or dependants and
households with elderly people, either in families or living alone. In households with fewer than
three members or with five or more members, food consumption and diversity were poorer.
78. The data from the review showed that only 14 percent of households with elderly members had
poor food consumption, compared with 30 percent of households without. However., 68 percent
of households with elderly people had “borderline” food consumption, compared with
51 percent of those without. Households with elderly people had slightly lower food-
consumption scores, however, and were at higher risk of falling into the “poor” consumption
category in the case of a shock.
79. Households with elderly members had reduced meal sizes and added water to increase food
volume more often than those without. This practice affects food quantity and nutrient intake
for the whole household, which is not measured in the food-consumption groups, and implies
that their diet is nutritionally inadequate.
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
21
80. This section refers to the logical framework of EMOP 200266 in discussing the extent to which
the targets of the operation were met during and after implementation.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1:
SAVE LIVES AND PROTECT LIVELIHOODS IN EMERGENCIES
Outcome 1
Improved food consumption over assistance period for
target population
Households with poor food consumption scores reduced from 77 percent to 30 percent
81. The target of reducing poor food consumption from 77 percent to 30 percent of households was
exceeded: in July 2012 poor food consumption was observed in only 25 percent of households
(see Figure 27). The improvement in food consumption was steady during EMOP 200266, as
measured by standard food-security assessments. Measurement of the baseline and the final
results took place in different months, however, so food consumption was unlikely to be the
same – but the improvement was very clear and WFP food contributed towards the
achievement.
Part 3:
Outcomes and Outputs
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
22
FIGURE 27. HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION
82. Despite the work of WFP and its international partners, much of the population of DPRK
suffered food deprivation from May to September 2011 because the PDS cereal ration was
reduced to 200 grams per person, per day – a third of minimum daily energy requirements.
The reduction of the ration is one reason why 66 percent of beneficiaries still had poor food
consumption in October 2011. Commercial imports, bilateral assistance and an early harvest
did not cover cereal requirements, and many urban PDS-dependent households depended on
rural relatives to provide some cereals. Other coping mechanisms included collecting wild foods,
adding water to increase food volume, using informal markets and reducing the size or number
of meals.
83. WFP sought to ensure that food was available from May to October, the most difficult period,
but was hampered by pipeline breaks and a lack of funding. The improvement in FCS after
December may be attributed to a better harvest of winter vegetables and the scaling up of WFP
food distributions from October 2011.
Outcome 2
Stabilized acute malnutrition in target groups of children
Prevalence of low MUAC among children under 5 stabilized at 5 percent of target group
84. The preliminary findings from the national nutrition survey conducted in September – October
2012 by the government in partnership with UNICEF, the World Health Organization and WFP,
indicate modestly improved child nutritional situation. Chronic malnutrition was found at 27.9
percent, a reduction from 32.4 percent in 2009 (MICS) which translates into “poor” situation
based on WHO standards. Child acute malnutrition reduced to 4.0 percent from 5.2 percent and
the situation is considered “acceptable”.
85. In November 2011, the Institute of Child Nutrition and WFP measured MUAC in 696 children
under 5 in 35 counties where EMOP 200266 was being implemented. The global acute
malnutrition rate was 14.1 percent, severe acute malnutrition was 1.6 percent and moderate
acute malnutrition was 12.5 percent.
77% 66%
25%
19% 28%
57%
4% 6% 19%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
RFSA CFSAM WFP
February October July
2011 2011 2012
Poor (<28) Borderline (28-42) Acceptable (>42)
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
23
86. In October 2011, UNICEF supported the Ministry of Public Health in a rapid screening and
treatment of SAM among children under 5 in 25 counties, reaching 80 percent of the
200,297 children aged 6–59 months. The results showed critical malnutrition rates in terms of
WHO standards, in that 17.4 percent were acutely malnourished. A follow-up screening in the
same area in February 2012 showed an improvement, in that acute malnutrition had been
reduced to 5.4 percent (see Figure 28).
FIGURE 28. ACUTE MALNUTRITION IN CHILDREN, OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 2011, FEBRUARY 2012 (MUAC)
87. In view of the fragile food and nutrition security situation in DPRK, UNICEF and the Ministry of
Public Health started community management of acute malnutrition projects in the 25 most
vulnerable counties, mainly in towns in four north-eastern provinces. Save the Children has
intervened in 25 counties in three other provinces. The aims are to address acute malnutrition,
manage the food and nutrition security of vulnerable populations, and counter the inevitable
increase in acute malnutrition and the negative long-term consequences for development. WFP
is already providing nutritious meals for children in institutions, and will address moderate
acute malnutrition under these community programmes to complement the treatment of
severely malnourished children as soon as the national guidelines are finalized.
Outputs 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2
1.1 and 2.1
Food items distributed in sufficient quantity and quality to targeted beneficiaries.
2.2
Days of food rations distributed to targeted beneficiaries
88. Figures 29 and 30 show that actual quantities of food distributed were well below the target,
particularly during the first five months of EMOP 200266, because of pipeline breaks, lack of
funding and procurement and external transport delays. As a result, output 2.2 – days of food
rations distributed – did not achieve its target.
17.4%
14.1%
5.4%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
UNICEF WFP UNICEF
October November February
2011 2011 2012
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
24
89. During its 15 months, EMOP 200266 distributed 103,300mt of food to 3 million people.
FIGURE 29. PLANNED AND ACTUAL QUANTITIES OF FOOD DISTRIBUTED, APRIL 2011– JUNE 2012
FIGURE 30. PLANNED AND ACTUAL NUMBERS OF BENEFICIARIES ASSISTED, APRIL 2011–JUNE 2012
Note: Beneficiaries may not have received the full food basket or full ration entitlements.
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
April May June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
2011 2012
me
tric
to
ns
Plan
Actual
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
April May June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
2011 2012
Be
ne
fici
arie
s
Plan
Actual
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
25
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5: STRENGTHEN THE CAPACITIES OF COUNTRIES TO
REDUCE HUNGER THROUGH HAND-OVER STRATEGIES AND LOCAL PURCHASE
Outcome 3
Increased local production capacity for fortified foods
44 percent increase in production of fortified foods, including complementary
food and special nutritional products
Output 3.1
Fortified food production quantity
13 food factories supported, with full production capacity increased from
3,256 metric tons to 4,700 metric tons per month
90. Thirteen LFP factories were supported throughout EMOP 200266. Average production increased
in some factories, and in spite of a pipeline break at one stage caused by late arrivals of
donations and a lack of raw materials annual local food production totalled 35,547 MT, which
amounts to 55 percent of planned output (see Figures 31 and 32).
FIGURE 31. TARGET AND ACTUAL TONNAGES OF FORTIFIED BLENDED FOODS PRODUCED IN LFP FACTORIES
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
April May June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
2011 2012
1,742 1,371
2,311
743
227
3,639
1,858
2,900 2,976
4,331 3,941
3,282 3,617
1,455 1,149
me
tric
to
ns
Plan
Actual
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
26
FIGURE 32. ACTUAL LFP FACTORY PRODUCTION SHARE, APRIL –JUNE 2011, BY FOOD TYPE
MM= maize meal.
Output 3.1
Number of people reached through LFPs
91. Figure 33 shows the monthly average number of beneficiaries reached between April 2011 and
June 2012. For the reasons given above, it was not possible to achieve the targets.
FIGURE 33. BENEFICIARIES REACHED PER MONTH ON AVERAGE, BY TYPE, APRIL 2011–JULY 2012
Biscuits 40%
CMB 38%
CSM 16%
RMB 1%
MM 5%
7,733 9,506
292,044 312,514
652,417 679,554
-
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
27
92. Discussions with county officials, focus groups and staff at children’s institutions indicated that
EMOP 200266 had improved:
health and nutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women and children;
attendance rates at children’s institutions;
children’s recovery rates at paediatric hospitals;
the birthweight of babies; and
food consumption.
93. Impacts were difficult to measure. Some county officials estimated changes in low birthweight
percentages, for example, but these could not be verified. The prevalence of child malnutrition
remains a challenge in that the interpretation of the indicators varies among counties and
institutions, but even slight improvements constitute success in terms of EMOP 200266
objectives.
94. In response to the reviewers’ question as to what peoples’ lives would be like without WFP food
assistance, many people observed that they would find a way to manage and that the
Government would help them. A significant number reported that the health and nutrition of
children and women would decline.
95. County officials and women in focus groups rated the most effective activities as food
distributions for children and pregnant and breastfeeding women (see Figure 34). The children
needed the food to support growth, and improved nutrition among pregnant women had
reduced the prevalence of low birthweight and enhances the health of babies. Health officials
reported faster recovery rates among children in paediatric hospitals.
FIGURE 34. MOST EFFECTIVE ACTIVITIES REPORTED BY COUNTY OFFICIALS AND FOCUS GROUPS
FGD: focus group discussion; FFCD: food for community development.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
FFCD
All
Pregnant / breastfeeding women
Children
FGD County offical
Part 4:
Impact and Effectiveness
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
28
96. Parents observed that children were not hungry when they came home from institutions after
receiving WFP-supported on-site meals, that they were very happy with the food provided, and
wished the assistance to continue. The LFP factory managers and staff reported that they were
happy to produce fortified food for children and women. The manager of the Munchon biscuit
factory was particularly proud that their biscuits had been ranked the best in the country.
Awareness and Value of WFP Assistance
97. The reviewers found that the county officials were aware that WFP was a major humanitarian
organization that provided food assistance for vulnerable and disaster-affected people and that
it also addressed hunger in general. Some knew that WFP was a United Nations organization.
98. The women in focus groups knew that WFP provided food for vulnerable groups such as women
and children, and some mentioned the nutritional value of the food. They also knew that WFP
was an international organization, but not always that it is part of the United Nations.
99. All those interviewed were very happy with WFP’s food assistance and hoped that the
programmes would continue. Of the householders interviewed, 5 percent stated that they would
not need WFP food assistance, 10 percent said that they would need it in an emergency or
during a lean season, and 85 percent said that they would need continuous food assistance in
future.
Suggestions for the Future
100. The county officials were keen to continue with the implementation of WFP’s activities. They
hoped to receive assistance for pregnant and breastfeeding women, children and hospitals,
and to be able to include elderly people more fully. More than half of the counties also asked
for FFCD activities, which were much preferred: they had been successful in the past and had
been included in PRRO 200114. Some also asked for support for children in middle school.
101. The county officials also hoped that WFP would be able to provide food regularly according to
the original allocations so that beneficiaries could be sure of continuous receipts of WFP food.
Oil and pulses were much in demand for inclusion in the food basket, and more Super Cereal
and biscuits were requested.
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
29
FINDINGS
EMOP 200266 was effective in that it reached many of the targeted beneficiaries.
Implementation was satisfactory in spite of operational challenges such as a funding shortfall.
Overall, the reviewers found that EMOP 200266 had been much appreciated by the beneficiaries
and county officials, and that it had reached the most needy population groups. Food had been
of good quality and much liked by the beneficiaries. In general, food had been received fairly
regularly but in reduced quantities as a result of funding shortfalls. Many of the county officials
understood the reasons behind the reduced food receipts.
Food security in terms of household food consumption had improved since 2011, but was
poorer than in 2009 and remained precarious. A large proportion of households had
“borderline” food consumption and were reducing serving sizes, adding water to meals and
relying on cheaper foods. Their intake of protein was low and their dietary diversity was poor in
terms of the number of food groups consumed. Any shock or reduction in food availability
would reduce such households to the “poor” food-consumption category. The population groups
most likely to experience food-related shocks were children, pregnant and breastfeeding
women and elderly people. PDS-dependent households and those with many children or
dependants could resist a shock more easily, but dependents were largely unable to provide
income to support the household.
The main factors that mitigated food insecurity were the PDS rations and gathering wild foods,
cultivating kitchen gardens and keeping livestock. But floods, droughts, and lack of agricultural
inputs all tended to exacerbate food insecurity.
Food consumption improved with ownership of a kitchen garden or livestock. Women from the
focus groups and the county officials stated that households without kitchen gardens or
livestock were more vulnerable to food insecurity.
County officials and beneficiaries wanted WFP’s food assistance to continue. An important issue
raised was the need for continuous support without pipeline breaks so that food would be
delivered regularly. The reviewers noted suggestions that the rations should be increased in
size and should contain more food types. These proposals would be analysed, taking into
consideration the nutritional value of the food basket and the prevailing poor dietary diversity.
The current targeting of population groups was seen as appropriate, but if adequate funding
were available more support could be provided for elderly people. It was suggested that FFCD
projects should be planned for the future with a focus on sustainable development and
improved food production – major factors in preventing food insecurity. Projects to increase
access to kitchen gardens and small livestock were also suggested.
Part 5:
Findings, Recommendations
and Conclusions
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
30
RECOMMENDATIONS
For its next operation, WFP should maintain the conditions agreed in the Letter of
Understanding with the Government for EMOP 200266 so that the extent and quality of
monitoring can be maintained.
Training and orientation for local officials, for example in children’s institutions, are highly
recommended. WFP might, for instance, consider developing information, education and
communications materials on Super Cereal.
WFP’s beneficiary targeting of young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women is
appropriate and should continue. Locally produced Super Cereal and biscuits are highly
appreciated and should continue to be provided in future.
Inclusion of the elderly in food assistance could be considered, especially in the most food-
insecure areas during lean seasons to ensure that elderly people and their families consume
larger quantities of food.
WFP should consider standardizing rations for projects. EMOP and PRRO rations should be
matched as much as possible.
WFP should consider including pulses in household rations to increase consumption of protein.
A CFSAM is needed to determine the prospects of food production in 2012. It should capture
information on household food consumption to understand how this indicator will develop,
especially in terms of the high proportion of borderline food consumption, coping strategies and
reduced production of early crops.
WFP should support as far as practicable the creation and improvement of kitchen gardens and
small livestock as means to avert food insecurity.
WFP should continue to advocate with donors to ensure that more funding and resources are
available to prevent pipeline breaks, especially during lean seasons.
CONCLUSIONS
102. It is clear that in delivering 103,000 metric tons of food assistance over 15 months,
EMOP 200266 made a significant contribution to enhancing the food intake and nutrition
status of 3 million vulnerable children, women and men at a time of serious food insecurity
in DPRK. When the operation started in April 2011, much of the population were suffering
from prolonged food deprivation, largely because the PDS ration had been reduced to less
than 200 g per person per day following a drought and successive poor harvests.
103. The successes of WFP’s EMOP 200266 were achieved with the support of the Government of
DPRK and of the many county officials and focus groups involved in implementing it. Their
commitment and hard work are warmly acknowledged. In particular, WFP staff were granted
unprecedented access to the project areas under the terms of the Letter of Understanding
with the Government, which made it possible to deliver food assistance to many needy
people and to monitor outputs and outcomes with a view to optimizing the activities.
104. The generous contributions received from the donors who supported the operation are also
gratefully acknowledged.
105. But it has to be said that EMOP 200266 received only a fraction of the required funding and
resources requested from the international community. Potential donors may have been
inhibited by the regime of sanctions currently applied to DPRK, but the lack of funding and
resources caused EMOP 200266 to fall well short of its targets, particularly in the first seven
months. This meant that WFP was unable to mobilize sufficient food to address the
widespread hunger and malnutrition and hence contribute to maintaining public health. As
the 2011 CFSAM noted: “… health officials interviewed reported a 50 to 100 percent increase
in the admissions of malnourished children into paediatric wards compared to last year, a
sharp rise in low-birthweight … and several cases of oedema. Inadequate food intake has
clearly compounded the health and nutrition status of vulnerable groups”.
106. WFP has acknowledged the resulting delays and inconveniences resulting from late
procurement and external transport delays. A review of procurement processes was carried
Performance Assessment of Emergency Operation 200266
31
out with a view to preventing future shortfalls as far as possible, and the WFP country office
undertook a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis to improve
operational effectiveness and efficiency.
107. WFP continues to be concerned about the long-term intellectual and physical development of
young children, who are malnourished because their diet is monotonous and lacking in
protein, fats and micronutrients. Operational activities continue to focus on providing
nutritious food products to address the nutritional needs of young children and their
mothers.
WFP in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
21 Munsudong, Pyongyang, DPR Korea
Tel: +850 2 3817219 / +850 2 3817217
Fax: +850 2 3817639
Email: WFP.Pyongyang@wfp.org
Front cover photo: WFP/Rein Skullerud
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