pufs and modeling attacks on pufs: a tutorialcryptanalysis of electrical pufs via machine learning...

Secure Computation Laboratory

Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering

University of Connecticut

PUFs and Modeling Attacks on PUFs: A tutorial

Marten van Dijk

Syed Kamran Haider, Chenglu Jin, Phuong Ha Nguyen

Content

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PUF’s

introductionPUF’s attacks

Attack’s Flow

Logistic Regression

base MLMA on

APUF

Covariance Matrix

Adaption Evolution

Strategy base MLMA on

APUF and XOR PUF

Concept Applications Categories

Weak PUF (POK):

RO PUF

Strong PUF : APUF,

XORPUF, LPN PUF

Reliability:

Fuzzy Extractor

Physically Unclonable Functions - PUF

Challenge-Response behavior of a given PUF can not be physically cloned and it is unique, i.e., different PUF instances have different Challenge-Response Behaviors

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Process variations – basement for PUF

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Courtesy of [1]

Courtesy of [2]

Courtesy of [3]

PUF-based Applications

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Courtesy of [4]

IP’s protection/ authentication

Courtesy of [5]

Secret key generation

PUF’s classification

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PUF

Weak PUF

(POK): RO PUF Strong PUF : APUF,

XORPUF, LPN PUF

Weak PUF: Ring Oscillator PUF

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Courtesy of [9]

Ring Oscillator (RO) Ring Oscillator PUF (RO PUF)

Strong PUF Constructions

Arbiter PUF (APUF)

XOR Arbiter PUF (XOR PUF)

LPN based PUF

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Arbiter PUF [1]

Blaise Gassend, Dwaine E. Clarke, Marten van Dijk, Srinivas Devadas:Silicon physical random functions. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2002: 148-160

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APUF [2]

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APUF linear delay model [1]

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Encoding C[i] = 0 (or 1) as +1 (or -1)

APUF linear delay model [2]

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APUF linear delay model [3]

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APUF linear delay model [4]

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The response r = 1 if ∆ < 0. Otherwise, r = 0

Proof of APUF’s linear delay Model

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XOR PUF

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Learning Parity with Noise

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LPN-based PUF

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LPN-based PUF is a strong PUF design which is based on LPN problem, POK and cryptographic primitives

TRNG and Hash function. (See [10])

Reliability Problem in PUF and Fuzzy Extractor [1]

ALL PUFs exploit the process variations which are not a stable feature. Thus PUF can generate different responses when a challenge is evaluated many times.

Not reliable + not full entroy: cannot directly use POK’s output as secret key

Need a methodology to generate a secret key r which is reliable and has full entropy from POK’s output.

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POK

w0

w1 ≠w0

rAlgorithm

Reliability Problem in PUF and Fuzzy Extractor [2]

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POK

w0

w1 ≠w0

rAlgorithm Fuzzy

Extractor

Extractor

Sketch/Gen

w0

r

P: helper dataExtractor

Rec/Decw1

rw0

Gen

p

Fuzzy Extractor: Generation Phase (Gen) and Reproduction Phase (Rep)

Rep

Reliability Problem in PUF and Fuzzy Extractor [3]

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Courtesy of [11]

Machine Learning Techniques based Modeling Attacks

Logistic Regression

Covariance Matrix Adaption Evolution Strategy

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Introduction on MLMA

Machine learning techniques based modelling attack (MLMA or MA): using the machine learning technique to model a PUF design

Typically, a mathematical structure of the target PUF design is required. In this context, the mathematical structure is the delay model

The goal: Learning the unknown variables w=(w[0],….,w[n-1],w[n]=1) from the recorded challenge-response pairs (CRPs)

Support Vector Machine (SVM), Logistic Regression (LR), Covariance Matric Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES), etc.

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Basic Steps in MLMA1. Building the model

2. Access the PUF and record a set of CRPs S={(c,r)}

3. Partition the set S into sets S1 and S2

4. Determine which MLMA technique is used

5. The set S1 is used for the phase called: training phase. In this phase, the MLMA is used to learn the unknown variables, i.e., vector w (APUF)

6. The set S2 is used to test the prediction accuracy of model, 𝑤 (APUF)

Note that: the discussion on MLMA in this presentation is based on [6]

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S={(c,r)}

S1={(c,r)}

S2={(c,r)}

PUF P

Model M

Accuracy

Model M

MLMA

Logistic Regression

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Courtersy of [7]

Maximum Likelihood Estimator

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APUF A

𝜃 = 𝑤X1=(C1,R1),

X2=(C2,R2),

….

Xn=(Cn,Rn)

𝜃 = 𝑤

(C1,R’1),

(C2,R’2),

….

(Cn,R’n)

Maximum matchings

(Ri = Ri’)

X1=(C1,R1),

X2=(C2,R2),

….

Xn=(Cn,Rn)

Logistic Regression: Math Background [1]

Let us define

Define the logistic sigmoid function:

Define

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Logistic Regression: Math Background [2]

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Logistic Regression: Math Background [3]

Why the correct w should be found by maximizing the function l ?

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Logistic Regression: Math Background [4]

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• To find the optimal w of function l, we should

compute the gradient of function l, i.e.

• According to LR algorithm, w is randomly

regenerated at very beginning

• We repeat the following steps until is close

to 0

Step 1: compute

Step 2: update

• When the algorithm stops, w is the desired

model

Logistic Regression: Pseudo Code of LR

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Enhanced LR Algorithm

Basically, the efficiency of LR can be significantly enhanced by combining Resilient Back Propagation (Rprop)

The Rprop algorithm is described in the following paper: http://deeplearning.cs.cmu.edu/pdfs/Rprop.pdf

In the LR algorithm above, 𝜂 is a constant but in Rprop algorithm, 𝜂 is dynamically changed in each iteration

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Arbiter: Repeatability –short-term Reliability

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(C,1),

(C,2),

….

(C,M)

APUF A

(R1=0),

(R2=1),

….

(RM=0)

R = (R1+R2+...+RM)/M

Arbiter PUF: Repeatability and Noise

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Idea of Attack on APUF using Repeatability

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[3]: The Gap Between Promise and Reality: On the Insecurity of XOR Arbiter PUFs CHES2015, Georg T. Becker

[5]: Side Channel Modeling Attacks on 65nm Arbiter PUFs Exploiting CMOS Device Noise, Delvaux, J., Verbauwhede, I.

CMA ES

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Courtesy of [7]

Matlab Code of CMAES is available at [8]

CMA-ES Algorithm

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Courtesy of [8]

CMAES on APUF based on Repeatability: Attack Strategy

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XOR PUF

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CMAES based attack on XOR PUF Fact 1: CMAES based attack on x-XOR PUF is done in the similar way as described for APUF

Fact 2: CMAES based attack on x-XOR PUF is a divide-and-conquer attack, i.e., all the models M0, M1, …, M(x-1) for A0, A1, …., A(x-1) are recovered. It is done by repeating CMAES many times until all x different models M0, …, M(x-1) are built

Fact 3: Each run of CMAES always produces a model M which may be the model of a certain APUF instance among x APUFs. Thus, we need to run CMAES on XORPUF many times, number of runs > x.

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Why CMAES on XOR PUF works

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Fact 3: Now, the CMAES-based algorithm tries to find model M which can have highest correlation coefficient with set Q and thus, M likely converges to A0 because A0 has largest noise rate.

Fact 4: If we repeat the attack many times and each time, new set Q is generated, then the models of all APUF instances will be built due to Fact 1, 2 and 3.

Fact 1

Fact 3

Fact 2

Literature1. http://image.slidesharecdn.com/secureesweb-131229032029-phpapp02/95/secure-embedded-systems-17-

638.jpg?cb=1388287390

2. https://www.gsaglobal.org/forum/2009/3/articles_tuyls.asp

3. http://rijndael.ece.vt.edu/puf/background.html

4. http://images.slideplayer.com/13/3927633/slides/slide_10.jpg

5. http://studiopresence.com/client/verayo/page_images/how_pufs_work_ill2.jpg

6. Cryptanalysis of electrical PUFs via machine learning algorithms – Master Thesis of Jan Solter

7. The Gap Between Promise and Reality: On the Insecurity of XOR Arbiter PUFs CHES, September 16 th , 2015, Georg T. Becker

8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CMA-ES

9. Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation. DAC2007, G. E. Suh and S. Devadas

10. Trapdoor Computational Fuzzy Extractors and Stateless Cryptographically-Secure Physical Unclonable Functions. Charles Herder, Ling Ren, Marten van Dijk, Meng-Day (Mandel) Yu, and Srinivas Devadas.

11. http://www.cs.haifa.ac.il/~orrd/PrivDay/2015/Benjamin-Slides.pdf

12. Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data. EuroCrypt2004. Yevgeniy Dodis, Leonid Reyzin and Adam Smith

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