redistricting and polarization
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Redistricting and Polarization
MicahAltmanandMichaelMcDonald*
CorrectedManuscriptForthcomingin
AmericanGridlock:TheSources,Character,andImpactofPoliticalPolarization,
2015,JamesA.Thurber,AntoineYoshinaka(Eds),CambridgeUniversityPress.
• WereviewhowtheideologicalpolarizationofmembersoftheHouseof
Representatives(elitepolarization)isaffectedby:
• sortingofparties’incumbentsintomoreideologically
compatibledistricts,
• replacementofincumbentsbymoreideologicallyextreme
successors,
*Authorsarelistedinalphabeticalorder.Wedescribecontributionstothe
chapterusingastandardtaxonomy(Allenetal.2014).MicahAltmanandMichaelMcDonaldweretheleadauthors,takingequalresponsibilityforrevisions.MichaelMcDonaldauthoredthefirstdraftofthemanuscriptandwasprimarilyresponsibleforthestatisticalanalysis.Bothcontributedtotheconceptionofthereport(includingcoreideasandstatementofresearchquestions),tothemethodology,totheprojectadministration,tothedatacollection,andtothewritingthroughcriticalreviewandcommentary.
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• thedrawingofmoreideologicallyextremedistricts.
• Weshowtherearefewercompetitivecongressionaldistricts–havinga
nearbalanceofDemocratsandRepublicans–followingredistricting.
• Weshowthatmorecompetitivedistrictscanbedrawnwithout
sacrificingothervalues,suchascompactnessorminorityrepresentation.
• Wediscusstheprospectsforredistrictingreform.
IncreasingideologicalpolarizationofAmericanpoliticalelites(“elitepolarization”)
hascoincidedwithamarkedincreaseofpolicygridlockwithinthenational
government.Concernswiththegovernment’sabilitytoaddressmajorpolicyissues,
eventhosewithbroadpublicsupport,haveledmanytosearchforcausesforand
solutionstoagovernmentsoparalyzedthatitcannotsatisfythebasicdemocratic
valueofexecutingthewillofitspeople.
Amongthefrequentlycitedcausesforelitepolarizationisredistricting,the
processofperiodicallydrawingdistrictboundariestoostensiblyalignthemwith
communitiesofinterest,representationalcriteria,andneutraladministrativegoals,
suchasequalizingpopulationsfollowinganewdecennialcensus.Statesare
responsiblefordrawingHouseofRepresentativesdistrictboundarylines;inmost
states,politiciansareinchargeoftheprocess,creatinganobviousconflictof
interestbecauseredistrictingaffectstheirchancesofreelection.
Redistricting’spotentialcontributionstoelitepolarizationemergefromthe
motivesofindividualpoliticiansandpoliticalparties.Districtboundarylinesmaybe
manipulatedtoaffectelectionoutcomesbyshoringupanotherwisecompetitive
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district(adistrictwithanearbalanceofDemocraticandRepublicanvoters)by
addingsupportersofthepartyonewishestoadvantageorsubtractingthe
opposition.Inredistricting,thereareopportunitiesforbipartisanshipthatelude
nationalpolicymaking:oneincumbent’strashisanother’streasure,whereby
incumbentsofdifferentpartiesswapconstituentsunfavorabletotheirparty,but
supporttheother.Iflegislatorsreflectthewilloftheirconstituents,elite
polarizationincreaseswhendistrictsaremademoreideologicallyhomogeneousas
reelection-seekingincumbentshavelessreasontomoderatetheirpositionstowin
overindependentsortheotherparty’ssupporters.
Reformershaveamendedtheredistrictingprocessinahandfulofstatesto
imposelimitations,includingmostrecentlyinNewYorkthrougha2014
constitutionalreferendumapprovedbyvoters.Amongthetechnicalinnovations
thatquietlyemergedduringthelastroundofredistrictingispublicaccesstoweb-
deployedredistrictingsoftwareanddata,whichenabledgreaterpublicparticipation
inthedrawingofalternativeredistrictingplans(AltmanandMcDonald2014b).The
publicapproachesredistrictinginafundamentallydifferentmannerthan
politicians,particularlywithrespecttopoliticalgoalssuchaspartisanfairnessand
districtcompetition(AltmanandMcDonald2013,2014a,2014c).Thesepublicplans
therebyprovideabenchmarkcomparisontoplansfabricatedbypoliticiansto
concretelyassesshowdistrictsmaybemademorecompetitivethroughreform
effortsandtowhatdegreethismayamelioratepolarization.
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The Causal Relationship between Redistricting and Polarization
Figure 1 Causal Connections Affecting Elite Polarization
Muchhasbeenwrittenaboutthecausesandconsequencesofpoliticalpolarization,
includingbythecontributingauthorstothisvolume.Ourpurposeisnottorehash
theextensivepolarizationliterature.However,wedowishtoprovidecontextfor
redistricting’srole.InFigure1wesketchhowredistrictingfitswithintheoretical
frameworksexplainingelitepolarizationoftheHouseofRepresentatives.The
linkagebetweenredistrictingandelitepolarizationismediatedthroughdistrict
partisanship,asvisualizedinFigure1.Thecausalchainfromredistrictingtoelite
polarizationhastwonecessaryconditions.First,theideologicalcharacterof
districts’constituenciesmustberelatedtotheideologicalcharacteroftheirelected
representatives.Second,redistrictingmustbeabletoaffectdistricts’ideologies.We
beginourdiscussionofthefirstordercausalconnectionswithcausesthatdirectly
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affectelitepolarization,andthenwithsecondordercausalconnectionsaffecting
thesefirstordercausalconnections.
First Order Connection: District Partisanship → Elite
Polarization
Withrespecttothefirstcondition,therearenoreliablenationalsurveymeasures
fortheideologyofdistricts’constituenciessincesamplesizeswithindistrictsare
typicallytoosmalltodevelopreliablemeasures.Scholarsfrequentlymeasure
districts’ideologiesusingdistricts’partisanship,constructedfromelectionresults
forstatewideoffices(McDonald2014).Presidentialelectionresultsareanalyzedfor
nationalstudiessincethisisthesoleofficeelectednationally,thusprovidinga
comparablemetricacrossallcongressionaldistricts.Wefollowthescholarlynorm
equatingdistrictideologywithdistrictpartisanship.
Themedianvotertheoremprovidesatheoreticalbasistoexpectthatdistrict
partisanshipisafactorinrepresentatives’ideologies.Downs(1957)formallyshows
howinplurality-wintwo-candidateelections,candidateswhowishtowinoffice
will,inequilibrium,positiontheirideologysuchthatitisthesameasthedistrict’s
medianvoter’sideology,inanelectoratewhereallvotersaredistributedalonga
one-dimensionalleft-rightideologicalcontinuum.(Thisis,ofcourse,acaricatureof
Downs’snuancedtheory;wediscusscomplicationsandothermotives
subsequently.)
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Thelogicissimpleand,intheabstract,plausible.Consideracandidatewhose
primarymotivationistogetelected.Acandidatewinsofficebyreceiving50percent
plusoneofthevotes.Ifvoterspreferthecandidatewiththeclosestideology,then
withoutknowingwhattheothercandidatewilldo,thefirstcandidateisalwaysbest
offpositioninghisorherideologyatthemedianvoter.Therearetwocasesto
consider.Caseone:ifthesecondcandidatepositionsatanypointotherthanthe
median,thefirstcandidateonthemedianissupportedbyallvoterstotheleftor
right(thosewithanideologyintheoppositedirectionfromthemedianasthe
secondcandidate’sposition),aswellashalfofthevotersbetweenthemedianand
theideologyofthesecondcandidate.Thefirstcandidatewinsandthesecondloses.
Casetwo:ifthesecondcandidatealsopositionsatthemedianvoter,thenvotersare
indifferentbetweenthetwocandidatesandtheyrandomlychoosebetweenthetwo
candidates.Afirstcandidatewhochoosesapositionotherthanthemedianis
gamblingthattheothercandidatewillpositionhis-orherselfevenfurtherfromthe
median.Whytakethisriskwhenthereisaclearpathwaytovictorybypositioning
atthemedian?
Theredistrictingapplicationisstraightforward.Theideologyofthemedian
voterofadistrictisrelatedtotheproportionofvotersontheleftandright(i.e.,
DemocratsandRepublicans)whoareassignedtoadistrict.Ifmorevotersonthe
leftorrightareaddedtoadistrict,theideologyofthemedianvoterofthedistrict
willbeavoterfurthertotheleftorright,respectively.Thoseinchargeof
redistrictingthushavetheabilitytoaffectnotonlywhichpartyisfavoredtowina
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district,but,bymanipulatingtheproportionofvotersinadistrictontheleftor
right,theideologicalcharacterofthewinningcandidateaswell.
Toempiricallydemonstratetherelationshipbetweendistrictpartisanship
andelitepolarization,whichwewillrefertoagainwhenwedescribeothercausal
pathways,weplotameasureofdistrictpartisanshipagainstameasureofmembers’
ideologyinFigure2.OurmeasureofdistrictpartisanshipistheMcCainshareofthe
ObamaandMcCain2008presidentialvote,orwhatiscommonlycalledthetwo-
partyvote.AhigherpercentagethusdescribesamoreRepublicandistrict.Wemight
reasonablyinferthatdistrictpartisanshipproxiesconstituents’ideology,witha
moreRepublicandistrictsignalingamoreconservativeconstituency.Ourmeasure
ofmembers’ideologyisPooleandRosenthal’s(2000)firstDW-NOMINATE
dimension,whichplacesmembers’rollcallvotesonaleft–rightcontinuum,with
highervaluesrelatedtoamoreconservativerollcallvotehistory.NOMINATE
scoresareendogenoustoCongress,meaningthattheyarebasedonobservableroll
callvotesthataretheendproductofthelegislativeprocess,andmaynotbetrue
measuresofmembers’ideology.Ifonecaresaboutelitepolarizationwithin
Congress,theyserveasastaticsnapshotofthecurrentCongress.Wefurther
identifyDemocratswithaDandRepublicanswithanR,anddrawasimplelinear
regressionlineforeachpartisantype.
TherearethreeimportantfeaturesofFigure2:(1)thecorrelationbetween
districtpartisanshipandmembers’ideologies,(2)partydivergenceofmembers
fromdifferentpartiesrepresentingdistrictswithsimilarpartisanship,and(3)
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candidatedivergenceamongmembersofthesamepartyrepresentingdistrictswith
similarpartisanship.Wefirstdiscussthefirstfeatureandreturntothetwoothers.
Figure 2 District Partisanship and Representatives’ Ideology
Centraltotheargumentthatredistrictingcanaffectpolarization,and
consistentwiththemedianvotertheorem(Downs1957),thereisastronglinear
relationshipbetweendistricts’partisanshipandmembers’ideologicalvoting
patterns,withmembersfrommoreRepublicandistrictsvotinginamore
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conservativemanner.Figure1isnotcontroversial.Thispatternofcandidate
convergencetothedistrictideologyispresentedintextbooks(Abramsonetal.
2014)andconfirmedbyananalysisofallcandidates’ideologies–incumbents,
challengers,andopenseatcandidates–derivedfrommembers’ideologicalvoting
scores(RyanandLyons2014)andcandidatesurveys(EriksonandWright1980;
Ansolabehere,Snyder,andStewart2001;Stonecashetal.2003;).Thisconvergence
isevidentinotherlegislativeactivities,suchasbillsponsorshipandrollcallvoting
withinspecificissuedomainsthatmaybesensitivetoconstituencydemographics
(Hayes,Hibbing,andSulkin2010).Ansolabehere,Snyder,andStewart(2001)find
candidatesmorecloselyhewtodistrictpartisanshipinthemostcompetitive
districtsnear50percent(thisheteroskedasticdynamicismostapparentamong
RepublicanincumbentsinFigure1),althoughtheyalsofindthatchallengersto
incumbentslesscloselyconvergetodistrictpartisanshipthanincumbents.
First Order Connection: Party Divergence → Elite
Polarization
AsecondfeaturethatisillustratedbyFigure2isasizableideologicalgapbetween
thetwopoliticalparties.Anincreasingideologicalgapbetweenthepoliticalparties
iswelldocumentedandhasgrownsomuchthatthereiscurrentlynooverlap
betweenthemostconservativeDemocratandmostliberalRepublican(McCarty,
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Poole,andRosenthal2009;seealsoChapter16,thisvolume).Contributingtothis
elitepolarizationisadeclineinthenumberofincumbentswhorepresentdistricts
withavotercomposition–measuredinpresidentialvote–favoringtheopposing
party,aphenomenonthatcontinuesfollowingthe2014election.Thisdecreaseisa
consequenceofthesortingbroughtaboutthroughthesectionalrealignmentofthe
SouthandNortheast.Beforetherecentriseinelitepolarization,conservative
SouthernDemocratsandliberalNorthernRepublicansfilledtheideologicalcenter
betweenthemoreextremeelementsoftheirrespectivepartycaucuses.Inrecent
decades,SouthernDemocratseitherformallyaffiliatedthemselveswiththe
RepublicanPartyoraRepublicanclaimedtheirseatfollowingaretirementor
electoraldefeat(settingasideSouthernDemocratsrepresentingminority
communities).WhileregionalrealignmentwasmostpronouncedintheSouth,a
mirroreddynamicoccurredamongliberalRepublicansintheNorth.Redistricting
mayalsoaffectsorting,whenincumbentsmismatchedwithanunfriendly
constituencyaredrawninanew,ideologicallycompatibledistrict(Jacobson2003;
McCartyetal.2009);wediscussthisingreaterdetaillaterinthechapter.Parties
havethusbecomemoreideologicallyconsistent(FiorinaandPope2010;Laymanet
al.2010),whichresultsinafurtherfeedbackmechanismwherebymembersofmore
ideologicallyhomogeneouspartycaucusesprovidetheirleadersadditionalpowers
toenforcepartydiscipline,whatisknownastheconditionalpartygovernment
model(Rohde1991).
AcaricatureofDowns(1957)portraysthemedianvotertheoremas
predictingcandidates’fullconvergencetothemedian,framingdivergenceasa
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“failure”ofthemodel(Ansolabehere,Snyder,andStewart2001:153).Downsdid
notpredictfullconvergence,ashecouldobservetheobviousfact–evenin1957–
thatinAmerica’stwo-partysystemtheparties’candidateswerenotideological
clones.Downspositedthatpartieswouldnotadoptthemedianpositionwithina
districtinordertodistinguishthemselvesfromoneanotherandtherebypresent
voterswithtangiblechoices.Butthereareothercompellingreasonsfordivergence.
AsevidentfromthedistributionofdistrictsacrosstheX-axisinFigure2,districtsdo
nothavethesamepartisanship,socandidateswithinpartycoalitionswouldbehard
pressedtosimultaneouslyadoptindividualideologiesconsistentwithan
overarchingnationalpartyideology(seecontributionsinGrofman,Blais,and
Bowler2009).Theremaybeotherreasonsforthisdynamicaswell,suchas
candidateshavingintrinsicpolicypreferencesoftheirown,beingreputationally
boundtotheirpreviouspolicypositions,beingresponsivetobothmore
ideologicallyextremeprimaryandmorecentristgeneralelectionelectorateswithin
thesamedistrict(Brady,Han,andPope2007),orthatentrycostsdeterpolitically
moderatecitizenswhomaywishtorunforoffice(GrosserandPalfrey2014).
First Order Connection: Candidate Divergence → Elite
Polarization
AthirdfeatureillustratedbyFigure2isthatwithinpartiesthereissizablevariation
ofideologyevenamongmembersindistrictswithcomparabledistrictpartisanship.
ThisismoreevidentintheSenate,wheresenatorswhoareofthesamepartyand
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whorepresentthesamestatehavedifferentideologies(PooleandRosenthal2000).
Itisalsoevidentinhowmembersfromthesamepartyreplacingaretiring
incumbentdonotadoptthesameideology(PooleandRomer1993;Stonecash,
Brewer,andMariani2003;Theriault2006).Indeed,thesereplacementshave
tendedtoadoptamoreextremepositionthantheirpredecessor,thereby
contributingtopolarizationwithmoderatesbeingreplacedbyextremists(Bafumi
andHerron2010).Incumbentsmayalsoadapttochangingpoliticalenvironments
bymodifyingtheirideologicalvotingoverthecourseoftheircareers(Theriault
2006),withmembersmovingtowardtheirdistrictpartisanship(Stratmann2000).
Itisforthislatterreasonthatwedrawacausalarrowfromcandidatedivergenceto
elitepolarization,althoughFigure2snapshotsuggeststhereismuchideological
variationamongmembersrepresentingdistrictswithsimilarpartisancomposition,
whichisnotnecessarilycontributingtoideologicaldivergenceofparties.
Second Order Connection: Redistricting → District
Partisanship
Thesecondconditionnecessaryforredistrictingtoaffectelitepolarizationisthat
redistrictingaffectsdistrictpartisanship.Itmayseemself-evidentfromobserving
theintensepoliticsthatsurroundredistricting,andtherelatedproblemof
gerrymandering,thatacausalconnectionbetweenthesetwoexists.Indeed,many
scholarsfindredistrictingaffectspartisandivisionofpoweramonglegislativeseats
(e.g.,Tufte1973;Cain1985;GelmanandKing1994;Hirsch2003),whileothers
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haveproposedevaluationmetricsonhowmuchpartisangerrymanderingmaybe
constitutionallypermissible(GrofmanandKing2007).However,thissecondorder
effectischallengedbycompetingexplanationsforchangingdistrictpartisanship,
particularlythenumberofcompetitivedistrictsthat,throughtheconnectionof
districtpartisanshipandmembers’ideologies,driveelitepolarization.
Abramowitz,Alexander,andGunning(2006)andMcDonald(2006a)differin
theirconclusionsaboutwhetherredistrictingresultsinfewercompetitivedistricts.
Themeasurementofcompetitivecongressionaldistrictsusingpresidentialelections
liesattheheartoftheirdivergentfindings.Analyzingnormalizedtwo-party
presidentialvote,1Abramowitzetal.(2006)findanincreaseincompetitivedistricts
duringthepost-1990censusbetweenthe1988Bushvs.Dukakiscontestandthe
1992three-wayBushvs.Clintonvs.Perotcontest(excludingPerot’svotessincehe
wasnotamajorpartycandidate).However,inanalyzingtheBushandDukakisvote
inthepre-andpost-redistricteddistricts,McDonald(2006a)findsadecreaseinthe
numberofcompetitivedistricts.2
WeupdateMcDonald’s(2006a)analysisofthetotalnumberofcompetitive
districtsbeforeandafterredistrictingforthemostrecentroundofredistrictingin
Figure3.Thetablereportsthenumberofdistrictswithintwocompetitiveranges,
1“Normalizedtwo-partyvote”isthevoteshareforamajorpartycandidate
expressedasashareofthetwomajorparties’candidates,excludingminorpartycandidates.Thisvoteshareisthennormalized,orsimulatingahypothetical50/50election,bysubtractingthedifferencebetweentheoverallnationaltwo-partyvoteshareand50percentfromthetwo-partyvotewithinaspecificdistrict.
2Forsimilarfindingsinthedeclineincompetitionfollowingaredistricting,seeSwain,Borrelli,andReed(1998)andMcCartyetal.(2009:673).
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45–55percentand48–52percent(thelatterareincludedintheformer).Thevote
betweenthetwomajorpartycandidates(commonlyreferredtobyscholarsasthe
“two-partyvote”)isdrawnfromvariousissuesoftheAlmanacofAmericanPolitics.
Thepresidentialvotesharesarenormalizedbysubtractingthedifferencebetween
theleadingcandidate’svoteshareand50percenttosimulateahypothetical50/50
election.Tocontrolforpotentialconfoundingcampaigneffects,statisticsare
calculatedforthesamepresidentialelection,theonemostrecentlyoccurredprior
toagivenredistricting.
Figure 3 Competitive Districts Before (Red) and After (Blue) Redistricting, 1980–2012
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Take,forexample,the2008presidentialelection,whoseresultsarereported
forthe2010and2012statistics.ThestatisticsinFigure3showthatforthemost
recentredistricting,therewasaslightdecreaseoffourdistrictswithinthewider
competitivenessrangeandadecreaseoftwelvedistrictsinthenarrower
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competitivenessrange.Despitethetraditionalrelianceona45–55percenttodefine
competitionelections(Mayhew1974),McDonald(2006a)findsfromastatistical
analysiscorrelatingpresidentialvoteandcandidatevotesharesthatthenarrower
rangeismoreappropriatetomeasurecompetitivedistricts.Bothnumbersarenear
thelowerboundevidentinthelasttworedistrictingcycles.Inthelargerpicture,
exceptforthe1980cycle,therewasadecreaseinthenumberofcompetitive
districtsinthenarrowerrangeinthe1990,2000,and2010redistrictingcycles,and
forthewiderrangetherewasalsoandecreasein1990,2000,and2010butan
increasein1980.UsingAbramowitzetal.’s(2006)preferredmeasure,the2012
normalizedtwo-partyvote,comparedtothe2008presidentialvote,only
strengthensthesefindings.3Thepreponderanceoftheevidenceshowsredistricting
resultsinfewercompetitivedistrictsinthepastthreedecades.
3Anissueforthepost-redistrictingstatisticsisthatsomeprecinctsaresplit
bynewdistricts,andthevoteswithinthesedistrictsmustbeapportionedtothenewdistricts(McDonald2014).Usingthe2012presidentialvotesharesforthe2012statistics,thenumberofdistrictsis84withina45–55percentrangeand29withina48–52percentrange.Thisalternativemeasurementprovidesstrongerevidenceforredistrictingtoresultinadecreaseinthenumberofcompetitivedistricts.WhereasthestatisticsreportedinFigure3showamodestdecreaseoffourinthenumberofcompetitivedistrictsinthewiderrangebetween2010and2012,thealternativemeasureshowsa30-districtdecrease.Similarly,whereasthestatisticsreportedinFigure3showthenarrowerrangehasatwelve-districtdecreaseincompetitivedistricts,thealternativemeasurehasathirteen-districtdecrease.
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Second Order Connection: Geographic Sorting → District
Partisanship
Redistrictingcanmanipulatedirectlyonlydistrictpartisanship,buttowhatextentis
manipulationpossible?Instateswithasmallnumberofdistricts–orjustone–
manipulationofdistrictpartisanshipisneighimpossible.Evenwithinlargerstates,
scholarscontestwhetherredistrictingcanaffectdistrictpartisanship.Theargument
forminimalredistrictingeffectsarisesfromresearchthatarguesAmericanshave
residentiallysegregatedthemselves(BishopandCushing2009).Suchgeographical
sortingproduces,sotheargumentgoes,anincreasingpoliticalhomogenizationof
congressionaldistricts(Abramowitzetal.2006)thatvirtuallylocksinRepublican
majoritiesabsentDemocraticgerrymandering(ChenandRodden2014).The
correlationbetweendistricts’partisanshipandmembers’ideologyevidentinFigure
2thusemergesorganicallyfromstates’geographies,notthroughconscious
redistrictingmanipulation.
Evidenceforthis“bigsort”thesisisderivedfromcounty-levelpresidential
electionresultsfrom1976to2004,whichshowthatthenumberoflandslide
countieswithavictorymarginof20percentagepointsormoreincreasedfrom27
percentto48percentduringthisperiod(BishopandCushing2009).Scholarshave
challengedthesefindings.KlinknerandHapanowicz(2005),takingalongerview,
showsubstantialup-and-downvariationinthenumberoflandslidecounties
between1976and2004,withtherisebetweenthesetwoelectionsfallingwithinthe
historicalrangefrom1840to2004.AbramsandFiorina(2012)objecttothe
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relianceonpresidentialelectionresults,notingthatpresidentialcandidatesarenot
allthesameand,thus,polarizationmeasuredbypresidentialelectionresultsmaybe
anartifactofthechoicesvotersarepresentedwith;4evenifvotersremainedthe
same,twomoderatecandidatesmayproducedifferentgeographicaldistributionof
votesthantwoextremecandidates.Utilizinganalternatemeasurefreerfrom
transitorycampaigneffects–partyregistration–therewasadecreaseinlandslide
countiesfrom1976and2004(McGeeandKrimm2009).
ThestatisticspresentedinFigure3alsodonotconformtothebigsortthesis,
althoughwedonotwishtotaketoomuchfromstatisticsdrawnfromdifferent
presidentialelections.Therewasaslightincreaseinthenumberofcompetitive
districtsbetween2002and2010,inboththewiderandnarrowerranges.Ifongoing
geographicalsortingofpartisansisprimarilyresponsibleforadeclinein
competitivedistricts(Abramowitzetal.2006),thereshouldhavebeenadecreasein
thenumberofcompetitivedistrictsoverthelastdecade.
Second Order Connection: Regional Realignment →
District Partisanship
InFigure1wedrawanarrowfromregionalrealignmenttopartydivergence,but
thepartydivergencetheoryimplicitlyinvolvesdistrictpartisanship.AsJacobson
notes(2013:548)“overthelastseveraldecades,changesinthepreferences,
behavior,anddistributionofcongressionalvotershavegiventhecongressional
4Furthermore,AbramsandPope(2012)arguethatAmericansarenotpolarizedgeographically;however,thiscritiqueisoutsidethescopeofouranalysis.
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partiesmoreinternallyhomogenous,divergentandpolarizedelectoralbases…The
mainsourceofthiselectoraltransformationwasthepartisanrealignmentofthe
South.”TherepresentationalanchorforSouthernDemocratsweretheir
conservativeconstituents.Ifmembershadrepresentedliberalconstituencies,as
Democraticmembersdidelsewhere,theyprobablywouldnothavebeenso
conservative,likewisesowiththeirRepublicanreplacements(ifregional
realignmentwouldhaveevenoccurred).Yet,partydivergenceisnottypically
presentedlayingbaretheseassumptionsasJacobsondoes,sowedrawonlydotted
arrowsfromregionalrealignmenttodistrictpartisanshiptopartydivergence.
Theregionalrealignmentstory,whenframedasaffectingdistrict
partisanship,hasapotentialinteractionwithredistricting.SouthernDemocrats
attemptingtostaveoffextinctionwerethwartedbytheGeorgeBush,Sr.
DepartmentofJusticefollowingthe1990redistricting.TheDepartmentofJustice
orderedSouthernDemocratic–controlledstategovernmentstomaximizethe
numberofAfrican-Americanmajoritydistricts,atacticthattheU.S.SupremeCourt
wouldlaterfindunconstitutionalintheShawv.Renocases.Butthedamagewas
done.GrofmanandHandley(1998)findthatwithoutenoughAfrican-American
constituentstobuoytheirelectoralfortunes,someDemocraticincumbents
succumbedtomountingpressuresofregionalrealignment.5
5Today,withDemocratic-controlledSouthernstategovernmentsreplaced
withRepublican-controlledstategovernments,theVotingRightsActinsomeinstancesforcedRepublicanstodrawDemocraticdistrictswheretheymayotherwisenotwishtodoso(Schotts2002).
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Full Causal Path: Redistricting → District Partisanship →
Elite Polarization
Astheprecedingdiscussionshouldmakeplain,redistrictingcannotberesponsible
forallelitepolarization.Scholarsfindredistrictingmakesacontribution.Stonecash,
Brewer,andMariani(2003)examinechangingdistrictcompositionandconclude
thesechangesproducemorehomogeneousdistrictsthatcontributetopolarization.
However,thesescholarsdonotdecomposethefactorsdrivingchangingdistrict
demographics.Strongerdirectevidencethatredistrictingaffectspolarizationcomes
fromstudiesthatexaminedistrictschangedbyredistricting.Carsonetal.(2007:
878)findthat“redistrictingisoneamongmanyfactorsthatproduceparty
polarization.”Theirmethodexaminestheideologyofmemberselectedfrom
congressionaldistrictsthatchangedsubstantiallyfollowingaredistricting.They
findthatthesedistrictstendtobemoreextremethanothersintheirpartisanship,
andthatmemberselectedfromthesedistrictsalsotendtobemoreideologically
extreme.Usingasimilarapproachtoexaminecongressionaldistrictsthatwere
changedbyredistricting,Hayes,Hibbing,andSulkin(2010)alsofindmembers’
behaviorisresponsivetodistricts’changeintermsofhowtheyco-sponsorbills
whentheirdistrictbecomesmorecompetitiveandhowtheyvoteinspecificissue
domainsthatmaybeofimportancetocertainconstituents,suchasrural
constituentsandfarmpolicies.Membersmaymodifytheirbehaviorinanticipation
ofconstituencychangewroughtbyredistricting(Boatright2004),althoughitmay
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takeseveralelectioncyclesformemberstofullyadjusttotheirnewconstituencies
(Stratmann2000).
Yet,therearelimitstoredistrictingeffects.Carsonetal.(2007:889)findthat
only60percent(or261of435)ofdistrictboundariessubstantiallychangedfrom
thebeginningtotheendoftheentiretimespanfrom1962to2002.Othersaremore
sanguineonthecontributionofredistrictingtopolarization.McCarty,Poole,and
Rosenthal(2009)arguethatCarsonetal.(2007)overstateredistrictingeffects
sincedistrictsundergoingchangearethosefoundinthemostpolarizedstates.6
McCartyetal.(2009:667)examinetwocausesofpolarization:theaveragedistance
betweentheideologiesofthetwopoliticalparties(i.e.,partydivergence)andthe
congruenceofideologyanddistrictpartisanship.Theycallthelatter“sorting”
(2009:669)inhowmembersmaybearrayedalongthecontinuumofdistrict
partisanship;inthiscontext,sortinginvokestheconceptthatmembersofthetwo
politicalpartiesmaybeincreasinglyelectedfromdistrictsmorecongruentwith
theirpartyaffiliation.Theauthorsconcludefromexaminationofdetrendedsorting
effectsacrossaredistrictingthatredistricting“canaccountfor,atmost,10–15%of
6Itisalsotruethatlargerstatesarewheremoredistrictschangevis-à-vis
apportionment,andwherevoterscanbemostsegregatedinwaysthatwouldcontributetopolarization.
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polarizationsincethe1970s.”7Theseauthorsassertmoreforciblyinthepopular
pressthat“gerrymanderinghasnothingtodowithpoliticalpolarization.”8
McCarty,Poole,andRosenthal(2009:672)setahighbarforredistrictingto
affectmembers’ideologies,inthatmembers’behaviormusthavea“sharpincrease”
immediatelyfollowingaredistricting,eventhoughmembersmayadjusttheir
behaviorpriortoaredistricting(Boatright2004)orgraduallyadjusttheirbehavior
overseveralelectioncyclesafteraredistricting(Stratmann2000).Furthermore,
McCartyetal.’smodelisstatic.Redistrictingmaybeusedtoshoreupanincumbent
mismatchedwithhisorherdistrict(Jacobson2003),suchthatdistrict
constituenciesaremadetobettermatchmembers’ideologies,particularlymembers
ofapartywhorepresentdistrictsthatleantowardtheotherpartyastheseare
generallythemostmoderateofallincumbents(seeFigure1).Carsonetal.(2007)
directlyexplorethiseffect,whileMcCartyetal.(2009)inferitbetweenchangesin
theirestimatedeffectsfromoneCongresstothenext.Astaticmodelalsocannot
7Elsewhere,McCarty,Poole,andRosenthal(2009:673)saythatredistricting
accountsfor“lessthan25%oftheincreaseinpolarizationsince1973.”UsingtheirfigurespresentedinTable2(p.673),wecalculatetheeffectfromtheirOLSmodeltobe25.1percentand19.4percentfromtheirmatchingmethod.The10–15percentfigureappearstobeadetrendedestimatethatassumesauniformincreaseinpolarizationinCongressesseatedbetween1973and2003.Theirunspecifieddetrendingmethodmaywashoutacuriousfeatureoftheirestimates,thatpolarizationduetosortingdeclinespriortoaredistricting(consistentwithBoatright2004)andthenincreasessharplyinallbutoneofsixoftheirestimates.
8McCarty,Nolan,KeithT.Poole,andHowardRosenthal.2013.“GerrymanderingDidn’tCausetheShutdown,”BloombergBusiness.Retrievedfromhttp://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013–10-09/gerrymandering-didn-t-cause-the-shutdown.
23
measureotherpotentialchanges.Iftheconditionalpartygovernmentmodel(Rohde
1991)holdsforhowrealignmentcontributedtoelitepolarization,vis-à-visan
increasinglyhomogeneouspartycaucuswillingtogivemorepowerfultoolsfor
leaderstoenforcepartydiscipline,thenitstandstoreasonthereverseistrue,too:
makingdistrictsmorecompetitivewouldleadtoamoreheterogeneousparty
caucusandaweakeningofleaders’powers.
Whilethesestudiesfindredistrictingaffectselitepolarizationtovarying
degrees,someauthorssuggestthatcreatingmorecompetitivedistrictscould,tothe
contrary,increasepolarization.Inthepresenceofcompetition,candidatesmustrely
moreheavilyonpartysupport,andthusmaybemoreresponsivetopartyleaders
whodemandpartydivergence.CoxandKatz(2002)notethatincumbency
advantageincreasedfollowingthereapportionmentrevolutioninthe1960s,when
districtsinitiallybecamelesscompetitive.Engstrom(2013)notesthatelite
polarizationhashistoricallybeenhigherwhendistrictsweremorecompetitive.
However,McDonald(1999)notesthatthecausalarrowmaybereversed,thatwhen
voterspolarize,anoptimalgerrymanderingstrategytotakeadvantageofaless
volatileelectorateistodrawdistrictsthatonlyappearmorecompetitive.
Can Redistricting Be Reformed to Reduce Polarization?
Theprecedingdiscussionprimarilyinvolvesobservationalstudiesofthefactorsthat
driveelitepolarization.Ifredistrictingcanaffectdistrictpartisanship,thentowhat
24
degreecanredistrictingreformleadtoagreaternumberofcompetitivedistricts
andareductioninideologicalpolarization?Thisquestioncanbeansweredthrough
twomethods.First,observationalstudiesofstatesthatadoptalternative
redistrictinginstitutions–particularlycommissions,whicharethepreferredreform
model(McDonald2007)–revealredistrictinginterventioneffects.Second,
alternativemappingbycomputersimulationorbyhumansrevealshowalternative
mapsrangeacrossquantifiablemeasuressuchascompactnessanddistrict
competitiveness.
Observationalstudiestendtofindnomeasurableeffectofredistricting
institutionsonpolarization.Abramowitzetal.(2006)findredistrictingcommission
statesdonothaveagreaternumberofcompetitivedistricts.RyanandLyons(2014)
similarlyfindcommissionstatesdonothaveagreaternumberofcompetitive
districts–whattheycall“bipartisandistricts”–orreducedelitepolarization.
ExaminingCalifornia,Kousser,Phillips,andShor(201425)bluntlyfind,“Neither
theCitizensRedistrictingCommissionnorthetop-twoprimaryhashaltedthe
continuingpartisanpolarizationofCalifornia’selectedlawmakersortheirdrift
awayfromtheaveragevoterineachdistrict.Ifanything,polarizationhasincreased
andthequalityofrepresentationhasdeclined.”
Ageneralproblemwiththeseanalysesisthattheydonotdeeplyconsiderthe
causalmechanismslinkingredistrictingcommissions’rulesandmembershipto
morecompetitivedistrictsormoderationofelitepolarization.Onlytwostates,
ArizonaandWashington,explicitlyhavearedistrictingcriteriontodraw
competitivedistricts(McDonald2007).California’scommissionisnotrequiredto
25
drawcompetitivedistricts,sothetheoryisunderdevelopedastowhythestate’s
newlyenactedcitizencommissionwouldreducepolarization.Likewise,Abramowitz
etal.(2006)andRyanandLyons(2014)paintallcommissionswithabroadbrush.
Wearenotsurprisedthatcommissionsareindistinguishablefromlegislaturesif
classificationofcommissionsincludespredominantlypartisanorbipartisan
commissionsthatmaybepoliticallymotivatedtodrawpartisanorbipartisan
gerrymanders,boththattheoreticallyshouldresultinnouncompetitivedistricts
(OwenandGrofman1988).
Simulationshelpdevelopingcounterfactualsastowhatoutcomesare
feasiblewithinastate.Therangeofoutcomesisprofoundlyaffectedbystates’
geographies.Idaho’sbipartisancommissionsimplycannotdrawoneofthestate’s
twocongressionaldistrictstobeDemocraticleaningorcompetitive,whereas
Arizona’scommissionhasmoreopportunitiestodrawboth,byvirtueofitslarger
sizeandmorebalancedpartisanship,butisuniquelyconstrainedbyLatinovoting
rightsconcernsandotherstateconstitutionalredistrictingcriteria(McDonald
2006b).Observationalstudiesbydesigntreatstatesasequalcases,andscholarscan
offeronlycrudecovariatesatbesttocontrolforstates’differingcharacteristics.
Analternativeassessmentmethodologyistosimulatewhatmayhappen
withinastatethroughalternativemapping.Thisapproachhasbeenusedwith
humanmapperstoexaminemotivesofthe1990sNorthCarolinaredistricting
(GronkeandWilson1999),toforecasttheeffectsofCalifornia’s2000sredistricting
reform(Johnsonetal.2005),toexaminechangingtherank-orderingofArizona’s
criteria(McDonald2006b),andtoexploretheuseofalternativecriteriainfive
26
Midwesternstates(McDonald2009),Virginia(AltmanandMcDonald2013),Florida
(AltmanandMcDonald2014a),andOhio(AltmanandMcDonald2014c).Scholars
havealsousedautomatedmethodstoexploretherangeofpotentialredistricting
plans.AutomationwasfirstproposedbyVickery(1961)andhasbeenusedto
explorealternativesinfourstatesinthe1960s(Nagel1965),toproberacial
gerrymanderingintentinSouthCarolina(Cirincione,Darling,andO’Rourke2000),
toprobenationallythelimitsofcreatingcompetitivedistrictsinthe2000s
(McCarty,Poole,andRosenthal2009),andtoprobethroughacasestudyof
Florida’sgeographicalconstraintsonpartisangerrymandering(ChenandRodden
2014).
Wecreatedthefirstopen-sourceautomatedredistrictingalgorithm,called
BARD(AltmanandMcDonald2011).Throughourexperiencewithautomation,we
cametoasimilarconclusionasNagel(1965:899):thatautomatedalgorithmsare
“usefulfortestingsomepolicyproposals”byrevealingalternativesfor
consideration.However,automatedalgorithmsaredeeplychallengedbythewell-
establishedtheoreticallimitsofintegeroptimization–whatredistrictingisinthe
abstract–andaresusceptibletosubtleimplementationbiases(Altmanand
McDonald2010).Inanutshell,redistrictingoptimizationalgorithmsarenot
guaranteedinamodest-sizedstatetofindtheglobaloptimumofascoringfunction
(i.e.,criteria)inafinitetime.Becausetherearepracticallyaninfinitenumberof
localoptima,thesealgorithmstendtobecometrappedinlocaloptimaandarethus
27
biasedinunknownways.9Alternativeredistrictingplansdrawnbycomputersor
humanscanilluminatetrade-offsamongredistrictingcriteria,buttheabsenceofa
redistrictingplanwithagivenscoringprofiledoesnotmeanthataplan,orahostof
similarplans,doesnotexist.
Someimplementationissuesariseoutofsimplificationsthatresearchers
maketotheirdata.Forexample,McCarty,Poole,andRosenthal(2009)employa
simulationapproachtoexplorehowgeographyconstrainsthenumberof
competitivedistricts.Thesescholarsdrawdistrictsoutofcounties.However,the
largestcountiesintheUnitedStatescanentirelycontainseveralcongressional
districts.Toaddressthisissue,thesescholarssubdividelargecountiesinto1,000
personblocks,and“assumethateachofthesecountyblocksisidentical”intermsof
theirpoliticalcompositiontothecounty(McCartyetal.2009:674).Thus,9,546
identicalblocksarecreatedforLosAngelesCounty,whereObamawon70.6percent
ofthetwo-partyvotein2008.McCartyetal.(2009:674)assertwithoutproofthat
this“homogeneityassumptionbiasestowardsfindingagerrymanderingeffect”
becausethesimulationalgorithmisunlikelyto“produceeitherveryconservativeor
veryliberaldistricts”(2009:675).Thisseemsoddtous:thealgorithmwillproduce
roughly13LosAngelesCountycongressionaldistricts;allwillhaveexactlythesame
70.6percentObamavoteshare.Similarpatternswillbeobservedinotherlarge
countiesthathavetwoormorecongressionaldistricts.McCartyetal.’s(2009)data
9ThisistruewhenimplementingalgorithmstomeetallU.S.legalredistrictingcriteria.Anautomatedalgorithmdoesexisttocreateequalpopulation,contiguous,andcompact(withaspecificcompactnessscoringmechanism)(Olson2010).
28
assumptionisfurtheratoddswiththebigsortthesisthatDemocratsgerrymander
themselvesbypredominantlylivinginlargecounties(BishopandCushing2009;
ChenandRodden2014).Tothecontrary,McCartyetal.’s(2009)county
homogeneityassumptionbiasesagainstfindingagerrymanderingeffect.
Sinceredistrictingalgorithmsmayhavesubtlebiasesthataffectconclusions,
wewishtoexplorewhetherhumanscandrawplansthatexploreabroaderrangeof
outcomesacrosscriteriaofsubstantiveinterest,suchasthenumberofcompetitive
districtsandcompactness.Whereashumansmaydrawmapswithbiases,our
intuitionisthathumanswillbegintheirmappingfromvariousstartingpointsand
employcomplexheuristicsthathelpthemavoidtrappingthemselvesinlocal
optima,whereasthesimpleheuristicsemployedthusfarresearchcannot.An
observationofMexico’sexperiencewithautomatedredistrictingdemonstrates
humansarecapableofbeatingasimulatedannealingoptimizationalgorithm
(Altmanetal.2014).WorkingwithoursoftwaredevelopmentpartnerAzavea,we
developedopen-sourceweb-accessibleredistrictingsoftwarecalledDistrictBuilder,
whichwedeployedinseveralstatestosupportadvocates’efforts(Altmanand
McDonald2014b).Florida’slegislaturedevelopedasimilaronlinetooltoenable
greaterpublicparticipation.Wepresenttheresultsfromthreestudiestodateon
Florida(AltmanandMcDonald2014a),Ohio(AltmanandMcDonald2014c),and
Virginia(AltmanandMcDonald2013).
InFigure4weplotalllegalredistrictingplansthatwerepubliclyavailablein
Florida,Ohio,andVirginia.Wedefinelegalplansasthosewhereallgeographyis
assignedtothecorrectnumberofcongressionaldistricts,thatthesedistrictshavea
29
populationdeviationofplusorminus1.0percentfromtheidealequi-populous
district(manyplanshavedistrictsthatdeviatebyoneperson),andthereisa
minimumnumberofminority-majoritydistricts.10Publiclyavailableredistricting
plansarethoseeithermadeavailablebythestatelegislatureordevelopedthrough
advocates’redistrictingcompetitionsthatwesupported.Weplottheaverage
compactnessofdistrictingplansalongthehorizontalaxis,suchthatmorecompact
districtshavehighervalues,11andthenumberofcompetitivedistrictsinthetighter
plusorminusfourpercentagepointrange,usingthe2008two-partypresidential
vote,normalizedtothecandidates’nationalvoteshares.Wedisaggregateprecinct
levelpresidentialvotetothecensusblockleveltoconstructourstatistics.This
approachreplacesMcCarty,Poole,andRosenthal’s(2009)county-level
homogeneityassumptionwithaprecinctlevelhomogeneityassumption(amuch
smallerunitofaggregation),asisconsultants’typicalpracticewhenconstructing
redistrictingdatabases(McDonald2014).Weidentifytheadoptedplanwithared
triangle;allotherplansareidentifiedbybluediamonds.
Figure4revealsthatitispossibletocreatemorecompetitivedistricts
withoutsacrificingcompactnessinFlorida,Ohio,andVirginia;indeed,theplanwith
themostcompetitivedistricts–andmanyotherplanswithagreaternumberof
10Weanalyzeplanswithatleastthreemajority-minoritydistrictsinFlorida
andoneinbothOhioandVirginia.11WeusetheSchwartzburgcompactnessmeasure.Wenormalizethevalues
sincethevaryinggeographyofthesestatesdoesnotmakecomparisonsofscoresacrossstatesmeaningful.
30
competitivedistricts–ismorecompactthantheadoptedplan.12InFlorida,the
adoptedplanhasonecompetitivecongressionaldistrictoutof27,whileaplan
existswitheightcompetitivedistricts.InOhio,theadoptedplanhaszero
competitivedistrictsoutof16,whiletheplanexistswitheightcompetitivedistricts.
InVirginia,theadoptedplanhastwocompetitivedistrictsoutofelevenwhileaplan
existswiththreecompetitivedistricts.Inall,theadoptedplanshaveatotalofthree
competitivedistrictsoutof55,whileplanswiththemaximumnumberof
competitivedistrictshaveacombined21competitivedistricts.Wedonotknowifit
ispossibletodrawmorecompetitivedistrictssincethosedrawingplansmaynot
havebeentryingtomaximizedistrictcompetitiveness;indeed,inOhioandVirginia,
manynon-legislativemapdrawersparticipatedincompetitionswherecompetitive
districtswereonecriterionamongothers.
Figure 4 Competitive Districts and Compactness; All Florida, Ohio, and Virginia Publicly Available Legal Redistricting Plans
12Thisistrueforothercriteriasuchasrespectforpoliticalboundariesand
partisanfairness;forspaceconsiderations,wedonotpresentscatterplotsoftheseothercriteria(AltmanandMcDonald2013;2014a;2014b).
31
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Ohi
o V
irgi
nia
Num
ber
of C
ompe
titiv
e D
istr
icts
Compactness
32
Discussion: Can Redistricting Reform Solve Polarization?
Ouranalysisofalternativelegalredistrictingplansthatincludeminorityvoting
rightsdistrictsrevealsthat,comparedtotheadoptedplansthathaveone
competitivedistrictoutof55,atleast21competitivedistrictscanbedrawnin
Florida,Ohio,andVirginia.McCarty,Poole,andRosenthal(2009:678),employing
simulationswithcontiguityandcompactnessconstraints,findthat80competitive
districtsarepossiblenationwide(althoughtheauthorsdonotdefinetheir
measurementofacompetitivedistrict).Wecannotfullyreconcilethesetwo
analysessinceMcCarty,Poole,andRosenthalexaminetheentirecountryandour
scopecoversonlythreeofthemostcloselycontestedbattlegroundstates.
Furthermore,wedonotbelievethatoneshouldsimplyextrapolateourfindingsto
allstates;forexample,thereareclearlysmalluncompetitivestateswithoneortwo
districtswhereredistrictingcanhavelittleornoeffect.Still,webelievethatthe
opportunitiesforcompetitivedistricts,andareductioninelitepolarization,maybe
greaterthantheMcCartyetal.analysisindicates.
WhereweagreewithMcCarty,Poole,andRosenthal(2009)isthatnotall
congressionaldistricts,andlikelynotevenamajority,canbemadecompetitive,and
thatredistrictingisbutonepieceofagreaterpolarizationpuzzle.Further,even
wheredistrictscouldbemadecompetitive,whetherredistrictingreformefforts
33
leadstocompetitivedistrictsdependsonthemannerinwhichthereformis
implemented.ContrasttheimplementationofredistrictingreforminCaliforniawith
theimplementationofreforminArizona.
AsKousser,Phillips,andShor(2014)discuss,California’sreformeffortis
likelytocreatecompetitivedistrictsandtoaffectpolarizationonlybyhappenstance.
Californiahasnoexplicitrequirementforcompetitivedistricts,andthecommission
adoptedonlythreecongressionaldistrictswitha2008Obamatwo-partyvoteshare
between48percentand52percent.Incontrast,inArizona,thecommissionis
explicitlytaskedbythestateconstitutiontodrawcompetitivedistricts.Arizona’s
commissionproducedthreecongressionaldistrictsoutofnine,whichisaseemingly
difficulttaskwhenalsodrawingtwoheavilyDemocraticLatinodistrictsinthis
Republicanleaningstate(McDonald2006b).LumpingArizonaandCaliforniaunder
thesamerubricofredistrictingcommissionsis,perhaps,whyscholarsfindthese
differentinstitutionshavenoeffectondistrictcompetition(Abramowitz,Alexander,
andGunning2006;RyanandLyons2014).(Similarly,Ohioadvocates’redistricting
competitionbalanceddistrictcompetitionagainstothercriteriatoapositiveeffect
ondistrictcompetition.SeeFigure4andAltmanandMcDonald2014c).Ifreformers
wishtoaffectapoliticaloutcome,werecommendexplicitlyincorporatingthe
intendedoutcomeintotheredistrictingcriteria.
OuranalysisdiffersfromsomeotherssuchasMcCarty,Poole,andRosenthal
(2009)infindingthatredistrictingreformcanhaveasubstantiveeffecton
polarization.Redistrictingisamongthefewinputstoelitepolarizationthatareboth
measurableandreadilysubjecttopolicyintervention.Webelieveredistricting
34
institutionscanbedevelopedtoproactivelyincreasethenumberofcompetitive
districtsandthusreduceelitepolarization.
Itispossiblethatredistrictingreformtoincreasecompetitivedistrictsmay
havesecond-ordereffectsbeyondthedirecteffectsofelectingmoremoderate
members.Thesesecondaryeffectscouldactintheoppositedirection;wenotethat
increaseddistrictcompetitionishistoricallycorrelatedwithgreaterideological
polarization(Engstrom2013).However,wejudge(followingEngstrom)that
historicalcorrelationisaresultofstrongandpolarizedpartiesusingbiaseddistricts
withthinmarginsinattempttomaximizepartisanadvantage–andnotaresultof
competitivedistrictscausingpolarization(McDonald1999).Moreover,thereare
theoreticalreasonstobelievethatthesecondaryeffectswillfurtherdecrease
polarization.Forexample,iftheconditionalpartymodelofgovernmentiscorrect
(Rohde1991),injectingtheHouseofRepresentativeswithmoremoderateswill
empowerthemtoconstrainthepowerofpartyleaderstoenforcepartydiscipline,
whichisamongtheprimarydriversofelitepolarizationthroughpartydivergence.
Basedonthecurrentevidence,weconjecturethatthesecondaryeffectswillbe
neutralorpositive–butnotethattheseeffectshaveyettobesystematically
measuredintheliterature.
Werecognizethattherearemanyotherreasonstoembraceredistricting
reformandcompetitivedistricts.Withspecificregardstocompetitivedistricts,they
providegeneralelectionvoterswiththeopportunitytoholdmembersaccountable
astheirdistrictsarenotsoelectorallysafe,anditlikewiseallowsvoterstohold
partiesaccountableastheirmajoritiesmaybeatrisk.Memberswhorepresent
35
competitivedistrictsmaynotdrawstrongchallengersiftheyrepresenttheir
districtswell(bybeingideologicallymoderate);however,itispossiblethata
greaternumberofcompetitivedistrictscanleadtoagreaternumberofcompetitive
elections,andhigherassociatedcampaigncosts.Likewise,competitiveelections
mayresultinagreaternumberofvotersbeingunhappyaboutthewinner(Brunell
2008).Weareremindedthatanyelectoralreformisinherentlyabalanceof
competingvalues(Arrow1951).Properlydesignedredistrictinginstitutionsmay
ameliorateelitepolarization,althoughtheeffectmaynotbeaslargeasadvocates
hope.Aswithallreforms,theremaybeunanticipatedconsequences.Still,ifoneis
concernedaboutelitepolarization,redistrictingshouldbeareformoptiononthe
table.
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