reference monitors - columbia universitysuman/secure_sw_devel/ref_monitor.pdf · 2017. 9. 11. ·...

Referencemonitors

SumanJana

*OriginalslidesfromVitalyShma9kov

ReferenceMonitor

•  Observesexecu9onoftheprogram/process– Atwhatlevel?Possibili9es:hardware,OS,network

•  Haltsorconfinesexecu9oniftheprogramisabouttoviolatethesecuritypolicy– What’sa“securitypolicy”?– Whichsystemeventsarerelevanttothepolicy?

•  Instruc9ons,memoryaccesses,systemcalls,networkpackets…

•  Cannotbecircumventedbythemonitoredprocess

EnforceableSecurityPolicies

•  Referencemonitorscanonlyenforcesafetypolicies[Schneider‘98]–  Execu9onofaprocessisasequenceofstates–  Safetypolicyisapredicateonaprefixofthesequence

•  Policymustdependonlyonthepastofapar9cularexecu9on;onceitbecomesfalse,it’salwaysfalse

•  Notpoliciesthatrequireknowledgeofthefuture–  “IfthisserveracceptsaSYNpacket,itwilleventuallysendaresponse”

•  Notpoliciesthatdealwithallpossibleexecu9ons–  “Thisprogramshouldneverrevealasecret”

ReferenceMonitorImplementa9on

•  Policiescandependonapplica9onseman9cs•  Enforcementdoesn’trequirecontextswitchesinthekernel•  Lowerperformanceoverhead

Program

RMKernel

RMProgram

Kernel

Program

Kernel

RM

Kernelized Wrapper Modifiedprogram

Integratereferencemonitorintoprogramcodeduringcompila9onorviabinaryrewri9ng

WhatMakesaProcessSafe?

•  Memorysafety:allmemoryaccessesare“correct”– Respectarraybounds,don’tstomponanotherprocess’smemory,don’texecutedataasifitwerecode

•  Control-flowsafety:allcontroltransfersareenvisionedbytheoriginalprogram– Noarbitraryjumps,nocallstolibraryrou9nesthattheoriginalprogramdidnotcall

•  Typesafety:allfunc9oncallsandopera9onshaveargumentsofcorrecttype

OSasaReferenceMonitor

•  Collec9onofrunningprocessesandfiles–  Processesareassociatedwithusers–  Fileshaveaccesscontrollists(ACLs)sayingwhichuserscanread/write/executethem

•  OSenforcesavarietyofsafetypolicies–  Fileaccessesarecheckedagainstfile’sACL–  Processcannotwriteintomemoryofanotherprocess–  Someopera9onsrequiresuperuserprivileges

•  Butmayneedtoswitchbackandforth(e.g.,setuidinUnix)–  EnforceCPUsharing,diskquotas,etc.

•  Samepolicyforallprocessesofthesameuser

HardwareMechanisms:TLB

•  TLB:Transla9onLookasideBuffer– Mapsvirtualtophysicaladdresses–  Locatednexttothecache– OnlysupervisorprocesscanmanipulateTLB

•  ButifOSiscompromised,maliciouscodecanabuseTLBtomakeitselfinvisibleinvirtualmemory(ShadowWalker)

•  TLBmissraisesapagefaultexcep9on–  ControlistransferredtoOS(insupervisormode)– OSbringsthemissingpagetothememory

•  Thisisanexpensivecontextswitch

Time

callsf=fopen(“foo”)

UserProcess

libraryexecutes“break”

Kernel

trap savescontext,flushesTLB,etc.checksUIDagainstACL,setsupIObuffers&filecontext,pushesptrtocontextonuser’sstack,etc.restorescontext,clearssupervisorbit

callsfread(f,n,&buf)libraryexecutes“break” savescontext,flushesTLB,etc.

checksfisavalidfilecontext,doesdiskaccessintolocalbuffer,copiesresultsintouser’sbuffer,etc.restorescontext,clearssupervisorbit

StepsinaSystemCall[Morrisett]

Midtermgrades

ModernHardwareMeetsSecurity

•  Modernhardware:largenumberofregisters,bigmemorypages

•  Isola9on⇒eachprocessshouldliveinitsownhardwareaddressspace

•  …buttheperformancecostofinter-processcommunica9onisincreasing–  Contextswitchesareveryexpensive–  TrappingintoOSkernelrequiresflushingTLBandcache,compu9ngjumpdes9na9on,copyingmemory

•  Conflict:isola9onvs.cheapcommunica9on

SohwareFaultIsola9on(SFI)

•  Processesliveinthesamehardwareaddressspace;sohwarereferencemonitorisolatesthem– Eachprocessisassignedalogical“faultdomain”– Checkallmemoryreferencesandjumpstoensuretheydon’tleaveprocess’sdomain

•  Tradeoff:checkingvs.communica9on– Paythecostofexecu9ngchecksforeachmemorywriteandcontroltransfertosavethecostofcontextswitchingwhentrappingintothekernel

[Wahbeetal.SOSP‘93]

FaultDomains

•  Process’scodeanddatainonememorysegment–  Iden9fiedbyauniquepajernofupperbits–  Codeisseparatefromdata(heap,stack,etc.)–  Thinkofafaultdomainasa“sandbox”

•  Binarymodifiedsothatitcannotescapedomain– Addressesaremaskedsothatallmemorywritesaretoaddresseswithinthesegment•  Coarse-grainedmemorysafety(vs.arrayboundschecking)

–  Codeisinsertedbeforeeachjumptoensurethatthedes9na9oniswithinthesegment

•  Doesthishelpmuchagainstbufferoverflows?

VerifyingJumpsandStores

•  Iftargetaddresscanbedeterminedsta9cally,maskitwiththesegment’supperbits–  Crash,butwon’tstomponanotherprocess’smemory

•  Ifaddressunknownun9lrun9me,insertcheckingcodebeforetheinstruc9on

•  Ensurethatcodecan’tjumparoundthechecks–  Targetaddressheldinadedicatedregister–  Itsvalueischangedonlybyinsertedcode,atomically,andonlywithavaluefromthedatasegment

SimpleSFIExample

•  Faultdomain=from0x1200to0x12FF•  Originalcode:writex•  NaïveSFI: x:=x&00FF x:=x|1200 writex•  BejerSFI: tmp:=x&00FF tmp:=tmp|1200 writetmp

convertxintoanaddressthatlieswithinthefaultdomain

Whatifthecodejumpsrighthere?…

InlineReferenceMonitor

•  GeneralizeSFItomoregeneralsafetypoliciesthanjustmemorysafety–  Policyspecifiedinsomeformallanguage–  Policydealswithapplica9on-levelconcepts:accesstosystemresources,networkevents,etc.•  “Noprocessshouldsendtothenetworkaherreadingafile”,

“Noprocessshouldopenmorethan3windows”,…

•  Policychecksareintegratedintothebinarycode–  Viabinaryrewri9ngorwhencompiling

•  Insertedchecksshouldbeuncircumventable–  RelyonSFIforbasicmemorysafety

PolicySpecifica9oninSASI

SASIpoliciesarefinite-stateautomata•  Canexpressanysafetypolicy•  Easytoanalyze,emulate,compile•  WrijeninSALlanguage(textualversionofdiagrams)

Nodivisionbyzero

¬ (op = “div” arg2 = 0) ∧

read¬ send¬

read

Nonetworksendaherfileread

[Cornell project]

PolicyEnforcement

•  Checkingbeforeeveryinstruc9onisanoverkill–  Check“Nodivisionbyzero”onlybeforeDIV

•  SASIusespar9alevalua9on–  Insertpolicychecksbeforeeveryinstruc9on,thenrelyonsta9canalysistoeliminateunnecessarychecks

•  Thereisa“seman9cgap”betweenindividualinstruc9onsandpolicy-levelevents– Applica9onsuseabstrac9onssuchasstrings,types,files,func9oncalls,etc.

–  Referencemonitormustsynthesizetheseabstrac9onsfromlow-levelassemblycode

M.Abadi,M.Budiu,U.Erlingsson,J.Ligaq

Control-FlowIntegrity:Principles,Implementa9ons,andApplica9ons

(CCS2005)

•  Mainidea:pre-determinecontrolflowgraph(CFG)ofanapplica9on– Sta9canalysisofsourcecode– Sta9cbinaryanalysis←CFI– Execu9onprofiling– Explicitspecifica9onofsecuritypolicy

•  Execu9onmustfollowthepre-determinedcontrolflowgraph

CFI:Control-FlowIntegrity[Abadietal.]

•  Usebinaryrewri9ngtoinstrumentcodewithrun9mechecks(similartoSFI)

•  Insertedchecksensurethattheexecu9onalwaysstayswithinthesta9callydeterminedCFG– Wheneveraninstruc9ontransferscontrol,des9na9onmustbevalidaccordingtotheCFG

•  Goal:preventinjec9onofarbitrarycodeandinvalidcontroltransfers(e.g.,return-oriented-programming)–  Secureeveniftheajackerhascompletecontroloverthethread’saddressspace

CFI:BinaryInstrumenta9on

CFGExample

•  Foreachcontroltransfer,determinesta9callyitspossibledes9na9on(s)

•  Insertauniquebitpajernateverydes9na9on–  Twodes9na9onsareequivalentifCFGcontainsedgestoeachfromthesamesource•  Thisisimprecise(why?)

– Usesamebitpajernforequivalentdes9na9ons

•  Insertbinarycodethatatrun9mewillcheckwhetherthebitpajernofthetargetinstruc9onmatchesthepajernofpossibledes9na9ons

CFI:ControlFlowEnforcement

CFI:ExampleofInstrumenta9on

Originalcode

Instrumentedcode

Abuseanx86assemblyinstruc9ontoinsert“12345678”tagintothebinaryJumptothedes9na9ononlyif

thetagisequalto“12345678”

•  UniqueIDs–  Bitpajernschosenasdes9na9onIDsmustnotappearanywhereelseinthecodememoryexceptIDchecks

•  Non-writablecode–  Programshouldnotmodifycodememoryatrun9me

•  Whataboutrun-9mecodegenera9onandself-modifica9on?

•  Non-executabledata–  Programshouldnotexecutedataasifitwerecode

•  Enforcement:hardwaresupport+prohibitsystemcallsthatchangeprotec9onstate+verifica9onatload-9me

CFI:Preven9ngCircumven9on

•  SupposeacallfromAgoestoC,andacallfromBgoestoeitherC,orD(whencanthishappen?)–  CFIwillusethesametagforCandD,butthisallowsan

“invalid”callfromAtoD–  Possiblesolu9on:duplicatecodeorinline–  Possiblesolu9on:mul9pletags

•  Func9onFiscalledfirstfromA,thenfromB;what’savaliddes9na9onforitsreturn?–  CFIwillusethesametagforbothcallsites,butthisallowsFtoreturntoBaherbeingcalledfromA

–  Solu9on:shadowcallstack

ImprovingCFIPrecision

CFI:SecurityGuarantees

•  Effec9veagainstajacksbasedonillegi9matecontrol-flowtransfer– Stack-basedbufferoverflow,return-to-libcexploits,pointersubterfuge

•  Doesnotprotectagainstajacksthatdonotviolatetheprogram’soriginalCFG–  Incorrectargumentstosystemcalls– Subs9tu9onoffilenames– Otherdata-onlyajacks

PossibleExecu9onofMemory[Erlingsson]

NextStep:XFI

•  Inlinereferencemonitoraddedviabinaryrewri9ng– Canbeappliedtosomelegacycode

•  CFItopreventcircumven9on•  Fine-grainedaccesscontrolpoliciesformemoryregions– Morethansimplememorysafety(cf.SFI)

•  Reliesinpartonload-9meverifica9on– Similarto“proof-carryingcode”

[Erlingsson et al. OSDI ‘06]

TwoStacks•  XFImaintainsaseparate“scopedstack” withreturnaddressesandsomelocalvariables–  Keepstrackoffunc9oncalls,returnsandexcep9ons

•  Securestorageareaforfunc9on-localinforma9on–  Cannotbeoverflown,accessedviaacomputedreferenceorpointer,etc.

–  Stackintegrityensuredbysohwareguards–  Presenceofguardsisdeterminedbysta9cverifica9onwhenprogramisloaded

•  Separate“alloca9onstack”forarraysandlocalvariableswhoseaddresscanbepassedaround

XFI:MemoryAccessControl

•  Modulehasaccesstoitsownmemory– Withrestric9ons(e.g.,shouldn’tbeabletocorruptitsownscopedstack)

•  Hostcanalsograntaccesstoothercon9guousmemoryregions–  Fine-grained:canrestrictaccesstoasinglebyte– Accesstoconstantaddressesandscopedstackverifiedsta9cally

–  Inlinememoryguardsverifyotheraccessesatrun9me•  Fastinlineverifica9onforacertainaddressrange;iffails,callspecialrou9nesthatcheckaccesscontroldatastructures

XFI:Preven9ngCircumven9on

•  IntegrityoftheXFIprotec9onenvironment– Basiccontrol-flowintegrity– “Scopedstack”preventsout-of-orderexecu9onpathseveniftheymatchcontrol-flowgraph

– Dangerousinstruc9onsareneverexecutedortheirexecu9onisrestricted•  Forexample,privilegedinstruc9onsthatchangeprotec9onstate,modifyx86flags,etc.

•  Therefore,XFImodulescanevenruninkernel