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PROJECT REPORT
“A STUDY ON FIVE WORLD FAMOUS
AIRLINE DISASTER”
“A STUDY ON FIVE WORLD FAMOUS AIRLINE DISASTER”
PROJECT REPORT
Submitted by:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxDIPLOMA IN AIRPORT MANAGEMENT
GUIDERS ACADEMY, KOCHI - 16
SEPTEMBER 2011
DECLARATION
I affirm that the project work titled A STUDY ON FIVE WORLD
FAMOUS AIRLINE DISASTER is the original work carried out by me. It has not
formed the part of any other project work submitted for award of any degree or
diploma, either in this or any other institutions.
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Place: xxxxxxxxxxxDate: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
With great pleasure, I am presenting this project entitled "A STUDY ON FIVE
WORLD FAMOUS AIRLINE DISASTER". A Project of this dimension would not
have been possible without the sincere help and earnest support provided to me from all
sources that was approached.
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INTRODUCTION
An aviation accident is defined in the Convention on International Civil
Aviation Annex 13 as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention
of flight and all such persons have disembarked, in which a person is fatally or
seriously injured, the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure or the aircraft is
missing or is completely inaccessible. The first fatal aviation accident occurred in a
Wright Model A aircraft at Fort Myer, Virginia, USA, on September 17, 1908, resulting
in injury to the pilot, Orville Wright and death of the passenger, Thomas Selfridge
An aviation incident is also defined there as an occurrence other than an accident,
associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of
operations.
An accident in which the damage to the aircraft is such that it must be written off, or in
which the plane is destroyed is called a hull loss accident.
WHAT MAY BE THE REASONS FOR ANY AIR CRASH?
There are many explanations for an airplane crash. Usually the crash is a result of more
than 2 reasons. Just like a car accident, it usually occurs when one driver is distracted
and the other driver is speeding and the roads are slippery with rain.
The general categories for airplane crashes include:
Weather - Poor visibility. Icing conditions. Some pilots are not trained or equipped to
fly at night and find themselves having to continue flying to reach an airport after it
gets dark. An example of this John Kennedy's plane that was lost at night in the ocean
near Marthar's Vineyard.
Mechanical - This can be a failure of a part during normal service. Most aircraft
systems have built-in redundancy so that a failure of one part will not create an unsafe
condition. Some mechanical failures is due to bad maintenance; such as someone
forgetting to tighten a bolt.
Pilot Error - this can vary from not paying attention to his instruments or watching for
other a/c. People are only human so many accidents are attributed to poor judegment of
the pilot. For example; the weather may be getting bad but the pilot chooses to fly into
the storm. Larger passenger airliners have 2 or more flight crew which helps eliminate
some human errors.
Air Traffic Controller - Sometimes the traffic controller gives the "Clear to Takeoff"
or similar instructions that result in an accident.
Cockpit Management - Airlines now stress that the Pilot In Command should keep
control of the situation and accept inputs from his crew without judging them. If the
Pilot In Command begins to ignore or judge the recommendations of the crew, the crew
will not function as a team and someone will over-look something that will lead to an
accident.
Fuel Starvation - This is really a subset of Pilot Error but it can be the result of several
factors.
MUNICH AIR DISASTER
The Munich air disaster occurred on 6 February 1958, when British European
AirwaysFlight 609 crashed on its third attempt to take off from a slush-covered runway
at Munich-Riem Airport in Munich, West Germany. On board the plane was
the Manchester United football team, nicknamed the "Busby Babes", along with a
number of supporters and journalists. Twenty of the 44 people on board the aircraft
died in the crash. The injured, some of whom had been knocked unconscious, were
taken to the Rechts der Isar Hospital in Munich where three more died, resulting in a
total of 23 fatalities with 21 survivors.
The team was returning from a European Cup match in Belgrade, Yugoslavia,
against Red Star Belgrade, but had to make a stop in Munich for refuelling, as a non-
stop trip from Belgrade to Manchester was out of the "Elizabethan" class Airspeed
Ambassador aircraft's range. After refuelling, the pilots, Captains James Thain and
Kenneth Rayment, attempted to take off twice, but had to abandon both attempts due to
boost surging in the port engine. Fearing that they would get too far behind schedule,
Captain Thain rejected an overnight stay in Munich in favour of a third take-off
attempt. By the time of the third attempt, it had begun to snow, causing a layer of slush
to build up at the end of the runway. When the aircraft hit the slush, it lost velocity,
making take-off impossible. It ploughed through a fence past the end of the runway,
before the port wing hit a nearby house and was torn off. Fearing that the aircraft might
explode, Captain Thain set about getting the surviving passengers as far away as
possible. Despite this, Manchester United goalkeeper Harry Gregg remained behind to
pull survivors from the wreckage.
An investigation by the West German airport authorities originally blamed Captain
Thain for the crash, claiming that he had failed to de-ice the wings of the aircraft,
despite statements to the contrary from eyewitnesses. It was later established that the
crash had, in fact, been caused by the build-up of slush on the runway, which had
resulted in the aircraft being unable to achieve take-off velocity; Thain's name was
eventually cleared in 1968, ten years after the incident.
At the time of the disaster, Manchester United were trying to become only the third
club to win three successive English league titles; they were six points behind League
leadersWolverhampton Wanderers with 14 games to go. They were also holders of
the Charity Shield and had just advanced into their second successive European
Cup semi-final. The team were also on an 11-match unbeaten run, and had booked their
place in the Fifth Round of the FA Cup two weeks previously.
Munich air disaster
An Airspeed Ambassador similar to the one
involved in the crash
Accident summary
Date 6 February 1958
Type Take-off failure
Site Munich, West Germany
48°07′34.09″N 11°40′39.98″
E
Passengers 38
Crew 6
Injuries 19
Fatalities 23
Survivors 21
Aircraft type Airspeed AS-57 Ambassador
Aircraft name Lord Burghley
Operator British European Airways
Tail number G-ALZU
Flight origin Belgrade Airport, SFR
Yugoslavia
Stopover Munich-Riem Airport, West
Germany
Destination Manchester Airport, England
Background
The Airspeed Ambassador G-ALZU at Riem airport before take-off
In April 1955, UEFA established the European Cup, a football competition for the
champion clubs of UEFA-affiliated nations, to begin in the 1955–56 season. However,
the English league winners, Chelsea, were denied entry by the Football League's
secretary Alan Hardaker, who believed it was in the best interests of English football
and football in general for them not to enter. The following season, the English league
was won by Manchester United, managed by Matt Busby. Originally, the Football
League again denied entry to the European Cup, but Busby and his chairman, Harold
Hardman, with the help of the Football Association's chairman Stanley Rous, defied the
league and United became the first English team to venture into Europe.
The Manchester United management had taken a chance, and it had paid off, with the
team – known as the "Busby Babes" for their youth – proving the Football League
wrong by reaching the semi-finals of the 1956–57 competition, being knocked out by
eventual winners Real Madrid. Winning the First Division title again that season meant
that they secured qualification for the 1957–58 tournaments, and their successful cup
run in 1956–57 meant that they were one of the favourites to win it. Domestic league
matches were played on Saturdays and European matches were played midweek, so,
although air travel was risky at the time, it was the only practical choice if United were
to fulfil their league fixtures, which they would have to do if they were to avoid proving
Alan Hardaker right.
After overcoming Shamrock Rovers and Dukla Prague in the preliminary round and the
first round respectively, Manchester United were drawn with Red Star
Belgrade of Yugoslavia for the quarter-finals. After beating the Yugoslavians 2–1
at Old Trafford on 21 January 1958, the club was scheduled to travel to Yugoslavia for
the return leg on 5 February. On the way back from Prague in the previous round, fog
over England prevented the team from flying back to Manchester, so they hastily made
arrangements to fly to Amsterdam before taking the ferry from the Hook of
Holland to Harwich and then the train up to Manchester. The trip took its toll on the
players and they were only able to scrape a 3–3 draw with Birmingham City at St
Andrew's three days later.
Eager not to miss any of their Football League fixtures in the future, and also not to
have to go through such a difficult trip again, the club chartered a plane through British
European Airways from Manchester to Belgrade for the away leg against Red Star. The
match itself was drawn 3–3, but it was enough to send United to the semi-
finals. The takeoff from Belgrade was delayed for an hour as United outside
right Johnny Berry had lost his passport, then the plane made a planned stop in Munich
to refuel, landing at 13:15 GMT.
Crash
The Airspeed Ambassador G-ALZUburning at Munich
Captain James Thain, the pilot, had flown the "Elizabethan" class Airspeed
Ambassador (registration G-ALZU) out to Belgrade, but handed the controls to his co-
pilot, Captain Kenneth Rayment, for the return journey. At 14:19 GMT, the control
tower at Munich airport was told that the plane was ready to take off, and they were
given clearance to attempt take-off due to expire at 14:31. Captain Rayment abandoned
the take off after Captain Thain had noticed the port boost pressure gauge fluctuating as
the plane reached full power and the engine sounded odd while accelerating. A second
attempt was made three minutes later, but, 40 seconds into the procedure, this too was
called off before the plane got off the ground. The reason given for the failed attempts
was that the engines had been running on an over-rich mixture, causing the engines to
over-accelerate, a common problem for the Elizabethan-class plane. After the second
failure, all the passengers were told to disembark from the plane and they retreated to
the airport lounge. By then, it had started to snow heavily, and it looked unlikely that
the plane would be making the return journey that day. Manchester United's Duncan
Edwards took the opportunity to send a telegram ahead to his landlady in Manchester. It
read: "All flights cancelled, flying tomorrow. Duncan."
Captain Thain informed the station engineer, Bill Black, about the problem with the
boost surging in the port engine, and Black suggested that since the immediate solution
of opening the engine throttle more slowly had not worked, the only remaining option
would be to hold the plane in Munich overnight for engine retuning. Thain was anxious
to stay on schedule and suggested that opening the throttle even more slowly would
suffice. This would mean that the plane would not achieve take-off velocity until
further down the runway, but with the runway being almost 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) long,
Thain believed that this should not pose a problem. Therefore, despite the snow, the
passengers were called back out to the plane just 15 minutes after leaving it.
A few of the players were not confident fliers, particularly Liam Whelan, who was
heard to say "This may be death, but I'm ready" shortly before take off. Others,
including Duncan Edwards, Tommy Taylor, Mark Jones, Eddie Colman and Frank
Swift moved to the back of the plane, believing it to be safer. Once everyone was back
on board, Captains Thain and Rayment got the plane moving again for a third take off
attempt at 14:56. At 14:59, they reached the runway holding point, where they received
clearance to line up ready for take-off. On the runway, the final cockpit checks were
carried out and at 15:02, they were contacted to tell them that their take-off clearance
would expire at 15:04. After discussion, the pilots agreed that they would attempt take-
off, but they would keep a close watch on the instruments in case of any more surging
in the engines. At 15:03, they contacted the control tower to inform them of their
decision.
American newsreel footage reporting the crash
Captain Rayment slowly moved the throttle forward, as agreed, and released the brakes;
the plane began to accelerate, and radio officer Bill Rodgers radioed the control tower
with the message "Zulu Uniform rolling". As the plane gathered speed, throwing up
slush as it went, Captain Thain called out the velocities in ten-knot increments. At 85
knots, the port engine began to surge again, and he pulled back marginally on the port
throttle before gingerly pushing it forward again. Once the plane reached 117 knots
(217 km/h), he announced "V1", indicating that they had reached the velocity at which
it was no longer safe to abort the take off, and Captain Rayment listened out for the call
of "V2" (9 knots (220 km/h)), the minimum speed required to get the plane off the
ground. When Thain glanced back down to the airspeed indicator, expecting the needle
to continue to rise, it fluctuated at around 117 knots before suddenly dropping back
down to 112 knots (207 km/h), and then 105 knots (194 km/h). Rayment shouted
"Christ, we won't make it!", as Thain looked up to see what lay ahead of them.
The plane skidded off the end of the runway and, out of control, crashed into the fence
surrounding the airport and then across a road before its port wing was torn off as it
caught a house, home to a family of six. The father and eldest daughter were away at
the time, and the mother and the other three children narrowly escaped with their lives
as the house caught fire. Part of the plane's tail was torn off too, before the left side of
the cockpit hit a tree. The right side of the fuselage hit a wooden hut, inside which was
a truck filled with tyres and fuel, which exploded. Twenty passengers died on board,
and there were three subsequent deaths.
Upon seeing the flames licking up around the cockpit, Captain Thain feared that the
burning fuel might make the aircraft explode and instructed his crew to evacuate the
area. The stewardesses, Rosemary Cheverton and Margaret Bellis, were the first to
leave through a blown-out emergency window in the galley, and they were followed by
radio officer Bill Rodgers. Thain shouted to Rayment to get out of his seat, but
Rayment was trapped in his seat by the crumpled fuselage. Rayment told Thain to go on
without him. Thain clambered out of the galley window. Upon reaching the ground, he
saw that flames were growing under the starboard wing, which still had an intact fuel
tank containing 500 imperial gallons (2,300 L) of fuel. He shouted to his crew to get as
far away as possible and climbed back into the aircraft to retrieve two handheld fire
extinguishers, stopping momentarily to tell Rayment that he would be back for him
when the fires had been dealt with.
Meanwhile, inside the passenger cabin, Manchester United goalkeeper Harry
Gregg was regaining consciousness, thinking that he was dead. He felt blood running
down his face and he "didn't dare put [his] hand up. [He] thought the top of [his] head
had been taken off, like a hard boiled egg." Just above him, a shaft of light was shining
into the cabin, so Gregg made his way towards it and kicked the hole wide enough for
him to escape through.
Investigation
Although the crash was originally blamed on pilot error, it was subsequently found to
have been caused by the build-up of slush towards the end of the runway, causing
deceleration of the aircraft and preventing safe flying speed from being attained. During
the take off, the aircraft had attained a speed of 117 knots (217 km/h), but, on entering
the slush, speed dropped to 105 knots (194 km/h), too slow for the plane to leave the
ground, with not enough runway remaining to abort the take off. Aircraft with tail-
wheel undercarriages had not been greatly affected by slush, due to the geometry of
these undercarriages in relation to the aircraft's centre of gravity,[citation needed] but newer
types, such as the Ambassador, with nose wheel landing-gear and the main wheels
behind the centre of gravity, were found to be vulnerable. The accident resulted in the
instigation of operating limits for the amount of slush build-up permitted on runways.
Despite this conclusion, the German airport authorities (who were legally responsible
for the state of the airport's runways, but generally unaware of the danger of slush on
runways for aircraft like the Ambassador) took legal action against Captain Thain, as
the one pilot who had survived the crash. They claimed that he had taken off
without deicing the wings and that responsibility for the accident was his alone, despite
several witnesses stating that this was not so. The basis of the German authorities' case
relied on a photograph of the aircraft (published in several newspapers) taken shortly
before take off, that appeared to show snow on the upper wing surfaces. When the
original negative was examined, however, no snow or ice could be seen, the "snow"
having been due to the published pictures being produced from a copy negative. [citation
needed] The witnesses were not called to the German inquiry and proceedings against
Thain dragged on until 1968, when he was finally cleared of any responsibility for the
crash. As the official cause, British authorities recorded a build-up of melting snow on
the runway which prevented the Elizabethan from reaching the required take-off speed.
Thain, having been dismissed by BEA shortly after the accident and never re-engaged,
retired and returned to run his poultry farm in Berkshire. He died of a heart attack at the
age of 53, in 1975
Aftermath
Seven of Manchester United's players died immediately, and Duncan Edwards died
from his injuries on 21 February at the Rechts der Isar Hospital in Munich. Johnny
Berry and Jackie Blanchflower were both injured so severely that they never played
again. Matt Busby was seriously injured and had to stay in hospital for more than two
months after the crash, and was read his Last Rites twice. After being discharged from
hospital, he went to Switzerland to recuperate in Interlaken. At times, he felt like giving
up on football entirely, until he was told by his wife, Jean, "You know Matt, the lads
would have wanted you to carry on." That statement lifted Busby from his depression,
and he returned by land to Manchester, before watching his team play in the 1958 FA
Cup Final.
Meanwhile, there was speculation that the club would fold, but a threadbare United
team completed the 1957–58 season, with Busby's assistant Jimmy Murphy standing in
as manager; he had not travelled to Belgrade as he was in Cardiff managing the Welsh
national team at the time. A team largely made up of reserve and youth team players
beat Sheffield Wednesday 3–0 in the first match after the disaster. The programme for
that match showed simply a blank space where each United player's name should have
been. Following the loss of so many players in the crash, United were desperate to find
replacements with experience, so Murphy turned to players like Ernie Taylor (signed
for £8,000 from Blackpool) and Stan Crowther, the Aston Villa wing half who had
played against United in the 1957 FA Cup Final.
There were changes amongst the backroom staff at the club too, following the deaths of
secretary Walter Crickmer and coaches Tom Curryand Bert
Whalley. United goalkeeper Les Olive, still registered as a player at the time of the
disaster, retired from playing and took over from Crickmer as club secretary,] while
another former United goalkeeper, Jack Crompton, took over coaching duties after
United chairmanHarold Hardman had negotiated with Crompton's then-
employers Luton Town for his release.
United only won one league game after the crash, causing their title challenge to
collapse and they fell to ninth place in the league. They did manage to reach the final of
the FA Cup, however, losing 2–0 to Bolton Wanderers, and even managed to
beat Milan at Old Trafford in the semi-finals of the European Cup, only to lose 4–0 at
the San Siro. Real Madrid, who went on to win the trophy for the third year running,
suggested that Manchester United be awarded the trophy for that year – a suggestion
supported by Red Star Belgrade – but this failed to materialise.
Busby resumed managerial duties the next season (1958–59), and eventually built a
second generation of Busby Babes, including George Best and Denis Law, that ten
years later won the European Cup, beating Benfica. Bobby Charlton and Bill
Foulkes were the only two crash survivors who lined up in that team.
Memorials
Old Trafford
Commemorative plaque in the Munich Tunnel at Old Trafford
The first memorials at Old Trafford to the lost players and staff were unveiled on 25
February 1960. The first, a plaque in the shape of the stadium with the image of a green
pitch, inscribed with the names of the victims in black and gold glass, was placed above
the entrance to the directors' box. Above the plaque was a teak carving of a player and a
supporter, heads bowed either side of a wreath and a football inscribed with the date
"1958". The plaque was designed by Manchester architect J. Vipond and constructed by
Messrs Jaconello (Manchester) Ltd. at a cost of £2,100, and unveiled by Matt Busby.
Also unveiled that day was a memorial to the members of the press who died at
Munich, which consisted of a bronze plaque that named the eight lost journalists. The
unveiling was performed by Munich survivor Frank Taylor on behalf of the Football
Writers' Association. The original plaque was stolen in the 1980s and replaced by a
replica now located behind the counter in the press entrance. The final memorial was
the Munich clock, a simple two-faced clock paid for by the Ground Committee and
attached to the south-east corner of the stadium, with the date "Feb 6th 1958" at the top
of both faces and "Munich" at the bottom. The clock has remained in the same position
since it was first installed. The clock was unveiled on 25 February 1960 by Dan
Marsden, the chairman of the Ground Committee.
When the stadium underwent renovations in the mid 1970s, it became necessary to
move the plaque from the directors' entrance to allow the necessary changes. However,
it was not possible to remove the plaque without damaging it, so the decision was taken
to simply wall up the old memorial within the Main Stand and commission a new one.
The replacement plaque was simpler than the original, now consisting simply of a slate
pitch with the names inscribed upon it, and was installed in 1976.
A third version of the memorial, more like the original than the second in that it
included the stands around the slate pitch and the figures above it, was installed in
1996, coinciding with the erection of the statue of Matt Busby, who had unveiled the
original memorial. This third version was constructed by stonemasons Mather and Ellis
from Trafford Park, and the second was put into storage. It is currently awaiting new
display panels before being placed into the club museum's Munich display. The third
plaque and the statue of Busby were originally located on the north side of the East
Stand, but the statue was moved to the front of the East Stand and the plaque to the
south side of the stand after the stand's expansion in 2000.
Munich
Wooden memorial
There are also two memorials in Germany. First, in the village of Trudering, on the
corner of Karotschstraße and Emplstraße, there is a small wooden memorial depicting
Jesus on the Cross, decorated by a stone trough filled with flowers. The trough bears a
plaque with the inscription: "Im Gedenken an die Opfer der Flugzeugkatastrophe am
6.2.1958 unter denen sich auch ein Teil der Fußballmannschaft von Manchester United
befand, sowie allen Verkehrstoten der Gemeinde Trudering" (English: In memory of the
victims of the air disaster of 6.2.1958 including members of the football team of
Manchester United as well as all the traffic victims from the municipality of Trudering).
Memorial stone
On 22 September 2004, a dark blue granite plaque set in a sandstone border was
unveiled in the vicinity of the old Munich Airport on the corner of Rappenweg and
Emplstraße, just metres from the wooden memorial. It reads, in both English and
German, "In memory of all those who lost their lives here in the Munich air disaster on
the 6 February 1958". Underneath is a plaque expressing United's gratitude to the
municipality of Munich and its people. The new memorial was funded by Manchester
United themselves and the unveiling was attended by club officials, including chief
executive David Gill, manager Alex Ferguson and director Bobby Charlton, a survivor
of the disaster himself.
On 24 April 2008, the town council of Munich decided to name the site where the
memorial stone is placed "Manchesterplatz" (English: Manchester Square).
40th anniversary
In late 1997, John Doherty approached United chairman Martin Edwards on behalf of
the Manchester United Former Players' Association to request a testimonial for those
victims of the Munich disaster – both the survivors and the dependants of the ones who
were lost. Edwards was hesitant, but a benefit match was eventually sanctioned for a
date as close to the 40th anniversary of the disaster as possible. Red Star Belgrade
and Bayern Munich were touted as possible opponents for the match, and fans
purchased tickets without the opponents even having been decided.
However, in the midst of the preparations, former United player Eric Cantona, who had
retired from football to pursue a career in film in the summer of 1997, expressed an
interest in returning to Manchester United for a farewell match. Edwards, ever the
businessman, took the opportunity to combine the two events into one. From then on, it
seemed to some that the match had ceased to be primarily a tribute to the Busby Babes
and more about Cantona. Due to Cantona's new acting career, his schedule meant that
he would not be available in February and the match was moved to 18 August, with the
opposition to be a European XI chosen by Cantona himself. Martin Edwards was
criticised for turning the match into a publicity stunt, while Elizabeth Wood, the
divorced wife of Munich survivor Ray Wood, compared the treatment of the Munich
victims to that of "dancing bears at the circus". Nevertheless, the match earned £47,000
for each of the victims' families, while Eric Cantona recouped over £90,000 in expenses
directly from the testimonial fund, rather than from the club. The club has also received
criticism from some quarters for its poor treatment of the survivors: Johnny Berry was
forced to leave the apartment he rented from the club to make way for a new player.
On 7 February 1998, United played Bolton Wanderers at Old Trafford in the Premier
League just a day after the 40th anniversary of the disaster. The match kicked off at
3:15 p.m. to allow a minute's silence to be observed at 3:06 p.m. Representatives from
both teams laid floral tributes to those who lost their lives, with crash survivor and
United director Bobby Charlton being joined by Bolton president Nat Lofthouse in
leading out the two teams.[citation needed]
50th anniversary
Old Trafford's Munich Tunnel, unveiled in 2008 on the 50th anniversary of the disaster.
A memorial service was held at Old Trafford on 6 February 2008. At the conclusion of
the service, the surviving members of the 1958 team were the guests of honour at a
ceremony to rename the tunnel under the stadium's South Stand as the "Munich
Tunnel", which features an exhibition about the Busby Babes.
On 6 February 2008, the England national football team took
on Switzerland at Wembley Stadium. Before the game, pictures of the players who lost
their lives at Munich were displayed on big screens, and England players wore black
armbands. There was also a tribute to the Busby Babes in the match
programme. Originally, a minute's silence was not to have been observed on the day,
due to the Football Association's fears that the silence would not be respected by fans of
Manchester United's rivals. However, they then agreed that a minute's silence should be
held. In the event, it was generally well-observed, but a small number of supporters
made whistles and cat-calls and the referee cut the silence short after less than 30
seconds.
Commemorative scarves laid out on the back of every seat prior to the game
On 10 February 2008, at the derby match between Manchester United and Manchester
City at Old Trafford, both teams were led onto the pitch by a lone piper playing "The
Red Flag", and the managers – Alex Ferguson and Sven-Göran Eriksson – each laid a
wreath in the centre circle. This was followed by a minute silence, which, despite
previous concerns, was respected by all the fans. Kevin Parker, secretary of Manchester
City's supporters club, had originally suggested a minute's applause instead of a
minute's silence, so as to drown out anyone who would disrupt the silence, but this was
rejected by the Manchester United management as inappropriate. United played in
strips reminiscent of those worn by the 1958 team, numbered 1–11 with no advertising
on the front or players' names on the back, while City removed sponsors' logos from
their kit and the image of a small black ribbon was embroidered to the right
shoulder; both teams wore black armbands in tribute to the victims of the Munich
disaster. Manchester City won 2–1 thanks to first half goals from Darius Vassell and
debutantBenjani. Fans in attendance were given commemorative scarves – in red and
white for the United fans, and blue and white for the City fans – which were held up
during the silence.
2000 Australia Beechcraft King Air crash
Sierra Kilo Charlie was the call sign for chartered Beechcraft 200 Super King
Air which, on September 4, 2000, crashed near Mount Isa, Queensland, Australia. The
flight plan of the aircraft called for the pilot to fly between Perth, Western Australia,
and the mining town of Leonora, Western Australia. During the flight, the aircraft
climbed above its assigned altitude. When air traffic control (ATC) contacted the pilot,
the pilot's speech had become significantly impaired and he was unable to respond to
instructions. Three aircraft intercepted the Beechcraft but were unable to make radio
contact. The aircraft continued flying on a straight heading for five hours before
running out of fuel and crashing near Mount Isa, Queensland. The incident became
known in the media as the "Ghost Flight"
A subsequent investigation concluded the pilot and the passengers had become
incapacitated and had been suffering from hypoxia, a lack of oxygen to the body,
meaning the pilot would have been unable to operate the aircraft. Towards the end of
the flight, the left engine began to be starved of fuel and the aircraft impacted with the
ground. The accident report said due to the damage to the aircraft upon impact with the
ground, investigators were unable to conclude if any of the eight aboard used the
oxygen system. The final report, issued by the Australian Transport Safety
Bureau (ATSB) did not come to a conclusion as to what caused the occupants to
become incapacitated. A number of safety recommendations were made following the
accident.
Background
The aircraft involved in the accident was a Beechcraft 200 Super King
Air, registration VH-SKC,serial number BB-47, manufactured in 1975. The aircraft had
been in service for a total for 18,771 hours before the accident. The amount of air
passed into the cabin is controlled by bleed airvalves on the engines. The positions of
the bleed air valves can be altered on the flight deck. According to the accident report,
"The aircraft was not fitted with a high cabin altitude aural warning device, nor was it
required to be." The aircraft was fitted with an emergency oxygen system—an oxygen
tank which could supply oxygen to the crew (through two masks located in the cockpit)
and passengers (through masks which would drop down from the ceiling of the cabin).
Accident investigators concluded the aircraft was airworthy at the time the accident
occurred, and a pilot who had flown the aircraft several hours before the accident flight
took off said the aircraft functioned normally. "The maintenance release was current
and an examination of the aircraft’s maintenance records found no recurring
maintenance problems that may have been factors in the accident," the accident report
stated.
Accident
On September 4, 2000, the aircraft chartered by mining company Sons of
Gwalia, departedPerth, Western Australia, for the mining town of Leonora, Western
Australia, transporting seven workers to Gwalia Gold Mine. The aircraft took off from
Perth at 1009 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), and one minute later was cleared by
ATC to climb to FL130 (13,000 feet (4,000 m)). Five minutes later, at 1015, the aircraft
was cleared to ascend to its cruising altitude of FL250 (25,000 feet (7,600 m)); the pilot
was told to ascend to FL160 by the time it was 36 nmi (67 km) from Perth. The pilot
acknowledged this transmission.
Five minutes later, at 1020, as the aircraft passed through FL156 (15,600 feet
(4,800 m)) it was cleared to waypoint DEBRA; the pilot acknowledged this. At
approximately 1033 the aircraft ascended through FL256 (25,600 feet (7,800 m)) and
ATC requested the pilot to confirm the altitude of the aircraft. “Sierra Kilo Charlie–
um–standby," the pilot said. This was the final spoken transmission from the aircraft,
and the altitude of the aircraft continued to increase. According to the accident report,
transmissions from the aircraft thereafter were only open-microphone transmissions,
sounds of what is believed to be standard background noise produced by the engines, a
person breathing, "one unintelligible syllable" and "two chime-like tones, similar to
those generated by electronic devices." ATC attempted to regain contact with the
aircraft as the transmissions occurred. "Sierra Kilo Charlie Sierra Kilo Charlie
Melbourne Centre if receiving this transmission squawk ident" the controller in contact
with the aircraft said at 1040. At 1041, the controller asked again, "Sierra Kilo Charlie
only receiving open mike from you. Would you contact me on one two five decimal
two."
the aircraft fly near the Beechcraft to observe the situation aboard. The flight crew of
the jet said the Beechcraft had levelled off at FL343 (34,300 feet (10,500 m)), and there
was no movement on the flight deck or in the cabin. They added the conditions made it
difficult to make observations of the situation of the Beechcraft.
Two other aircraft were then told to intercept and monitor the Beechcraft; they sighted
it in theNorthern Territory, northwest of Alice Springs. The flight crews of the aircraft
reported the Beechcraft was making a steady descent. Both aircraft followed the
Beechcraft during the descent. The airspeed of the Beechcraft increased during the
descent. "Although its external lights were on, nothing could be seen inside the cabin"
the accident report stated. "The crews of the chase aircraft attempted to contact the pilot
of the Beechcraft by radio but they did not receive a response." At 1510, the aircraft
turned left through 90 degrees as it descended through FL50 (5,000 feet (1,500 m)).
The aircraft impacted with the ground near Mount Isa, Queensland. Upon impact the
aircraft broke up; all seven passengers and the pilot were killed.
Investigation
The accident was investigated by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), a
federal body responsible for investigating transportation accidents in Australia. The
final accident report was published in March 2001. The report was unable to make a
definitive conclusion as to the cause of the crash.
The report found all those aboard the aircraft, including the pilot, had likely become
incapacitated and begun suffering from hypoxia. Hypoxia is a lack of oxygen to body
tissues and organs including the brain, heart and lungs, which can occur if an aircraft
flying at high altitude becomes depressurized. When affected by hypoxia, a person may
initially lose judgement and suffer impaired vision. "Simple tasks become
extraordinarily difficult and performance fails," a report on hypoxia states. "As hypoxia
continues, you become semiconscious. After you lose consciousness entirely, you have
only minutes to live, depending on the altitude."
The accident report stated, "After the aircraft climbed above the assigned altitude of
FL250, the speech and breathing patterns of the pilot, evidenced during the radio
transmissions, displayed changes consistent with hypoxia." Investigators were,
however, unable to conclusively dismiss toxic fumes as the cause. "The incapacitation
of the pilot and passengers was probably due to hypobaric hypoxia because of the high
cabin altitude and their not receiving supplemental oxygen" the report said, adding,
"The reasons for the pilot and passengers not receiving supplemental oxygen [from the
oxygen tank aboard the aircraft] could not be determined."
The ATSB found it likely that the autopilot was engaged, and this caused the aircraft to
fly on a straight heading; the vertical path of the aircraft indicated climb power had
been set before the occupants of the aircraft were incapacitated. "The design of the
aircraft systems were such that, with the autopilot engaged, the engines would continue
to operate and the aircraft would continue to fly without human input until it was
disrupted by other events, such as collision or fuel exhaustion," according to the
accident report. It was suggested that, towards to the end of the flight, the fuel tank for
the left engine on the aircraft was almost empty. "The near exhaustion of fuel in the left
wing tanks may have produced at least one, and probably several, momentary losses of
left engine power shortly before all power was lost" the report said. "The aircraft yawed
and rolled towards the left engine, as was observed shortly before the aircraft collided
with the ground."
The accident report said due to the damage to the aircraft upon impact with the ground,
investigators were unable to conclude if any of the eight aboard used the oxygen
system. However, the report stated "The absence of a distress radio call, or an attempt
to descend the aircraft, and the likelihood that the pilot did not don his oxygen mask,
suggested that the pilot was unaware that the aircraft was unpressurised or
depressurising." The passengers, the report added, were also likely not wearing their
oxygen masks, as there was no noise recorded on the ATC transmissions indicating
they were attempting to assist the pilot.
Investigators were not able to determine what caused the depressurisation of the
aircraft, but stated likely causes included either an incorrect switch selection due
to pilot error or a mechanical failure in the aircraft pressurization system. The air traffic
control recordings suggested it was unlikely a rapid decompression had occurred.
"During an explosive or rapid depressurisation of a pressurised aircraft, however, the
noise, pressure changes, temperature changes and draughts within the cabin would have
alerted the occupants that a substantial failure had occurred," the report added. The
document listed the two main factors in the accident as,
Aftermath
The flight deck of the Beechcraft Super King Air has visual warning if cabin altitude is
too high.[22] It is likely the pilot of the accident aircraft was suffering from hypoxia and
did not notice the visual warning. In the aftermath of an incident in 1999 involving the
pilot of a Beechcraft Super King Air suffering hypoxia, the ATSB published Report
199902928 and recommended an aural warning be fitted on the flight deck, in addition
to the visual warning, on all Beechcraft Super King Air aircraft. The Civil Aviation
Safety Authority (CASA) issued a notice to owners of pressurised aircraft registered in
Australia recommending installation of an aural warning, but did not make it
mandatory. The notice said, "The benefit to your pilots and passengers lies in the
reduction in risk of an uncommanded depressurisation leading to an incident or fatal
accident. The benefit is much greater than the cost of purchase and installation of one of
these low-cost systems."
When the air traffic controller responsible for the Beechcraft received the open-
microphone transmissions, he alerted his supervisor that he was concerned the pilot
could be suffering from hypoxia. The controller and his supervisor completed the
standard checklist which, at the time, did not include a procedure to follow in the case
of incapacitation or hypoxia. In the aftermath of the accident, the checklist was changed
to "incorporate procedures to be followed by air traffic controllers, when a controller
suspects that a pilot has been affected by hypoxia."
Accident summary
Date September 4, 2000
Type Crew incapacitation
Site Mount
Isa, Queensland,Australia
Passengers 7
Crew 1
Fatalities 8 (all)
Survivors 0
Aircraft type Beechcraft 200 Super King
Air
Tail number VH-SKC
Flight origin Perth, Western Australia
Destination Leonora, Western Australia
Air France Flight 4590
Air France Flight 4590 was a Concorde flight operated by Air France which was
scheduled to run from Charles de Gaulle International Airport near Paris, to John F.
Kennedy International Airport in New York City. On 25 July 2000, it crashed
in Gonesse, France. All one hundred passengers and nine crew members on board the
flight died. On the ground, four people were killed with one left injured.
The flight was chartered by German company Peter Deilmann Cruises. All passengers
were on their way to board the cruise ship MS Deutschland in New York City for a 16-
day cruise to South America.
This was Concorde's only accident in which fatalities occurred. It was the beginning of
the end for Concorde as an airliner; the type was retired three years later.
Event summary
Post-accident investigation revealed that the aircraft was just at, if not exceeding,
maximum weight for ambient temperature and other conditions, and up to one ton over
maximum structural weight. As it left the gate, it was loaded such that the centre of
gravity was excessively aft.]Fuel transfer during taxi may have overfilled number five
wing tank. A twelve inch spacer that keeps the left main landing gear in alignment had
not been replaced after recent maintenance, though the 2002 French Bureau Enquetes-
Accidents investigation concluded that this did not contribute to the accident. The wind
at the airport was light and variable that day, and was reported to the cockpit crew as an
eight knot tailwind as they lined up on runway 26R. Over an hour delayed, the crew
proceeded with take-off.
Five minutes before that decision, a Continental Airlines DC-10 departing for Newark,
New Jersey, had lost a titanium alloy strip, 435 millimetres (17.1 in) long and about 29
millimetres (1.1 in) to 34 millimetres (1.3 in) wide, during takeoff from the same
runway.
During the Concorde's subsequent take-off run, this piece of debris, still lying on the
runway, cut a tyre causing rupture and tyre debris to be hurled by centrifugal force. A
large chunk of this debris (4.5 kilograms or 9.9 pounds) struck the underside of the
aircraft's wing structure at an estimated speed of 500 kilometres per hour (310 mph).
Although it did not directly puncture any of the fuel tanks, it sent out a pressure
shockwave that eventually ruptured the number five fuel tank at the weakest point, just
above the landing gear. Leaking fuel gushing out from the bottom of the wing was most
likely to have been ignited by an electric arc in the landing gear bay or through contact
with severed electrical cables. At the point of ignition, engines one and two both surged
and lost all power, but engine one slowly recovered over the next few seconds. A large
plume of flame developed; the Flight Engineer then shut down engine two, in response
to a fire warning and the Captain's command.
Having passed V1 speed, the crew continued the take-off but the plane did not gain
enough airspeed with the three remaining engines, because the severed electrical cables
prevented the retraction of the undercarriage. The aircraft was unable to climb or
accelerate, and it maintained a speed of 200 knots (370 km/h; 230 mph) at an altitude of
60 metres (200 ft). The fire caused damage to the port wing, and it began to disintegrate
– melted by the extremely high temperatures. Engine number one surged again, but this
time failed to recover. Due to the asymmetric thrust, the starboard wing lifted, banking
the aircraft to over 100 degrees. The crew reduced the power on engines three and four
in an attempt to level the aircraft, but with falling airspeed they lost control, crashing
into the Hôtelissimo Les Relais Bleus Hotel near the airport.
The crew was trying to divert to nearby Le Bourget Airport, but accident investigators
stated that a safe landing, given the aircraft's flight path, would have been highly
unlikely.
As the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript recorded it, the last intelligible words of
the crew were (translated into English):
Co-pilot: "Le Bourget, Le Bourget, Le Bourget."
Pilot: "Too late (unclear)."
Control tower: "Fire service leader, correction, the Concorde is returning to runway
zero nine in the opposite direction."
Pilot: "No time, no (unclear)."
Co-pilot: "Negative, we're trying Le Bourget" (four switching sounds).
Co-pilot: "No (unclear)."
Passenger and crew fatalities
A memorial to the crash
All passengers and the crew were killed in the incident. Most of the passengers were
German tourists en route to New York for a cruise.
Nationality Passengers Crew Total
Germany 96 0 96
France 0 9 9
Denmark 2 0 2
Austria 1 0 1
United States 1 0 1
Total 100 9 109
Concorde grounded
The Concorde had been the safest working passenger airliner in the world according to
passenger deaths per distance travelled. The crash of a Concorde was the beginning of
the end of the aircraft's career.
A few days after the crash, all Concordes were grounded, pending an investigation into
the cause of the crash and possible remedies. Air France Concorde F-BVFC was
allowed to return to its home base from its stranded position in New York without
passengers.[citation needed]
Air France's Concorde operation had been a money-losing venture, but had been kept in
service as a matter of national pride (by contrast, British Airways claimed a profit on its
Concorde operations. Revenue service was resumed in 2001, until the remaining
aircraft were retired in 2003.
Accident investigation
A DC-10 similar to the one that dropped the metal piece
The official investigation was conducted by France's accident investigation bureau,
the BEA, and it was published on 14 December 2004. Only 1 video was found of the
flight.
Conclusions
The investigators concluded that:
The aircraft was overloaded by about a ton above the maximum safe take off
weight.
After reaching take-off speed, the tyre of the number 2 wheel was cut by a metal
strip lying on the runway, which came from the thrust reverser cowl door of the number
3 engine of a Continental Airlines DC-10 that had taken off from the runway several
minutes before. This strip was installed in violation of the manufacturer's rules [citation
needed].
The aircraft was airworthy and the crew were qualified. The landing gear that
later failed to retract had not shown serious problems in the past. Despite the crew
being trained and certified, no plan existed for the simultaneous failure of two engines
on the runway, as it was considered highly unlikely.
Aborting the take-off would have led to a high-speed runway excursion and
collapse of the landing gear, which also would have caused the aircraft to crash.
While two of the engines had problems and one of them was shut down, the
damage to the plane's structure was so severe that the crash would have been inevitable,
even with the engines operating normally.
Previous tyre incidents
In November 1981, the American NTSB sent a letter of concern, which included safety
recommendations for the Concorde, to the French BEA. This communiqué was the
result of the NTSB's investigations of four Air France Concorde incidents, during a 20
month period, fromJuly 1979, through February 1981. The NTSB described those
incidents as "potentially catastrophic", because they were caused by blown tyres during
take-off. The NTSB also expressed concern about the lack of adequate remedies, on the
part of the French, as well as improper crew responses to those incidents.
13 June 1979: The number 5 and 6 tyres blew out during a take-off from
Washington, D.C. Dulles Airport. Shrapnel thrown from the tyres and rims damaged
number 2 engine, punctured three fuel tanks, severed several hydraulic lines and
electrical wires, in addition to tearing a large hole on the top of the wing, over the
wheel well area.
21 July 1979: Another blown tyre incident, during take-off from Dulles Airport.
After that second incident the "French director general of civil aviation issued an air
worthiness directive and Air France issued a Technical Information Update, each
calling for revised procedures. These included required inspection of each wheel and
tyre for condition, pressure and temperature prior to each take-off. In addition, crews
were advised that landing gear should not be raised when a wheel/tyre problem is
suspected."
October 1979: Tyres number 7 and 8 failed during a take-off from New York's
JFK Airport. In spite of the well-publicized danger from the previous incidents, the
crew ignored the new safety recommendations and raised the landing gear and
continued to Paris. There was no subsequent investigation by the French BEA or the
NTSB of that incident.
February 1981: While en-route from Mexico City to Paris, Air France (F-BTSD)
blew more tyres during another take-off at Dulles Airport. Once again, the crew
disregarded the new procedures by raising the landing gear. The blown tyres caused
engine damage which forced the flight to land at New York JFK Airport. The NTSB's
investigation found that there had been no preparation of the passengers for a possible
emergency landing and evacuation. The CVR was also found to have been inoperative
for several flights, including one which followed a layover in Paris.
To save on weight, Concorde was designed to take off without the assistance
of flaps or slats. That required a significantly higher air and tyre speed, during the take-
off roll, which imposed a much greater centripetal force load on the tyres. That higher
speed increased the risk of tyre explosion during take-off. When the tyres did explode,
much greater kinetic energy was carried by the resulting shrapnel travelling at great
speeds tangentially from the rims (the kinetic energy of an object being directly
proportional to the square of its speed), increasing the risk of serious damage to the
aircraft. A thicker skin on the bottom side of the wings could have prevented serious
damage from an exploding tyre, but that would have added too much weight, cancelling
out most of the advantage of not having flaps or slats.
Alternative theories
British investigators and former French Concorde pilots looked at several other
possibilities that the report ignored, including an unbalanced weight distribution in the
fuel tanks and loose landing gear. They came to the conclusion that the Concorde
veered off course on the runway, which reduced take-off speed below the crucial
minimum. The aircraft had passed close to a Boeing 747 carrying French
President Jacques Chirac who was returning from the 26th G8 summit meeting in
Okinawa, Japan, which was much further down the runway than the Concorde's usual
take-off point; only then did it strike the metal strip from the DC-10
The Concorde was overweight for the given conditions, with an excessively aft centre
of gravity and taking off downwind. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to
roll, it was over its approved maximum take-off weight for the given conditions.
The Concorde was missing the crucial spacer from the left main landing-gear beam that
would have made for a snug-fitting pivot. This compromised the alignment of the
landing gear and the wobbling beam and gears allowing three degrees of movement
possible in any direction. The uneven load on the left leg's three remaining tyres
skewed the landing gear, with the scuff marks of four tyres on the runway showing that
the plane was veering to the left.[27]
Modifications and revival
The accident led to modifications being made to Concorde, including more secure
electrical controls, Kevlar lining to the fuel tanks, and specially developed, burst-
resistant tyres. The new-style tyres would be another contribution to future aircraft
development.
The crash of the Air France Concorde nonetheless proved to be the beginning of the
end for the type. Just before service resumed, the 11 September 2001 attacks took
place, resulting in a marked drop in customer numbers, and contributing to the eventual
end of Concorde flights.[29] Air France stopped flights in May 2003, while British
Airways ended its Concorde flights in October 2003.
In June 2010, two groups were attempting to revive Concorde for "Heritage" flights in
time for the 2012 Olympics. The British Save Concorde Group, SCG, and French group
Olympus 593 were attempting to get four Rolls-Royce Olympus engines running
smoothly at Le Bourget Air and Space Museum in France.
Criminal investigation
On 10 March 2005, French authorities began a criminal investigation of Continental
Airlines, whose plane dropped the debris on the runway.[31]
In September 2005, Henri Perrier, the former head of the Concorde division
at Aérospatiale, and Jacques Herubel, the Concorde chief engineer, came under
investigation for negligence: a report stated that the company had more than 70
incidents involving Concorde tyres between 1979 and 2000, but had failed to take
appropriate steps based upon these incidents.
On 12 March 2008, Bernard Farret, a deputy prosecutor in Pontoise, outside Paris,
asked judges to bring manslaughter charges against Continental Airlines and four
individuals:
John Taylor, a Continental mechanic
Stanley Ford, a Continental maintenance manager
Henri Perrier of Aérospatiale
Claude Frantzen, a former employee of the French airline regulator.
Charges against Jacques Herubel were reported to have been dropped, but on 3
July 2008, confirmation of the trial, including Herubel, was published. ] The trial started
on 2 February 2010. Also facing fines or a custodial sentence were the designers of the
plane, who prosecutors say knew that the plane's fuel tanks could be susceptible to
damage from foreign objects, as well as a French official responsible for the regulation
of the plane's safety.
Continental denied the charges, and claimed in court that the aircraft was already on
fire when it passed over the titanium strip.
On 6 December 2010, Continental Airlines was found criminally responsible for the
disaster by a Parisian court and was fined €200,000 ($271,628) and ordered to pay Air
France €1 million. Continental mechanic John Taylor was given a 15-month suspended
sentence, while another airline operative and three French officials were cleared of all
charges. The court ruled that the crash resulted from a piece of metal from a
Continental jet that was left on the runway; the object punctured a tyre on the Concorde
and then ruptured a fuel tank. Another Continental employee, Stanley Ford, was found
not guilty Continental's lawyer, Olivier Metzner, said it would appeal the verdict.
The court also ruled that Continental would have to pay 70% of any compensation
claims. As Air France has paid out €100 million to the families of the victims,
Continental could be made to pay its share of that compensation payout.
American Airlines Flight 587,
an Airbus A300, crashed into the Belle Harbor neighborhood of Queens,
a borough of New York City, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy
International Airport on November 12, 2001. This is the second deadliest U.S. aviation
accident to date, after American Airlines Flight 191.
With 260 fatalities on board and 5 on the ground, this accident has the third highest
death toll of any accident involving an Airbus A300. Iran Air Flight 655 and China
Airlines Flight 140 had higher fatalities.
The accident took place two months after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center in Manhattan. Several factors, such as the date, time, aircraft size, airline,
eyewitness accounts, and location in New York, raised concerns that the crash was
caused by another terrorist attack. Al-Qaeda listed the crash among its successes, and a
Canadian militant cooperating with authorities suggested that it had been brought down
with a shoe bomb. Nonetheless, terrorism was officially ruled out as the cause by the
National Transportation Safety Board, which instead attributed the disaster to the first
officer's overuse of rudder controls in response to wake turbulence.
Accident summary
Date November 12, 2001
Type Pilot error in response
to wake turbulence
Site Queens, New York City,
New York
Passengers 251
Crew 9
Injuries 1 (ground)
Fatalities 265 (including 5 on the
ground)
Survivors 0
Aircraft type Airbus A300-600
Operator American Airlines
Tail number N14053
Flight origin John F. Kennedy
International Airport
Destination Las Américas International
Airport,Dominican Republic
Summary
On November 12, 2001, about 09:16 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight
587, an Airbus A300 -605R delivered in 1987 and powered by two General
Electric CF6-80C2A5, N14053, crashed into Belle Harbor, a New York City residential
area, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York.
Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Américas International
Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crew members, seven
flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the plane. Ed States served as the captain,
and Sten Molin served as the first officer.
The plane's vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and fell into Jamaica Bay,
about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The plane's engines subsequently
separated in flight and fell several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All
260 people aboard the plane and 5 people on the ground died, and the impact forces and
a post-crash fire destroyed the plane. Flight 587 operated under the provisions of 14
Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual
meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.
Investigation
The A300-600, which took off minutes after a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 on the same
runway, flew into the larger jet's wake, an area of turbulent air. The first officer
attempted to keep the plane upright with aggressive rudder inputs. The strength of the
air flowing against the moving rudder stressed the aircraft's vertical stabilizer and
eventually snapped it off entirely, causing the aircraft to lose control and crash. The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that the enormous stress on
the rudder was due to the first officer's "unnecessary and excessive" rudder inputs, and
not the wake turbulence caused by the 747. The NTSB further stated "if the first officer
had stopped making additional inputs, the aircraft would have stabilized". Contributing
to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 sensitive
rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft
Maneuvering Training Program
Investigators were concerned in regard to the manner in which the vertical stabilizer
separated. The vertical stabilizer is connected to the fuselage with six attaching points.
Each point has two sets of attachment lugs, one made of composite material, another
of aluminum, all connected by a titanium bolt; damage analysis showed that the bolts
and aluminum lugs were intact, but not the composite lugs. This, coupled with two
events earlier in the life of the aircraft, namely delamination in part of the vertical
stabilizer prior to its delivery from the manufacturer and an encounter with heavy
turbulence in 1994, caused investigators to examine the use of composites.] The
possibility that the composite materials might not be as strong as previously supposed
was a cause of concern because they are used in other areas of the plane, including the
engine mounting and the wings. Tests carried out on the vertical stabilizers from the
accident aircraft, and from another similar aircraft, found that the strength of the
composite material had not been compromised, and the NTSB concluded that the
material had failed because it had been stressed beyond its design limit, despite ten
previous recorded incidents where A300 tail fins had been stressed beyond their design
limitation in which none resulted in the separation of the vertical stabilizer in-flight.
The official NTSB report of October 26, 2004 stated that the cause of the crash was the
overuse of the rudder to counter wake turbulence]
The crash was witnessed by hundreds of people, 349 of whom gave accounts of what
they saw to the NTSB. About half (52%) reported a fire or explosion before the plane
hit the ground. Others stated that they saw a wing detach from the aircraft, whereas in
fact it was the vertical stabilizer.
After the crash, Floyd Bennett Field's empty hangars were used as a makeshift
morgue for the identification of crash victims.
Aftermath
Since the NTSB's report, American Airlines has modified its pilot training
program. Training methods have been reviewed and changed as a result of the accident,
as previous training methods may have contributed to the accident. Previous simulator
training did not properly reflect "the actual large build-up in sideslip angle and side
loads that would accompany such rudder inputs in an actual airplane", according to the
NTSB final report.
Flight 587 no longer exists. The flight route designations of flights between Kennedy
Airport and Las Américas Airport are now 619, 635 and 789.
American Airlines retired all its Airbus A300-600 Aircraft from service eight years
after the accident (and 21 years in service) in August, 2009, with its last flight, flight
1908 from Miami to New York-JFK operating on August 24, 2009.
Cause
Terrorist claims
Because the crash was two months after the September 11 attacks and occurred in New
York, several major buildings including the Empire State Building and the United
Nations Headquarterswere evacuated. In the months after the crash, rumors were
suggesting that it had been destroyed in a terrorist plot, with a shoe bomb similar to the
one found on Richard Reid.[14][15]
In May 2002, Mohammed Jabarah agreed to cooperate with investigators as part of
a plea bargain. Among the details he gave authorities, was that Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed's lieutenant had told him that Reid and Abderraouf Jdey had both been
enlisted by the al-Qaeda chief to carry out identical shoe-bombing plots as part of a
second wave of attacks against the United States, and that Jdey had successfully blown
up Flight 587, while Reid had been stymied.
Nicholas Stix of Middle American News recounted the mutually contradictory theories
that the NTSB had floated immediately following the crash, the statements made by
retired fire fighters and police officers who had witnessed the crash, and the history of
similar crashes, and concluded that the agency was frantically seeking to calm a public
whose faith in commercial aviation had hit rock bottom.
National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the cause of the crash was overuse
of the rudder mechanism.
NTSB findings
According to the official accident report, after the first officer made his initial rudder
pedal input, he made a series of alternating full rudder inputs. This led to increasing
sideslip angles. The resulting hazardous sideslip angle led to extremely high
aerodynamic loads that resulted in separation of the vertical stabilizer. If the first officer
had stopped making these inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer separation, the
natural stability of the airplane would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0°, and
the accident would have been avoided. The airplane performance study indicated that
when the vertical stabilizer separation began, the aerodynamic loads were about two
times the loads defined by the design envelope. It can be determined that the vertical
stabilizer's structural performance was consistent with design specifications and
exceeded certification requirements.
Contributing factors include the following: First, the first officer's predisposition to
overreact to wake turbulence; second, the training provided by American Airlines that
could have encouraged pilots to make large flight control inputs; third, the first officer
likely did not understand an airplane's response to large rudder inputs at high airspeeds
or the mechanism by which the rudder rolls a transport-category airplane; finally, light
rudder pedal forces and small pedal displacement of the A300-600 rudder pedal system
increased the airplane's susceptibility to a rudder misuse.
Airbus and American are currently disputing the extent to which the two parties are
responsible for the disaster. American charges that the crash was mostly Airbus' fault
because the A300 was designed with unusually sensitive rudder controls. Most aircraft
require increased pressure on the rudder pedals to achieve the same amount of rudder
control at a higher speed. The Airbus A300 and later A310 do not operate on a fly-by-
wire flight control system, instead using conventional mechanical flight controls. The
NTSB determined that "because of its high sensitivity, the A300-600 rudder control
system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher
speeds". The Allied Pilots Association, in its submission to the NTSB, argued that the
unusual sensitivity of the rudder mechanism amounted to a design flaw which Airbus
should have communicated to the airline, and pointed to ten previous incidents in which
A300 tail fins had been stressed beyond their design limitation.
Airbus charges that the crash was mostly American's fault because the airline did not
train its pilots properly about the characteristics of the rudder. Aircraft tail fins are
designed to withstand full rudder deflection in one direction at maneuvering speed.
They are not usually designed to withstand an abrupt shift in rudder from one direction
to the other. Most American pilots believed that the tail fin could withstand any rudder
movement at maneuvering speed. The NTSB indicated that American Airlines'
Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program tended to exaggerate the effects of wake
turbulence on large aircraft. Therefore, pilots were being trained to react more
aggressively than was necessary.
Victims
Victims' nationalities[24]
Nationality Passengers Crew Total
United States 176 9 185
Dominican Republic 68 0 68
Republic of China (Taiwan) 3 0 3
France 1 0 1
Haiti 1 0 1
Israel 1 0 1
United Kingdom 1[note 1] 0 1
Total 251 9 260
All 260 people aboard the plane died, along with 5 people on the ground.
Relatives gathered at Las Americas International Airport. The airport created a private
area for relatives wishing to receive news about Flight 587. Some relatives arrived at
the airport to meet passengers, unaware that the flight had crashed.
One of the passengers killed on the flight was Hilda Yolanda Mayol, a 26-year-old
American woman on her way to vacation in her native Dominican Republic. Two
months earlier, on September 11, Mayol worked at a restaurant on the ground floor of
the World Trade Center and escaped before the building collapsed.
New York Yankee infielder Enrique Wilson was scheduled to be on the flight.
However, after the Yankees lost the 2001 World Series to the Arizona Diamondbacks,
negating any victory parade in New York, Wilson flew home a few days earlier and
was not on the flight.
Around 90% of the passengers on the flight were of Dominican descent. The Guardian
describes the flight as having "cult status" in Washington Heights, a Dominican area
of Manhattan. Belkis Lora, sister of crash victim Jose Lora, said, "Every Dominican in
New York has either taken that flight or knows someone who has. It gets you there
early. At home there are songs about it."
Memorial
A memorial was constructed in Rockaway Park, Belle Harbor's neighboring
community, in memory of the 265 victims of the crash at Beach 116th Street, a major
commercial street in the area. It was dedicated on November 12, 2006, the fifth
anniversary of the incident, in a ceremony attended by Mayor of New York
City Michael Bloomberg.
The memorial wall, designed by Dominican artist Freddy Rodríguez and Situ Studio,
has windows and a doorway looking towards the nearby Atlantic Ocean and angled
towards the Dominican Republic. It is inscribed with the names of the victims.[ Atop the
memorial is a quote, in both Spanish and English, from Dominican poet Pedro Mir,
reading "Después no quiero más que paz." (Translation: "Afterwards I want only
peace.")
In a ceremony held on May 6, 2007, at Woodlawn Cemetery in the Bronx, 889
unidentified fragments of human remains of the victims of the crash were entombed in
a group of four mausoleum crypts.
Singapore Airlines Flight 006
Singapore Airlines Flight 006 (SQ006) was a scheduled passenger flight
from Singapore Changi Airport to Los Angeles International Airport via Chiang Kai-
shek Airport (now Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport) in Taiwan. On 31 October
2000, at 15:17 UTC, 23:17 Taipeilocal time, a Boeing 747-412 on the route attempted
to take off from the wrong runway in Taipei during a typhoon, destroying the aircraft
and killing 83 of the 179 occupants.
SQ006 was the first fatal crash of a Singapore Airlines aircraft; prior to the SQ006
crash, the sole fatal incident involving SIA was the crash of SilkAir Flight 185,
operated by subsidiary SilkAir.
Crash
The path of Typhoon Xangsane
At 15:00 UTC, 23:00 Taipei local time on 31 October 2000, 9V-SPK, a Boeing 747-
400delivered on 21 January 1997, left Bay B5 during heavy rain caused
by Typhoon Xangsane. At 23:05:57, the CKS Airport cleared the aircraft to taxi to
runway 05L via "taxiway Sierra Sierra West Cross" and "November Papa". At
23:15:22, the airport cleared the aircraft to takeoff at 05L. Many carriers
in Southeast and East Asia take off during inclement weather. 9V-SPK had its last
maintenance check on 16 September 2000, and had no defects.
After a six-second hold, at 23:16:36, the crew attempted takeoff on runway 05R, which
had been closed for repairs, instead of the assigned runway 05L (which runs parallel to
05R). The captain, Foong Chee Kong, correctly heard that he needed to take off at 05L,
but he turned 215 metres (705 ft) too soon and lined up with 05R. The airport was not
equipped with ASDA, a ground radar which allows the airport controllers to monitor
aircraft movements on the ground.
Diagram of Chiang Kai-shek International Airport (now Taiwan Taoyuan International
Airport) and the taxi path of Singapore Airlines Flight 006. The dotted green line
indicates the correct path to Runway 05L. The yellow arrow indicates the path to
Runway 05R. The red path indicates the fatal takeoff path.
Due to poor visibility in the heavy rain, the flight crew did not see that construction
equipment, including two excavators, two vibrating rollers, one small bulldozer, and
one air compressor, had been parked on runway 05R. In addition, the runway contained
concrete jersey barriers and pits.About 41 seconds later, the aircraft collided with the
machinery and broke into pieces. The fuselage was torn in two, and the engines and
landing gear separated. A crane tore the left wing from the aircraft, forcing the jet back
on to the ground. The nose struck a scoop loader. A large fire followed, destroying the
forward section of the fuselage and the wings. 79 of 159 passengers and 4 of 20 crew
members died in the accident. Many of the dead were seated in the middle section of
the aircraft; the fuel stored in the wings exploded and sent balls of flame through that
section. At 23:17:36, the emergency bell sounded. 41 fire fighting vehicles, 58
ambulances, 9 lighting units, and 4,336 personnel were dispatched to assist survivors
and extinguish the fire. Chemical extinguishing agents rained on the aircraft at about
three minutes after the impact. At 23:35, roughly 10 minutes after the impact, the fire
was brought under control. At 23:40, non-airport ambulances and emergency vehicles
from other agencies congregated at the north gate. At 00:00 Taipei time on 1
November, the fire was mostly extinguished and the front part of the aircraft was
destroyed. Authorities established a temporary command centre.
Immediate news reports incorrectly stated that the Singapore Airlines jet hit one or two
aircraft on the tarmac, with one being a China Airlines jet "2601TW"; no other aircraft
were involved in the Singapore crash.
A passenger of China Airlines Flight 004 recorded a video of Singapore Airlines Flight
006 on fire.
Casualties
Rescuers retrieving a casualty from the wreckage.
179 passengers and crew,were including 3 children and 3 infants, were on the aircraft at
the time of the crash. Of the 179 occupants, 83 were killed, 39 suffered from serious
injuries, 32 had minor injuries, while 25 were uninjured. Amongst those who perished,
there were 4 crew members. 79 passengers and crew died on impact and immediately
after the crash and 2 passengers died at a hospital.
The passengers mostly consisted of Taiwanese and Americans.
Nationalities of passengers and crew
Nationality
Passengers Crew Total
Total Killed Total Killed Total Killed
Australia 1 0 0 0 1 0
Cambodia 1 0 0 0 1 0
Canada 1 0 0 0 1 0
Germany 1 0 0 0 1 0
India 11 10 0 0 11 10
Indonesia 5 1 0 0 5 1
Ireland 1 0 0 0 1 0
Japan 1 1 0 0 1 1
Malaysia 8 4 1 0 9 4
Mexico 3 0 0 0 3 0
Netherlands 1 1 0 0 1 1
New Zealand 2 0 0 0 2 0
Philippines 1 1 0 0 1 1
Singapore 11 8 17 4 28 12
Spain 1 0 0 0 1 0
Republic of China (Taiwan) 55 26 2 0 57 26
Thailand 2 0 0 0 2 0
United Kingdom 4 2 0 0 4 2
United States 47 24 0 0 47 24
Vietnam 2 1 0 0 2 1
Total 159 79 20 4 179 83
Amongst the Singaporeans who perished were Mrs. Elma Thwaites, mother
of Singapore Turf Club horse-trainer Malcolm Thwaites, Dr. Sung Kah Kay, assistant
professor of the National University of Singapore's Department of Computer
Science, and Captain Lim Kim Hock, a Republic of Singapore Air Force pilot on his
way to the Air National Guard to attend the Advanced Fighter Weapons Instructor
Course. In addition, four of the dead were Motorola employees. Sung's wife, Jennifer
Loo (a.k.a. Loo Tak Wing), also died on the flight.
Amongst perished passengers of other nationalities were the president and two vice
presidents of Buena Park, California-based Ameripec Inc. Kevin Rice, a professor
at UC Davis, survived the crash with more than 12% of his body burned, as did John
Diaz, a vice president of MP3.com, who survived the crash with injuries not related to
burns. William Wang, who later founded Vizio, survived with only carbon
monoxide poisoning."
Origin of passengers and crew and types of injuries sustained
Diagram of 9V-SPK illustrating crew and passenger seat locations, lack of injury,
severity of injuries, and deaths.
The captain, relief pilot, Ng Kheng Leng, and co-pilot, Latiff Cyrano, originated from
Singapore on the 30 October SQ 006, rested at a hotel in Taipei, and boarded the 31
October SQ 006. The crew consisted of 12 males and 8 females. Of the flight crew, 2
males and 2 females died.]The co-pilot received minor injuries. The pilot and relief pilot
sustained no injuries. Of the 17 cabin crew members, 4 died, 4 received serious injuries,
and 9 received minor injuries.
Of the passengers, 79 died, 35 received serious injuries, 22 received minor injuries, and
23 were uninjured.
The aircraft had 5 first-class passengers, 28 business-class passengers (9 on lower deck
and 19 on upper deck), and 126 economy-class passengers. Of the first class
passengers, 1 received a minor injury and 4 received no injuries. Of the business-class
passengers, 14 (2 on lower deck, 12 on upper deck) died, 2 (1 on lower deck, 1 on
upper deck) received serious injuries, 7 (2 on lower deck, 5 on upper deck) received
minor injuries, and 8 (4 on lower deck, 4 on upper deck) were uninjured. Of the
economy class passengers, 65 died, 33 received serious injuries, 14 received minor
injuries, and 11 were uninjured. The lower deck passengers who died were seated in
rows 22 through 38. 64 of 76 passengers in the forward economy section were killed by
the explosion of the centre fuel tank, which resulted in intense fire. In the upper deck of
the business class section, 12 of 19 passengers and 1 of 2 flight attendants died due to
smoke inhalation and fire; 10 bodies, originating from the upper deck of business class,
were found between the stairwell and the 2L exit on the main deck. All passengers in
the aft economy section survived.
Of the passengers on the TPE-LAX leg, 77 flew from Singapore and 82 flew from
Taipei. Of the passengers originating from Singapore, 37 died. Of the passengers
originating from Taipei, 42 died Of the three male passengers identified as infants,
including two Indians originated from Singapore and one Taiwanese originated from
Taipei, all three died.
The Department of Forensic Pathology Institute of Foreign Medicine, Ministry of
Justice performed seven autopsies. One person died from impact injuries, and six
people died from severe burns. Many passengers on the flight sustained burns since jet
fuel splashed onto the passengers.
Lin Ming-liang, a 45-year old Taiwanese passenger bearing burns to more than 86% of
his body, died of his injuries at Chang Gung Memorial Hospital, Linkou, Taipei
County (now New Taipei City) on Sunday 5 November 2000. Lee Suet Yee, a
hospitalized Singaporean woman bearing burns to 95% of her body, died of her injuries
in a Taiwanese hospital on 24 November 2000.
Diaz did not receive burns; he received lung damage and "body shock," which resulted
in compressed joints with soft tissue damage.When Diaz appeared on Oprah Winfrey's
show, he used a walker.
A Taiwanese couple who survived the incident stated that they chose to fly Singapore
Airlines because of the airline's safety record.
Investigation findings
SQ006 9V-SPK; the broken off tail section of the aircraft.
An investigation into the accident was conducted by the Aviation Safety Council (ASC)
of the Republic of China. The final report was issued by the ASC on 24 April 2002. In
the report section "Findings Related to Probable Causes," which detailed factors that
played a major role in the circumstances leading to the accident, it was stated that the
flight crew did not review the taxi route, despite having all the relevant charts, and as a
result did not know the aircraft had entered the wrong runway. Upon entering the
wrong runway, the flight crew had neglected to check the paravisual display (PVD) and
the primary flight display (PFD), which would have indicated that the aircraft was lined
up on the wrong runway. According to the ASC, these errors, coupled with the
imminent arrival of the typhoon and the poor weather conditions, caused the flight crew
to lose situational awareness and led them to attempt to take off from the wrong
runway.
Notification of details
Immediately after the accident occurred, James Boyd, a Singapore
Airlines spokesperson in Los Angeles, stated that no fatalities occurred in the crash; the
airline statement revised to state that fatalities occurred.
The airline initially stated that reports of the aircraft taking the wrong runway were
untrue before the fact that the wrong runway was used was proven true.
Khan Mahmood, an Atlanta man whose sister and parents died on SQ006, criticised the
airline for taking too much time to notify relatives.
A counseling center opened at Los Angeles International Airport to deal with relatives
of passengers.
Relatives of victims provided blood samples in order to identify bodies.
Contesting investigation findings
The report by ASC was deemed controversial by Singapore's Ministry of
Communications & Information Technology (now Ministry of Transport), Singapore
Airlines and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA),
among others.[citation needed]
Singaporean officials protested that the report did not present a full account of the
incident and was incomplete, as responsibility for the accident appeared to have been
placed mainly on the flight crew of SQ006, while other equally valid contributing
factors had been played down. The team from Singapore that participated in the
investigation felt that the lighting and signage at the airport did not measure up to
international standards. Some critical lights were missing or not working. No barriers or
markings were put up at the start of the closed runway, which would have alerted the
flight crew that they were on the wrong runway. The Singapore team felt that these two
factors were given less weight than was proper, as another flight crew had almost made
the same mistake of using runway 05R to take off days before the accident.[citation needed]
Singapore Airlines also issued a statement after the release of the ASC report. In their
statement, Singapore Airlines reiterated the points brought up by the Singapore
investigators and added that air traffic control (ATC) did not follow their own
procedure when they gave clearance for SQ006 to take off despite ATC's not being able
to see the aircraft. Singapore Airlines also clarified that the paravisual display (PVD)
was meant to help the flight crew maintain the runway centreline in poor visibility,
rather than to identify the runway in use.
The statement by Kay Yong (戎凱 Rēng Kǎi), managing director of the Republic of
China's Aviation Safety Council, implied that pilot errorplayed a major role in the crash
of the Boeing 747-400, which led to the deaths of 83 people. He stated that the airport
should have placed markers stating that the runway was closed to takeoffs and landings.
In general, airport runways that are closed are not normally lighted, to make it clear
they are not in use. At Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport, a single switch
controlled green lights on the common taxiway to both runways and on the centreline of
runway 05R. Civil Aeronautics Administration Deputy Director Chang Kuo-cheng said
runway 05L was fully lit on Tuesday night by white and yellow lights and only the
green centreline lighting was illuminated on closed runway 05R. On the taxiway to the
runways, four large signs point the way to runway 05L, he added, and he refused to
state explicitly that pilot error was the primary cause of the mix-up.[citation needed]
Runway 05R was not blocked off by barriers because part of the strip was used by
landing planes to taxi back to the airport terminal. The pilot confirmed twice with the
control tower that he was on the correct runway; controllers did not know the plane had
actually gone on to the wrong runway because the airport lacked ground radar and the
plane was out of sight of the tower at the time of its takeoff.[citation needed]
Actions of flight crew and flight attendants
Steven Courtney and John D. Wiggans, survivors of the crash, stated in a USA
Today article that the staff were unable to help the passengers escape from the aircraft
due to being frozen by fear and/or due to lack of competence in emergency procedures;
Wiggans was seated in the upper deck business class area. The Straits Times carried
reports of flight attendants saving lives of passengers. One story from the newspaper
stated that Irene Ang (a.k.a. Ang Miau Lee) escaped the crash, ran back into the aircraft
to attempt to save passengers, and died.
The Australian reported that some flight attendants helped passengers and some flight
attendants fled the aircraft before all passengers were accounted for. Genevieve Jiang
of The Electric New Paper stated that the pilots attempted to help the passengers.]
The Taiwanese report stated that the relief pilot (Crew Member 3, or CM-3) said in an
interview that he was the first to leave the cockpit and the last to leave the aircraft . A
passenger sitting in seat 17A stated that the Right Upper Deck Door flight attendant
directed him to the main deck via the stairs. The flight attendant died .
Upper deck passengers and flight attendants stated that the Crew-In-Charge flight
attendant (CIC) traveled upstairs after the first impact; the Crew-In-Charge flight
attendant died
The 3R and 3L flight attendants died; they were seated in the middle of the aircraft
Aftermath
A Singapore Airlines Boeing 747-400 in its normal livery. Following the crash of
SQ006, the airline removed the tropical livery given to SPK's sister ship.
After the release of the ASC report, Republic of China public prosecutors called upon
the flight crew of SQ006 to return to the ROC for questioning and the three-member
crew complied. Rumours abounded during that period that the pilots might be detained
in the ROC and charged with negligence. IFALPA had previously stated that it would
advise its members of the difficulties of operating into the ROC if the flight crew of
SQ006 were prosecuted. The prosecutors did not press charges and the flight crew were
allowed to leave the ROC.[citation needed]
Singapore Airlines changed the flight route designation to SQ030 immediately after the
incident, and then later to SQ028. The TPE-LAX route was operated by Boeing
777 aircraft until its demise on October 1, 2008. Flights to Los Angeles are now served
with a stop over in Tokyo's Narita Airport.
The accident aircraft 9V-SPK was painted in Singapore Airlines special promotion
livery, a scheme called "Tropical", at the time of the accident. The special livery was
intended to promote Singapore Airlines new first class and new business class products.
After the accident, 9V-SPK's sister aircraft, 9V-SPL, the only other aircraft painted
with the promotional livery, was immediately removed from service and repainted
withstandard Singapore Airlines livery. No special promotion livery has been
introduced on any Singapore Airlines's aircraft since the accident.
Dozens of survivors and relatives of those killed filed lawsuits against the airline and
ROC authorities. Singapore Airlines denied culpability and the captain and first officer
were subsequently fired by the airline.
The Association of Asian American Yale Alumni named the Tina E. Yeh Community
Service Fellowship program after Tina Eugenia Yeh, an American who boarded SQ006
in Taipei and died.
Runway 05R at TPE has been converted to taxiway NC and runway 05L has been
renamed to runway 05.
Repatriation and distribution of bodies
Rows of coffins and grieving kin of the deceased.
By 8 November 2000, several bodies were scheduled to be repatriated. Of the bodies:
19, including 14 Americans, 3 Taiwanese, and 2 Indians, were repatriated to the
United States
13, including 11 Singaporeans, 1 British, and 1 American, were repatriated to
Singapore
10, including 8 Indians and 2 Americans, were repatriated to India
4 were repatriated to Malaysia ]
3 Americans were repatriated to Canada
1 was repatriated to Indonesia
1 was repatriated to Japan
1 was repatriated to the Netherlands
1 was repatriated to the United Kingdom
1 was repatriated to Vietnam
The bodies of 14 Taiwanese passengers remained in Taipei to be collected by relatives.
Hospitalization and release of survivors
By 2 November 2000, 40 passengers and crew were hospitalized, of whom 11 were
later released that night. On 5 November 2000, 34 passengers and crew remained
hospitalized. 64 were discharged from the hospitals. Lin Ming-liang, a Taiwanese
passenger, died that day. On 8 November 2000, 14 passengers and crew remained
hospitalized: 20 in the Republic of China (Taiwan), 3 in Singapore and 1 in United
States. 73 survivors, 40 who were not hospitalized and 33 who were discharged, had
either returned home or continued with their travel. Lee Suet Yee, a Singaporean
woman hospitalized in Taipei on 8 November, died on 24 November 2000.
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