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Cobenefits or collateral damage?The potential impacts on the wellbeing of forest-dependent people under different
shades of REDD (Country case studies)
Karin Svadlenak-Gomez
Research report submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc inBiodiversity Conservation and Management for Distance Learning Students of the
University of London, Centre for Development, Environment and Policy (CeDEP), Schoolof Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
25 September 2009
Word count: 9986
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Table of Contents
Research Report Declaration Form.................................................................................1Table of Contents............................................................................................................2
List of Figures and Tables ...............................................................................................3
Abstract...........................................................................................................................4
Acknowledgements.........................................................................................................51 Introduction ..............................................................................................................62 Methodology ............................................................................................................8
2.1 Research questions .....................................................................................82.2 Data collection & analysis ............................................................................82.2.1 Analytical framework....................................................................................92.2.2 Country cases............................................................................................10
3 Climate change, deforestation, biodiversity, and human wellbeing.........................123.1 Deforestation as a driver of global climate change and biodiversity loss ....123.2 The flip side: climate change impacts on forests and associated
biodiversity.................................................................................................143.3
The human aspect: Impacts on the wellbeing of forest-dependent people .15
3.4 Multiple benefits from REDD......................................................................153.5 Poverty, equity, governance, and REDD....................................................17
4 Country case studies..............................................................................................204.1 Africa .............................................................................................................20
4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)..................................................204.2 South and Central America............................................................................25
4.2.1 Bolivia ........................................................................................................254.2.2 Guatemala .................................................................................................30
4.3 Southeast Asia...............................................................................................354.3.1 Cambodia ..................................................................................................35
5 Discussion..............................................................................................................416
Conclusions and Recommendations ......................................................................46
Appendix 1: The evolution of REDD......................................................................... A.1-1Appendix 2: Sample Questionnaire .......................................................................... A.2-1Appendix 3: Notes on Indicators and Country Data Comparison.............................. A.3-1Appendix 4: Expanded Country Case Studies.......................................................... A.4-1
A.4.1 Africa ................................................................................................... A.4-1A.4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ......................................... A.4-1A.4.2 South and Central America ................................................................ A.4-17A.4.2.1 Bolivia ............................................................................................. A.4-17A.4.2.2 Guatemala ...................................................................................... A.4-27A.4.3 Southeast Asia region........................................................................ A.4-38
References..................................................................................................................R-1Bibliography ................................................................................................................ B-1
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List of Figures and Tables
Figure 3-1: Global Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions.....................................13Figure 4-1: DRC Land Cover Map .................................................................................20
Figure 4-2: North-Eastern DRC .....................................................................................20Figure 4-3: Bolivia Land Cover Map ..............................................................................26Figure 4-4: Satellite image of Bolivia .............................................................................27Figure 4-5: Guatemala land cover map .........................................................................31Figure 4-6: Satellite image of fires from biomass burning in Guatemala ........................32Figure 4-7: Cambodia Land Cover Map.........................................................................36Figure 4-8: Satellite image of South East Asia...............................................................37Figure 5-1: Comparison of two key governance indicators ............................................41Figure A.4-1: DRC Land Cover Map......................................................................... A.4-2Figure A.4-2: North-Eastern DRC............................................................................. A.4-2
Figure A.4-3: DRC logging concessions and protected areas................................... A.4-4Figure A.4-4: The Eastern Afromontane Hotspot...................................................... A.4-4
Figure A.4-5: Bolivia land cover map...................................................................... A.4-18Figure A.4-6: Satellite image of Bolivia................................................................... A.4-19Figure A.4-7: The Tropical Andes Hotspot.............................................................. A.4-19Figure A.4-9: Guatemala land cover map............................................................... A.4-28Figure A.4-10: Satellite image of fires from biomass burning in Guatemala............ A.4-29Figure A.4-11: Political map of the MBR in Guatemala........................................... A.4-37Figure A.4-12: Land use in the Guatemalan Maya Biosphere Reserve................... A.4-37Figure A.4-13: Cambodia land cover map .............................................................. A.4-39Figure A.4-14: Satellite image of South East Asia (2001) ....................................... A.4-40Figure A.4-15: Protected areas and protected forests ............................................ A.4-41
Figure A.4-16: Forested and sparsely populated provinces in Cambodia ............... A.4-42Figure A.4-17: Forest classification, administration and concessions ..................... A.4-44
Figure A.4-18: The Oddar Meanchey Carbon Forestry Project Area ...................... A.4-49Figure A.4-19: The Seima Biodiversity Conservation Area ..................................... A.4-50
Table 2-1: Analytical framework ....................................................................................10Table 4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC).....................................................................21Table 4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia) ..................................................................25Table 4-3: Key data and indicators (Guatemala) ...........................................................30Table 4-4: Key data and indicators (Cambodia).............................................................35Table A.3-1: Country data comparison..................................................................... A.3-5
Table A.4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC)............................................................. A.4-1
Table A.4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia)........................................................ A.4-17Table A.4-3: Environmental threat changes as a result of the project ..................... A.4-25Table A.4-4: Key data and indicators (Guatemala)................................................. A.4-27Table A.4-5: Key data and indicators (Cambodia) .................................................. A.4-38
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Abstract
Tropical deforestation and forest degradation are important drivers of both climatechange and loss of biodiversity, while forests and the ecological services they provide
are also being affected by climate change. The new mechanism Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), which is being considered as onecomponent of a successor arrangement to the Kyoto Protocol, offers a promising newavenue for financing forest conservation. Under REDD, developing countries would bepaid by developed countries for avoided deforestation and degradation. REDD couldoffer benefits for climate change mitigation, biodiversity, and poverty reduction indeveloping countries.
This research report presents an analysis of governance issues related to pro-poorREDD implementation. Section 2 presents the methodology used. Section 3 discussesrelevant background in a global context based on a literature review of the links betweenclimate change, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and poverty, and relevant governance
issues. Section 4 presents four country-specific case analyses (Democratic Republic ofCongo, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia) of the impact different governance contexts,and in particular forest governance, is likely to have on REDD co-benefits for forest-dependent people. Findings from the analysis are used to discuss, in section 5, theimplications of national governance indicators for forest-dependent people.
To achieve pro-poor REDD outcomes, governance institutions need reform andstrengthening in the countries analyzed. It is also argued that where political will islacking or pressures from powerful groups are too strong, chances are slim thatmarginalized communities will experience real improvements in wellbeing.
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"What we are doing to the forests of the world is but a mirrorreflection of what we are doing to ourselves and to one another."Mahatma Gandhi
1 Introduction
The global environment today is faced with the dual crises of climate change and drastic
biodiversity decline, driven primarily by anthropogenic forces. Some estimates warn that
between 20 and 30% of all plant and animal species will probably be threatened with
extinction if global average temperatures exceed 1.5 to 2.5C over 1980-1999 levels
(IPCC, 2007b).
Tropical deforestation and forest degradation are important drivers of both climatechange and loss of biodiversity. In turn, forests and the ecological services they provide
are also being affected by climate change. There has long been a large gap between
funding needed and funds available for effective biodiversity conservation in tropical
forests, and innovative approaches to generate additional funding are increasingly being
explored (Emerton et al., 2006; Olander et al., 2009; Richards & Jenkins, 2007; White &
Hatcher, 2009). Because forest services have been undervalued, users and owners
often do not have sufficient motivation to leave forests standing1.
The emergence of carbon markets (both the voluntary market and the new mechanism
called Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD), which is being
considered as one component of a successor arrangement to the Kyoto Protocol of the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) after 2012, appear to offer a
promising new avenue for financing forest conservation (Angelsen, 2008). Under the
Kyoto Protocol, countries can obtain carbon credits only for afforestation/reforestation
activities. In the EU Emissions Trading Scheme forest carbon is also marginalized
(Richards & Jenkins, 2007).2
Under REDD, developing countries would be paid bydeveloped countries for the service of avoided deforestation and degradation (Ebeling
& Yasu, 2008).
1This is not the only underlying cause, but it is a significant one.2 The evolution of REDD is briefly outlined in Appendix 1.
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While the principal aim of REDD schemes is to maintain carbon stocks to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, such a mechanism could offer benefits for biodiversity and
other ecosystem services, and for poverty reduction in developing countries (Peskett et
al., 2008).
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2 Methodology
Due to the broad scope of this topic, this report concentrates on the impacts of REDD on
the wellbeing and rights of forest-dependent people.
Peskett et al. (2008) have looked at general policy options for designing pro-poor REDD
initiatives. They argue that more research is needed, inter alia, on poverty implications
of demonstration REDD activities and of REDD systems in different national contexts.
This research report is an attempt to contribute to these areas.
2.1 Research questions
This research report investigates the following questions:
1. What is the likely consequence of REDD for the rights and livelihoods of poor
forest-dependent people in different country contexts?
1.1 What processes are jeopardizing local livelihoods and rights?1.2 Who wins and who loses in different governance and land tenure contexts?
2. What policies exist or would have to be put into place to ensure equitable benefit-
sharing within countries and avoid harmful REDD impacts on forest-dependent
people?
2.2 Data collection & analysis
Data collection was primarily accomplished through a thorough literature review
including follow-up with some of the authors. Secondarily, interviews or written answers
to questionnaires with country-based informants provided additional insights. An open-
ended questionnaire/interview guide was devised for this purpose and is attached as
Appendix 2
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The data collected were primarily qualitative in nature, except for existing statistics and
indicators. Information on countries was compiled and synthesized into brief case
studies (see Section 4). Although generalization from the case studies is not possible,
as the main challenges involved are national governance issues, it is likely that thegeneral analysis and conclusions could be applicable in similar contexts elsewhere.
2.2.1 Analytical framework
The analytical framework for REDD implications for the poor used by Peskett et al.
(2008) provided a starting point. It is based on three poverty dimensions (income and
growth; equity; and voice and choice) and four spatial scales: individual, community,national, and international.
For this research, some representative indicators for the above poverty dimensions
(relating to human wellbeing and governance issues) were selected (see Table 2-1) and
statistics collected for each case country. These primarily national level data, and,
where they exist, studies of relevant project experiences, were reviewed and used to
analyse REDD/wellbeing implications and to infer the likelihood of benefits reaching the
individual/community level
3
. Selected indicators, as well as forest,- and biodiversity data,are further explained and presented in summary form (see Table A.3-1) in Appendix 3.
3Although Peskett et al. rightly distinguish between individual and community levels, for purposesof this report, due to data limitations, these are here lumped together as one category.
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Table 2-1: Analytical framework
Dimensions of wellbeing Related governance issues4 Indicators
(national level)Livelihoods/income National development status
Income distribution Poverty Reduction Strategies
National Human DevelopmentIndex (HDI) NationalMillennium Development
Goal (MDG) reports Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP) or similarstrategy documents prepared
Timber & non-timber forestproduct (NTFP) use
Equity (intra-country/intra-community)
Benefit-sharing mechanisms(Who owns forest carbon?)
Land tenure/resource access(Who may use forestresources?)
Status of indigenous/ forest-dependent people
National income-distribution(GINI)
Forest ownership/tenure Forest laws ILO 169, UNDRIP, national
legislation
Voice & Choice
(participation)
Transparency in governance
Participatory forestmanagement Institutional capacity
Corruption perception index
(CPI) Voice & accountability index Government effectiveness
index Extent of community-
management FSC certification Community participation in
national REDD processdevelopment
2.2.2 Country cases
The topic was illustrated through four country cases: Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia. These were selected on the basis of
location (aiming for a broad geographical spread) and existence of forests of high
conservation importance, such as the Global 200 priority areas (NGS & WWF, n.d.).
Countries were classified into one of four potential categories based on forest cover and
recent deforestation rates following Da Fonseca et al. (2007): 1. Low Forest Cover/High
Deforestation (LFHD), 2. Low Forest Cover/Low Deforestation (LFLD), 3. High ForestCover/High Deforestation (HFHD), and 4. High Forest Cover/Low Deforestation (HFLD).
The cut-off point for HF/LF is 50% forest-cover, and for HD/LD a 0.22% annual
deforestation rate. Under some REDD scenarios, HD countries would have greater
4 Governance issues are crosscutting and do not usually apply to only one of the dimensions ofwellbeing. The separation here is merely for convenience.
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potential for earning REDD credits than LD countries, since REDD would only pay for
avoiding additionaldeforestation.
This report does not provide a complete analysis of this issue. Rather, it is assumed that
the countries analyzed will be able to receive substantial earnings from REDD that couldbe distributed to stakeholders at national and local levels. The specific focus of analysis
is the likelihood of REDD benefits reaching the forest-dependent poor, which is
essentially a governance matter. The F/D classification was adopted merely for
illustrative purposes, as it provides a rough idea of a countrys forest situation. The
classification for each country is shown in data tables in Section 4 of the report.
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3 Climate change, deforestation, biodiversity, and
human wellbeing
3.1 Deforestation as a driver of global climate change and
biodiversity loss
Climate change due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is now widely
considered a very urgent threat to the global environment and continued human
wellbeing. The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2), the principal anthropogenicgreenhouse gas, in the atmosphere had risen from a pre-industrial value of about 280
ppm to 379 ppm in 2005, and the average annual rate of increase in concentration over
the decade 1995-2005 (1.9 ppm p.a.) surpassed by far the average since the beginning
of atmospheric measurements. The bulk of the increased concentration is attributable to
fossil fuel use, while land-use change also contributes about 30%. Within the land-use
change category, deforestation and forest degradation is most important, accounting for
17.4% of overall CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2007b). This is more than the share of the
transport sector (Stern, 2006), as can be seen in Figure 3-1.
In 2005 about 30% of the Earths land mass (4 billion hectares) was forested, but global
forest area continues to decrease. In the period 2000-2005, about 13 million hectares
per year were lost, mainly due to land use change (FAO, 2005). Global average
deforestation figures hide large differences among regions and countries. The rates of
deforestation in tropical regions were highest. Over the past few decades, the direct
causes of deforestation have largely shifted from being driven by land conversion for
subsistence farming to large-scale exploitation of forest areas for commercial use, suchas oil and mineral extraction, logging, and conversion to plantations (Butler & Laurance,
2008).
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Figure 3-1: Global Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions
a) Global annual emissions (1970 to 2004), b) Share of different anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (CO2-eq.) in 2004, c) Emissions share of different sectors (forestry includes deforestation).
Source: IPCC (2007a, p.36)
Many disappearing forests are of high biodiversity value and home to threatened, often
unique, species. There is widespread scientific consensus that protected area coverage
of important biodiversity areas is insufficient (Schmitt et al., 2009). Furthermore, many
protected forests suffer considerably from illegal deforestation and degradation, though
at lower rates than unprotected forests (Campbell et al., 2008).
Estimates of carbon stored in different types of forest vary. Most global estimates are
rough approximations based on biome-average datasets that use representative values
of forest carbon per unit area for broad forest categories (Gibbs et al., 2007). Tropical
forests probably store more than 320 billion tonnes of carbon globally (Campbell et al.,
2008). Whether mature forests are net sinks or emitters has been contentious, but
recent research has strengthened the case for the important role old-growth forest plays
in carbon sequestration (Lewis et al., 2009). Even the cautious assessment of forests
and emissions undertaken for the Eliasch Review confirms that, overall, intact tropicalforests are expected to remain net carbon sinks (Betts et al., 2008).
Forest cover also produces an indirect climate impact by modifying some physical
properties of the land surface, such as its albedo. The feedback mechanisms are
complex and dependent on forest-type and land use. For tropical regions, there is broad
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agreement that further deforestation would cause the land surface temperature to warm
because of reduced transpiration, and that large scale deforestation may alter
atmospheric circulation, thereby further modifying climates (Betts et al., 2008).
3.2 The flip side: climate change impacts on forests and
associated biodiversity5
Climate change is expected to increasingly drive biodiversity loss, but the process is
complex, as current and projected impacts on biodiversity are subject to the multiple and
non-linear feedback loops and lag-times within ecological systems (Ehrlich & Ehrlich
2008). The impacts on forests are as yet uncertain. While some forest areas may
become more productive, others may eventually change into different ecosystems
altogether (Betts et al., 2008). Rosenzweig et al. (2007) report that physical and
biological systems on all continents are already being affected, particularly by regional
temperature increases that initiate alterations in hydrological systems, water resources,
coastal zones, and oceans. Shifts in species distributions, local abundance, and
phenology have by now been documented (e.g., Adams et al., 2009; Battisti et al., 2005;
Chen et al., 2009; Dale et al., 2001; Danby & Hik, 2007; Ehrlich & Pringle, 2008; Evans,
2006; Myers et al., 2009; Reid et al., 2004; Seppl et al., 2009; Van Mantgem et al.,
2009; Williams & Liebhold, 2002).
While the severity of the impacts and the extent of future biodiversity losses due to
climate change and forest degradation or deforestation are difficult to predict (Laurance,
2007; Wright & Muller-Landau, 2006; Dirzo & Raven, 2003), without decisive action, the
decline will be unstoppable (Ehrlich & Pringle, 2008).
5 Several drivers of biodiversity loss tend to reinforce one another (MEA 2005). This report limitsthe discussion to climate change impacts on forest-based biodiversity.
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3.3 The human aspect: Impacts on the wellbeing of forest-
dependent people
While human actions are driving biodiversity loss and climate change, reciprocal
consequences are also diminishing human wellbeing. Poor people, especially those
living in remote rural areas, are expected to be most severely impacted.
About 1.6 billion people rely on forest resources for food and cash income (FAO, 2008;
UN-DESA, 2009), and over 800 million people live inside tropical forests and woodlands
and in mosaiclands, outnumbering people dwelling on purely agricultural lands (Chomitz,
2006). In areas of high forest and very low population densities forest-dependence is
likely highest (Chomitz, 2006). It is, however, fruitless to seek simplistic connections
between forests and poverty. Empirically, the links are weak. Some people derive
wealth from forests, others from converting forests to agriculture (Chomitz, 2006, p. 81).
Deforestation results in the decline of many species that are essential to forest peoples
livelihoods, with negative consequences for subsistence use and local trade. It has
been estimated that by the 2080s between 50 and 200 million people (mostly from
developing countries) will be displaced by climate-induced changes to crop yields,
ecosystem boundaries and species ranges (Anderson, 2005). Under the rightgovernance systems, the millions of people who depend on forests for their livelihoods
are likely to benefit from climate change mitigation and forest conservation.
3.4 Multiple benefits from REDD
Given the synergies between protecting forests, biodiversity conservation, and mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions, governments could simultaneously meet multipleenvironmental obligations, including those under the UNFCCC, the Convention on
Biological Diversity, and other conventions and agreements. In addition, REDD could
advance poverty reductionefforts at national and local levels and provide other social
benefits.
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There are, however, also risks to biodiversity6 and local communities that could arise
from REDD. Concerning poverty reduction, there are two distinct issues:
First, there is the question of how much overall funding a particular country is likely to
gain from a REDD scheme, and whether this would be sufficient to counteractdeforestation pressures. What type of reference level is used is critical7 (Ebeling &
Yasu, 2008). In addition, the opportunity costs of avoided deforestation are highly
variable, depending on location (type of land-use, soil, climate, production scale,
technology and inputs used, market access and infrastructure quality), and are
complicated by factors such as commodity market prices, costs of the factors of
production, and the discount rate applied (Grieg-Gran, 2008). It is not surprising, given
this complexity, that estimates of opportunity costs per hectare vary widely (see, e.g.,
analyses by Butler et al. (2009), Venter et al. (2009), Wise et al. (2009)).
Second, there is the issue of the distribution of benefits to stakeholders within the
country. This report does not address the first issue in detail8, focusing more specifically
on the second one.
In the absence of pro-poor policies, co-benefits from REDD may not reach the rural poor.
There are concerns that rural communities will not be adequately compensated for
conservation efforts (Richards & Jenkins, 2007; Luttrell et al., 2007; Ebeling & Yasu,2008), or that indigenous people living inside forests may be displaced or their rights
infringed upon in other ways (Anchorage Declaration, 2009; Butler, 2009;
Climatefrontlines.org, 2009; Griffiths, 2007; Palmer, 2009; Roe et al., 2007). One of the
major challenges will be to balance equity and efficiency considerations.
There are human wellbeing implications for different REDD options chosen for a global
instrument, but regardless of the global design, at national level pro-poor policies would
6 Risks to biodiversity are not elaborated here. For discussions of these see, e.g., ATBC & GT,2009; Ebeling & Yasu, 2008; Miles, 2007; Miles & Kapos, 2008; Sasaki & Putz, 2009.7E.g. whether to use a static (e.g. historical) or a dynamic (either declining or improving) baseline,determines how many carbon credits a country can receive for avoided deforestation activities, butthe details of this are beyond the scope of this report. An excellent summary of this and generalchallenges for PES can be found in Wunder (2007; 2005) and a useful discussion of possibleperverse incentives depending on reference levels used can be found in Miles (2007).8 Refer, e.g., to da Fonseca et al., 2007; Dutschke et al., 2008; Griscom et al., 2009.
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be needed to avoid harmful impacts and encourage positive effects on the rights and
livelihoods of forest-dependent poor communities (Peskett et al. 2008).
3.5 Poverty, equity, governance, and REDD
Poverty can be defined in many ways, but clearly people who cannot meet their basic
needs fall within the category of the poor. Income alone is not a sufficient indicator for
human wellbeing, although it is often used as a convenient proxy. Indicators such as the
HDI and those outlined in the MDGs offer better descriptors of the multiple dimensions of
human wellbeing.
Regarding global equity, there are concerns about justice and power differentials amongrich and poor nations, such as the global distribution of obligations of climate change
mitigation vs. the right to development in poorer countries. Much of the REDD
discussion related to equity issues focuses on the distribution of benefits among different
developing countries. This does not automatically address important intra-country
justice issues. These are determined by the types of governance and benefit sharing
mechanisms that exist or are put in place within countries. Several groups are also
lobbying for global pro-poor REDD design standards. Various organizations are
developing relevant standards that could be helpful not only at the project level, but alsofor governments seeking to meet poverty reduction goals. The already existing Climate,
Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Project Design Standards (Victurine, 2008; CCBA,
2008) and the social and environmental standards for REDD, which are currently being
developed by the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) (CCBA, n.d.),
explicitly address poverty and rights issues. At the time of writing it seems likely that a
global REDD instrument will at least include language requiring that the rights of
indigenous peoples and local communities are not negatively affected by REDD
(UNFCCC, 2009).
Concerning indigenous peoples rights, there are a number of international instruments
that a majority of countries have committed to. These include (Lawlor & Huberman,
2009) the 1989 International Labour Organizations Convention Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169), which covers special rights
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concerning their customary lands; and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP), which was voted for by 143 countries. It requires, inter alia, the free
prior informed consent (FPIC) of indigenous people on any activity on their traditional
lands. More general human rights instruments also contain relevant provisions,
including the right to property in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.Governments thus have both moral and legal duties to uphold the rights of forest-
dependent and indigenous people. Not doing so may not only be inequitable and in
contravention of laws, but may also lead to failures of REDD programmes.
Land tenure regimes and other property rights are generally an important aspect of
forest governance. Vast areas of forest in the tropics are communally held and
managed, but historically there has been friction between customary and statutory
tenure and the latter is used as the basis for defining property rights, adjudicating claims,and establishing contracts (RRI & ITTO, 2009). REDD could, given political will, lead to
or reinforce recognition of traditional forest use rights and to clarification of tenure and
recognition of ancestral claims. But tenure is not the only issue. The human, civil and
political rights of forest-dependent people are often denied or insecure, especially when
competing with the interests of more powerful groups or individuals. Equitable forest
governance therefore requires a broader spectrum of rights recognitions, such as
systems of representation, and social, cultural, and economic rights for indigenous and
other forest-dependent people (Colchester, 2008). Good governance also demandsrights that are enforceable, and access to an impartial justice system for all citizens
(Stockbridge, 2006).
Variation in the bargaining power of different organizations is important in determining
how rules are defined and which interests they favour (Stockbridge, 2006). For example,
despite the increasing trend towards various types of co-management schemes of
forests, while these have tended to improve access rights of the rural poor to forest
resources, they have not always significantly improved their livelihoods, as forestryagencies interests in timber production or environmental conservation may ride
roughshod over local peoples interests or favour local elites (Wollenberg et al., 2004).
Another problem that applies to forest governance in general and will certainly also
affect REDD is that in many tropical countries with large forest resources, governments
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have only limited control over what is happening in forests (Legge et al., 2008). The
implication is that, even when laws and policies exist for conservation and SFM,
implementation may be deficient. Furthermore, because deforestation is not exclusively
a forest sector issue, coordination is needed among many institutions working in different
sectors, and broad-based information sharing and participation are required, from thegrassroots to the national government level. In this regard, another potential co-benefit
that could emerge from the process of getting countries ready for REDD implementation,
may be improved governance institutions.
It is only through well developed and fully functional institutions at the national, sub-
national and community levels that co-benefits of REDD for local communities have a
chance to deliver what they promise: real benefits for livelihoods and general wellbeing.
It also seems important, so as to avoid creating a class of rent recipients (Schipulle,2009, pers.comm.) among the target population, that benefits if they do reach forest-
dependent people are not perceived as charity, but are in fact clearly linked to specific
actions, such as SFM, conservation work, or alternative livelihood schemes.
In practice it seems that many target countries for REDD are not well prepared to ensure
that local people benefit (Cotula & Mayers, 2009). A phased approach to REDD design
and implementation is therefore finding increasing support among negotiators. In such
an approach, tropical forest countries would first develop a national strategy andimplement some pilot projects, then receive donor funding for reform of tenure and forest
laws, and finally get large amounts of funding from carbon markets for actual emissions
reductions (Block, 2009; Meridian, 2009). Some programmes to help countries plan for
and test REDD activities already exist, among them the World Banks Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FCPF) (FCPF, 2009) and the multi-agency UN-REDD Programme
(UN-REDD, 2009b).
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4 Country case studies
The cases in this report examine what implications local context and existing relevantpolicies and governance systems could have for REDD impacts on forest-dependent
communities in these countries. These cases are presented with more detail in
Appendix 4.
4.1 Africa
4.1.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
DRC is among the poorest countries in the world, with the lowest human development
and governance scores. At the same time, the Congo Basin still has vast extensions of
relatively intact tropical forest. Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and
forests are shown in Table 4-1-and additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3.
Figure 4-1 shows the vast extent of still existing tropical forest, while Figure 4-2 is a
satellite photograph of the dense rainforest cover surrounding the Congo river and its
tributary Aruwimi in north-eastern DRC..
Figure 4-1: DRC Land Cover Map Figure 4-2: North-Eastern DRC
Source: Vancutsem et al. (2009, p.67) Source: ESA (2008)
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Table 4-1: Key data and indicators (DRC)
H U M A N W E L L B E I N G &G O V E R N A N C E F O R E S T
Population 62,399,224Total forest area(1000 ha) 133,610
GDP/capita (PPPUS$) 714 Forest as % of totalland area (FAO) 58.9%
Life expectancy 45.8
Deforestation rate(Change in forestarea in %) 2000-2005(FAO) -0.2%
HDI (2007/2008Report) 0.411 Trend Down
GDP per capita (PPPUS$) rank HDI rank(2007/08) 7
Original forest areaas % of total landarea (WRI) 83.0%
HPI (2007/2008Report) 39.30%
Classificationfollowing Fonseca etal. (2009) HFLD
GINI 55
Carbon stock inforest 2005 (milliontonnes) 32,152
WB GovernanceScore Voice &Accountability (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -1.48 Forest ownership public 100%
WB GovernanceScore GovernmentEffectiveness (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -1.89 FSC certification -CPI (2008) 1.7EPI Overall score 47.3ILO 169signed/ratified NUNDRIP supported? Y
Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)
Despite relatively low levels of deforestation so far, there is concern about the increasing
number of logging concessions and potential land conversion for commercial agriculture
in the country (Kidd & Kenrick, 2009). By 2008, 33.5 million ha of forest lands were
under some type of concession for timber or mining (Sunderlin et al., 2008), none of
which was following international SFM standards (Lescuyer & Delvingt, 2007), although
the government has expressed its intent to move towards SFM (BTC, 2007).
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Forest livelihoods
About 70% of the population are forest-dependent for their livelihoods (Counsell, 2006),
but only a small percentage of people are indigenous forest-dwellers, collectively
referred to as pygmy. More than two thirds of the country are occupied by the majorityBantu peoples, who also depend on forest-resources, albeit to a different degree, and
have overlapping customary rights to forest resources with the pygmies (IP, 2007). It is,
however, the pygmies who have the most trouble gaining formal rights to lands and
resources, due to systemic discrimination (Lewis et al., 2008). The 2005 Constitution
guarantees the protection of fundamental rights to all citizens of DRC, but no special
status is given to pygmy groups (ibid.).
Governance
DRC is in a severe economic and governance crisis, after emerging from a long internal
conflict between the central government and various rebel groups that has caused the
deaths and displacement of millions of people (WB, 2008a). Despite the decade-long
presence of UN Peacekeepers, conflict is still taking lives and causing many human
rights abuses in some areas of the country (HRW, 2009; OHCHR, 2009). Governance
scores are low and corruption levels are very high. The government prepared its first full
PRSP in July 2006, which aims, inter alia, to strengthen public institutions and improvegovernance (WB, 2008b).
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly organized over the
past few years, many of which are grouped under the umbrella organization Natural
Resources Network (RRN), as have pygmy groups.
Forest governance
Forestry is governed by the Ministry of Environment (MECNT). A Thematic Group on
Forests brings together relevant MECNT Directorates, the Planning Ministry, and
representatives from international agencies that support DRCs forest sector (UN-REDD,
2009a). A decentralization and reorganization programme is in progress.
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The 2002 Forest Code zoned 40% of the forest for commercial exploitation, 15% for
conservation, and the remainder for concessions. Zoning does not reflect traditional
land tenure systems, but it imposes a duty on logging companies to provide socio-
economic benefits and allows communities to participate in setting concession limits
(Sakata, 2007). Communities have also been given the right to receive forestconcessions and manage forests, but by 2008 none had been awarded (Sunderlin et al.,
2008).
An independent World Bank Investigation Panel states that while a solid legal framework
is important, an almost overwhelming problem in the forest sector in DRC is the lack of
institutional capacity to implement and enforce the laws and regulations, especially at
the provincial and local levels (IP, 2007, p.132), and that one can therefore not count on
the law to guarantee sustainable development or benefits for local people in the forestsector.
REDD Potential
DRC is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like Bolivia and Guatemala),
which has expressed formal interest in REDD to the UNFCCC. Based on a highly
simplified model, Butler (2006) estimated that DRC could earn anywhere between
US$179 million and US$1.28 billion per year for avoided deforestation, depending on thecarbon price and actual emissions reductions, which would be a significant income boon.
The government views REDD as a potential input to the national development agenda
(Kasulu et al., 2008), and has formally stated that REDD activities should support local
communities and indigenous peoples social, environmental and economic development
(UNFCCC, 2008, p.5).
Yet corruption is reportedly systemic, and transparency and accountability at all levels
are low. Particularly for pygmies, it is hard to see how they will be able to benefit fromREDD income, given their historic social exclusion, except perhaps through targeted
projects. Neither may poor Bantu farming communities see many income benefits from
REDD, due to unresolved issues around legislating for community land tenure and
creating implementing bodies, which makes it difficult for policy makers to assign carbon
rights, especially where there are overlapping land claims (Rogers, 2008).
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More positively, however, DRC has one of the strongest civil society networks in central
Africa (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.), and it will not be that easy for the government to
completely centralize (i.e. appropriate) REDD credits. NGOs and the government are
trying to raise awareness on REDD among the population so that affected people canmake informed decisions (Potter, 2009, pers.comm.). Hope also springs from continued
international pressure and support for governance reform.
DRC will receive assistance from the FCPF (FCPF, 2008b), which will help to create the
necessary legal and institutional frameworks to facilitate REDD implementation. It will
also receive assistance from the UN-REDD Programme. Many other international and
national agencies are involved in strengthening forest governance in DRC. The UN-
REDD (2009) proposal argues that despite a heritage of distrust between governmentand civil society, the REDD process in DRC has so far been a cooperative effort and that
the prospects for REDD advancing through a government/civil society dialogue are solid.
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4.2 South and Central America
4.2.1 Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, and considered biologically
megadiverse. It has the sixth largest tropical forest area in the world (UDAPE, 2006).
Table 4-2: Key data and indicators (Bolivia)
H U M A N W E L L B E I N G &G O V E R N A N C E F O R E S T
Population 9,517,537
Total forest area
(1000 ha) 58,740
GDP/capita (PPP US$) 2,819Forest as % of totalland area (FAO) 54.2%
Life expectancy 64.7
Deforestation rate(Change in forest areain %) 2000-2005 (FAO) -0.5%
HDI (2007/2008Report) 0.695 Trend Up
GDP per capita (PPPUS$) rank HDI rank(2007/08) 7
Original forest area as% of total land area(WRI) 54.0%
HPI (2007/2008Report) 13.6%
Classificationfollowing Fonseca etal. (2009) HFHD
GINI 60
Carbon stock inforest 2005 (milliontonnes) 5,877
WB Governance ScoreVoice & Accountability(2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.01 Forest ownership
public 85%,private 10%,
other 5%
WB Governance Score
GovernmentEffectiveness (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.81
FSC certification(June 2009) (1000 ha) 1,819
CPI (2008) 3EPI Overall score 64.7ILO 169 signed/ratified YUNDRIP supported? Y
Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)
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Some key statistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table 4-2, and
additional statistics can be found in Appendix 3.
Despite relatively low levels of deforestation so far, there is concern about an increasing
rate of forest loss, mostly because of the expansion of industrial agriculture, logging, andincursion of colonists from the degraded highlands (Robertson & Wunder, 2005).
Figure 4-3: Bolivia Land Cover Map
Source: (FAO, 2009a)
Legend
Administration
Land Cover
Developed
Dry Cropland & Pasture
Irrigated Cropland
Cropland/Grassland
Cropland/Woodland
Grassland
Shrubland
Shrubland/Grassland
Savanna
Deciduous Broadleaf Forest
Deciduous Needleleaf Forest
Evegreen Broadleaf Forest
Evergreen Needleleaf Forest
Mixed Forest
Water
Herbaceous Wetland
Wooded Wetland
Barren
Herbaceous Tundra
Wooded Tundra
Mixed T undra
Bare Tundra
Snowor Ice
Partly Developed
Unclassified
Figures 4-3 and Figure 4-4 show how agricultural land use is spreading into forest areas.
Forest livelihoods
Some 1.4 million people live in or near forested areas, including 180,000 indigenous
people with a claim on 42% of Bolivias forest lands, and 30,000 peasant farmers whouse NTFPs. There are about 500 registered small-scale timber producers. Conflicts
exist especially with poor colonists from the highlands, and with large-scale forest
concessions. (Colchester, 2004)
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Governance
As a medium human development country, Bolivia has some general governance
challenges. Corruption is somewhat of an issue, as is the highly skewed income
distribution.
The fourth national MDG report and the National Development Plan of 2006 (PND)
include broad, integrated social goals, reflecting political will to work against social
exclusion and reduce socio-economic inequalities (Loza Tellera, 2006). Indigenous
people9 on average score lower on human development indicators than non-indigenous
people (UDAPE, 2006).
Bolivia ratified ILO 169 in 1991 (ILO, 2006), and UNDRIP became national Law 3760 in2007 (Sunderlin et al., 2008). The election of Bolivias first indigenous president allowed
the incorporation of indigenous social movements into the national political arena
(UDAPE et al., 2006).
Forest governance
The extent of large-scale illegal logging has
decreased substantially since the institutionof the independent Forest Superintendence
(Colchester, 2004). The PND also includes
SFM as a goal (UDAPE, 2006).
Bolivia is undergoing a process of forest
land reform to recognize or transfer formal
rights to local communities and
smallholders based on ancestral claimsand cultural identity. Land tenure in Bolivia
is still skewed towards large-scale
landholders, despite earlier land reforms.
9 The majority (66%) of the population above age 15 self-identify as indigenous, among the highestproportions in Latin America, and almost 50% speak indigenous languages (UDAPE et al., 2006).
Figure 4-4: Satellite image of Bolivia
Source: NASA (2008a)
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The Forest Law (1996) includes indigenous and campesino interests, including
community forestry for commercial purposes (Colchester, 2004; Pacheco et al., 2008).
The current reforms are intended to reconcile conservation, livelihoods and rights-based
concerns (Pacheco et al., 2008). They are among the most progressive in community
and indigenous land tenure and resource access reform, and also regarding safeguardsfor equal land access for women and men (Taylor, 2006). There are, however,
incidences of conflicts over forest tenure, for example where customary use rights clash
with awarded timber or other concessions (Asquith et al., 2002), and unintended
instances of elite capture have arisen locally (Taylor, 2006).
As part of a broader decentralization programme, Bolivia is also moving forest
management authority from central to local government (Chomitz, 2006). Municipal
governments in Bolivia retain 25% of forest revenues, which could be invested into localpro-poor development (OECD, 2009). Officially 85% of forests are publicly owned, while
10% are privately owned, and the remainder is either community-owned or of undefined
tenure status (Chomitz, 2006). Local communities and indigenous groups own relatively
large tracts of forest (ibid.). Community forest management is somewhat hampered by
cumbersome standards, bureaucracy and high transaction costs for smallholders
(Pacheco et al., 2008). Overall, the decentralization of forest land administration has
had a positive impact on the conservation of forests (Taylor, 2006).
According to Ebeling and Yasu (2008), corruption in the forestry agency has been
much reduced due to policy and institutional reform, which has translated into much
better forest management. By 2009, 16 forestry operators had achieved FSC
certification, including one indigenous communal concession (FSC, 2006; FSC, 2009).
REDD Potential
Bolivia is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like DRC and Guatemala),which has expressed formal interest in REDD to the UNFCCC.
Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (Butler, 2006a) estimated that Bolivia could
earn anywhere between US$72 million and US$1.08 billion per year for avoided
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deforestation, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions. This
would make a significant contribution to national earnings.
In practice, Bolivias supportive legislative framework and pro-poor policies are often
hampered by institutional weaknesses, lack of financial resources, and lack of technicalcapacity (May et al., 2004). Bolivia will receive assistance for REDD preparations from
the FCPF, which will help to ameliorate governance challenges.
One pilot experience with carbon forestry, the carbon project in Noel Kempff Mercado
National Park (see Appendix 3), on the whole, resulted in net positive protection and
livelihood effects on participating service-sellers and positive community-wide social
effects. Based on Bolivias efforts to uphold indigenous rights and to improve forest
governance so far, chances are good that REDD in Bolivia will have a positive impact on
local forest-dependent communities.
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4.2.2 Guatemala
Guatemala is a medium human development country in Central America, with one of the
highest levels of biodiversity and endemism combined in Latin America. Some keystatistics relating to human wellbeing and forests are shown in Table 4-3, and additional
statistics can be found in Appendix 3.
Table 4-3: Key data and indicators (Guatemala)
H U M A N W E L L B E I N G &G O V E R N A N C E F O R E S T
Population 13,348,222Total forest area
(1000 ha) 3,938
GDP/capita (PPP US$) 4,568Forest as % of totalland area (FAO) 36.3%
Life expectancy 69.7
Deforestation rate(Change in forest areain %) 2000-2005 (FAO) -1.3%
HDI (2007/2008Report) 0.689 Trend Up
GDP per capita (PPPUS$) rank HDI rank(2007/08) -11
Original forest area as% of total land area(WRI) 99.0%
HPI (2007/2008Report) 22.5%
Classificationfollowing Fonseca etal. (2009) LFHD
GINI 55
Carbon stock inforest 2005 (milliontonnes) 572
WB Governance ScoreVoice & Accountability(2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.26 Forest ownership
public 42.2%,private 52.5%,
other 5.3%
WB Governance ScoreGovernment
Effectiveness (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.49
FSC certification(June 2009) (1000 ha) 457.6
CPI (2008) 3.1EPI Overall score 76.7ILO 169 signed/ratified YUNDRIP supported? Y
Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)
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Within Guatemala, there is great variation in forest loss rates among departments
(Ferrate et al., 2009). The highest loss in terms of area was experienced in the remote
Petn region, although this is where most protected areas are located. Conversion to
farmland, fuelwood consumption, illegal industrial logging, fires, and pests drive
Guatemalas deforestation. (Ferrate et al., 2009). Figure 4-5 maps different types ofland cover, and Figure 4-6 shows smoke from forest fires in 2002.
Forest livelihoods
Many peoples livelihoods are connected
to communal and industrial timber
concessions and use of forest products.Fuelwood use is increasing (about 60%
of the population depend on it for
energy), but there is little control and
much more appears to be harvested than
is authorized (Ferrate et al., 2009).
Governance
Guatemala has many governance
challenges. The country was embroiled
in a long civil war, during which extreme
human rights violations by the State were
committed. Numerous violent massacres of entire Mayan communities took place.
(CEH, 2005)
Peace came in 1996, but the society bears deep scars. Violence and organized crimeare widespread. Income distribution remains very unequal. Formally, the government
today is committed to indigenous rights, reflected in its ratification of international
indigenous-rights related legal instruments and in the new national Constitution. There
are now indigenous peoples offices in some public institutions (Ferrate et al., 2009), but
budgets are insufficient to address indigenous issues efficiently (MRGI, 2008). Crimes
Figure 4-5: Guatemala land cover map
Source: FAO (2000)
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against human rights defenders by illegal armed groups are frequently committed with
almost complete impunity (UN, 2008b).
Forest governance
Forestry and conservation is the
legal purview of a number of
ministries and agencies, mainly the
National Forestry Institute (INAB),
the National Council of Protected
Areas (CONAP), the Ministry of
Environment and Natural Resources
(MARN) and the System for Controland Prevention of Forest Fires
(SIPECIF). Municipalities are
autonomous and responsible for
managing natural resources in their
jurisdiction and for undertaking their own land use planning. (Ferrate et al., 2009) Co-
management arrangements with NGOs exist for some of the National Parks (ELI, 2003).
A process of forest land reform is ongoing, with a move towards decentralizedmanagement of forest resources. Ownership of forests is 42.2% public, 37.8% private
and 14.7% communal (Ferrate et al., 2009). SFM is increasing: At the time of writing,
there were 10 FSC-certified forestry operations in Guatemala, totaling 457,625 ha (FSC,
2009).
Co-management of forests with communities is common. In the Petn region, almost
500,000 ha were put under 13 co-managed community concessions in the 1990s
(Junkin, 2007). This constitutes the largest expanse of community-managed forest inthe world, and almost 70% of this is FSC-certified (Cronkleton et al., 2008). Chomitz
(2006) reports that, despite problematic corruption and lack of organizational capacity,
the extraction of valuable hardwoods has made these concessions mostly profitable, and
that deforestation inside them appears substantially lower than outside them.
Figure 4-6: Satellite image of fires from biomass
burning in Guatemala
Source: NASA (2008b)
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Guatemala thus has an appropriate legal framework and policies for SFM, but
inadequate national budget allocations for forests and conservation appear to reflect the
low political priority given to environmental issues vis--vis other areas (EPIQ, 2003).
Furthermore, more powerful actors often succeed in getting their interests represented
(Larson, 2008), whether at the national level, or at municipal and indigenous authoritylevels.
REDD Potential
Guatemala is a member of the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (like DRC and Bolivia),
which has expressed formal interest in REDD.
Based on a highly simplified model, Butler (2006a) estimated that Guatemala could earnanywhere between US$21-216 million per year for avoided deforestation, depending on
the carbon price and actual emissions reductions. A national agenda for REDD projects
with coordination among the various government agencies is under preparation,
supported by several NGOs. Guatemala will also receive funding from the FCPF for
REDD readiness activities.
According to McNab (2009, pers.comm.) the government maintains that carbon rights
are held by the state, but there is no specific law governing carbon, and the details fordistribution of REDD benefits are still under discussion.
Municipalities in Guatemala may retain a substantial portion of forestry revenue (50%,
double the figure of Bolivia), which can be utilized for pro-poor development (OECD,
2009). The government has expressed interest in maximizing the potential income of
indigenous people from REDD, and potentially, REDD incentives could lead to greater
internal support within communities for SFM activities and might lead to new livelihood-
enhancing opportunities (McNab, 2009, pers.comm.). Which agencies should receiveREDD resources, or what the share for each should be is not yet clear, and it is likely
that greater centralization of REDD income will be sought ( ibid.).
The first REDD demonstration project will launch in the Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR)
in the Petn with support from international NGOs, but is still in the design stage. The
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groups proposed for participation have legal standing through forest concessions, so it is
expected that local groups would be affected positively (McNab, 2009, pers.comm.).
Overall, it seems that there is good potential for forest-dependent people to derive
benefits from REDD in Guatemala. The Petn region offers an interesting example ofthe complex relations underlying negotiations in contested areas. Most observers agree
that the Petn has become, over the past several years, a territory governed to the
benefit of both communities and forests, enabled through collective action and a shift in
several rights bundles from the state and individual (industrial) concessions to the
communities involved (Monterroso & Barry, 2008).
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4.3 Southeast Asia
4.3.1 Cambodia
Cambodia is a medium human development country with a very high deforestation rate.
It has high numbers of endangered or critically endangered species (Clements & Evans,
2008).
Table 4-4: Key data and indicators (Cambodia)
H U M A N W E L L B E I N G &G O V E R N A N C E F O R E S T
Population 14,446,056Total forest area(1000 ha) 10,447
GDP/capita (PPP US$) 2,727Forest as % of totalland area (FAO) 59.2%
Life expectancy 58
Deforestation rate(Change in forestarea in %) 2000-2005(FAO) -2.0%
HDI (2007/2008Report) 0.598 Trend Up
GDP per capita (PPPUS$) rank HDI rank(2007/08) -6
Original forest areaas % of total landarea (WRI) 100.0%
HPI (2007/2008Report) 38.6%
Classificationfollowing Fonseca etal. (2009) HFHD
GINI 41.7
Carbon stock inforest 2005 (milliontonnes) 1,426
WB Governance ScoreVoice & Accountability(2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.94 Forest ownership public 100%
WB Governance ScoreGovernmentEffectiveness (2009)(-2.5 to +2.5) -0.81 FSC certification -CPI (2008) 1.8EPI Overall score 53.8ILO 169 signed/ratified NUNDRIP supported? Y
Source: Author, drawing on various sources (see Appendix 3)
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people were estimated to be forest-dependent in the year 2000 (Poffenberger, 2006).
Fuelwood provides energy for 84% of the population.
Governance
Cambodias recent history was marred by war in the 1970s and the brutal regime of the
Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979, followed by years of renewed occupation by Vietnam. A
Peace Agreement finally brought new hope in 1991, although it did not mark the end of
violence. Cambodia emerged heavily scarred and, despite an elected government,
serious deficiencies in governance and justice administration remain. (Sharp, 1997)
Cambodia has made substantial
progress in reducing poverty over thepast decade, reducing the proportion
of poor people by about 1% annually
on average. Nevertheless, reducing
inequality is a major challenge,
though not as large as in some of the
other countries presented.
The PRSP of 2002 (RGC, 2002)planned for national poverty
reduction for the years 2003-2005.
In 2003 Cambodia prepared its first
national MDG report and elaborated strategies for achieving the targets in a number of
policy documents, including the Rectangular Strategy (2004) and the National
Development Plan 2006-2010, which integrated the earlier Socio-Economic
Development Plan, the National Poverty Reduction Strategy and the MDGs. (UNDP,
2008)
Although Cambodia voted for UNDRIP, according to OHCHR (OHCHR, 2008, p.15),
indigenous people have suffered greatly from illegal evictions from their traditional
lands. Unlike in other countries, there is no national-level indigenous representative
organization, although there are some provincial-level associations, but there is a
Figure 4-8: Satellite image of South East Asia
Source: NASA (2008c)
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thriving umbrella NGO Forum that brings together social and environmental NGOs,
mainly for networking and advocacy (Evans, 2009).
Forest governance
All forest lands are state-owned (FAO, 2005), and the proportion of community-managed
forests is low (Chomitz, 2006). The Forestry Administration (FA), a semi-autonomous
unit governed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), is
responsible for the management of production forests, whereas the Ministry for the
Environment (MOE) oversees protection forests (Sunderlin, 2006).
Commercial forestry concessions contributed much to deforestation before the
moratorium on logging that was introduced in 2002. Concession management nowrequires mandatory Strategic Forest Management Plans, and Environmental and Social
Impact Assessments. Illegal logging has continued despite the logging ban (Sunderlin,
2006). At the time of writing, none of the logging operations in Cambodia are FSC-
certified (FSC, 2009). Global Witness reports illegal logging even in protected areas due
to lack of political will and institutionalized corruption at the highest levels of government,
which tends to enforce the law selectively against community forest users, but not
against large operators (GW, 2004a).
The government has formally recognized the importance of forest-based livelihoods and
the need to maximize the forestry sectors contribution to poverty reduction, food
security, and equitable development in a 2002 Statement on National Forest Sector
Policy (van Beukering et al., 2009). The Statement also explicitly mentioned the need to
legally recognize and protect the traditional rights of local populations. As of 2008 only
about 2% of forest lands were community forests, but the FA intends to increase the
area to about 20%, and there is now a National Community Forestry Coordination
Committee (Sokhun et al., 2009).
Unlike in Bolivia and Guatemala, logging is not allowed in community forests, so the
extraction and sale of NTFPs is the only way participants can earn income from these
forests (Sunderlin, 2006). Furthermore, most community forestry projects are situated
on already deforested or degraded lands, as the original intent was not poverty-reduction
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per se, but the rehabilitation of such lands and the conservation of what forest remains
(ibid.).
In addition to conflicts with loggers, the illegal appropriation of land, encroachment by
agricultural settlers, and economic land concessions present a problem for ethnicminority forest-dependent communities, whose status in Cambodian society is low, and
who are unable to defend their land or forest use rights (ARD, 2004; ARD, 2006;
Poffenberger, 2006).
There are several ongoing efforts to improve forest governance in Cambodia, such as
donor-funded independent monitors of forest law enforcement. Efforts are also being
made at inter-sectoral coordination.
REDD Potential
As an HFHD country, Cambodia is likely to be able to count on sizeable REDD
investments to avoid further deforestation. Based on a highly simplified model, Butler
(2006a; 2006b) estimated that Cambodia could earn between US$80-875 million from
REDD, depending on the carbon price and actual emissions reductions.
According to a 2008 Council of Ministers decision, the FA now has the right to negotiatedeals and sell REDD credits, but as yet there is no mechanism to disperse funds in such
a way that the maximum revenue reaches the local level (Clements & Evans, 2008).
Like all countries studied, Cambodia will receive assistance from the FCPF for REDD-
readiness.
However, in a situation where [laws] may be made under pressures from donors, but
there is no intention to enforce laws inconvenient to the ruling group (OHCHR, 2008,
p.16), it is not very likely that local forest-dependent communities will receive a fair shareof benefits from REDD, except where NGOs or donors are directly monitoring
performance.
There are at least two international NGO-sponsored forest carbon pilot initiatives under
preparation or recently launched in Cambodia, which are specifically designed with
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community benefits in mind. On a national scale, however, the extent of benefits forest-
dependent people can derive may be limited by lack of political will and generally weak
institutions. The demonstration projects will provide lessons to take into account when
developing further REDD initiatives, and they do appear to have the potential to build
institutional capacities at both national and local levels and demonstrate how suchprojects can work transparently and bring the expected benefits to local communities.
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5 Discussion
Most important for making REDD work for forest-dependent people are, in all country
cases, the existing governance and institutional capacities as well as political will. It is
clear that their starting points are different. All countries have governance challenges,
including institutional deficiencies and issues around corruption and law enforcement
capacity, but it is a matter of degree. As far as governance and human wellbeing
indicators are concerned, Bolivia and Guatemala have been doing much better lately
than Cambodia, which in turn does better than DRC.
Two key governance indicators, voice & accountability, and the CPI, are shown in Figure
5-1 to illustrate this (countries are ranked from worst to best performance). None of the
countries have a stellar performance on either indicator, but DRC and Cambodia are
clearly the worst in terms of accountability and have the highest reported corruption.
Figure 5-1: Comparison of two key governance indicators
CPI
1.7 1.8
3 3.13.4
DR Con go Camb odia Bol ivia Gu atema la Ma dag asca r
S
cale
0-10
Source: Author, drawing on World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009) and TI (2008)
Going back to the research questions posed in the beginning, it can be said that, while
specific impacts are uncertain and some will depend on the way the global mechanism is
designed, some general answers are emerging.
Q1. What is the likely consequence of REDD for the rights and livelihoods of
poor forest-dependent people in different country contexts?
Voice & Accountability
-1.48
-0.94
-0.26
-0.01
DRC Cambodia Guatemala Bolivia
Scale
-2.5
to
+2.5
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1.1 What processes are jeopardizing local livelihoods and rights?
The situation for forest-dependent people differs markedly in the countries examined, but
also has some similarities in the underlying causes that affect livelihoods and rights.
Appropriation of lands for commercial exploitation, such as mining, logging, or large-scale agriculture, has affected many smallholder farmers in the past, especially in
Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cambodia. This has so far been less of an issue in DRC. In
Cambodia upland indigenous communities have been evicted from their lands, either to
make room for commercial concessions or because other poor farming groups have
moved in. In-migration into indigenous territories to convert forest to farmland has been
a problem in all countries, though in DRC many pygmy groups have themselves become
semi-sedentary farmers and others have become displaced from their lands. In all
countries, if REDD initiatives concentrate mainly on large-scale state-, or private-sector-managed SFM operations, this could potentially lead to negative impacts on smallholder
forest owners or even displace indigenous forest dwellers if areas they inhabit are zoned
for conservation without human habitation.
Social injustices are making indigenous communities particularly vulnerable to loss of
livelihoods. All countries studied have high levels of inequality, with biases against rural
people. Forest-dependent indigenous groups invariably find themselves at the bottom of
the wellbeing scale, but there are clear differences. Bolivia and Guatemala haverecently made strides towards solidifying indigenous rights and have integrated legal
protection for indigenous and local communities into their forest laws. In DRC, like
elsewhere in Africa, the term indigenous itself is controversial, and pygmy people have
traditionally been discriminated against. In Cambodia, highland peoples are also
marginalized and suffer incursion from lowland agricultural migrants. Nevertheless, all
these countries have supported UNDRIP and have at least made statements to the
effect that local and indigenous communities should receive the maximum possible
benefit from REDD.
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1.2 Who wins and who loses in different governance and land tenure
contexts?
To some extent the answer to this question depends how one defines winners. In
general, carbon credit earnings could flow into central government coffers, from wherethey could be redistributed; or they could go straight to the communities living in target
areas to pay them for environmental services provided. Additionally, new employment or
income earning opportunities may arise from REDD-induced SFM operations or
conservation projects with development components. Communities may also see
wellbeing improvements from indirect effects, such as improved institutional and
governance capacity at all levels.
Who is likely to win or lose with REDD implementation will depend on the generalgovernance and institutional situation, and on the detailed arrangements negotiated
between the parties to specific REDD initiatives. The importance of land tenure issues
has been discussed. Where forest sector decentralization processes are well under
way, such as in Bolivia and Guatemala, the chances of community co-benefits are
greater. In these countries, community forestry is relatively prevalent, and this seems to
predestine communities for active participation in REDD. On the other hand, not all
communities are concessionaires, and not all land claims have been sorted out, and
those who cannot legitimize their claims stand to lose, at least concerning direct carbonincome. In Cambodia and DRC, almost all forests are state-owned, and there are much
fewer co-management agreements to date. Prospects do exist to increase their share,
which may yet make some forest-dependent communities into winners.
Where there are conflicting rights claims, particularly over land or resource use, these
need to be clarified. In DRC and Cambodia, indigenous groups have in the past had
their traditional land rights ignored. It remains to be seen how this will be handled in the
future. All countries studied have issues relating to tenure security, including conflictsamong different local communities, law enforcement, and balancing the interests of
various stakeholders.
In practice, in countries with very high corruption levels, such as DRC and Cambodia,
there is a danger that only a minor share will end up with the communities it is intended
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for, while the bulk is captured by elites. The proportion of rural poor is very large, and so
far there appears to be little voice or representation for them vis--vis more powerful
actors, except where NGOs and donors are intervening directly. In countries like Bolivia
and Guatemala, which have accumulated considerable positive experiences with
community forestry, it seems reasonable to expect that communities will not lose out onREDD benefits.
In all countries, through project-based initiatives, such as the pilot projects under
development or implementation, it may be easier to ensure benefits for local
stakeholders; the details depend on the benefit distribution mechanisms negotiated.
Q2. What policies exist or would have to be put into place to ensure equitablebenefit-sharing within countries and avoid harmful REDD impacts on
forest-dependent people?
At least in theory, all countries studied have acceptable legal frameworks and stated
policies that would pave the way for equitable benefit-sharing. Their Constitutions
guarantee indigenous rights and/or equality for all citizens. Forest laws now require
forest management plans and social responsibility strategies from concessionaires, and
national development plans all talk about decreasing poverty and increasing livelihoodopportunities.
REDD specific policies will still have to be elaborated. These will have to address the
benefit-sharing mechanisms (e.g. the percentage of net income to go to various
departments and organizations). In a pro-poor scenario, the maximum possible share
should probably go to the local level, as is, for example, already the case for forestry-
related taxes in Guatemala, where municipalities may keep 50%, which they can use for
local development. For large scale concessions, social obligations are already beingplaced on logging companies, but are at the moment selectively enforced in those
countries with a poor governance record.
Reconciliation of traditional customs concerning forest management and national law is
also necessary in some instances.
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What emerges from the cases studied is that policies and laws are in place or in the
process of being updated, but that implementation is still lacking.
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6 Conclusions and Recommendations
Clearly, co-benefits for biodiversity and the wellbeing of forest-dependent people will notautomatically emerge from REDD. If REDD is to live up to its promise of social co-
benefits, it will have to be flexible enough to accommodate differences in national
situations, and provide sufficiently specific guidance on equity issues to increase the
likelihood of benefits reaching forest-dependent communities.
Politics and policies play a big role in determining actual outcomes. Including pro-poor
policies in national REDD programmes is an important first step. Reforming national and
sub-national institutions to be able to implement such policies is vital. Trade-offs amongthe interests of different groups are inevitable, and in the negotiation process there is a
need for awareness and attempts at mitigation of power differences to avoid elite
capture of benefits. Oversight by watchdog organizations may be needed to ensure
fairness, especially where corruption is high.
Clearly there should be full participation of local communities (through designated
representatives) and FPIC for those groups whose forest areas may be affected, in all
stages of the REDD process. For this to happen, capacity has to be developed at alllevels, from national government agencies to local community organizations. In some of
the countries examined, such processes are well underway (particularly Bolivia and
Guatemala), in others they have only started (DRC, Cambodia). A phased approach, as
outlined in Section 3.5, would be useful in all countries examined. Rights and
governance issues are the crux of the matter, and it will be well worth investing in
clarifying and improving these, for REDD to have a chance to live up to its promise.
The sub-national pilot REDD type projects that are currently under implementation or inthe planning stages will form a pool of experiences on which governments should draw
when designing national REDD schemes. Those initiatives reviewed for this research
are being designed with a participatory, local community-focus, so they will provide
valuable lessons on ways to ensure co-benefits for forest-dependent people. Much
thought will have to go into how these early REDD initiatives may eventually be
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integrated into national programmes and could count under a national accounting
standard.
The challenges for the case countries and other tropical forest countries are formidable,
but not impossible to achieve. However, where political will is lacking or pressures frompowerful groups are too strong, chances are slim that marginalized communities will
experience real improvements in wellbeing.
The inferences presented here are worth following up on through further research based
on specific REDD scenarios once there is clarity on global and national REDD policies.
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Appendix 1: The evolution of REDD
One of the underlying reasons why standing forests have been subject to continueddeforestation is because of the public good nature of the types of environmental
services they provide, beyond marketable products. Public goods are typicallyundersupplied through market mechanisms, and this has also been true of such forestservices as biodiversity or watershed protection. Furthermore, the costs of damages tonatural capital such as forests are usually not accounted for in markets, they areconsidered externalities, and future benefits from, for example, conserving a tract offorest are often discounted so heavily that the immediate consumption income becomesmore attractive than conservation (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2008). Thus, because forestservices are undervalued, users and owners often do not have sufficient motivation toleave forests standing10.
From the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) emergedthe UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), and the Forest Principles. However, fiscal and regulatorymeasures introduced to attempt to promote sustainable forest management (SFM) andreduce deforestation in tropical forests, or project-based approaches have generally notbeen very successful at reducing deforestation (Richards & Jenkins, 2007; Ebeling &Yasu, 2009). Similarly, global initiatives to stem deforestation and promote SFM, suchas Tropical Forest Action Plans, ITTO Objective 2000, or the UN Forum on Forestsdeclarations on SFM, have not had a large enough impact (White & Hatcher, 2009).Market-based mechanisms offer the potential to obtain much greater amounts of funding(Miles & Kapos, 2008; Roe et al., 2007) and to directly link conservation action tounderlying causes of deforestation and degradation.
Recent experiences with payment for ecosystem services (PES), including some early
carbon-market related projects, have shown that paying land users for ecosystemservices can be effective (FT, 2008; Pagiola et al., 2005; Wunder, 2005). It has alsobeen demonstrated that even very poor people can participate in and benefit from PESschemes (Pagiola et al., 2005).
Already in the late 1970s, the idea of compensating for rising atmospheric CO2concentrations through global scale afforestation was brought up (Dyson, 1977, cited inStuart & Moura-Costa, 1998), and since the beginning of the 1990s a variety of forestry-based carbon offset projects have been initiated. By early 2009, 144 early REDD-typeinitiatives were trading credits on the voluntary carbon market (Cotula & Mayers, 2009).
The UNFCCCs Kyoto Protocol makes only limited reference to forestry activities in its
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) initiatives. Theonly types of forest carbon initiatives currently eligible under this global mechanism areafforestation and reforestation, and to date only 8 forestry projects have been registeredunder the CDM (UNFCCC, 2009b). In the existing EU Emissions Trading Scheme forestcarbon is also mar
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