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The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950:Crafting Domestic Response in the Early
Years of the Cold War
byRosemary M. Benton
Table of Contents
Introduction --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
The Problem of Panic, Deterrence and Civil Defense Programs -------------- 3
The Science Behind Civil Defense ------------------------------------------------ 14
Power and Authority in the Civil Defense Act----------------------------------- 27
How Civil Defense Imagines America ------------------------------------------- 39
The Civil Defense Education of America ---------------------------------------- 56
Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 65
Bibliography ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 68
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my parents who provided me with the love and support which got me along my road to this moment. I would also like to profusely thank both
Professors Stephen Ortega and Zhigang Liu for their advice and input throughout the creation of this work. This paper would not have been possible without your help.
1
In order to understand the national repercussions of the Cold War era it is imperative to
consider the use of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 as it was repeatedly called upon to
support or change the foundation of American policy - an intriguing balancing act of self-
preparedness and deterrence policy which, while intended to bring the United States together in a
time of crisis, created a gap between the people and the government that intended to protect
them. As it was created by the December 1950 Executive Order 10186, and functioned in
accordance with the authorities and duties outlined by the Civil Defense Act, the Federal Civil
Defense Administration (FCDA) served in a dual role as an agent of the United States’ civil
defense program and as a recipient of civil defense critique. For my purposes the focus of this
paper will be the study of the Civil Defense Act and its agency, the FCDA, between 1950 and
1958. It was during this span of time that the FCDA came into being, attempted to urge the
nation to prepare for the potential use of hostile nuclear weapons and subsequently perished
amidst a swath of confusion and frustration on the part of the Federal Government.
While there is not a substantial body of literature that has been written directly on the
Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 - or as it would be known upon its January 1951 approval
from Congress, Public Law 920 or merely Civil Defense Act - there exists a tangible connection
between scientific research in America, the imagined concept of American identity, and the
power balance of leadership within the nation’s civil defense program, all of which coalesced
within the educational outreach of domestic defense. On a larger scale the civil defense program
formed part of America’s deterrence policy by creating a united civilian population that could
not easily by intimidated or derailed by the threat or execution of a direct enemy attack. That
being the case, the success of the FCDA’s efforts to create this home front defense would rely on
the agency’s ability to mold the nation into a state of constant readiness. This public disposition
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of American civil preparedness was believed to discourage any enemies from considering an
attack, although it likewise trained the American people to accept the event of direct physical
aggression. As I have found, the department attempted to accomplish this through public
education, building upon and disseminating information gained through their own weapons and
survival research, the perceived patriotism of the American national identity, and the
coordination of civil defense responsibilities within various federal departments. By looking at
the transcripts of Senate hearings specifically addressing the progress and legitimacy of the Civil
Defense Act and its program of civilian mobilization, it becomes clear that the FCDA’s success
or failure as a component of American deterrence policy hung on its ability to compile the
various resources at its disposal and convince the public to act using relevant survival
information and methods as a guide. If this could not be achieved, then not only would the
FCDA have failed, but the aspect of a civilian defensive in the nation’s two-front deterrence
policy would have proved insufficient as well.
The Problem of Panic, Deterrence and Civil Defense Programs
In order to understand the place civil defense held in United States policymaking, it is
necessary to look at the formative years following the official end of World War II. These events
would cumulatively create a mindset of fear that would set the precedence for the creation of the
Federal Civil Defense Administration. Like many studies on the Cold War, I am also of the
opinion that the driving force behind this conflict was one of competition between ideology and
technology, a race to outlast and out maneuver one’s opponents following the initiating violence
of the Korean War and the increased presence of Communism throughout Europe following
World War II. Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad characterize the Cold War as a,
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“competition between the United States and the Soviet Union to represent the best model for
future societies”, using the finesse and precision of weapons as a way to perceive a nation’s
intellect and modernity.1 As such, technology was both a means to and a measurement of a
superior society. Its continued existence could likewise hang in the balance of power derived
from comparative weapons technology.
Shows of power would become a common feature of the Cold War, such as the January
31, 1950 public announcement from President Truman that the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) had been directed continued development of various atomic weapons, but more
specifically they had been charged with the creation of the hydrogen bomb. Truman would later
say that the creation of the hydrogen bomb had not officially been a set directive of the AEC, but
its eventual construction was inevitable, “if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians”.2
His adherence to enlarging and perfecting the United States’ supremacy as an atomic power was
likewise embodied within the National Security Council Directive 68 (NSC 68) which, following
Truman’s January 31st proclamation of the development of the H-bomb, sought to answer
whether or not the country was prepared to fight against another atomic nation.
Produced in April 1950, NSC 68 presented the current state of international affairs as a
growing emergency that needed immediate and firm military action including the stockpiling of
atomic weapons, a renewed investment in the military establishment, and pursuit of alliances
with nations sympathetic to United States interests. This solidity of United States world influence
would, as Arnold Offner summarizes, “reduce Soviet power on its periphery, promote
independent countries in Eastern Europe, revive national aspirations within the Soviet Union,
1 Hanhimäki, Jussi M. and Odd Arne Westad, Ed. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 273.2 Offner, Arnold. Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002. 363.
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and foster fundamental change in the Soviet system”.3 In keeping with the directive’s assertion
that the United States remained the only impediment to Soviet power expansion following the
Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949 and the Communist Party of China’s victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s
Nationalist government, the closing line of the document speaks not only of the nation’s own
survival, but its responsibility to a higher world calling. “The whole success of the proposed
program hangs ultimately on the recognition by this Government, the American people, and all
free people, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at
stake”.4 Despite the similarities between Truman’s view of the Soviet Union as a nation with
dangerously burgeoning power and influence that stood as the antithesis of the United States in
policy and practice, he was not as invested in the suggestion of militarization which the NSC 68
called for. Instead, Truman preferred to approach the situation from the position of preparing for
the possibility of an atomic attack rather than from the setting of certain parameters under which
the United States would be pushed to use its own weapons supply.
Although Truman’s administration did not have a high degree of confidence in the ability
of civilians to respond and regroup in the face of the tremendous destructive forces of
contemporary weapons, the use of both military and civilian defense as a force of deterrence
from enemy attack was implemented during his presidency. As a deterrent, civil defense is not as
effective as a strictly military defense but, as William Vogele describes in his 1993 article
“Deterrence by Civilian Defense”, it provides alternative solutions to a single form of deterrence
based on military strength. If successfully propagated it has to ability to harness and direct the
influence of widespread “social powers”, thus creating a commonly felt need to protect shared
3 Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953, 366.4 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. New York, NY: Routlege, 2001. 38.
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territory, values, and institutions.5 Likewise, civil defense can act as a postponement of conflict
escalation, thus preventing what Stephen L. Quackenbush describes as “immediate deterrence”
or “crisis decision making”. In his article, Quackenbush offers the example of the Cuban Missile
Crisis as an example of how “general deterrence” aka “everyday decision-making in
relationships involving conflicts of interest” has failed, causing the implementation of
“immediate deterrence”.6 Andrew Grossman and Guy Oakes point out that a program of civil
defense did not merely act as an alternative to military deterrence, but supported and
strengthened it by offering the American public with information and action which they could
take in order to prepare for and accept any possible sacrifices military deterrence may require of
them.7 In any situation, the importance of the military as an aspect in the country’s policy of
national security would continue to play a crucial role especially during the formative years of
the Cold War. Not only would representatives of the Department of Defense continually reassess
their responsibilities in civilian mobilization between 1950 and 1958, but they would redefine the
very basics of what civil defense constituted.
As the American and Western European governments continued experimenting with the
capability of atomic power in the late 1940s via the American nuclear testing over the Marshall
Islands in Operation Crossroads in July 1946, followed by creating and activating the Graphite
Low Energy Experimental Pile (GLEEP) in August 1947, the realization came that nuclear
weapons held not only immense power for physical destruction, but they could also act as objects
of intimidation. Who directed this intimidation would hold power over anyone else. Having lost
their monopoly on nuclear weapons following the Soviet Union’s successful nuclear weapons
5 Vogele, William B. “Deterrence by Civilian Defense.” Peace & Change, 18, no. 1 (January 1993): 26. 6 Quackenbush, Stephen L. “Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?” Review of International Studies, 37, no. 2 (February 2011): 752.7 Oakes, Guy and Andrew Grossman. “Managing Nuclear Terror: The Genesis of American Civil Defense Strategy.” International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society, 5, no. 3 (1992): 363.
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test in August of 1949, the United States adopted a policy of deterrence which assumed that the
possibility of continued armed violence was never far from consideration.
It cannot be denied that the response of the Federal Government in the event of an enemy
offensive was of great concern to civilians and government officials, but perhaps most intriguing
is the ever-present anxiety expressed by experts and federal employees regarding the civilian
response in a nuclear crisis. First, a public gripped in fear of nuclear war will not condone further
nuclear weapons research, thus putting their country at a marked disadvantage in an arms race
scenario. Second, in the event of a nuclear attack the country would be all but paralyzed with no
sense of, or intention to, proceed in an orderly fashion so that the country could make a swift
recovery. Nobel laureate Harold C. Urey believed that the ability of nuclear weapons to inspire
fear, irrationality and self-serving behavior, or passivity followed by surrender could ultimately
preempt any actual violence from either the Soviet Union or China.8 With regard to the United
States, this intimidation could translate into an issue of widespread panic among the public. As
such, in order to dampen American fears of atomic warfare and to give the impression that with
proper preparations such a war could be winnable, the Civil Defense Board was established by
the War Department on November 25, 1946. The conclusion of this committee was the Bull
Report (publicly available on February 2, 1948 as A Study of Civil Defense), which attested to a
plan to combat foreign enemies in the event of attack, and also to investigate internal threats
intent on undermining American liberty, life and the “will to fight”.9 A follow up report by
Russell J. Hopley, director of the Office of Civil Defense Planning (established March 27, 1948),
provided not only a guide for the establishment of civil defense offices for each state but stressed
that the public must be educated.
8 Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 34.9 Oakes, The Imaginary War, 37.
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The emphasis on education was a common conclusion amongst civil defense theorists,
and would later become the primary objective of civil defense throughout the United States.
Knowledge of proper evacuation procedures and distribution of any current declassified data on
the effects of a nuclear attack would in theory lessen the fear Hopley believed stemmed from
ignorance of current threats.10 The United States Civil Defense report (or Blue Book) submitted
in September of 1950 also confirmed the image of the American public as panic stricken masses
in an emergency scenario, thus recommending that all police forces be trained to “handle panic
situations” in exercises that would involve civilian participants and thus engender faith in the
abilities of the law enforcement.11 In theory, conditioning civilians to better appreciate the
gravity of what they could be facing would give them a feeling of safety and confidence in their
own knowledge; not to mention confidence in the competence of the government which had
taken the necessary steps to acquire and arm its citizens with valuable insight into their collective
situation. As those in power would soon learn, civilian cooperation was difficult to manage, but
ultimately essential to have in order to the support a policy of deterrence. In the same way a
strong, united public educated by a prominent civil defense program was essential to the image
of America’s deterrence policy. One could not exist without the other.
Guy Oakes, author of The Imaginary War, and Andrew D. Grossman, author of Neither
Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold
War, both argue that America’s policy of deterrence against potential foreign or internal attacks
required the adoption of a program of civil defense in order to manage the continued cooperation
of the civilian population. For Oakes, civil defense was the means by which the American people
could be convinced to, “pay the price for the failure of deterrence was civil defense”. 12
10 Oakes, The Imaginary War, 37.11 Oakes, The Imaginary War, 38.12 Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War. 6.
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Grossman’s work expands upon this by exploring the FCDA under the belief that it was a vehicle
between the need to sell civilians on the necessity of nuclear deterrence and the agency which
would handle the information they would need to know about the nuclear weapons their
government planned to stockpile. Put simply, the involvement of the public in the process of
deploying a successful deterrence policy not only involved their acceptance of such a policy, but
required their participation in the framework of the strategy.
Theorists speculated that a public who believed in the possibility of self-protection during
a nuclear attack would strengthen, “the moral underpinnings of American national security”,
with consolation that even in the worst scenario in which deterrence failed, the quality of life
would be tolerable if proper steps were taken beforehand to prepare.13 A civilian population that
did not believe in the message of a civil defense program could prove to be highly dangerous not
only to themselves should an attack occur, but to the legitimacy of the America’s deterrence
policy. If the American public did not believe in the threat of attack, their ability to survive an
attack, or the acceptability of post-attack living conditions then they might rebel against their
government’s authority, or worse, self interest would cause people to, “withdraw into
isolationism”.14 While they did not want to find themselves in the same position as they were in
the period between World War I and World War II, where the efforts to demobilize were in fact
premature, the eventuality of another full-scale war was still in question. Americans still needed
to be on the defensive, yet they were facing the possibility of attacks being carried out with
weapons for which there was little known defense. It would come to be the responsibility of the
FCDA, as outlined in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, to address both the issues of
continued weapons research and the education of the population using this new found
13 Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War. 37.14 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. 30.
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information. Taking this into consideration the early deterrence policy was one based on the
ideal of a poised military offensive backed by the support and security of a unified American
population committed to the continuation of living under constant, but acceptable, nuclear threat.
The FCDA, as an educator and research coordinator, would be bridging the gap between the
civilian and military components of the deterrence strategy.
The Truman Administration overall held a low opinion of the public’s ability to
successfully prepare and weather the possibility of an atomic attack. Their emotional disposition
would require leadership and management if they were to be successful contributors to national
security. Truman and his national security planers attempted to enact a program for the
mobilization of civilians that would uphold contemporary economic and political structures
while at the same time prepare the nation for the possibility of severe upheaval in the event of an
attack.15 To this end, the National Security Act of 1947 in addition to creating the National
Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and a War Council, the National Security
Resources Board (NSRB) was the integral agency which would apply itself to the task of home-
front mobilization.
The NSRB would act as the Federal Government’s response to the issue of emotional
containment, economic disruption, and a pioneer in the development of defense techniques. Prior
to the establishment of the FCDA in 1951 via the enactment of the Civil Defense Act of 1950,
the NSRB designated it the responsibility of its internal agency, the Office of Civil Defense
Planning (OCDP), to handle public education on civil defense, disaster planning and civil servant
training. The NSRB, on the other hand, would be more occupied with the “strategic-military-
15 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. 116.
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economic facets” of the mobilization effort.16 Although short lived the NSRB, and subsequently
the OCDP, would bring in many agency representatives, ideas and data that the FCDA would
inherit. Within the December 1950 hearings for the Civil Defense Act it was evident that some of
the structural layout for the program’s administration was to be kept intact, such as the
appointment of State health officers, by the State’s governor, as the directors of health services.
In this way the proposed FCDA would be working with the Public Health Services to plan civil
defense procedures “down to the particular city, or target area”.17 Likewise, the FCDA would
receive such contacts as the Construction Industry Task Force which had strong ties to one of the
leading shelter design advisors, the American Institute of Architects; and the belief that the best
program for civilian preparedness was to first and foremost protect the American economy by
directing a slow civil preparedness outreach on the level of local and State governments.18 As
part of the concern for economic safety during home-front mobilization, the NSRB even
undertook a joint program with the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1951 to protect the
American economy by offering incentives to industries with defense contracts in order to
persuade them to place their factories away from urban areas as these were considered more
likely to be targeted in comparison to a more rural location.19 This decision would prove to be an
enduring theme within the evacuation and relocation techniques purported by the FCDA
throughout its lifetime.
The Civil Defense Act of 1950 holds to many truths of American policy at the time, but
primarily it can provide a glimpse at the Federal Government’s response to the fear which many
16 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. 2.17 United States. Cong. Senate. Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 81st Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1950. 100.18 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 35.19 Monteyne, David. Fallout Shelters: Designing for Defense in the Cold War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 11.
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experts believed existed in the minds of Americans. As a product of American policy during the
crucible of the Korean War and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a nation with nuclear
capabilities to rival the United States’, the bill encapsulates the anxiety of policymakers on all
tiers of American society, from local officials to state and federal employees. How could the
public reaction in the event of a nuclear attack be prescribed so as to avoid chaos? By 1950 the
power and influence of the NSRB was proving to not be enough to accomplish the civilian
mobilization efforts necessary to assuage public fear. NSRB was also considered by many to
have become unwieldy and confusing with numerous duplication of functions between the
NSRB and the OCDP.20 It was the objective of the Civil Defense Act of 1950, in establishing a
federal civil defense program to be enacted through the Federal Civil Defense Administration, to
provide a unified solution to this dilemma of organization and effectiveness via several key
operations components which would be revisited numerous times throughout the 50s.
First, transcripts of hearings regarding Public Law 920 and the FCDA indicate that to
further the quality and accuracy of any federal civil defense program outreach it was explicitly
understood and encouraged that there would need to be more research done in order to better
prepare civilian, and by extension military defense. Who undertook this research and which areas
of study would be investigated likewise came into question within the original bill and its
revisions. Second, the issue was raised repeatedly as to what should be the functions of different
agencies in the federal government in encouraging civilian preparation for an attack and
coordinating civilians in the event of an attack. Also the question was asked who had the
authority within the federal government to provide the agencies with the materials and
information they would need in either situation. For example, who could be relied upon to
20 Jordan, Nehemiah. “U.S. Civil Defense Before 1950: the Roots of Public Law 920”. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=AD0637900. Institute for Defense Analysis. Economic and Political Studies Division. 1966. 127.
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administer immediate medical assistance after a disaster, and what funds should be made
available to citizens in such a situation so that they could afford new shelter, clothing and food?
At a more fundamental level this hesitancy to become deeply involved in the civil defense
program of the bill came back to the issue of what tier of government – local, state or federal -
should be in charge of the aspects of mobilization on the home front concerned those in
attendance regarding the bill. Third, it was a matter of some debate concerning what could be
expected of the average citizen in terms of participation in civil defense. Following that, how
could the American identity be presented as one that was founded on the necessary personality
qualification for a successful civil defense program - self reliance, initiative and commitment to
the protection of United States boundaries. Most importantly, the fourth component of the
proposed FCDA’s program would be the means by which it disseminated the prescribed
American identity throughout the cities and towns of the nation. Education through seminars,
pamphlets, films and other publications would be in line with the approach of previous civil
defense agencies such as the Office of Civilian Defense, the NSRB, and the NSRB’s internal
agency the OCDP, but the question of what should citizens be told and who should tell it to them
remained a point of contention.
Tying together the data gathered through scientific research on civil defense methods, the
coordinated efforts of numerous federal departments and agencies, and the obligation of all
civilians to participate in national defense, educational programs of the FCDA sought to bring
the nation in line with the rising threat of attacks perpetrated on United States soil. It would
ultimately be this final component on which the legitimacy of the Civil Defense Act and its
civilian mobilization program and agency, the FCDA, would be judged. For if the bill could not
produce a program which could convince America to channel their fear for the future into
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productive self preparedness, then one half of the United State’s deterrence policy would have
failed.
The Science Behind Civil Defense
As Jussi Hanhimäki and Odd Westad point out in their book, The Cold War: A History
in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, the majority of fighting during the Cold War was done
in the laboratory since, “Technological achievement was the yardstick in the competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union to represent the best model for future
societies”.21 Being able to judge the progress made by the Soviet Union and the People’s
Republic of China in the developing arms and technology race of the late 1940s was absolutely
paramount to safeguarding the United States’ tenuous position as a world power. Given the
aggressive invasion of the American sympathetic South Korea by the Soviet ally North Korea
earlier in June 1950, the willingness of other nations to take up arms for or against American
interests deeply resonated throughout the Federal Government.
In conjunction with the Soviet Union having deployed their first successful nuclear
weapon test in August 1949, the United States recognized the need to ready the civilian
population for an enemy nation which could be as well armed as their own country. To this end
section 2 of the bill deems it of paramount importance for the proposed FCDA to develop and
coordinate a strong program of research on civil defense methods to meet enemy attacks on the
civilian front and to disseminate this information amongst States and local communities. Various
forms of attack methods including atomic, radiological, chemical, bacteriological and biological
were to be studied under the FCDA’s guidance in order to research such topics as protection and
21 Hanhimäki, Jussi M. and Odd Arne Westad., ed. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 273.
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survival methods.22 Using this information the FCDA, working with other federal agencies,
would then proceed to develop civilian and State appropriate standards to be disseminated
throughout the United States. According to the bill it would also be the responsibility of the
FCDA to encourage further study of survival techniques within both government agencies and
private institutions, as well as follow the advancements and new theories of the scientific
community in the hopes that the United States could strengthen the ability of their civilian
population and in doing so further deter foreign attacks.
Whether given as verbal affirmation of plans for further research into atomic warfare, or
outright pledges of agency materials, the December hearings regarding the Federal Civil Defense
Act of 1950 universally condoned any research done under the FCDA. Oscar R. Ewing, Federal
Security Administrator and one of the most vocal supporters of civil defense research during the
December hearings for the bill, made his approval of the FCDA’s civil defense research clear not
only by pointing out the usefulness of agencies under the Federal Security Administration, but by
offering to go beyond the call of duty via networking inside and outside of his department. Case
in point, to show their support of the FCDA’s research agenda both the Federal Security
Administration’s Office and Education and Public Health Service offered their services and
resources in the statements given by their representatives at the December 8th hearing for the bill.
Touting the long standing support of civil defense agencies including the Office of Civilian
Defense, NSRB, and the early transition of the NSRB to the Federal Civil Defense
Administration, Surgeon General Dr. Leonard A. Scheele of the United States Public Health
Service pointed out on page 98 of the hearing transcript that the agency was ready and willing to
continue providing references for expert specialists and researchers. Federal Security
Administrator Ewing adds that the Public Health Services has amongst its resources the National
22 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 2.
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Institutes of Health, while the Office of Education can offer connections with university and
college facilities. In keeping with the directive of civil defense it was the hope that through war-
time preparation techniques and knowledge of current threats, an educated public could
hopefully avoid falling into the dreaded state of hysteria feared by civil defense theorists.
In accordance with the bill, the FCDA would be privy to any unclassified information
relevant to planning counter attack measures with the Department of Defense.23 However, as
Director of the United States Atomic Energy Commission’s Division of Biology and Medicine,
Dr. Shields Warren, points out, no agency including the proposed FCDA had carte blanche
access to the AEC’s findings. In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the Atomic
Energy Commission had the responsibility of protecting the nation’s security by holding sole
control as to when sensitive data on atomic energy could be accessed and published.24 Within the
final version of Public Law 920 there exists Section 410 to enforce this position. The
Commission would also need the FCDA to allow it to continue its research without much
interference. The reasoning being that the Commission was aware of the research being carried
out within the scientific community, and as such would be the most appropriate body to
supervise and consequently prevent the FCDA from funding or requesting research which was
already underway25. Regardless of these stipulations, it was recognized by the Senate Committee
on Armed Forces that the cooperation of the AEC was greatly valued as a resource for the FCDA
and thus should be appeased. Knowing this it was imperative to Dr. Warren that he make clear
not only his willingness to aid the FCDA in civil defense research, but the parameters under
which his agency and its people would work.
23 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 2. 24 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 110.25 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 110.
16
Given their years of working with the NSRB, the AEC confidently presented itself as a
cooperative supporter of the FCDA who would willingly donate time and resources to further the
understanding of human and environmental reactions to atomic attack. It is stressed, however,
that while the Commission may aid the FCDA with information and guidance on how to apply
that knowledge to practical civil defense purposes, it was not, nor had it ever served as, an
organization in charge of administering civil defense functions.26 Aside from monitoring area
contamination from a nuclear blast, the AEC was simply not suited or willing to operate such
tasks as administering emergency first aid, fire fighting, or area evacuation. As in their prior role
to the NSRB, Dr. Warren points out on page 110 of the hearing transcript that the role of the
Commission, as discussed with the acting civil defense agency as recently as March 1950, was in
supplying information to those agencies who have primary responsibilities for civil defense
planning.
While this may seem peripheral to the mission and purpose of civil defense as understood
in the bill and in American policy, Dr. Warren does remain proactive by demonstrating that,
while the Commission may be more of a wealth of knowledge rather than a tool of
implementation, the newly founded FCDA is welcome to make use of the existing publications
and advisory committees on radiation monitoring and training which had already been
established to train local and State governments.27 Stockpiled instruments belonging to the
Commission were likewise available for use in civil defense training exercises performed by
authorized State civil defense organization. Although the purpose of the Commission’s
emergency radiation monitoring teams was to protect Commission facilities and installations, Dr.
Warren considered their training and organization to be applicable to the civil defense goals of
26 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 110.27 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 111.
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radiation containment and treatment. As such Dr. Warren states on page 111 that the
Commission would be willing to deploy their emergency radiation monitoring teams in the event
of a disaster, specifically if there were no ready civil defense teams available in the area.
Surprisingly, the interest in scientific achievement sparked during this era did not initially
translate well into any kind of heavily funded, well planned effort as is evident in the parameters
of the bill. Despite an open line of communication between the FCDA and the people and
resources of the Atomic Energy Commission as outlined in Section 4 of the bill and established
already through the FCDA’s predecessor, the legislation regarding the use of consultants and
experts is surprisingly limited. As it would be later realized in the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1956, the funds available to visiting experts were too small to encourage any kind of special
interest in government consultation. Barely fifty dollars a day was reserved within the original
Civil Defense Act for the payment of a visiting expert, and nowhere within the bill was there a
specific budget set aside for the funding of research into weapons testing or civil defense
techniques. Within the final version of Public Law 920 as approved by Congress in 1951, there
still remains no inclusion of a research budget or compensation for expert consultation. Despite
this initial rocky start it was evident by the testimony from various politicians at the December
1950 Senate hearing for the bill that the transparency of government actions and research done
for civil defense purposes would be a prerequisite for any forthcoming research. Consequently a
virtually universal agreement between visiting speakers at the December 1950 hearings was that
research into weapons and civil defense techniques was vital for the well being of America; yet
little was done about conducting this research within the first several iterations of the bill.
Despite an initial lack of funding going directly to organizations and expert consultants in
the private sector, the political climate of the early 1950s bolstered an unprecedented interest in
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atomic research. Of all agencies and institutions involved in this field, the United States Atomic
Energy Commission stood within the Federal Government as the authority on the scientific
community, and thus it was through them that federal officials were presented with information
regarding nuclear tests and intelligence. The actions of the Atomic Energy Commission during
the mid to late 1940s would come to represent the types of tests undertaken throughout the 1950s
and 60s to, in part, aid civil defense efforts.
The role that the Commission would come to play in league with the FCDA deviated
very little from the ground rules emphasized by Dr. Warren in the hearings for the Civil Defense
Act of 1950. With their knowledge of medical treatments for radiation exposure the Commission
and the NSRB had sponsored instructor training courses for people from 31 States, Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. 89 people, as well as 70 nurses, all with
added instructions to expand their numbers by passing along their knowledge to State and local
governments, represented the fruits of these efforts. Collaborative Atomic Energy Commission
publications under the NSRB included many works which would form the basic knowledge of
early civil defense used by the FCDA. Such works included the “United States Civil Defense”
manual, and the bibliography of 400 references on entitled “Civil Defense Against Atomic
Warfare – A Selected Reading List”. “The Effects of Atomic Weapons”, the first handbook for
public use disclosing the total effects of an atomic explosion, was published in August 12, 1950.
“Medical Aspects of Atomic Weapons” focused solely on medical information provided within
“The Effects of Atomic Weapons”. Even more recent was the pamphlet “Survival Under Atomic
Attack”. Published in October 1950, this literature offered estimated damages as a result of fire
started during and immediately after a bombing. The book which Dr. Warren personally felt to
be of great importance was the “NSRB Document No. 128”, an ongoing collaborative effort
19
between the Commission and the NSRB which, in the most recent volume as of December 1950,
included significant medical information on atomic energy.28
Moving forward following the official approval of Public Law 920 and the establishment
of the FCDA in the Office for Emergency Management under the Executive Office of the
President in 1951, the AEC continued its research in radiation detection instruments for civil
defense purposes, emergency radiation exposure limits for personnel, and tolerable levels of
radiation in food and drinking water. Since it was stated in Public Law 920, Section 201(d), that
the FCDA would be allowed to perform research into protection and survival method standards
and the effects of various attack types this research fit well within the parameters of the FCDA’s
information requirements. Research projects which the Commission oversaw during and after the
founding of the FCDA included those undertaken at Argonne National Laboratory, the
University of Rochester, and the University of California, all of which were involved in the study
of radiation injury therapy.29 However, with new understanding of the effect and factors of
nuclear weapons came a better understanding of the unique qualities of any given attack. In
addition to weather, the distance from ground zero of a bomb’s detonation, as well as the
material comprising the ground of the surrounding environment became contributing factors to
the likelihood of surviving a nearby nuclear detonation.
In order to assuage public fear and normalize the concept of effects of nuclear weapons,
not to mention test the function of equipment and all aspects of shelters from construction to
living conditions, the FCDA and the AEC immediately set about undertaking field tests. In 1951
the energy release of 20 kiloton weapons was used against shelters that were feasible for families
to build, constructed with commercially available materials, and required only common house
28 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 110.29 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 111.
20
hold tools. That same year the FCDA tested 28 family shelters under similar circumstances in
order to bring compiling information for how-to shelter guides and pamphlets. Shelter designs
were again improved through the Buster-Jangle series of tests. By 1953 one begins to see the
effects of the FCDA’s limited budget, as they recycled shelters in order to witness cross-sections
of shelters that survived the 1951 tests.30 Regardless, the FCDA did manage to coordinate the
successful Upshot Knothole series that same year, in which vehicles, frame houses, radiation
protection methods and family shelters are all tested.
Funding proved to further limit the involvement of the FCDA with AEC tests as Dr. C. L.
Dunham, Director of the Division of Biology and Medicine within the AEC, makes mention of
the FCDA’s spending limit for the shelters used in Operation Teapot in 1955.31 The statement
regarding this particular test given by Edward Saunders, FCDA Director of Test Operations, is
naturally more optimistic since it was at the 1958 hearings Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic
Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 that the FCDA was in dire need of
defending its actions toward the objectives of research and education within the Civil Defense
Act. Within the statement of Director Saunders, the emphasis is put on the data gathered from the
tested residential, commercial and industrial structures and building materials, utilities and
services equipment, mobile houses, emergency vehicles, food, civilian shelters and radiation
protection methods.32 The 1957 Operation Plumbbob while massive, only peripherally involved
the FCDA. According to Robert L. Crosbie, AEC Director of the Civil Effects Test Group, there
were around 400 medical doctors, physicists, veterinarians, biologists, chemists, architects, and
engineers in addition to AEC and FCDA staff. 30 The first biological tests were held during this year to observe the effects of overpressure and underpressure.31 United States. Cong. House. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 85th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1958. 8.32 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 109.
21
Very quickly, the data collected by the Commission indicated more and more that the
fatalities incurred by the disastrous and numerous stages of a nuclear explosion would be greater
than anyone had anticipated, while the probability of surviving an atomic attack and the
conditions the population would have to face compiled an increasingly fatalistic impression of
post attack life. With a greater understanding of the effects of fallout came the greater
appreciation for issues related to contamination such as the longevity of radioactive isotopes in
the food chain and how they can eventually reach humans, thus resulting in a high number of
cases of bone cancer.33 By 1956 the Atomic Energy Commission presented the likelihood of
death within three miles of a ten megaton nuclear bomb detonation to be 100% should the
residents seek shelter within reinforced concrete buildings with standard ten inch walls and six
inch floors.34 It was also the conclusion of Dr. Willard F. Libby, Commissioner of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission, in Civil Defense for National Survival that, whether above-
ground or below-ground, common shelters being built in homes across America would not
provide sufficient thickness to prevent harmful radiation exposure. At one mile from the blast it
would not matter what self-preparation methods you had taken; death was virtually assured.
“You will have to protect against other effects [besides radiation exposure] which would have
gotten you anyway. That is, if you were within a mile of that fireball…something else would
probably get you”.35 However, Dr. Libby in his statement within Civil Defense for National
Survival is hesitant to disregard all civil preparedness methods. Shelters can still provide
sufficient protection in peripheral areas to a blast, and there is still the option of evacuation
before and after the detonation of a bomb. Dr. Libby goes on to assure the Senate that the FCDA,
33 United States. Cong. House. Part 1 Hearings Before the United States House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations. Civil Defense for National Survival. 84th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1956. 24.34 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 8.35 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 13.
22
to the best of his knowledge, is working on both the tasks of shelters and evacuation “with the
wholehearted cooperation of other Government agencies”.36 Implying, at least, that the AEC is
doing its part. Nonetheless, as the 1950s progressed it became clear that there was a serious need
to reevaluate civil defense methods and determine whether or not they were a truly realistic
option.
Despite the new knowledge of atomic weapons’ effects and damages creating a grim and
daunting impression the FCDA was determined to make the best use of the information they
were supplied. Although most research conducted by the Commission was for the purpose of
testing the durability of everything from building materials to living tissue, the FCDA found this
information useful and applied it to everything from construction of fallout shelters to the
planning of evacuation routes. Unwilling to accept that nothing could be done for those at any
distance from the detonation of a bomb the FCDA continued to approach shelters as a viable
option for protection. Monteyne notes that the use and feasibility of fallout shelters was
challenged in a number of ways including the idea of communal living being representative of
communist ideology and the lack of funding being offered by Congress for a fallout shelter
program given their apprehension of the FCDA’s ability to plan, coordinate and implement such
a program.37 Educational material, courses and research data on nuclear weapons effects and
personal protection was therefore the extent of most FCDA civilian outreach. Progress continued
to be made regarding potential shelter designs as is evident by the continued participation of the
AEC and FCDA in weapons field tests, but by 1953 the majority of material published by the
FCDA was focused more on evacuation rather than shelters, as well as the necessity of taking
action to protect oneself and one’s family immediately following a bomb’s detonation such in the
36 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 29.37 David Monteyne. Fallout Shelters: Designing for Defense in the Cold War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 13.
23
film “Duck and Cover”. A demonstration of this new direction for the FCDA is present in
hearings such as the January and February 1956 hearings before the Military Operations
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, titled Civil Defense for National
Survival. In a statement by Dr. Libby, he not only enlightened the Congress as to the risks and
newfound data on nuclear blasts, but demonstrated the connections being made between tests in
the Pacific Proving Grounds and the Nevada Proving Grounds, and information supplied to the
FCDA. With greater understanding of the effects of nuclear blasts, combined with the
advancement of weapons’ capabilities, Dr. Libby was able to make new highly specific
suggestions about such topics as the minimal requirements of various building materials
including concrete and earth, which could be used in shelters to protect from radiation, neutron
and gamma rays. In an interesting conclusion citing the scientific community’s better
understanding of travel distance and the longevity of radioactive fallout, it was the conclusion of
Robert L. Crosbie that weather data for a given area should facilitate the formulation of multiple
evacuation routes.38 Unfortunately, despite combined efforts of the FCDA’s outreach, a more
prevalent issue began to arise – the management of information.
With such a large focus on the effects of nuclear weapons damage the data that the FCDA
was trying to manage was becoming unwieldy. Indeed, in the 1956 hearing Civil Defense for
National Survival it was the opinion of Dr. Lloyd Berkner39 (120), Chet Holifield40 (120), and Dr.
Libby (40), that the amount of information regarding bomb effects, shelter designs, etc. was not
organized and cohesive enough for any agency with civil defense intentions to use it effectively.
Dr. Berkner and Holifield conclude that, given the rapid pace of research, a new volume of
current theories, methods and techniques regarding self preparedness would greatly help civil
38 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 15.39 Dr. Lloyd Berkner was the president of Associated Universities Inc. and a member of Project East River.40 Chet Holifield was the Chairman of the Military Operations Subcommittee.
24
defense officials and civilians.41 Not to mention the fact that it would clarify relevant educational
material. What information the FCDA was given from the AEC or the Department of Defense
was admittedly not meant for immediate public consumption due to its classified nature. In order
for the data to be used in any form of educational outreach it had to be either reworded or
declassified which, according the Civil Defense Act section 403(a), required an investigation by
the FBI as to the intent of use and loyalty of the requester. A result of this change was the
noticeable use of outdated information in the FCDA’s program.
Within the hearings between 1950 and 1958 addressing the Civil Defense Act and/or the
FCDA there is surprisingly little mention of new data being internalized within the FCDA’s
functions. One exception was when FCDA Administrator J. J. Wadsworth provided a brief
mention of refresher courses to be offered to staff of the FCDA’s civil defense “staff college”
and training centers during the 1951 hearing Civil Defense Training School and Other
Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. These refresher courses expressed Wadsworth’s
intention to update the civil defense trainers, and consequently the students, with the newest
methods devised through research. However, aside from this brief statement, there is little other
indication of new self preparedness methods being incorporated into the FCDA’s educational
program. Consequently, the lack of public acknowledgement testifying to the fact that the FCDA
was incorporating new information into their public education efforts had the unfortunate effect
of leading to, and then supporting, the conclusion drawn from Part II – Reorganization Plan No.
1 of 1958.
In Part II – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, part of the April and May 1958 hearings
titled Civil Defense, hearing it was stated that the FCDA’s, “organization for the planning,
coordination, and conduct of [the United States’] nonmilitary defense programs”, had resulted in
41 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 120.
25
persistent repetition of civil defense functions among other agencies and the use of out-of-date
data due to the agency’s inability to keep up with the rapid change of “technical advances of
military science”.42 Occasionally it was evident that the data was not being used at all, as in the
case of Dr. Libby’s testimony that the FCDA was not consulting the AEC at any point in their
planning for civilian evacuation.43 In one memorable exchange within Civil Defense for National
Survival, Commissioner of the United States Atomic Energy Commission Dr. Libby mentions
that the Commission’s book Effects of Atomic Weapons, which contains the same information
that the FCDA has been basing their contemporary shelter designs and survival techniques on, is
five years out of date!44 Dr. Libby proceeded to offer assurance that there was soon to be an
updated edition published, but Holifield still expressed undoubtedly shared frustration at this lag
in information. “[Effects of Atomic Weapons] is obsolete as far as the consideration of blast,
thermal and radiation damage is concerned. The principles are there, but... the results have to be
changed as a result of the new and bigger type bombs.”45 Despite testimony in 1958 from Robert
L. Crosbie, speaking as the Director of the Civil Effects Test Group (CETG), that all projects in
the AEC-FCDA test program are screened for non-duplication of prior experiments, the
necessity of undertaking the experiment as a field test, and the reasonable feasibility of said
experiment, it was the eventual conclusion of the Federal Government within the President’s
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 that the functions within the Civil Defense Act would be best
suited to another organization – the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (ODCM). With
the AEC, the FCDA, the small Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) all participating in a
research project among other civil defense functions, the chaotic nature of the FCDA’s approach
42 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 322. 43 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 34.44 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 7.45 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 7.
26
to scientific research eventually contributed to its merger with the ODM to form the ODCM.
Science, however, was not the only field in which the FCDA integrated itself to such a degree
that it lost the capacity to function effectively. As part of the Civil Defense Act the FCDA was
authorized to make use of other agencies within the Federal Government, and it was not only
working with the AEC that the FCDA found it had overlapping functions.
Power and Authority in the Civil Defense Act
Since the emphasis of civil defense was as an element of deterrence to foreign attack and
simultaneously a preparatory step in readying citizens for the eventuality of an attack, the
proposed FCDA of Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 would need strong leadership and
extensive power to coordinate the agencies of the Federal Government in order to reach out to
local municipalities across America. The civil defense efforts of World War II proved to be a
bountiful resource on which to draw administrative and practical reference during the
deliberation before the Senate with regard to the administrative provisions of the bill. Federal
Security Administrator Oscar R Ewing considered the organizational structure and duties of
local, state and federal agencies during World War II to be a sensible model for the
interdepartmental cooperation that a civil defense administration would need to capitalize on. For
example, Ewing makes a point of highlighting the existing connections between the Public
Health Service and the Department of Defense and the National Security Resources Board. He
also mentions that the proposed FCDA would need to know which civil defense functions are
already being handled so as to avoid redundancy; such as the Public Health Services’ duty to
inform Federal Security Agency regional offices about civil defense planning, who will then pass
this information on to the State departments of health.46 Crediting the prior experience of
46 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 95.
27
providing day-to-day necessities to citizens during World War II, Ewing extols the individual
usefulness of the Public Health Service, The Food and Drug Administration, and the Social
Security Administration in a civil defense capacity. However, despite the strongly advocated
networking which the proposed FCDA was encouraged to make use of, the efforts which would
be undertaken by the FCDA to commence citizen national security responsibilities were highly
decentralized. Civil defense planning and guidance would be provided at the top most level of
government, but it would be the states and local governments which would be mobilizing
citizens.
Not only would this model of civil defense administration be based upon the successful
home front mobilization of World War II, but, as Andrew Grossman points out on page 36 of
Neither Dead Nor Red, it would be a visible display for the world to see how a country could
plan for an attack and motivate its people to do so. It would be democracy at work as the people
gathered behind a commonly accepted goal and took actions seemingly of their own accord to
reach that goal. And with the Soviet Union and the United States competing to see whose society
would form the template for future societies, this kind of community effort would reflect well on
the nation who managed to achieve it.
As it was proposed to the United States Senate on December 6, 1950, the Federal Civil
Defense Act of 1950 would create a separate agency to expand upon the functions previously
held by the NSRB and the OCDP; that is, all responsibilities necessary to defend the U.S., its
provinces and its allies from sabotage, subversive acts, and direct attacks.47 While
acknowledging that the element of civilian preparedness was absolutely necessary to the
American international image, it had also become clear to representatives at the 1950 hearings
for the Civil Defense Act that a fully effective civil defense plan required as much information as
47 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 1.
28
possible regarding enemy activities, not to mention access to current scientific advances. To
accommodate these needs the FCDA would require access to data and contacts within various
agencies in order to gather relevant material for civil defense application. Through civil defense
training, education, research, and outreach programs to supply a nation in peril with the tools
necessary to pick themselves up and carry on, it was the hope of the hearing representatives that
the directives of the Civil Defense Act of 1950 would nullify some of the fear that had
supposedly gripped the nation. This enormous effort would be difficult to coordinate and execute
however. It would require strong leadership and decisive action in order to reach out to local
municipalities across America. A national civil defense mobilization program designed to
educate and incorporate a population as large as that of the United States would require that the
head agency, the FCDA, be given power which had not been held by any preceding agencies
charged with civil defense responsibilities.
Given the rising apprehension of the public’s ability to react efficiently in a nuclear crisis
situation, compounded with the escalation of the Korean War during 1950 and into 1951, the
power of action granted to the Administrator of the FCDA was staggering. Heading the FCDA
was an individual known as the Administrator, an individual appointed by the President pending
Senate approval. Chosen personally by the President, the Administrator’s position required him
to oversee all functions of the FCDA, or simply “Administration” in the language of the bill,
including the organization of collaborative civil defense measures with “neighboring countries”
as well as the coordination of federal defense measure between different departments, and
between the aforementioned departments and the civilian population.48 In times of crisis Section
303(c) of Public Law 920 authorized the Administrator to coordinate relief activities of any
department or agency within the Federal Government. Sections (b), (d), and (e) allowed the
48 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 3.
29
Administrator to move funds to the acquisition of land, equipment, transportation and people
independently of any federal power except for that of the President.
Murky language such as that outlining the Administrator’s authority to direct his staff to
work with “similar political subdivisions” located in neighboring countries would seem to
suggest the funding and cooperation of American sympathizers regardless of that country’s
political standpoint. The suggested subversion by which the Administration could act was made
all the more evident as the bill goes on to define “neighboring countries” as Canada, Cuba,
Mexico and, “the European possessions in the Western Hemisphere and their political
subdivisions”.49 This would be revised in Public Law 920 to merely include Mexico and Canada
according to Section 3(g), although it was permissible to employ personnel from the United
Kingdom provided in Section 401(b) that their position as temporary or part time advisors did
not exceed a combined total of 25 people of Canadian and United Kingdom citizenship.
For the most part, however, the FCDA did not take foreign involvement in the civil
defense program beyond the scope of cooperative research on shelter designs and the sharing of
program infrastructure. For example, during the July 1951 hearing for S. 1260, a bill which
presented plans for the construction of a permanent federal civil defense technical school, the
case of Great Britain’s permanent civil defense “staff college” was used as a successful example
of a government organized institution designed to furnish potential civil defense trainers with the
skills and knowledge they would need to teach the public. In the case of a “staff college” in the
United States, it would not only supply the nation with civil defense trainers for all levels of
government (federal, state and local), but would also serve as a vehicle to strengthen
international relations by educating visiting students from such places as Australia and Canada.50
49 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 6.50 United States. Cong. Senate. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO,
30
In terms of research for civil defense purposes, the section titled Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests
within the 1958 hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations
denoted FCDA sponsorship of five French and nine West German shelter tests (paid for by the
respective governments) in order to, “obtain design criteria and make design improvements”.51
The participation of 31 observers from 10 different countries was also mentioned in Part 1 –
Atomic Shelter Tests regarding the undertaking of Operation Plumbbob in 1957.
As outlined in the bill, decisions made by the Administrator could not be overturned if
they were considered in good faith within the outlined requirements of the Act. Even the seizure
of land without payment no longer became subject to any previous legislature, more specifically
the Act of June 30, 1932 or any of its subsequent amendments according to Section 303(a). If it
was deemed a necessary step by the Administrator then it was legal. The reach of the
Administrator was immense in accordance with the numerous functions he and his staff were
required to perform. While at peace, Section 201(e) of the law stated that the Administration
staff was to be predominantly concerned with the well being of American citizens via training
programs, civil defense schools, public awareness campaigns to better educate people at to the
nature of atomic attacks, and the equipping of civilians with survival materials such as medicine
and “technical information of processes”. Assuming, naturally, that such release of information
did not violate any confidentiality clauses and that there would be a pending investigation by the
FBI into the information request.
In times of attack nearly all due process could be overturned save for any Presidential
decrees or orders. In this legal stature alone there were no other proposed forms of restraint put
on the Administration. The bill even supplies in section 7(a) of S. 4219 that other federal
1951. 4.51 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 142.
31
departments would be obligated to equip the FCDA with any materials or facilities requested.
Quite simply the FCDA was to be the last line of homeland defense while the Defense
Department coordinated the most appropriate counter defenses for any potential attack. In a dual
role the FCDA would serve both the public and the Defense Department. There were, however,
definitive lines which certain agencies insisted be drawn between the functions necessary for
civil defense and those which were related to a more military nature.
The investigation of suspected subversion, espionage or act of sabotage was the express
jurisdiction of the FBI to pursue any lines of inquiry. Fearful of the wording within Section 2 of
the original bill presented to the Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Civil Defense in December
1950, Allen Crozier of the Department of Justice wished it to be made clear that the rights of the
Administrator and Administration staff were not being extended to, “broad investigative
jurisdiction over these offenses to the myriad people – federal, state and local – who may be
engaged in the overall civil-defense program”.52 Possible security transgressions were best left to
those with the proper connections and training. It was also implied by Crozier as well as the
representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the responsibility of the FCDA
should concern itself with educating and preparing the civilian population rather than policing it.
The latter, General Counsel L. Paul Winings, had similar concerns with the wording of the bill.
However, unlike Crozier, his apprehension of the authority seemingly granted to the
Administrator was not merely a matter of involvement in another department’s affairs, but an
overstepping of federal law. Section 5(b) of the bill stated that the Administrator, in forming a
compact with, “any state or province of a neighboring country for mutual aid into or out of the
United States”, could restrict the entry or exit of anyone traveling in the United States.53 Wining
52 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 118.53 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 4.
32
brought up the point that the International Security Act, or Public Law 831, held the Attorney
General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service accountable for preventing the entry of,
“aliens seeking to enter the United States.. to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest or would endanger the welfare or safety of the United States,.. members of the Communist Party, Communist association, or other totalitarian parties or subsidiaries or such parties in this country or abroad, aliens who there is reason to believe seek to enter the United States to engage in activities which would be prohibited by laws of the United States relating to espionage and sabotage, or in other activities subversive to the national security”.
However, in creating a compact the Administrator could unknowingly allow such individuals to
enter the country under the guise of offering aid.54 Again, the reasoning of resources and inside
knowledge were used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to support its unique
qualifications to handle any such persons. Civil defense was again relegated to the role of
instructor rather than active member of investigative security.
The civil defense responsibilities of the Federal Government as they were outlined in the
Civil Defense Act were a continuous point of contention throughout the existence of the FCDA,
particularly between the military establishment and the FCDA. With the close connection made
between civil defense and military strength in the United States’ policy of deterrence it is
understandable that, from the very conception of the post World War II civil defense program,
there would a fine line between military responsibilities and priorities, and likewise those of the
NSRB, OCDP, FCDA and subsequent successors. In his statement to the Senate, Federal
Security Administrator Ewing denounced the expenditure of military resources on functions
which were the responsibility of civilians, yet even he did not delineate a clear distinction
between civil defense and military purpose in terms of national security. His empowered speech,
“Total war knows no rear areas, and every civilian should feel as much a part of the fighting
machine as are men and women in uniform” demonstrates the apparent ambiguous distinction
54 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 122.
33
between civilian contributions to security and those made by official members of the armed
service. In many ways the relationship between the two is centered around the idea of “equal but
different”. Unfortunately this does not lend itself well to any form of administrative distinction
between one group’s functions versus another’s.
The FCDA considered its service to national security not merely additive to the measures
undertaken by the military establishment, but of equal importance and necessity. Statements
given at the 1950 hearings for the enactment of the Civil Defense Act described civil defense and
the responsibilities of the proposed FCDA as military parallels on the civilian front, and
considering the power invested in the Administrator during an attack scenario it was considered
paramount by the FCDA staff that their Administration should be perceived as worthy of equal
funding and publicity as the Defense Department and all agencies within. In order to make their
case before the Senate and Congress the FCDA’s representatives drew parallels to the benefits of
the civil defense program and how they directly aided not only the nation, but more specifically
the operability of the military presence throughout the nation. Within the 1951 hearing to discuss
the exemption of Alaska from requirements pertaining to funding and the administering of oaths
as outlined within the Civil Defense Act, the argument given in favor of this change centered
around the benefits which could be afforded to the military presence. If civil defense measures
were not implemented which could accommodate the isolation of many of Alaska’s
municipalities, then the civilians would be inclined to move. As the military outposts within
Alaska relied upon the local population for laborers in the construction and maintenance on the
facilities, it would be in the best interest of the people and the military presence in Alaska for
there to be funding exceptions made on behalf of the State. Building upon this, Governor of
Alaska Ernest Gruening drew upon the common consideration of Alaska as being “on the front
34
line” and called upon the likelihood of loss of both lives and territory if the bill were not
modified to accommodate the state’s situation.55 A similar argument for the reliance of the
military on civil defense was presented in September 1951 at the Senate hearing Civil Defense
Program, whereupon the FCDA Administrator Millard Caldwell stated that the stability created
through civil defense efforts provides the Defense Department with a labor force that, in the
event of an attack, would be able to promptly regroup and continue manufacturing and producing
any and all essential supplies.56
During the hearings later that year in July titled Civil Defense Training School and Other
Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950 it was the position of the current FCDA Deputy
Administrator, J. J. Wadsworth, that the importance of civil defense was irreversibly linked with
the need for well trained civil defense officials. Deputy Administrator Wadsworth goes on to
state that it is not merely a matter of equal contribution, but part of the nature of the threat that
the United States was sharing. As the threat was one that could affect all levels of society it had
to be dealt with using equal fervor and passion from both civilian and military agencies. Page 20
of the transcript for this hearing expresses Wadsworth’s conviction quite clearly, “The enemy of
the future is not only the enemy of the armies in the field, but also the enemy of the civilian
population”. Drawing this link between the perceived shared purpose of the military with that of
the civil defense program, Wadsworth thereby placed the civil defense program on an equal
standing with the nation’s military deterrence efforts. It would prove to be a position that the
FCDA would need to defend throughout the agency’s existence.
55 United States. Cong. House. Hearings before the United States House Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Relating to the Territory of Alaska. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1951. 11.56 United States. Cong. House. Hearings before the Civil Defense Task Force of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. Civil Defense Program. 82nd Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1951. 5.
35
As 1951 drew to a close the legitimacy of the FCDA and the continued enactment of the
Civil Defense Act came into question. The belief originally present during the hearings for the
enactment of the Civil Defense Act back in December of 1950 was again raised; that being that a
civil defense program run through a federal agency was not a realistic option and could not
possibly function over such a large region and with so large a population. It had also come to the
attention of the federal agencies that the relationship of civil defense with the defense department
was not clearly delineated as was evident by the stated position of the FCDA in prior Senate
hearings and in the actions of the agency. Indeed, the case was made by the FCDA that the
Department of Defense, as well Congress, were partially responsible for the unsatisfactory public
reaction to the civil defense program.57 Falling back on the irrefutable need of the nation for a
powerful military, the FCDA fought for its existence by bringing up what they argued was an
equal partnership of the civil defense program and the military. On page 2 of the September 1951
hearing to discern the future of both the bill and its agency, simply titled Civil Defense Program,
the FCDA is described as a, “civilian counterpart with the Military Establishment”. An argument
was even presented that Congress and the Defense Department were in violation of the law as
described in the Civil Defense Act via their seeming unwillingness to provide critical support for
the civil defense effort.58 That support being adequate funding for the FCDA’s operations,
funding for local shelter construction, the stockpiling of medical supplies and equipment, and an
outspoken acknowledgement of the need for the civil defense program and the operations
conducted by the FCDA.
Legally it was within the rights of the Administrator and his staff to ask these concessions
of the Defense Department as per Sections 201(a), 201(b), and 401(c) of the official version of
57 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Program. 4.58 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Program. 4.
36
Civil Defense Act, aka Public Law 920. Nonetheless, in asking for contributions of supplies and
other materials for civil defense purposes, as was demonstrated in the hearings Civil Defense
Program (1951) and To Amend Further The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of
1949, As Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes)
(1955), the FCDA further blurred the line between the role of the Administration and the
Department of Defense. Granted in the short term this would enable the Administration to
accomplish their goal of civilian self-preparedness, but it would eventually work against them as
it became increasingly obvious that the FCDA and the Defense Department were performing
many closely related functions and as such were redundant.
In the 1956 hearing Civil Defense for National Survival two proposals were presented.
One suggested that the FCDA be integrated into the Department of Defense and the other argued
that the FCDA be made into a cabinet department of the government. In the view of the Military
Operations Subcommittee this was compliant with their belief that the Civil Defense Act had
become obsolete given advent of the successful detonation of a hydrogen bomb by the Soviet
Union. In such a situation it was the consensus in the subcommittee that the principle protection
of civilians was what subcommittee chairman Chet Holifield personally described as “our
obligation”.59 Echoing what Robert Dallek describes as the conservative viewpoint that, “in order
to preserve personal liberties, Americans would all have to stand together against communism”60,
the increased militarization and conformity characteristic of Eisenhower’s presidency brought
the functions of the FCDA and the Civil Defense Act even further into the military field.
Essentially proposing an integrated program, the functions of the FCDA as the Civil Defense Act
59 United States. Cong. House. Part 1 Hearings before the United States House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Military Operations. Civil Defense for National Survival. 84th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1956. 68.60 Robert Dalek. The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1983. 190.
37
had described them would be altered so that rather than have civil defense responsibilities
primarily be comprised of relief efforts and the organization of protective measures such as
shelters, evacuation plans and survival techniques, the civilian mobilization effort would be one
of “nonmilitary defense”.
Within “nonmilitary defense” would be a more disciplined undertaking of alert behavior
such as the operation of early warning systems and the increased production of goods for
military consumption. Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner succinctly described the purpose of “nonmilitary
defense” as both a coordination of civilian and military units as well as a true form of security for
American power, thus showing a drastic move away from the need of civil defense as a
containment of public emotions to one of protecting the productivity of society and industry.
“The job of nonmilitary defense is to increase the number of bombs that an enemy must deliver
to damage us mortally, so that no enemy can imagine that any mass or surprise attack within his
capability can put us out of the running”.61
As of 1958, the realization of these proposals came to fruition with the Reorganization
Plan No. 1 of 1958. Serving two agencies at once, the Director would be in charge of both the
National Security Council and the ODCM. Most importantly, the Reorganization Plan
considered the program priorities of the ODCM to be first and foremost advising the President
on how to, “clarify and expand the roles of the federal departments and agencies in carrying out
nonmilitary defense preparedness functions”.62 Secondary was the actual coordination and
direction of said functions within their assigned departments or agencies. Unlike the
independence given to the Administrator of the FCDA in his coordination of civil defense
measures within other departments, it would be the position of the Director of the ODCM to
61 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 97.62 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 322.
38
advise the president on appropriate functions to be carried out by other agencies. The greater
involvement of the President was not only for supervisory purposes, but necessary to consolidate
the movements of all national defense activities within the executive branch. By 1958 the Civil
Defense Act was all but dismantled. What had originally started as a department that would
coordinate and assist State and local community initiatives had become a militarized
coordination of agencies acting for the civilians’ own good.
How Civil Defense Imagines America
Many historians maintain that the necessity of civil defense was tied to a steady
succession of propaganda campaigns propagated throughout the Cold War by Americans for
Americans in order to facilitate the creation of a common, unifying enemy who employed
despicable underhanded tactics including the spread of panic, the use of nuclear attack and
espionage, and the deconstruction at all levels and in all aspects of society. Guy Oakes wrote in
The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture that civil defense provided a
way to enforce the resolve of Americans against the Soviet Union during the early years of the
Cold War, as well as provide a means to fight back since their mere education about the risks
involved in a war with this nation was not enough. “Their hearts had to be moved as well. In
order to equip American people for this struggle, it was imperative to build up their courage and
steadfastness. Only then would they be prepared to assume the risks entailed by the strategy of
deterrence.”63 Andrew D. Grossman had a more succinct way of describing the formative civil
defense plans of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), the short lived predecessor to
the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), by characterizing them as a “blueprint for
63 Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture. 31
39
social control”.64 In civil defense schools and community meetings, literature, movies, comic
books, and other material, the techniques taught were not meant simply as the survival of the
average citizen, they were his or her moral and national responsibility. Once learned and applied
it was then the citizen’s duty to see to the continued education of his community and the
adherence of all people to the program of his nation’s civil defense administration.
In his book on Cold War architecture and defense, David Monteyne outlines the civil
defense agenda as striving to address the short and long term consequences of an enemy attack
by proving that social, economic and political standards would remain unaffected following any
disaster be it natural or man-made. The means for doing this were, “to demonstrate that what
good citizens already did in everyday life was a model for the roles they should perform when
under attack”.65 The survival and response techniques which were researched and advocated
throughout the Cold War by the Federal Government’s civil defense offices offered the proactive
approach provided to the quintessential American; a way to contribute on the home front while
simultaneously serving ones own goals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This image of
the “good citizen” simultaneously gave a set of social roles which formed the basis for the ideal
American.
At its heart Cold War civil defense was meant to be integrated as a family affair. This
“family” did not necessarily include only the immediate members of the nuclear family, but
rather the entirety of a community be it a town, city, or organization such as a school or hospital.
Between 1950 and 1955 the language used with regard to the FCDA consistently referred to the
public as “local communities” or “State government”, thus distinguishing the divide between the
Federal Government and most specifically the Department of Defense, from the rest of the
64 Grossman, Andrew D. Neither Dead Nor Red: Civilian Defense and American Political Development During the Early Cold War. 37.65 Monteyne, David. Fallout Shelter: Designing For Civil Defense in the Cold War. XII.
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nation’s population. It is largely after 1955 that the language begins to change from
“community” to individuals whose efforts can be coordinated or integrated into nonmilitary
responsibilities.
If civil defense materials are to be taken at face value, the common American town is one
in which everyone will come to the aid of their neighbors. Having heard and taken to heart the
necessity of reliance on group efforts to stave off disasters, it would be the immediate response
of all patriotic citizens to efficiently prepare and respond in the event of a threat to the group.
One film produced in 1951 by Encyclopedia Britannica Films Inc. entitled Atomic Alert
(Elementary Version) urged civilians to seek shelter with strangers if they could provide the
nearest cover since, “Everyone is in on this. Strangers will understand”.66 During this time when
civil defense was still a community undertaking, the constant portrayals of families
simultaneously involving themselves in drills, rescue exercises and the construction and
occupation of shelters speaks for the desire of civil defense to be brought into the private
landscape of the home. Although the immediate and far reaching benefits of civil defense are
described as a community effort within Atomic Alert, the film does not draw a line between the
nuclear family and the community they live in. Before branching into the aspects of
neighborhood cooperation and contribution the film clearly distinguishes the family as a group
within a group. The following lines illustrate this,
We have the national defenses to help intercept an enemy, and we all form a team to help each other through emergencies. You are on that team. So is your family – each member of it. And in your community every doctor, fireman, every policeman and nurse, every lineman and operator, every civil defense worker – in fact, every community employee is ready to help you if you need him.67
66 Encyclopedia Britannica Films, Atomic Alert (Elementary Version) (1951), MPEG2 video, 10:13. http://archive.org/details/AtomicAl1951.67 Encyclopedia Britannica Films, Atomic Alert (Elementary Version) (1951), MPEG2 video, 10:13. http://archive.org/details/AtomicAl1951.
41
Likewise, the starring family unit of the National Archives and Records Administration’s 1950
dramatization Atomic Attack keep mostly to themselves, but when asked to are willing to help
out their neighbors by providing shelter, offering consolation for those in grief, keeping the
peace, and in one instance literally bringing a stranger into their family circle.
It was common for FCDA civil defense publications to frame the usefulness of disaster
response as knowledge that was applicable to common mishaps such as fires and floods. As such
the functions and procedures of self-preparedness were often contextualized as common sense,
and merely a rehearsal of information that should already be known. Both the educational comic
strip and film “Bert the Turtle Says Duck and Cover”, produced in 1951 by the FCDA, begin to
address the proper reaction to atomic attack by building upon the everyday safety routines which
are taught to people as common sense. “You have learned to take care of yourself in many ways
– to cross the street safely. And you know what to do in case of fire. But the atomic bomb is a
new danger.”68 Similarly, “Mr. Civil Defense Tells About Natural Disasters!” (1956) and
“Operation Survival!” (1957), both published by the FCDA and the Graphic Information Service,
began with a discussion about the safety tips civilians will have already learned, extending the
new safety precautions civil defense provided in order to face the “new danger”. According to
these civil defense publications, the sheer magnitude of disaster response functions required the
involvement of the entire neighborhood. Films like Atomic Alert depicted a group of young
adults learning about the purpose and use of a Geiger counter, which was then followed up with
a scene of a lineup of civilians with different jobs accompanied by a narrative statement stressing
the importance of their involvement in “helping you if you need it”.
68 Richard L. Graham. Government Issue: Comics for the People, 1940s – 2000s. New York: Abrams Comicarts, 2011. 145.
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As the film progressed and the camera pulled back as series of connections is made
between the town we are first introduced to and then neighboring communities, until the image
merged into a map of the United States accompanied by a description of the State and National
headquarters of civil defense. In choosing to begin at the individual level with young men and
women learning how to use common civil defense equipment, and then pulling backwards to the
community, then the local surrounding area and finally the nation, the film was connecting all of
the smaller functions of civil defense to the grand picture of the United States security policy.
The 1956 comic strip “Mr. Civil Defense Tells About Natural Disasters!”, published for the
FCDA by the Graphic Information Service, brought out the seriousness of a community’s
preparedness for flood, and by implication an atomic attack, by detailing the extensive damage
which can be brought down instantly upon people, even going so far as to assure that lives will
be lost. However, hope is offered in the form of “well trained civil defense workers” who, while
they may not be able to prevent any loss of life from occurring, can prepare civilians and direct
them, through a system of previously constructed communication networks in an emergency.
Despite most claims that the portrayal of civil defense as a community effort was a
propaganda attempt, this viewpoint is essentially too narrow. To believe that civil defense
materials propagated the image of unity in small-town America merely as a reaffirmation of
nationalist ideology robs members of the FCDA and the Federal Government of any other
motivation besides that of manipulation. Granted, the purpose of civil defense as it was defined
in NSC-68 and repeatedly by representatives at the 1950 hearings for the Civil Defense Act of
1950 was the mobilization of citizens to take up arms and knowledge for the defense of a
particular America – one founded on “freedom, democracy, and the defense of the free world” –
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but the incentive for reaching out to towns and municipalities was not merely to connect them
with a larger, imagined national narrative.
As purely an administrative technique, the purpose of targeting local towns and cities in
civil defense films, pamphlets and comic books among other publications, was necessary for the
FCDA to filter down its knowledge and standards for civil defense techniques. The public
mobilization that could be achieved through local organizations, voluntary organizations,
professional societies, churches, and civic associations was openly acknowledged. Social groups
could not only influence public opinion of the war effort on a local scale, but on a national scale
as well assuming they were convinced of the need for their members to apply methods and
techniques of civil defense, as well as their patriotic responsibility to do so. As part of his
statement during the hearings for the Civil Defense Act of 1950, Federal Security Administrator
Oscar R. Ewing made sure to voice his hope that section 7(c) of the bill would take this into
consideration as it could greatly influence their generosity in providing, “public or private lands,
protective and other work essential for the preservation of life and property, for clearing debris
and wreckage, and for making emergency repairs to, and temporary replacement of,
communications, hospitals, utilities, transportation facilities, or public facilities of States or their
political subdivisions damaged or destroyed by enemy attacks”.69 While neither the bill S. 4219
to authorize a federal civil defense program, nor the December 1, 1950 executive order from
President Truman establishing the FCDA in the Office for Emergency Management of the
Executive Office of the President pay heed to the chain through which civil defense shall be
disseminated amongst the general populace, testimony before United States Senate committee on
Armed Services addresses this repeatedly.
69 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 4.
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In numerous instances the tiers of communication are described as starting with the
Federal Government, or more accurately its civil defense department the FCDA, which
communicates with the State government, who then passes any necessary information on to the
local municipalities. Thus, a strong divide between civilians and the federal civil defense
authorities, the purpose of which is to distribute the process of planning and enacting civil
defense across all tiers of government, is created.
The Acting Director of the Civil Defense Office, accompanied by Federal Civil Defense
Administrator Millard F. Caldwell Jr., drew upon the prior experience during World War II of
the Civil Defense Office to advocate this communication hierarchy on the basis of encouraging
interstate civil defense and disaster relief alliances.70 Other representatives at the hearing for the
bill, including Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service Dr. Leonard A
Scheele and Federal Security Administrator Oscar R. Ewing, considered it a civic responsibility
of all citizens to contribute to civil defense effort by organizing and administering various
functions that would directly affect their everyday communities, especially immediately after an
attack. To some the shirking of this civic responsibility was not only reprehensible, but
detrimental to the well being of one’s neighbors. The statement on page 61 from James J.
Wadsworth, Acting Director of the Civil Defense Office, best exemplifies this sentiment. While
emphasizing the need for all civilians to cooperate and to do their share of civil defense
preparation, Wadsworth simultaneously denounces community leaders who don’t consider civil
defense to be an immediate necessity, despite the early stages of planning civil defense in the
context of atomic warfare. As it is from them that communities look for direction, it must be the
community leaders who push their friends and neighbors to take up the charge for a prepared and
fortified town. Quite simply, “Local officials who pass off this grave responsibility [of civil
70 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 59.
45
defense] or say that they cannot or will not move until every “i” is dotted, and every “t” crossed
by the Federal Government are losing sight of their responsibility to their own people”.71
Federal Security Administrator Ewing, sharing the fear that the nature of civil defense
would be misinterpreted as a military responsibility, hastened to point out that the issues of war
which were outside of civilian expertise were the priority of the military. Civil defense, however,
was in practice and in the parameters of the bill, a civilian undertaking, comprised of functions
meant to serve the interests of citizens. And although the methods of self-preparedness
comprising the directive of the proposed FCDA’s program were important for “preserving the
maximum civilian morale and support for the war effort”, it was all ultimately done to restore
“normal community life” after an attack.72 This, Ewing pointed out on page 97 of the hearing
transcript, was the very premise of the United States Civil Defense manual as it was written by
the National Security Resources Board and the Atomic Energy Commission, and so it should
remain.
When asked on the December 8th 1950 hearing by future FCDA Assistant Administrator
for Plans and Policy, Justice M. Chambers, whom, under the provisions of the bill, should be
responsible for training “first aid people” and additional nurses within the medical profession of
small communities, Dr. Scheele firmly stated that it was a local responsibility.73 However, he
hastened to clarify that the educational programs at local levels would not have to be built from
scratch. By networking through the other agencies of the Federal Government it was expected
that the FCDA would request the aid of the Atomic Energy Commission (who could provide
information on medical treatments for radiation exposure), the Public Health Service, and other
appropriate government agencies to help train teachers to lead State-to-State educational
71 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 61.72 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 97.73 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 102.
46
programs. “[The Federal Government] can do the top training, because it has the resources and
the available information across the broad range of subjects involved. On top of that it is
qualified to provide the best framework for this, but the real job at the grass roots level is the
local responsibility”.74 However, it was not merely a combination of administrative and the
availability of resources which entrenched the active role of local communities in 1950 civil
defense policy.
Personal belief in the ability of local governments to appreciate and prepare for Soviet
threats to United States security empowered people such as Senator Kefauver, Federal Security
Administrator Oscar R. Ewing, and Mayor William Devin to speak on behalf of municipality and
other local community’s responsibilities in civil defense preparedness. Senator Kefauver,
speaking on behalf of the Armed Services Subcommittee, stated on the December 1, 1950
hearing for S. 4219 that the role of the Federal Government in civil defense preparation should
be one of coordination. Assistance in the forms of funding, materials and facilities could be
distributed where needed, but it would be through the actions of individuals, local communities
and State governments that the country would persevere through any attack on American
territory.75 Administrator Ewing had a somewhat more skeptical view of civilian willingness to
help one another after an attack, but still maintained that people would come to the aid of their
neighbors. Seeing disaster response as more of a mutual necessity, Administrator Ewing stated
that, “Though they may not want to they will be required to furnish full support to their stricken
neighbors and perhaps receive evacuees and causalities and care for them”.76 Mayor of Seattle,
WA, Williams Devin, believed that in the event of an attack the municipal officials and
municipality had the potential, and responsibility, to prepare to deal with the immediate
74 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 102.75 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 8.76 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 94.
47
aftermath.77 He did, however, believe that areas with a high risk of being targeted for an attack
should be exempt from the unilateral hierarchy of civil defense communication and dealt with on
the same level as the State government i.e. direct contact with FCDA officials.
The reality of local governments and community individuals shouldering the burdens of
self-preparedness was rather far removed from the idealized conception. While a nice sentiment,
the portrayal of Americans taking those in need into the very center of their familial circle
ignored the pressing debate of fallout shelter morality whereby people questioned whether they
should accept an outsider into their home and shelter given the limited supplies and space
available. Jesuit priest and former Georgetown University professor of ethics L. C. McHugh
wrote in the Catholic magazine America that the only way to avoid having to turn away
neighbors, or worse shoot them, should they attempt to force entrance to your family’s shelter
was to help them build one of their own.78 The willingness of rural communities to shelter, feed
and clothe refugees fleeing from bombed cities was likewise a point of contention. Researchers
contracted by the FCDA found that not only were outlying communities against the idea, they
were in some instances hostile such as one Midwestern resident who told his interviewer that his
community would fire upon those attempting to enter their town in order to, “Keep those city
folk from using up our children’s food and water”.79 It was apparent that for the FCDA, issues in
attempting to reach and influence municipalities and State governments were going to be many
and frequent after the official start of the department.
Following the beginning of official operations for the FCDA in January of 1951, the
municipalities of Alaska, and by extension the State, found that they had a crippling inability to
generate the necessary funds for fallout shelter construction, the purchase of equipment and
77 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 15.78 Hine, Thomas. Populux. Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2007. 136.79 Monteyne, David. Fallout Shelters: Designing for Defense in the Cold War. 14.
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means of transportation, as well as any funding for the education of local officials and volunteer
civil defense workers. In answer to this problem it was proposed in the April 1951 hearings titled
Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Relating to
the Territory of Alaska that the state in question should not be held to specific restriction
regarding the acceptance of federal funding for civil defense purposes. Specifically, it was
suggested that the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, now known as Public Law 920, be revised
in order for the second sentence of subsection 201(i) be followed by the following lines,
“Provided further, that the limitations upon the making of federal contributions contained in the
second, third, and fourth provisos of this sentence shall not apply to the Territory of Alaska”.80 In
adopting this change within the Civil Defense Act the State would be free from having to match
any federal funds received for the purpose of purchasing civil defense “organizational
equipment”, land, buildings or shelters, nor would it be held to the same method of funding
distribution as other States in order to receive contributions for shelters and “other protective
facilities”. Given the State’s low population density of only 127,000 people spread out over a
large area, the local governments were only able to raise a combined $400,000 despite asking a
for a greater amount of money per citizens than observed in any other state. In order to facilitate
a shelter program in Alaska exceptions to Public Law 920 would need to be made. Thinking of
what the absence of the FCDA’s program in Alaska could signify, the delegate for Alaska, E. L.
Bartlet, formulated his argument for Alaska’s need of funding exception around several points
which, if the Senate failed to accommodate, would mean the hypothetical loss of civilian support
for civil defense in Alaska. Unlike other areas in the United States, it was pointed out by Bartlet
that the towns and cities of Alaska were not situated close to one another and as such the theory
80 United States. Cong. House. Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Relating to the Territory of Alaska. 1.
49
of nearby communities taking in refugees would not be entirely practical.81 As mentioned on
page 24 of this paper, a loss of civilians due to their migration away from the dangers of the
“front line” would mean a loss of labor for the military outposts stationed at key cities
throughout Alaska. However, this could be avoided if expansive underground shelters were
funded and constructed in order to give the people a sense of security, but this could only be
done with additive funding and the changes put forth by the FCDA to exempt Alaska from
having to match contribution from the federal government.
In the case of Alaska in 1951 it was apparently not due to a lack of community interest
that resulted in the problematic adoption of advised civil defense preparations. Indeed, it is quite
clear from testimony from E. L. Bartlet, Hurbert R. Gallagher (Director of Field Administration
within the FCDA) and Colonel Joseph D. Alexander (the acting Adjutant General for Alaska and
Director of Civil Defense) that citizens were very much aware of their danger given their close
proximity to Russia, their vulnerable dispersal across the State, and their mutual association with
numerous military facilities. It was in their interest to adopt civil defense measures in order to
protect their livelihoods and their lives, and they were willing to do so provided they received
financial help. In this early stage of the FCDA it was the mere possibility of the citizens of
Alaska growing apathetic and discouraged that spurred Congress to take action before any true
discontent over the FCDA’s civil defense program could take root. Indeed, so great was the
desire to prevent disinterest in the civil defense program that compromises were made in order to
make it even slightly easier for civilians to become involved. At the same January 1951 hearing,
the possibility of modifying the means of taking the mandatory oath of allegiance required in
order to become a member of staff for a state or local civil defense organization was seriously
81 United States. Cong. House. Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Relating to the Territory of Alaska. 5.
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considered. In an effort to make enrollment in local civil defense organizations more convenient,
since it was pointed out that having to visit a public notary or similar person authorized to
administer oaths of allegiance to the United States Constitution could be a “burden”, it would be
a prudent measure to simplify the process by editing the applicable section, 403(b), of the Civil
Defense Act. Although not in favor of Alaska being granted special consideration regarding
section 201(i) of the Civil Defense Act, the prepared statement of Secretary of the Army, Frank
Pace Jr., speaking on behalf of the Department of the Army stated that the modification of
section 403(b) was an applicable and reasonable request. FCDA General Counselor Samuel H.
Sabin, although disagreeing with the Department of the Army in respect to Alaska’s need for
special funding consideration, held similar feelings about making changes to section 403(b).
Although clarification was asked for on the part of Bartlet’s understanding of how the oath
would be administered should the motion to change section 403(b) be approved, no statements of
direct objection were raised.
As the FCDA’s program progressed it became apparent that hypothetical scenarios were
not sufficient for envisioning all possible deterrents for public participation in the FCDA’s
program. A few months after the April hearing to address the funding issues of Alaska, the July
1951 hearing Civil Defense Training School and other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of
1950 presented not only new civilian apprehensions regarding civil defense, but compelling
evidence of public acceptance and support for the educational aspects of the FCDA’s program.
Specifically, Deputy Director of the FCDA, J. J. Wadsworth, pointed out that public land and
buildings are being volunteered to act as potential locations for the construction of training
centers for national, state, and local level officials of civil defense.82 However, Wadsworth
82 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. 6.
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mentioned that it had been observed by the Eastern Conference of State Civil Defense Directors
in February 1951 that the fear of injury in service of civil defense functions was discouraging
people from volunteering for the nation’s Civil Defense Corps. To address this issue, Wadsworth
advised that incentives such as insurance protection would provide the proper kind of personal
protection needed to increase volunteer numbers. Still, despite ongoing attempts to placate the
public fear through education and incentives, the issue of civilian willingness to participate in
civil defense on the grounds of injury continued to resurface.
The situation grew worse following the detonation of the H-bomb, which not only
brought a new level of weapon destruction into the public imagination, but seemingly negated
any civilian preparations taken up to this point to defend themselves in an attack. Protest
movements against nuclear armament challenged the further advance of civil defense techniques
and despite threats of jail time and fines there continued to be scattered resistance. Repeating the
opinion of his predecessors FCDA Director Val Peterson likewise made it clear that, “Panic – not
the A bomb – may be the easiest way to win a battle, the cheapest way to win a war”.83 The
problem of societal breakdown through panic was again a serious consideration. The increased
militarization rhetoric of civil defense added to public discontent. One of pacifist Dorothy Day’s
pamphlet’s, distributed on the day Operation Alert (1954) was scheduled, reads, “We will not
obey this order to pretend, to evacuate, to hide… We know this drill to be a military act in a cold
war to instill fear, to prepare the collective mind for war”.84 In his statement to the Senate during
the 1956 hearing Civil Defense for National Survival Congressman Chet Holifield announced on
page 1 that the national opinion on civil defense had become one that envisioned civilian
83 Garrison, Dee. “Our Skirts Gave Them Courage: The Civil Defense Protest Movement in New York City, 1955-1961”. Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945 – 1960. Ed. Joanne Meyerowitz. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. 205.84 Garrison, Dee. “Our Skirts Gave Them Courage: The Civil Defense Protest Movement in New York City, 1955-1961”. Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945 – 1960. 207.
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preparedness as pointless. He went on to say that his own opinion on the possibility to defend
against modern weapons was suspect, but if there were techniques which would benefit the
public both morally and physically they should be known throughout the country and applied.
Public disconnect from the higher levels of civil defense leadership proved to be an
obstacle of public participation in civil defense from early on in the FCDA’s operation. Even
prior to the official approval of the Civil Defense Act and the beginning of FCDA operations,
statements given during the hearing on the bill likewise expressed concerns for the top – down
approach by which the Federal Government would handle civil defense. Richard Graves, the
Executive Director of the League of California Cities, raised the issue of local governments
receiving second hand information and contacts to the FCDA from their State Government.85 By
his reasoning this practice would result in the timely dissemination of information which would
ultimately mean that the lower levels of government would constantly be out of touch with new
data, research and civil defense policy updates. In actuality the gap between local communities
and the leadership of the civil defense program brought on a more immediate public concern for
the “actual” importance and necessity of civilian mobilization. It was less than a year after Civil
Defense Training School and other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950 when the
hearing titled Civil Defense Program was held to discuss whether or not a national civil defense
program was justifiable and by extension if the Public Law 920 should be repealed. To bolster
his argument regarding the lack of public pronouncements from Congress and the Department of
Defense in support of civil defense contributing to poor public acceptance of civil defense
responsibilities, FCDA Administrator Caldwell noted that the public felt that there was no
universal consent in the government regarding their need to act. Despite the statement of Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense, in which
85 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 19.
53
he noted the ways in which the Department was bringing civilians into activities which bridged
the gap between military and civil defense, such as the Civil Air Patrol and the operation of the
air raid warning system, Caldwell remained unconvinced of their effort. Citing an article from
the Memphis Commercial Appeal which wrote, “The people are told of their danger by second-
string officials and not by their highest and more responsible defense leadership… If Russia is as
well armed as is now claimed, the matter is one of such gravity as to call for a solemn
pronouncement of civil defense needs for preparatory action reaching from the highest levels of
government to those of even smaller cities and communities”, Caldwell argued that if the
government wanted civil defense to be effective it must demonstrate this effectiveness within
itself first and commit to the cause of the civil defense program.86 Otherwise, such views would
continue to dissolve the tenuous hold civil defense had on the American public.
Greatly shaken by the reported lack of public interest, the representatives at the
September 1951 hearing Civil Defense Program attempted to legitimize the continuation of the
program by explaining why there had not been a greater surge of public interest in civil defense.
It was the argument of Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman of the Preparedness Task Force, that
the civil defense program was on par with the need for a strong military force but was not being
promoted to the same extent on the part of both Congress and the Department of Defense. As a
result of this contradiction, the public believed that there was a lack of leadership in the civil
defense program and no clear program objectives.87 The argument in favor of greater
congressional and federal support was used to great effect in the years leading up to the
Eisenhower’s 1958 Reorganization Plan. In the 1955 hearing To Amend Further The Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, As Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of
86 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Program. 12.87 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Program. 2.
54
Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes) Director of New York State Civil Defense,
Lieutenant General Clarence Huebner, was quoted as having been of the opinion that bills H. R.
4660 and H. R. 7227 should be approved since they would disprove any notion of the Federal
Government’s awareness for the needs of the people.88 Foreshadowing the 1958 hearings for the
Reorganization Plan the subject of direct communication between the higher levels of the
government and the State level government came into play as Civil Defense Director of Boston,
MA, Joseph Malone, made his statement in favor of the bills, thanking the Senate for giving him
an opportunity to speak. As the president of the United States Civil Defense Council, Malone
expounded that the organization had over 400 members, yet the standard procedure which allows
his agency to voice their concerns has handled through FCDA officials rather than through any
higher legislative body such as the Senate.89 Hinting at the desire to be heard by more powerful
leadership, Malone was inadvertently expressing the concern of many Americans – if civil
defense is of such importance why is it not more closely tied to more powerful bodies? With the
occurrence of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 this question was answered. By investing in the
President the power to oversee, coordinate and delegate civil defense functions through the
ODCM, the need for centralized leadership was met for the purposes of, “providing unified
guidance and assistance to the State and local government”90, and improving relationships with
officials of State and local government91. From there it was the hope that the public would
88 United States. Cong. House. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. To Amend Further the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, As Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes). 84th Cong., 1st sess. Washington: GPO, 1955. 21.89 United States. Cong. House. To Amend Further the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, As Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes). 30.90 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 322.91 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 334.
55
recognize the strong leadership given to the civil defense program, and thus would reinvest in
mobilization efforts for national security.
The Civil Defense Education of America
Above all else education was considered the most important function of the civil defense
program, and it was on the success of this undertaking which would ultimately prove or discredit
the actions of the FCDA, as well as the effectiveness of the department’s infrastructure as
outlined within the Civil Defense Act. Regardless of the eventual overlap in operations resulting
in the merger of the FCDA and the Office of Defense Mobilization to form the OCDM, the
public acceptance and willingness to take action against an ever present threat would determine
whether there was a need for, or even an ability to continue, civil defense as a component of
American’s national deterrence policy.
From the hearings for the Civil Defense Act in 1950 through the creation of the OCDM
in 1958, the educational functions of the FCDA remained central components of the purpose.
The NSRB’s study of “the sociological problems of civil defense from the field of morale”,
submitted mere months prior to the beginning of FCDA operations, stressed the forthcoming
agency’s need to provide Americans with enough information that they would be able to
comprehend the danger but not be overwhelmed. It was the goal of any agency created to serve
the purpose of civil defense as outlined in all stages of the Civil Defense Act (including the
official Public Law 920 as well as the bill S. 4219) to prepare the civilian population for the
event of an attack. S. 4219 clearly stated in Section 2 that the FCDA would be responsible for
spreading methods for meetings enemy attacks developed via scientific research, with specific
mention in Section 4(e) that the proposed method for accomplishing this task is within the
56
authorization of the Administrator to, “conduct or arrange, by contract or otherwise, for training
programs for the instruction of civil defense officials and other persons in the organization,
operation, and techniques of civil defense; conduct or operate schools or classes,… and provide
instructors and training aids as deemed necessary.”92 Within Public Law 920 this authority is
written the same word-for-word, but with the added stipulation in Section 201(e) that there can
only ever exist one national civil defense college and three civil defense technical training
schools at a time. Section 201(e) clearly states that in times of peace the Administrator should
focus on training programs, public awareness campaigns to spread familiarity with the nature of
atomic attacks, and providing them with the materials and skills they would need to survive a
nuclear threat upon their lives. In comparison to S. 4219, Public Law 920 even goes one step
further by including as part of the very definition of “civil defense” within Section 3(b), the
necessity for the “establishment of appropriate organizations,… [and] the recruitment and
training of personnel”. Throughout its existence, the FCDA used its plans and accomplishments
in the area of public education regarding civilian preparedness to promote the value of the
Administration and the necessity of civil defense.
By July of 1951 the proposition for Congressional approval of civil defense schools came
before the Senate as the FCDA sought to relate its timelessness to that of the permanent nature of
the military establishment, the incorporation of new scientific data into its educational program,
and the public acceptance of the civil defense program despite lower than expected enrollment in
the United States Civil Defense Corps. In order to convey the scale of the FCDA’s educational
program and their desire to make use of their authority as allowed by Public Law 920, FCDA
Deputy Administrator Wadsworth sought to present the establishment of a permanent civil
defense college as a means to disseminate survival methods and techniques to not only civilians,
92 United States. Cong. Senate. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 2.
57
but to civil defense trainers, directors and even federal employees of other agencies. Quite
simply, the education of anyone remotely involved with civil defense activities could benefit
from such training facilities.
Dividing the two types of learning organizations by the students they would produce, the
FCDA sought to systematize their education agenda, thus presenting an effective and efficient
teaching agenda. The “staff college” would seek to teach those who would be leading civil
defense operations on a national level, as well as within State and local community governments.
Listed on page 3 of Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense
Act of 1950, the groups who would be catered to by the college’s curriculum would be State
directors of civil defense, deputy State directors, mutual aid coordinators, mayors and city
managers, city engineers, police and fire chiefs, plant protection directors, religious and social
workers, liaison personnel with national social societies and associations, department store and
business building civil defense officers, as well as, “Others who carry significant administrative
and operational responsibilities in civil defense”.93 Training centers, on the other hand, were
meant to educate the local instructors and volunteer workers so that they would be capable of
going into their respective social groups and passing along their knowledge. Training centers
were to be the technical schools of the civil defense program, while the college would be the
center for teaching critical decision making and situational analysis simultaneously over large
areas and numerous communities.
In each case it was the hope of the FCDA that the students would take what knowledge
they had acquired and use it to organize civil defense efforts in their respective communities,
businesses, services or organizations. Given time it would hopefully come to pass that the natural
93 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense Training School and Other Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950. 3.
58
dissemination of information gained through research would prompt community minded
Americans to mobilize the nation through group mentality and participation in local government.
Thus, civil defense education would unify the country toward national security by catering to the
American image of patriotism and offering scientifically gained knowledge that could be applied
to the public and private life of all citizens. The execution of this goal would prove to be
problematic however.
Films, comics, pamphlets, radio announcements and other forms of popular media were
utilized to shape the public response to the possibility of an attack as well as to rehearse what
each member of society should do in an actual attack. As discussed in chapter 4 “How Civil
Defense Imagines America”, the message within these materials served to both enforce widely
held perceptions of American identity while building upon “common sense” and the desire to
live take preemptive actions against the anxiety of bomb threats and mass vulnerability.
However, the effectiveness and implementation of these publications is not well documented,
leading one to question the impact they had upon the population. If there was such a desire
within the public to be offered activities which would ease their bubbling panic and sense of
helplessness, the FCDA was clearly not offering them the right information or the means through
which they would learn about that information. After all, a book must be read, a radio
announcement or speech must be heard, and a film must be watched. If these senses were not
being saturated to the point that they were noticeably instigating public change, then there was
the possibility that the public was either not interested in what the FCDA had to offer or they
were not convinced in the message of protection within the civil defense agenda. In either
scenario, the FCDA had apparently not made the right decisions in enacting their public
outreach. Within the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, the language on page 322 suggests that
59
the very design of the FCDA failed to properly lead the public to the conclusion that civil
defense was important, and that not all of the public civil defense responsibilities as envisioned
in Public Law 920 were realistic.
Within the transcripts of congressional hearings, evidence of conflicts regarding the
FCDA’s need of more funding, better equipment and stronger support pertaining to their mission
to shift American perception through reeducation surface frequently. The 1955 hearing To
Amend Further the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as Amended
offers evidence on page 10 that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the
FCDA did not have a smooth system balancing who would have supervisory roles with regard to
the distribution of surplus equipment for the purpose of educational programs. The FCDA’s
vocal opposition of congressional favoring for military expenditure over civil defense is evident
throughout 1951 in the Subcommittee Hearings on S. 1244, To Amend the Federal Civil Defense
Act of 1950, Relating to the Territory of Alaska, and in Civil Defense Training School and Other
Amendments to the Civil Defense Act of 1950, as well as the hearing Civil Defense Program. In
1955 the issue of military favoritism was again raised within To Amend Further the Federal
property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as Amended (To Authorize the Disposal of
Surplus Property for Civil Defense Purposes) and in 1956 within the hearing titled Civil Defense
for National Survival.
In a similar vein, at the same time that the FCDA and the Department of Defense vied for
funding, they also raised the issue of outspoken support and the need of interdepartmental
contributions whether it was physical resources, information or services deemed necessary to the
civil defense agenda, or simply outspoken support. The latter was particularly sought after since
it was necessary to convince the public that civil defense was not merely the pursuit of one lone
60
federal agency, but was recognized as of paramount importance by the entirety of the
government. While the FCDA’s sense of alienation and abandonment was appeased to a great
degree following 1955, the greater involvement of the Department of Defense began to the
struggle of power over who would carry out the functions of the FCDA. Not merely interested in
offering public acknowledgement of the need for civil defense, representatives of the military
establishment at the hearings regarding the FCDA and Public Law 920 questioned the nature of
civil defense and whether it should be a military undertaking rather than a project by an
independent agency. As I have discussed on page 38, the replacement of the term “civil defense”
with “nonmilitary defense” in 1956 leant the belief in a more militarized approach to education
on national preparation for a nuclear attack. As Dr. Libby pointed out in the 1956 hearing, the
information and training program may exist within the FCDA, but it is his professional opinion
based on observation that there is little knowledge that has been so ingrained in people that they
will be able to carry out the FCDA recommended actions under the stressful and terrifying
experience of a nuclear attack.94 It is no coincidence that further down in the transcript on page
93 there is talk of “coordinating” civil defense efforts, by that the adoption of regimented
military-like training of civilians. At the same time the possibility of implementing martial law
also appears on page 96 as a way the public might be given the disciplined training they would
need in order to be properly prepared in survival techniques for the immense shock of an atomic
attack.
It was during this meeting that the idea of “nonmilitary defense” was also introduced, in
which education would still play a role, but the subject matter would be very different from that
offered by the FCDA. While the FCDA supplied the public with knowledge about the effects of
an atomic attack, their information was continually out of date and had no immediate purpose
94 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense for National Survival. 47.
61
other than to serve as a justification for why civilians should prepare evacuation routes and build
shelters. Nonmilitary defense, on the other hand, would provide civilians with active roles which
they could perform on a daily basis. Examples given by Dr. Berkner included participating in
such jobs as working for the Civil Air Patrol or producing goods for military consumption.
Although the conclusion of the committee did not officially take a stance in favor or against
coordination of military and civil defense the ideas would remain, and eventually become
realized in Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. During the lifetime of the FCDA there would
never be a solution to address the need for internalizing nuclear attack response activities in any
other way besides the far removed and scattered city and town drills.
At the same time that the degree of military versus civilian involvement in national
defense in the latter half of the 1950s was coming to a head, the AEC remained highly active in
its role as researcher into the effects and counter measures against weapons of mass destruction.
Educational efforts of the FCDA also found their way into the AEC-FCDA test program. In
defense of the FCDA’s outreach efforts during the 7 years of its existence, FCDA Director of
Test Operations Edward Saunders claimed that all FCDA projects in conjunction with the AEC
had not only been undertaken with the intent of producing new data and results than previous
tests, as was the concern of the Senate with regard to overlapping civil defense functions
between agencies, but the tests had served as educational opportunities. According to Saunders
the tests served to offer practical defense experience for specialists, local officials, as well as
federal and state civil defense officials.95 There was even a “test information program” which the
FCDA established so that the AEC would be able to educate the public on the effects of nuclear
weapons.
95 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 100.
62
Here in lay the problem with the FCDA’s educational undertakings, and thereby all other
civil defense functions. Throughout its existence the FCDA conducted and sponsored many field
and laboratory tests in order to study the effects of nuclear blasts, but it lacked any form of
productive output for this information. Despite the many comics, films, manuals and pamphlets
that it produced, the speed of scientific developments outpaced the agency’s ability to acquire
information, reword or declassify it, and then disseminate any relevant defense methods
throughout the public. What information it had accumulated was so scattered that it was
incredibly difficult to discern any kind of relevant data by which to enlighten the public. Its
training centers and staff college were not heavily used as was evident from testimony given at
the hearings, and neither was there anything other than a scattering interest in making the major
investments necessary for shelter construction and equipment purchasing.
Despite the acknowledged necessity of civil defense by the Senate, Congress, President
Truman, President Eisenhower, and the many representatives present at the hearings regarding
the agency produced to enforce the mandates of Public Law 920, limitations in funding,
organizational structure and varying public interest were far to crippling for the FCDA to achieve
any significant form of public change. As William Finan, the Bureau of the Budget’s Assistant
Director for Management and Organization, put it in 1958, “The States and localities, which, in
the final analysis, must make a most important contribution to our preparedness effort,…
suffered from a lack of clear and uniform guidance from the Federal Government”.96 Overlap in
actions and responsibilities between the AEC, the Department of Defense, and various other
agencies, all for the purpose of teaching the public how to cope emotionally and physically in the
event of an atomic attack proved to be the downfall of the FCDA.
96 United States. Cong. House. Civil Defense: Part 1 – Atomic Shelter Tests, Part 2 – Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. 326.
63
As an early attempt at bringing public participation into the arena of national policy it
was an overly idealistic undertaking. The belief that, through education on threats and methods
of preparation, the general public would adapt and conform to their role as protectors of the
nation was not entirely unrealistic. The NSRB, the Office of Civil Defense Planning, and the
Civil Defense Board were all organization which had witnessed a great interest in civil defense
and nuclear deterrence, but the indefinite nature of the FCDA’s decentralized campaign to quell
public emotions and direct their attention to productive outlets of defense had lacked direction
from the beginning.
So it came to pass that the ODCM consolidated the FCDA and the Office of mobilization
in an attempt to salvage its deterrence policy. What remained of the Civil Defense Act pertained
now to the emergency abilities of the President who, like the Administrator of the FCDA, could
now enact any of the emergency procedures for meeting the aftermath of an attack. However, the
time for the push for a grass-roots civilian mobilization and emergency preparation as had been
outlined in Public Law 920 had passed. In its place would be the ODCM and its directives to
protect the productivity of the United States so that the people could feasibly “win” the war
instead of simply hide from it.
ConclusionAs an early attempt at molding the domestic response to what was perceived as a time of
national threat from external and internal forces, Public Law 920 sought to outline a program and
create an agency that could address this rapidly growing state of emergency. Although it was
based on the ideals of commonly held public willingness to protect values of freedom from being
extinguished and to preserve the country which allowed them these freedoms, it was clear by
1958 that the American public was not willing to position itself in a state of constant readiness.
64
Within the hearings regarding Public Law 920 and the FCDA this was attributed to a lack of
administrative organization, misuse of information for educational purposes not to mention the
sheer volume of scientific data that the FCDA was expected to incorporate. Lastly there was the
unfortunate failure of the government to convince the public that civil defense was best solution
to preparing for the “acceptable” sacrifices that could result before and after an atomic attack. In
short, the fear had been realized that civilian mobilization could not be carried out by the people
with guidance offered the government. Civil defense as an independent part of the nation’s
deterrence policy was not feasible. As such, the replacement agency of the FCDA would attempt
this again within the Executive Office of the President where the president himself overseeing
the responsibilities previously held by the FCDA Administrator. With such a powerful,
respected, symbolic and visible person touting the importance of civil defense, or as it would be
now referred to as “nonmilitary defense”, it was the hope that civilian participation in national
security would be more forthcoming.
Although representatives at the hearings regarding the Civil Defense Act and the FCDA
consistently vocalize their belief that the people not only want leadership through educational
programs in order to arm brace themselves for attacks, the response to these training efforts is
not discussed at length. The emphasis is always on new methods or ways to improve existing
training programs, such as the AEC offering more speeches on fallout or more funds being
allocated to the FCDA for the purpose of strengthening their training centers. This attitude of “if
we do more we will be more successful” did not work in the FCDA’s favor. Without ingrained
practice, civilians would be incapable of action when faced with an actual attack. The switch of
wording and alteration of function from “civil defense” to “nonmilitary defense” within the
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 sought to offer a more militarized outlet for civilian
65
participation, thus offering them the training which would by necessity become second nature in
a crisis scenario. In theory, the public would not be abandoned as the deterrence policy moved
away from a dual approach of civilian mobilization and military defense. Rather the public
would become an even stronger source of support for the military aspects of national security.
While not on exactly equal footing on par with the Department of Defense, as the FCDA had
attempted, the new OCDM would “coordinate” with them in a way similar to the discussion of
“coordination” within the 1956 hearing Civil Defense for National Survival.
In trying to marry the scientific research of civil defense, use the materials and services of
other agencies, and mold American perception of duty to community and national security
through a massive educational campaign the FCDA attempted and ultimately failed to instigate
the civilian mobilization revolution they had hoped for. It did, however, pose as an interesting
experiment into the manipulation of public perception, and offered conclusive evidence that a
decentralized civil defense program would not garner satisfactory results over an extended period
of time. Had an actual attack occurred during the years between 1950 and 1958 it is impossible
to say whether or not the public would have been properly prepared to duck and cover, or if they
would have been able to experience the short period of reconstruction they were promised in
FCDA publications and announcements. However, through the limited public response, as well
as the many issues surrounding information use in educational outreach, the chaotic distribution
of civil defense functions throughout the levels of government, and the belief that the entire
undertaking lacked clear goals and leadership, nearly the entirety of the Civil Defense Act of
1950 had to be reexamined. As it stood, neither Public Law 920 nor the acting departments
carrying out its objectives were effective within the nation’s deterrence policy. The product of
the Reorganization Act of 1958, the OCDM, sought to address the need for a more centralized
66
civil defense program that would not rely so heavily upon civilians undertaking the initiative for
their own, and the nation’s, protection. The OCDM would in theory flourish in the ways the
FCDA had failed. It would give the American people high-profile leadership which would
inspire them to relearn what they believed they knew about their safety, and it would give them
the means to offer them preemptive activities for their own good. The OCDM would take away
the individual agency offered to the public under the FCDA and, while technically offering direct
contact with powerful supervisors, it would at the same time distance civilians from the
administration of the American security policy. But this was judged to be an acceptable public
sacrifice for national security, and it was one that the people were willing to make.
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