save the rhinos
Post on 08-Apr-2016
227 Views
Preview:
DESCRIPTION
TRANSCRIPT
The Rhino Facing Extinction
Game Theory
Instructor: David McAdams
February 24, 2014
Brett Farley
Andrei Horga
Reza Logday
Tina Retief
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
The Plea for Help:Dear Game Theory strategists,
I am in a life threatening position and I would like to call on you for help to ensure my and my
family’s survival. I am one of 20 000 rhinos left in the world, with poaching rates exceeding
birth rates my kind are on the brink of extinction (Stoddard, 2014). In 2013 alone 1000+ rhinos
were poached, which is a 50% increase on 2012’s figures, and the highest in modern history
(Stoddard, 2014), as shown below.
Figure 1: Rhinos poached in South Africa 2000- 2013. South African Department of Environmental Affairs. Retrieved from
http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/poaching_statistics
Page 2 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
I find myself in South Africa, which is home to 73% of the world’s rhinos with poachers
flocking here to obtain our precious horn. Sixty-five percent of rhino kills are in South Africa,
with the poaching network stretching internationally (Affairs, 2014). Our horns are being
exported to Vietnam and Chinese markets where they are irrationally perceived as status symbols
or used as party drugs, aphrodisiac or as a treatment against cancer (Guildford, 2013). I just
don’t understand it as my horn is made of keratin, the same material human nails and hair is
made of (Ellis, 2014). Can’t they rather just grind and use their nail clippings for their health
tonics instead of killing my friends and I for a little bit of Keratin? My elephant brothers also
struggled with this problem, but fortunately they shook them off as Ivory become uncool. When
is it my turn to be uncool?
The poachers have become increasingly competent at tracking us down using night vision
goggles, high-powered weapons, dart guns and helicopters operating in gangs. What sort of a
chance do we stand with just four legs? Even some of the farmers are cutting off our horns to
prevent us from being shot, or selling us as our security is breaking the bank and poses a risk to
their family’s safety (Sharife, 2013).
Admittedly it seems it is a lucrative possession to have with my 2 kilogram (4.4lbs) horn
reaching $120 000 ($60 000/kg). In Vietnam Rhino horn prices reach between $33 and $133 per
gram, which is double the price of gold and higher than the cost of cocaine (Guildford, 2013).
There is talk of several options, including conservation authorities and private landowners set up
anti-poaching units armed with latest weapons and drones to stop the trade. My concern is as
imminent as tomorrow as I might not be able to stick around to find solution. Thus I am in
desperate need of your help game theorists to act fast to find solutions to save my family and I.
Fondest from the green pastures of the Kruger National Park,
Rex The Rhino
Page 3 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Several Popular Solutions ConsideredWe have considered many different options to save Rex the Rhino. The following section
describes solutions that we considered and discarded, as they were not optimal in combating the
poaching epidemic. Our optimal solution is described at the end.
Trade EmbargoA trade embargo with the countries that are identified as being the main culprits (Vietnam and
China) was considered as a way to punish these countries and force their governments into action
to stop the trade of Rhino horn. The problem with this solution is that often the governments
have no control of the poachers and illegal traders and are therefore almost powerless to stop it.
There is also massive underlying corruption in many of these governments that extends far
beyond the trade of Rhino horn and so asking these governments to solve one problem of this
sort would be almost impossible. In addition these countries are often significant trade partners
and so it would far too much of a financial sacrifice in many instances to have a trade embargo
with these countries and the trade embargo would only hurt the legitimate businesses while the
black market businesses will continue to thrive.
In our solution we had to weigh the conservation of an endangered species against the significant
financial implications that a trade embargo would have and decided that it would not be feasible
to implement a unilateral trade embargo.
Page 4 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
PoisonAnother option that was seriously considered was to poison the horn of the all Rhinos. This
would mean that poison would be injected into these horns and that the consumption of this horn
would result in the person either becoming ill or dying. This is already done at a small scale level
(Tafline, 2013).
This was a drastic proposition and the hope was that once people start realizing that these horns
could potentially kill them, they would stop demanding them and this would drive the prices
down and make it unattractive for the poachers.
The problem with this solution was that the majority of Rhino horns would have to be poisoned
for this solution to work and this would be almost impossible logistically as this poison would
have to be injected on a regular basis. If the poachers felt that there was still a reasonable chance
of getting an unpoisoned horn, they would keep poaching. Another reason with this is that the
people who would suffer would be the ignorant consumers rather than the poachers. These
consumers are already paying a lot of money for something that has no health benefits and will
not potentially die when they consume it, all while the poacher still gets paid. We felt that while
the conservation of Rhinos is very important, it would not be correct to advocate for a solution
that takes human lives to save the lives of Rhinos.
Improved Security and ConservationSixty-five percent of the world’s rhino population, and 60% of all the rhinos poached yearly are
in Kruger National Park (“Helping Rhinos,” 2014) . Kruger has lost 50% of its Rhinos since
2010. This is ground zero for conservation, and this is where the war on poaching will be won or
lost.
Seventy percent of rhino killings in South Africa can be attributed to Mozambiquans. With a
long, porous border between South Africa and Mozambique, and 7580 square miles to patrol,
there is simply not enough manpower available to secure the rhinos.
Page 5 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
There are “multiple incursions of up to 15 heavily armed poaching groups in Kruger at any given
time”, who shoot at park rangers on sight (Carnie, 2014a). Many of these poachers are ex-
Mozambiquan militiamen, trained in their previous civil war. During a full moon, up to 60
poaching groups are in the park (“Posts about Kruger National Park on Fight for Rhinos,” 2014).
The rhino war is getting bloodier and bloodier in these battlefields, with an estimated 300
Mozambiquan poachers (who make up 70% of the poachers) killed in Kruger since 2008 (“Posts
about Kruger National Park on Fight for Rhinos,” 2014).
The SA government has deployed 262 troops and 1 helicopter to patrol Kruger national park, and
has even deployed an unarmed drone (Laing, 2013). The problem is that there is simply too
much area to cover for this group of park rangers and military. It does not help that the border
with Mozambique is porous, and that rangers and South African military men cannot cross the
border in pursuit of suspects. Many times, cases against poachers must be dropped as the
evidence is mysteriously lost (as syndicates bribe officials).
As shown below, arrests are increasing every year, but this does not deter poachers, many of who
are promised enormous sums of money (relative to their living situation) for a Rhino horn.
Page 6 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Figure 2: Number of rhino poaching arrests in South Africa, 2010-2013. South African Department of Environmental Affairs.
Retrieved from http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/poaching_statistics
We have considered deploying more drones to the area, but as a drone only has 90 minutes of
fly/surveillance time, this is not practical. Increasing security at Kruger could help, but it is still a
massive space, and with only 262 troops protecting rhinos against up to 60 poaching groups that
shoot to kill, this will only increase the bloodshed. Most likely the poachers will simply move to
a less secure park if security is increased at Kruger. As long as it’s profitable to them, the will
continue to hunt, so this solution is not optimal.
Increased penalties will have the same effect. While it might deter a few, if you are promised
more than a year’s salary as a poor farmer, would you still poach rhinos? The answer is yes, as it
is simply too lucrative to poach.
Page 7 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Ship Rhinos to AustraliaSeveral drastic options were considered to save the rhino, which include transporting some
animals to alternative locations for safeguarding. South Africa, which has 73% of the world’s
rhino population, struggles to monitor and protect the current rhino population and therefore
suggests an alternative home as contingency plan. Australia is included as an suggested
alternative home, to prevent their extinction and the country’s ability to guard them and lower
likelihood of bribery and corruption of guarding officials in Australia (Carnie, 2014b).
While we feel this could work on a small scale, the Rhinos remaining in Africa would still get
poached, perhaps at an ever greater rate, as there is less supply easily available, which could
push prices up, making the Rhino horn even more profitable for crime syndicates. This could be
a safeguard against extinction, but it would not solve our poaching problem.
CounterfeitThe idea would be to create and flood the market with fake Rhino horns with the intention of
reducing the price of Rhino horns and therefore the incentive to poach Rhinos. The proportion of
counterfeits needs to be just enough to creating doubt in consumers’ minds about the market. For
some, counterfeits may still provide the placebo effect and may satisfy those wanting to impress
colleagues through a status symbol.
This approach has its merits, but time is running out and the R&D required to create credible
fakes would take some time. Although this would provide some funding to continue R&D, there
would be a continuous race against improving detection technologies by the better-funded
syndicate networks. The syndicates would potentially be incentivized to create and support
testing labs, which would add to the cost of “certified” Rhino horns, and this would circumvent
the fake horns, much like DeBeers is doing with their support of artificial diamond detection
machinery.
Page 8 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Selected Solution – Legalization, Dehorning, and Farming
LegalizationLegalization seems to be a good solution to the dilemma, as it would allow us to cater to the
needs of irrational consumers who truly believe that these Rhino horns will provide them with
health benefits. If we assume that it would be very difficult to eradicate this mentality from the
consumers of Rhino horn, then this may be the best strategy. If we cannot eradicate this
consumer mentality then it means that there will always be demand that will need to be fulfilled
and the best way would be to make it unattractive financially to poachers, who are responsible
for the majority of Rhino deaths.
Removing horn from a Rhino to sell does not mean that the Rhino has to be killed. It could
simply be a similar sort of case to that of sheep that are sheared for their wool whenever it has
grown back. By legalizing and regulating the market for Rhino horn, legitimate businesses will
enter the market and these businesses will adhere to the regulations and through farming and
other sources will increase supply and this will drive prices down and there will be less incentive
to poach Rhino horn.
The problem with this approach is largely that we would be advocating the consumption of
Rhino horn, which would almost give it a stamp of approval in some consumers eyes and this
may result in the consumption increasing dramatically. However as long as this demand is
catered for be legitimate supply, then this should not be a problem. The other issue would be that
we would continue to sit by while consumers waste their money on something that has been
scientifically proven to have no health properties, but the aim is to save the lives of the
endangered Rhino species and as said this solution would more than likely be the best suited if
we are dealing with a market of consumers whose mentality cannot be changed.
Page 9 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
De-horningDe-horning has been heralded as a solution to the poaching dilemma. If Rhinos were to be
legally dehorned, poachers would have no incentive to kill them, and demand could be met via a
renewable supply. Namibia was the first to dehorn Rhinos legally, in 1989. This proved to be
successful, as not a single dehorned rhino was poached (“De-horning,” 2014).
However, this raises a few concerns. Firstly, Rhinos use their horns for mating rituals. Dehorning
increases infant mortality as mothers are less able to protect them from predators, however it
reduces mortality from adult fight (Berger & Cunningham, 1994). A hornless Rhino could be at
evolutionary risk.
Secondly, dehorned Rhinos are still killed. This could be because the poacher doesn’t want to
track the same (economically) valueless Rhino again. Or it could be out of vengeance, to display
to the park rangers that they will not stop killing if they de-horn (“De-horning,” 2014).
There are significant challenges of trying to reach 100% dehorning of Rhinos. Not only is it
expensive and time consuming, at $1,000 per Rhino, but also not all Rhinos can be tranquilized,
such as the very young or pregnant Rhinos. Some will be able to hide. This now makes the
supply of Rhino horn even rarer, and pushes up the price, leading to increased poaching of those
left with horns - young Rhinos and pregnant Rhinos - leading to a dramatic decrease in
population.
Making Rhino horn legal makes it socially acceptable and increases demand. A legal market
enables laundering opportunities and provides cover for illegal trade and may encourage illegal
farming.
Page 10 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
The suggestion of dehorning has been seen as highly controversial by conservation groups and it
will require some convincing to get buy in. Culling of Elephants in Kruger Park was also
controversial when it was started. As they have no natural predators, culling was used to keep
their numbers under control and prevent habitat destruction and is beginning to be accepted by
the public.
FarmingSpeaking to increased supply farming is a natural choice, but is proving to be a difficult option.
Through rearing animals on a program with numbers as a key output the extinction of the animal
can be managed to an extent. In nature rhinos age until an average of 35 - 40 years, with females
beginning breeding at 4 years old, but males only sexually mature at 9 years old. The gap
between calves is however 3 to 4 years, which can make breeding under monitored environments
possible, with gestation taking 16 to 18 months. These factors highlight the difficulty of natural
reproduction.
A suggested solution would be for mature rhinos to be taken into captivity for farming purposes
and producing offspring and released into the wild. Through marking females breeding can take
place every three to four years constantly yielding new rhinos in an attempt for breeding rates to
exceed poaching rates.
Page 11 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Flood MarketAnother method that can be used to control supply, and thus customer price, is flooding the
market with stockpiled rhino horns. South Africa alone has 16,000 tons of stockpiled horn
(Mead, 2013). The thinking here is that if we flood the market with supply, price will drop
significantly, and every player in the illegal supply chain will have less of an incentive to do their
part - as it is not as profitable, thus poaching would be reduced.
This method has been attempted before. In 1997 and 2008, elephant ivory was auctioned legally,
China and Japan colluded before the auction to keep prices low and short change the selling
countries. Once the Chinese government acquired the elephant horn, they did not flood the
market to lower prices but instead kept supply limited, charging high prices, and in effect
competing with the illegal crime syndicates (Revkin, 2012). This actually caused prices to
double and caused poaching of elephants to be increased by three times as they were more
lucrative and profitable. A legal distribution system would be required to get the products
directly into the hands of consumers and avoid this problem.
The long-term effect of flooding the market set a bad precedent; implicitly approving of rhino
horn usage in Asia and encouraging more Chinese and Vietnamese may buy horn. This is also
true if indeed the prices do manage to go down, as more people can financially access the horn.
Flooding the market with no legalized, trusted, distribution system will therefore not work.
However, if there was some sort of legalized, monopolized control, flooding the market could
indeed keep the price down, and possibly discourage the illegal poaching of Rhinos. This, in
addition to a customer education campaign, could decrease both supply and demand side
pressures on rhino horn.
Page 12 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Monopoly (DeBeers Model)The cartelization option requires legalization, but differs from the option to flood the market as it
attempts to control the market and increase the price to reduce demand. The market would be
modeled on DeBeers in that Rhino horn would only be sold legally through a centralized selling
organization who controls distribution channels and supply levels. In the long term, high costs
may encourage the Vietnamese government and others to step in and help spread the message.
Until then, Southern Africa could ride the wave until the bubble bursts.
This option would be financially beneficial to farmers and the National Parks as a whole. It costs
$2,000 to tranquilize and dehorn a Rhino and the horn can be sold for $120,000 or more. Horns
regrow fully every 2 years, but may need to be done more frequently to reduce poaching risks to
Rhinos with valuable part-grown horns. Revenue could be used for:
Registration, monitoring, policing, stockpile security and monopoly control
Conservation and anti-poaching efforts
Community health and education (with clear messages of funding source)
The monopoly approach can only be effective if it has complete control of the supply. All Rhinos
therefore need to be dehorned to avoid poacher efforts being redirected to those with horns. By
focusing efforts on dehorning all rhinos quickly, the monopoly will effectively make the first
move, sending a strong and highly observable signal to the poachers that the game has changed.
To maintain credibility and highlight its irreversibility, the dehorning process needs to continue
uninterrupted for a long period of time (decades).
Tourism is likely to be negatively affected; however there will be a large increase in awareness
and publicity with Rhinos dehorned on this scale. Some people may unfortunately profit from
stockpiled Rhino horns previously sourced illegally.
Page 13 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Education and PRRhino horn is made of a hard material, mostly keratin much like fingernails and human hair, with
the perception of great medicinal benefits. Through education and solid public relation work the
user can be educated and break down the information cascade, which they are a victim of. This
misperception costs users serious heavily and causes unnecessary death of rhinos. Through
simple perception change and educating consumers the perception change can have physical
impact affecting the information asymmetry. Education and effective public relations campaigns
can be used to educate the user indicating a lack of benefit and can therefore impact use of the
horn.
Education in terms of scientific testing can be done using a placebo controlled test and prove the
inefficiency of the products. This should be widely publicized and featured to spread the words.
Insinuation can be created the poachers robbing people selling them Keratin, and charging in
excess of the price of gold.
The following techniques are recommended to change the perception:
Emotional pictures of rhino casualties and harm done to rhinos removing the horn, such
as the one below.
Page 14 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Figure 3: An illegally dehorned Rhino. Source unknown.
An educational smear campaign can be used which bad mouths rhino horn buyers.
Stigmas can also be associated implying damaging future generations with bad karma of
rhino horn buyers or users. Vietnam being the biggest user of the product the campaign
should be targeted to this audience, and stigmatize on a property that is important in their
culture. This threat can be helpful in changing the game.
Through educating users the properties of rhino horn alternatives to their ailments can be
discussed. Alternatives, which can be discussed instead: abalone, Viagra, zinc. Instead
of sign of wealth or status symbol luxury goods can be used instead, and through flooding
the market with rapid price decrease rhino horn will lose its value as status symbol.
Page 15 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
By combining the monopoly and education suggestions, Rhino horns could be sold with
packaging similar to that from no-smoking campaigns (pictures of slaughtered rhinos and
educational information about the lack of health benefits) to educate users and reduce demand.
References
Page 16 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Affairs, S. A. D. of E. (2014). Poaching Statistics. South African
Department of Environmental Affairs. Retrieved February 24, 2014,
from http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/poaching_statistics
Berger, J., & Cunningham, C. (1994). Phenotypic Alterations,
Evolutionarily Significant Structures, and Rhino Conservation.
Conservation Biology, 8, 833–840. doi:10.1046/j.1523-
1739.1994.08030833.x
Carnie, T. (2014a). 11 poachers killed in rhino war. IOL. Retrieved
February 24, 2014, from
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/11-poachers-killed-in-
rhino-war-1.1634857#.UwtxKv3HSoU
Carnie, T. (2014b). Plan to ship SA rhinos to Australia. IOL. Retrieved
February 24, 2014, from
http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/science/environment/plan-to-ship-sa-
rhinos-to-australia-1.1648375#.Uwttcf3HSoV
De-horning. (2014). Save The Rhino. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from
http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/issues_for_debate/de-
horning
Page 17 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Ellis, R. (2014). Poaching for Traditional Chinese Medicine. Save The
Rhino. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from
http://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/threats_to_rhino/poachin
g_for_traditional_chinese_medicine
Guildford, G. (2013). Why Does a Rhino Horn Cost $300,000? Because
Vietnam Thinks It Cures Cancer and Hangovers - Gwynn Guilford -
The Atlantic. The Atlantic. Retrieved from
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/05/why-does-
a-rhino-horn-cost-300-000-because-vietnam-thinks-it-cures-cancer-
and-hangovers/275881/
Helping Rhinos. (2014). Game Reserves United. Retrieved February 24,
2014, from http://www.helpingrhinos.org/how-we-help/game-
reserves-united/
Laing, A. (2013). Drones join war on rhino poachers in South Africa. The
Telegraph. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocea
n/southafrica/10082727/Drones-join-war-on-rhino-poachers-in-
South-Africa.html
Page 18 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
Mead, D. (2013). Why South Africa’s Proposed Rhino Horn Auction
Won't Work As Advertised | Motherboard. Vice. Retrieved February
24, 2014, from http://motherboard.vice.com/en_ca/blog/why-
south-africas-proposed-rhino-horn-auction-wont-work-as-
advertised
Posts about Kruger National Park on Fight for Rhinos. (2014). Fight for
Rhinos. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from
http://fightforrhinos.com/tag/kruger-national-park/
Revkin, A. (2012). A Story Exposes How the Chinese Government is
Fueling Elephant Slaughter. New Scientist. Retrieved February 24,
2014, from http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/a-
report-exposes-how-the-chinese-government-is-fueling-elephant-
slaughter/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
Sharife, K. (2013). Is it time to legalise rhino horn trade? Le Monde
Diplomatique. Retrieved February 24, 2014, from
http://mondediplo.com/openpage/is-it-time-to-legalise-rhino-horn-
trade
Stoddard, E. (2014). More than 1,000 rhinos poached in South Africa
last year - Government - Yahoo News. Yahoo News. Retrieved
Page 19 of 20
Game Theory: The Rhino facing extinction
February 24, 2014, from http://news.yahoo.com/more-1-000-
rhinos-poached-south-africa-last-135215268.html
Tafline, L. (2013). South African Game Reserve Poisoned 100 Rhino
Horns to Curtail Poaching. Inhabitat. Retrieved February 24, 2014,
from http://inhabitat.com/south-african-game-reserve-poisoned-
100-rhino-horns-to-curtail-poaching/
Page 20 of 20
top related